FATHER *MALEBRANCHE'S*

TREATISE

CONCERNING

The Search after Truth.

THE WHOLE WORK COMPLEAT.

To which is Added

The AUTHOR'S TREATISE of

NATURE, and GRACE.

BEING

A Conſequence of the PRINCIPLES

Contain'd in the SEARCH:

Together with

His ANSWER to the ANIMADVERSIONS upon the Firſt Volume: His DEFENSE againſt the Accuſations of *Mr. De la Ville, &c.* Relating to the ſame Subject.

All TRANSLATED *By*

T. TAYLOR, *M. A.* of *Magd.* Coll. in OXFORD.

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TO

The HONOURABLE

Sir William Glynn,

BARONET.

SIR,

WHILST I offer to say something expressive of my Gratitude, and worthy of Your self, the inward Resentment of Your Kindness over-bears my Thoughts, and Commands me rather to be silent. And indeed it were more eligible to say nothing of Your Favours, than to lessen them by the Poverty of my Thanks and Expressions; did I not think it necessary to testify to the World, how great my Obligation. For whatever could contribute to the Heightning a Benefit, was exemplify'd in Your Manner of Bestowing it. It was not extorted by tedious Addresses, and importunate Applications. 'Twas not allay'd with Demurrs or Reluctancy, or given in a way that might make the Receiver blush; 'Twas granted as soon as asked; even before the Petitioner could have time to fear a Denial. This, SIR, certainly would double the Obligation, if that were all: But that which perfectly incapacitates me to esteem it as I ought, is Your Conferring on me, a Stranger, Unknown, I had almost said, Unheard of, an Unmerited, and Unsought Preferment. But whilst I admire Your Generosity, I should, it may be, derogate from Your Prudence, did I not declare something to Your greater Commendation; which was Your immediate Compliance, as a True Son of the CHURCH, with the Desires of Your Worthy Diocesan; which one single Instance, concurring with the Publick Voice, and my own Experience from a few hours Happiness in Your Conversation, bespeaks You a True Lover of the CHURCH, and a most Worthy and Accomplish'd Gentleman. And that Sweetness of Temper, that Candour in Behaviour, that Affability and Good Nature, which appear in Your very Air and Countenance, recommend, and endear You to all Conditions of Men. But I mean not to draw Your Character, or soil Your Vertues, with too rude and unmasterly a Pen: I leave that to others, whilst I only admire at a distance those Excellencies I cannot express, or fully imitate. And now, SIR, I need not doubt to Authorize my Book with Your Name and Patronage, who have so generously been a Patron to its Author.

In

The EPISTLE DEDICATORY.

Inasmuch as it contains a Subject worthy of a Gentleman's *Perusal, who is throughly possess'd with the Sence of* TRUTH, *and* RELIGION. *This,* SIR, *unmasks the* Errors, *which impose on Man in abusive Appearances. This conducts You in the way to* TRUTH, *through all the mazes of Doubt and Uncertainty, and gives you the Prospect of such an* Happiness; *as shall fill the whole extent and capacity of Your Soul. Had it been an* Original, *the Present had been Sutable to Your Worth: But being a* Copy, *I design it only for a Testimony of my Gratitude, whilst I have no better way of expressing, than by making this Voluntary and Publick Profession, with what Earnestness and Passion I am,*

WORTHY SIR,

Your Oblig'd,

Humble Servant to Command,

T. TAYLOR.

The Preface.

THE *Mind of Man* is, as it were, by its Nature ſituated between its *Creator* and *Corporeal Creatures*; nothing, according to St. * *Auſtin*, being above it but GOD, nor beneath it but *Body*. But as the great Elevation *it* obtains above all *Material Beings*, is no hindrance to its Uniting with them, and even to its Depending after a ſort, upon a *Piece of Matter*; ſo, notwithſtanding the infinite diſtance between the *Soveraign Being*, and the *Humane Mind*, the *latter* is immediately, and moſt intimately united with the *former*. This laſt Union exalts the Mind above all things: 'tis this which gives it Life, and Light, and all its Happineſs; and of this Union it is St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks in very many places of his Works, as of that which is moſt Natural and Eſſential to it: On the contrary, the Union it has with the Body extreamly debaſes it, and is at this day the principal Cauſe of all its Errors, and its Miſeries.

I do not wonder that the Vulgar part of Men, or that the *Heathen Philoſophers*, ſhould only conſider in the Soul its Relation, and Union with the Body; without acknowledging any Union, or Relation that it has to GOD. But I admire that the *Chriſtian Philoſophers*, who ought to prefer the *Spirit* of GOD to the *Mind* of Man, *Moſes* to *Ariſtotle*, St. *Auſtin* to any wretched Commentator upon an *Heathen Philoſopher*, ſhould regard the Soul rather as the *Form* of the Body, than as made *in*, and *for* the * *Image* of GOD; that is, according to St. *Auſtin*, for *Truth*: to which alone *She* is immediately united. 'Tis true, the Soul is united to the Body, and is naturally the Form of it: but 'tis likewiſe true, that ſhe is united to GOD in a much ſtricter and more eſſential manner. The Relation ſhe has to her Body might have *not been*: But her Relation to GOD is ſo eſſential, that 'tis impoſſible to conceive GOD ſhould create a Spirit without it.

It is evident that GOD can have no other End of acting, than Himſelf: that He cannot create Spirits, but to *know* and *love* Him: that He can neither give them any *Knowledge*, nor impreſs upon them any Love, but what *is for*, and *tends to* Himſelf: but He might have refus'd to unite to Bodies thoſe *Spirits* which He has united. Therefore the Relation of our Minds to GOD is Natural, Neceſſary, and abſolutely Indiſpenſable: But their Relation to our *Bodies*, though *Natural*, is not of abſolute Neceſſity, nor of indiſpenſable Obligation.

This is not a proper place to alleadge all the Authorities, and Arguments, which might induce us to believe, That it's more eſſential to the Mind to be united to GOD, than to a Body. That would carry us out too far. To expoſe this Truth in its juſt Light, it would be neceſſary to overthrow the principal Foundations of *Pagan Philoſophy*; to explain the *Corruptions of Sin*; to encounter what is *falſly* named *Experience*; and to argue againſt the Prejudices, and Deluſions of the Senſes. So that to give the common ſort of Men a perfect Knowledge of it, is not ſo eaſy a Task, as may be undertaken in a *Preface*.

However 'tis not difficult to make it out to Attentive Perſons, and ſuch as are skill'd in *True Philoſophy*. For they need only be put in Mind, That ſince the *Will* of GOD *Regulates the Nature of all things*, it is more congenial to the Nature of the Soul to be united to GOD by the *Knowledge of Truth*, and by the *Love of Good*, than to be united to the Body; ſince 'tis certain, as is above ſaid, that GOD created Spirits, more for the Knowledge and Love of Him, than for the *Informing* Bodies. This Argument is inſtantly able to ſtartle Minds any whit enlightned, to render them attentive, and afterwards to convince them. But 'tis Morally impoſſible

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for *Minds* immers'd in Fleſh and Blood, whoſe *Knowledge* goes no farther than their *Senſes*, to be ever convinc'd with ſuch kind of Reaſonings. No Proofs will ſerve theſe People, but ſuch as may be even *felt* and *handled*, ſince every thing ſeems *Chimerical*, that makes not ſome Impreſſion on their Senſes.

The Firſt Man's *Sin* has ſo weakned the Union of our Mind with GOD, that none but thoſe whoſe *Heart is purify'd, and Mind enlightned*, can perceive it: for 'tis an imaginary Union in their Opinions, who blindly follow the *Judgements* of the *Senſes* and *Motions* of the *Paſſions*.

Mens quod non ſentit, niſi cum puriſſima & beatiſſima eſt, nulli cohæret, niſi ipſi veritati, quæ ſimilitudo & imago patris, & ſapientia dicitur. *Auguſt. lib. imp. de Gen ad litt.*

On the contrary, *it* has ſo ſtrengthened the Soul's Union with the Body, as to make us think theſe two parts of Our ſelves but one ſingle Subſtance: or rather, has ſo enſlav'd us to our Senſes, and Paſſions, as to perſwade us our *Body* is the *Principal* of the *Two* Parts whereof we are compos'd.

If we conſider the different Occupations of Men, we ſhall have all the reaſon in the world, to believe they have this ſo mean, and groſs a Notion of themſelves. For whereas they all love *Felicity*, and the *Perfection* of their *Being*; and are conſtantly labouring to grow happier, or more perfect; could it be ſuppos'd they ſet not a greater value on the *Body*, and the Goods of it, than on the *Mind*, and the Goods of that; when we find them almoſt always employ'd about things relating to the *former*, and ſeldom or never thinking on thoſe, that are abſolutely neceſſary to the perfection of the *latter*?

The greateſt part of Mankind lay themſelves out with ſo much Induſtry, and Pains, meerly for the *Support* of a wretched Life, and to leave their Children ſome neceſſary *Suſtenance* for the preſervation of their Bodies.

Such as by their good *Fortune*, or *Chance* of *Birth*, are freed from that Neceſſity, do no better manifeſt by their Buſineſs, and Employments, that they look upon the *Soul* as the *Nobler part* of their Being. Hunting, Dancing, Gaming, Feaſting, are their ordinary Occupations: Their Soul grown the *Slave* of their Body, eſteems and cheriſhes all theſe *Divertiſements*, though wholly unworthy of *Her*. But becauſe their Body is related to all things ſenſible, the *Soul* is not only the ſlave of their *Body*, but through *its* means, and for *its* ſake, of all things ſenſible likewiſe. For 'tis by the *Body* that they are united to their Relations, their Friends, their City, their Office, and all ſenſible Goods: the Preſervation of which ſeems as neceſſary and valuable, as that of their own Being. Thus the *Care* of their Fortunes, and the *Deſire* of increaſing them, their *Paſſion* for Glory and Grandeur buſies and employs them infinitely more, than the Perfection of their Soul.

Even *Men of Learning*, and Dealers in Wit, ſpend more than one half of their Life in Actions *purely Animal*, or ſuch as give us reaſon to think their Health, their Eſtates, and Reputations, are of dearer concern, than the Perfection of their Minds.

They ſtudy more to acquire a *Chimerical Grandeur* in the Imagination of others, than to give their Mind greater Force and Comprehenſion. They make a kind of Wardrobe of their Brain, wherein they huddle without *Order* or *Diſtinction*, whatever bears a certain Character of *Learning*; I mean, whatever can appear but *Rare*, and *Extraordinary*; and provoke others to admire them. Their Ambition lies in reſembling thoſe Cabinets fill'd with *Relicks* and *Curioſities*, which have nothing truly *Rich* or *Valuable*, but derive their worth from *Fancy*, *Paſſion*, or *Chance*: and they rarely labour to make their Mind accurate, and to regulate the Motions of their Heart.

Non exigua hominis portio, ſed totius humanæ univerſitatis ſubſtantia eſt. *Ambr. 6. Hexam. 7.*

Yet it ſhould not be thought from hence, that Men are entirely *Ignorant* that they have a *Soul*, and that this their *Soul* is the *Principal part* of their Being. They have too, been again and again convinc'd both by Reaſon and Experience, that 'tis no ſo conſiderable an Advantage, to live in *Reputation*, *Affluence*, and *Health* the ſpace of a few Years; and in general, that all *Corporeal Goods*, all that are poſſeſs'd by means, and for the ſake of the Body, are *Imaginary*, and Corruptible Goods. They know 'tis better to be *Juſt* than *Rich*, to be *Reaſonable* than *Learned*; to have a Lively and *Penetrating Mind*, than to have a Brisk and *Active Body*. Theſe are Truths *indelibly* imprinted on the Mind, and *infallibly* diſcover'd whenever Men

pleaſe

pleaſe to attend to them. *Homer*, for Inſtance, who extols his *Hero* for his *Swiftneſs*, might have perceiv'd, if he would, that 'twas an *Elogy* fitter for a *Race-Horſe*, or a *Grey-hound*. *Alexander*, ſo celebrated in Hiſtory for his *Illuſtrious Robberies*, heard ſometimes from his moſt *Retir'd Reaſon* the ſame Reproaches, as *Villains* and *Thieves*, in ſpight of the confus'd noiſe of a ſurrounding Crowd of Flatterers. And *Cæſar*, when he paſs'd the *Rubicon*, could not help manifeſting how theſe *Inward Loſſes* terrified him; when at laſt he had reſolv'd to *Sacrifice* the Liberty of his Country to his Ambition.

† The Soul however united very ſtrictly to the Body, is nevertheleſs united to *GOD*: And at that very time of her receiving by her *Body* the lively and confus'd *Senſations* her Paſſions inſpire into her, ſhe receives from the *Eternal Truth*, preſiding over her Underſtanding, the *Knowledge of her Duty* and *Irregularities*. When her treacherous Body deceives her, *GOD* undeceives her. When it indulges, He wounds her. When it gives her Incenſe and Applauſes, He ſtrikes her inward with ſmarting remorſes; and condemns her by the manifeſtation of a more Pure and Holy Law, than that of the Fleſh, which ſhe has obey'd.

* *Alexander* needed not that the *Scythians* ſhould have come to teach him his Duty in a ſtrange Language: He knew from *Him* who teaches the *Scythians*, and the moſt *Barbarous Nations*, the Rule of Juſtice, which he ought to follow. The *Light* of Truth which *Enlightens* the World, *enlightned* him alſo; and the *Voice* of Nature, which ſpeaks neither in *Greek* nor *Scythian*, nor *Barbarian Dialect*, ſpoke to him as to the reſt of the World, in a moſt clear and moſt intelligible Language. In vain did the *Scythians* upbraid him with his Conduct: their words ſtruck no deeper than his Ears: And *GOD*, not ſpeaking *home* to his Heart, or rather *GOD* ſpeaking to his Heart, whilſt he heard only the *Scythians*, who but provok'd his Paſſions, and led him out of himſelf, he heard not the *Voice of Truth*, though loud as Thunder, nor ſaw *its Light*, though it pierc'd him through and through.

'Tis true, our Union with *GOD diminiſhes* and weakens proportionably, as our *other* with things ſenſible *ſtrengthens* and increaſes; but 'tis impoſſible the former Union ſhould be abſolutely loſt without the deſtruction of our Being. For however thoſe who are immers'd in Vice, and drench'd in Pleaſures are inſenſible to Truth; they are notwithſtanding united to it. * *It* never deſerts them, 'tis they that deſert it. Its *Light* ſhines in *Darkneſs*, but does not always diſpell it; as the Light of the *Sun* ſurrounds the *Blind*, and thoſe that *wink*, though it *enlightens neither*.

† Ubiq; veritas præſidet omnibus conſolentibus te, ſimulque reſpondes omnibus etiam diverſa conſulentibus. Liquide tu reſpondes, ſed non liquide omnes audiunt. Omnes inde volunt conſulunt, ſed non ſemper quod volunt audiunt. *Conf. S. Aug. l.* 10. *cap.* 26.

* *V. Quint. Curt. lib.* 7. *cap.* 8.

Intus in domicilio cogitationis, nec Hebræa, nec Græca, nec Latina, nec Barbara veritas, ſine oris & linguæ organis, ſine ſtrepitu ſyllabarum. *Confeſſ. S. Aug. l.* 11. *c.* 3.

* Videtur quam ipſe a te occidere, cum tu ab ipſo occidas. *Aug. in Pſal* 25.

Nam etiam ſol lite & videntis faciem illuſtrat & cæci; ambobus ſol præſens eſt, ſed præſente ſole unus abſens eſt. Sic & ſapientia Dei Dominus J. C. ubique præſens eſt, quia ubique eſt veritas, ubique ſapientia. *Aug. in Joh. Tract.* 35.

The caſe is the ſame with the *Union* of our *Mind* with the *Body*. That *Union decreaſes* as faſt as the *other* we have with *GOD increaſes*; but it is never quite diſſolv'd, but by our Death. For though we were as enlightned, and as diſengag'd from all things ſenſible, as the *Apoſtles* themſelves, yet *Adam*'s Fall would neceſſitate us to a Dependence on the Body; and we ſhould feel a Law of our Fleſh conſtantly oppoſing and warring againſt the Law of our Mind.

What I here ſay of the Unions of the Mind with GOD, and with the Body, ought to be underſtood according to our ordinary way of Conception: For indeed our Mind can be immediately united to GOD only; that is, can truly depend on GOD. And if it be united to, or depend on the Body, 'tis becauſe the Will of GOD makes that Union or Dependence Efficacious. Which will eaſily be conceiv'd in the ſequell of this Work.

Proportionably as the *Mind* increaſes its Union with *GOD*, it grows *purer*, and *more Luminous*, *ſtronger*, and more *capacious*; ſince 'tis from this Union it derives all its Perfection. On the other ſide, it becomes *corrupt*, *blind*, *weak*, and contracted, by the ſame degrees, as its Union with its Body corroborates and increaſes; becauſe *this* is the Source of all its imperfection. Thus a Man, who *judges* of all things by his *Senſes*; who on all accounts purſues the *Motions* of his *Paſſions*, who has no other than *Senſible Perceptions*, and loves only *Flattering Gratifications*, is in the moſt wretched ſtate of Mind imaginable; as being infinitely remote from *Truth*, and from his *Good*. But when a Man judges of things but by the pure *Idea's* of the *Mind*, carefully avoids the confus'd *Noiſe* of the Creatures, and retiring into himſelf, hears his *Soveraign Teacher* in the calm Silence of the Senſes and Paſſions, he cannot poſſibly fall into Error.

Quis enim bene ſe inſpiciens non expertus eſt, tanto ſe aliquid intellexiſſe proceriùs, quanto ſe amoveret atque ſubduceret interioribus amentis a corporis ſenſibus potuit. *Aug. de Immort. Anim. c.* 10.

GOD never deceives those who *Interrogate* Him by a serious Application, and an entire *Conversion* of Mind towards Him: Though He does not always make them hear His Answers. But when the Mind by its *Aversion* from GOD diffuses it self abroad; when it consults only its Body, to be instructed in the Truth; and only listens to its *Senses*, *Imaginations*, and *Passions*, which talk to it everlastingly, it must inevitably be engag'd in Error. *Wisdom*, *Truth*, *Perfection*, and *Happiness*, are not Goods to be hop'd for from the *Body*. There is none, except ONE, that is above us, and from whom we receive our Being, who can make it perfect.

Principium creaturæ intellectualis est æterna sapientia quod principium manens in se incommutabiliter, nullo modo cessat occulta inspiratione vocationis loqui ei creaturæ, cui principium est, ut convertatur ad id ex quo est, quod aliter formata ac perfecta esse non possit. *Lib. 1. de Gen ad Litter. Ch.* 30.

This is what we are taught by these admirable Words of St. *Austin*, *Eternal Wisdom*, says he, *is the principle of all Intellectual Creatures, which persisting immutably the same, never ceases to speak to the most secret, and inward Reason of His Creatures, to convert them towards their Principle. Because nothing but the Intuition of Eternal Wisdom, which gives Being to Spirits, can give them*, as we may say, *the Accomplishing stroke, and the utmost Perfection they are capable of.*

Scimus quoniam cum apparuerit, similes ei erimus, quoniam videbimus eum sicuti est. *Joh Ep. 1. ch 3. v. 2.*

When we see GOD *as He is, we shall be like Him*, says the Apostle St. *John*. By that Intuition of *Eternal Truth*, we shall be rais'd to that degree of Grandeur, to which all Spiritual Creatures tend, by the necessity of their Nature. But whilst we live on Earth, the * *Weight* of the *Body drags* down the *Mind*; withdraws it continually from the presence of *GOD*, or that *Internal Light*, which illuminates it, makes perpetual Essays to *Fortify* its Union with *Sensible Objects*: and compells it to represent *things*, not as they are *in themselves*, but according to the *Relation* they bear to the *Preservation* of Life.

* Corpus quod corrumpitur, aggravat animam. *Sap.* 9. 10.

Terrena inhabitatio deprimit sensum multa cogitantem, & difficile æstimamus quæ in terra sunt, & quæ in prospectu sunt invenimus cum labore. *Sap.* 9. 15.

The Body, according to the *Wise-man*, fills the Mind with such a multitude of *Sensations*, that it becomes unable to discover the most obvious things: the *Sight of the Body* dazles and dissipates *that* of the *Mind*; so that the *Eye* of the *Soul* has great difficulty distinctly to perceive any Truth, whilst the *Eye* of the *Body* is employ'd in the Discovery, which evidences, that all Truths are found out, and all Sciences learn'd meerly by the *Attention* of the Mind. *This* being indeed its *Return* and *Conversion* unto *GOD*, who is our only *Tutour*, who only can instruct us with all Truth, by the Manifestation of His *own Substance*, as St. *Austin* † speaks.

† Deus intelligibilis lux, in quo, & a quo, & per quem intelligibiliter lucent omnia. 1. *Sol.* Insinuavit nobis [*Christus*] animam humanam non vegetari, non illuminari, non beatificari, nisi ab ipsa substantia Dei. *August. in Joh.*

From all which it is manifest, that 'tis our Duty constantly to withstand the Opposition the *Body* makes against the *Mind*; and to accustom our selves by degrees, to *dis-believe* the *Reports* our Senses make concerning all circumambient Bodies; which they always represent, as worthy of our Application and Esteem; because we must never make *Sensible things* the Object of our Thoughts, or the Subject of our Imployment: 'Tis one of the Truths, which the *Eternal Wisdom* seems willing to teach us, by His *Incarnation*. For after having exalted a *Sensible Body* to the highest Dignity possible to be conceiv'd; He gave us to understand by the *Ignominy* He reduc'd this same Body to, that is, by the Ignominy of the Noblest of all Sensible things, what *Contempt* we ought to have for all *Sensible* Objects. 'Tis possibly for the same reason that St. *Paul* said, *He knew not* JESUS CHRIST *after the Flesh*. For 'tis not the *Flesh of* CHRIST we must rely on, but the Spirit vail'd under the Flesh. *Caro vas fuit, quod habebat attende, non quod erat*, says St. *Austin*. * Whatever is a *Visible* and *Sensible* Nature in our LORD, merits not our *Adoration*; but because of the Union with the WORD, which can only be the Object of the Mind.

Illa autoritas divina dicenda est quæ non solum insensibilibus signis transcendit omnem humanam facultatem, sed & ipsum hominem agens ostendit et quousque se propter ipsum deprimere, & non nisi quam parvi pendat. *Aug. 2. de Ord 9.* * *Tract in Joan.* 27. Et si cognovimus secundum carnem Christum, jam non secundum carnem novimus. 2. *ad. Corr.*

It is absolutely necessary for those who desire to become *Wise*, and *Happy*, to be wholly convinc'd, and as it were *pierc'd* with what I have said. 'Tis not enough that they believe me on my Word, contented by the glimpse of a transitory Light; 'tis necessary they should know it by a thousand Experiences, and as many undeniable Demonstrations. These are things to be engraven indelibly on their Mind, to be made present to their Thoughts in all their Studies, and in all the Business and Employs of Life.

The PREFACE.

Such as will take the pains to read the Work I have offer'd to the Publick with any Application of Thought, will, if I miſtake not, enter into ſuch a frame and temper of Mind. For we have ſeveral ways demonſtrated, that our *Senſes*, *Imagination* and *Paſſions* are abſolutely uſeleſs to the diſcovery of *Truth* and *Happineſs*; that on the contrary, they dazle and ſeduce us on all occaſions; and in general, that all the *Notices* the Mind receives through the *Body*, or by Means of ſome *Motions* excited in the *Body*; are all *Falſe* and *confus'd* with reference to the *Objects* repreſented by them; though they are extreamly *uſeful* to the *Preſervation* of the *Body*, and the *Goods* that are related to it.

In this Work we *Encounter* ſeveral *Errors*, eſpecially ſuch as have been of longeſt growth, of univerſal Reception, and have caus'd the greateſt *Diſorder* in the *Mind*; and we ſhew that they almoſt all proceed from the *Mind's Union* with the *Body*. We offer in diverſe places to make the *Mind* ſenſible of its *Slavery*, and Dependance on all *Senſible* things, in order to awaken it from its *Lethargie*, and to put it upon attempting its *Deliverance*.

Nor do we reſt ſatisfy'd with a bare Expoſition of our *Ramblings*; but moreover explain the *Nature of the Mind*. We don't, for Inſtance, inſiſt upon a long Enumeration of all the particular Errors of our *Senſes*, and *Imagination*; but chiefly dwell upon the *Cauſes* of theſe *Errors*. And in the Explication of theſe *Faculties*, and the *General Errors* we fall into, we expoſe all at one View an infinite number of particular Errors whereunto we are obnoxious. So that the Subject of this *Treatiſe* is the *Whole Mind of Man*. We conſider it *in it ſelf*, with its *Relation to the Body*, and with its *Relation to* GOD. We examine the Nature of all its Faculties; we point out the Uſes to be made of them for the Avoiding Error. In fine, we explain moſt of the things we thought neceſſary to our progreſs in the *Knowledge of the Humane Nature*.

The Fineſt, the moſt delightful, and moſt neceſſary *Knowledge* is undoubtedly *that of Our Selves*. Of all Humane Sciences, that concerning *Man* is the moſt worthy of Man. And yet this is none of the moſt improv'd, and moſt finiſh'd Science that we have. The *Vulgar* part of Men neglect it wholly: Among the *Pretenders to Science* there are very few which apply to it, and much fewer whoſe Application is ſucceſsfull: The *generality* even of thoſe who go for *Men of Parts*, have but a confus'd Perception of the Eſſential Difference between the *Soul* and *Body*. Saint *Auſtin* himſelf, who has ſo admirably diſtinguiſh'd theſe two Beings, confeſſes it was long before he could diſcover it. And though it muſt be acknowledg'd he has better explain'd the *Properties* of the Soul and Body, than all that went before him, or have come after him to our preſent Age; yet it were to be wiſh'd he had not attributed to the Bodies that are about us, all the *Senſible Qualities*, we perceive by means of them. For in brief, they are not contain'd in the Idea which he had of Matter. In ſo much as that we may pretty confidently ſay, *The Difference between the Mind and Body* till of late Years, was never *ſufficiently* and *clearly* known.

Some there are who fancy to themſelves, they *very well know* the *Nature* of the *Mind*. Many others are perſwaded, 'tis *impoſſible to know* any thing of it; Laſtly, the greateſt number of all ſee not of *what uſe* that Knowledge could be, and therefore deſpiſe it. But all theſe ſo common Opinions are rather the Effects of the *Imagination*, and *Inclination* of Men, than the *Conſequences* of a Clear and *Diſtinct View* of their Mind. And proceed from their *Feeling*, and Uneaſineſs, and Regret to retire into themſelves, there to diſcover their Weakneſſes, and Infirmities; and their *being pleas'd* with Curious Enquiries, and gayer ſort of Sciences. Being always *Abroad*, they are inſenſible of the *Diſorders* that happen at *Home* within themſelves. They think all's right, becauſe there's a *Stupor* on their *Soul*: and find fault with thoſe who knowing their Diſtemper, betake to Remedies: ſaying they make themſelves *ſick*, becauſe they try for *Cure*.

But theſe *Great Genius's*, who pierce into the moſt *Myſterious Secrets* of Nature, who lift themſelves, in *Opinion* as high as *Heaven*, and deſcend to the bottom of the *Abyſs*, ought to remember *what* they *are*. Theſe great Objects it may be do but dazle

dazle them. The Mind must needs *start* out of it self, to compass so many things; and this it can't do without *fostering* its Force.

Men came not into the World to be *Astronomers*, or *Chymists*, to spend their whole Life at the end of a *Telescope*; or labouring at a *Furnace*, to deduce trifling Consequences from their painful Observations. Grant that an *Astronomer* made the first Discoveries of Continent, and Sea; and Mountains in the *Moon*; that he first observ'd the Spots that circuit upon the *Sun*; and that he had exactly calculated their *Motions*. Suppose that a *Chymist* had found out at length the Secret of fixing *Mercury*, or of making the *Alkaest* wherewith *Van-helmont* boasted to *dissolve* all Bodies: What are they the wiser, or happier for all this? It perhaps has set them up in Reputation with the World. But if they would reflect upon it, they would find that Reputation did but increase their Bondage.

Astronomy, *Chymistry*, and most of the other Sciences, may be look'd on as proper Divertisements for a Gentleman. But Men should never be enamour'd with their *Gayety*, nor prefer them before the *Science* of *Humane Nature*. For though the *Imagination* fixes a certain Idea of *Greatness* to *Astronomy*, by reason of its Considering Great and Glorious Objects, and seated infinitely above all other things; the Mind is not blindly to *prostrate* it self to that *Idea*; but *fit* its Master, and its Judge, and *strip* it of that *Sensible* Pomp which amazes Reason. The *Mind* must *pronounce* of all things according to its *Internal Light*, without hearkning to the false and confus'd *Verdict* of its *Senses*, and *Imagination*: and whilst it examines all Humane Sciences by the *Pure Light* of Truth, which enlightens it, we doubt not to affirm, it will dis-esteem most of them, and set a greater price on that, which teaches us *To know our selves*, than on all the other put together.

Therefore we choose rather to advise such as wish well to *Truth*, to judge of the Subject of this *Treatise*, by the *Responses* they shall receive from the *Soveraign Instructor* of all Men, after having *interrogated* him by some *Serious Reflections*, than to foretell them with a long anticipating Discourse, which perhaps they might look on as *Common-place-matter*; or the *Vain Ornaments* of a Preface. If they are perfuaded this is a Subject worthy their Study and Application, we desire them once more not to *judge* of the Things contain'd in it, by the *good* or *ill* Manner they are express'd in, but still to *retire into themselves*, and there to hear the *Decisions* they are to *follow*, and to *judge* by.

Being thus fully perfuaded, that Men cannot teach one another; and that those who hear us, learn not the Truths we speak to their *Ears*; unless at the same time He who taught them us, manifest them likewise to *their* Mind. We think our selves farther oblig'd to advertise the *Readers*, that would profit by this, not to credit us on our Word, out of any *Inclination*, and *Good-liking*; nor withstand our Sentiments out of Prejudice or Aversion. For though nothing be therein advanc'd, but what we learn't at the expense of Meditation, we should however be very sorry that others should be contented with the *Remembrance* and *Belief*, without the *Knowledge* of our Notions; and fall into Error for *want* of Understanding us, or because we have *Err'd* before them.

Nolite putare quenquam hominem aliquid differre ab homine. Admonere possumus per streptum vocis nostræ, si non sit intus qui doceat, foris sit streptus noster. *Aug. in Joan.*

Auditus per me factus, intellectus tia. *Augu. Joan. Tract.* 10.

per quem. 2. dixit aliquis & ad cor vestrum, sed non eum vidistis, si intellexistis fratres, dictum est & cordi vestro. Munus Dei est intelligen-

That presumptuous *Pride* of some of the *Learned*, who demand our Belief upon their *Word*, seems intolerable; They are angry with us for *Interrogating* GOD, when once they have *spoke* to us; because they Interrogate Him not themselves. They grow warm upon every *Opposition* to their Opinions, requiring an absolute Preference should be given to the *Mists* and *Darkness* of their *Imagination*, before the *Pure Light* of *Truth*, which illuminates the Mind.

We are, thanks to GOD, very remote from this way of proceeding; though it be often charg'd upon us. We demand indeed a Resignation to *Matters of Fact*, and the *Experiments* we produce, because these are things not learn'd by the Applying the Mind to *Reason*, and *Universal Reason*. But as to Truths discoverable in the *Pure Ideas* of things, which the *Eternal Wisdom* suggests to us in our most inward;

and ſecret Reaſon; herein we expreſly caution againſt reſting upon what we have thought of them, as judging it no ſmall crime thus to *eraſtize* our ſelves with GOD, by uſurping a *Power* over the Minds of *Men*.

Noli putare te ipſum eſſe locum. *Aug. in Pſal.*

The chief Reaſon why we are ſo earneſtly deſirous, that thoſe who read this Work, bring all poſſible Application along with them, is that we are willing to be reprehended for the *Faults* we have been *guilty* of. For we pretend not to be Infallible. We have ſo ſtrict an Union with, and ſo ſtrong a *Dependance* on our *Body*, that we are juſtly apprehenſive, leſt we have ſometimes miſtaken the *confus'd noiſe* wherewith it fills the *Imagination*, for the *Pure Voice* of *Truth*, which ſpeaks to the *Underſtanding*.

Were it GOD only who ſpoke, and did we judge only according to what we heard, we might perhaps ſay in the words of our LORD, *As I hear I judge, and my Judgement is juſt*. But we have a *Body* that ſpeaks *lowder* than GOD Himſelf, but *never* ſpeaks the *Truth*. We have *Self-love*, which *corrupts* the *Words* of GOD, which are all *Truth*: and we have *Pride*, which emboldens us to judge without attending to the *Words of Truth*, which ought to be the *Rule* of all our Judgements. For the principal Cauſe of our Errors, is that our *Judgements* reach farther than our *Pure Intellectual Perceptions*. Wherefore I intreat thoſe to whom GOD ſhall diſcover my *Wandrings*, to put me in the *Right way*; that ſo this *Treatiſe*, which I offer as an *Eſſay*, whoſe *Subject* is well worthy the Application of Men, may by degrees arrive to its *Perfection*.

Sicut audio ſic judico, & judicium meum juſtum eſt; quia non quæro voluntatem meam. *Johan cap. 5. 30.*

This *Undertaking* was at firſt attempted only with Deſign of inſtructing my ſelf. But ſome Perſons being of Opinion it might be of uſe, if publiſht, I the willinger ſubmitted to their Reaſons; becauſe one of the principal, ſo well ſuited with the deſire I had of advantaging my ſelf. *The beſt means*, ſaid they, *of being inform'd in any matter, is to communicate our Opinions about it to the Learned.* This quickens our own *Attention*, as well as provokes *theirs*. Sometimes they have different Proſpects, and make other *Diſcoveries* of Truths; ſometimes they puſh on certain *Enquiries*, which we out of Lazineſs have neglected, or for want of Strength and Courage have deſerted.

And upon this Proſpect of *Beneſiting my ſelf*, and ſome *others*, I run the *hazard* of being an *Author*. But that my Hopes may not prove abortive, I throw in this *Precaution*, That a Man ſhould not be preſently diſcourag'd, though he meet with things that run counter to Common Opinions; which he has all his Life long believ'd, and found generally approv'd by all Men in all Ages of the World. For they are *Theſe Univerſal Errors* I more eſpecially ſtrive to extirpate. Were Men thoroughly enlightned, *Univerſal Approbation* would be an Argument: but the caſe is quite contrary. Let him therefore be once for all re-minded, that nothing but *Reaſon* ought to preſide over the *Judgements* we paſs on all Humane Opinions; which have no relation to *Faith*: of which GOD alone informs us in a *quite different* way, from that of our diſcovering Natural things. Let him *Retire into himſelf*, and preſs near to that *Light*, which perpetually *ſhines Within*, to the end his *Reaſon* may be more and more enlightned. Let him induſtriouſly avoid all thoſe *too lively Senſations*, and all the *Commotions of the Soul*, which fill the Capacity of the *Mind*. For the *leaſt noiſe*, or *Glimmering* of *Light* ſometimes diſturbs the *View of the Mind*: And therefore 'tis good to avoid all theſe things, though not abſolutely neceſſary. And if after all the ſtruggles he can make, he finds himſelf unable to withſtand the continual Impreſſions that his Body, and the Prejudices of Childhood, make upon his Imagination: recourſe to *Prayer* is needfull, that GOD may afford thoſe Supplies, wherewith his own Strength cannot furniſh him; *Never failing ſtill to reſiſt his Senſes*. For that ought to be the perpetual Imployment of thoſe, who in imitation of Saint *Auſtin*, have a great love for *Truth*.

Qui hoc videre non poteſt, oret & agat ut poſſe mereatur. Sapientiæ illi qui lumen mentis aſcendit, attendat ut intelligat. *Conf. Ep. Fund. cap. 33.*

Nullo

Nullo modo resistitur Corporis Sensibus; QUÆ NOBIS SALUBERRIMA DISCIPLINA EST; *si per eos inflictis plagis vulneribusque blandimur. Ep. 72.*

THE *Candid* READER *is desir'd to Correct such Mistakes of the* Press, *as He shall find in Pointing, or otherwise; being occasion'd by the* AUTHOR's *Absence.*

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F. *MALEBRANCHE'S*

TREATISE,

CONCERNING

The Search after Truth.

BOOK the FIRST.

Concerning The

ERRORS of the SENSES.

CHAP. I.

I. Of the Nature and Properties of the UNDERSTANDING.

II. Of the Nature and Properties of the WILL; *and where in its Liberty consists.*

ERROR is the universal Cause of the Misery of Mankind, 'tis the corrupt Principle that has Produc'd *Evil* in the World. 'Tis this which breeds and cherishes in our Souls all the Evils that afflict us; and we can never hope to establish a solid, and real Happiness, but by seriously labouring to avoid it.

We are taught by the Holy Scriptures, that Men are no farther miserable than they are Sinners, and Criminals; and they would neither be Sinners, nor Criminals, did they not make themselves Slaves to Sin, by taking part with *Error*.

If it be true then; That *Error* is the Source of all the Miseries of Men, 'tis very reasonable that Men should endeavour to free themselves from it; and certainly their Endeavour would not be altogether unprofitable, and unrewarded, though it met not with all the Success that they could wish. If Men should not hereby become Infallible, yet they would be much less subject to be Deceiv'd; and though they obtain'd not an absolute Deliverance from their Evils, they would however avoid a great part of them. An intire Felicity ought not to be expected in this Life, since in this Mortal State there can be no Pretensions to Infallibility; but the Endeavour against Error should be earnest and continual, because the Desire of being freed from Misery is necessant. In a word, as we fervently desire perfect Happiness, without the hopes of it; so we should ever industriously tend towards Infallibility, without pretending to it.

It should not be imagin'd there is much Difficulty to be undergone in the *Search of Truth*; 'Tis but opening the Eyes, becoming Attentive, and exactly observing some Rules we shall give in the following Discourse. An exactness of Thought has scarce any thing painful in it; 'tis not a slavery as the Imagination represents it, and though we should meet with some Difficulty at first, yet we might find Satisfaction enough to recompense our Pains; for at last, 'tis this only which enlightens us, and guides us into Truth. * See the Sixth Book.

But not to spend time in preparing the Mind of the Reader, whom 'tis much more fit to believe sufficiently of himself, dispos'd to the *Search of Truth*, let us examine the Causes and Nature of our *Errors*; and since the method of examining things by considering them in their Birth, and Origine, is the most regular and perspicuous, and serves better than others to give us a thorough Knowledge of them, let us try to put it in Practice.

The Mind of Man, being neither Material nor Extended, is undoubtedly a simple Substance, indivisible, and without any Composition of Parts; Notwithstanding it has been the Custom to distinguish in it two Faculties, namely, the *Understanding* and the *Will*, which it is necessary forthwith to explain. For it seems that the Notions or Idea's Men have of these two Faculties, are not so clear or distinct as they ought to be.

I. Of the Nature & Properties of the Understanding.

But becauſe theſe Idea's are very Abſtract, and fall not under the Imagination, it ſeems not amiſs to expreſs them by the Reſemblance they bear to the Properties belonging to Matter, which being eaſy to be Imagin'd, will render the Notions which may conveniently be apply'd to theſe two Words *Underſtanding* and *Will*, more diſtinct in themſelves, and more familiar to Us; Only this Caution muſt be obſerv'd, that theſe Reſemblances betwixt the Mind and Matter, are not perfectly juſt; And that theſe two kinds of Beings are only compar'd in order to make the Mind more Attentive, and to make others, as it were, *ſenſible* of our meaning.

Matter, or Extention contains in it two Properties or Faculties; the firſt Faculty is that of receiving different Figures, and the ſecond is its capacity of being Mov'd: In like manner the Mind of Man includes two Faculties; the firſt, which is the *Underſtanding*, is that of receiving many Idea's, that is, of perceiving many things; the ſecond which is the *Will*, is the Faculty of receiving many Inclinations, or of *Willing* different things. We will begin with an explication of the Reſemblances the firſt of the Faculties belonging to *Matter*, has to the firſt of the two Faculties appertaining to the *Mind*.

Extention is capable of admitting two kinds of Figures, The one is only External, as the Roundneſs of a piece of Wax, the other is Internal, and is peculiar to all the little parts the Wax is compos'd of; for it is moſt certain that all the little parts which go to the Compoſition of a piece of Wax, are of a Figure very different from thoſe, which conſtitute a piece of Iron. Therefore I call that which is external, barely *Figure*, and I term the internal Figure, *Configuration*; which is peculiarly neceſſary to the Wax to make it what it is. So likewiſe it may be ſaid that the Idea's of the Soul are of two ſorts, taking the name of *Idea* in general for whatever the Mind immediately perceives.

The firſt give Us a Repreſentation of ſomething without Us as of a *Square*, or an Horſe, &c. The ſecond repreſent to Us only what we find within Us, as our Senſations, *Griefs*, *Pleaſures*, or the like. For we ſhall make it plain hereafter, that theſe laſt Idea's are only a *manner* of the Mind's *exiſting*; and for that reaſon I ſhall call them the *Modifications* of the Mind.

Thus alſo the Inclinations of the Soul might be call'd *Modifications* of the ſame Soul: For it being manifeſt that the Inclination of the Will is a *manner* of *exiſting* of the Soul, it might be term'd a *Modification* of the Soul; juſt as Motion in Bodies, being a manner of *exiſting* of thoſe Bodies, might be ſaid to be a *Modification* of Matter: Notwithſtanding I do not term the Inclinations of the Will, or the Motions of Matter, Modifications, for as much as both thoſe Inclinations, and thoſe Motions have commonly a reference to ſomething that's external; for the *Inclinations* ſtand related unto *Good*, and the *Motions* have a reference to ſome ſeparate Body. But the *Figures* and *Configurations* of Body, and the *Senſations* of the Soul have no neceſſary relation to any thing without. For as a Figure is round when all the external parts of a Body are equally diſtant from one of its parts, which we call the Center, without relation to any thing external; ſo all the Senſations we are capable of, might have their ſubſiſtence, though there were no outward object in the World: Their *being* includes not any neceſſary relation to the Bodies which cauſe them, as we ſhall elſewhere prove; and they are nothing but the Soul modify'd in ſuch, or ſuch a manner; ſo that they are properly Modifications of the Soul. Let me then take leave to name them ſo, to make my meaning underſtood.

The firſt, and principal Agreement, or Reſemblance, that is found betwixt the Faculty which Matter has of receiving different Figures, and different Configurations; and that which the Soul has of receiving different Idea's, and different Modifications is this, That as the Faculty of receiving different Figures, and different Configurations in Bodies, is intirely *paſſive*, and contains nothing as all of Action, ſo the Faculty of receiving different Idea's, and different Modifications in the Mind, is altogether *paſſive* and includes no Action at all. I call that Faculty or Capacity, the Soul has of receiving all theſe things, the UNDERSTANDING.

Whence we ought to conclude, That 'tis the *Underſtanding* which *perceives*; ſince 'tis only Its buſineſs to receive the Idea's of Objects: For, for the Soul to perceive an Object, and to receive the Idea which repreſents it, is one and the ſame thing. 'Tis alſo the *Underſtanding* which perceives the Modifications of the Soul, ſince I mean by this word *Underſtanding* that paſſive Faculty of the Soul, through the means of which it receives all the different *Modifications* it is capable of. For it is the ſame thing for the Soul to receive a *mode* of *exiſtence*, which we call *pain*, as to perceive Pain, ſince it has no other way of *receiving* Pain, than by the *Perception* of it; whence it may be inferr'd, that 'tis the *Underſtanding* that *imagines* the Objects that are abſent, and is *ſenſible* of thoſe that are preſent; and that the *Senſes* and *Imagination*, are nothing but the *Underſtanding*, perceiving Objects by the Organs of the Body, as ſhall be explain'd hereafter.

But becauſe in the Senſation of Pain, or any thing elſe, Men generally perceive it by the mediation of the Organs of *Senſe*; they cuſtomarily ſay they are the Senſes which perceive it, without knowing diſtinctly what it is they mean by the word *Senſe*: They fancy there is ſome Faculty diſtinct from the Soul, which renders It, or the Body capable of Senſation, as believing the Organs of Senſe do really participate of our Perceptions. They imagine the Body is ſo aſſiſtant to the Mind, in its Senſations, that if the Mind was ſepa-

rate-

rate from the Body, it could have no *Sensation* at all. But these thoughts are the effects of Prejudice, because in the State we are in, we are *sensible* of nothing but through the use of the Instruments of Sense, as shall be shewn elsewhere more at large. 'Tis by way of accommodating my self to the ordinary way of Speaking that I say, in the Process of my Discourse, the Senses perceive; but by the word Sense I mean nothing but that passive Faculty of the Soul before-mention'd, that is the Understanding apprehending any thing, on occasion of what happens in the Organs of her Body, according to the Institution of Nature, as shall be declar'd in another place.

The other Resemblance between the passive Faculty of the Soul, and that of Matter is this, That as Matter receives no *real* alteration by the change which happens in its Figure; I mean, for instance, that as Wax receives no considerable change by becoming *Round* or *Square*; so the Mind receives no Alteration by the diversity of Idea's it contains; I would say, the Mind receives no considerable change though it receives the Idea of a *Square*, or a *Circle*, in perceiving a Square, or a Circle.

Again, As it may be said that Matter receives considerable Changes, when it loses the Configuration, peculiar to the parts of Wax, to take that which is proper to those of Fire and Smoak, when the Wax is chang'd into Fire and Smoak; so it may be said that the Soul undergoes very considerable Changes, when it alters its Modifications, and suffers *Pain* after it has *felt Pleasure*. Whence we ought to conclude, That *Idea's* are to the Soul, in a manner what *Figures* are to Matter, and that *Configurations* are to Matter almost what *Sensations* are to the Soul.

There are still other Correspondencies betwixt the Figures and Configurations of *Matter*, and the Idea's and Modifications of the *Mind*; for Matter seems to be an Image, or Representative of the Mind, I mean only that there are Properties in Matter which have some mutual Respects between them, not unlike those which we find between the Properties belonging to the Mind; though the Nature of the Mind is very different from that of Matter, as we shall clearly see in that which follows.

From what I have said I would have it well remember'd, That by *Understanding* I mean that *passive* Faculty the Soul has of Perceiving, that is of receiving not only different *Idea's*, but also an abundance of different *Sensations*, as Matter has a capacity of receiving all sorts of external *Figures*, and internal *Configurations*.

The other Faculty of Matter is that of its being capable of receiving many *Motions*, and the other Faculty of the Soul is that Power it has of receiving many *Inclinations*. Let us make the Comparison between them.

II. *Of the Nature and Properties of the Will and of its Liberty.*

As the Author of Nature is the universal Cause of all those Motions which we find in Matter, so also he is the general Cause of all those natural Inclinations which are found in the Mind: And as all Motions proceed in a right line, unless otherwise determin'd by the Rencounter, of some forreign and particular Causes, which by their Opposition, put them into a Circular course; so all the Inclinations we receive from God, have a direct tendency, and could only aim at the possession of *Good* and *Truth*, were there not some extraneous cause, which biass'd that natural *Impression* towards corrupt and mischievous Ends. Now 'tis that forreign Cause which is the cause of all our Evils, and depraves all our Inclinations.

To understand this rightly, we must know, there is a very considerable difference, between the *Impression* or Motion the Author of Nature produces in *Matter*, and the *Impression* or Motion towards *Good* in general, wherewith the same Author of Nature continually influences our Soul. For Matter is wholly passive, it has no power of retarding, or stopping its Motion, or determining and turning it one way rather than another. Its Motion, as I have said, proceeds always in a right line, and if at any time it is hindered, from continuing it in that manner, it describes the greatest circular line it can, and consequently that which comes nearest to a right, because 'tis God that imprest its Motion, and rules its Determination. But 'tis not so with the Will, which may in one sense be said * to be Active, and to have a Power in it self of giving a different Determination to the Inclination, or Impression it receives from God; for though it cannot stop this Impression, it may in one sense cause a Deviation to what side it pleases, and thereby produce all those Disorders, which happen in the Inclinations, and all the Miseries which are the certain and necessary Consequents of Sin.

* *See the Illustrations.*

So that by the Word WILL, I would be conceiv'd to design, *That Impression of natural Motion which carries us towards Good universal, and undetermined.* And by that of LIBERTY I mean nothing more than *The Power the Mind has of turning that Impression towards agreeable Objects, and terminating our natural Inclination upon some particular Object, which before were loose and undetermined*, except towards general or universal Good; that is to say, towards God, who is the sole universal Good, since 'tis he alone who comprehends in himself all other Goods.

Whence it is easy to discover, That though our natural Inclinations are Voluntary, yet they are not Free with that Freedome of Indifference I am speaking of; which contains a Power of *willing* or *not willing*, or rather of *willing the contrary* to what our natural Inclinations carry us. For though it is Voluntarily and Freely that a Man loves good in general; since there is no Love but proceeds from the Will, and 'tis a contradiction, for the Will to

ſuffer violence or conſtraint: However 'tis impoſſible to Love with that Freedom I have juſt explain'd, ſince 'tis not in the Power of the Will not to wiſh to be Happy.

But it muſt be obſerv'd, that the Mind conſider'd under ſo ſtrong a bent towards Good in general, can not determine its Motion towards a particular Good, unleſs the ſame Mind conſider'd as ſuſceptible of Idea's, has knowledge of that particular Good, I would ſay, to make uſe of the ordinary terms, that the Will is a *blind Power*, that makes no advances to things unleſs conducted by the *Underſtanding*; ſo that the Will can not diverſly determine its Propenſity to Good, or over-rule the *direct* Bent of its natural Inclinations, but by * commanding the *Underſtanding* to repreſent to it ſome particular Object. The power then that the *Will* has of determining its Inclinations, neceſſarily contains an ability of applying the Underſtanding to the Objects which it likes.

**See the Illuſtrations.*

That what I have ſaid of the Underſtanding and the Will may be better underſtood I will make it familiar by an Inſtance: A Man repreſents to himſelf an Honor or Preferment under the Notion of a Good, which he might hope for, and immediately his Will *wills* this Good; that is, the *Impreſſion* which is continually carrying the Soul towards Univerſal and undetermin'd Good, inclines it towards this *Honour*; But whereas this Honour is not the Univerſal Good, nor is conſider'd by a clear and diſtinct view of the Mind, as Univerſal Good is, (for the Mind can never ſee clearly that which is not) the Propenſity we have towards Univerſal Good is not ſtopt by this particular Determination: the Mind has a tendency to go farther; it is not neceſſarily and invincibly in Love with this Honour, but is intirely at its Choice and Liberty in this reſpect. Now its Liberty conſiſts in this, that being not fully convinc'd that this Honour comprehends all the Good it is capable of Loving, it may ſuſpend both its Judgment and Affection; and thereupon, as ſhall be ſhewn in the Third Book, may through the Union it has with the *Univerſal Being*, or that Being which contains all Good, think of other things, and conſequently Love other Goods: Finally it may compare all Goods together, and love them according to their order, and in the Proportion they are lovely, and refer them all to that one which contains all, and which alone is fit to fix bounds to our Love, as being the only one, that is capable of filling all the Capacity of our Affection.

Almoſt the ſame thing may be ſaid of the Knowledge of Truth as of the Love of Good. We are deſirous of the Knowledge of Truth, as of the Injoyment of Good, through a natural Impreſſion; and that Impreſſion is no more invincible, than that which carries us towards Good; that which makes it ſo, is only evident Conviction, or a perfect and intire Knowledge of the Object. And we have equal Liberty in our *falſe Judgments* as in our *inordinate Affections*, as ſhall be made to appear in the next Chapter.

CHAP. II.

I. *Of our Judgments, and Reaſonings.* II. *That they depend upon the Will.* III. *The Uſe which ſhould be made of its Liberty on their account.* IV. *Two general Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin.* V. *Some neceſſary Reflections upon thoſe Rules.*

I. Of our Judgments and Reaſonings.

IT might be readily inferr'd from what has been ſaid in the precedent Chapter, that the Underſtanding never *judges*, ſince it goes no farther than *Perception*; or that the *Judgments* and *Reaſonings* which the Underſtanding makes, are nothing but pure Perceptions: That 'tis the Will alone which really *judges*, by acquieſcing in, and voluntarily reſting upon, what the Underſtanding repreſents: and thus it is the Will alone which leads us into Error: But this requires a larger Explication.

I ſay then, there is no other difference on the part of the Underſtanding, between a ſimple *Perception*, a *Judgment*, and a *Reaſoning*, than that the Underſtanding perceives a *ſimple* thing, without relation to any thing whatſoever, by a *ſimple Perception*; that it perceives the Relations between two things or more, in its *Judgments*: And laſtly, that it perceives the Relations, which are betwixt the Relations of things, in its *Reaſonings*; wherefore all the Operations of the Underſtanding, are nothing but *pure Perceptions*.

In *Perceiving*, for Example, twice 2 or 4, there is only a *ſimple Perception*. In *Judging* that twice 2 are 4, or that twice 2 make not 5, the Underſtanding only perceives the Relation of Equality found between twice 2 and 4; or the Relation of Inequality between twice 2 and 5. Thus the Judgment, in point of the Underſtanding, is only *the Perception of the Relation which is found between two things or more*. But *Reaſoning* is the *Perception*, not of the Relation which is found between two things or more, for that would be a Judgment; but, *of the Relation which is found between two or more Relations of two or more Things*. Thus when I infer that 4 being leſs than 6, twice 2 being equal to 4, are conſequently leſs than 6, I not only Perceive the Relation of Inequality between 12 and 2, and 6, for that would be

only

only a Judgment, but the Relation of Inequality which is between the Relation of twice 2 and 4, and that Relation between 4 and 6, which is a *Reasoning*. The Understanding then does only *perceive*, and 'tis the Will alone which *judges* and *reasons* by voluntarily resting upon what the Understanding represents to it: as has been already said.

II. *That Judgments and Reasonings depend upon the Will.*

Notwithstanding, when things which come under our Consideration, are palpably Evident, our *Consent* seems to be no longer *Voluntary*, whence we are ready to believe that 'tis not our *Will* but our *Understanding* that *judges* thereof.

But that we may be sensible of our Error, we must know that the things we consider never obtain that Convincing Evidence, till the Understanding has throughly examin'd all their Parts and Relations necessary to form a Judgment of them: whereupon it happens that the *Will*, which wills no farther than it knows, can act no longer on the Understanding, that is, can not desire the Understanding to represent something new in its Object, since it has already consider'd all the parts of it any ways relating to the question to be decided, it is therefore oblig'd to rest upon what has been already represented, and cease from its Agitation and Casting about: 'tis this Acquiescence of the Will which is properly a *Judgment* or *Reasoning*. Thus because this acquiescence or Judgment is not left *Free*, when things strike us with that Evident Conviction, we fancy likewise that it is not *Voluntary*.

But as long as there is an Obscurity in the Subject we consider, and we are not perfectly assured, we have discover'd all that's necessary to the Resolution of the Question, as it most commonly happens in those which are abstruse and difficult, and include many Relations: we are free to deny our *Consent*, and the *Will* may still command the *Understanding*, to apply it self to something new: which makes us not so averse to believe that the *Judgments* we form on such kind of Subjects are *Voluntary*.

However, the generality of Philosophers suppose that even the Judgments we form upon things obscure, are no ways Voluntary, and will have the *Consent* to Truth, to be an Action of the *Understanding*, which they call *Assensus* to distinguish it from the *Consent* to *Good*, which they attribute to the Will, and term *Consensus*: but see the cause of their Distinction and Mistake.

Which is, that in this State of Life, we often evidently perceive some *Truths* without any reason to Doubt of them; and so the Will remains not indifferent in the Consent it gives to Truths so Manifest, as has been just explain'd: but 'tis not so in point of *Good*, there being no *Particular Good* we know, but we may have reason to doubt, whether we ought to Love it. Our Passions and Inclinations, which we naturally have for Sensible Pleasures, are though confus'd, yet through the corruption of our Nature, very strong Reasons, which render us cold and indifferent even in the Love of God himself: And so we are manifestly sensible of our Indifference, and are inwardly convinc'd, we make use of our *Liberty* in our Loving GOD.

But we are not so apprehensive that we imploy our *Liberty* in *Consenting to Truth*, especially when accompanied with Evidence and Conviction: which induces us to believe our *Consent to Truth*, is *Involuntary*: as if it was necessary our Actions should be Indifferent to become *Voluntary*, and that the Blessed did not love God most *Willingly*, without being diverted from it by something or other; in like manner as we Consent to that evident Proposition that *twice 2 are* 4, without being diverted from the Belief of it by any shew of a contrary Reason. But to the end we may distinctly discover, what the difference is between the *Consent* of the *Will* to *Truth*, and its *Consent* to *Good*; it is requisite to know the difference which is found between *Truth* and *Goodness*, taken in the ordinary acceptation, and with reference to us. That difference consists in this, That we have an Interest and Concern in *Goodness*, but *Truth* does not at all affect us: For *Truth* consists only in the Relation which two things or more have between them, but *Goodness* consists in the Relation of agreement which things have with our selves; which is the reason that the *Will* has but *One* Action in respect of *Truth*, which is its Acquiescence in, or Consent to, the Representation of the Relation which is betwixt things; and that it has *two* in respect of *Goodness*, namely its Acquiescence in, or Consent to, the Relation of agreement the thing has with our selves, and its Love or Tendency towards that thing, which actions are extreamly different, though they are usually confounded. For there is a great deal of difference betwixt simply Acquiescing, and being carried to love the thing which the Mind represents, since we often Acquiesce in things we could gladly wish were not, and which we have an aversion to.

Geometricians love not Truth, but only the Knowledge of Truth, though it be otherwise said.

Now upon a due consideration of things, it will visibly appear, that 'tis even the *Will* which Acquiesces not only in things if they be agreeable to it, but in the Representation of things; and that the reason of the *Will*'s Acquiescing always in the Representation of things of the clearest Evidence, is, as we have already said, because there is no farther Relation in them necessary to be consider'd; which the *Understanding* has not already throughly discuss'd: In so much that 'tis as it were necessary for the will to leave off disquieting and tireing it self in vain, and to rest satisfy'd in a full assurance, that it is not deceived, since there is nothing left, to put the *Understanding* upon a fresh Inquiry.

This is especially to be observed, that in the Circumstances we are under, we have but a very imperfect Knowledge of things, and consequently there is an absolute necessity we should

have this *Liberty* of *Indifference* whereby we are impower'd to with-hold our ſelves from giving our Conſent.

For the better underſtanding this Neceſſity, it muſt be conſider'd, that we are carry'd by our Natural Inclinations to the imbracing *Truth* and *Goodneſs*; ſo that the Will never reaching after things, but what the Mind has ſome notice and apprehenſion of, muſt needs purſue that which has the face and *Appearance* of *Truth* and *Goodneſs*: But becauſe all that has the look of *Truth* and *Good*, is not always what it appears to be; it is plain that if the Will had not this Liberty, but muſt neceſſarily and indiſpenſably have embrac'd every thing that came cloath'd with an *Appearance* of *Truth* and *Goodneſs*, it would have almoſt ever been Deceived. Whence probably it might be concluded that the *Author* of its *Being*, was the *Author* of its *Errors* and Seducements.

III. *What uſe ſhould be made of our Liberty, that we never may be deceiv'd.*

We have therefore a Liberty given us by God, that we might avoid falling into Error, and all the Evils conſequent upon Errors, by not reſting with a full Aſſurance upon Probabilities, but only upon Truth: that is, by commanding the Mind with an indefatigable Application to examine every thing till it has fully inlightned and unravell'd all that comes under its Examinations. For Truth generally comes attended with Evidence, and Evidence conſiſts in a clear and diſtinct View of all the Parts and Relations of the Object which are neceſſary to give a certain and well grounded Judgment.

The uſe then we ſhould make of our Liberty is to IMPLOY IT AS FAR AS IT WILL GO. That is, never to conſent to any thing whatever until we are as it were forc'd to't, by the ſecret Reproaches of our Reaſon.

To ſubmit our ſelves to the falſe Appearances of Truth, is to be inſlav'd contrary to the Will of God; but honeſtly to yield to the inward Reproaches of our Reaſon, which accompany the Denial of our Submiſſion unto Evidence, is to obey the Voice of Eternal Truth, which ſpeaks within us. Here then are *Two Rules* founded upon what I have been ſaying, which are the moſt Neceſſary of all others, both for *Speculative* Sciences and *Morality*, and which may be lookt on as the *Foundation* of all Humane Sciences.

IV. *General Rules for the avoiding Error and Sin.*

The *Firſt* which reſpects the *Sciences* is this: *A Man ſhould never give an entire Conſent, but only to Propoſitions which appear ſo evidently true, that he cannot deny it them without feeling an internal Pain,* and *the ſecret Upbraidings of his Reaſon*: that is, without being plainly convinc'd, he would make an ill uſe of his *Liberty*, in caſe he ſhould refuſe to give his Conſent, or would extend its Power over things where it has no Right, or Juriſdiction.

The *Second* relating to *Morality* is this; *A Man ought never to fix his Love abſolutely on any Good, if he can without Remorſe refuſe to love it.* From whence it follows, That nothing but God ought to be Loved abſolutely, and independently. For He alone it is, that we cannot forbear loving in that Nature without an inward Remorſe, that is, without evident Conviction of doing Ill, upon Suppoſition we have arriv'd to the Knowledge of Him, through the means of Reaſon or of Faith.

A neceſſary Reflection on the two Rules.

But it muſt here be obſerv'd, That when things which we perceive come recommended with ſtrong Probability, we are extreamly ready to Believe them. We feel our ſelves in Pain, when we will not ſuffer Perſuaſion to Break in upon us; in ſo much that were we not very cautious, we ſhould be in danger of Conſenting to them, conſequently of being Deceiv'd; for 'tis a great Chance, whether *Truth* be found intirely to agree with the Probability. And for this Reaſon, I have expreſly put it in the two Rules; *That nothing ſhould be conſented to, without palpable Conviction, that Evil uſe would be made of a Man's Liberty in not Conſenting.*

But though we find our ſelves moſt readily inclin'd to Conſent to a Probability, or a likelihood, yet if we would be at the pains of making Reflection, whether we perceive our ſelves evidently oblig'd to conſent to it, we ſhould doubtleſs find we were not. For if this likelihood be founded upon the Impreſſions of our Senſes, (a likelihood by the way that very ill deſerves the Name) a Man finds himſelf readily diſpos'd to embrace it. But no other Cauſe can be aſſign'd for this, but ſome Paſſion or general Affection he has for that which affects or concerns the Senſes, as ſhall be ſufficiently ſhewn in the following Diſcourſe.

But if the likelihood proceeds from ſome Conformity with Truth, as ordinarily Probable Notices are True, taken in a certain Senſe; then if a Man examines his own Breaſt, he will find himſelf inclin'd to do two things; The one is to Believe, and the other to make farther Inquiry ſtill: But he will never find himſelf ſo fully perſuaded, as to think he does evidently ill, if he does not Conſent at all.

Now theſe two Inclinations a Man has in reſpect of Things Probable, are very Good. For He may and ought to give his Conſent to Things probable or veriſimilar taken in a Senſe which denotes the *Image* of *Truth*; but he ought not however to yield an intire Conſent, as we have precaution'd in the Rule; and he muſt examine all the latent ſides, and faces yet undiſcover'd; ſo as to enter fully into the Nature of the thing, and to diſtinguiſh what is Truth from what is Falſe, and then to give an entire Conſent if the Evidence oblige him to it.

He muſt then be well accuſtom'd to diſtinguiſh Truth from Probability by examining himſelf inwardly, as I have been Explaining: For 'tis for want of this care of Examining a Man's ſelf in this nature, he perceives himſelf Touch'd and Affected almoſt in the ſame manner,

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by two so different things; For in fine 'tis of the greatest Consequence to make a good use of this Liberty by perpetually bridling in our Consent, and Affection to things till we find our selves as it were forc'd to let them go, by the Commanding Voice of the Author of Nature, which I call'd before the Reproaches of our Reason, and the Remorse of our Consciences.

All the Duties of Spiritual Beings, as well Angels as Men, consists principally in the good use of this Liberty; and we may say without any scruple, That if they carefully Imploy their Liberty, and not preposterously render themselves slaves to Lies and Vanity, they are in the ready way to the greatest Perfection they are naturally capable of: Provided in the mean time their *Understanding* stands not idle, and that they are careful continually to excite it to new Discoveries, and that they render themselves dispos'd for the Reception of greater Truths, by perpetually Meditating on Subjects worthy of their Attention.

For that the Mind may advance to its Perfection, it will not suffice a Man constantly to make use of its Liberty, by Consenting to nothing at all: like those Men who take Pride in Knowing nothing, in doubting and boggling at every thing in Nature: Nor on the other hand must he Consent to all things like many Others, who fear nothing so much as to be Ignorant of any thing, and pretend to Universal Knowledge. But he must make so good use of his *Understanding*, by continual Meditations, as to find himself in a Capacity of being able to Consent to what it represents, without Fear or Danger of being Deceiv'd.

CHAP. III.

I. *The Answers to some Objections.* II. *Observations upon what has been said concerning the necessity of Evidence.*

'TIS no hard thing to fore-see that the Practice of the First Rule, which I have been treating of in the fore-going Chapter, will not go very well down with a great part of Mankind: But especially with those Imaginary Philosophers, who pretend to the Knowledge of every thing, but really know Nothing at all: who please themselves in talking Positively upon the most difficult Subjects, and yet are certainly at the same time Ignorant, of the more Ordinary and Easy.

I. *The Answer to some Objections.*

I question not but they would be ready to say with *Aristotle*, That Absolute *Certainty* is no where to be sought for, but in the *Mathematicks*; That *Physicks* and *Moral Philosophy* are such Sciences as take up with meer *Probability*. That *Des-Cartes* was very much out in his Design of handling *Physicks* like *Geometry*; and that for that Reason he had no better Success. That 'tis not possible for Men to arrive to the Knowledge of Nature, that her Secret Springs and Movements lye too deep to be piere'd by an Humane Mind; with a great deal more of such fine Things as these, which they put off with Pomp and Ostentation, and which they support with the Authority of a vast Flight of *Authors*, whose Names they can repeat, and out of which they can quote a Passage on Occasion; and this is sufficient for them to plume themselves and look big upon.

I would heartily beg of these Gentlemen, they would leave off talking of those things which they themselves acknowledge they do not Understand; and would put a stop to the ridiculous Motives of their Vanity, by ceasing to compose large Volumes on those Subjects which by their own Confession they Know nothing of.

But I would have those Men seriously examine, whether one of these two Things is not absolutely Necessary, either to fall into Error, or never to give an entire Consent, except to things entirely Evident; Whether the Reason that *Geometry* is ever attended with *Truth*, may not be ascrib'd to the *Geometricians* Observation of that Rule: and whether the Errors some have fallen into touching the *Quadrature* of the *Circle*, the *Duplication* of the *Cube*, and some other very difficult Problems, have not proceeded from an heady and conceited rashness which has possess'd them with *Likelihoods*, and made them pass for *Truths*.

Let them consider likewise on another hand, whether the Cause of Error and Confusion's reigning so much in the Ordinary Philosophy, may not be imputed to the Philosophers contenting themselves with Probability, very easy and obvious to be met with, and highly advantagious to their Vain Humour and their Interests? Do not we almost every where find an infinite Diversity of Opinions upon the same Subjects, and consequently infinite Errors. Notwithstanding a prodigious number of Disciples give way to their own Seducements, and submit themselves blind-fold to the Authority of these Philosophers, without so much as Understanding what they mean.

It is true there are some of them that after twenty or thirty Years time lost, confess they have learnt nothing by their Reading; but yet this their Confession is not so Ingenuous as it should be. They think it requisite first to prove after their fashion, that nothing can be known; and after that they will make Confession of their Ignorance, as Believing then they have the Priviledge of doing it without being laught at for their pains.

Yet were a Man disposʼd to entertain himself, he would not want a proper Subject for his Laughter and Diversion, should he handsomely Interrogate them, concerning the Progress of their Learned Acquisitions; and were they in Humour to declare in particular all the Fatigues they have undergone in the Study and purchase of *Nothing*.

But though this their Learnʼd and profound Ignorance deserves to be well rallyʼd, yet it seems not amiss to spare them at present, and to commiserate those who have spent so many Years in learning *nothing* but that false Proposition, the irreconcileable enemy to all Science and to all Truth, *That nothing can be known*.

Since then the *Rule* I have establishʼd is so necessary as has been seen, in the *Search after Truth*, let no Man cavil at the proposing it. And let not those, who will not be at the pains of observing it themselves, be forward to condemn so celebrated an Author as *Des-Cartes* for following it, or according to their Notion, for indeavouring so zealously to follow it.

They would not be so peremptory to condemn him, did they know the Man on whom they pass so rash and unadvis'd a Sentence, and did they not read his Works as they do Fables and Romances, which they take up to entertain their idle Minutes, but never to Study or be Instructed in. Would they Meditate with that Author, they might probably still find in themselves some Notions and Scatterʼd Seeds of Truth, which he teaches, that would grow up, and unfold themselves in spight of so disadvantagious a Load of mistaken Learning which oppresses them.

The Master that speaks and teaches us *within*, challenges our Submission to him rather than to the Authority of the greatest Philosophers: He takes pleasure in Instructing us, provided we apply our Minds to what he says. 'Tis by Meditation and a very exact Attention we Inquire of him; and 'tis by a certain internal Conviction and the secret Lashes and Reproaches felt upon our Non-submission that he answers us.

We ought in such wise to read the Works of Men, as not to expect to receive Instruction from Men: We must consult Him who Enlightens the World, that with the Rest of the World he may Enlighten us. And if he fails to Enlighten us, after we have consulted him, 'tis doubtless, because we have ill consulted him.

Whether then we read *Aristotle* or whether we read *Des-Cartes*, we must not instantly believe either *Aristotle* or *Des-Cartes*: But we should only Meditate as they have done, or as they ought to have done, with all the Earnestness and Attention we are capable of, and thereupon Obey the Voice of our Common Master, and honestly yield up our Consent to that Internal Conviction, and those Motions we find in us upon our Meditation.

This being done, it may be allowʼd a Man to pass a Judgment for or against an Author. But he must first have digested the Principles of *Des-Cartes* and *Aristole*'s Philosophy before he can reject the one, and approve the other; before he can maintain concerning the *Latter*, that no one *Phænomenon* of Nature can ever be explain'd by the Principles peculiar to him, as they have been of no use for this two thousand Years, though his *Philosophy* hath been the Study of the most Ingenious Men in most parts of the World: and on the contrary, before he can boldly pronounce of the *Other*, that he hath penetrated those recesses of Nature that lay deepest conceal'd from the Eyes of Men, and hath open'd to them a most certain and infallible way of Discovering all the Truths 'tis possible for a limited Understanding to Comprehend.

But not to dwell upon the Notion we may conceive of these two Philosophers, and of all others; let us ever look upon them as Men: And let not those of *Aristotle*'s Party take it ill, if after they have travell'd so many Ages in the Dark without finding themselves one step farther advanc'd than at their Setting out; there are some at last that have a Mind to see clearly what they do: and if after the former have suffer'd themselves to be led like the blind, there are those who remember they have Eyes with which they will attempt to conduct themselves.

Let us then be fully persuaded that this *Rule*, viz. *That an entire Consent should never be given*, but to *things evidently perceiv'd*, is the most necessary of all others in the *Search after Truth*; and let not our Mind embrace any thing as True, which is not accompany'd with all the Evidence it demands. 'Tis requisite we should be persuaded of this to disburden us of our Prejudices: and 'tis absolutely necessary we should entirely quit our Prejudices, to enter into the Knowledge of Truth, for as much as there is an absolute Necessity that our Mind be purify'd before it be Inlightned. *Sapientia prima Stultitiâ caruisse.*

II. *Observations on what has been said concerning the necessity of Evidence.*

But before I conclude this Chapter, 'tis necessary to observe three Things. The First is, That I speak not here of things of *Faith*, which have no Evidence attending them, as have Natural Sciences: The Reason of which seems to be this, That we can have no Apprehension of Things but from the Idea's we have of them. Now the Idea's we have, are only given us by God according to our Exigencies and the need we have of them to conduct us in the Natural Order of Things, according to which he has created us. So that the Mysteries of *Faith* being of a Supernatural Order, we need not wonder if we want that Evidence, since we want the Idea's of them; because our Souls were created by vertue of a General Decree, through which we have all the Notions that are necessary for us, but the Mysteries of Faith have receiv'd their Establishment only from an *Order* of

See the Illustrations.

Grace;

Grace, which in our ordinary way of Conception, is a Decree posteriour to this *Order* of *Nature*.

Mysteries then of *Faith* must be distinguish'd from *things* of *Nature*: We ought equally to submit to Faith and to Evidence: but in the concernments of Faith, we must not look for Evidence: as in those of Nature, we ought not to take up with Faith: That is, with the Authority of Philosophers. In a word, to be a Believer, 'tis requir'd to *assent blindly*, but to be a Philosopher, it is necessary to *See plainly*.

'Tis not however to be deny'd but there are some Truths besides those of Faith, for which it would be unreasonable to demand indisputable Demonstrations, as are those which relate to Matter of Fact in History, and other things which have their dependance on the Will of Men. For there are two kinds of Truth; the one *Necessary*, the other *Contingent*. I call those *Necessary Truths* which are of an immutable Nature, and which have been fix'd and determin'd by the Will of God, which is not subject to Change. All other sorts of Truth are *Contingent*. *Mathematicks*, *Physicks*, *Metaphysicks*, as also a great part of *Morality* contain *Necessary Truths*: *History*, *Grammar*, *Private Right*, or *Customs*, and such other things as depend on the changeable Will of Man, contain only *Contingent Truths*.

We demand therefore an exact Observation of the Rule we have been establishing, in the *Search of Necessary Truths*, the Knowledge of which may be call'd Science; and we must be content with the greatest Probability in History, which includes the Knowledge of things *Contingent*. For under the Name of History may be concluded the Knowledge of Languages, Customs, as also of the different Opinions of Philosophers; when Men have learnt them by Memory, without having either Evidence or Certainty concerning them.

The Second thing to be Observ'd, is that in *Morality*, *Politicks* and *Medicine*, and in all *Practical Sciences*, we are obliged to be content with *Probability*; Not Universally, but upon occasion; not because it satisfies the Mind, but because the Instance is pressing: and if a Man should always delay Acting, till he had perfect Assurance of Success, the Opportunity would be often lost. But though it falls out that a Man must inevitably act, yet he should in acting doubt of the Success of what he does: and he should indeavour to make such Advances in Sciences, as to be able on Emergencies to act with greater Certainty; For this should be the constant end of all Mens Study and Employment, who make any use of Thought.

The Third and last thing is this, That we should not absolutely despise Probabilities, since it often happens that many of them in Conjunction, have as convincing a force, as most evident Demonstrations. Of which Nature there are infinite Examples to be found in *Physicks* and *Morality*: so that 'tis then expedient to amass together a sufficient number of them in subjects not otherwise Demonstrable, in order to come to the Knowledge of *Truth*, impossible to be found out any other way.

And now I must needs confess that the Law I impose is very Rigorous and Severe; That there are abundance of Those who had rather renounce Reasoning at all, than reason on such Conditions; That 'tis impossible to run so fast, with such retarding Circumspections. However, it must be granted me, that a Man shall walk with greater Security in observing it, and that hitherto those who have march'd so hastily, have been obliged to return upon the same Ground: Besides there are a great number of Men who will agree with me in this, That since *Monsieur Des-Cartes* has discover'd more Truths in Thirty Years, than all the *Philosophers* that preceded him, meerly for his Submission to that Law; if many others would study *Philosophy* as he has done, we should in time be acquainted with the greatest part of those things which are necessary to make Life as happy as is possible, upon an Earth which God has Curs'd.

CHAP. IV.

I. *Of the occasional causes of Error, whereof there are five principal.* II. *The general Design of the whole Work.* III. *The particular Design of the First Book.*

WE have seen from what has been said, that a Man falls not into *Error*, but for want of making a due use of his *Liberty*; that 'tis for want of curbing that eagerness, and moderating that heat which pushes the Will on to the embracing the outward *Appearances of Truth*, that he is deceiv'd: And that *Error* consists only in the *Consent* of the *Will*, which has a greater Latitude than the *Perception* of the Understanding, since we should never err if we only simply *judg'd* according as we *perceiv'd*.

I. Of the Occasional Causes of our Errors, and that there are five principal.

But though to speak properly there is no other cause of *Error*, than the betraying of the Liberty of the Will, it may notwithstanding, be said we have several Faculties that are the Causes of our Errors; not *Real* Causes, but such as may be term'd *Occasional*: All the ways of our *Perceiving* are so many *occasions* of *Deceiving* us. For since our false Judgments include two things, namely the *Consent of the Will*, and the *Perception of the Understanding*, it

it is manifeſt that all the ways of our Perception, may afford us ſome occaſion or other of falling into Error. For as much as they may incline us to raſh and precipitate Conſents.

But becauſe it is neceſſary forthwith to make the Soul ſenſible of her Weakneſſes and Wandrings in order to poſſeſs Her with juſt Deſires of a Deliverance from them, and that ſhe may with greater eaſe ſhake off her Prejudices: we will endeavour to make an exact Diviſion of her Manners of Perception; which may ſerve as ſo many heads to one or other of which, may be referr'd as we proceed, the different Errors whereunto we are obnoxious.

The Soul has three ſeveral ways of *Perception*: By *Pure Intellect*, by *Imagination*, and by the *Senſes*.

By *Pure Intellect*, ſhe perceives things Spiritual, Univerſals, Common Notions, The Idea of Perfection, that of a Being infinitely perfect, and in general her own thoughts, when ſhe knows them by a Reflection made upon her ſelf: 'Tis likewiſe by *Pure Intellect* ſhe perceives Material things, Extention with its Properties. For 'tis the pure Underſtanding only which is capable of Perceiving a Circle, and a perfect Square, a Figure of a thouſand ſides, and ſuch like things. Such ſort of Perceptions bear the name of *Pure Intellections* or *Pure Perceptions*, ſince there is no neceſſity of the Mind's formings Corporeal Images in the Brain to repreſent them by.

By *Imagination*, the Soul only perceives things Material, when being Abſent ſhe makes them preſent to her by forming the Images of them in the Brain. This is the way whereby a Man Imagines all ſorts of Figures, a Circle, a Triangle, a Face, an Horſe, Towns and Fields, whether he has already ſeen them or not. This ſort of Perceptions, we may call *Imaginations*, becauſe the Soul repreſents to her ſelf theſe things, by framing Images of them in the Brain. And for as much as Spiritual things cannot be repreſented by any Image, it follows the Soul cannot imagine them; which is a thing worthy to be remembred.

Laſtly, By *Senſe* the Soul perceives only Senſible, groſs and ruder Objects, when being preſent they cauſe an Impreſſion on the external Organs of her Body. Thus it is the Soul *ſees* things plain and rugged, preſent to her Eyes, thus ſhe knows the Hardneſs of Iron, the point of a Sword, and the like; and this kind of Perceptions one may call *Sentiments* or *Senſations*.

The Soul then has no more than theſe three ways of Perceiving; which will eaſily be granted, if we conſider that the things we perceive are either *Spiritual* or *Material*. If they be *Spiritual*, they are perceptible only by the *Pure Underſtanding*. If they be *Material*, they are either Preſent or Abſent. If they be Abſent, the ordinary way of the Soul's repreſenting them is by the *Imagination*: But if they be preſent, the Soul can perceive them by the Impreſſions they make upon her Senſes. And thus Our Souls are not capable of more than a three-fold Perception, by *Pure Intellect*, by *Imagination*, and by *Senſe*.

Theſe three Faculties therefore may be lookt upon as ſo many certain Heads, to which we may reduce the Errors of Men, and the Cauſes of their Errors, and ſo avoid the confuſion into which the multitude of them would infallibly caſt us, ſhould we talk of them without Order or Method.

But moreover, our Inclinations and our Paſſions act very ſtrongly upon us: They dazle our Mind with their falſe Lights, and overcaſt and fill it with Clouds and Darkneſs. Thus Our Inclinations and our Paſſions engage us in an infinite number of Errors, when we ſuffer our ſelves to be guided by that falſe Light, and abuſive glare which they produce within us. We muſt then together with the three Faculties of the Mind, conſider them as the Sources of our Deviations and Delinquencies, and add to the Errors of *Senſe*, *Imagination* and *Pure Intellect*, thoſe which may be charg'd upon the *Paſſions* and *Natural Inclinations*. And ſo all the Errors of Men and the Cauſes of them, may be reduc'd to five Heads, and we ſhall treat of them according to that Order.

II. *The General Deſign of the whole Work.*

Firſt, we ſhall ſpeak of the *Errors* of the *Senſes*; Secondly, of the *Errors* of *Imagination*; Thirdly, of the *Errors* of the *Pure Intellect*; Fourthly, of the *Errors* of our *Inclinations*; and Fifthly, of the *Errors* of the *Paſſions*. And thus having made an Eſſay to rid the Soul of the Errors what ſhe's ſubject to, we ſhall lay down a General Method to Conduct her in the *Search after Truth*.

III. *The particular Deſign of the firſt Book.*

We will begin with an Explication of the *Errors* of our *Senſes*, or rather of the Errors into which we fall for want of making the due uſe, we ſhould do of our Senſes: and here we ſhall not ſo much deſcend to our Particular Errors, which are almoſt infinite, as fix upon the general Cauſes of our Errors, and ſuch things as ſeem moſt neceſſary to inform us of the Nature of an Humane Mind.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the SENSES.

I. *Two ways of explaining how they were corrupted by Sin.* II. *That 'tis our Liberty, and not our Senses, which is the true Cause of our Errors.* III. *A Rule for avoiding Error in the use of our Senses*

UPON an attentive Consideration of the Senses and Passions of Man, we find them so well proportion'd to the End for which they were given us, that we can by no means agree with those who say, they are to all intents and purposes debauch'd and spoil'd by Original Sin. But that it may appear it is not without Reason we are of a different Opinion, it is necessary to Explain, in what manner we may conceive the Order and Regularity which was to be seen in the Faculties and Passions of our First Parent in his State of Innocence, and the Changes, and Disorders that were consequent to his Fall. Now there are Two ways of Conceiving these things: of which this is the First.

1. *Two ways of explaining how our Senses were corrupted by Sin.*

That it seems to be a generally receiv'd Notion, That to the end Humane Affairs should be rightly disposed, the Soul ought to perceive lesser or greater Pleasures, according to the proportion of the Littleness or Greatness of the Goods which she enjoys. Pleasure is an Instinct of Nature, or to speak clearer, 'tis an Impression of God himself, who inclines us towards some Good; which Impression should be so much stronger, by how much that Good is greater. According to which Principle, it seem not to be contested that our first Parent before his Sin, coming fresh out of the Hands of his Maker, found greater Pleasures in the most solid Goods, than in those that were not so. Wherefore since he was created in order to Love God who created him, and that God was his truest Good; it may be said, God gave him a Taste and Relish of himself; That he inclin'd him to the Love of the Divine Perfection, by a Sense of Pleasure, and that he possess'd him with those Internal Satisfactions in his Duty (that counter-balanc't the greatest Pleasures of the Senses) whereof since the State of Sin, Man is altogether insensible without a Supernatural Assistance and particular gift of Grace.

Notwithstanding, since he had a Body which God design'd he should take care of, and look upon as a Part of himself, he gave him to Perceive by the Mediation of his Senses, Pleasures like those we our selves are sensible of, in the use of things which are proper for, and adapted to the Preservation of our Life and Being.

We presume not here to determine whether the First Man before his Fall, had a Power to hinder agreeable or disagreeable Sensations, in the instant that the principal part of his Brain was agitated by the Actual Impression of Sensible Objects: possibly he had that *Soveraignty* over himself, because of his *Subjection* to the Will of God, though the contrary Opinion seems more probable. For though *Adam* might stop the Commotions of the Blood and Spirits, and the Vibrations of the Fibres of his Brain, which Objects excited in it, because being in a Regular State, his Body must needs submit to his Mind: yet it is not probable, he was able to prevent the Sensations of Objects at the time he had not stopt the Motions they produc'd in that Part of his Body, to which his Soul was immediately united. For the Union of the Soul and Body consisting principally in the mutual Relation there is betwixt Sensations, and the Motions of the Organs, this Union would rather seem Arbitrary than Natural, if *Adam* had been capable of hindring Sensation, when the Principal Part of his Body receiv'd an Impression from those round about it. However I declare for neither of the two Opinions.

The First Man therefore felt Pleasure in that which was Perfective of his Body, as he felt it in that which was Perfective of his Soul; And because he was constituted in a Perfect State, he found that of the Soul far greater than that of the Body. Thus it was infinitely easier for him to preserve his Righteousness, than for Us without the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST*; since without this we have no Delight or Satisfaction in our Duty. Albeit, he misfortunately suffer'd himself to be seduc'd: he lost that Uprightness by his Disobedience; and the Principal Change he underwent, and which was the cause of all the Confusion of his Senses and his Passions, was that *GOD*, by way of punitive Justice withdrew himself from him, and would no longer be his *Good*; or rather Ceas'd to make him sensible of that Pleasure, which pointed out and directed him to *GOD*, as his Sovereign Good. So that Sensible Pleasures, which only carry'd him to the Injoyment of the Goods of the Body, being left alone and no longer counterpois'd by those, which drew him to his True and Proper Good; the close Union that he had with *GOD* was wonderfully loosen'd, and that which he had with his Body, as much strengthened or increas'd, sensible Pleasure having got the Dominion

S. Gregor. Homil. 29. upon the Gospels.

debauch'd his Morals, by faſtening him upon all Senſible Objects; and this Corruption of his Morals darkned his Intellectual Purity, by turning him from that Light which Enlightned him, and inducing him to form his Judgments on things, only from the Relation or Analogy they could have to his Body.

But to the Nature of the thing it ſelf, it cannot be ſaid, That the Change which happen'd on Part of the Senſes was very conſiderable. For as when two Weights are plac'd in *Equilibrium* in a Balance, if you take away one of them, the oppoſite Scale will be weigh'd down by the other, without any alteration on part of the former weight, ſince that ſtill remains the ſame: So after Sin, the Pleaſures of Senſe bar'd and weigh'd down the Soul towards Senſible Objects, for want of thoſe Internal Delectations which, before Sin, counterpois'd that Inclination unto ſenſible Good; but without any ſo Subſtantial a Change in point of the Senſes, as is generally Imagin'd.

I come now to the *Second Way* of accounting for the Diſorders introduc'd by Sin, which is certainly more Reaſonable than that we have been explaning. It is very different from it, becauſe it is founded on a different Principle; Yet both theſe ways are very conſiſtent and agreeable as to what reſpects the Senſes.

Being we are made up of a Body and a Mind, there are two ſorts of Goods to imploy our Reſearches about, the Goods of the Body, and the Goods of the Mind. We have likewiſe two means of Diſcovering it by uſing the Mind alone, or by the uſe of the Mind in Conjunction with the Body. We can know our Good by a clear and diſtinct Knowledge; we can know it likewiſe by a dark and confus'd Senſation. Reaſon teaches me that Righteouſneſs is Amiable; My Taſte informs me that ſuch a Fruit is Good. The Beauty of Righteouſneſs is not *Senſible*, nor the Goodneſs of a Fruit *Intelligible*. The Goods of the Body deſerve not the application of the Mind, which *GOD* has created only for himſelf: It muſt needs be then, That the Mind acknowledges ſuch kind of Goods without Examination, and by the ſhort and incontroverted Proof of Senſation. Stones are not fit for Nouriſhment, the Tryal is a convincing Argument, and the Taſte alone has made all Mankind agree to it.

Pleaſure then and Pain are the Natural and undoubted Characters of Good and Evil; I confeſs it: but 'tis only ſo in reſpect of thoſe things which having no Power of being Good and Evil in themſelves, cannot be known for ſuch by a Knowledge clear and evident; 'tis ſo in regard of thoſe things only, which being inferior to the Mind, can neither Puniſh nor reward it: In fine, 'tis only ſo in point of ſuch things and Objects as are undeſerving of the Soul's Application, and concern about them; ſuch things as *GOD*, not willing we ſhould be taken up with, inclines us to by *Inſtinct*, that is by Agreeable or Diſagreeable ſenſations.

But as for *GOD*, who is the True and only Good of the Mind, who is alone above it, who alone can reward it in a thouſand different ways; who is only worthy of its Application, and who is under no Fear of not being found Amiable by thoſe that know him; he is not content to be belov'd by a blind and *Inſtinctive* Love, he will be lov'd by a *Rational* Love, and a Love of *Choice*.

If the Mind ſaw only in Bodies what was really in them, without being ſenſible of what was not therein, it could not poſſibly Love them, nor make uſe of them without great Pain and Reluctancy; ſo that it is as it were neceſſary they ſhould appear Agreeable, by producing Senſations, of which themſelves are Deſtitute. But 'tis far from being ſo with *GOD*. 'Tis ſufficient to ſee him ſuch as he is, to be inclin'd to love him as we ought: nor is there any Neceſſity he ſhould imploy that *Inſtinct of Pleaſure* as a kind of Bait and Artifice to allure our Love, without deſerving it. The Pleaſure which the Bleſſed enjoy in the Poſſeſſion of *GOD*, is not ſo much an *Inſtinct* which inclines them to the Love of Him, as the *Recompence* of their Love. For it is not for the ſake of that Pleaſure that they love *GOD*, but becauſe they manifeſtly know Him to be their True, their Only Good.

See the Illuſtrations.

This being the Caſe, it ought to be concluded, That *Adam* was not invited to the Love of *GOD* and the reſt of his Duty by a *Preventing Pleaſure*: for as much as the Knowledge which he had of *GOD*, as of his Good, and the Joy he was continually poſſeſs'd with, neceſſarily conſequent to the View of his Felicity, in his Uniting himſelf with *GOD*, were ſufficient Motives to recommend his Duty to him, and to make his Actions more Meritorious, than if he had been as it were determin'd to it by a *Preventing Pleaſure*: In this manner he was in perfect *Liberty*. And 'tis poſſibly in this Capacity the Scripture means to repreſent Him to us in theſe words, ——*He himſelf made Man from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his Counſel, to keep the Commandments*, &c. Eccleſ. 15. 14. That is, kept him cloſely united to Himſelf, only through the clear View he gave him of his Happineſs and his Duty, without alluring him to it by any taſte of a *Preventing Pleaſure*. But Experience has convinc'd us, to the Eternal Reproach of *Free Will*, and the *Glory of GOD* alone, of the Frailty *Adam* was obnoxius to, even in a State of ſuch Perfect Order and Sublime Happineſs, as was that, he was poſſeſs'd of before his Diſobedience.

Deus ab initio conſtituit hominem, & reliquit illum in manu Conſilii ſui. adjecit mandata & præcepta ſua. &c. *Eccl.* 15. 14.

But it cannot be ſaid *Adam* was inclin'd to the Searching out, and Uſing of Senſible things, through a nice and exact Knowledge of the Relation and Correſpondence they might bear to his Body. For indeed, if it had been neceſſary for him to have examin'd the Configurations of the parts of any Fruit, thoſe likewiſe of all the parts of his Body, and the Agree-

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ment and Disagreement resulting, to each other from their respective Constitution, before he could judge whether as to the present Temperature of his Blood, and a thousand other Dispositions of his Body, that Fruit was good for his Nourishment; it is plain that the whole Capacity of his Mind had been intirely fill'd up, with things altogether unworthy of its Application: and that too to very little Purpose, since we see he was not able to preserve himself long, though we suppose him so accomplisht.

Upon Consideration then that the Mind of *Adam* was not Infinite, it should not be taken ill, that we say he was not acquainted with all the Properties of Bodies, that encompass'd him; since it is certain those Properties are Infinite. And if it be granted, which no Man of any Attention can deny, that his Mind was not made to examine the Motions and Configurations of Matter, but to be continually Intent on *GOD*; we need incur no Blame, in Maintaining, it had been a Disorder and Irregularity, at a time when all things should have been perfectly adjusted, if he had been oblig'd to call off his Mind from the View of the Perfections of his Sovereign Good, to contemplate the Nature of a Fruit and Examine whether it was fit to nourish him.

Adam then was furnisht with Senses like to ours, by which he was admonisht, without being taken off from the Contemplations of *GOD*, of what was necessary for him to do for the Preservation of his Body: He was sensible of Pleasures as we are, and also of Preventing and indeliberate Pains and Dislikes. But those Pleasures, and those Pains were incapable of inslaving him, and rendering him Unhappy as they do us; for as much as being absolute Master of all the Motions excited in his Body, he could quiet them in the same instant (if he desir'd it) that he was aware of them: And doubtless he always desir'd it in respect of Pain. Happy had we been, if he had done the same thing in respect of Pleasure too, and had he not Voluntarily divorc'd himself from the Union and Presence of his *GOD*, by suffering the Capacity of his Mind to be fill'd with the Beauty, and the expected Sweets of a forbidden Fruit, or possibly with a presumptious Joy kindled in his Soul, upon Reflection on his own Natural Perfections.

But after he had sinn'd, those Pleasures which before only respectfully Caution'd him; and those Pains which, not disturbing his Felicity, only gave him to understand he was capable of losing it, and becoming Miserable, presery'd no longer that Deference and Submission. His Senses and his Passions obey'd not his Orders, rebell'd against him, and enslav'd him as they do us to all kinds of Sensible Objects.

Thus the Senses and the Passions in no wise ow'd their Birth to Sin, but only their Power of Tyrannizing over Sinners: And that Power was not so much a Disorder on part of the Senses, as it was of the Mind or the Will of Man, who having loosen'd the strict Union which he had with *GOD*, receiv'd no longer that Light and that Strength by means whereof he preserved his Liberty and his Happiness.

Upon concluding these two Ways of Explaining the Disorders Sin has been the Cause of, we ought to infer that there are two things necessary to re-instate us in the Order of Nature.

A Remedy for the Disorder which Original Sin has caus'd in the World, and the Foundation of Christian Morality.

The first is this, That we should take off, from that weight which sinks us down, and bends us towards sensible Goods, by a continual defalcation of our Pleasures, and by mortifying the sensibility of our Senses by Repentance and Circumcision of heart.

The second is this, That we ought to implore of *GOD* the poize of his Grace, and that *Preventing Delight*, which * *JESUS CHRIST* has particularly merited for us, without which (let us lighten the former Scale as much as we can,) it will constantly be lowermost; and (though never so little heavier) will infallibly sink us into Sin and Disorder.

* *See the Illustrations.*

These two things are absolutely necessary to restore us to, and continue us in our Duty. *Reason*, as we see, agrees intirely with the *Gospel*, by both which we are taught, that the Privation, Denegation and Diminution of the *Weight of Sin*, are necessary Preparatives for *Weight of Grace* to re-establish us and unite us unto *GOD*.

But though in this State of Ours, we are under a Perpetual Obligation of warring with our Senses, yet we should not conclude from thence, they are absolutely corrupted, or disorder'd. For if it be consider'd, that they were given us for the Preservation of our Body, we shall find them acquit themselves of their Duty so excellently well, and conduct us in that just and faithful manner to their End, that they seem to be injuriously charg'd with Corruptness and Irregularity: They so readily advertise the Soul by Pleasure and Pain, by agreeable and disagreeable Tasts and other Sensations, of what she ought to do, or not to do, for the preservation of Life, that it cannot but be unreasonably said, that this Order and this Exactness are the consequents of Sin.

II. *That our Liberty, not our Senses is the true Cause of our Errors.*

Our Senses therefore are not Corrupted as is imagin'd, but 'tis that which is more Inward and Essential to the Soul, 'tis our Liberty which is corrupted. They are not our Senses that deceive us, but the Will by its rash and precipitate Judgments, leads us into Error. When, for instance, we see Light, it is most certain that we see Light, when a Man feels Heat, he is not mistaken in believing that he Feels it, whether before or after the first Sin. But thus we deceive our selves in judging that the Heat which is felt, is out of the Soul which feels it, as we shall explain hereafter.

The Senses then would in no wise cast us into Error, did we not imploy our Liberty amiss,

and judge of things upon their Report, without ſufficient Caution and Advertency. But becauſe it is very difficult to help this, and we are as it were forc'd to't, on the account of the ſtrict Union of our Soul and Body, ſee in what manner we ought to behave our ſelves in uſing them, that we may avoid falling into Error.

III. *A Rule for avoiding Error in the uſe of our Senſes.*

We ought exactly to obſerve this Rule; *Never to judge by the Senſes what things are in themſelves, but only of the Relation they have to one another*: Becauſe indeed the Senſes were not given us for the Knowledge of things as they are in their own Nature, but only for the Preſervation of our Body.

But that we may be altogether deliver'd from that Facility and Inclination we have to follow the Guidance of the Senſes in the *Search after Truth*, we ſhall in the ſucceeding Chapters, give a Summary of the moſt Principal and General Errors into which they throw us, whereby the Truth of what we have been advancing will be manifeſt and acknowledg'd.

CHAP. VI.

I. *Of the Errors of Sight in reſpect of Extention* abſolutely *conſider'd.* II. *A Continuation of theſe Errors about inviſible Objects.* III. *Of the Errors of Sight touching extenſion* relatively *conſider'd.*

THE *Sight* is the Firſt, the moſt Noble and Comprehenſive of all the Senſes, in ſo much that had it been given us for the Diſcovery of Truth, it alone had had more to do than all the Other; wherefore if we can overthrow the Authority the Eyes obtain over our Reaſon, it will be ſufficient to undeceive us; and to poſſeſs us with a general diſtruſt of all the other Senſes.

Our buſineſs therefore is to make it appear, That we ought in no wiſe to rely on the Teſtimony of our Sight, in our Judgment of the Truth of things, as they are in their own Nature, but only in diſcovering the Relation they have to the welfare and preſervation of our Body. That our Eyes generally deceive us in all the Repreſentations they make of things, in the Magnitude in the Figures, and Motions of Bodies, in Light and Colours, which are the only things we ſee: That none of theſe things are really what they ſeem to be; that all Mankind is miſtaken in them, and that hereby we fall into other Errors numberleſs and infinite.

I. *Of the Errors of Sight in reſpect of Extention abſolutely conſider'd.*

We begin with Extention. Lo! then the Reaſons that induce us to believe that our Eyes never repreſent it to us ſuch as it is in it ſelf. With glaſſes we diſcover as often as we pleaſe, Animals much leſs than a grain of Sand, which is almoſt inviſible: * Nay, there have been ſeen a thouſand times leſs than they.

* *See the Journal of the Learned, Nov. 12. 1668.*

Theſe animated Atoms walk and move no leſs than other Animals: therefore they muſt have Legs and Feet, Bones in their Legs to ſupport them, Muſcles to move them, Tendons and infinite Fibres in every Muſcle, laſtly Blood or animal Spirits extreamly ſubtil and refin'd, either to fill or make theſe Muſcles move ſucceſſively. Without this it is impoſſible to conceive they live, are nouriſht, or tranſlate their little Bodies into different places, according to the different Impreſſions of objects: or rather 'tis impoſſible for thoſe Men themſelves who have ſpent all their Life in Anatomy, and in diſcloſing Nature, to imagine the number, the Diverſity, the delicacy, of all the parts theſe little Bodies are neceſſarily compounded of, whereby they live and perform all thoſe things we ſee them do.

The Imagination is loſt and confounded at ſo incredible a littleneſs; it cannot catch the vaniſhing parts, nor take hold of them, as being too little to be graſp'd by it: And though Reaſon juſtifies our Aſſertion, the Senſes and Imagination withſtand the Conviction, and bring us back to Doubt and Uncertainty.

Our Sight is extreamly ſhort and limited; but it ought not to preſcribe limits to its object: The Idea it gives us of Extention has very narrow bounds, but it does not from thence follow the bounds of Extention are ſo. It is doubtleſs infinite in a certain ſenſe: and that diminutive part of Matter which is hidden from our Eyes is capable of containing a World, in which may be hid as many things, though leſs proportionably, as appear in this great World in which we live.

Theſe little Creatures, which we have been ſpeaking of, may poſſibly have other little Animals to prey upon them, and which are imperceptible to them by reaſon of their unſpeakable ſmalneſs, as the others are imperceptible to us. What an Hand-worm is in compariſon to us, that thoſe little Animals are in reſpect of an Hand-worm; and perhaps there may be in Nature leſs, and leſs ſtill to infinity, proceeding in that prodigious proportion of a Man to an Hand-worm.

We have Evident and Mathematical Demonſtrations of the Diviſibility of Matter *in infinitum*, and that's enough to perſwade us there may be Animals, ſtill leſs and leſs than others

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in infinitum; though our Imagination is frighted and ſtarts at ſuch a conception. GOD made Matter only to frame his wonderful Works out of it; wherefore ſince we are certain that theſe are no parts of it, the Minuteneſs whereof is capable of giving Limits to his power, in the formation of theſe little Animals, why ſhould we unreaſonably confine and leſſen the Idea of an Infinite Artiſt by meaſuring the Greatneſs and Depth of his Power and Wiſdom, by our finite and ſhallow Imagination?

We have been in part undeceiv'd by Experiment, which hath diſcover'd to us ſuch Animals as are a thouſand times leſs than an Hand-worm, why ſhould we ſuppoſe that they are the Leaſt and the Leaſt of all? For my part I ſee no reaſon to imagine it: 'Tis much more reaſonable to be believ'd, there are far leſs than thoſe already diſcover'd: For in fine, little Animals are never wanting for the Microſcopes, but we want Microſcopes for them.

If one examines in the midſt of Winter the Cicatricle of a Tulip-root, with a plain Magnifying or a convex glaſs, or even with the bare Eye, one may eaſily diſcover in it the leaves which are to become green: thoſe which are to make the Flower or the Tulip, the little triangular part which contains the Seed, and the ſix little columns that incompaſs it at the bottom of the Tulip. Thus it cannot be doubted but the Cicatricle of a Tulip-root contains in it a Tulip all entire.

It's reaſonable to believe the ſame thing of the Cicatricle of a grain of Muſtard, of that of the kernel of an Apple, and generally of all ſorts of Trees and Plants, though it cannot be diſcern'd with the Eye, not yet with a Microſcope; and we may with ſome ſort of certainty affirm, That all Trees lye in Miniature in the Cicatricle of their Seed.

Nor does it ſeem leſs reaſonable to think that there are infinite Trees conceal'd in a ſingle Cicatricle, ſince it not only contains the future Tree whereof it is the Seed, but alſo abundance of other Seeds, which may all include in them new Trees ſtill, and new Seeds of Trees: Which new Seeds poſſibly may be big with other Trees, and other Seeds of Trees as fruitful as the former, in an incomprehenſible littleneſs, and thus *in infinitum*. So that, according to this Notion (which will not be thought impertinent or whimſical, except by thoſe who meaſure the Wonders of the Infinite Power of GOD, by the Idea's of their Senſes and Imagination) it may be ſaid, that in the ſingle kernel of an Apple, may be involved Apple-trees, Apples and Seeds of Apple-trees, for infinite or almoſt infinite Ages; in that proportion of a perfect Apple-tree to an Apple-tree in its Seed. And, That Nature does only open and unfold theſe little trees, by giving a ſenſible growth to that which is out of its Seed and inſenſible, but moſt real increaſes, to thoſe which we conceive to be in their Seeds, in proportion to their Bigneſs. For it cannot be doubted but there are Bodies little enough to inſinuate themſelves between the Fibres of thoſe Trees, which we conceive in their Seeds, and to be ſerviceable to their Nouriſhment.

What has been ſaid of Plants and their Cicatricles, we have liberty to conceive of *Animals*, and of the Cicatricles of which they are produc'd. We ſee in the Cicatricle of a Tulip-root an entire Tulip. * We ſee in the Cicatricle of a new-laid Egg, and which had never been brooded, a Chicken, which is poſſibly compleatly form'd. We ſee † Frogs in the Eggs of Frogs, and we ſhall ſee other Animals ſtill in their Cicatricles when we have Art and Experience enough to diſcover them. But 'tis not for the Mind to ſtand ſtill, when the Eyes can go no farther: For the view of the Soul is of a greater compaſs than the ſight of the Body. Beſides this therefore, we ought to think, That all the Bodies of Men and of Beaſts, which ſhall be born or produc'd till the *End* of the World, were poſſibly created from the *Beginning* of it; I would ſay, That the Females of the original Creatures were for ought we know, created together, with all thoſe of the ſame *Species* which have been, or ſhall be, begotten or procreated whilſt the World ſtands.

* *The Cicatricle or the Sperm of the Egg is a little white ſpot upon the Yolk. See* Malpigh. de Formatione Pulli in Ovo.

† *See* Swammerdam's Miraculum Naturæ.

We might puſh this Thought much farther yet, and it may be with a great deal of Reaſon and Truth: But we have juſt cauſe to fear, leſt we ſhould be too deſirous of penetrating too far into the works of GOD: We ſee nothing but Infinities round about us: and not only our *Senſes* and our *Imagination*, are too limited to comprehend them; but the *Mind* it ſelf however *pure* and diſengag'd from Matter, is too groſs as well as too feeble to pierce into the leaſt of the works of the Almighty. 'Tis loſt, 'tis diſſipated, 'tis dazled and amazed at the view of that which according to the Language of the Senſes, is call'd an *Atom*. Notwithwithſtanding, the *Pure Intellect* has this advantage above the Imagination and the Senſes, that it aknowledges its own *Weakneß*, and the *Almightineſs* of GOD: Whereas our *Imagination* and our *Senſes* bring down the works of GOD, and audaciouſly ſet themſelves above them, and ſo throw us headlong and blind-fold into *Error*. For our *Eyes* furniſh us not with the Idea's of any of thoſe things we diſcover by *Microſcopes* and our Reaſon. We perceive not by our *Sight* any leſs Body than an *Hand-worm*, or a *Mite*. The half of an *Hand-worm* is nothing if we rely on the Report of our *Eyes*. A *Mite* is a *Mathematical* point in their account, which you can't divide, but you muſt annihilate. Our Sight then does not repreſent Extention to us as it is in it ſelf, but as it is in Relation to our Body: and becauſe the half of a Mite has no conſiderable relation to our Body, and has no influence either towards the Preſervation or Deſtruction of it, and therefore our Eyes intirely conceal it from Us.

But if we had Eyes made after the manner of Microſcopes, or rather if we were as little as Hand-worms and Mites, we ſhould judge of the Magnitude of Bodies in a far different manner. For without doubt thoſe little Animals have their eyes ſo diſpos'd as to ſee the Bodies that ſurround them and their own Bodies, far greater than we ſee them; for otherwiſe they could not receive ſuch impreſſions as were neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life, and ſo the Eyes they have would be altogether uſeleſs.

But that we may throughly explain theſe things, we muſt conſider, that our Eyes are in effect only Natural Spectacles; that their humours have the ſame way of operating as the glaſſes in the Spectacles, and that according to the figure of the Criſtalline, and its diſtance from the *Retina* we ſee objects very differently: in ſo much that we cannot be aſſur'd there are two Men in the World that ſee Bodies of the ſelf-ſame bigneſs, ſince we cannot be aſſur'd there are two Mens eyes altogether made alike.

'Tis a Propoſition which ought to be imbrac'd by all thoſe who concern themſelves with Opticks, That objects which appear equally diſtant are ſeen ſo much bigger, as the figure which is delineated in the fund of the Eye is bigger. Now it is certain that in the eyes of thoſe Perſons whoſe Cryſtalline is more convex, the Images are painted leſſer, in proportion to the convexity. Thoſe then who are ſhort-ſighted having their Cryſtalline more convex ſee the objects leſſer, than thoſe whoſe Cryſtalline is of the common ſtandard, or than old People, who want Spectacles to read with, but ſee perfectly well at a diſtance; ſince thoſe whoſe Sight is ſhort muſt neceſſarily have the Cryſtalline more convex on ſuppoſition their Eyes as to the other parts are equal.

'Twere the eaſieſt thing in Nature to demonſtrate all theſe things *Geometrically*; and were they not of the number of thoſe which are very well known, I would inſiſt longer upon them to make them evident. But becauſe ſeveral have already handled this Subject, I deſire ſuch as are willing to be inſtructed therein, to turn to them and conſult them.

Since it is not manifeſt that there are two Men in the World who ſee objects in the ſame bulk and magnitude, and generally the ſame Man ſees them bigger with his left eye than his right, according to the Obſervations which have been made, and are related in the *Journal* of the Learned from *Rome*, in *January* 1669, it is plain we ought not to build upon the teſtimony of our Eyes, ſo as to paſs our judgment from it. It is much better to attend to Reaſon, which proves to us, that we are unable to determine what is the abſolute Magnitude of Bodies which encompaſs us, or what Idea we ought to have of the Extention of a foot-ſquare, or of that of our own Body; ſo as that Idea may repreſent it to us as it is. For we learn from Reaſon, that the leaſt of all Bodies would be no longer *little*, if it were alone, ſince it is compounded of an infinite number of parts out of each of which *GOD* could frame an Earth, which yet would be but a ſingle Point in compariſon of the reſt in conjunction. Thus the Mind of Man is incapable of forming an Idea great enough to comprehend and embrace the leaſt extention in the World, ſince the Mind has bounds, but that Idea ſhould be infinite.

It is true, The Mind may come very near the Knowledge of the Relations theſe Infinites have to one another, which conſtitute the World; it may know for inſtance one of them to be double to another, and that a Fathome is the meaſure of ſix foot. Yet for all this it cannot form an Idea to it ſelf that can repreſent theſe things as they are in their own Nature.

Well, but let it be ſuppos'd that the Mind is capable of Idea's, which equal or which meaſure the Extention of Bodies, which we ſee; for it would be a difficult undertaking to convince Men of the contrary: Let us ſee what may be concluded from the Suppoſition. Doubtleſs this will be the Concluſion, That *GOD* does not deceive us: that he has not given us Eyes like glaſſes, to magnify or diminiſh the object, and therefore we ought to believe that our Eyes repreſent things as really they *are*.

'Tis true *GOD* never deceives us, but we often deceive our ſelves, by judging of things with an unwarrantable raſhneſs. For we often judge that the objects whereof we have Idea's exiſt, and likewiſe that they altogether reſemble their Idea's; when yet it often falls out that the objects are neither like their Idea's, nor do they exiſt at all.

The Exiſtence of a thing does no ways follow from our having an Idea of it, much leſs does it follow that the thing be perfectly like the Idea which we have thereof. It cannot be concluded from *GOD*'s giving us ſuch a ſenſible Idea of Magnitude upon the preſentation of a ſix foot-rule to our eyes, that this Rule has the ſame Extention, as is repreſented to us by that Idea? For firſt, All Men have not the ſame ſenſible Idea of this ſame meaſure, ſince all Men have not their eyes diſpoſed in the ſame manner. Again, The ſame Perſon has not the ſame ſenſible Idea of a ſix foot-rule; when he beholds it with his left eye, as when he views it with his right, as has been already ſaid. Finally, It often happens that the ſelf-ſame Perſon, entertains quite different Idea's of the ſame objects at different times, according as they are ſuppos'd nearer or farther off, as ſhall be explain'd in its proper place.

It is then nothing but prejudice grounded upon no good reaſon to think we ſee Bodies according to their real magnitude, for our Eyes being not given us for any other purpoſe than the ſecurity of our Body, they diſcharge their duty admirably well, in giving us ſuch Idea's of objects as are proportion'd to its magnitude.

But

But the better to conceive what ought to be our judgments concerning the Extention of Bodies, from the Report of our Eyes, let us imagine *GOD* to have created in Epitomie, out of a portion of matter of the bigneſs of a ſmall globe, an Heaven and Earth, and Men upon this Earth, with all other things, the ſame proportion being obſerv'd, as in this Grand World. Theſe little Men would ſee each other, and the parts of each other, as likewiſe the little Animals which were capable of incommoding them. Otherwiſe their Eyes would be uſeleſs to their preſervation. It is manifeſt then from this Suppoſition, theſe little Men would have Idea's of the magnitude of Bodies quite different from ours; ſince they would look upon their little World, which would be but a Ball in our account, as ſtretch'd out into infinite ſpaces, juſt as we do in reſpect of the World in which we are.

Or if this is not ſo eaſy to be conceiv'd, let us ſuppoſe *GOD* had created an Earth infinitely vaſter than this which we inhabit, ſo that this new Earth ſhould be to ours, what ours would be to that we have ſpoken of in the fore-going Suppoſition. Let us moreover conceive *GOD* Almighty to have obſerv'd in all the parts which went to the Compoſition of this New World, the very ſame proportion he has done in thoſe which make up *Ours*. It is plain that the Inhabitants of this latter World would be Taller than the ſpace betwixt our Earth and the moſt diſtant Stars we can diſcover: and this being ſo, it is manifeſt that if they had the ſame Idea's of Extention of Bodies as our ſelves, they would not be able to diſcern ſome of the parts of their own Bodies, and would ſee others of a prodigious unweildineſs; ſo that 'tis ridiculous to think they would ſee things in the ſame Bigneſs as they are ſeen by us.

It is apparent in theſe two Suppoſitions we have made, that the Men whether of the Great or the Little World, would have Idea's of the Magnitude of Bodies very different from ours, ſuppoſing their Eyes to furniſh them with Idea's of the Objects round about them, proportion'd to the Magnitude of their own Bodies. Now if theſe Men ſhould confidently affirm upon the Teſtimony of their Eyes, that Bodies were of the very ſame bigneſs whereof they ſaw them, it is not to be doubted but they would be deceiv'd: and I ſuppoſe no Man will make a queſtion of it: And yet it is certain that theſe Men would have as good Reaſon to juſtify their Opinion, as we have to defend our Own. Let us acknowledge then from their Example, That we are very uncertain of the Magnitude of Bodies, which we ſee, and that all which can be known by us concerning them from the Teſtimony of ſight, is only the mutual Relation there is between Them and Us. In a word, that our Eyes were never given us whereby to judge of the Truth of things, but only to give us notice of ſuch as might either moleſt or profit us in ſome thing or other.

II. *A continuation of theſe Errors about Invisible Objects.*

But 'tis not thought ſufficient for Men to credit their Eyes only, in order to judge of *Viſible* Objects: they think they are to be miſled farther, even to judge of thoſe which are *Inviſible*. Becauſe there are ſome things which they cannot *ſee*, they conclude they do not *exiſt*, attributing to their Sight a Penetration in a manner Infinite. This is an Impediment which prevents their diſcovering the real cauſes of abundance of Natural Effects: For that they aſcribe them to *Imaginary* Faculties and Qualities, is often meerly for want of diſcerning the *True*, which conſiſts in the different Configurations of theſe Bodies.

They ſee not, for Inſtance, the little parts of Air or Flame, much leſs thoſe of Light, or of a matter ſtill more fine and ſubtil: and upon this ſcore they are ready to believe, they are not in *being*, at leaſt conclude them void of force and action. They betake themſelves to *Occult Qualities*, or *Imaginary Faculties* to explain the Effects, whereof thoſe Impereeptible parts are *The True and Natural Cauſe*.

They had rather have recourſe to the *horror* of a *Vacuum* to Explain the Elevation of water in the Pump, than impute it to the Gravitation of the Air. They chooſe to aſcribe the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, to the Qualities of the Moon, rather than to the preſſure of the Atmoſphere, that is, to the Air which ſurrounds the Earth; and the Elevation of Vapours to the *Attractive* Faculties of the Sun, than to the ſimple Motion of Impulſe cauſed by the parts of the *Subtil Matter*, which it continually diffuſes abroad.

They look upon thoſe as Men of trifling and impertinent Thought, who have recourſe only to the Fleſh and Blood, in accounting for all the Motions of Animals: likewiſe for the diſpoſitions, and the Corporeal Memory of Men: And this partly proceeds from the Conception they have of the littleneſs of the Brain, and it's incapacity thereupon to preſerve the Traces of an almoſt infinite number of things, lodg'd in it. They had rather admit, though they can't conceive how, a Soul in Beaſts, which is neither Body nor Spirit; Qualities and *Intentional Species*, for the Habits and Memory of Men; or ſuch like things, notwithſtanding they have no particular Notion of them in their Mind.

I ſhould be too tedious ſhould I ſtand to reckon up all the Errors we fall into through this Prejudice. There are very few in Natural Philoſophy, to which it has not given ſome occaſion; and if a Man ſhould make a conſiderate Reflection thereupon, he would poſſibly be aſtoniſht at it.

But though I am not willing to dwell too long upon theſe things, yet I cannot ſo eaſily paſs by the contempt Men generally have for Inſects, and other little Animals which are produc'd out of a Matter, call'd by them Corrupted. 'Tis a very unjuſt contempt, founded only on the

Ignorance of the thing deſpis'd, and the fore-mention'd Prejudice. There is nothing deſpicable in Nature, and all the Works of *GOD* are worthy of our Reſpect and Admiration; eſpecially if we attend to the wonderful ways he takes both in making, and preſerving them. The leaſt of Flies are as compleat, as Animals of an exceſſive bulk or ſtature: The proportions of their limbs are as juſt as thoſe of the other: And it ſeems moreover that *GOD* has deſign'd them greater Ornaments to recompenſe them for the Littleneſs of their Bodies. They have Coronets and Plumes, and other Attire upon their Heads, which out-ſhine all that the Luxury of Men can invent. And I dare venture to ſay, that all thoſe who have never made uſe of any thing but their Eyes, have never ſeen any thing ſo ſplendid, ſo exact, or ſo magnificent in the Palaces of the greateſt Princes, as may be ſeen with Glaſſes on the Head of an ordinary Fly.

'Tis true, theſe things are exceedingly Little, but it is ſtill more ſurprizing to find ſuch a collection of Beauties in ſo little Room; and though they are very common, yet that is no Diminution to their Value; nor are thoſe Animals thereby leſs perfect in themſelves: but on the contrary, the Power and Wiſdom of *GOD* appear more wonderful, who with ſuch Profuſion and Magnificence has ſhewn an almoſt infinite number of Miracles in their Production.

And yet our Sight conceals all theſe Beauties from us: it makes us deſpiſe all theſe Works of *GOD* ſo worthy of our Admiration: and becauſe theſe Animals are little in *Relation* to our Body, it cauſes us to conſider them as little *abſolutely*, and conſequently as deſpicable by reaſon of their Littleneſs; as if Bodies could be little in themſelves.

Let us ſtrive then to forbear following the Impreſſions of our Senſes, in the judgement which we paſs on the Magnitude of Bodies: and when we ſay, for Inſtance, That a Bird is little, let it not be *abſolutely* underſtood: For nothing is Great or Little in it ſelf: And a Bird is great, in compariſon of a Fly; and if it be little in *reſpect* of our Body, it doth not follow it is *abſolutely* ſo; ſince our Body is not the moſt perfect Rule by which we ought to meaſure others. It is it ſelf very little in reference to the Earth, as is the Earth it ſelf in reſpect of the Circumference which the Sun or Earth deſcribe round each other: and ſo is that Circumference in relation to the ſpace contain'd betwixt us and the fix'd Stars; and ſo continuing the progreſſion on. For we may ſtill imagine ſpaces greater and greater *ad infinitum*.

III. *Of the Errors of Sight touching Extention* relatively *conſider'd.*

But it muſt not be imagin'd that our Senſes exactly inform us of the Relation other Bodies have to our own: For Exactneſs and Juſtneſs are no ways eſſential to ſenſible Notices, which ſhould only be Inſtrumental to the Preſervation of Life. It is true we know exactly enough the Relation Bodies, which are near us, have with our own. But in proportion to the Diſtance theſe Bodies are remov'd from us, we know leſs of them, becauſe then they have leſs relation to our Body. The Idea or Senſation of Magnitude, which we have upon ſight of a Body, leſſens in proportion to the Body's being in a capacity of hurting us: and that Idea or Senſation increaſes proportionably as the Body approaches nearer, or rather as the Relation it has to our own Body, is augmented. Finally, if this Relation altogether ceaſes; that is, if any Body is ſo little or ſo diſtant from us, as to be incapable of hurting us, we forthwith looſe the Senſation of it. So that by our ſight we may ſometimes judge pretty nearly of the Relation other Bodies have to ours: and of that which they have to one another: but we ought never to think they are of the ſame Magnitude they appear to us.

Our Eyes, for example, repreſent the Sun and Moon of one or two feet diameter, but we ſhould not imagine with *Epicurus* and *Lucretius*, that they are really of that dimention. This ſame Moon ſeems to us upon ſight far greater than the greateſt Stars, yet no Man doubts but it is incomparably leſs: Thus we ſee daily on the Earth two things or more, of whoſe magnitude we can have no exact aſſurance: becauſe to make a judgement of this nature, 'tis neceſſary to know the preciſe diſtance of theſe Bodies, which is very difficult to be known.

We are even hard put to't to judge with any kind of certainty of the Relation there is betwixt two Bodies though never ſo near us. We are forc't to take them in our hands, and hold them one againſt the other to compare them; and after all, we often heſitate without being able juſtly to determine any thing. This is viſibly acknowledg'd as often as a Man would examine which are biggeſt of ſome pieces of Coyn that are almoſt equal: for he is then oblig'd to put them one upon another, to diſcover by a ſurer Method then by Sight whether they correſpond in bigneſs. Our Eyes therefore not only deceive us in the Magnitude of Bodies abſolutely conſider'd, but even in the Relation thoſe Bodies have betwixt themſelves.

CHAP.

CHAP. VII.

I. *Of the Errors of Sight about Figures.* II. *We have no Knowledge of the leaſt of them.* III. *The Knowledge we have of the greater, is not exact.* IV. *An Explication of ſome Natural judgements which prevent our Deception.* V. *That theſe very judgements deceive us in ſome particular junctures.*

I. *Of the Errors of Sight about Figures.*

OUR Sight is leſs liable to deceive us in the Repreſentation of Figures, than in the repreſentation of any other thing, becauſe Figure is not a thing of an *abſolute* kind, but its Nature conſiſts in the Relation which is between the parts which terminate ſome ſpace, and a certain point, which we conceive in that ſpace, and which we may call, as in a Circle, the Center of the Figure. Notwithſtanding, we are miſtaken a thouſand ways in Figures, and the Knowledge we receive from our Senſes, is not exceedingly exact concerning any one of them.

II. *We have no knowledge of the leaſt of them.*

We have already prov'd that our Sight diſcovers not to us all ſorts of Extention, but only that which is in ſome conſiderable proportion to our Body; and that for this reaſon we ſee not all the parts of the minuteſt Animals, nor thoſe that conſtitute all hard and liquid Bodies. Thus not being able to perceive theſe parts by reaſon of their Littleneſs, it follows we are as unable to perceive their Figures, ſince the figure of Bodies is nothing but the Term that bounds them. See here what an infinite number of inviſible figures preſent themſelves in an inſtant, which are far more numerous than thoſe our Eyes acquaint us withall: which yet induce the Mind, that truſts too much to their reach and capacity, and ſtands not to examine things to the bottom, to believe theſe Figures don't exiſt.

III. *The knowledge we have of the greater, is not exact.*

As for Bodies proportion'd to our Sight, (the number whereof is very inconſiderable in compariſon of the other) we diſcover their figure tolerably well, but never know it exactly by our Senſes. Nay, we cannot ſo much as be aſſur'd from our Sight if a *Circle* or a *Square*, which are two of the moſt ſimple figures that are, be not an *Ellipſis* and a *Parallelogramme*, though theſe figures be both in our Hands, and very near our Eyes.

I add farther, that we cannot exactly diſcern whether a Line be right or not, eſpecially if it be ſomewhat long. We muſt then have a Rule for it: But to what purpoſe? we know not whether the Rule it ſelf be ſuch as we ſuppoſe it ought to be; nor can we be fully ſatisfy'd concerning it. And yet without the knowledge of this Line, we can never know any figure, as is evident to all the World.

This is what may be ſaid in General of Figures, which we have before our Eyes, and in our Hands. But if we ſuppoſe them at a diſtance from us, how many changes do we find in the projection they make in the fund of our Eyes. I will not ſtand to deſcribe them here; they may eaſily be learn'd in any Book of Opticks, or by examining the Figures which we ſee in Pictures. For ſince the Painter is oblig'd to change them almoſt all, to the end they may appear in their Natural ſite, and to paint, for inſtance, Circles like *Ellipſes*: 'Tis an infallible ſign of the Errors of our Sight, in objects that are not painted; But theſe Errors are corrected by freſh Senſations, which poſſibly may be lookt upon as a ſort of Natural Judgements, and may be term'd the Judgements of the Senſes.

IV. *An Explication of ſome Natural judgements which prevent our deception.*

In beholding a Cube, for Example, it is certain that all the ſides we ſee of it never cauſe a Projection, or an Image of an equal dimention in the fund of our Eyes; ſince the Image of all theſe ſides, when painted in the *Retina* or the Optick Nerve, nearly reſembles a Cube pictur'd in *Landſchape*; and conſequently the Senſation we have of it, ought to repreſent the faces of a *Cube unequal*, becauſe they are ſo in Landſchape or Perſpective. This notwithſtanding, we ſee them all equal, nor are we in an Error.

Now it might be ſaid, That this is occaſion'd by a kind of Judgement, which we are naturally inclin'd to make; namely, That the Faces of the Cube which are fartheſt from us ought not to caſt on the fund of our Eyes ſo large Images as the Faces which are nearer; but whereas *Senſation*, is only peculiar to the Senſes, and *Judgement* in propriety of Speech cannot be aſcrib'd to them, it is certain this Judgement is only a Compound-Senſation, which conſequently may be ſometimes falſe.

However, ſince that which is only Senſation in us, may in Relation to the Author of Nature, who excites it, be conſider'd as a kind of Judgement, I ſpeak ſometimes of Senſations as of Natural Judgements; becauſe this form of ſpeaking is expedient in giving an account of things; as may be ſeen towards the End of the Ninth Chapter, and in ſeveral other places.

V. *That theſe very judgements deceive us in ſome particular junctures.*

Though the Judgements I ſpeak of, are ſerviceable in correcting our Senſes, a thouſand different Ways, and without them we ſhould hardly ever be in the Right, nevertheleſs they fail not to be ſometimes the occaſion of our Error. If it happens, for inſtance, that we

ſee the Spire of a Steeple behind a great Wall, or beyond a Mountain, it will appear to us to be both little and at no great diſtance: But if we ſhould ſee it at the ſame diſtance, but with many Fields and Houſes lying betwixt us and it, it would undoubtedly appear both much bigger and more remote, although in both caſes the projection of the rays of the Steeple or the Image of theSteeple which is pictur'd in the fund of our Eye, is altogether the ſame. Now it may be ſaid that the reaſon why we ſee it greater, is the judgment we naturally make, *viz.* That becauſe ſo many Fields lye betwixt us and the Steeple, it muſt needs be more remote, and conſequently greater.

But if on the other hand, we ſaw no interjacent Lands betwixt our Eyes and the Steeple, though at the ſame time we knew there were many, and that it was a great way off, which is very obſervable, it would notwithſtanding ſeem to us to be very little and very near, as I have ſaid before: which we may farther ſuppoſe to happen from a kind of judgment natural to our Soul, whereby ſhe ſees the Steeple in this manner, becauſe ſhe judges it to be at five or ſix hundred paces diſtance. For generally our Imagination repreſents no greater ſpace betwixt the objects and our ſelves,unleſs aſſiſted by a ſenſible view of other intervening objects; and beyond which it has ſtill liberty to imagine ſomething more.

See the 9. Chapter towards the end.

'Tis for this reaſon that the Moon at the Riſing or Setting, is ſeen much bigger, than when elevated a good height above the Horizon: for this elevation removes our view from off the objects lying betwixt us and her, the dimentions whereof we know; ſo that we cannot judge of that of the Moon, by forming the compariſon between them. But when ſhe is juſt riſen, or about to ſet, we ſee a great many Fields, betwixt her and us, of whoſe extention we have a tolerable knowledge; and thus it is that we judge her more remote, and upon that reaſon ſee her ſo large as we do.

And it muſt be obſerv'd, That when ſhe is elevated above our heads, though our Reaſon moſt infallibly aſſures us, ſhe is vaſtly diſtant, yet we cannot avoid ſeeing her very near and very little; becauſe indeed theſe Natural Judgements of the Sight, are founded only on the Perceptions of the ſame Sight, and Reaſon is unable to correct them: ſo that they frequently lead us into Error, by making us form voluntary judgments, that go hand in hand along with them. For when we judge according to our Senſations, we are always deceiv'd, though we never err in judging according to our Conceptions: becauſe the Body is no farther inſtructive, than is conducing to the Body, and 'tis only *GOD* who always teaches us the Truth, as ſhall be ſhewn hereafter.

Theſe falſe Judgements not only deceive us in the Diſtance and Magnitude of Bodies, which are not the Subject of this Chapter, but in repreſenting their Figure otherwiſe than it is. We ſee, for Inſtance, the Sun and Moon, and other very remote Spherical Bodies as if they were flat, and only circular: Becauſe at that great diſtance we are unable to diſcern whether the part oppoſite to us, is nearer us than the others; and on that account, we judge it is equally diſtant from us: And thus upon the ſame grounds we conclude the Stars with the Azure which appears in the Heaven, are rang'd in the ſame juſt diſtance, in a vault perfectly convex,ſince our Mind ever ſuppoſes Equality,where it diſcovers no Inequality; which yet it ought not poſitively to admit, unleſs there be evident conviction for it.

I ſhall not here inſiſt longer on the Errors of our Sight, in reſpect of the Figures of Bodies, ſince a Man may be ſufficiently inſtructed in any Book of Opticks. That Science in effect does only inſtruct us how to put fallacies on our Eyes; and its whole drift and artifice conſiſts meerly in finding means of making us form thoſe Natural Judgements, I have been ſpeaking of, at a time when they are moſt impertinent and unſeaſonable. And this cheat may be acted in ſo many different ways, that, of all the Figures that are in the World, there is not any ſingle one, but may be painted in a thouſand different faſhions; ſo that the Sight muſt unavoidably be deceiv'd. But this is not the proper place of explaining theſe things more throughly. What I have ſaid is ſufficient, to let us ſee we ſhould not give over-much credit to the Teſtimony of our Eyes, even in their Repreſentations of the Figures of Bodies, though in point of Figures, their reports are much more faithful than in any other occaſion.

CHAP. VIII.

I. *That our Eyes are incapable of informing us of the Quantity or Swiftneſs of Motion conſidered in it ſelf* II. *That Duration which is neceſſary to our Knowledge of the Quantity of Motion, is unknown to us.* III. *An Inſtance of the Errors of Sight about Motion and Reſt.*

HAVING already diſcover'd the moſt Fundamental and General Errors of our Sight, touching Extention and its Figures, I come now to correct thoſe in which this ſame Sight ingages us, about the Motion of Matter. And this has no great difficulty in it, after what

what I have already ſaid of Extention. For there is ſo neceſſary a relation and dependance betwixt theſe two things, that if we are deceiv'd in the Magnitude of Bodies, we muſt as certainly be deceiv'd in their Motion too.

But that I may advance nothing but what is clear and diſtinct, it is neceſſary to take off whatever is equivocal from the word *Motion*. For this Term has generally two ſignifications. The firſt denotes a certain *Power* or *Force*, which we imagine in the Body mov'd, and which we ſuppoſe the cauſe of its Motion: The ſecond is the Tranſlation or continued *Conveyance* of a Body, either in its removal from, or approaching to another, which we conſider as at *reſt*.

When I ſay, for Inſtance, That a Boul has communicated its Motion to another, the word *Motion* is to be underſtood in its firſt ſignification: But if I ſay ſimply, that I ſee a Boul in a great Motion, it is to be taken in the ſecond. In a word, the Term *Motion* ſignifies at once both *Cauſe* and *Effect*, which are yet two things altogether different.

I am perſwaded that Men are under moſt palpable and moſt dangerous miſtakes, concerning the Force that gives this Motion, and Tranſlation to the Bodies mov'd. Thoſe fine Terms, *Nature* and *Impreſs'd qualities*, are good for nothing but to ſhelter the Ignorance of the *Falſly Learned*, and the Impieties of the *Libertine*; as I could eaſily demonſtrate. But this is not a place proper to diſcourſe of the Power that moves Bodies, ſince that is not of a viſible Nature; and I am only ſpeaking here of the Errors of our Eyes. I defer it till a time when it will be more ſeaſonable. *See the 3d. Chap. of the 2d. Part of the 6. Book.*

Motion taken in the ſecond ſenſe, that is, for the Tranſlation of a Body in its removal from another, is ſomething of a viſible kind, and the ſubject of this Chapter.

I. *That our Eyes are incapable of informing of the Quantity of Swiftneſs of Motion conſider'd in it ſelf.*

I have, I think, ſufficiently demonſtrated in the ſixth Chapter, that our Sight does not acquaint us with the Quantity or Magnitude of Bodies, in themſelves; but only withthe mutual relation they ſtand in to each other, and eſpecially to our own. From whence I infer that we are incapable of knowing the true and abſolute Magnitude of their Motion, that is, of their ſwiftneſs or ſlowneſs, but only the relation theſe Motions have to one another, and more eſpecially to the Motion ordinarily incident to our own Body. Which I thus prove.

It is certain that we know not how to judge how great the Motion of a Body is, but by the Length of the Space the Body has ran over. Thus our Eyes not informing us of the true Length of the Space deſcrib'd by the Motion, it follows that 'tis impoſſible for us to know the true Quantity of the Motion.

This Argument is only a Corollary of that which I have ſaid of Extention, and all the force it has proceeds from its being a neceſſary Concluſion of what I have there Demonſtrated: I ſhall now give one which depends on no Suppoſition. I ſay then, that ſuppoſing we were able clearly to diſcover the true Quantity of the Space deſcrib'd, it would no way follow, that we could know the Quantity of Motion alſo.

II. *That Duration which is neceſſary to our knowledge of the Quantity of Motion, is unknown to us.*

The Greatneſs or the Swiftneſs of Motion includes two things. The firſt is the *Tranſlation* or Conveyance of a Body from one place to another, as from *Paris* to *St. Germains*: The ſecond is the *Time* that neceſſarily goes to the making this Conveyance. Now it is not enough to know exactly how far *Paris* is diſtant from *St. Germains*, to know whether a Man has gone it with a Quick or a Slow Motion; But it muſt moreover be known how much time he has imploy'd in his Journey: granting then that the Length of the Journey may be truly known; I utterly deny we can have an exact knowledge by our Sight, or indeed any other way whatever, of the Time that is ſpent in the paſſage, and of the true Quantity of Duration.

This is ſufficiently evident, in that at certain times one hour ſeems to us as long as four; and on the contrary at other times, four hours ſlip inſenſibly away: When, for Inſtance, a Man's Mind is fill'd with Joy, hours ſeem no longer than a Moment; becauſe then the time paſſes away without thinking of it. But when a Man is dejected with Grief, and lyes under ſome ſenſible Pain or Affliction, every day is thought an entire Year. The reaſon of which difference is, That in this caſe the Mind is weary of its Duration, becauſe it is Painful. The more it applies it ſelf to the thought of it, the more it diſcovers it, and thereby finds it longer than in the ſeaſon of Mirth and Joy, or ſome diverting Imployment, which as it were carries the Soul out of it ſelf, to fix her cloſer to the Object of her Joy, or her Diverſion. For as a Man finds a piece of Painting ſo much larger, by how much he ſtands to conſider all the little things repreſented in it, with greater attention; or as he finds the head of a Fly conſiderably great, when he diſcerns all the parts of it with a Microſcope; ſo the Mind finds its duration ſo much longer, as it conſiders it with greater Attention and is ſenſible of all the parts of it.

In ſo much that I don't at all doubt, but that *GOD* could ſo apply our Mind to the parts of its Duration, by giving us abundance of Senſations in a very little time, as to make one hour appear as long as many Ages. For as there are no *Indiviſible Points* in Bodies, ſo there are no *Indiviſible Inſtants* in Duration. But as the leaſt parts of Matter may be divided to *Infinity*, ſo the parts of Duration may be aſſign'd leſs and leſs to *Infinity*, as is eaſy to demonſtrate. If then the Mind were made Attentive to the minuteſt parts of its Duration, by its Senſations which ſhould leave ſome Traces in the Brain, whereby to remember them, it would undoubtedly ſeem longer to it than it does.

But finally, the use of Watches is a convincing proof, that there can be no exact knowledge of Duration, and I desire no more. For since the knowledge of the absolute Greatness or Intenseness of Motion depends on a preceding knowledge of the Length of Duration, as we have shewn it does; it thence follows, that on Supposition we can never exactly know the absolute Quantity of Duration, we shall never be able to know exactly the absolute Quantity of Motion.

But because some Relations which Duration or one time has to another may be known, some Relations likewise which Motions have to one another may be equally understood: For as we can certainly know that the *Solary* Year is longer than the *Lunary*; so we can certainly know that a Cannon Bullet has greater Motion than a Tortoise. So that though our Eyes will not let us see the absolute Quantity of Motion, yet they fail not to assist us in discovering, nearly enough, the Relative Intenseness of it; I mean the Relation or Proportion of one Motion to another: and we have no need of any farther knowledge thereof for the Preservation of our Bodies.

III. *An Instance of the Errors of Sight, in respect of Motion and Rest.*

There are many Instances to be given, which manifestly shew that our Sight deludes us touching the Motion of Bodies; it very often happens, that the things which seem to us in Motion, are perfectly at Rest; and on the contrary those which seem to us at Rest, notwithstanding are in Motion. As when a Man, for Instance, sits on shipboard whilst the Vessel is under sail in a swift and steady Motion, he seems to see the Lands and Towns fly from him; they seem to be in motion, and the Vessel to stand still.

So if a Man were plac'd upon the Planet *Mars*, he would conclude upon sight that the Sun, the Earth, and the rest of the Planets together with all the Fixed Stars perform'd their circumvolution in about 24 or 25 hours; which is the space of time that *Mars* imploys in turning round his own *Axis*. And yet the Earth, the Sun and the Stars never circuit round that Planet. So that this Man would see things in Motion which were at Rest, and would think himself at Rest, though he were in Motion all the time.

I stand not here to explain, how it comes to pass that the Man on shipboard would easily correct the mistake of his Eyes, but the Man suppos'd on the Planet *Mars* would obstinately defend his Error. The Reason of it is easy to be known: and we shall more readily find it by reflecting on what would happen to a Man that were asleep in a Vessel, who starting on a sudden, saw nothing when he wak'd, besides the top of a Mast of some Vessel that made towards him. For in case he saw not the Sails swell'd with the Wind, nor the Mariners at work, nor felt any Agitation or concussion of the Ship, or the like, he would absolutely be at a loss and in doubt, without knowing which of the two Vessels was in Motion; and neither his Eyes nor his Reason could give him any Information.

CHAP. IX.

A Continuation of the same Subject. I. A general Demonstration of the Errors of our Sight concerning Motion. II. That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known in order to judge of the Quantity of their Motion. III. *The* Mediums *whereby we know the Distances of Objects, are examin'd.*

I. *A general Demonstration of the Errors of of our Sight concerning Motion.*

I COME now to give a General Demonstation of all the Errors, into which our Sight leads us, in respect of the Motion of Bodies.



Let A be the Eye of the Spectator; C the Object, which I suppose at a convenient distance from A. I say, that though the Object remains fix'd in C, it may be thought to be remov'd as far as D, or to approach as near as B. And though the Object recedes towards D, it may

may be believ'd immoveable in C, and even to approach towards B; and on the contrary, though it approaches towards B, it may be thought to be immoveable in C, or even to recede towards D. That though the Object be advanc'd from C as far as E or H, or to G or K, it may be thought to have mov'd no farther than from C to F or I. And again on the other hand, that though the Object be mov'd from C unto F or I, a Man may think it mov'd to E or H, or else unto G or K. That if the Object be mov'd in a line equally distant from the Spectator, that is, in a circumference whereof the Spectator is the center; though that Object be mov'd from C to P, it may be thought to be mov'd only from B to O: and on the contrary, though it me mov'd only from B to O, it may be thought mov'd from C to P.

If beyond the Object C there happens to be another Object, suppose M; which is thought at rest, and which notwithstanding is in motion towards N: Though the Object C remains unmov'd, or is mov'd with a more gentle motion towards F, than M is mov'd towards N, it will yet seem to be oppositely mov'd towards Y; and on the contrary, if *&c.*

II. *That the Distance of Objects is necessary to be known in order, to judge of the Quantity of their Motion.*

It is plain that the proof of all these Propositions except the last, in which there is no difficulty, depends on one Supposition only, namely this, that we cannot with any assurance determine concerning the Distance of Objects. For if it be true that we cannot judge thereof with any certainty, it follows that we cannot be assur'd whether C is advanc'd on towards D, or has approach'd towards B, and so of the other Propositions.

Now to know whether the judgements we form of the Distance of Objects are infallible, we have no more to do than to examine the means we make use of to judge concerning it. If these means are uncertain, 'tis not possible the Judgement's depending on them should be more infallible. There are many of them, which it is necessary to explain.

III. *The Medium's whereby we know the Distances of Objects, are examined.*

The first, the most universal, and sometimes the safest way we have, whereby to judge of the distance of Objects, is the Angle made by the Rays of our Eyes, whereof the Object is the Vertical Point, that is, the Object is the Point, where the two rays meet. When this Angle is very large, the Object appears near at hand, on the contrary when it is very acute, we see the Object a great way off. And the change which happens in the situation of our Eyes, according to the changes of this Angle is the means the Soul imploys to judge concerning the Distance or the Nighness of Objects. For just as a Blind Man having two strait Sticks in his hands, the length whereof he did not know, may by a kind of *Natural Geometry* give a tolerable conjecture concerning the distance of any Body, in touching it with the end of his two Sticks, by reason of the Disposition and Distance he finds his hands in, with respect to one another; so it may be said that the Soul judges of the Distance of an Object by the Disposition of her Eyes, which is different according as the Angle, whereby she sees, is great or little, that is, as the Object is nearer or farther.

The Soul does not make all those judgements I attribute to her; these Natural judgements are nothing but Sensations, and I only speak thus, the bett[illegible] explain things

A Man would easily be convinc'd of what I say, if he would be at the trouble of making a very easy Experiment: As, let him hang a Ring at the end of a thread, so plac'd that the hoop being turn'd directly towards him, the aperture of it may not appear; or if he please let him drive a Stick in the ground, and take another in his hand, that is curv'd at the end; let him retreat three or four steps from the Ring or the Stick, and shutting one Eye with one hand, let him try to hit the aperture of the Ring, or with the bent end of the Stick in his hand to touch the other across, at an height that is much upon a level with the Eye; and he will be surpriz'd to find himself incapable of doing it at an hundred tryals, though nothing in the world seems easier: Nay, though he should lay aside the Stick, and only endeavour to direct his finger cross-ways into the concavity of the Ring, he would find it difficult enough to be done, though he stood very near it.

But it ought to be well observ'd that I have said, A Man should endeavour to hit the aperture of the Ring, or to touch the Stick *cross-ways*, and not by way of a Right Line from our Eye to the Ring: for so indeed there would be no difficulty at all: so far from it, that it would be much easier to effect it, with one Eye shut, than with both of them open, since that would be a Rule to direct him.

Now it may be said, that the Difficulty, which is found, when a Man tryes to direct the end of the Stick through the Ring *cross-wise*, with only one Eye open, proceeds from this, namely, that one Eye being shut, the Angle I have mention'd is unknown. For to know the Magnitude of an Angle, it is not enough to know the length of its Base, and the Bigness of the Angle made by one of its *Sides* upon the *Base*: for this is known in the fore-going Experiment: but it is yet farther necessary to know the other *Angle*, which is made by the other *Side* upon the *Base*, or the length of one of the *Sides*. Which cannot be exactly known without opening the other Eye. And thus the Soul cannot make use of her Natural Geometry to judge of the Distance of the Ring.

The Disposition then of the Eyes, which accompanies the Angle made of the *Visual* rays which cut each other and center in the Object, is one of the best and most universal means the Soul imployes whereby to judge of the Distance of things. If then that Angle receives no sensible Alteration, upon a little removal of the Object, whether it approaches nearer us, or recedes from us, it will thence follow, that it is a fallacious means, and unserviceable to the Soul whereby to judge of the true Distance of that Object.

Now 'tis plain that this Angle is notably chang'd, when an Object at about a foot distance

from our Sight is tranſlated four foot off: but if it be only tranſlated from four to eight, the Alteration is much leſs diſcernable; if from eight to twelve, leſs yet: if from a thouſand to an hundred thouſand, hardly at all: Laſtly, in carrying the Object farther on, even to the imaginary ſpaces, the change of the Angle grows imperceptible, and is quite loſt. So that were there a conſiderable ſpace betwixt A and C, the Soul could not by that means know whether the Object were near B or D.

This is the Reaſon why we ſee the Sun and Moon, as if they were involv'd in Clouds, though they are vaſtly diſtant from them; and that we naturally think all the Stars rang'd in an equal diſtance from us; that we imagine the *Comets* are fixt, and almoſt motionleſs, at the end of their courſe. We imagine too that *Comets* are entirely diſſipated in ſome Months time, becauſe they recede from us in almoſt a right Line, or a Line direct from our Eyes; and are going to loſe themſelves in the vaſt ſpaces, from whence they return not till after many Years, or even many Ages.

The ſecond Medium wherreby to judge of the Diſtance of Objects.

The ſecond *Medium* the Soul imployes to judge concerning the Diſtance of Objects, conſiſts in a Diſpoſition of the Eyes, different from that I have been ſpeaking of. In order to explain it, we muſt know it is abſolutely neceſſary that the figure of the Eye be different, according to the different Diſtance of Objects which we ſee: For when a Man ſees an Object near him, there is a neceſſity of his Eyes being longer, than if the Object were farther off: Becauſe to the end the Rays of this Object may be collected in the Optick Nerve, which is neceſſary to its being ſeen, the diſtance between this Nerve and the Cryſtalline ought to be greater.

It is true, if the Cryſtalline became more convex when the Object were near, that would effect the ſame thing as the Elongation of the Eye. But 'tis not credible that the Cryſtalline can eaſily change its convexity; and on the other ſide, we have a moſt evident Experiment for the Elongation of the Eye: For *Anatomy* informs us, there are Muſcles that ſurround the middle of the Eye; and we are ſenſible of the Effort theſe Muſcles make to compreſs it, and lengthen it, when we have a mind to ſee any thing very near.

But it is not at all neceſſary, we ſhould know here, by what way this is done; it is enough that there happens a *Change* in the Eye, whether it proceeds from the Preſſure of the Muſcles, that ſurround it; or whether the little Nerves, which anſwer to the *Ciliary* Ligaments which hold the *Cryſtalline* ſuſpended betwixt the other Humours of the Eye, become relax'd, to augment the convexity of the Cryſtalline; or intenſe, to diminiſh it.

For this Change which happens, what-ever it be, is only to collect and unite the Rays of Objects, with an exact juſtneſs, upon the Optick Nerve. But it is certain that when the Object is five hundred Paces, or ten thouſand Leagues diſtant, we behold it with the ſame Diſpoſition of Eyes, without any ſenſible Change in the Muſcles which ſurround the Eye, or in the Nerves which anſwer to the *Ciliary* Ligaments of the Cryſtalline: And the Rays of Objects are very exactly collected upon the *Retina*, or the Optick Nerve. Thus the Soul judges that Objects, at ten thouſand or an hundred thouſand Leagues diſtance, are no more than five or ſix hundred Paces off; when ſhe judges of their Diſtance, only by the Diſpoſition of the Eyes, which I have been ſpeaking of.

However, it is certain this *Medium* is of uſe to the Soul, when the Object is nigh at hand. If, for inſtance, an Object is only at half a foot diſtance, we diſcern its Diſtance well enough, through the Diſpoſition of the Muſcles which conſtringe our Eyes, in order to make them ſomewhat longer: And this Diſpoſition is moreover painful. If the Object be remov'd two foot, we can ſtill diſcern the Diſtance, becauſe the Diſpoſition of the Muſcles is ſomewhat ſenſible ſtill, although no longer painful. But if the Object be removed ſtill ſome feet farther, this Diſpoſition of our Muſcles, grows ſo imperceptible, that it is altogether uſeleſs to us in judging of the Diſtance of the Object.

Theſe then are two *Means* the Soul makes uſe of to judge of the Diſtance of the Object, which are altogether uſeleſs, when the Object is remote to five or ſix hundred Paces, and which are never infallible, though the Object be much nearer.

The third Medium wherreby to judge of the Diſtance of Objects.

The third *Medium* conſiſts in the Greatneſs of the Image painted on the fund of the Eye, and that makes the Repreſentation of the Objects which we ſee. 'Tis confeſs'd that this Image grows leſs in proportion as the Object is remov'd to a greater Diſtance, but this Diminution grows ſo much leſs diſcernable, as the Object which changes its Diſtance is more remote. For when an Object is at a conſiderable Diſtance, as of five or ſix hundred Paces, under or over in Proportion to its Bigneſs, there happens very conſiderable Changes in its Remoteneſs, without any conſiderable Changes occaſion'd in the Image which repreſents it, as is eaſy to be demonſtrated. Thus the third *Medium* has the ſame defect as the other two, of which we have been ſpeaking.

It is farther to be obſerv'd, That the Soul does not judge thoſe Objects the remoteſt, that have the leaſt Images painted on the *Retina*. When I ſee, for inſtance, a Man and a Tree at an hundred Paces diſtance, or ſuppoſe many Stars in the Heaven, I do not judge the Man to be more remote than the Tree, and the Little Stars farther diſtant than the Greater; though the Images of the Man, and the Little Stars, that are pictur'd on the *Retina*, are leſs than the Images of the Tree and the greater Stars. Beſides it is neceſſary to know the greatneſs

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of an Object, to be able to judge nearly of its Distance, and because I know an House is bigger than a Man, though the Image of the House be bigger than that of a Man, I do not however judge the House nearest upon that account. And so it is in respect of the Stars; Our Eyes represent them to us equally remote, though it is very reasonable to believe some of them at a far greater Distance than others. Thus there are Infinite Objects, the Distance whereof we cannot know, since there are Infinite Objects with whose Magnitude we are unacquainted.

The fourth and fifth Mediums.

We judge farther of the remoteness of an Object by the *Force* wherewith it acts upon our Eyes, because a remote Object acts more languishing and weakly than another; and again, by the *Distinctness* and *Beams* of the Image, which is form'd in the Eye; because when an Object is remote, the Pupill of the Eye must needs be more open and Capacious, and consequently the Rays must be collected somewhat confusedly. 'Tis for this reason that obscurer Objects, and such as we see confusedly, appear remote; and on the contrary, that Luminous Bodies, and such as we see distinctly, seem near. It is plain enough, that these last *Means* are too fallible whereby to judge with any kind of Certainty concerning the Distance of Objects: and I shall not any longer insist upon them, but come to the last of all, as being that which helps the Imagination most, and inclines the Soul more easily to judge that Objects are very remote.

The sixth Medium, whereby to judge of the Distance of Objects.

The sixth then and the Principal *Medium* of all, consists in this, *viz.* that the Eye exhibits not to the Soul a single Object separate from others, but gives her View at once of all those which lye betwixt us and the Principal Object of our actual Consideration.

When, for instance, we behold a Steeple at a considerable Distance, we usually see a great many interjacent Lands and Houses at the same time: and because we judge of the Remoteness of these Lands, and Houses, and in the mean time see the Steeple beyond them, we judge likewise, that it is not only more remote, but a great deal larger and taller, than if we saw it all alone: Notwithstanding the Image which is projected in the Fund of the Eye, is always of an equal Bigness, whether there are Lands and Houses lying betwixt us and it, or whether there are none, provided we see it from a place equally distant, which is suppos'd. Thus we judge of the Bigness of Objects, according as we believe them remote from us; and the Bodies which we see betwixt us and the Objects, assist the Imagination mightily in judging of their Remoteness: just as we judge of the Extent of our Duration, or of the time that has pass'd since we have done any Action, by the confus'd Remembrance of the things we have done, or of the Thoughts we have had successively since that Action. For they are all these Thoughts and Actions that have succeded one another, which are assistant to the Mind in judging of the length of any Time, or of any part of our Duration: Or rather the confus'd Remembrance of all these successive Thoughts, is the same thing as the judgement of our Duration; as the confus'd View of Lands betwixt us and a Steeple, is the same thing as the judgement concerning the Remoteness of the Steeple.

Hence it is easy to assign the true Reason of the Moon's appearing larger at her Rising, than when considerably elevated above the Horizon. For at her Rising she appears many Leagues distant, and even beyond the sensible Horizon, or the Lands which terminate our Sight. Whereas we judge her but at half a League's Distance, or seven or eight times higher than our Houses, when she is ascended above our Horizon. Thus we judge her far greater when she is near the Horizon, than when at a great distance from it; because we judge her to be far more remote from us, when she rises, than when mounted very high above our Horizon.

I confess a great part of the Philosophers attribute what I have been saying to the Vapours arising from the Earth. I agree with them in this, that the Rays of Objects being refracted by the Vapours, are a reason of the Objects seeming larger. I know there are more Vapours betwixt us and the Moon when rising, than when she is elevated a good height; and consequently she ought to appear somewhat larger than she would seem, if she were always equally remote. But yet it cannot be said, that this Refraction of the Lunary Rays is the cause of those *apparent* Changes of her Magnitude: For that Refraction is no Impediment why the Image delineated in the Fund of the Eyes when we see the Moon rising, may not be less than that which she proj cts, when she hath been a long time risen.

The *Astronomers* who measure the Diameters of the Planets, observe that the Diameter of the Moon is magnify'd in proportion to her Distance from the Horizon, and consequently in Proportion to her Appearing lesser to us: thus the Diameter of the Image which is painted in the Fund of our Eyes, is at that time least when we see the Moon biggest: Indeed, the Moon when she rises, is remoter from us by a Semidiameter of the Earth, than when she is perpendicularly over our heads, and 'tis upon that account her Diameter grows greater in her Ascent above the Horizon, because then she's approaching nearest us.

The reason then that we see her Greater when she rises, is not the Refraction of her Rays meeting with the Vapours which proceed from the Earth, since the Image which is at that time form'd from those Rays, is lesser; but 'tis the Natural Judgement we make of her Remoteness, occasion'd by her appearing beyond those Lands which we see at a vast Distance from us, as has been before explain'd; and I am amaz'd to find *Philosophers* asserting

that the reason of this Appearance, and Deluſion of our Senſes, is harder to be diſcover'd than the greateſt *Æquations* of *Algebra*.

This *Medium* whereby we judge of the Remoteneſs of any Object, by knowing the Diſtance of the things betwixt us and it, is often of conſiderable uſe, when the other means I have ſpoke of, are wholly inſignificant; For by this laſt *Medium*, we can judge that certain Objects are many Leagues diſtant, which we cannot do by any of the other. And yet if we ſtrictly ſurvey it, it will be found in ſeveral things deficient.

For, firſt, we can only make uſe of it, about things upon the Earth, ſince it can be but very rarely, and then very unprofitably imploy'd upon thoſe in the Air, or in the Heavens. Secondly, it cannot be made uſe of on the Earth, but about things a few Leagues diſtant. In the third place, we ought to be certain that there are neither Mountains, nor Valleys, nor any thing of the like nature betwixt us and the Object, that hinders us from applying the afore-ſaid *Medium*. Laſtly, I am perſwaded there is no body but has made ſufficient Tryals upon the Subject, to be convinc'd, that it is a thing extreamly difficult to judge with any certainty of the Remoteneſs of Objects by a ſenſible View of the things lying betwixt us and them: and we perhaps have dwelt too long upon it.

Theſe then are all the Means we have to judge of the Diſtance of Objects, in which ſince we have found conſiderable Imperfections, we cannot but conclude, that the Judgements that are grounded upon them, muſt needs be very *Precarious* and Uncertain.

Hence it is eaſy to manifeſt the Truth of the Propoſitions I have advanc'd. The Object C was ſuppos'd conſiderably remote from A: Therefore in many Inſtances, it may be advanc'd on towards D, or may have approach'd towards B, and no one can diſcover it, becauſe there is no infallible Means whereby to judge of its Diſtance. Nay, it may recede towards D when it is thought to approach towards B: becauſe the Image of the Object is ſometimes augmented, and inlarged upon the *Retina*; whether it be becauſe the Air betwixt the Object and the Eye occaſions a greater Refraction at one time than at another; whether it proceeds from ſome little Trembling, which happen in the Optick Nerve; or laſtly, that the Impreſſion, which is caus'd by an unexact Union of the Rays upon the *Retina*, is diffus'd and communicated to the parts, which ought to receive no Agitation from it; which may proceed from many different cauſes. Thus the Image of the ſame Objects, being larger on theſe occaſions, gives the Soul reaſon to believe the Object approaches nearer. The like may be ſaid of the other Propoſitions.

Before I conclude this Chapter, I would have it obſerv'd, That it is of great concern to us, in order to the Preſervation of our Life, to have a nicer Knowledge of the Motion or Reſt of Bodies, in Proportion to their Nighneſs to us: and that it is a thing uſeleſs and inſignificant, to know exactly the truth of theſe things, when happening in places very remote. For this evidently ſhews that what I have generally advanc'd concerning all the Senſes, how they never Diſcover things to us as they are *abſolutely*, and in their own Nature; but only in *Reflection* to the Preſervation of our Body, is found exactly True in this particular; ſince we know the Motion or Reſt of Objects proportionably better, as they approach nearer to us, and are incapable of judging of them by the Senſes, when they are ſo remote as to ſeem to have no Relation at all, or very little to our Body: as, for inſtance, when they are five or ſix hundred Paces diſtant, if they be of a Moderate Bigneſs; or even Nearer than this, when they are Leſſer; or ſomewhat farther off, when they are proportionably Greater.

CHAP. X.

Of our Errors about ſenſible Qualities. I. *The Diſtinction of the Soul and Body.* II. *An Explication of the Organs of the Senſes.* III. *To what part of the Body the Soul is immediately united.* IV. *An Inſtance to explain the Effect which Objects have upon our Bodies.* V. *What it is they produce in the Soul, and the Reaſons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fibres of the Body.* VI. *Four things which are generally confounded in every Senſation.*

WE have ſeen in the fore-going Chapters that the Judgements we form upon the Teſtimony of our Eyes, concerning Extention, Figure and Motion are never exactly true. And yet it muſt not be allow'd that they are altogether falſe; they contain ſo much Truth at leaſt as this amounts to, that there are Extention, Figures and Motions, whatever they be, which are extrinſical, or *without* our ſelves.

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I confeſs we often ſee things that have no Exiſtence, nor ever had, and it ought not to be concluded that a thing is Actually without us from our *Seeing* it without us. There is no neceſſary Connexion between the Preſence of an Idea to the Mind of a Man, and the Exiſtence of the Thing repreſented by the Idea. Which is manifeſt enough from the Conſideration of what happens to Men in a Dream or a *Delirium*. And yet we may ſafely affirm that ordinarily, Extention, Figures and Motions, are without us when we ſee them ſo. * These things are not in the Imagination only, but are Real. And we are not deceiv'd in believing them to have a Real Exiſtence, and wholly independent on our Mind; though it be a very hard thing to prove it.

* *See the Illuſtrations.*

It is certain then that the Judgments we form concerning the Extention, the Figures and Motions of Bodies, contain ſome Truth: But 'tis another caſe in point of thoſe Judgements we make concerning Light, Colours, Taſts, Smells, and all other Senſible Qualities. For Truth has nothing to do with them, as ſhall be made manifeſt, in the Remainder of this Firſt Book.

We make not here any Diſtinction between Light and Colours, becauſe we ſuppoſe them to have no great Difference; and that they cannot be ſeparately Explain'd. We ſhall likewiſe be oblig'd to ſpeak of other Senſible Qualities in general, at the ſame time we ſhall treat of theſe Two in Particular, becauſe they may be accounted for upon the ſame Principles. The things which follow demand the greateſt Attention imaginable, as being of the higheſt Importance, and very different, as to their Uſefulneſs, from thoſe of the foregoing Diſcourſe.

I. *The Diſtinction of the Soul and Body.*

We inſtantly ſuppoſe a Man to have made ſome Reflection upon two * Idea's which he finds in his Soul: one that repreſents the Body, and the other which repreſents the Mind; and that he is able eaſily to diſtinguiſh them by the poſitive Attributes they contain: In a word, that he is very well ſatisfy'd, that *Extention* is a different thing from *Thought*. Or we will ſuppoſe he has read, and meditated on ſome places of St. *Auſtin*, as the 10 Chapter of the 10 Book, *Concerning the Trinity*, the 4 and 14 Chapters of his Book concerning *The Quantity of the Soul*, at leaſt *Mr. Des-cartes's Meditations*, eſpecially that Part which treats of the Diſtinction of the Soul and Body: or laſtly *Monſieur Cordemoy's* ſixth Diſſertation concerning the Difference of the Soul and Body.

* *I call by the Name of Idea here whatever is the immediate Object of the Mind.*

II. *An Explication of the Organs of the Senſes*

We ſuppoſe farther, that he is acquainted with the *Anatomy* of the Organs of the Senſes; and knows that they conſiſt of little Threads or Fibres, which derive their Origine from the middle of the Brain: that they are diſpers'd through all the Members wherein there is Senſation, and being continued without any Interruption, are terminated upon the External parts of the Body: that whilſt a Man is awake and in health, one of the Extremities cannot be mov'd, but the other will be mov'd in the ſame time becauſe they are always ſomewhat Intenſe and upon the ſtretch: the ſame thing which happens to a Rope that is intenſe, one part whereof cannot be mov'd, but the other muſt receive ſome Vibration.

'Tis farther neceſſary to know that theſe little Threads or Fibres may be mov'd by two ſeveral ways, either by that end that is external to the Brain, or by the end which terminates in the Brain. If theſe Fibres are externally agitated by Objects acting on them, and this Agitation be not communicated ſo far as the Brain, as it happens in Sleep, the Soul receives no freſh Senſation from them at that time: But if theſe Fibres are mov'd in the Brain by the courſe of the Animal Spirits, or by any other cauſe, the Soul has a Perception of ſomething: though the Parts of theſe Fibres which are *without* the Brain, and are diſpers'd throughout all the Parts of the Body, are quiet and undiſturb'd; as it happens when a Man's aſleep.

III. *The Soul is immediately united to that part of the Brain where the Fibres of the Organs of the Senſes center.*

It will not be amiſs to obſerve here, by the way, that Experience certifies us, it is not impoſſible to feel Pain in thoſe parts of our Body, which have been intirely cut off: Becauſe the Fibres of the Brain, which correſpond to them, being Vibrated in the ſame manner, as if thoſe Parts were actually wounded, the Soul feel in thoſe Imaginary Parts, a moſt real Pain. For all theſe things are a palpable Demonſtration, that the Soul immediately reſides in that Part of the Brain in which all the Organs of the Senſes terminate and center: I mean that in this Part ſhe receives the Senſation of all the Changes, that there occur, in reference to the Objects that have caus'd them, or have us'd to cauſe them: and ſhe has no Perception of any thing happening in any other Part, but by the Intervention of the Fibres which terminate therein. This being laid down and well underſtood, it will be no hard thing to diſcover how Senſation is effected, which is neceſſary to be explain'd by ſome particular Inſtance.

IV. *An Inſtance to explain the effect which Objects have upon our Bodies.*

When a Man thruſts the Point of a Needle into his hand, this Point moves and ſeparates the Fibres of the Fleſh. Theſe Fibres are extended from that Place to the Brain, and whilſt he is awake, they are ſo Intenſe, that they can receive no Concuſſion or Vibration, but it is Communicated to thoſe in the Brain: It follows then that the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain muſt be in like manner mov'd. If the Motion of the Fibres of the Hand is Moderate, that of the Fibres of the Brain will be ſo too: and if this Motion is violent enough to break ſomething in the Hand, it will be more forcible and violent in the Brain.

Thus if a Man holds his Hand to the Fire, the little parts of the Wood, whereof it continually throws out innumerable quantities with great violence, (as Reason, upon the defect of our Sight, demonstrates,) beat against the Fibres, and communicate a Part of their Agitation to them. If that Agitation be but moderate, that of the Extremities of the Fibres in the Brain, which answer to the Hand, will be moderate also. And if this Motion be violent enough in the Hand, to separate some Parts of it, as it happens when it is burnt; the Motion of the Internal Fibres of the Brain will be proportionably stronger and more violent. This then, is what occurs in our Body when Objects strike upon us: we must now see what happens to our Soul.

V. *What it is that Objects produce in the Soul, and the Reasons why the Soul perceives not the Motions of the Fibres of the Body.*

She is principally Resident, if we may be permitted so to speak, in that Part of the Brain, where all the Fibres of our Nerves are centred. She is seated there in order to cherish and preserve all the Parts of our Body: and consequently it is necessary she should have notice of all the Changes that occur therein, and that she be able to distinguish those which are adapted and agreeable to the Constitution of her Body, from the contrary; since it would be to no use or purpose for her to know them *absolutely*, and without *Relation* to the Body. Thus though all the Changes of our Fibres do in true speaking, consist meerly in the Motions of them, which are generally no farther different, than according to the Degrees of *more* or *less*; yet it is necessary for the Soul to look upon these Changes as essentially different: For though they differ very little in themselves, they ought however to be consider'd as essentially different, in reference to the Preservation of the Body.

This confus'd Reasoning or this Natural Judgement, is only a Compound Sensation. See what I have said before of Natural Judgements, and the first Ch. of the 3d. Book.

The Motion, for instance, that produces Pain, has rarely any considerable difference from that which causes Titillation: There is no necessity there should be any Essential Difference betwixt these two Motions, but it is necessary there should be an Essential Difference betwixt the Titillation and the Pain, which these two Motions cause in the Soul. For the Vibration of the Fibres which accompanies Titillation, certifies the Soul of the good Constitution of her Body, and assures her it has Strength enough to resist the Impression of the Object, and that she need not be under any Apprehensions of its being injur'd by it: But the Motion which acompanies Pain, being somewhat more violent, is capable of breaking some Fibre of the Body, and the Soul ought to be advis'd of it by some Disagreeable Sensation; so as to be aware of it for the future. Thus though the Motions, which are occasion'd in the Body, are no farther different in themselves than according to the Degrees of *more* or *less*; yet being consider'd with Relation to the Welfare and Preservation of our Life, they may be said to differ Essentially.

'Tis upon this account our Soul has no Perception of the Vibrations, which are excited by Objects, in the Fibres of our Flesh: it would be of very little use, for her to know them; nor could she from thence receive sufficient Light to judge whether the things about us were capable of Destroying or Maintaining the *œconomy* of our Body. But she feels her self touch'd with Sensations essentially different, which shewing precisely the Qualities of Objects as they are related to her Body, make her most exactly sensible in what capacity these Objects are in to hurt it.

We may farther consider, That in case the Soul had no Perception, but of that which happen'd in her Hand, when it were burnt, if she saw nothing there but the Motion and Separation of some Fibres, she would not much concern her self about it: Nay, she might probably sometimes out of an Humour or a Frolick, take some satisfaction in doing it, like those Freakish kind of Men, who divert themselves in their Passions or Debauches, in breaking all things they light upon.

Or as a Prisoner would not be much concern'd, to see the Walls batter'd down about him, that confin'd him, but rather would be glad of it, upon the hopes of a Deliverance: So if we had no other Perception than of the Separation of the Parts of our Body, when we were burnt, or hurt in any manner, we should soon be perswaded that our Happiness was not confin'd to a Body which prevented our Injoying those things, which ought to make us Happy; and so should be glad of seeing it destroy'd.

Hence it is apparent that the Author of the Union of our Soul and Body, hath with greatest Wisdom ordain'd, That we should be sensible of Pain, whenever any Change happen'd to our Body, capable of incommoding it; as when a Needle pierced the Flesh, or the Fire separated some parts of it; and that we should be sensible of a Titillation, or an agreeable Heat, when these Motions were moderate, without perceiving the Truth of that which occurr'd in our Body, or the Motions of the Fibres, we have been speaking of.

First, because in the Sensation of Pleasure and Pain, which are things far more different than in Degree, we distinguish with greater Ease the Objects which occasion them. Secondly, because this way of Informing us, whether the Uniting our selves with the Bodies that encompass us, or the Separating from them be most convenient, is the shortest and the speediest, and takes up the capacity of the Mind the least; which is only made for *GOD* himself.

Lastly, because Pleasure and Pain are Modifications of our Soul, which she feels with Relation to her Body, and which more nearly affect her than would the Knowledge of the Motion of some Fibres belonging to it; this obliges her to be more sollicitous about them: and

this

this is a Reason of the most strict Union betwixt the two *Essential* Parts of Man. From all which it is manifest that the Senses are given us, for the Preservation of our Body only, and not for the Discovery of Truth.

What hath been said concerning Titillation and Pain, ought universally to be understood of all other Sensations, as we shall see hereafter. I chose to begin with these two Sensations rather than others, because they are more Strong and Lively and Proper to make my Meaning more *Sensibly* conceiv'd.

It is at present a very easy thing to shew, That we fall into infinite Errors, concerning Light and Colours, and generally concerning all Sensible Qualities; as Cold, Heat, Smells, Tasts, Sound, Pain, and Titillation; and if I would stand to make a particular Enquiry into all those we fall into about all the Objects of our Senses; whole Years would not suffice to make a Deduction of them; because they are in a manner Infinite. It will be sufficient therefore to speak of them in General.

In almost all Sensations there are four different things which Men confound with one another; because they happen altogether, and as it were in the same Instant: And this is the Principle of all the Errors of our Senses.

VI. *Four things which are generally confounded in every Sensation.*

The First is the *Action* of the Object, that is, in Heat, for instance, the Impulsion or Motion of the little parts of the Wood against the Fibres of the Hand.

The Second is the *Passion* of the Organ of Sense, that is to say, The Agitation of the Fibres of the Hand caused by *that* of the little Parts of Fire, which Agitation is communicated to the Brain, because otherwise the Soul would have no Sensation of it.

The Third is the *Passion*, the *Sensation* or *Perception* of the Soul, that is, What every one *Feels* in himself when he is near the Fire.

The Fourth is the *Judgement* the Soul makes, that what she feels is both in her Hand, and in the Fire: Now this *Judgement* is *Natural*, or rather is only a *Compound Sensation*. But this Sensation or this Natural Judgement, is for the most part attended with another *Free* or Voluntary Judgement, which is so customary for the Soul to make, that she is almost incapable of preventing it. Here then are four things of a very different Nature, as may be seen, which Men are not nice enough to distinguish, but are apt to confound, because of the strict Union of the Soul and Body, which hinders them from making an exact distribution of the Properties of Matter, and of the Mind.

'Tis notwithstanding easy to discover that of these four things, which occur within us, in the Sensation of an Object; the two first belong to the Body, and the two last appertain to the Soul only, provided a Man has any whit meditated on the Nature of the Soul and Body, as he ought to have done, as I before suppos'd him. But these things demand a particular Explication.

CHAP. XI.

I. *The Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the External Fibres of our Senses.* II. *The Cause of this Error.* III. *An Objection and Answer.*

IN this and the three succeeding Chapters I shall treat of these four things above-mention'd, which I said us'd to be confounded, and taken for a Simple Sensation: and I shall only give a General Explication of the *Errors* we fall into, because if I would descend to Particulars, there would never be an end of them: But I hope however to put the Mind of those, who will seriously consider what I am about to say, in a condition of discovering with a great deal of Ease, all the *Errors* our Senses can make us Subject to; but in order to this it is demanded, That they would attentively Meditate as well upon the following Chapters, as upon that they have last been Reading.

The first of the things we confound, in each of our Sensations, is the Action of Objects upon the External Fibres of our Body. It is certain a Man makes hardly any Difference betwixt the Sensation of the Soul, and that Action of Objects; which is so plain as not to need any farther Proof. The Generality of Men imagine that the Heat, for instance, which they *Feel*, is in the Fire which causes it; that Light is in the Air, and Colours are upon colour'd Objects. They have no Thought of any Motions of Imperceptible Bodies, which are the cause of these Sensations.

I. *Of the Error we fall into concerning the Action of Objects against the External Fibres of our Senses.*

It is true they do not judge that Pain is in the Needle which pricks them, in like manner as they judge that Heat is in the Fire: But the Reason of it is, That the Needle and its Action are visible, but the little parts of the Wood that proceed from the Fire, and their Motion against our Hands are altogether invisible. Thus seeing nothing that strikes upon our Hands when we warm our selves, and yet feeling Heat in them, we Naturally judge this Heat to be in the Fire, for want of discovering any thing in it besides.

II. *The Cause of this Error.*

So that it is generally true, that we attribute our Senſations to the Objects themſelves, when we are ignorant of the Cauſes of theſe Senſations: And becauſe Pain, and Titillation are produc'd by Senſible Bodies, as by a Needle or a Feather, which we both ſee and touch, we for this Reaſon do not conclude, that there is any thing in theſe Objects like the Senſations which they cauſe in us.

III. *An Objection and Anſwer.*

And yet I confeſs that we do not fail to judge *Combuſtion* is not in the Fire, but only in the Hand, though it proceeds from the ſame cauſe, *i. e.* the Action of the little parts of the Wood, as well as Heat, which yet we attribute to the Fire. But the Reaſon of this is that Combuſtion is a *Species* of Pain: For having often judg'd that Pain is not in the external Body which produces it, we are induc'd to form the ſame Judgement of *Combuſtion*.

That which is another Reaſon of our Judging in this manner, is, that Pain or Combuſtion, moſt ſtrenuouſly applys our Soul to the conſideration of the parts of her Body; and this *Intention* of the Soul turns off her thoughts from any other thing: Thus the Mind attributes the Senſation of Combuſtion to the Object that is moſt preſent, and nigh her ſelf. And becauſe we find preſently after, that the Combuſtion has left ſome viſible marks in the part in which we felt the Pain, this is a Confirmation of the Judgement we have made that Combuſtion is in the Hand. But this is no Impediment, why we ſhould not embrace this General Rule, *That we are accuſtom'd to attribute our Senſations to Objects when-ever they act upon us by the Motion of ſome Inviſible Parts.* And upon this ground it is, that we uſually believe Colours, Light, Smells, Taſts, Sounds, and ſome other Senſations, to be in the Air, or in the External Objects which produce them: for as much as all theſe Senſations are produc'd in us by the Motions of ſome Imperceptible Bodies.

CHAP. XII.

I. Of our Errors concerning the Motions of the Fibres of our Senſes. II. That we have no Perception of theſe Motions, or that we confound them with our Senſations. III. An Experiment that proves it. IV. Three kinds of Senſations. V. The Errors that accompany them.

I. *Of our Errors concerning the Motions or Vibrations of the Fibres of our Senſes.*

THE ſecond thing that occurs in every Senſation is the Vibration of the Fibres of our Nerves, which is communicated to the Brain: And we err in confounding always this Vibration with the Senſation of the Soul, and in judging there is no ſuch Vibration at all, when we have no Perception of it through the Senſes.

II. *That we confound them with the Senſations of our Soul, and ſometimes have no Perception of them.*

We confound, for inſtance, the Vibration excited by the Fire in the Fibres of our Hand, with the Senſation of Heat: And we ſay the Heat is in the Hand: But becauſe we are inſenſible of any Vibration caus'd by viſible Objects in the Optick Nerve, which is in the Fund of the Eye, we think this Nerve is not vibrated at all, nor cover'd with the Colours that we ſee. On the contrary, we judge theſe Colours are ſpread only on the ſurface of the External Objects. Yet it is manifeſt by the following Experiment that the Colours are as ſtrongly and lively expreſs'd on the Fund of the Optick Nerve as in Viſible Objects.

III. *An Experiment that proves it.*

For take but the Eye of an Ox juſt kill'd, and ſtrip off the Coats that are oppoſite to the *Pupill* and ſituate near the Optick Nerve, putting a piece of very tranſparent Paper in their room: This done, place the Eye in the hole of a Window, ſo as the Pupill may be towards the Air, and the hind-part of the Eye in the Chamber; which ſhould be cloſe ſhut up and darkn'd all over: And upon this the Colours of Objects that are out of the Chamber will appear to be ſpread upon the Fund of the Eye, but painted topſy-turvy. If it fortunes that the Colours are not lively enough, on the account of the too little diſtance of the Objects repreſented in the Fund of the Eye, the Eye muſt be lengthened by conſtringing the ſides of it, or ſhortned if the Objects are too remote.

We ſee by this Experiment, that we ought to judge or perceive that Colours are in the Fund of the Eye; in like manner as we judge that Heat is in our Hands, if our Senſes were given us for the Diſcovery of Truth, and if Reaſon conducted us in the Judgements we make upon the Objects of our Senſes.

But in accounting for this inconſiſtent Variety of our Judgements about Senſible Qualities, it muſt be conſider'd, that the Soul is ſo intimately united to her Body, and moreover has contracted ſo much Carnality ſince the Fall, that ſhe attributes a great many things to the Body, which are only peculiar to Her Self; and can hardly any longer diſtinguiſh her ſelf from It. In ſo much that ſhe does not only attribute to it all the *Senſations* we are at preſent ſpeaking of, but alſo the Force of *Imagination*; and even ſometimes the Power of *Reaſoning*: For there have been a multitude of Philoſophers ſtupid, and ſenſeleſs enough to believe, the Soul was nothing elſe but the more refin'd and ſubtle part of Matter.

A Man that ſhall read *Tertallian* conſiderately, will be but too ſenſibly convinc'd of what I ſay; ſince He ſubſcribes to this Opinion, after a great number of Authors whoſe Authority he alledges: This is ſo true, that he endeavours to prove in his Book *Concerning the Soul*, that we are oblig'd by Faith, Scripture, and Particular Revelations, to believe the Soul a Corporeal Being. I deſign not a Refutation of his Notions, becauſe I have ſuppos'd a Man to have read ſome of St. *Auſtin*'s or *Mr. Des-Cartes*'s Works, which will ſufficiently diſcover the Extravagance of theſe Thoughts, and confirm and corroborate the Mind in the Diſtinction of Extention and Thought, of the Soul and Body.

IV. *An Explication of three ſorts of Senſations of the Soul.*

The Soul then is ſo blind, as not to know her ſelf, nor diſcern that her own Senſations do belong to her. But to explain this, it is neceſſary to diſtinguiſh in the Soul three kinds of Senſations, ſome Vigorous and Lively, others Faint and Languiſhing; and laſtly, a Middle ſort between theſe two.

The Vigorous and Lively Senſations, are ſuch as ſurprize and quicken the Mind with a ſort of Violence; as being either very grateful or diſagreeable to it: Such as are Pain, or Titillation, a great Cold, or vehement Heat; and in general all ſuch as are not only attended with Traces in the Brain, but moreover with ſome Motion of the Animal Spirits towards the Internal Parts of the Body; ſuch a Motion as is proper to excite the Paſſions, as ſhall be explain'd in another place.

The Faint and Languiſhing Senſations are ſuch as affect the Soul very little; and are neither very Pleaſant, nor very Diſagreeable to her: as moderate Light, all Colours, weak and ordinary Sounds, *&c.*

Laſtly, the Middle kind betwixt the Vigorous and Faint, I call ſuch ſorts of Senſations, as moderately affect the Soul; as a great and glaring Light, a loud and mighty Sound, *&c.* But it is obſervable, that a Weak and Languid Senſation may become a Middle one, and proceed to be a Vigorous and Lively one. The Senſation, for inſtance, a Man has of Light is faint, when the Light of a Flamboy is but glimmering or remote; but this Senſation may become a Middle one upon the approaching of the Flamboy nearer us: it may laſtly grow moſt ſtrong and lively, by holding th Flamboy ſo cloſe to the Eyes as to dazle them; or ſuppoſe a Man beholds the Sun: Thus the Senſation of Light may be Vigorous or Faint, or neither, but Moderate, according to its different Degrees.

V. *The Errors that accompany the Senſations.*

Let us ſee then the Judgements the Soul paſſes upon theſe three ſorts of Senſations; wherein we may obſerve that ſhe almoſt ever blindly and implicitly follows the Senſible Impreſſions, or the Natural Judgements of the Senſes: and that ſhe is delighted, if I may ſo term it, to diffuſe her ſelf upon the Objects ſhe conſiders, by diſmantling her own Being, to cloath and adorn External Objects.

The firſt of theſe Senſations are ſo vigorous and Powerful, that the Soul muſt whether ſhe will or not, acknowledge they do in ſome meaſure belong to her: So that ſhe not only judges them to be in the Objects, but believes them alſo to be in the Members of her Body, which ſhe conſiders as a Part of her ſelf. Thus ſhe judges that Heat and Cold are not only in the Fire and Ice, but in her own Hands alſo.

As to the languid Senſations, they ſo little concern the Soul, that ſhe concludes they do not belong to her; that they are neither in her ſelf, nor in her Body; but in Objects only. And for this Reaſon it is we deveſt our own Soul, and our own Eyes, of Light and Colours to cloath and beautify the Objects that are without us, though Reaſon teaches us that the Idea we have of Matter does not include them in it. And Experience viſibly manifeſts that we ought equally to judge them in our Eyes as on the Objects; ſince we ſee them no leſs upon the one than the other, as I have experimentally prov'd by the Eye of an Ox plac'd in the hole of a Window.

Now the Reaſon why Men do not ſo readily perceive Colours, Smells, Taſts, and all other Senſations to be the Modifications of their Soul, is becauſe we have not diſtinct Idea of the Soul. For when we know a thing by the Idea that repreſents it, we know clearly the Modifications it is capable of. All Men whatever agree that Rotundity, for inſtance, is a Modification of Extention; becauſe all Men know what Extenſion is by a clear Idea that repreſents it. Thus becauſe we know not the Soul by its Idea, as I ſhall explain hereafter, but only by an Internal Senſation that we have of it, we can't underſtand by a ſimple View, but by the force of Reaſoning only, whether Whiteneſs, Light, Colours, Sounds, and other faint and languiſhing Senſations are the Modifications of our Soul, or not. But as to the lively Senſations, as Pain and Pleaſure, we eaſily judge that they are within us; becauſe we feel them ſenſibly affect us; and there is no need of our knowing them by their Idea's, to underſtand that they belong to us.

As for the Middle Senſations, the Soul ſeems dubious and at a Fault about them. For on one hand ſhe is willing to follow the Natural Judgements of the Senſes, and thereupon ſhe removes as far from her as poſſible this kind of Senſations, to beſtow them upon the Objects: But on the other hand, 'tis impoſſible but ſhe muſt feel within her ſelf, and be conſcious, that they belong to her; eſpecially when theſe Senſations come up near to thoſe, which I have nam'd the Strong and Lively; whereupon let us ſee how ſhe behaves her ſelf in reſpect of the Judgements ſhe makes concerning them: If ſhe is ſmartly touch'd with the Senſation,

ſhe judges it to be in her own Body, as well as in the Object: If the Senſation affects her but a very little, ſhe judges it only in the Object: If the Senſation be of a Middle ſort betwixt thoſe we call the ſtrong, and the Weak, the Soul then knows not what to think of it, whilſt ſhe judges only by the Senſes.

For inſtance, If a Man ſees a Candle at a good competent diſtance, the Soul judges the Light to be only in the Object: if he puts it very near his Eyes, the Soul judges the Light to be not only in the Candle, but likewiſe in the Eyes: but if he withdraws about a foot from it, the Soul is at a pauſe without determining whether or not the Light be in the Object only. But ſhe is never ſo wiſe as to think as ſhe ought to do, that Light neither is, nor can be any Property or Modification of Matter; and that it only is within her ſelf; becauſe ſhe never thinks of imploying her Reaſon in diſcovering the Truth of the Matter, but only her Senſes, which never can diſcover it, nor indeed were given us for any other uſe than the Preſervation of the Body.

Now the cauſe why the Soul makes no more uſe of her Reaſon, that is of her pure *Intellection*, in conſidering an Object which may be perceiv'd by the Senſes, is this, that the Soul is not at all mov'd or concern'd on the account of thoſe things ſhe perceives by pure *Intellection*, but on the contrary, is moſt nearly touch'd by things *Senſible*: For the Soul applies her ſelf intenſely to that which affects her moſt; but is too careleſs to apply her ſelf to things that work in her no Concernment. Thus ſhe almoſt univerſally ſuites her Free Judgements to the Natural Judgement of her Senſes.

To judge aright then of Light and Colours, as of all other ſenſible Qualities, we muſt carefully diſtinguiſh between the Senſation of Colour, and the Motion of the Optick Nerve; and we muſt find out by our Reaſon, that Motions and Impulſions, are Properties of Bodies, and therefore may poſſibly be found both in Objects, and in the Organs of our Senſes, but that Light and Colours which we ſee, are Modifications of our Soul, very different from the other, and of which we have quite different Idea's.

For it is evident that a Peaſant, for inſtance, ſees Colours very well, and can diſtinguiſh them from all things elſe that are not Colour. It is evident too that he perceives nothing of Motion either in the colour'd Objects, or in the Fund of his Eyes; Therefore Colour is not Motion: In like manner, a Peaſant is very ſenſible of Heat, and he has knowledge clear enough to diſtinguiſh it from all things elſe, which are not Heat. Yet he never ſo much as thinks of the Fibres of his Hand's being mov'd. Heat then which he feels is not Motion, ſince the Idea's of Heat and Motion are different, and one may be had without the other. For we have no other Reaſon to affirm a Square is not a Circle, but becauſe the Idea of a Square is different from that of a Circle, and we can think of one without thinking of the other.

There needs but a little Attention to diſcover, that it is not neceſſary the cauſe which occaſions a Senſation of ſuch or ſuch a Thing in us, ſhould contain that thing in it ſelf. For as there is no neceſſity there ſhould be Light in my Hand, when I ſee a flaſh, upon giving my Eye a blow; ſo there is no need that Heat ſhould be in the Fire, to make me ſenſible of it, upon the approach of my Hand towards it; Nor indeed that any other ſenſible Qualities, ſhould be in the Objects that produce them. 'Tis enough that they cauſe a Vibration in the Fibres of my Fleſh, to the end my Soul which is united to it, may be modify'd by ſome Senſation. There is no Analogy, I confeſs, between Motions and Senſations: Nor is there any betwixt body and Spirit. But ſince Nature, or the Will of the Creator, aſſociates theſe two Subſtances, though eſſentially different, we need not wonder if their Modifications are Reciprocal. It is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo, that both of them might conſtitute but one entire Being.

It ſhould be well obſerv'd, that our Senſes being given us only for the Preſervation of of our Body, it is moſt conveniently order'd that they ſhould induce us to judge of ſenſible Qualities juſt as we do. It is abundantly more for our advantage to recieve the ſenſation of Pain and Heat as being in our own Body, than to judge they were only in the Objects that occaſion'd them: Becauſe Pain and Heat being capable of injuring the Members of our Body, it is moſt requiſite we ſhould be warn'd of them when-ever they attach'd us, to prevent our Body's being endammag'd by them.

But in point of Colours 'tis another caſe; for the Generality, they are unable to hurt the Fund of the Eye, where they are collected, and it is an uſeleſs thing to us to know they are painted on it. Theſe Colours are only neceſſary to us, as far as they are conducible to a more diſtinct Diſcovery of Objects; and upon that account our Senſes induce us to attribute them to Objects only. Thus the Judgements which the Impreſſion of our Senſes incline us to make, are moſt exact if conſider'd only in Relation to the Preſervation of our Body. But yet they are altogether Phantaſtical, and very remote from the Truth, as we have already ſeen in part, and ſhall be more abundantly manifeſt in that which follows.

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

I. *Of the Nature of Senſations.* II. *That a Man knows them better than he thinks he does.* III. *An Objection and Anſwer* IV. *Why a Man imagines he has no knowledge of his own Senſations.* V. *That 'tis an Error to think all Men have the ſame Senſations of the ſame Objects.* VI. *An Objection and Anſwer.*

I. *The Definition of the Senſations.*

THE third thing which is found in each of our Senſations, or that which we Feel, for inſtance, when we are near the Fire, is *a Modification of our Soul, in relation or correſpondence to that which occurs in the Body, to which ſhe is united.* This Modification is grateful or agreeable when that which occurs in the Body, is proper to promote the Circulation of the Blood and other Vital Functions: And this is nam'd in an Equivocal Term, *Heat*. But this Modification is painful, and quite different from the Other, when that which occurs in the Body, is capable of incommoding or burning it; that is to ſay, when the Motions which are in the Body are capable of breaking ſome of its Fibres, and this generally goes by the name of *Pain* or *Combuſtion*; and ſo 'tis with the other Senſations: But now let us ſee what are the Thoughts Men uſually have upon this Subject.

II. *That a Man knows his own Senſations better than he thinks he does.*

The firſt Error is this, that a Man unreaſonably imagines he has no Knowledge of his Senſations. We daily find a great number of ſuch Men as are much concern'd and very ſollicitous to know what Pain and Pleaſure, and the other Senſations are: neither will they grant that they are only in the Soul, and the Modifications of it: I confeſs theſe are a ſtrange ſort of Men, who would needs be taught what they cannot be ignorant of; For 'tis impoſſible a Man ſhould be abſolutely ignorant what Pain is, when he is under the ſenſe of it.

A Man, for example, that burns his Hand, does very well diſtinguiſh the Pain he feels from Light, Colour, Sound, Taſts, Smells, Pleaſure, and from every other Pain beſides that he feels. He diſtinguiſhes it very well from Admiration, Deſire, and Love. He diſtinguiſhes it from a Square, a Circle, and a Motion; in a word, he finds 'tis very different from every thing which is not the Pain he feels. Now if he has no Knowledge of Pain, I would fain be ſatisfy'd, how he can tell with any certainty or evidence, that what he feels is none of all theſe things.

We know then in ſome meaſure what we are immediately ſenſible of; as when we ſee Colours, or have any other Senſation: and if it were not for this Knowledge, it is certain we could know nothing of any ſenſible Object. For 'tis manifeſt, for example, that we ſhould be unable to diſtinguiſh Wine from Water, did we not know that the Senſations we have of the one were different from thoſe we have of the other; and ſo 'tis with all other things which we know by our Senſes.

III. *An Objection and Anſwer.*

'Tis true, ſhould a Man be importunate in deſiring me to explain what is Pain, Pleaſure, Colour, or the like, I ſhould not be able to define it in words as it ought to be. But it does not follow from thence that if I ſee a Colour, or burn my ſelf, I have no manner of Knowledge of that whereof I have an Actual Senſation.

Now the reaſon why our Senſations cannot be explain'd by words, as well as all other things, is becauſe it depends on the Arbitrary Will of Men, to joyn the Idea's of things to what names they pleaſe. They may call the Heaven *Ouranos*, *Shamajim*, &c. as the *Greeks* and *Hebrews*: But the ſame Men have not an equal Liberty of affixing their Senſations to words, nor indeed to any thing elſe. They ſee no Colours, unleſs they open their Eyes, diſcourſe to them what you will about them. They have no Reliſh of Taſts, unleſs ſome change happens in the diſpoſition of the Fibres of their Tongue and Brain: In ſhort, the Senſations have no manner of Dependance upon the Will of Men: and 'tis only he that created Men, that ſtill preſerves them in that mutual correſpondence of the Modifications of their Soul to thoſe of their Body. So that if a Man would have me repreſent to him Heat, or Colour, I cannot make uſe of words to do it: But I muſt impreſs in the Organs of his Senſes, ſuch Motions as Nature has affixt theſe Senſations to. I muſt bring him to the Fire, and ſhew him a piece of Painting.

And this is the reaſon why 'tis impoſſible to give Men that are born Blind the leaſt Knowledge of that which we underſtand by Red, Green, Yellow, or the like. For ſince 'tis impoſſible for a Man to make another underſtand him, when he that hears, has not the ſame Idea's as he that ſpeaks; it is manifeſt that ſince Colours are neither conjoyn'd to the ſound of words, nor to the Motion of the *Auditory*, but to that of the *Optick Nerve*, we can never repreſent them to Men that are Blind, ſince their Optick Nerve cannot be Vibrated by colour'd Objects.

We have therefore ſome ſort of Knowledge of our Senſations. Let us now ſee how it comes to paſs that we are ſtill caſting about to know them, and that we believe our ſelves deſtitute of any Knowledge of them. The reaſon of it undoubtedly is this.

IV. *From whence it proceeds that a Man imagines he has no Knowledge of his Sensations.*

The Soul since the Original Sin, is now as it were Corporeal in her Inclination; the love she has for sensible things, is perpetually lessening the Union or the Relation she has with those that are Intellectual. She is disgusted and uneasy in conceiving things that will not enter by the Senses, and is presently for leaving the Consideration of them. She imploys her utmost endeavour to produce the Images that represent them in her Brain, and she is so throughly inur'd to this kind of Conception from our Infancy, that she thinks that she can have no *Knowledge* of what she can have no *Imagination.* Notwithstanding there are a great many things, which, being not Corporeal, cannot be represented to the Mind by Corporeal Images: as, to instance, our Soul with all her Modifications. At what time therefore our Soul would represent to her self her own Nature, and her own Sensation, she endeavours to form a Corporeal Image thereof. She is in search of her self amongst all Corporeal Beings: One while she takes her self for one Thing, and another while for Another; sometimes for Air, sometimes for Fire, or for the Harmony of the parts of her own Body. And being thus desirous of finding her self among the Mass of Bodies, and of imagining her own Modifications, which are her Sensations, as the Modifications of Bodies, we need not wonder if she's bewildred in her wandrings, and is misguided out of the Knowledge of her self.

That which induces the Soul to be still more fond of *Imagining* her Sensations, is her judging them to be in the Objects: And moreover, that they are the Modifications of them; and consequently that they are something Corporeal, and fit to be *Imagin'd.* She judges then that the Nature of her Sensations consists only in the Motion which produces them, or in some other Modification of a Body, which is manifestly different from what she is *Sensible* of; this being nothing Corporeal, nor possible to be represented by Corporeal Images: This is what confounds her, and makes her believe she is altogether Ignorant of her own Sensations.

See the Illustrations upon the 7. Chap. of the Second Part of the third Book.

As for those who make none of these fruitless Attempts, to represent the Soul and its Modifications by Corporeal Images, and yet are desirous of having their Sensations explain'd to them; they must understand that neither the Soul nor its Modifications can be known by Idea's, taking the word *Idea* in its most proper signification, as I have determin'd and explain'd it, in the third Book; but only by *Conscience* or *Internal Sensation.* So that when they ask us to explain the Soul and her Modifications by any Idea's, they demand what is impossible for all the Men in the World put together to give them: Because Men cannot instruct us by giving us *Idea's* of things, but only by making us attentive to those we have already.

The second *Error* whereinto we fall about our Sensations, is the attributing them to Objects; which has been explain'd in the XI and XII Chapters.

V. *That 'tis an Error to think all Men have the same Sensations of the same Objects.*

The third is our judging that all Mankind have the same Sensations of the same Objects. We believe, for example, that all the World sees Snow white, the Sky Azure, the Meadows green, and all visible Objects in the same manner as we see them; and so likewise all the other sensible Qualities of the other Senses. There are many who will wonder even that we call in question those things, which they believe indubitable. However, I can certify them they have not any Reason to judge of these things as they do. And though I cannot Mathematically demonstrate they are in an Error, I can nevertheless demonstrate, 'tis the greatest chance in the World, if they are not: And I have Arguments strong enough to convince them they are certainly deceiv'd.

That the Truth of what I here advance may be acknowledg'd, we must call to mind what has been already prov'd; namely that there is a vast difference betwixt our Sensations and the causes of our Sensations. We may conclude from thence, that *absolutely* speaking, it is possible for Similar Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Optick Nerve, to produce in different Persons, different Sensations, that is to cause them to see different Colours: And it may so fall out, that a Motion which shall produce in one Person the Sensation of Blew, shall cause the Sensation of Green or Gray in another, or perhaps a new Sensation, which never any Man had besides.

It is certain, I say, that this is possible, and there is no reason in the World that can prove the contrary: however, we will grant that it is not probable it should be so. It is much more reasonable to believe that GOD acts always uniformly in the Union he has establisht betwixt our Souls and our Bodies; and that he has affixt the same Idea's and the same Sensation to Similar Motions of the Internal Fibres of the Brain of different Persons.

Let it be granted then that the same Motions of the Fibres which terminate in the middle of the Brain, are accompany'd with the same Sensations in all Men: if it fortunes that the same Objects produce not the same Motions in their Brain, they will not by consequence excite the same Sensations in their Soul: Now to me it seems indisputable, that the Organs of the Senses of all Men being not dispos'd in the same manner cannot receive the same Impressions from the same Objects.

The Blows, for instance, that Porters give one another by way of Complement, would cripple some sort of People: The same Blow produces very different Motions, and consequently excites very different Sensations, in a Man of a Robust constitution, and in a Child or a Woman of a tender Make. Thus since we cannot be ascertain'd that there are two Persons in the World, who have the Organs of their Senses exactly match'd; we cannot be assur'd there are two Persons in the World who have altogether the same Sensations of the same Objects.

This

This is the original cauſe of the ſtrange Variety which is found in the Inclinations of Men. Some there are who are extreamly pleas'd with Muſick, others find nothing agreeable in it: and even between theſe who delight in it, ſome love one ſort of Muſick, ſome another, according to that almoſt Infinite Diverſity which is found in the Fibres of the Auditory Nerve, in the Blood, and in the Animal Spirits. How great, for inſtance, is the difference between the Muſick of *Italy*, of *France*, of the *Chineſe*, and other People; and conſequently between the Reliſh theſe different People have of theſe different ſorts of Muſick? It is uſual likewiſe for the ſame Men at ſeveral times to receive different Impreſſions from the ſame Conſorts. For if the Imagination be well warm'd by a great plenty of brisk and active Spirits, a Man is much more pleas'd with a bolder hand or a Voluntary, wherein there are many Diſcords; than with a ſofter Muſick, that is compos'd with exacter Rules and a Mathematical Niceneſs. Experience proves this, and 'tis eaſy to give a Reaſon for it.

'Tis juſt the ſame with Smells. He that loves an Orange-flower, poſſibly cannot endure a Roſe; and ſo on the contrary.

As for Taſts, there is no leſs a Diverſity in them than in the other ſenſations. Sawces muſt be made wholly different, equally to pleaſe different Men, or equally to pleaſe the ſame Perſon at different times: One loves ſweet, another ſowre; one loves the taſte of Wine, another abhors it; the ſame Perſon who thinks it pleaſant when he's in health, finds it bitter in a Fever; and ſo 'tis with the other Senſes. And yet all Men are fond of Pleaſure; they all delight in agreeable Senſations: And in this have all the ſame Inclinations. They receive not therefore the ſame Senſations from the ſame Objects, ſince they do not love them equally alike.

Thus that which makes one Man ſay, he likes ſweet things, is the agreeable ſenſation he has of them; and that which makes another ſay he does not love ſweet things, is indeed becauſe he has a different Senſation from him that loves them. And ſo in ſaying he loves not ſweet things, it is not imply'd that he would not have the ſame Senſation as the other; but only that he has it not. Wherefore 'tis an Impropriety of Speech for a Man to ſay, he loves not what is ſweet, he ſhould rather ſay he loves not Sugar or Honey, or the like, which to others ſeem ſweet and agreeable; and that he has not the ſame Taſt as others, becauſe the Fibres of his Tongue are differently diſpos'd.

But to give a ſenſible Inſtance; Let us ſuppoſe that among twenty Men there were ſome one of them whoſe hands were cold, and that he was unaquainted with the words they make uſe of in *England* to explain the ſenſations of Heat and Cold by: and on the contrary that the hands of all the reſt were extreamly hot. If in Winter ſome Water ſomewhat frigid ſhould be brought them all to waſh in, thoſe whoſe hands were very hot, waſhing after each other, might very well ſay, This Water is very cold, I can't endure it: But when the other whoſe hands were extreamly cold, came to waſh at laſt, he might ſay on the contrary, I can't imagine, Gentlemen, why ye like not the cold Water, for my part I take pleaſure in feeling it cold and waſhing in it.

It is manifeſt in this particular inſtance, that the laſt in ſaying he lov'd the cold, could mean nothing elſe but that he lov'd the Heat, and that he felt the Water hot, whilſt others felt the contrary.

Thus when a Man ſays, I love what is bitter, and can't endure ſweets: no more is meant thereby than that he has not the ſame ſenſations, as thoſe who ſay they love ſweets, and have an averſion to what is bitter.

It is certain therefore, that a ſenſation which is agreeable to one Man, is ſo to all others who have the ſame; but the ſame Object does not cauſe the ſame ſenſation in all Men; becauſe of the different diſpoſition of the Organs of the ſenſes: which is a thing of greateſt conſequence to be obſerv'd both as to Natural and Moral Philoſophy.

VI. *An Objection and Anſwer.*

To this only one Objection can be made, and that very eaſy to be anſwer'd; which is this: It ſometimes happens that thoſe very Perſons, who love extreamly ſome ſorts of Meats, at length ſhall hate them in as great a degree, either becauſe in eating they met with ſome uncleanlineſs in the Diſh, which ſurpriz'd and diſguſted them; or becauſe they ſurfeited on them by eating to exceſs, or for ſeveral other reaſons; Theſe Men ('tis objected) love not the ſame ſenſations as they lov'd before: For ſtill though they eat the ſame Meats, yet they find them no longer pleaſant and palatable.

In anſwering this Objection, it muſt be obſerv'd, that theſe Men upon eating thoſe Meats, to which they have ſo great an abhorrence and loathing, have two very different ſenſations at the ſame time. They have that of the Meat which they eat, as 'tis ſuppos'd in the Objection: And they have yet another ſenſation of Diſtaſte or Loathing, which proceeds, for inſtance, from a ſtrong imagination of ſome uncleanlineſs they have formerly ſeen mingled with what they eat. The reaſon of this is, that when two Motions are occaſion'd in the Brain at the ſame time; one of them is never excited without the other, unleſs it be ſome conſiderable time after. Thus becauſe the Agreeable is always accompany'd with the loathſome ſenſation; and we uſually confound things which happen at the ſame time, we imagine with our ſelves, that this ſenſation which was formerly pleaſant and agreeable is no longer ſo. And yet if it were always the ſame, it muſt neceſſarily be always agreeable: where-

fore ſuppoſing it to be diſagreeable and unpleaſant, 'tis becauſe it is joyn'd and confounded with another ſenſation, which is more diſtaſtful than it is it ſelf agreeable.

There is much more difficulty to prove that Colours, and ſuch other Senſations, which I term'd the Faint and Languid, are not the ſame in all Mankind. Becauſe all theſe Senſations affect the Soul ſo weakly, that a Man cannot diſtinguiſh as he may in Taſts or other more powerful and lively Senſations, whether one is more agreeable than another; nor diſcover the diverſity of Mens Senſations by the variety of Pleaſure or Diſtaſt, which might be found in different Perſons. Yet Reaſon which ſhew that the other Senſations are not all alike in different Perſons, does likewiſe ſhew there muſt neceſſarily be variety in the Senſations we have of Colours. And indeed it cannot be doubted but there is much diverſity in the Organs of Sight of different Perſons, as well as in thoſe of Hearing and Taſting. For what reaſon is there to ſuppoſe an exact conformity and reſemblance in the diſpoſition of the Optick Nerve of all Men, ſince there is ſuch an infinite variety in all the things of Nature, but eſpecially in thoſe that are Material. There is then great probability that all Men do not ſee the ſame Colours in the ſame Objects.

This Paragraph is wanting in ſome Editions, and is obſcure in the *French*, and therefore has receiv'd ſome alteration, that it might be perſpicuous.

Nevertheleſs I am of opinion that it never happens, at leaſt very rarely, that any Perſons ſee Black and White of a different Colour from what our ſelves ſee them. But as to middle Colours, ſuch as Red, Yellow, Blew, and eſpecially thoſe that are compounded of theſe three, I am perſwaded there are very few Men that have exactly the ſame Senſations. For there are Men ſometimes to be met with, who ſee ſome ſort of Bodies of a yellow colour, for inſtance, when they view them with one Eye, and of a green or Blew when they behold them with the other. And yet ſuppoſing theſe Men to be born with one Eye only, or with two Eyes ſo diſpos'd as to ſee that of a red or Yellow Colour, which other call Green or Blew, they would believe they ſaw Objects of the ſame Colours as others do, becauſe they would always have heard the name *Green* given to that which they ſee Yellow, and *Blew* to that which to them ſeems red.

It might, as a farther proof, be alledg'd, that all Men ſee not the ſame Objects of the ſame colour, becauſe according to the obſervations of ſome Men, the ſame colours are not equally pleaſing to all ſorts of People; ſince on ſuppoſition theſe Senſations were the ſame, they would be equally agreeable to all Mankind: But becauſe very ſtrong Objections might be urg'd againſt this Argument founded on the Anſwer I gave to the former Objection, I though it not ſolid enough to be propos'd.

Indeed it is very rarely found that a Man is much more pleas'd with one colour than another, as he takes greater pleaſure in one Taſt than another. The reaſon of it is, that the Senſations of Colours, are not given us to judge whether the Bodies about us are fit to nouriſh us or not: This is the part of Pleaſure and Pain, to ſhew which are the Natural Characters of Good and Evil. Objects in point of Colours, are neither good nor bad to eat; If Objects on account of their Colour, ſhould either ſeem agreeable or diſagreeable, the ſight of them would conſtantly be ſucceeded with the courſe of the Animal Spirits, which excite and accompany the Paſſions; ſince the Soul cannot be affected without ſome Commotion. We ſhould often hate Good things, and be fond of the Bad; ſo that our Life could not be long preſerv'd. In ſhort, the Senſations of Colour are given us meerly to diſtinguiſh Bodies from one another; and this is effected well enough, whether a Man ſees Graſs green or red, provided the Perſon who ſees it green or red, ſees it always in the ſame manner.

But ſo much for our Senſations: Let us now ſay ſomething of our Natural Judgments, and our Voluntary Judgements that attend them. The fourth thing to be conſider'd which we confound with the three others, whereof we have been ſpeaking.

CHAP. XIV.

I. *Of the Falſe Judgements that accompany our Senſations, and which we confound with them.* II. *The Reaſons of theſe Falſe Judgements.* III. *That Error is not in our Senſations, but only in theſe Judgements.*

I. *Of the falſe Judgements that accompany our Senſations, and which we confound with them.*

WE inſtantly fore-ſee, that there are very few Perſons who will not be offended at this General Propoſition we lay down, namely, That we have not any Senſation of External things, but contains one or more Judgements. We know well enough too that the generality of Men are of opinion that there is not any Judgement True or Falſe in our Senſations: In ſo much that theſe Perſons ſurpriz'd with the Novelty of this Propoſition, will undoubtedly ſay with Themſelves; How is this poſſible? I do not judge the Wall to be white, I ſee well enough it is ſo. I do not judge that Pain is in my hand, I feel it moſt infallibly there. And who can doubt of things ſo certain, unleſs he has a different Senſation

of Objects from what I have my ſelf? In fine, their Inclinations for the Prejudices of Childhood will carry them much farther. And if they proceed not to Contumely, and to the Contempt of thoſe whom they believe of a contrary ſentiment to themſelves, they will doubtleſs deſerve to be reckon'd amongſt the Moderate ſort of People.

But 'tis not our buſineſs to ſtand propheſying any longer what ill Reception and Succeſs our Thoughts ſhall meet with; 'tis much more expedient to draw them out with ſuch convincing Arguments, and to ſet them in ſo clear a Light as to leave it impoſſible for a Man to engage them with his Eyes open, or to conſider them attentively, without ſubmitting to them. We are to prove that we have no Senſation of External things, which does not include ſome falſe Judgement or other. And the Proof is as follows.

To me it ſeems paſt controverſy, that our Souls take not up ſuch vaſt ſpaces as are thoſe we ſee betwixt us and the Fix'd Stars, though it ſhould be allow'd that they are extended. Thus it is unreaſonable to believe our Souls are in the Heavens, when they ſee the Stars there: Nor is it more credible that they depart out of their Bodies a mile, ſuppoſe when they ſee Houſes at that diſtance: The Soul then muſt neceſſarily ſee Stars and Houſes where they are not, ſince ſhe goes not out of the Body wherein ſhe is; and nevertheleſs ſees them out of it. Now whereas the Stars which are immediately united to the Soul, and which are the only Stars the Soul can ſee, are not in the Heavens, it follows that all Men who ſee Stars in the Heavens, and thereupon voluntarily judge that they are there, make two falſe Judgements; the one Natural, and the other Free and Voluntary. The one is a Judgement of the Senſes, or a Compound Senſation, which ought not to be a meaſure for us to judge by. The other is a Free Judgement of the Will, which a Man may avoid making, and conſequently muſt not make, if he would avoid falling into Error.

II. *The Reaſon of theſe Falſe Judgements.*

But let us ſee upon what grounds a Man believes thoſe ſame Stars he immediately ſees, to be out of the Soul, and in the Heavens: The reaſon is this, That it is not in the power of the Soul to ſee them when ſhe pleaſes; For ſhe can perceive them only at ſuch times as thoſe Motions are excited in her Brain, to which the Idea's of theſe Objects are affix'd by Nature. Now becauſe the Soul has no Perception of the Motions of her Organs, but only of her own Senſations, and is confident theſe ſame Senſations are not of her own producing in her: ſhe is induc'd to judge they are *without* her, and in the cauſe that repreſents them to her. And ſhe has ſo often made theſe kinds of Judgements, at the time of her perceiving Objects, that 'tis hardly in her power at laſt to prevent them.

In order to explain more throughly what I have been ſaying, it would be neceſſary to ſhew the unuſefulneſs of thoſe infinite numbers of little Beings, which we call *Species* and *Idea's*, which are as it were Nothing, and yet repreſent all things: which we Create and Annihilate at our pleaſure, and which our Ignorance has caus'd our Imagination to invent, that we might account for thoſe things we do not underſtand. We ſhould ſhew too the ſolidity of thoſe Mens Opinion, who believe *GOD* to be Father of Light, who alone enlightens all Men, without whom, the moſt ſimple and eaſy Truths would not be intelligible, nor the Sun, as bright and glorious as he is, be viſible; Who acknowledge no other Nature, than the Will of the Creatour; and who upon theſe Conſiderations have diſcover'd that Idea's which repreſent the Creatures to us are nothing but the Perfections of *GOD* himſelf, which are correſpondent to the ſame Creatures, and which repreſent them.

Laſtly, it would be neceſſary to treat of the Nature of what we call *Idea's*; and afterwards we might with greater eaſe, diſcourſe more diſtinctly of the things I have been ſpeaking of: But this would lead us too far; and theſe things ſhall be reſerv'd for the Third Book only, becauſe our Method will require them there. At preſent let it ſuffice, that I bring a moſt ſenſible and uncontroverted Inſtance; wherein we find many Judgements confounded with one and the ſame Senſation.

I ſuppoſe there is no Man in the World, who looking on the Moon, does not ſee her about a Mile's diſtance from him, and finds her greater at her Riſing and Setting, than in the Meridian, or when a good way Elevated above the *Horizon*: and perhaps too he fancies he only ſees her larger, without thinking there is any Judgement in his Senſation. However, it is undoubtedly certain, that if he had no kind of Judgement included in his Senſation, he would not ſee her at that diſtance ſhe appears to him; and beſides, would ſee her leſſer at her Riſing, than when in her Exaltation above the *Horizon*; ſince we only ſee her greater at her Riſing, becauſe we judge her more remote by a Natural Judgement which I have ſpoke to in the ſixth Chapter.

But beſides our Natural Judgements, which may be regarded as Compound Senſations, there occurs in almoſt all our Senſations a Free or Voluntary Judgement. For Men do not only judge by a *Natural* Judgement, that Pain, for inſtance, is in the Hand, they judge it is by a *Free* and Voluntary Judgement alſo. They not only *Feel* it there, but *Believe* it there too; and they are ſo ſtrongly habituated to form ſuch ſort of Judgements, that they find great difficulty to forbear them when they would.

And yet theſe Judgements are moſt falſe in themſelves, though very advantagious to the Welfare and Preſervation of Life. For our Senſes do not inſtruct us but with reference to

the Body: and all our Free Judgements which are conformable and adapted to the Judgement of the Senses, are very remote from Truth.

But not to leave these things without shewing how to discover the Reasons of them: we must take notice that there are two sorts of *Beings*: *Beings* which our Soul immediately sees, and *Others* which she knows only by the Mediation of the former. When, for instance, I perceive the Sun arising, I first perceive that which I immediately see; and because my Perception of the former, is only occasion'd by something *without* me, which produces certain Motions in my Eyes and in my Brain, I judge the former Sun which is in my Soul, to be *without* me, and to exist.

It may notwithstanding happen that we may see the first Sun which is intimately united to our Soul, though the other were not above the *Horizon*, or though it did not exist at all. And thus we may see the first Sun greater when the other rises, than when elevated high above the *Horizon*; and though it be true that the first Sun, which we see immediately, be greater at the other's Rising, it doth not follow that the other is so too. For 'tis not properly that which Rises which we see, since that is many millions of Leagues remote; but 'tis the former, which is truly greater, and such exactly as we see it; because all the things we immediately see, are always such as we see them: And we should not be Deceiv'd, did we not judge that what we immediately see is to be found in External Objects, which are the cause or occasion of what we see.

In like manner, when we see Light by beholding the First Sun, which is immediately united to our Mind, we are not mistaken in believing that we see it: 'tis ever impossible to doubt of it. But herein consists our Error, that without any Reason, and indeed against all Reason, we will have this Light, which we see immediately, to exist in the Sun, which is *without* us; and thus it is with the other Objects of our Senses.

That Error is not in our Sensations, but only in these Judgements.

Upon a due Attention to what has been said from the beginning, and in the Process of this Work, it will be easy to see, that amongst all the things which occur in every Sensation, Error is only to be found in the Judgements we make, that our Sensations exist in the Objects.

First: 'Tis not an Error not to know that the Action of Objects consists in the Motion of some of their Parts, and that that Motion is communicated to the Organs of our Senses, which are the two first things observable in every Sensation: for there is a great deal of difference between not knowing a Thing, and being in an Error in respect of that Thing.

Secondly; We are right as to the third thing, which is properly *Sensation*. When we feel Heat, when we see Light, Colours, or other Objects, it is certainly true that we see them, though we are mad or Phrentick. For there is nothing more infallibly true, than that your Visionary People see what they think they see; and their Error consists only in the Judgements which they make, that what they see has a real Existence *without* them, because they see it *without* them.

This is the Judgement that implyes a Consent of our Liberty, and which consequently is liable to Error. And it is our duty ever to refrain from making it according to the Rule which was given in the beginning of this Book; That we should never judge of any thing whatever, when we could avoid it, and were not oblig'd to't by the certainty and evidence thereof; as it happens in this place: For though we feel our selves extreamly dispos'd by a confirm'd and inveterate Habit to judge our Sensations are in the Objects, as that Heat is in the Fire, and Colours in the Pictures: yet we can see no evident and convincing Reason, or forcible enough to oblige us to believe it. And thus we voluntarily subject our selves to Error by the ill use we make of our Liberty, when we freely form such Judgements as these.

CHAP. XV.

An Explication of the Particular Errors of the Sight, which may serve as an Exemplar of the General Errors of our Senses.

I HAVE, if I am not mistaken, given a sufficient Inlet to the Discovery of the Errors of our Senses in respect of Sensible Qualities in general, of which I have spoken, on the account of Light and Colours, which our Method oblig'd us to explain. It may now be expected I should descend to Particulars, and examine the respective Errors into which each of our Senses casts us: but I shall not insist long upon these things, because after what I have already said, a little Attention will do the business of those tedious Discourses I should be oblig'd to make. I shall only recount the general Errors our Sight occasions us to fall into, touching Light and Colours; and this Example will, I believe, suffice to give us an Insight into the Errors of our other Senses.

When we have fixt our Eyes upon the Sun for some moments, this is what occurs both in our Eyes and in our Soul, and these are the Errors into which we fall.

Those

Thoſe who are acquainted with the Firſt Elements of *Dioptricks*, and with any thing of the admirable Contexture of the Eyes, know that the Rays of the Sun are refracted in the Cryſtalline, and the other humours; and that they are recollected upon the *Retina* or the Optick Nerve, which cloathes all the Fund of the Eye; in the ſame manner as the Rays of the Sun paſſing through a convex burning Glaſs, reunite in the *Focus*, or in the burning point of the Glaſs at three or four Inches diſtance from it, in proportion to its convexity. Now we are taught by Experiment, that if we place in the *Focus* of the Glaſs a piece of ſtuff or brown Paper, the Rays of the Sun make ſo great an Impreſſion on the ſtuff or on the Paper, and agitate the little parts thereof ſo violently, as to break and ſeparate them from one another; or in a word to burn them, and reduce them into ſmoake and aſhes.

Brown Paper preſently takes fire, but the Glaſs muſt be larger or more convex to burn White Paper.

So we ought to conclude from this Experiment, that if the Optick Nerve were black, and the Pupil or the Aperture of the *Uvea*, through which the Light enters into the Eyes ſhould widen and enlarge it ſelf, to take in freely the Solary Rays, inſtead of which it contracts and ſtraitens it ſelf to prevent their paſſage, the ſame thing would happen to the *Retina*, as to the ſtuff or the Black or Brown Paper, and its Fibres would be ſo violently agitated as to be burnt, and burn'd in pieces. And for this reaſon it is that the Generality of Men feel great Pain in beholding the Sun for a moment; becauſe they cannot ſo cloſely ſhut the Aperture of the Pupil, but there will ſtill paſs Rays enough to agitate the Fibres of the Optick Nerve ſo violently, as to give us Reaſon to apprehend their breaking.

The Soul is altogether ignorant of all this we have ſaid; and when ſhe beholds the Sun, ſhe neither has any Perception of her own Optick Nerve, nor of any Motion in the Nerve: But this cannot be call'd an Error, 'tis purely Ignorance: The firſt Error ſhe falls into, is her judging the Pain ſhe feels, to be in the Eye.

If inſtantly upon a Man's beholding the Sun, he withdraws into a dark place with his Eyes open, that Concuſſion of the Fibres of the Optick Nerve caus'd by the Rays of the Sun decreaſes and wears off by little and little; and this is all the alteration we can conceive in the Eyes. But the Soul perceives nothing of this in them, but only a whitiſh or a yellowiſh Light; and the ſecond Error is, her judging this Light which ſhe ſees, to be in her Eyes, or in the Neighbouring Wall.

Finally, the Agitation of the Fibres of the *Retina* conſtantly decreaſes and dwindles by degrees: For after a Body has been Vibrated or ſhaken, we ſhould conſider nothing in it more than the Diminution of its Motion. But this is not the thing the Soul is ſenſible of in her Eyes. She ſees the whitiſh colour Metamorphos'd into Orange, after chang'd into Red, and laſtly into Blew. And the third Error into which we fall, is our judging there are in our Eye, or on the next Wall, ſuch alterations as differ more than *Secundum magis & minus*; becauſe the colours Blew, Orange and Red, which we ſee have a more conſiderable difference than according to degrees of *more* or *leſs*.

Theſe are ſome of the Errors into which we fall in point of Light and Colours; and theſe are the occaſion of our falling into many others, as we are going to explain in the following Chapters.

CHAP. XVI.

I. *That the Errors of our Senſes ſerve us inſtead of General and very fruitful Principles, from whence to draw falſe Concluſions; and theſe Concluſions again become other Principles in their turn.* II. *The Origine of Eſſential Differences.* III. *Concerning Subſtantial Forms.* IV. *Of ſome other Errors of the Schole Philoſophy.*

I. *That the Errors of our Senſes ſerve us inſtead of General and very fruitful Principles, from whence to draw falſe Concluſions, and theſe Concluſions again become other Principles in their turn.*

I HAVE, I think, given a ſufficient Explication to unprejudic'd Perſons, and ſuch as are capable of Thinking any thing Attentively of the Nature of our Senſations, and of the General Errors that accompany them: It is not amiſs to ſhew at preſent that theſe General Errors are made uſe of, as uncontroverted Principles, to explain all things by: that infinite falſe Conſequences have been drawn from them, which in their Turn have ſerv'd as Principles for a train of other Conſequences: and thus by little and little thoſe imaginary Sciences void of Body and Reality, have been eſtabliſht, which have ſuch multitudes of Blind Followers; but which like Fantoms leave nothing in their Embraces, but the Shame and Confuſion of ſuffering themſelves to be ſeduc'd, or the Brand and Character of Folly, which makes Men delight to feed on Deluſions and *Chimera's*. This is what we muſt ſhew in particular by ſome Examples.

It has been already ſaid, that we are us'd to attribute to Objects our own Senſations, and we judge that Colours, Smells, Taſts, and other ſenſible Qualities, are in the Objects which

we call Colour'd, and ſo of the reſt. Whe have found this to be an Error. At preſent 'tis our Buſineſs to ſhew, that we make uſe of this Error by way of Principle, to deduce falſe Conſequences from: which laſt Conſequences afterwards we reſpect as other Principles, upon which we go on to found our Reaſonings. In a word, we ſhall here manifeſt what Progreſs and Advances an Humane Mind makes in the *Search* of ſome Particular *Truths*, when once this falſe Principle has been taken for granted, That *Our Senſations are in Objects.*

But in order to render this more ſenſibly manifeſt, let us ſuppoſe ſome Particular Body, whoſe Nature ſome Perſon is in *Search* of: let us ſee what a Man would do, who has a Mind to know what Honey or Salt is. The firſt thing this Man would do, would be to examine the Colour, the Taſt, and Smell, and the other ſenſible Qualities of them: What are the Properties of Salt, and what of Honey: Wherein they agree, and wherein they differ; and the Analogy there may be betwixt theſe and other Bodies. Which done, he would doubtleſs reaſon and infer much after this manner, ſuppoſing he laid this down as an uncontroverted Principle, That our Senſations were in the Objects of our Senſes.

II. *The Original of the Differences attributed to Objects: That theſe Differences are in the Soul.*

Whatever I have a Senſation of in Taſting, Seeing, and in Handling Salt and Honey, is in the Salt and in the Honey. But it is certain that what I ſenſibly perceive in the Honey eſſentially differs from what I ſenſibly perceive in the Salt: The whiteneſs of the Salt differs more doubtleſs than according to the degrees of *more* or *leſs*, from the Colour of the Honey; and the Sweetneſs of the Honey from the pungent Taſt of Salt; and conſequently there muſt be an eſſential difference betwixt Salt and Honey, ſince all that I am ſenſible of both in the One and the Other, not only differs according to *more* or *leſs*, but has an eſſential Difference.

This is the firſt ſtep this Gentleman would make. For doubtleſs he coult not judge there was an eſſential Difference between Salt and Honey, did he not think the ſenſible appearances of the One eſſentially differ'd from the thoſe of the Other: that is to ſay, That the Senſations he has of Honey eſſentially differ'd from thoſe he has of Salt; for as much as he only judges of them by the Impreſſion they make upon the Senſes. Hence he looks upon this his Concluſion as a new Principle from whence he deduces other Concluſions in like manner.

III. *The Original of Subſtantial Forms.*

Seeing then Salt and Honey, and other Natural Bodies differ eſſentially from one another, it follows, that thoſe are groſly deceiv'd, who would have us believe, That all the difference which is found in Bodies, conſiſts only in the different Configuration of the like parts, that go to their Conſtitution. For ſince Figure is not eſſential to a figured Body, let the Figure of theſe little parts, which they imagine in the Honey, change how they will, the Honey will ſtill continue Honey, even though the parts of it ſhould take the Figure of the little parts of Salt. And thus there muſt of neceſſity be ſome ſubſtance or other, which being joyn'd to the firſt Matter, that is common to all different Bodies, muſt cauſe an eſſential difference betwixt them.

This then is the ſecond Advance this Gentleman would make, and the happy Diſcovery of *Subſtantial Forms*: Thoſe fruitful ſubſtances which cauſe every thing we ſee in Nature, though they have no ſubſiſtence of themſelves, except the Imagination of our Philoſopher. But let us ſee the Properties which he goes ſo liberally to beſtow on this Being of his own Creation; for doubtleſs he will rob all other Subſtances of their moſt eſſential Properties, to cloath this Creature of his withall.

IV. *The Origine of all the other more general Errors of the Schole Philoſophy.*

Since then there is found in every Natural Body, two Subſtances which go to its Compoſition; the one which is common to Honey and Salt, and all other Bodies; and the other which makes Honey to be Honey, and Salt to be Salt, and all other Bodies to be what they are; it follows that the firſt of them which is Matter, having no Contrary, and being indifferent to the Reception of all Forms, muſt remain without Force and Action, ſince it has no occaſion to defend it ſelf: But as to the others, which are the *Subſtantial Forms*, they have need always of being attended with Qualities and Faculties, for their own defence. They muſt neceſſarily be always upon their guard, for fear of being ſurpriz'd: They muſt be labouring continually for their Preſervation, and extending their Dominion over the bordering Matters, and puſhing their Conqueſts as far as poſſibly they can; becauſe if they were forceleſs, or ſhould deſiſt from their Activity, the other Forms would fall upon them by ſurprize, and forthwith reduce them to Nothing. They muſt then be always fighting, and nouriſhing theſe Antipathies and irreconciliable Hatreds againſt their Rival Forms, which are continually ſeeking to deſtroy them.

Let it happen that a Form ſhould ſeize the Matter of another: Let the Form of a Carcaſe, for inſtance, ſeize the Body of a Dog; it is not enough for this Form to reſt ſatisfy'd in the Annihilation of the Form of the Dog, ſhe muſt gratify her Hatred and Revenge with the Deſtruction of all the Qualities which have ſided with her Enemy. The Hair of the Carcaſe muſt immediately turn white with the whiteneſs of a new Creation; the Blood muſt be red with the redneſs, which was never dreamt of; and the whole Body muſt be ſurrounded with Qualities faithful to their Miſtreſs, whom they muſt defend according to the ſmall ſtrength and capacity, which may be ſuppoſed in the Qualities of a dead Body, which in their turn muſt needs periſh too. But becauſe it is impoſſible to be always in Battel, and all Bodies have a place of Reſt; the Fire, for inſtance, muſt undoubtedly have it Center,

where

where it ever ſtrives to go by its own Levity, and Natural Inclination, in order to Reſt, to burn no longer, and alſo to reſigne its Heat, which it preſerv'd here below, meerly for its own ſafety and defence.

Theſe are a ſmall part of the Conſequences, a Man would deduce from this laſt Principle, that there are *Subſtantial Forms*; which Conſequences we have brought in Our Philoſopher, ſomewhat too frankly and ingenuouſly concluding; for generally others ſay the ſame things, in a more ſerious ſtrain than he hath done here.

There are ſtill infinite other Conſequences, which Philoſophers daily inferre according as their Humour and Inclination leads them, or according as they are determin'd by the Fruitfulneſs or Barenneſs of their Imagination; for this is all the Difference that is between them.

I ſhall not ſtand here to ingage theſe *Imaginary Subſtances*, others have ſufficiently examin'd them. They have made it evidently appear, that there were never *Subſtantial Forms* in Nature; and that they ſerve for no other uſe, than to inferre abundance of Falſe, Ridiculous, and even Contradictory Concluſions. I am ſatisfy'd to have diſcover'd their Origine, in the Mind of Man, and to have ſhewn that they are at preſent altogether owing to that Prejudice common to all Men; That *Senſations are in the Objects of their Senſes.* For if what I ſaid before be conſider'd with any attention, namely, that it is neceſſary for the Preſervation of our Bodies, we ſhould have *Senſations* eſſentially differing, though the Impreſſions which Objects make upon our Bodies, differ very little; it will manifeſtly appear he is much in the wrong, who imagines ſuch wide differences in the Objects of our Senſes.

But, by the way, I think it not amiſs to declare, that no fault is to be found with theſe Terms, of *Form*, and *Eſſential Difference.* Honey is doubtleſs Honey, by its Form, and thus it is that it differs eſſentially from Salt; but this *Form* or this *Eſſential Difference* conſiſts only in the different Configuration of its Parts. 'Tis this different Configuration, which makes Honey to be Honey, and Salt to be Salt: And though it be accidental to Matter in general, to have the Configuration of the parts of Honey or Salt, and ſo to have the Form of Honey or Salt; yet it may be ſaid to be eſſential to Honey or Salt, to be what they are, to have ſuch or ſuch a Configuration in their parts; juſt as the Senſations of Cold, of Heat, of Pleaſure and Pain, are not eſſential to the Soul, but only to the Soul which feels them; in as much as by theſe Senſations, ſhe is ſaid to feel Heat, Cold, Pleaſure, and Pain.

CHAP. XVII.

I. *Another Inſtance taken from Morality, which ſhews that our Senſes offer us nothing but falſe goods.* II. *That* GOD *alone is our true and proper Good.* III. *The Origine of the Error of the* Epicureans *and* Stoicks.

I HAVE, I think, brought ſufficient Arguments to prove that this Prejudice, *That our Senſations are in the Objects*, is a moſt fruitful Principle of Errors in Natural Philoſophy. It is my Buſineſs at preſent to bring others drawn from Morality, wherein the ſame Prejudice joyn'd with this other, *That the Objects of our Senſes are the true and ſole Cauſes of our Senſations*, is as highly dangerous.

I. *An Inſtance taken from Morality, which ſhews that our Senſes offer us nothing but falſe goods.*

There is nothing ſo common in the World, as to ſee Men devoted to ſenſible Goods; ſome love Muſick, ſome Banquetting, and others have a Paſſion for other things. Now this is the way of Reaſoning theſe Men muſt have taken to perſwade themſelves that theſe Objects are their Goods. All the pleaſant Taſts we are delighted with in Feaſting, the Sounds which gratify the Ear, and thoſe other Pleaſures we are ſenſible of, upon other occaſions, are doubtleſs contain'd in ſenſible Objects; or at leaſt theſe Objects give us the Senſation of them; or laſtly, are the only means of Conveying them to our Senſes. Now it is impoſſible to doubt that Pleaſure is good, and Pain evil. We receive a Conviction from *within*, and conſequently the Objects of our Paſſions, are moſt reall goods, to which we muſt cleave, if we will be happy.

This is the Reaſoning we generally fall into almoſt without being aware of it: Thus, becauſe we believe that our Senſations are in Objects, or that the Objects are of themſelves capable of giving us the Senſation of them, we conſider theſe things as our own goods, though we are infinitely exalted above them; ſince they are able to act only upon our Bodies, and to produce ſome Motion in their Fibres, but are incapable of acting upon our Souls, or making us ſenſible either of Pleaſure or Pain.

I will explain in the laſt Book, in what ſenſe Objects act upon the Body.

II. *That* GOD *only is our Good; and that all ſenſible Objects*

Certainly if our Soul acts not upon her ſelf, on occaſion of what happens in the Body, it is GOD alone who hath that Power: And if ſhe be not the Cauſe of her own Pleaſure and Pain, according to the Diverſity of the Vibrations of the Fibres of her Body, as it is moſt highly probable ſhe is not, ſince ſhe feels Pleaſure and Pain without conſenting thereunto; I

cannot give us any sense of Pleasure.

know no other hand potent enough to make her sensible thereof, except that of the Author of Nature.

Certainly it is *GOD* alone who is our true Good: He only is able to fill us with all the Pleasures we are capable of enjoying; and it is only by the Knowledge of Him and Love of Him, He has resolv'd to make us sensible of them. Such as He has affixt to the Motions which happen in our Body, to make us the more solicitous for its Preservation, are very little in themselves, very weak as to their Capacity, and very short in their Duration.

Notwithstanding in the estate Sin has reduc'd us to, we are absolutely become their Vassals. But those which He shall make his Elect sensible of in Heaven, will be infinitely greater, since He both Created us that we might know and love Him. For whereas the order of Nature requires the Perception of the greatest Pleasures in the Possession of the greatest Goods, *GOD* being infinitely above all other things, the Pleasure of those who shall enjoy Him, will certainly exceed all other Pleasures.

III. *The Origine of the Errors of the Epicureans and Stoicks.*

What we have said of the Cause of our Errors in respect of Good, gives us a sufficient Knowledge of the falsity of the Opinions the *Epicureans* and *Stoicks* embrac'd, touching the Sovereign Good. The *Epicureans* placed it in Pleasure; and because a Man is sensible of this no less in Vice than in Vertue, and more generally in the Former than in the Other, it has been commonly thought they let loose the Reines to all sorts of Sensible Pleasures.

Now the first cause of their Error is this, that judging falsly there is something pleasant and agreeable in the Objects of their Senses, or that they were the reall Causes of the Pleasures they felt; and being moreover convinc'd by an Internal Sensation, which they naturally had that Pleasure was good for them, at least for the time wherein they enjoy'd it, they let themselves loose to all sorts of Passions, from which they had no Apprehensions of receiving any dammage in the Consequence. Whereas they ought to have consider'd, that the Pleasure they reap'd from Sensible things, could not exist in those things as their true Causes, nor any other way, and consequently that sensible Goods could not be Goods in respect of the Soul, and they should have thought of the things we have already explain'd.

The *Stoicks* on the other hand, being perswaded that Sensible Pleasures were only seated in, and fitted for the Body, and that the Soul ought to have a peculiar Good of her own, plac'd Felicity in Vertue; see then the Origine of their Errors.

They believ'd that Sensible Pleasure and Pain were not in the Soul, but in the Body only; and made use of this their false Judgement as a Principle for other false Conclusions; as that Pain was not an Evil, nor Pleasure a Good: That the Pleasures of the Senses were not good in their own Nature, that they were common to Men and Beasts, *&c.* Notwithstanding it is easy to see, that though the *Epicureans* and *Stoicks* were in the wrong in many things, they were in the right in some; for the Happiness of the Blessed consists only in a perfect and accomplisht Vertue; that is to say, in their Knowledge and Love of *GOD*, and in a most exquisite Pleasure that never fails to accompany them.

Let it then be well remembred, That External Objects contain nothing either Pleasant or Troublesome in themselves; that they are not the Causes of our Pleasures, that we have no reason either to fear or love them; but it is *GOD* alone, whom 'tis our duty to fear, and our duty to love; since 'tis only He that has Power enough to punish and reward us; to make us sensible of Pleasure and of Pain: Finally, it is only in *GOD* and from *GOD*, we ought to hope to receive the Pleasures, towards which we have so strong, so natural, and so just an Inclination.

CHAP. XVIII.

I. *That our Senses make us liable to Error, even in things which are not sensible.* **II.** *An Example taken from the Conversation of Men.* **III.** *That sensible Manners are not to be regarded.*

WE have sufficiently explain'd the Errors of our Senses, in respect of their Objects; as of Light, Colours, and other Sensible Qualities. Now let us see how they misguide us, even in regard to those Objects which are not of their Jurisdiction, by diverting us from an attentive Consideration of them, and inclining us to judge of them from their Testimony and Report; a thing that well deserves to be throughly explain'd.

I. *That our Senses make us liable to Error, even in things which are not sensible.*

Attention and Application of the Mind to the clear and distinct Idea's we have of Objects, is the most necessary thing in the World, to discover what truly they are: For as it is impossible to see the Beauty and Excellency of any peice of Art, without opening the Eyes, and looking fixedly upon it: So the Mind cannot evidently see the most part of things, with the Relations they bear one to another, unless it considers them with Attention. But it is certain that nothing casts us off more from our Attention to clear and distinct Idea's, than our own

Senses,

Senſes, and conſequently nothing ſets us ſo remote from *Truth*, or ſo ſoon throws us into *Error*.

For our better conceiving theſe things, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary to know, That the three ways the Soul has of perceiving, *viz.* by the *Senſes*, by the *Imagination*, and by *Intellect*, do not all equally affect her; and conſequently, ſhe does not fix an equal Attention on every thing ſhe perceives by their means: for ſhe applies her ſelf moſt to that which touches her neareſt, and ſhe is careleſs enough of that which affects her but a little.

Now what ſhe perceives by the Senſes affects her much, and takes up all her Application; what ſhe knows by her Imagination, touches her leſs pathetically: But that which the *Underſtanding* repreſents to her, I would ſay, what She of her ſelf perceives indepedently on the Senſes and Imagination, ſcarce quickens or awakens her at all. No body doubts but that the leaſt ſenſible Pain is more preſent to the Mind, and makes it more attentive than the Meditation of a thing of far greater Importance.

The reaſon which may be given for this, is, That the Senſes repreſent the Objects as preſent, the Imagination repreſents them as abſent. Now the order of things requires that among many Goods, or many Evils propos'd to the Soul, thoſe which are preſent ſhould give her more concern or application than others which are abſent; becauſe 'tis neceſſary for the Soul ſuddainly to determine what ought to be done on this occaſion. And thus ſhe is more intent to a ſimple prick of a Pin, than to the moſt exalted Speculations. And the Pleaſures and Evils of this World make a greater Impreſſion on her, than the ineffable Pains and infinite Pleaſures of Eternity.

The Senſes then do extreamly warp and bend down the Soul to what they repreſent to her: but whereas ſhe is of a limited and finite Nature, and ſo cannot conceive diſtinctly many things at once; ſhe cannot have a diſtinct Perception of what the Underſtanding repreſents to her at the ſame time her Senſes offer any thing to her conſideration. She forſakes then the clear and diſtinct Idea's of the Underſtanding, however proper to diſcover the truth of Things in their own Nature, to apply her ſelf intirely to the confus'd Idea's of the Senſes, which affect her tendereſt part, and give her not a repreſentation of things as they are in their own Nature, but only as they ſtand related to her Body.

II. *An Example taken from the Converſation of Men.*

If a Man, to give an inſtance, would explain any Truth, he muſt neceſſarily make uſe of Speech, and expreſs his Notions and Internal Senſations by Motions and Manners ſenſible. Now the Soul is incapable of perceiving many things diſtinctly at the ſame time; ſo having always a great Attention to what comes in to her by way of the Senſes, ſhe is ſcarce at leiſure to conſider the Reaſons which ſhe hears alledg'd: But her greateſt Application is confin'd to the ſenſible Pleaſure ſhe receives from the finely term'd Periods, the Conformity of the Geſtures to the Words, from the Genteel Mein of the Face, from the Air and the Way and Manner of the Speaker. Yet after ſhe has heard, ſhe will needs judge, becauſe it is the Cuſtom. And thus her Judgements muſt be different, according to the diverſity of the Impreſſions ſhe has receiv'd through the Senſes.

If, for example, the Speaker has a voluble Tongue, and eaſineſs of Delivery; if he obſerves the numerouſneſs of Words, and a delightful Cadence in his Periods; if he has the Look of a Gentleman, or of a Man of Parts; if he be a Perſon of Quality, or is attended with a great Retinue; if he dictates with Authority, or ſpeakes in a grave deciſive Manner; if others liſten to him with Silence and Reſpect; if he has any Reputation in the World, or is acquainted with the great Wits of the Age: in fine, if he has the happineſs to pleaſe, or to be eſteem'd, he will have Reaſon in every word that he advances; and there ſhall be nothing even to his Band and Cuffs, but ſhall prove ſomething or other.

But if he be ſo unfortunate as to have the Qualities quite contrary to theſe, let him demonſtrate as long as he pleaſes, he ſhall prove nothing. Let him ſay the fineſt things in the World, no Man ſhall ever regard them. The Attention of the Auditors being imploy'd upon that only which ſtrikes their Senſes, the Diſguſt they conceive at the ſight of a Man ſo uncouth and ill-contriv'd, will wholly take them up, and hinder the Application they ought to allow to his Thoughts; A dirty or a rumpled Band is enough to make the Wearer diſpis'd, and all that comes from him; and that way of talking like a Dotard or a meer Philoſopher will make the moſt noble and exalted Truths which are above the reach of the generality of Mankind be look'd on as Ravings and Extravagances.

Such are the ordinary Judgements of Mankind. Their Eyes and their Ears ſet up for Judges of Truth, and not their Reaſon, even in things that depends only on Reaſon; becauſe Men apply themſelves meerly to the Senſible and Agreeable Manners of Men, and ſeldom afford any Attention that is Reſolute and Serious, towards the Diſcovery of Truth.

III. *That Senſible and Agreeable Manners ought not to be regarded.*

Yet what greater Injuſtice is there, than to judge of things by the Manner of them, and to deſpiſe Truth, becauſe it comes not dreſs'd in thoſe Ornaments that pleaſe us and indulge and flatter our Senſes? It ſhould be reckon'd a Reproach to Philoſophers and ſuch as pretend to Senſe, to be more inquiſitive after theſe agreeable out-ſide Manners, than Truth it ſelf, and rather to entertain their Mind with the Noiſe and Emptineſs of Words, than with the Solidity of Things. 'Tis for Men of a Vulgar Stamp, 'tis for Souls of Fleſh and Blood,

to ſuffer themſelves to be won with Rhetorical Periods, and captivated with Figures and Motions that awake and excite the Paſſions.

Omnia enim ſtolidi magis admirantur amantque,
Inverſis quæ ſub verbis latitantia cernunt:
Veráque conſtituunt, quæ bellè tangere poſſunt
Aures, & lepido quæ ſunt fucata ſonore.

But wiſe Men endeavour to arm themſelves againſt the malignant force, and the powerful charms of theſe ſenſible Manners. The Senſes impoſe on them as well as on other Men, ſince they are no more than Men, but they have the Wiſdom to diſregard the Reports they make. They imitate that famous Inſtance of the Judges of the *Areopagus* who upon a ſevere Penalty, forbad their Advocates the uſe of any fallacious Words and Figures, and never heard them plead but in the dark; for fear the Pleaſantneſs of their Words and Inſinuating Geſtures ſhould perſwade them to any thing prejudicial to Truth and Juſtice, and to the end they might apply themſelves with leſs diſtraction to the Solidity of their Reaſons.

CHAP. XIX.

Two other Examples. I. *The firſt, concerning our Errors about the Nature of Bodies.* II. *The ſecond, concerning thoſe which reſpect the Qualities of the ſame Bodies.*

WE have been ſhewing that there are a vaſt multitude of Errors, which are originally owing to the ſtrong Application of the Soul to that which enters by the Senſes, and that Lukewarmneſs and Indifference to things repreſented by the Underſtanding. We have given an Inſtance of very conſiderable Importance in Morality, taken from the Converſation of Men; we ſhall produce ſome others drawn from the Commerce we have with the reſt of Nature, which are abſolutely neceſſary to be obſerv'd in Natural Philoſophy.

I. *The Errors concerning the Nature of Bodies.*

One of the Principal Errors we fall into in point of Natural Philoſophy, is our Imagining there is much more Subſtance in Senſible, than in Imperceptible Bodies. The Generality of Men are of Opinion there is much more Matter in Gold and Lead, than in Air and Water: and Children who have made no Obſervation by their Senſes of the Effects of Air, ordinarily imagine it has nothing of Reality in it.

Gold and Lead are extreamly ponderous, very hard and very ſenſible; Water and Air on the contrary are ſcarce perceptible by the Senſes. Whence Men conclude the former are more real than the other. They judge of the Truth of things by the Senſible Impreſſion, which is ever fallacious; and they neglect the clear and diſtinct Idea's of the Intellect which never deceives us; becauſe that which is ſenſible affects us, and challenges our Application; but that which is Intelligible lays us to ſleep. Theſe falſe Judgements reſpect the Subſtance of Bodies; let us now ſee the others about the Qualities of the ſame Bodies.

II. *Errors concerning the Qualities and Perfection of Bodies.*

'Tis the way for Men almoſt univerſally to judge that the Objects which excite in them the moſt Pleaſant Senſations, are the moſt Perfect and Pure of all others: without ſo much as knowing wherein the Perfection and purity of Matter conſiſts, and indeed without caring whether they do or not.

They ſay, for inſtance, that Mud is impure, and that the cleareſt Water is very pure. But Camels which love muddy Water, and thoſe Animals which delight to wallow in Mire, would be of another opinion. They are Beaſts, 'tis true; but thoſe Men who love the Entrails of a Woodcock, and the Excrements of a Civit-Cat, do not ſay they are Impure, though they ſay ſo of the Excrements of all other Animals. Finally, Musk and Amber are in general eſteem with all Men, though they are ſuppos'd to be nothing but Ordure.

It is certain Men judge of the Perfection and Purity of Matter, with Relation to their own Senſes; whence it falls out, that the Senſes being different in all Men, as has been abundantly explain'd, they muſt needs judge very differently of the Purity and Perfection of Matter. So that thoſe Books which are daily compos'd upon the Imaginary Perfections attributed to certain Bodies muſt needs be ſtuff'd with Errors, in all the ſtrange and odd variety that can be: ſince the Reaſonings they contain are founded only on the falſe, confus'd and irregular Idea's of the Senſes.

It is not the Part of Philoſophers to call Matter Pure or Impure, till they know what they preciſely mean by the Words *Pure* and *Impure*. For a Man ſhould never talk without knowing what he ſays; that is to ſay, without having diſtinct Idea's, which anſwers to the Terms he uſes. Now if they had fixt clear and diſtinct Idea's to each of theſe Terms, they would ſee that what they call Pure would prove often very Impure, and what ſeems to them Impure would be found pure in an high degree.

If,

If, for inſtance, they would have that Matter to be moſt Pure and Perfect, whoſe Parts are moſt true and diſunited and eaſieſt to be mov'd; Gold, Silver and Precious Stones, would be extreamly Imperfect Bodies; Air and Fire on the other hand would be the moſt perfect. When Fleſh began to putrify, and caſt a very noiſom ſtench, it would then be commencing its Perfection, and ſtinking Carrion would be a more perfect Body, than ſound and common Fleſh.

Again, if on the other hand they would have thoſe to be the moſt perfect Bodies, the parts whereof are moſt Groſs, Solid and difficult to be mov'd; the Earth would be perfecter than Gold, and Air and Fire would be more Imperfect Bodies.

But if they are not willing to affix the Clear and Diſtinct Idea's I have mention'd, to the Terms *Pure* and *Perfect*, let them ſubſtitute others in their room. But if they pretend to define theſe words only by ſenſible Notions, they will eternally confound things with one another, ſince the Signification of the Terms that expreſs them can never be fix'd and determin'd. All Men, as we have already prov'd, have very different Senſations of the ſame Objects: Wherefore a Man ought not to define theſe Objects by the Senſations he has of them, unleſs he has a Mind to be unintelligible, and to put all things in confuſion.

But at the Bottom, there is no matter to be found, (not that which the Heavens are fram'd of) which has more Perfection in it than any other. All that Matter ſeems capable of, are Figures and Motions, and 'tis indifferent to it whether it has Figures and Motions regular or irregular. Reaſon does not tell us that the Sun is more perfect or more Luminous than dirt; nor that the celebrated Beauties of Romancers and Poets, have any advantage over the moſt corrupted Carcaſſes; they are our falſe and treacherous Senſes that tell us this. It is in vain for Men to cry out againſt what we ſay; all their Railleries and Exclamations will appear frigid and ridiculous, to ſuch as ſhall ſeriouſly examine the Reaſons we have alledged.

Thoſe who are us'd to no other Perception than that of their Senſes, believe the Sun to abound with Light; but thoſe who can be *Senſible* and *Reaſonable* at the ſame time, are of another opinion; provided they have as good a Faculty of Reaſoning, as they have of Senſation. I am very well perſwaded, that even thoſe who pay the greateſt Deference to the teſtimony of their Senſes, would cloſe with our Opinion, had they well conſider'd the things that we have ſaid: But they are too much in love with the Deluſion of their Senſes; they have obey'd their Prejudices too long, and their Soul is too unthoughtful, or forgetful, to acknowledge or remember that all the Perfections ſhe imagines ſhe ſees in Bodies, belong only to her ſelf.

But it is not to this ſort of Men we addreſs our ſelves, we are very little concern'd for their Approbation and Eſteem: They refuſe to hearken to us, and conſequently are incompetent Judges; we are ſatisfy'd in defending Truth, and having the Approbation of thoſe who ſeriouſly labour to rid themſelves of the Errors of their Senſes, and to employ the Light of their Underſtanding. We only require of them, that they would ſeriouſly meditate on theſe Thoughts, with the greateſt Attention they can, and then let them judge of them: Let them condemn them or acquit them; we ſubmit them to their Judgement, ſince by their Meditation they have obtain'd a Supreme Power and Juriſdiction over them, which without Injuſtice cannot be conteſted with them.

CHAP. XX.

The Concluſion of the Firſt Book. I. *That our Senſes are given us only for the Preſervation of our Body.* II. *That we ought to doubt of the Reports they make.* III. *That 'tis no little thing to doubt, as we ought to do.*

I Have, if I am not miſtaken, made a ſufficient Diſcovery of the General Errors into which our Senſes lead us, whether in regard to their own Objects, or in reſpect of Things, which can only be perceiv'd by the Underſtanding: And I am of an Opinion, that we fall into no Error by their Conduct, the cauſe whereof may not be diſcover'd by the things that have been ſaid, in caſe a Man will beſtow a little Meditation upon them.

I. *That our Senſes are given us only for the Preſervation of our Body.*

We have hitherto ſeen, that our Senſes are moſt faithful and exact in inſtructing us in the Relations, which all the Bodies which ſurround us have with our own, but are incapable of teaching us what theſe Bodies are in their own Nature; that to make the beſt uſe of them, they muſt only be imploy'd in the Preſervation of our Health and Life; and that they can't be ſufficiently deſpis'd, when they pretend to raiſe themſelves to a Sovereignty above the Underſtanding. This is the principal Thing I would gladly have well remembred in all this Firſt Book, *viz.* Let a Man throughly conſider, that our Senſes were only given us for the Preſervation of our Body, let him fortify himſelf in this Notion; and in

order to free himſelf from the Ignorance he is under, let him ſeek out other Succours and Aſſiſtances, than thoſe his Senſes furniſh him withall.

II. *That we ought to doubt of the Reports which our Senſes make of Things.*

But ſuppoſing there be ſome ſuch Men to be found, (as doubtleſs there be but too many of them) who will not be perſwaded of theſe laſt Propoſitions by what we have hitherto ſaid, we demand of them ſtill much leſs than this; we only deſire of them to enter into ſome Diſtruſt of their Senſes, and if they cannot entirely reject their Teſtimonies as falſe and treacherous, let them only ſeriouſly doubt, leſt theſe Reports ſhould not be abſolutely true: And certainly, in my Opinion, enough hath been ſaid, to caſt at leaſt ſome Scruple in the Mind of Reaſonable Men, and conſequently to excite them to the Employing their Liberty otherwiſe than they have hitherto done: for if they could once begin to doubt, that the Report of their Senſes were not true, they might with greater Eaſe with-hold their Conſent, and and prevent their falling into thoſe Errors, into which they have hitherto fallen; eſpecially if they could remember that Rule we have given at the Beginning of this Diſcourſe, *That we ought not to give an entire Conſent, except to Things that appear entirely evident, and to which we could not forbear conſenting, without being certainly convinc'd, we ſhould make an ill uſe of our Liberty in not conſenting.*

III. *That 'tis no little thing to doubt as we ought to do.*

For what remains, let not a Man imagine he has made but an inconſiderable Progreſs, if he has only learn'd to Doubt. To know how to Doubt with Judgement and Reaſon, is not ſo ſmall a thing as is ſuppos'd. For we muſt needs ſay, there is a great deal of difference betwixt Doubting, and Doubting. Some Doubt out of a Raſh Paſſion, and a Brutiſh Reſolution; others out of Blindneſs and Malice, out of Humour and Fancy, and becauſe they will do ſo: But there are others likewiſe, that Doubt out of Prudence and Caution, out of Wiſdom and Penetration of Mind. The *Academicks* and *Atheiſts* Doubt after the former manner; but true *Philoſophers* Doubt in the latter. The firſt Doubt is a Doubt of Darkneſs, which never conducts us towards the Light, but ſets us at a greater Diſtance from it. The ſecond Doubt proceeds from Light, and is aſſiſtant in ſome meaſure, to the production of it, in its turn.

Thoſe who only Doubt in the former manner, know not what it is to Doubt with Underſtanding: They laugh at *Monſieur Des-Cartes*'s teaching us to Doubt, in the firſt of his *Metaphyſical Meditations;* becauſe it ſeems to them, that it is no other, except a Fantaſtick Doubting; That 'tis only to ſay in general, that our Nature is infirm, that our Mind is full of Blindneſs, that we ought to be very careful to rid our ſelves of our Prejudices, and ſome ſuch things as theſe. They ſuppoſe that this is enough to prevent being ſeduc'd by their Senſes, and not to be deceiv'd at all. But it is not enough to complain, that the Mind is weak; we muſt make her Senſible of her Weakneſſes: It is not enough to ſay, She is ſubject unto Error; we muſt diſcover to her wherein her Errors conſiſt, to which I think we have given an Introduction in this Firſt Book, by accounting for the Nature and Errors of our Senſes; and we will ſtill purſue the ſame Deſign, in explaining the Nature and Errors of our Imagination in the Second.

F. *MALE-*

F. *MALEBRANCHES*

TREATISE,

CONCERNING

The Search after Truth.

BOOK the SECOND,

Concerning

The IMAGINATION.

THE FIRST PART.

CHAP. I.

I. *A General Idea of the Imagination.* II. *That it includes two Faculties, an Active and a Passive.* III. *A General Cause of the Changes which happen in the Imagination of Men; and the Foundation of the Second Book.*

IN the fore-going Book I have treated concerning the *Senses;* I have endeavour'd to Explain their Nature, and precisely to determine the Use that ought to be made of them. I have discovered the Principal and most General Errors, wherein they ingage us: and have attempted such a Limitation of their Power, as to put Man in a capacity of *Hoping* much, and *Fearing* nothing from them; whilst they keep them within those Boundaries I have prescrib'd them. In this Second Book I shall Discourse concerning the *Imagination*, as the Natural Order and Method I have laid down obliges me. For there is so near a Relation and Affinity betwixt the *Imagination* and the *Senses*, that they in no wise ought to be separated. We shall see too in the Sequel of the Discourse, that these two Powers are no farther Different than according to Degree of *more* or *less*.

This then is the Method which I have Observ'd in this Treatise: It is divided into three Parts. In the First I Explain the *Natural Causes of the Disorder and Errors of the Imagination:* In the Second I make some *Application of the Causes to the more General Errors of the Imagination;* and I Discourse of such as may be term'd the *Moral Causes* of these Errors. In the Third I treat of the *Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations.*

Though the greatest part of the things contain'd in this Tract may not be so new, as those I have already deliver'd in Explaining the *Errors of the Senses*, yet their Use and Advantage will be no less considerable. Men of bright and clarify'd Understandings can easily discover the Errors, and the Causes of the Errors I am treating of: But there are few such Men as can make sufficient Reflection thereupon: I pretend not to give Instructions to all the World, my Design is only to Inform the Ignorant, and to Caution and Remind the rest, or rather I try to be my own Instructour and Remembrancer.

It has been said in the First Book, that the Organs of our Senses were compos'd of little Fibres, which terminate on one hand upon the External parts of the Body and on the Skin; and on the other, center in the middle of the Brain. But these Fibres may be mov'd in a two-fold manner; either by commencing their Motion at those Extremities which terminate in the Brain, or at those which terminate on the Surface of the Body. Seeing the Agitation of these Fibres cannot be communicated to the Brain, but the Soul must have some Per-

I. *A General Idea of the Imagination.*

ception or other; if the Agitation be begun by the Impreſſion of Objects made upon the External Surface of the Fibres of the Nerves, and be communicated to the Brain; the Soul thereupon receives a Senſation, and judges * what ſhe has the Senſation of, to be *without*; that is to ſay, She perceives an Object as *Preſent*: But if it be only the Internal Fibres that are agitated by the Courſe of the Animal Spirits, or in ſome other manner, the Soul *Imagines* and judges what ſhe imagines to be not without, but within the Brain; that is, ſhe perceives an Object as *Abſent*. And this is the Difference there is between *Senſation*, and *Imagination*.

* By a Natural Judgement, whereof I have ſpoken in ſeveral places of the preceding Book.

But it ought to be obſerv'd, that the Fibres of the Brain are more violently agitated by the Impreſſion of External Objects, than by the Courſe of the Animal Spirits; and that for this reaſon the Soul is more nearly touch'd by External Objects, which ſhe judges as preſent, and as it were capable of making her inſtantly ſenſible of Pleaſure or Pain; than by the Courſe of the Animal Spirits. And yet it happens ſometimes in Perſons whoſe Animal Spirits are put in extream Commotion, by Faſtings, Watchings, a ſcorching Fever, or a violent Paſſion, that theſe Spirits move the Internal Fibres of the Brain with as great a force, as External Objects; ſo that theſe Perſons have the *Senſation* of what they ſhould only have the *Imagination*, and think they *See* Objects before their *Eyes*, which they only *Imagine* in the *Brain*. Which evidently ſhews, that in regard of what occurs in the Body, the *Senſes* and *Imagination* differ but in Degree of *more* or *leſs*, as I have before declar'd.

But in Order to give a more Diſtinct and Particular Idea of the *Imagination*, we muſt know that as often as any Change happens in that part of the Brain where the Nerves unite, there happens a Change alſo in the Soul: That is, as has been already explain'd, if there happens any Motion in this part which alters the Order of its Fibres, there happens at the ſame time a new *Perception* in the Soul; and She either *Feels* or *Imagines* ſomething afreſh: And that the Soul is incapable of receiving any freſh *Senſation* or *Imagination*, without ſome Alteration in the Fibres of that part of the Brain.

So that the *Faculty of Imagining*, or the *Imagination*, conſiſts only in the Power the Soul has of framing the Images of Objects, by effecting a Change in the Fibres of that part of the Brain, which may be call'd the Principal Part, as being that which correſponds to all the parts of our Body; and is the Place where the Soul keeps her immediate Reſidence, if I may be ſo allow'd to ſpeak.

II. *Two Faculties in the Imagination, an Active and a Paſſive.*

This manifeſtly ſhews that this Power which the Soul has of Forming theſe Images, includes two things; one that has its Dependance on the *Soul*, and the other on the *Body*. The firſt is the *Action* and the *Command* of the *Will*. The ſecond is the ready *Obedience* paid to it by the Animal Spirits which delineate thoſe Images, and by the Fibres of the Brain wherein they muſt be imprinted. In this Tract, both one and the other of theſe two things goes indifferently by the name of *Imagination*; nor are they diſtinguiſh'd by the Terms *Active* and *Paſſive*, which might be given them: becauſe the Senſe of the thing ſpoken of, eaſily determines which of the Two is underſtood, whether the *Active* Imagination of the *Soul*, or the *Paſſive* Imagination of the *Body*.

I ſhall not here particularly determine which is that Principal Part of the Brain before mention'd; Firſt, becauſe it would be but an uſeleſs thing to do it. Secondly, becauſe it is not perfectly and infallibly known. And laſtly, ſince I could not convince others, it being a Matter incapable of Probation in this place; though I ſhould be infallibly aſſur'd which was this Principal Part, I ſhould think it more adviſeable to ſay nothing of it.

Whether then it be according to the Opinion of Dr. *Willis*, in the two little Bodies, call'd by him *Corpora Striata*, that the Common Senſe reſides; and the Cells of the Brain preſerve the *Species* of the *Memory*, and the *Corpus Calloſum* be the Seat of *Imagination*. Whether it be according to *Fernelius*'s Opinion, in the *Pia Mater*, which involves the Subſtance of the Brain: Whether it be in the *Pineal Gland*, according to the Notion of *Des-Cartes*; Or laſtly, in ſome other part hitherto undiſcover'd, that our Soul exerciſes her Principal Functions, is of no great concern to know. 'Tis enough to be aſſur'd that there is a Principal Part, (and this is moreover abſolutely neceſſary) and that the *Baſis* of Mr. *Des-Cartes*'s *Syſtem* ſtands its ground. For 'tis to be well obſerv'd, that, though he ſhould be miſtaken in aſſuring us it is the *Pineal Gland*, to which the Soul is immediately united; this could no ways injure the Foundaton of his *Syſtem*, from which may ever be deduc'd all the profit that could be expected from the true, to make all neceſſary advances in the knowledge of Man.

III. *A General Cauſe of the Changes, which happen in the Imagination; and the Foundation of the Second Book.*

Since then the Imagination conſiſts only in the Power the Soul has of Forming the Images of Objects, by imprinting them (as I may ſo ſay) in the Fibres of the Brain; the greater and more diſtinct the Impreſſes of the Animal Spirits are, the more ſtrongly and diſtinctly the Soul will Imagine Objects. Now as the Largeneſs, and Depth, and Cleaverneſs of the Strokes of any Sculpture depend upon the Forcible Acting of the Graving Inſtrument, and the plyable yielding of the Plate: ſo the Depth, and the diſtinctneſs of the Impreſſes of the Imagination, depend on the Force of the Animal Spirits, and the Conſtitution of the Fibres of the Brain: And 'tis the Variety that is found in theſe two things, which is almoſt the univerſal Cauſe of that great Diverſity we obſerve in the Minds of different Men.

For

For 'tis no hard thing, to account for all the different Characters to be met with in the Minds of Men: on the one hand, by the Abundance and Scarcity, by the Rapidneſs and Slowneſs, by the Groſsneſs and the Littleneſs of the Animal Spirits; and on the other hand, by the Fineneſs and Courſeneſs, by the Moiſture and Drineſs, by the Facility and Difficulty of the yeilding of the Fibres of the Brain: and laſtly by the Relation the Animal Spirits may poſſibly have with theſe Fibres. And it would be very expedient for every one, forthwith to try to Imagine to himſelf all the different Combinations of theſe things, and to apply himſelf ſeriouſly to the Conſideration of all the Differences, we have obſerv'd between the Minds of Men. Becauſe it is ever more Uſeful, and alſo more Pleaſant for a Man to employ his own Mind, and to accuſtom it to the finding out Truth by it's own Induſtry, than to ſuffer it to gather Ruſt by a careleſs Lazineſs, in applying it only to things wholly digeſted, and explain'd to his hands. Beſides that, there are ſome things ſo delicately nice and fine, in the different Character of Minds, that a Man may eaſily ſometimes diſcover them, and be ſenſible of them himſelf, but is unable to repreſent them, or make them ſenſible to others.

But that we may explain, as far as poſſibly we can, all the Differences that are found in different Minds, and that every Man may more eaſily obſerve in his own, the Cauſe of all the Changes, he ſenſibly perceives in it at different times; it ſeems convenient to make a General Enquiry into the Cauſes of the Changes, which happen in the Animal Spirits, and in the Fibres of the *Brain*: Since this will make way for the Diſcovery of all thoſe, which happen in the *Imagination*.

Man never continues long like himſelf; all Mankind have ſufficient Internal Convictions of their own Inconſtancy. A Man judges one while in one manner, and another while in another, concerning the ſame Subject. In a word, the Life of a Man conſiſts only in the *Circulation of the Blood*, and in another *Circulation of Thoughts and Deſires*. And I am of Opinion, a Man can't imploy his Time much better, than in Searching for the Cauſes of theſe Changes we are ſubject to, and entring into the Knowledge of our Selves.

CHAP. II.

I. *Of the Animal Spirits, and the Changes they are ſubject to in general.* II. *That the Chyle entring the Heart, occaſions a change in the Spirits.* III. *That Wine does the ſame thing.*

I. *Of the Animal Spirits, and the changes they are ſubject to in general.*

'TIS confeſs'd by all the World, that the Animal Spirits are nothing, but the more ſubtil and agitated parts of the Blood; which Subtilty and Agitation is principally owing to the Fermentation it receives in the *Heart*; and the violent Motion of the *Muſcles*, which conſtitute that part: That theſe Spirits together with the reſt of the Blood, are conducted through the *Arteries* to the Brain: and that there they are ſeparated from it, by ſome parts appropriated to that purpoſe; but which they are, it has not been yet agreed upon.

From whence we ought to conclude, that in caſe the Blood be very ſubtil, it will have abundance of Animal Spirits; but if it be groſs, the Animal Spirits will be few: That if the Blood be compos'd of parts eaſy to be inflam'd in the Heart, or very fit for Motion, the Spirits in the Brain will be extreamly heated, and agitated: and on the contrary, if the Blood admits little Fermentation in the Heart, the Animal Spirits will be languid, unactive, and without force: And laſtly, according to the Solidity, which is found in the parts of the Blood, the Animal Spirits will have more or leſs ſolidity, and conſequently greater or leſſer force in their Motion. But theſe things ought to be explain'd more at large, and the Truth of them made more ſenſibly apparent, by Examples and uncontroverted Experiments that prove them.

II. *That the Chyle entring the Heart, occaſions a change in the Spirits.*

The Authority of the Ancients has not only blinded ſome Mens Underſtandings, but we may ſay, has ſeal'd up their Eyes. For there are ſtill a ſort of Men that pay ſo ſubmiſſive a deference to Ancient Opinions, or poſſibly are ſo ſtiff and obſtinate, that they will not ſee thoſe things which they could ~~not~~ contradict, would they but pleaſe to open once their Eyes. We daily ſee Men in good Reputation and Eſteem for their Study, Write and Diſpute publickly againſt the Viſible and Senſible Experiments of the Circulation of the Blood, againſt that of the Gravitation and Elaſtick force of the Air, and others of the like Nature. The Diſcovery Mr. *Pecquet* has made in our Time, and which we have here occaſion for, is of the number of thoſe that are miſ-fortunate, meerly for want of being born Old; and as a Man may ſay, with a Venerable Beard. I ſhall not however omit to make uſe of it, and am under no Apprehenſion of being blam'd by Judicious Men for doing ſo.

According to that Diſcovery, it is manifeſt that the Chyle does not immediately paſs from the *Viſcera* to the *Liver*, through the *Meſaraick Veins*, as was believ'd by the Ancients; but that it paſſes out of the *Bowels* into the *Lacteal Veins*, and from thence into ſeveral *Receptacles*, where theſe *Veins* coterminate: That from thence it aſcends through the *Ductus Thora-*

Thoracicus along the *Vertebræ* of the Back, and proceeds to mix with the Blood in the *Axillary Veins*, which enters into the Superiour *Trunck* of *Vena Cava*; and thus being mingled with the Blood, it discharges it self into the *Heart*.

It ought to be concluded from this Experiment, that the Blood thus mingled with the Chyle, being very different from that which has already circulated several times through the *Heart*, the Animal Spirits, that are only the more fine and subtil parts of it, ought to be very different in Persons that are fasting, and others after they have eaten. Again, because in the Meats and Drinks that are us'd, there is an infinite Variety, and likewise those that use them, have Bodies diversly disposd: Two Persons after Dinner though rising from the same Table, must sensibly perceive in their Faculty of Imagining, so great a Variety of Alterations, as is impossible to be describ'd.

I confess those who are in a perfect state of Health, perform Digestion so easily, that the Chyle flowing into the Heart, neither augments nor diminishes the Heat of it, and is scarce any Obstruction to the Blood's Fermenting in the very same manner, as if it enter'd all alone: So that their Animal Spirits, and consequently their Imaginative Faculty admit hardly any change thereby. But as for Old and Infirm People, they find in themselves very sensible Alterations after a Repast: They generally grow Dull and Sleepy; at least their Imagination flags and languishes, and has no longer any Briskness or Alacrity. They can conceive nothing distinctly, and are unable to apply themselves to any thing. In a word, they are quite different and other sort of People from what they were before.

III. *That Wine effects the same thing.* But that those of a more sound and robust Complection, may likewise have sensible proofs of what I have said; they need only make reflection on what happens to them in, Drinking *Wine* somewhat more freely than ordinary; or on what would fall out upon their drinking *Wine* at one Meal, and *Water* at another. For it is certain, that unless they be extreamly stupid, or that their Body be of a Make very extraordinary, they will suddainly feel in themselves some Briskness, or little Drousiness, or some such other accidental thing.

Wine is so Spirituous, that it is Animal Spirits almost ready made: But Spirits a little too libertine and unruly, that not easily submit to the orders of the Will, by reason of their Solidity, and excessive Agitation. Thus it produces even in Men that are of a most strong and vigorous Constitution, greater Changes in the Imagination, and in all parts of the Body, than Meats, and other Liquors. *It gives a Man a Foil*, in *Plautus*'s Expression; and produces many Effects in the Mind, less advantagious than those describ'd by *Horace* in these Lines.

Vinum incitator dolosus est.

Quid non Ebrietas designat? operta recludit:
Spes jubet esse ratas: in prælia trudit inermem:
Sollicitis animis onus eximit: addocet artes.
Fœcundi calices quem non fecere disertum?
Contracta quem non in paupertate solutum?

It would be no hard matter to give a Reason for all the Principal Effects produc'd in the Animal Spirits, and thereupon in the Brain, and in the Soul it self, by this Commixture of the Chyle and Blood; as to explain how Wine exhilarates, and gives a Man a certain Sprightliness of Mind, when taken with Moderation; why it Brutifies a Man in process of time, by being drunk to excess; why a Man is drousy after a good Meal, and a great many others of like Nature, for which very ridiculous Accounts are usually given. But besides that I am not writing a Tract of *Physicks*, I must have been necessitated to have given some Idea of the *Anatomy* of the Brain, or have made some Suppositions, as *Monsieur Des-Cartes* has done before me in his *Treatise concerning Man*, without which it were impossible to explain ones self. But finally, if a Man shall read with Attention that Discourse of *Monsieur Des-Cartes*, he will possibly be satisfy'd as to all these Particular Inquiries: because that Author explains all these Things: at least he furnishes us with sufficient Knowledge of them, to be able of our selves to discover them by Meditation, provided we are any whit acquainted with his Principles.

CHAP. III.

That the Air imploy'd in Respiration causes some Change in the Animal Spirits.

THE Second General Cause of the Changes which happen in the Animal Spirits, is the Air we breathe. For though it does not forthwith make such sensible Impressions as the Chyle, yet it causes at long run, what the Juices of Meats do in a much shorter time. This Air passes out of the *Branches* of the *Trachea* into *those* of the *Arteria Venosa*: hence it mingles, and ferments with the rest of the Blood in the Heart: and according to its own particular *Disposition*, and *that* of the Blood, it produces very great Changes in the Animal Spirits, and consequently in the Imaginative Faculty.

I know there are some Persons, who will not be perswaded that the Air mixes with the Blood in the Lungs and Heart: because they cannot discover with their Eyes, the Passages in the Branches of the *Trachea*, and in those of the *Arteria Venosa*, through which the Air is communicated. But the *Action* of the *Intellect* ought not to stop, when *that* of the Senses can go no farther. It can penetrate that which to them is impenetrable, and lay hold on things which have no handle for the Senses. 'Tis not to be question'd, but some parts of the Blood continually pass through the Branches of the *Vena Arteriosa*, into those of the *Trachea*. The Smell and Moisture of the Breath, sufficiently prove it: and yet the Passages of that Communication are imperceptible. Why then may not the subtil parts of Air be allow'd to pass through the Branches of the *Trachea*, into the *Arteria Venosa*, though the Passages of this Communication be undiscernible? In fine, a much greater quantity of Humours transpire through the Imperceptible Pores of the Arteries and the Skin, than escape through the other Avenues of the Body; and even the Pores of the most solid Metals, are not so close, but there are found Bodies in Nature little enough to find a free passage through them: since otherwise these Pores would quickly be entirely stopt.

It is true that the coarse and ragged parts of the Air cannot penetrate through the ordinary Pores of Bodies; and that Water it self, though extreamly gross, can glide through those cranies, which will not give admittance to them. But we speak not here of the coarse or branch'd and ragged Parts of Air; they seem to be of little use to Fermentation: We only speak of the little, stiff and pungent Parts, and such as have none or very few Branches to impede their passage, because these are the fittest for the Fermentation of the Blood.

I might notwithstanding affirm upon the Testimony of *Silvius*, that even the coursest Air passes from the *Trachea* to the Heart, who testifies he has seen it pass thither by the Art and Ingenuity of *Mr. de Steenmerdam*. For 'tis more reasonable to believe a Man who says he has seen it, than a thousand others who talk at random. It is certain then that the most refin'd and subtil Parts of Air which we breath, enter into the Heart; and there together with the Blood and Chyle, keep up the Fire which gives Life and Motion to our Body; and that according to their different Qualities, they introduce great Changes in the Fermentation of the Blood, and in the Animal Spirits.

We daily discover the Truth of this by the various Humours, and the different Characters of the Minds of Men of different Countries: The *Gascons*, for instance, have a more brisk and lively Imagination, than the *Normans*: Those of *Rhelan*, and *Dieppe*, and *Picardie*, differ all from one another: and yet farther from the *Low Normans*, though at no great distance from each other. But if we consider Men that live in Countries more remote, we shall find much stranger Differences between them: For instance, an *Italian*, a *Flemming*, and a *Dutch Man*. To conclude, there are places celebrated in all Ages for the Wisdom of their Inhabitants, as *Theman* and *Athens*, and others as notorious for their Stupidity, as *Thebes* and *Abdera*, and some others.

Numquid non ultra est sapientia in Theman? *Jerem.* c. 49. v. 7.

Athenis tenue cœlum, ex quo acutiores etiam putantur Attici, crassum Thebis. Cic. de Fato.

Abderitanæ pectora plebis habes. Mart.

Bœotum in crasso jurares aëre natum. Hor.

CHAP. IV.

I. *Of the Change of the Spirits caus'd by the Nerves, which go to the Heart and Lungs.* II. *Of that which is caus'd by the Nerves, which go to the Liver, to the Spleen and* Viscera. III. *That all this is perform'd without the concurrence of our Will, but yet it cannot be done without a Providence.*

THE third cause of the Changes, which happen to the Animal Spirits, is the most ordinary, and most active of them all, because it is this which produces, maintains and corroborates all the Passions. For our better understanding this, we must know that the Nerves of the fifth, sixth, and eighth Conjugation shoot out the greatest part of their Branches into the Breast and Belly, where they are most advantagiously imploy'd for the Preservation of the Body, but most dangerously in regard to the Soul: because these Nerves in their Action depend not on the Will of Men, as do those us'd in moving the Legs and Arms, and other External Parts of the Body: and they have a greater influence upon the Soul, than the Soul has upon them.

I. *Of the Changes of the Spirits caus'd by the Nerves.*

We must know then, that many of the Branches of the Nerves of the eighth Conjugation, fall in among the Fibres of the Principal of all the Muscles, the Heart; that they encircle its *Orifices*, its *Auricles* and its *Arteries*. That they expatiate also into the *Substance* of the *Lungs*, and thus by their different Motions produce very considerable Changes in the Blood.

which go to the Heart, and Lungs.

For the Nerves which are dispers'd among the Fibres of the Heart, causing it to *Dilate* and *Contract* it self in too hasty and violent a manner, throw with an unusual Force abundance of Blood towards the Head, and all other External Parts of the Body. Tho' sometimes these same Nerves have a quite contrary Effect. As for the Nerves which surround the *Orifices* of the Heart, its *Auricles* and *Arteries*, their use is much the same with that of the *Registers*, wherewith the *Chymists* moderate the Heat of their Furnaces; or of *Cocks* which are instrumental in Fountains, to regulate the Course of their Waters. For the use of these Nerves is to *contract* and *dilate* diversly the *Orifices* of the *Heart*, and by that manner to hasten, and retard the *Entrance* and the *Exit* of the Blood, and so to *augment* and *diminish* the Heat of it. Lastly, the Nerves which are dispers'd over the *Lungs*, have the same imployment: For the *Lungs* being made up only of the *Branches* of the *Trachea*, of the *Vena Arteriosa*, and the *Arteria Venosa*, inter-woven one among another, it is plain that the Nerves which are dispers'd through their Substance, by their Contraction, must obstruct the Air from passing so freely out of the *Branches* of the *Trachea*, and the Blood out of *those* of the *Vena Arteriosa*, into the *Arteria Venosa*, to discharge it self into the Heart. Thus these Nerves according to their different agitation, augment and diminish still the Heat and Motion of the Blood.

All the Passions furnish us with very sensible Experiments of these different Degrees of Heat of our Heart; we manifestly feel its Diminution and Augmentation sometimes on a sudden: And as we falsly judge our Sensations to be in the Parts of our Body, and are occasionally excited by them in our Soul, as has been explain'd in the fore-going Book; So the generality of Philosophers imagine the Heart to be the principal Seat of the Passions of the Soul, and 'tis even at this day the most common and receiv'd Opinion.

Now because the Imaginative Faculty receives considerable Changes by the Changes which happen in the Animal Spirits; and because the Animal Spirits are very different, according to the different Fermentation of the Blood, perform'd in the Heart; it is easy to discover the Reason of Passionate People's imagining things quite otherwise, than those who consider'd the same sedately, and in Cold Blood.

The other Cause which exceedingly contributes to the Diminution and Augmentation of these Extraordinary Fermentations of the Blood, in the Heart, consists in the Action of many other Branches of the Nerves, whereof we have been speaking.

II. *Of the Change of the Spirits, caus'd by the Nerves which go to the Liver, to the Spleen, and other Viscera.*

These Branches are dispers'd throughout the *Liver*, which contains the more subtile part of the Blood, or that which is commonly call'd the *Bile*; through the *Spleen*, which contains the grosser part of the *Melancholy*; through the *Pancreas*, which contains an acid Juice, most proper for Fermentation; through the *Stomach*, the *Guts* and the other parts, which contain the *Chyle*. Finally, they are dispers'd and spread about all the parts, that can any ways contribute to the varying the Fermentation of the Blood in the Heart. There is moreover nothing even to the Arteries and Veins, which has not a Connection with these Nerves; as *Dr. Willis* has discover'd of the *Inferiour Trunck* of the *Great Artery*, which is connected to them near the Heart; of the *Axillary Artery* on the right side of the *Emulgent Vein*, and several others.

Thus the use of the Nerves being to agitate the parts, to which they are fastened diverse ways, it is easy to conceive how, for instance, the Nerve which surrounds the *Liver* may, by constringing it, drive a great quantity of *Bile* into the *Veins*, and the *Canalis Cysticus*, which mingling with the Blood in the *Veins*, and with the *Chyle*, through the *Canalis Cysticus*, enters the Heart, and produces a Heat therein much more fervent than ordinary. Thus when a Man is mov'd with some kind of Passions, the Blood boyls in the Arteries and in the Veins, and the Heat is diffus'd throughout the Body, the Fire flies up into the Head, which is presently fill'd with such a prodigious quantity of over-brisk and rapid Animal Spirits, as by the Impetuous current, hinder the Imagination from representing other things, than those, whose Images they form in the Brain; that is, from thinking on other Objects than those of the *Predominant Passion*.

'Tis so again which the little Nerves which run into the *Spleen*, or into other parts which contain a Matter more gross, and course, and less capable of Heat and Motion; they render the Imagination wholly Languid, Drousy and Unactive, by powring into the Channels of the Blood a Matter that is gross and difficult to be put in Motion.

As for those *Nerves* which environ the *Arteries* and *Veins*, their Use is to put a stop to the current of the Blood, and by their Pressure, and Constriction of the *Veins* and *Arteries*, oblige it to flow into those places, where it meets with a passage more free and open. Thus that part of the great *Artery*, which furnishes all the parts of the Body, below the Heart, with Blood, being bound and straitned by these Nerves, the Blood must necessarily enter the Head in greater quantities, and so produce a Change in the Animal Spirits, and consequently in the Imagination.

III. *That these things are perform'd by the order of Providence, without*

But it ought to be well observ'd, that all this is perform'd by meer *Mechanisme*; I mean, that all the different Movements of these Nerves in all the different Passions, are not effected by the *Command* of the *Will*; but on the contrary, are perform'd without its orders, and even in contradiction to them: Insomuch that a Body without a Soul dispos'd like that of a sound Man,

Man, would be capable of all the Movements, which accompany our Paſſions: And thus Beaſts themſelves might have ſuch as nearly reſembled them, though they were only pure *Machines.* *out the concurrence of our Will.*

This is the thing for which we ought to admire the incomprehenſible Wiſdom of Him, who has ſo regularly rang'd and contriv'd all theſe Natural Wheels, and Movements, as to make it ſufficient for an Object, to move the *Optick Nerve* in ſuch and ſuch a manner, to produce ſo many diverſe Motions in the Heart, in the other parts of the Body, and on the Face it ſelf. For it has lately been diſcover'd, that the ſame Nerve which ſhoots ſome of its Branches into the Heart, and into other Internal parts, communicates alſo ſome of its Branches into the Eye, the Mouth, and other parts of the Face; ſo that no Paſſion can riſe or mutiny within, but it muſt preſently betray it ſelf without, becauſe there can be no Motion in the Branches extended to the Heart, but there muſt another happen in thoſe, which are ſpread o're the Face.

The Correſpondence and Sympathy, which is found between the Nerves of the Face, and ſome others, anſwering to other places of the Body, not to be nam'd, is ſtill much more remarkable; and that which occaſions this great Sympathy, is as in the other Paſſions, becauſe theſe little Nerves which climb into the Face, are only Branches of that, which deſcends lower.

When a Man is overtaken with ſome violent Paſſion, if he is careful to make a Reflection upon what he feels in his Entrails, and in other parts of his Body, where the Nerves inſinuate themſelves, as alſo upon the Changes of Countenance, which accompany it; and if he conſiders that all theſe divers Agitations of the Nerves, are altogether involuntary, and that they happen in ſpite of all the Reſiſtance that our Will can make to them, he will find it no hard matter to ſuffer himſelf to embrace this ſimple Expoſition, that hath been given of all theſe Relations and Correſpondencies betwixt the Nerves.

But if a Man examines the Reaſons and the End of all theſe things, ſo much Order and Wiſdom will be found in them, that a little Soberneſs of Thought and Attention will be able to convince the moſt devoted Admirers of *Epicurus* and *Lucretius*, that there is a Providence that governs the World. When I ſee a *Watch*, I have reaſon to conclude, that there is ſome Intelligent Being, ſince it is impoſſible for Chance and Hap-hazard to produce, to range and poſture all its Wheels. How then could it be poſſible, that Chance, and a confus'd Jumble of Atomes, ſhould be capable of ranging in all Men and Animals, ſuch abundance of different Secret Springs and Engines, with that Exactneſs and Proportion, I have juſt explain'd: and that Men and Animals ſhould thereby procreate others exactly like themſelves. So ridiculous it is to think or to ſay with *Lucretius*, That all the parts which go to the Compoſition of Man, were pack't together by Chance; that his Eyes were not made with any deſign of Seeing, but that he afterwards thought of Seeing, becauſe he found he had Eyes; And thus with the other parts of the Body. Theſe are his Words.

Lumina ne facias oculorum clara creata,
Proſpicere ut poſſimus: &, ut proferre viai
Proceros paſſus, ideo faſtigia poſſe
Surarum, ac feminum pedibus fundata plicari:
Brachia tum porro validis ex apta lacertis
Eſſe, manúſque datas utraque à parte miniſtras,
Ut facere ad vitam poſſimus, quæ foret uſus.
Cætera de genere hoc inter quæcunque putantur:
Omnia perverſa præpoſtera ſunt ratione.
Nil adeo quoniam natum 'ſt in corpore, ût uti
Poſſemus: ſed quod natum 'ſt, id procreat uſum.

Muſt not he needs have a ſtrange Averſion to a Providence, who would thus voluntarily put out his Eyes for fear of ſeeing it, and endeavour to render himſelf inſenſible to Arguments ſo ſtrong and convincing, as thoſe Nature furniſhes us withall? I confeſs, when once Men affect to be thought bold, or rather Atheiſtical Wits, as did the *Epicureans*, they preſently find themſelves benighted in darkneſs, and ſee only falſe glimmerings for the future; they peremptorily deny the moſt clear and Self-evident Truths, and as hautily and Magiſterially affirm the falſeſt and obſcureſt Things in the World.

The *Poet* I have juſt cited, may ſerve as a Proof of that Blindneſs of theſe venturous Wits; he confidently pronounces, and againſt all appearance of Truth, about the moſt difficult and obſcureſt Queſtions: when at the ſame time it may well be thought, he has no Perception of Idea's, that are moſt clear and evident. If I ſhould ſtand to tranſcribe paſſages of that *Author*, I ſhould make too long and tedious a Digreſſion; for though it may be permitted me to make ſome Reflections, which ſtay and faſten the Mind for a moment upon eſſential Truths, yet I ſhould never atone for making Digreſſions, which throw off the Mind a conſiderable time, from its Attention to its principal Subject, to apply it to things of little or no Importance.

CHAP. V.

I. *Of the Memory.* II. *Of the Habits.*

WE have been explaining the general Cauſes, as well External as Internal, which effect a Change in the Animal Spirits, and conſequently in the Imaginative Faculty. We have ſhewn that the External are the Meats we feed upon, and the Air we take in, for Reſpiration. And that the Internal conſiſt in the Involuntary Agitation of certain Nerves. We know no other general Cauſes, and we are confident there are none. In ſo much that the Faculty of Imagining, as to the Body, depends only on two things, namely the Animal Spirits, and the Diſpoſition of the Brain, whereon they act. There nothing more remains at preſent to give us a perfect Knowledge of the Imagination, than the manifeſtation of the different Changes, that may happen in the Subſtance of the Brain.

They ſhall be examined by us, as ſoon as we have given ſome Idea of the Memory and Habits, that is to ſay, of that facility we have of thinking upon things which we have already thought upon, and doing the ſame thing we have already done: The Methodical Order of our Diſcourſe will have it ſo.

I. *Of the Memory.* In order to give an Explication of the *Memory*, it ſhould be call'd to Mind, what has been ſeveral times already inculcated; that all our different Perceptions are affix'd to the Changes which happen to the Fibres of the Principal part of the Brain, wherein the Soul more particularly reſides.

This one Suppoſition being laid down, the Nature of the *Memory* is explain'd: for as the Branches of a Tree, which have continued for ſome time bent after a particular manner, preſerve a readineſs and facility of being bent afreſh in the ſame manner; ſo the Fibres of the Brain, having once receiv'd certain Impreſſions from the current of the Animal Spirits, and from the Action of Objects upon them, retain for a conſiderable time, ſome Facility of receiving the ſame Diſpoſitions. Now the *Memory* conſiſts only in that Promptneſs or Facility; ſince a Man thinks upon the ſame things, when-ever the Brain receives the ſame Impreſſions.

And whereas the Animal Spirits act ſometimes more, and ſometimes leſs ſtrongly upon the Subſtance of the Brain; and External Objects make far greater Impreſſions, than the Imagination ſingly; it is from hence eaſy to diſcover, why a Man does not equally remember all the things he has formerly perceived: how, for inſtance, it comes to paſs, that what a Man has often perceiv'd, is generally repreſented livelier to the Soul, than what a Man has had but now and then a Perception of: why he more diſtinctly remembers the things he has ſeen, than thoſe he has only imagin'd; and ſo why, for example, a Man ſhall know better the diſtribution of the Veins in the *Liver* by once ſeeing the Diſſection of that part, than by often reading it in a Book of *Anatomy*; and ſo of other things of like nature.

But if a Man would make reflection upon what has been formerly ſaid, concerning the *Imagination*; and upon the little which has juſt now been ſpoken concerning the *Memory*; and if he be rid of that prejudice, that our Brain is too little for the hoarding up and preſerving ſuch abundance of Traces and Impreſſions, he will take pleaſure in diſcovering all thoſe wonderful Effects of the *Memory*, St. *Auſtin* with ſo much admiration ſpeaks of, in the *Tenth Book of his Confeſſions*. But I ſhall not explain theſe things more at large; as believing it more expedient for every Man to explain them to himſelf by ſome Eſſay of Thought; for as much as the things that way diſcover'd, are always more grateful and agreeable, and make greater Impreſſion on us, than thoſe we learn from other Men.

II. *Of the Habits.* It is neceſſary to the Explication of the *Habits*, to know the manner whereby we have reaſon to think the Soul moves the parts of the Body, to which ſhe is united; and that is this: According to all appearances in the world, there are always in ſome places of the Brain, whatever they be, a very great Quantity of Animal Spirits, very rapidly mov'd by the Heat of the Heart, from whence they proceeded; and moſt readily diſpos'd to glide into thoſe places, where they find an eaſy and an open paſſage. All the Nerves terminate in the Receptacle of thoſe Spirits, and the Soul has the * Power of Determining their Motion, and conducting them through the Nerves, into all the Muſcles of the Body. Theſe Spirits entring therein ſwell them up, and conſequently contract them: And thus they move the parts to which the Muſcles are affix'd.

* *I explain elſewhere wherein this Power conſiſts.*

We ſhall readily be perſwaded, that the Soul moves the Body in the manner thus explain'd, if it be obſerv'd, that when a Man has been a long time faſting, let him try, how he will, to give certain motions to his Body, he will be unable to effect them, and even will be at ſome pains to ſtand upon his Legs. But if ſo be he find a way of conveying into his Heart ſomething very Spirituous, as Wine or any like nutriment, he forthwith perceives that his Body obeys his Deſires with far greater facility, and that he is able to move it how he pleaſes. For this ſingle Experiment makes it, one would think, ſufficiently manifeſt, that the Soul is incapable of giving Motion to her Body for want of Animal Spirits; and that by their means ſhe re-aſſumes her Sovereignty and Dominion over it.

Now

Now these Inflations of the Muscles are so plain and palpable in the Motions of our Arms, and other parts of our Body; and 'tis so reasonable to believe these Muscles cannot receive any Inflation, without the admission of some body into them; as a Bladder cannot be blown and extended, without the entrance of the Air, or something else; that it seems not to be doubted but the Animal Spirits are driven from the Brain, through the Nerves into the Muscles, to dilate them, and to produce in them all the Motions we desire. For a Muscle being full is necessarily shorter than when it is empty; and so attracts and moves the part to which it is conjoyn'd; as may be seen explain'd more at large in *Mr. Des-Cartes* Treatise of the *Passions*, and in That *Concerning Man*. I do not however deliver that Explication as perfectly demonstrated in all its parts: To render it entirely evident, there are many things farther requisite to be demanded: without which, it is next to impossible to explain ones self. But the Knowledge of them is not so useful for our Subject; for let the Explication be true or false, it will not fail to be of equal use to acquaint us with the Nature of the Habits. Since if the Soul moves not the Body in that manner, it necessarily moves it in some other, that comes up near enough to it, to deduce those consequences from it, which we shall infer.

But to the intent we may pursue out Explication, it is necessary to observe, that the Spirits find not the paths, through which they ought to pass, always so free and open, as they should be; which is the occasion, for example, of the Difficulty we meet with in moving the Fingers with that Nimbleness, as is necessary to play on Musical Instruments; or the Muscles imploy'd in Pronunciation, to pronounce the Words of a strange Language: but that the Animal Spirits by little and little, so open and plain the Ways by their continued succession, as to take away in time all manner of Resistance. Now the Habits consist in that Facility the Animal Spirits have of passing into the Members of our Body.

'Tis the easiest thing imaginable, according to this Explication, to resolve a multitude of Questions relating to the *Habits:* As why, for instance, Children are more capable of acquiring new *Habits*, than Persons of a more consummate Age. Why it is a thing of such Difficulty, to lay aside an inveterate Custom. Why Men by use of Speaking, obtain so great a Dexterity at it, as to pronounce their Words with an incredible swiftness, and even without considering them; as is but too often customary with those, who say the Prayers which they have been us'd to, several Years together. And yet many things go to the Pronunciation of one Word; many Muscles must be mov'd at once, in a certain time, and a definite Order, as those of the *Tongue*, the *Lips*, the *Throat*, and *Diaphragm*. But a Man may with a little Meditation give himself satisfaction upon these Questions, as upon many others very curious, and no less useful, and it is not necessary to dwell any longer upon them.

It is manifest from what has been said, that there is a great affinity between the *Memory* and *Habits*; and that in one sense, the *Memory* may pass for a *Species* of *Habit*. For as the Corporeal *Habits* consist in the Facility the Spirits have acquir'd, of passing into certain places of our Body: So the Memory consists in the Traces the same Spirits have imprinted in the Brain, which are the cause of that Facility we have of Recollecting and Remembring things. In so much that were there no Perceptions affix'd to the courses of the Animal Spirits, and the Traces they leave behind them; there would be no difference between the *Memory* and the other *Habits*. Nor is there greater difficulty to conceive how Beasts, though void of Soul, and incapable of any Perception, may remember after their way, the things that have made an Impression in their Brain; than to conceive how they are capable of acquiring different Habits; and after what I have explain'd concerning the Habits, I see no great difficulty to represent to a Mans self, how the Members of their Body procure different Habits by degrees; than how an Engine newly made, cannot so easily be play'd, as after it has been some time made use of.

See the Illustrations upon the Intellectual Memory and Habits.

CHAP. VI.

I. *That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to so sudden Changes, as the Spirits.* II. *Three different Changes incident to the three different Ages.*

ALL the Parts of Animate Bodies are in a continual Motion, whether they be Solid, or Fluid, the Flesh no less than the Blood: There is only this difference between the Motion of one and the other, that the Motion of the Parts of the Blood is sensible and visible, and that the Particles of Fibres of our Flesh are altogether Imperceptible. There is then this difference between the Animal Spirits, and the Substance of the Brain; that the Animal Spirits are very rapidly mov'd, and very fluid, but the Substance of the Brain has some Solidity and Consistence. So that the Spirits divide themselves into little Parts, and are dispers'd in a few Hours, by transpiring through the Pores of the Vessels that contain them; and others often succeed in their Place, not altogether like the former: But the Fibres of the Brain are not so easy to be dissipated; there seldom happen any considerable

I. *That the Fibres of the Brain are not subject to so sudden Changes, as the Spirits.*

Alteration in them; and their whole Substance can't be chang'd, but by the successive tract of many Years.

The most considerable Differences, that are found in the Brain of one and the same Person, during his whole Life, are in his *Infancy*, in his *Maturity*, and in his *Old Age*.

II. *Three Considerable Changes which happen in the Three different Ages of Man.*

The Fibres in the Brain in a Man's *Childhood*, are soft, flexible and delicate: A Riper and *more consummate Age* dries, hardens, and corroborates them; but in *Old Age*, they grow altogether inflexible, gross, and intermix'd with superfluous Humours, which the faint and languishing Heat of that Age is no longer able to disperse. For as we see that the Fibres which compose the Flesh, harden by Time, and that the Flesh of a young Partridge is without dispute more tender, than that of an old one; so the Fibres of the Brain of a Child, or a young Person must be much more soft and delicate, than those of Persons more advanc'd in Years.

We shall understand the Ground and the Reason of these Changes, if we consider that the Fibres are continually agitated by the Animal Spirits; which whirl about them in many different manners. For as the Winds parch and dry the Earth by their blowing upon it, so the Animal Spirits by their perpetual Agitation, render by degrees, the greatest part of the Fibres of Man's Brain, more dry, more close and solid; so that Persons more stricken in Age, must necessarily have them almost always more inflexible, than those of a lesser standing. And as for those who are of the same Age, your Drunkards, which for many Years together have drank to excess, either Wine or other such Intoxicating Liquours, must needs have them more solid and more inflexible, than those who have abstain'd from the use of such kind of Liquours all their Lives.

Now the different Constitutions of the Brain in Children, in Adult Persons, and in Old People, are very considerable Causes of the Difference observable in the Imaginative Faculty of these Three Ages, which we are going to speak of in the following Chapters.

CHAP. VII.

I. *Of the Communication there is between the Brain of a Mother, and that of her Infant.* II. *Of the Communication that is between our Brain, and the other Parts of our Body, which inclines us to Imitation, and to Compassion.* III. *An Explication of the Generation of Monstrous Children, and the Propagation of the Species.* IV. *An Explication of some Irregularities of the Understanding, and of some Inclinations of the Will.* V. *Concerning Concupiscence, and Original Sin.* VI. *Objections and Answers.*

IT is, I think, sufficiently manifest that there is some kind of Tye and Connection between us, and all the Rest of the World; and that we have some Natural Relations to, or Correspondencies with all things that encompass us; which Relations are very advantagious, both as to the Preservation, and welfare of our Lives. But all these Relations are not equally binding; There is a closer Connection betwixt us and our Native Country, than *China*; we have a nearer Relation to the Sun, than to any of the Stars; to our own House, than that of our Neighbours: There are invisible Ties, that fasten us with a stricter Union unto Men, than Beasts; to our Relations and Friends, than Strangers; to those in whom we have our Dependance for the Preservation of our Being, than to such as can neither be the Objects of our Hopes or Fears.

That which is more especially remarkable in this Natural Union, betwixt us and other Men, is that it is so much greater, by how much we stand more in need of their Kindness or Assistance. Relations and Friends are intimately united to one another: We may say that their Pains and Miseries are common, as well as their Pleasures and Happiness: For all the Passions and Sentiments of our Friends, are communicated to us by the Impression their Mein, and Manner, and the Air of their Countenance make upon us: But because we may *absolutely* live without them, the Natural Union betwixt them and us is not the greatest that is possible.

I. *Of the Communication that is between the Brain of the Mother, and that of her Infant.*

Children in their Mothers Womb, whose Bodies are not yet compleatly form'd, and who are of themselves in a state of the greatest Weakness, Impotency, and Want, that can possibly be conceiv'd, ought to be united likewise to their Mothers in the strictest manner imaginable. And though their Soul be separate from that of their Mothers, yet since their Body is not loos'd, and disengag'd from hers, it ought to be concluded, they have the same Sentiments and the same Passions; in a word, all the same Thoughs as are excited in the Soul, on occasion of the Motions which are produc'd in the Body.

Thus

Thus Infants ſee what their Mothers ſee, they hear the ſame cries, they receive the ſame Impreſſions of Objects, and are agitated with the ſame Paſſions. For ſince the Air of the Face of a Man in a Paſſion, pierces thoſe which look upon him, and Naturally impreſſes in them a Paſſion reſembling that with which he is poſſeſs'd, though the Union of that Man with thoſe that conſider him, be not very great and binding; one would think there were good reaſon, to believe the Mothers capable of imprinting on their Infants all the ſame Sentiments they are touch'd with, and all the ſame Paſſions themſelves are acted withall. For, in ſhort, the Body of an Infant in the Womb, is all of a piece with the Body of the Mother; the Blood and the Spirits are common to them both; the Senſations and Paſſions are the Natural Reſults and Conſequents of the Motions of the Blood and Spirits, and theſe Motions are neceſſarily communicated from the Mother to the Child: therefore the Paſſions and Senſations, and generally all the Thoughts occaſion'd by the Body, are common to the Mother and the Child.

Theſe things ſeem to me beyond exception true, for ſeveral Reaſons: which yet I advance not here but as a Suppoſition, which I think will be ſufficiently demonſtrated by what follows: For every Suppoſition that can ſtand the ſhock of all the Difficulties poſſible to be rais'd againſt it, and repel them; ought to paſs for an indiſputable Principle.

II. *Of the Communication between our Brain, and the other Parts of our Body, which incline us to Imitation and Compaſſion.*

The Inviſible Bonds and Cements wherewith the Author of Nature has united all his Works, are worthy of the Wiſdom of *GOD*, and the Admiration of Men; there is nothing in the World at once more Surprizing and Inſtructing than this: but we are too inconſiderate to regard it. We leave our ſelves to be conducted, without conſidering who conducts us, or how he does it: Nature is conceal'd from our Eyes, as well as its Author; and we feel the Motions that are produc'd in us, without conſidering from what Springs they are: And yet there are few things more neceſſary to be known by us: ſince upon the Knowledge of them it is, that the Explication of all things relating to Man, depends.

There are certainly in our Brain ſome ſecret Springs and Movements, which incline us to *Imitation*; for this is neceſſary to Civil Society. It is not only neceſſary for Children to believe their Fathers; for Diſciples to believe their Maſters; and Inferiours, their Superiours: It is moreover neceſſary, that all Men ſhould be inclinable to take up the like Exterior Manners, and to do the ſame Actions, as thoſe with whom they mean to live. For to the intent that Men ſhould have a Connexion and Dependance on each other, 'tis neceſſary they come near to one another, in the Characters both of Body and Mind. This is the Fundamental Principle of Abundance of things we ſhall treat of in the following Diſcourſe: But as to what we have to ſay in this Chapter, it is farther neceſſary to know, that there are in the Brain ſome Natural Diſpoſitions, which incline us to *Compaſſion*, as well as to *Imitation*.

It ought to be known then, That the Animal Spirits do not only Naturally convey themſelves into the Parts of our Body, for the performing the ſame Actions, and the ſame Motions which we ſee others do; but farther, for the Receiving, after a Manner, their Hurts and Injuries, and participating of their Miſeries. For Experience teaches us, that when we very attentively conſider a Man violently ſtruck, or dangerouſly wounded, the Spirits impetuouſly haſten to the Parts of our Body correſpondent to thoſe we ſee wounded in another, provided we turn not the current of them another way, by a voluntary and forcible Titillation of a different Part from that, which we ſee hurt or wounded: or that the Natural courſe of the Spirits towards the Heart and Viſcerous parts, which is uſual in ſuddain Commotions, changes not the Determination of the Flux of the Spirits we are ſpeaking of, and hurries them along with them: or laſtly, unleſs ſome unuſual and extraordinary Connection of the Traces of the Brain, with the Motions of the Spirits, effects the ſame thing.

This Tranſlation of the Spirits into the Parts of our Body, which are Analogous to thoſe we ſee injuriouſly treated in others, makes a very ſenſible Impreſſion on Perſons of a fine and delicate Conſtitution, who have a lively Imagination, and very ſoft and tender Fleſh. For they feel, for inſtance, a kind of ſhivering or trembling in their Legs, by an attentive beholding any one that has a Sore there, or actually receives a Blow in them.

For a confirmation of this, take what a Friend of mine wrote to me to the ſame purpoſe. *An Old Gentleman that liv'd with one of my Siſters, being ſick, a Young Maid held the Candle whilſt he was Blooded in the Foot: But as ſhe ſaw the Surgeon ſtrike in the Lancet, ſhe was ſeiz'd with ſuch an Apprehenſion, as to feel three or four days afterwards ſuch a piercing Pain in the ſame part of her Foot, as forc'd her to keep her Bed all that time.*

The Reaſon whereof is this, That the Spirits impetuouſly diffuſe themſelves into theſe parts of our Body; that by keeping them more intenſe, they may render them more *Senſible* to the Soul; and may put her upon her guard, and make her ſolicitous to avoid thoſe Evils, which we behold in others.

This Compaſſion in Bodies produces another Compaſſion in Minds: It induces us to Condole and Comfort others in their Troubles, becauſe in ſo doing, we Comfort and Solace our ſelves: In fine, it gives a check to our Malice and Cruelty. For the horror of Blood, and the Fear of Death, in a word, the ſenſible Impreſſion of Compaſſion often prevents thoſe Perſons from Butchering Beaſts, who are the moſt convincingly perſwaded they are meer Machines: Becauſe a great many Men are unable to kill them, without wounding themſelves by a Repercuſſive ſtroke of Compaſſion.

But that which here is moſt eſpecially remarkable, is, That the ſenſible View of a Wound receiv'd by another, produces in thoſe which behold it, a ſo much greater Wound, as their Conſtitution is more weak and delicate: Becauſe that Senſible View impetuouſly throwing the Animal Spirits into the Parts of the Body, which are correſpondent to thoſe they ſee hurt or wounded, they muſt needs make a greater Impreſſion in the Fibres of a tender and delicate Body, than in thoſe of more ſtrong and robuſt Complection.

Thus Men who abound with Srength and Vigour, are not at all hurt with the Sight of a Maſſacre; not ſo much inclined to Compaſſion, becauſe the Sight of it is an offence to their Body, as becauſe it ſhocks their Reaſon: Theſe Perſons have no Pity for a Condemned Criminal, as being both Inflexible and Inexorable: whereas Women and Children ſuffer much Pain by the Hurt and Wounds, they ſee receiv'd by others. They are Mechanically diſpos'd, to be very Pitiful and Compaſſionate to the Miſerable. And they are unable to ſee a Beaſt beaten, or hear it cry, without ſome diſturbance of Mind.

As for Infants which are ſtill in their Mothers Womb, the delicacy of the Fibres of their Fleſh infinitely exceeding that of Women and Children, the courſe of their Spirits muſt neceſſarily produce more conſiderable Changes in them, as will be ſeen in the Sequel of the Diſcourſe.

We will ſtill ſuffer what we have ſaid, to go for a ſimple Suppoſition, if Men will have it ſo. But they ought to endeavour well to comprehend it, if they would diſtinctly conceive the things I preſume to explain in this Chapter. For theſe two Suppoſitions I have juſt made, are the Principles of an infinite number of things, which are generally believ'd very difficult and abſtruſe. And which indeed ſeem impoſſible to be explain'd and clear'd up without them. I will here give ſome Inſtances of what I have ſaid.

III. *An Explication of the Generation of Monſtrous Children, and the Propagation of the Species.*

It was about ſeven or eight Years ago, that there were ſeen in the *Incurable*, a Young Man who was born an Ideot, and whoſe Body was broken in the ſame places that Malefactors are broken on the Wheel. He lived near twenty Years in the ſame condition: Many Perſons went to ſee him; and the late Queen-Mother going to viſit the Hoſpital, had the Curioſity to ſee him, and alſo to touch his Legs and Arms, in the places where they were broken.

According to the Principles I have been eſtabliſhing, the Cauſe of this calamitous Accident was, That his Mother hearing a Criminal was to be broken, went to ſee the Execution. * All the blows which were given to the Condemned, ſtruck violently the Imagination of the Mother; and by a kind of Repercuſſive blow, the tender and delicate Brain of her Infant. The Fibres of this Mother's Brain receiv'd a prodigious Concuſſion, and were poſſibly broke in ſome places, by the violent courſe of the Spirits, produc'd at the Sight of ſo frightful a Spectacle. But they had Conſiſtency enough to prevent their total Diſſolution. The Fibres, on the contrary, of the Infant's Brain not being able to reſiſt the furious torrent of theſe Spirits, were broke and ſhattered all to pieces. And the havock was violent enough to make him loſe his Intellect for ever. This is the Reaſon why he came into the World deprived of Senſe. Now for the other, why he was broken in the ſame parts of his Body as the Criminal, whom his Mother had ſeen put to Death.

* *According to the firſt Suppoſition.*

At the Sight of this Execution, ſo capable of diſmaying a timorous Woman, the violent courſe of the Animal Spirits of the Mother, made a forcible deſcent from her Brain, towards all the Members of her Body, which were Analogous to thoſe of the Criminal, and * the ſame thing happened to the Infant. But becauſe the Bones of the Mother were capable of withſtanding the violent Impreſſion of theſe Spirits, they receiv'd no dammage by them; It may be too, ſhe felt not the leaſt Pain, nor the leaſt Trembling in her Arms or Legs, upon the Breaking of the Criminal: But the rapid courſe of the Spirits was capable of burſting the ſoft and tender parts of the Infant's Bones. For the Bones are the laſt parts of the Body that are form'd; and they have very little Conſiſtence, whilſt Children are yet in their Mothers Womb. And it ought to be obſerv'd, That if this Mother had determined the Motion of theſe Spirits, towards ſome other part of her Body, by ſome powerful Titillation; her Infant would have eſcaped the Fracture of his Bones. But the part which was correſpondent to that, towards which the Mother had determined theſe Spirits, would have been ſeverely injured; according to what I have already ſaid.

* *According to the ſecond Suppoſition.*

The Reaſons of this Accident are general enough, to explain how it comes to paſs that Women, who whilſt big with Child, ſee Perſons particularly mark'd in certain places of their Face, imprint on their Infants the very ſame Marks, and in the ſelf-ſame places of the Body. And 'tis not without good Reaſon, that they are caution'd to rub ſome latent part of the Body, when they perceive any thing which ſurpriſes them; or are agitated with ſome violent Paſſion. For by this Means, the Marks will be delineated rather upon the hidden parts, than the Faces of their Infants.

We ſhould have frequent Inſtances of like Nature with this I have here related, if Infants could live after they had receiv'd ſo great Wounds or Diſruptions: but generally they prove Abortions: For it may be ſaid that rarely any Child dies in the Womb, if the Mother be not diſtemper'd, that has any other cauſe of its ill fortune, than ſome fright or impotent Deſire, or other violent Paſſion of the Mother. This following is another Inſtance, very unuſual and particular.

It

It is no longer than an Year ago, that a Woman, having with too great an Application of Thought, contemplated the Picture of *St. Pius*, at the Celebration of his Feaſt of Canonization, was deliver'd of a Child perfectly featur'd like the Repreſentation of the Saint. He had the Countenance of an Old Man, as near as was poſſible for an Infant that was beardleſs. His Arms were folded acroſs upon his Breaſt; His Eyes bent up towards Heaven, and had very little Fore-head, becauſe the Picture of the Saint, being poſtur'd as looking up to Heaven, and elevated towards the Roof of the Church, had ſcarce any Fore-head to be ſeen: He had a kind of Mitre reclining backwards on his Shoulders, with many round prints in the places, where the Mitres are imboſs'd with Precious Stones. In ſhort, this Infant was the very Picture of the Picture, upon which the Mother had form'd it, by the force of her Imagination. This is a thing that all *Paris* might have ſeen as well as I, ſince it was for a conſiderable time, preſerv'd in Spirit of Wine.

This Inſtance has this remarkable in it, that it was not the Sight of a Man alive, and acted with ſome violent Paſſion, that mov'd the Spirits and Blood of the Mother to the Production of ſo ſtrange an Effect; but only the ſight of a Picture; which yet made a very ſenſible Impreſſion, and was accompanied with a mighty Commotion of Spirits, whether by the Fervency and Application of the Mother; or whether by the Agitation, the noiſe of the Feaſt caus'd in her.

This Mother then beholding the Picture with great Application of Mind, and Commotion of Spirits, the Infant according to the firſt Suppoſition, ſaw it with the like Application, and Commotion. The Mother being ſenſibly ſmitten imitated the Picture, at leaſt in outward Poſture; according to the ſecond Suppoſition: For her Body being compleatly form'd, and the Fibres of her Fleſh hard enough to withſtand the torrent of the Spirits, ſhe could not poſſibly imitate it, or become perfectly like it in all things: But the Fibres of the Infant's Fleſh, being extreamly ſoft, and conſequently capable of being moulded into any Figure, the rapid courſe of the Spirits produc'd in his Fleſh, all that was neceſſary to render him entirely like the Image which he ſaw: And the Imitation to which Children are the moſt diſpos'd, was almoſt as perfect as it poſſibly could be. But this Imitation having given the Body of the Child a ſhape too extraordinary, was the occaſion of its Death.

There are many other Inſtances to be met with in Authors of the Power of the Mothers Imagination; and there is nothing ſo odd or extravagant, but they ſometimes miſ-carry of: For they not only bring forth Deform'd and Miſ-ſhapen Children, but the Fruits they have long'd to Eat, as Apples, Pears, Grapes and the like. The Mother ſtrongly Imagining, and impatiently longing to eat Pears, for inſtance; the Infant receives the ſame impatient Longings, and ſtrong Imaginations: and the current of the Spirits actuated with the Image of the deſir'd Fruit, diffuſing it ſelf through the little Body, which by reaſon of its flexibility and ſoftneſs, is readily diſpos'd for a Change of it Figure; the poor Infant is faſhioned in the ſhape of the thing it too ardently deſires. But the Mother ſuffers not in her Body by it, becauſe it is not ſoft and plyable enough, to receivethe Figure of the thing imagined; and ſo ſhe cannot imitate, or make her ſelf entirely like it.

Now it ought not to be ſuppos'd that this Correſpondence, I have been explaining, and which is ſometimes the cauſe of ſuch great Diſorders is an unuſeful thing, and an inconvenient Ordinance in Nature. On the contrary, it ſeems to be very advantagious to the Propagation of an Humane Body, and the Formation of the *Fœtus*; and it is abſolutely neceſſary to the Tranſmitting ſeveral Diſpoſitions of the Brain, which ought to be different at different Seaſons, and in different Countries. For it is neceſſary, for inſtance, that Lambs in particular Countries, ſhould have their Brain altogether diſpos'd for the avoiding and flying Wolves; by reaſon of their abounding in thoſe places, and being very formidable creatures to them.

It is true, this Communication between the Mother's and the Infant's Brain, is ſometimes attended with unluckly Conſequences; when the Mothers ſuffer themſelves to be tranſported with ſome outragious Paſſion. Notwithſtanding it ſeems to me, that without this Communication, Women and other Creatures could not Propagate their Young ones in the ſame *Species*. For though ſome Reaſon may be given for the Formation of the *Fœtus* in general, as *Monſieur Des-Cartes* has happily enough attempted; yet it is moſt difficult, without this Communication of the Mother's Brain with that of the Infant, to explain why a Mare does not produce a Calf, and a Hen an Egg which contains a little Partridge, or ſome other Bird of a new *Species*. And I am of opinion, that thoſe who have thought much upon the Formation of the *Fœtus*, will agree in the ſame Notion.

'Tis true, that the moſt reaſonable Opinion, and that which is moſt agreable to Experience, touching that very difficult Queſtion, about the Formation of the *Fœtus*, is this; That Infants are already wholly form'd, even before the Action whereby they are conceiv'd; and that their Mothers only beſtow upon them the ordinary Growth, in the time of their being big with them. Nevertheleſs, this Communication of Animal Spirits, and of the Brain of the Mother, with the Spirits and Brain of the Infant, ſeems however to be ſerviceable in regulating this Growth, and determining the parts imploy'd in its Nouriſhment, to the poſturing themſelves almoſt in the ſame manner, as in the Body of the Mother. That is, in

rendring the Infant like to, or of the ſame *Species*, with the Mother. This is manifeſt enough by the Accidents which occur, when the Imagination of the Mother is diſordered, and ſome tempeſtuous Paſſion changes the Diſpoſition of her Brain. For then, as we have juſt explain'd, this Communication alters the natural Formation of the Infant's Body, and the Mother proves Abortive ſometimes of her *Fœtus*. So much more reſembling the Fruits ſhe longed for; as the Spirits find leſs Reſiſtance in the Fibres of the Infant's Body.

We deny not however, but *GOD* Almighty, without that Communication we have been mentioning, might have diſpos'd all things neceſſary to the Propagation of the *Species*, for infinite Ages, in ſo exact and regular a manner, that Mothers ſhould never have Miſcarried, but have always born Children of the ſame Bigneſs and Complection, perfectly alike in all things. For we ought not to meaſure the Power of *GOD* by our weak Imagination; and we are ignorant of the Reaſons, which might have determined Him in the Conſtruction of his Work.

We daily ſee, that without the help and aſſiſtance of this Communication, Plants and Trees produce regularly enough their like; and that Birds, and many other Animals, ſtand in no need of it for the Breeding and Hatching of their Young ones; when they brood upon Eggs of a different *Species*; as when a Hen ſits on the Eggs of a Partridge. For though we have reaſon to ſupoſe, that the Seeds and Eggs have originally contain'd in them the Plants and Birds, which proceed from them; and that the little Bodys of theſe Birds may have receiv'd their Conformation, by the Communication before mentioned; and the Plants have receiv'd theirs by another Communication, which is equivalent; yet this perhaps would be but a Conjecture. But though it ſhould be more than Conjecture, yet we ought in no wiſe to judge by the things, which *GOD* has made, what thoſe are which it is poſſible for Him to make.

Yet if it be conſidered, that Plants which receive their Growth from the Action of their Mother-plant, reſemble it much more, than thoſe which proceed from the Seeds; that the Tulips, for inſtance, which ariſe from the Root, are of the ſame colour with their Mother-Tulip; and that thoſe which are deriv'd from the Seed, are generally very different: It cannot be doubted, but that if the Communication of the generating Plant with the generated, is not abſolutely neceſſary to make it of the *ſame Species*; it is always neceſſary to make it of the *ſame Likeneſs*.

So that, though it were fore-ſeen by *GOD*, that this Communication of the Mother's Brain, with the Brain of her Child, would ſometimes be the occaſion of the Death of the *Fœtus*, and the Generation of Monſters; by reaſon of the diſorderly Imagination of the Mother: Yet this Communication is ſo admirable, and ſo neceſſary, for the Reaſons I have alledg'd, and for ſeveral others that might ſtill be brought, that the fore-knowledge of theſe Inconveniences prevented not *GOD* from executing his Deſign. It may be affirm'd in one Senſe, that *GOD* had never a Deſign of making Monſters: for it ſeems evident to me, that ſuppoſing he ſhould make but one Animal, he would never make it Monſtrous: But his Deſign being to produce an admirably contriv'd Work, by the moſt ſimple Means; and to unite all his Creatures to one another; he fore-ſaw certain Effects, that would neceſſarily follow from that Order, and Nature of Things, and that was not ſufficient, to make him change his Purpoſe and Deſign. For though, in concluſion, a Monſter conſider'd diſ-junctively, be an Imperfect Work, yet when conjoyn'd with the reſt of the Creation, it renders not the World Imperfect.

We have ſufficiently explain'd, what the Imagination of a Mother is capable of working, upon the Body of her Child: Let us now examine the Influence ſhe has upon his Mind, and let us try to diſcover the firſt and topmoſt irregularities of the *Underſtanding* and *Will* of Men in their Original. For this is one Main and Principal Deſign.

IV. *An Explication of ſome Irregularities of the Underſtanding, and Inclinations of the Will.*

'Tis certain that the Traces of the Brain are accompany'd with Senſations, and Idea's of the Soul; and that the Motions of the Animal Spirits are never excited in the Body, but there are Motions in the Soul correſpondent to them. In a word, it is certain that all the Corporeal Paſſions and Senſations, are attended with real Senſations and Paſſions of the Soul. Now, according to our firſt Suppoſition, Mothers communicate to their Children the Traces of their Brain, and conſequently the Motions of their Animal Spirits. Therefore they breed in the Mind of their Infants the ſame Senſations and Paſſions themſelves are affected with, and conſequently corrupt their Moral and Intellectual Capacity ſeveral ways.

If it be ſo common for Children to bear imprinted in their Faces the Marks, or Traces of the Idea, that made an Impreſſion on their Mother; though the Cutaneous Fibres make a ſtronger reſiſtance to the current of the Spirits, than the ſoft and tender parts of the Brain, and the Spirits are in a greater Agitation in the Brain, than towards the Surface of the Body: it can't be reaſonably doubted, but the Animal Spirits of the Mother produce in the Brain of their Children, many Tracks and footſteps of their diſorderly Motions. Now the great Traces of the Brain, and the Emotions of the Spirits anſwering to them, being a long time preſerv'd, and ſometimes for the whole courſe of a Man's Life; it is plain that as there are few Women but have their weakneſſes and failings, and are diſturb'd with ſome Paſſion or other during the ſeaſon of their Breeding, there muſt needs be but few Children, but what bring into the World with them, a Mind ſome way or other prepoſterouſly fram'd, and are born ſlaves to ſome domineering Paſſion.

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We have but too frequent Experience of these things, and all Men know well enough, that there are whole Families subject to great Weaknesses of Imagination, which have been hereditarily transmitted from their Ancestors. But it would be unnecessary here to give particular Instances. On the contrary, it is more expedient for the Consolation of some Persons to affirm, that these Infirmities of their Fore-fathers, being not Natural, or essential to the Nature of Man, the Traces and Impresses of the Brain, which were the cause of them, may by degrees wear out, and in time be quite effac'd.

Yet it will not be amiss to relate here an Instance of *James I. King of England*, which is mention'd by Sir *Kenelm Digby*, in his Book that he publish'd concerning *Sympathetick Powder*. He asserts in that Book, that *Mary Stuart* being big with *King James*, some *Scotch Lords* rusht into her Chamber, and kill'd her *Secretary*, who was an *Italian*, before her Face, though she interpos'd her self between them, to prevent the *Assacination*; that this *Princess* receiv'd some slight hurts; and that the Fright she was put into, made such deep Impressions in her Imagination, as were communicated to the Infant she bore in her Womb; In so much that *King James* her Son was unable all his Life to behold a naked Sword: He says he experimentally knew it, at the time he was Knighted. For the King, when he should have laid the Sword upon his Shoulder, run it directly against his Face, and had wounded him with it, if some one had not guided it to the proper place. There are so many Examples of this kind, that it would be needless to turn over Authors for them: And I believe there is no body will dispute the truth of these things. For in short, we see very many Persons, that can't endure the sight of a Rat, a Mouse, a Cat or a Frog, and especially creeping Creatures, as Snakes, and Serpents; and who know no other reason of these their extraordinary Aversions, than the Fear their Mothers were put in, by these several Creatures at the time of their going with Child.

V. *An Explication of Concupiscence, and Original Sin.*

But that which I would above all have observ'd upon this Subject is, that there are all appearances imaginable of Men's preserving to this day in their Brain the Traces and Impressions of their first Parents. For as Animals produce others that are like them, and with the like Impresses in their Brains; which are the Cause that Animals of the same *Species* have the same Sympathies and Antipathies, and perform the same Actions, at the same junctures, and the like occasions: So our First Parents after their Sin, receiv'd such great Prints and deep Traces in their Brain, through the Impression of sensible Objects, as might easily have been communicated to their Children. In so much that the great Adhesion which is found in us from our Mother's Womb, to sensible Objects, and the great Distance betwixt us and *GOD*, in this our Imperfect state, may in some measure be accounted for, by what we have been saying.

For since there is a necessity, from the establish'd Order of Nature, that the Thoughts of the Soul should be comformable to the Traces of the Brain; we may affirm, that from the time of our Formation in our Mother's Belly, we are under Sin, and stain'd with the Corruption of our Parents: since we date from thence our vehement Application to sensible Pleasures. Having in our Brain the like Characters and Impresses, with those Persons who gave us Being; we must necessarily have the same Thoughts and the same Inclinations, with respect to Sensible Objects.

And thus we must come into the World with Concupiscence about us, and infected with *Original Sin*: We must be born with Concupiscence, if Concupiscence be nothing but *a Natural Effort made by the Traces of the Brain upon the Mind, to unite it to things sensible*: and we must be born with Original Sin, if Original Sin be nothing but *the Reign of Concupiscence, and that Effort grown as it were victorious*, and Master of the Infant's Heart and Mind. Now there is great probability, that this Reign or Victory of Concupiscence is what we call *Original Sin* in Infants, and *Actual Sin* in Men that have Liberty of Acting.

Rom. Ch. 6. 5. 12, 14, &c.

It only seems as if one might conclude, from the Principles I have establish'd, a thing repugnant to Experience; to wit, that the Mother must always communicate to her Infant Habits and Inclinations like those she has her self, and the facility of Imagining, and learning the same things she understands; For all these things depend only as has been said on the Traces and Impresses of the Brain. And it is certain, that the Traces and Impresses of the Mother's Brain are communicated to her Children. This has been Experimentally prov'd by the Instances that have been related concerning Men; and has been farther confirm'd from the Example of Animals, whose young ones have their Brain fill'd with the same Impresses as those they proceeded from. Which is the Reason that all those of the same *Species* have the same Voice, the same way of moving their Limbs, in short, the same Stratagems for seizing their Prey, and of defending themselves against their enemies. From hence it must follow, that since all the Traces of the Mother are engraven and imprinted on the Brain of the Child, the Child must be born with the same Habits and the other Qualities of the Mother: And also must preserve them generally through the course of his Life; since the Habits which have been contracted in our more tender Age, are more lasting than the other; which notwithstanding contradicts Experience.

VI. *Objections and Answers.*

In Answer to this Objection, we must understand that there are two kinds of Traces in the Brain: The one *Natural*, or peculiar to the Nature of Man; the other *Acquired*. The Natural are Extraordinary deep, and 'tis impossible they should be quite effaced. The

Acquired, on the contrary, may be eaſily loſt; becauſe ordinarily they are not ſo deep. Now tho' the Natural and Acquired differ only in Degree of more or leſs, and often the former are leſs forcible than the latter, ſince we daily accuſtom Animals to the doing thoſe things, which are quite contrary to thoſe their Natural Traces lead them to: (A Dog, for inſtance, has been train'd up not to touch the Bread before him; and not to purſue a Partridge, which he is in ſcent and ſight of) Yet there is this Difference between theſe Traces; that the *Natural* are, as one may ſay, connected with imperceptible Ties to the other parts of our Body. For all the Wheels and Contrivances of our Machine are aſſiſtant to each other, to their continuing in their Natural ſtate. All the parts of our Body mutually contribute to all things neceſſary to the Preſervation or Reſtauration of theſe Natural Traces: thus they can never be wholly aboliſh'd; and they begin to revive again, when we thought them quite deſtroyed.

On the contrary, the Acquired Traces, though greater, and deeper, and ſtronger than the Natural, are loſt, and vaniſh by degrees; unleſs care be taken to preſerve them, by a perpetual Adminiſtration of the Cauſes which produce them: becauſe the other parts of the Body lend no aſſiſtance to their Preſervation, but contrariwiſe, continually labour to expunge and blot them out. We may compare theſe Traces to the ordinary wounds of a Body: they are hurts which our Brains receive, which cloſe up of themſelves, as other wounds do, by the admirable Conſtruction of the Machine.

As then, there is nothing in the whole Body, but what is friendly and conformable to theſe Natural Traces; they are delivered down to the Children in all their force and ſtrength. Thus Parrots breed their Young with the ſame cries, and the ſame Natural Notes with themſelves. But becauſe the Acquired Traces are only in the Brain, and make no Radiations into the reſt of the Body, or very little, (as ſuppoſe, when they are impreſt on it by the Motions which accompany violent Paſſions) they ought not to be tranſmitted to their Infants. Thus a Parrot, who bids his Maſter Good Morrow and Good Night, produces not a Young one ſo expert as himſelf; nor do Men of Senſe and Learning beget Children anſwerable to their Fathers.

So that though it be true, that all that happens in the Mother's Brain happens likewiſe at the ſame time in the Brain of her Infant; and that the Mother can neither ſee, nor feel, nor imagine, but the Infant muſt ſee, and feel, and imagine the ſame thing: and laſtly, that all the illegitimate Traces of the Mother, corrupt the Imagination of the Child; yet theſe Traces being not Natural, in the Senſe we have juſt explain'd it; 'tis no wonder if they uſually cloſe up aſſoon as the Child proceeds from the Mother's Womb. For then the cauſe, which delineated theſe Traces, and fed and nouriſh'd them, ſubſiſts no longer; the Natural Conſtitution of the whole Body lends an hand to their Deſtruction; and Senſible Objects produce a new Set extraordinary deep and numerous, which efface the greateſt part of thoſe the Child had in its Mother's Womb. For it daily happening that a great Pain makes us forgetful of thoſe that have preceded it; 'tis not imaginable but ſuch lively Senſations, as are thoſe of Infants, when firſt the delicate Organs of the Senſes receive the Impreſſions of External Objects, muſt deſtroy the greateſt part of thoſe Traces, which they only receiv'd before from the ſame Objects, by a kind of rebound from their Mother, when they lay as it were ſheltred from them by the incloſing Womb.

Notwithſtanding, when theſe Traces are form'd upon a ſtrong Paſſion, and are accompany'd with a moſt violent Agitation of the Blood and Spirits in the Mother, they act ſo forcibly on the Brain of the Child, and the reſt of its Body, as to imprint therein Characters as deep and durable as the Natural Traces. As in the Inſtance of Sir *Kenelm Digby;* in that of the Child who was born an Ideot and a Cripple; in whoſe Brain and all his Members ſuch ravage was made, by the Imagination of the Mother: and laſtly, in the Inſtance of the General Corruption of the Nature of Mankind.

And we need not wonder, that the *King of England*'s Children were not ſubject to the ſame Infirmity as their Father: Firſt, Becauſe this ſort of Traces diffuſe not their Impreſſion ſo far into the Body as the Natural. Secondly, Becauſe the Mother having not the ſame Infirmity as the Father, by her good Conſtitution prevented its deſcending to her Children. And laſtly, Becauſe the Mother acts infinitely more on the Brain of the Child, than the Father, as is evident from what has been already ſaid.

But it muſt be obſerv'd, That all theſe Reaſons which ſhew that *King James*'s Children might eſcape the Infirmity of their Father, make nothing againſt the Explication of *Original Sin*; or of that predominant Inclination towards things ſenſible: nor of that great Alienation from *GOD*, which we derive from our Parents: becauſe the Traces which Senſible Objects have imprinted on the Brain of the firſt Founders of Mankind, were ſtamp'd extreamly deep; were accompany'd and augmented with violent Paſſions; were fortify'd and corroborated by the continual uſe of things Senſible and neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life; not only in *Adam* and *Eve*; but alſo, which is very remarkable, in the greateſt Saints; in all Men, and in all Women, from whom we are deſcended. So that there is nothing which could put a ſtop to this Corruption of our Nature. And thus it is ſo far from being poſſible for theſe Traces of our Firſt Parents to wear out by Degrees; that on the contrary, they

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must needs be continually renewing and increasing: and without the Grace of JESUS CHRIST, which is continually opposing this unruly torrent, it would be absolutely true to say in the words of an Heathen *Poet*:

Ætas parentum, pejor avis, tulit
Nos nequiores, mox daturos
Progeniem vitiosiorem.

For great Notice should be taken, That the Traces which quicken the most Devout Mothers with the sentiments of Piety, communicate not any Piety to the Children in their Womb; and that the Traces, on the other hand, which excite the Idea's of Sensible things, and which are pursued with Passions, fail not to communicate to their Children the Sensation, and love of Sensible things. A Mother, for example, who is stirred up to the love of GOD, by a Motion of Spirits, accompanying the Traces which the Image of a Venerable Old Man occasions in her Brain; because this Mother has affix'd the Idea of GOD to the Trace of an Old Man; (for as we shall shortly see in the Chapter concerning the Connection of Idea's, this may easily be done, though there is no Analogy at all betwixt the Image of GOD and an Old Man) This Mother, I say, can only produce in the Brain of her Infant the Trace of an Old Man; and an Inclination for Old Men; which is not the love of GOD, wherewith she was her self affected. For, in fine, there are no Traces in the Brain that can naturally excite any other Idea's, than those of Sensible things: because the Body was not made to instruct the Mind, and it never speaks to the Soul but in its own favour and behalf.

Thus a Mother whose Brain is fill'd with Traces, which by their own Nature correspond to Sensible things, and which cannot be extirpated by reason of Concupiscence abiding in her; and because she has not her Body in subjection, by an unavoidable Communication of them to her Infant, she brings forth a Sinner, though her self be Righteous. This Mother is Righteous, for as much as loving GOD actually, or having loved him by a *Love of Choice*; this Concupiscence makes her not obnoxious, tho' she may follow the Motions of it in her sleep. But the Infant she beares, having not loved GOD by a *Love of Choice*, and his Heart having never been turn'd towards GOD; 'tis plain he is in disorder, and in a State of Corruption; and of that there is nothing in him but what deserves the wrath of GOD.

But when Children are Regenerated by *Baptism*, and Justify'd by a Disposition of Heart, much like that which remains in the Righteous, during the Illusions of the Night: or, it it may be, by a *Free Act* of loving GOD; which act was perform'd whilst they were for some moments deliver'd from the Dominion of the Body, by the Vertue of the *Sacrament*: (For since GOD has made their Loving him, to be the end of his Creating them, it cannot be conceiv'd how they can be actually Justified, and in the Divine Order; unless they actually love him, or have formerly loved him, or at least have such a Disposition of Heart as they would have if they had actually loved him) Then though they obey *Concupiscence* in their Infancy, their *Concupiscence* is no longer *Sin*. It renders them not culpable, nor deserving of the wrath of GOD: They fail not to be righteous and acceptable to GOD; by the same reason, that a Man falls not from the *State of Grace*, though in his sleep he follows the Motions of *Concupiscence*. For Infants have a Brain so soft and pliable, and receive so lively and so strong Impressions from Objects never so weak; that they have not Liberty of Mind sufficient to resist them.

But I have insisted too long upon things, which do not properly belong to the Subject of my Discourse. 'Tis enough, if I can conclude from the Explication I have given in this Chapter, that all those Spurious Traces which Mothers imprint in the Brain of their Children, adulterate their Minds, and corrupt their Imaginations. And thus the generality of Men are wont to Imagin things otherwise than they are, by giving some false colour, and some irregular stroke to the Idea's of things which they perceived. *See the Illustrations.*

CHAP. VIII.

I. *The Changes which happen in the Imagination of an Infant after his Birth, by his accompanying with his Mother, his Nurse and other Persons.* II. *Some Instructions for their good Education.*

IN the preceding Chapter we have considered the Brain of an Infant in his Mothers Womb, let us at present examine what Changes it is subject to after his Departure from it. At the same time that he quits his darksome Habitation, and first beholds the Light, the cold of the Exteriour Air takes hold of him: the tenderest Embraces of the Woman that receives him, are offensive to his nice and delicate Body; All External Objects round about

astonish and confound him: they are all occasions of his fear, since he does not as yet know them, nor is in a capacity of resisting or avoiding them. His Tears and Cries wherewith he bemoans himself, are infallible Indications of his Pains and Fears. For these are in effect the Supplications which Nature makes to the Assistants for him, that they would deliver him from the Evils that he suffers, and from those he is apprehensive of.

I. The Changes which happen in the Imagination of an Infant after his Birth, by his accompanying with his Mother, his Nurse and other Persons.

But the better to conceive what confusion his Mind is under in this condition, it must be remembred that the Fibres of his Brain are most soft and tender, and consequently that all External Objects make most profound Impressions on them. For since the least things are often capable of hurting a weak Imagination, such a multitude of surprizing Objects cannot fail to wound and embroil that of a new born Child.

But to form a more lively Imagination of the Perturbations and Pains, Children are expos'd to at their Coming into the World, and the wounds their Imagination must receive; Let us represent to our selves, what astonishment would seize those Men, who should see at some small distance Giants five or six times as tall as themselves approaching towards them without knowing any thing of their Design. Or should they behold some new *Species* of Animals, that had no Analogy to any they had already seen, or if only a Flying Horse, or some other Chimera of our *Poets* should, descending from the Clouds, on a suddain, light upon the Earth. What deep strokes would these Prodigies leave in the Mind, and how would they perplex and confound the Brain, though at a single View?

It daily happens that an unexpected Event, that has any thing terrible in its circumstances, deprives of their Senses, Men of a Mature Age, whose Brain is not so susceptible of new Impressions, who are experienc'd in the World, who can make a Defence, or at least are capable of taking up some Resolution. Children at their first Arrival in the World, suffer some thing from every Object that strikes upon their Senses, wherewith they are not yet acquainted. All the Animals they see, are Creatures of a new *Species* on their Regard, since nothing of what they see at present was ever seen by them before. They are destitute of Strength, and void of Experience; the Fibres of their Brain are of a most fine and flexible temper. How then is it possible their Imagination should continue whole, when expos'd to the Impressions of so many different Objects?

'Tis true the Mothers have pre-accustomed their Children to the Impressions of Objects, by having already imprinted them in the Fibres of their Brain before they left the Womb; and this is the Means they receive much less damage when they behold with their own Eyes, what they in some manner have perceived already with their Mothers. 'Tis farther true that these adulterate Traces and wounds, their Imagination receives upon the sight of so many Objects to them frightful and terrible, close up and heal again in Time; for as much as being unnatural, the whole Body is against them, and all the parts conspire to their Destruction, as has been seen in the preceding Chapter. And this is the cause that all Men in general are not Fools from their Cradles. But this hinders not but that there may be some Traces so strong and deep impress'd as can never be effac'd, but will remain as long as Life it self.

If Men would make serious Reflections upon what happens in their own Breast, and contemplate their own Thoughts, they would not want an Experimental Proof of what I have said. They would generally discover in themselves some secret Inclinations and Aversions, which are not in others, whereof there seems no other Reason to be given than these Traces of our Infancy. For since the causes of these Inclinations and Aversions are peculiar to us, they have no foundation in the Nature of Men; and since they are unknown to us, they must needs have acted on us at a time, when our Memory was not yet capable of registring the circumstances of things, which might have assisted us in calling them again to Mind; and that time could be only that of our tenderest Age.

Monsieur Des-Cartes has acquainted us in one of his *Epistles*, that he had always a particular fancy for all Squint-eyed People; and having diligently search'd into the Cause of it, at length understood this Defect was incident to a young Maid he lov'd, when he was a Child; the Affection he retained for her diffusing it self to all others that any way resembled her.

But 'tis not these little Irregularities of our Inclinations which subject us most to Error. 'Tis our having universally, or almost universally, our Mind adulterate in something or other, and our being generally subject to some kind of Folly, though perhaps we are not aware of it. Let a Man but examine carefully the Temper of those People he converses with, and he will easily be perswaded into this Opinion, and though himself be an Original for others to copy after, and be look'd upon as such; yet he will find all others to be Originals too, and all the difference to consist in the Degree of *more* or *less*.

Now one of the Causes of the different Characters of Mens Minds, is doubtless the difference of Impressions received by them at their leaving their Mother's Womb, as has been manifested touching peculiar and unusual Inclinations: because these being *Species* of Folly, that are settled and permanent for the most part, they cannot have their Dependance on the Constitution of the Animal Spirits, which is of a flux and alterable Nature. And consequently they must needs proceed from the Base and Spurious Impressions made in the Fibres of the Brain, at such time as our Memory was incapable of preserving the Remembrance of them,

that is in the beginning of our Lives. This then is one of the commoneſt Cauſes of the Errors of Mankind; I mean that Subverſion of their Brain, cauſed by the Impreſſion of External Objects, in making their Entrance into the World; and this Cauſe does not ſo ſuddainly ceaſe, as may be poſſibly imagined.

The ordinary Commerce Children are oblidg'd to have with their Nurſes, or even with their Mothers that frequently have had no Education, puts the laſt hand, and gives the finiſhing ſtroke to the corruption of their Mind. Theſe ſilly Women entertain them with nothing but Fooleries, with ridiculous Tales, and frightful Stories: Their whole Diſcourſe to them is about things ſenſible; and they deliver it in a way moſt proper to confirm them in the falſe Judgements of their Senſes. In a word, they ſow in their Minds the Seeds of all the Follies and Weakneſſes themſelves are ſubject to; as of their extravagant Fears and Apprehenſions, their ridiculous Superſtitions, and other the like *Feebleſſes* of Mind. Which is the Reaſon, that not being accuſtomed to ſearch for Truth, nor to taſt and reliſh it, they at laſt become incapable of diſcerning it, and of making any uſe of their Reaſon. Hence they become timorous and low-ſpirited, which Temper for a long time ſticks by them: For there are many to be ſeen, who when fifteen or twenty Years old, retain the Character and Spirit of their Nurſe.

'Tis true Children ſeem not to be greatly qualified for the Contemplation of Truth, and for abſtract and ſublime Sciences: becauſe the Fibres of their Brain being extreamly fine, are moſt eaſily agitated by Objects, even the moſt weak, and leaſt ſenſible that can be; and their Soul neceſſarily admitting Senſations proportioned to the Agitation of theſe Fibres, leaves *Metaphyſical* Notions, and pure *Intellection*, to apply her ſelf wholly to her Senſations. And thus Children ſeem improper for, and incapable of an attentive Application to the pure Ideas of Truth, being ſo frequently and ſo eaſily drawn off, by the confus'd Ideas of their Senſes.

Yet in anſwer to this it may be ſaid: Firſt, that 'tis eaſier for a Child of ſeven years old, to be freed from the Errors his Senſes lead him to, than for a Man at ſixty, who all his Life long has been miſ-guided by the prejudices of Childhood: Secondly, for that a Child, though incapable of the clear and diſtinct Ideas of Truth, is at leaſt capable of being admoniſh'd, that his Senſes deceive him upon all occaſions: and if he cannot be taught the Truth, he ſhould not however be encouraged and fortified in his Errors: Laſtly, the youngeſt Children, though never ſo taken up with Pleaſant and Painful Senſations, yet learn in little time, what Perſons more advanced in Years cannot in much longer; as the Knowledge of the Order and Relations, which all the things and words, they ſee and hear, ſtand in to one another. For though theſe things depend moſtly on the *Memory*, yet 'tis very evident they make great uſe of their *Reaſon*, in the manner of their learning their Language.

II. *Inſtructions for the good Education of Children.*

But ſince that Aptneſs and Facility there is in the Fibres of a Child's Brain, to receive the *Pathetick* Impreſſions of ſenſible Objects, is the cauſe of our judging them incapable of Speculative Science; it is eaſy to be redreſſed. For it muſt be acknowledged, that were the Fears, Deſires, and Hopes of Children removed or prevented; were they never caus'd to ſuffer Pain, and removed as far as poſſible from their little Pleaſures, they might be taught as ſoon as they could ſpeak, things moſt difficult and abſtract, or at leaſt ſenſible *Mathematicks*, *Mechanicks*, and ſuch like Sciences as are neceſſary in the conduct of their Life. But they have but little concern for applying their Minds to abſtract Sciences, whilſt they are hurried with Deſires, or moleſted with Fears: which is worth while to be well conſidered.

For as a Man of Ambition, who had juſt loſt his Eſtate or Honour, or was ſuddainly rais'd to an unexpected Preferment, would not be in a Capacity of reſolving *Metaphyſical* Queſtions, or *Æquations* of *Algebra*; but only to do thoſe things, to which he was influenced by his preſent Paſſion: So Children in whoſe Brain an Apple or a Sugar-plumb makes as deep an Impreſſion, as a great Poſt, a Title, or Preferment, in that of a Man of forty Years old; are not qualified to attend to abſtracted Truths, that are taught them. So that we may affirm, there is nothing ſo oppoſite to Children's Advancement in Science, as thoſe continual Diverſions we give them as Rewards, and the Pains we conſtantly are wiſhing and threatning them withall.

But that which is infinitely more conſiderable is, that the fears of Correction, and the deſires of ſenſible Gratifications, which fill the capacity of a Child's Mind, utterly alienate him from the ſenſe of Piety and Religion; Devotion is ſtill more abſtract than Science, it has leſs of the reliſh of corrupted Nature in it. The Mind of Man is ſtrongly enough inclin'd to Study; but has no Inclination to piety at all. If then great Agitations will not give us leave to Study, though we Naturally find Pleaſure in it; how is it poſſible for Children, whoſe Thoughts are continually intent and buſied about ſenſible Pleaſures wherewith they are rewarded, and ſenſible Pains with which they are affrighted, to preſerve amongſt all theſe Avocations a Liberty of Mind to reliſh the things belonging to Religion?

The Capacity of the Mind is very ſtrait and limited, 'twill contain but a little furniture; and when once 'tis full, it has no farther room for any Novel Thought, unleſs it empties it ſelf firſt of the former to receive them. But when the Mind is filled with ſenſible things, it does not evacuate it ſelf at its Pleaſure.

In order to conceive this, it must be considered, that we are all inceſſantly carried towards Good by our Natural Inclinations; and that Pleaſure being the Character whereby we diſtinguiſh it from Evil, Pleaſure muſt unavoidably be more our concern and buſineſs than all things beſides. Pleaſure therefore being conjoyn'd to the uſe of Senſible things, becauſe they are the Goods of the Body of Man, there is a kind of neceſſity theſe Goods ſhould fill up the whole extent of our Mind, till *GOD* diffuſes ſome Bitterneſs upon them, which creates in us a diſlike and averſion, by giving us through his Grace a Senſation of thoſe Heavenly Delights, which extinguiſh all Earthly Enjoyments; *Dando menti Cœleſtem delectationem, quâ omnis terrena delectatio ſuperatur.*

S. Auguſt.

But becauſe we are as much inclin'd to fly Evil, as to love Good, and Pain is the Character which Nature has affix'd to Evil; all that has been ſaid of Pleaſure ought in a contrary ſenſe, to be underſtood of Pain.

Seeing therefore the things which make us ſenſible of Pleaſure and Pain, fill the capacity of the Mind; and 'tis not in our Power to quit them, and to be unconcern'd about them, when we would: 'tis plain that we cannot give Children a reliſh of Piety (no more than we can any other Men) unleſs we begin, according to the Precepts of the Goſpel, with a Deprivation of all thoſe things which affect the Senſes; and promote great Deſires and Fears. Since all the Paſſions obnubilate and extinguiſh Grace, and that internal Delectation which *GOD* makes us ſenſible of in our Duty.

The leaſt Children are inſtructed with Reaſon no leſs than perfect Men, though they want Experience. They have too the ſame Inclinations, though they are carried by them unto different Objects. They ſhould then be accuſtomed to follow the conduct of Reaſon, ſince they have it in them; and they ought to be excited to their Duty by a dexterous management of their good Inclinations. 'Tis the way to extinguiſh their Reaſon, and to debauch their beſt Inclinations, to hold them to their Duty by ſenſible Impreſſions. They ſeem to be in the performance of their Duty, but they are only ſo in ſhew and appearance: Vertue is not at the bottom of their Heart or Mind, their Moral or their Intellectual Part: They know Vertue very little, but they love it much leſs. Their Mind abounds with nothing but Fears and Deſires, with Averſions and ſenſible Fondneſſes, which they cannot get rid of, to come to the uſe of their Liberty and Exerciſe of their Reaſon. Thus Children who are Educated in that Diſ-ſpirited and ſlaviſh manner, grow hardened by degrees, and become inſenſible to all the Sentiments of an honeſt Man and a Chriſtian; which Inſenſibility cleaves to them all their days. And when they are in hopes of ſecuring themſelves from the Laſh, by their Authority, or their Management; they give themſelves up to every thing that flatters their *Concupiſcence* and their *Senſes*: becauſe indeed they know no other Goods than the Goods of the Senſes.

It is true, there are ſome particular Junctures, in which it is neceſſary to inſtruct Children by their Senſes; but this ought never to be done but where Reaſon is defective. They ought at firſt to be perſwaded by Reaſon, of what their Duty is; and if they have not Light enough to diſcover their Obligations to it, it ſeems beſt to let them alone for ſome time. For this would not be to inſtruct them, to force them upon an External Performance of what they do not conceive their Duty: Since 'tis the Mind muſt be their Inſtructor, and not the Body. But if they refuſe to do what Reaſon tells them they ought to do, they are no longer to be born with: But rather Severity ſhould be uſed to ſome exceſs. For in ſuch Conjunctures, *He that ſpares his Son* according to the Wiſe Man, *has a greater degree of hatred than of love for him.*

Qui parcit virgæ, odit filium ſuum. *Prov.* 13.24.

If Chaſtiſements be not inſtructive to the Mind, nor conducive to the love of Vertue; they inſtruct at leaſt the Body in ſome meaſure, and prevent their taſting Vice, and conſequently their becoming ſlaves to it. But that which is more eſpecially obſervable is, that Pains fill not the Capacities of the Mind as Pleaſures do. We eaſily ceaſe to think of them, when we no longer ſuffer them, and are out of the danger and fear of them. For then they importune not the Imagination; they excite not the Paſſions, nor provoke Concupiſcence. In fine, they leave the Mind at liberty to think of what it pleaſes; and thus we may diſcipline Children with them, to keep them in their Duty, or in the Appearance of it.

But though it be ſometimes uſeful to affright and puniſh Children with ſenſible Corrections; it ought not to be concluded, that they ſhould be allured by ſenſible Rewards. There ſhould no means be made uſe of, that any what forcibly affect the Senſes, but in a caſe of extreme neceſſity: Now there can be none of beſtowing Senſible Rewards upon them, and repreſenting theſe Rewards as the end of their Employment. This, on the contrary, would be the means of vitiating their beſt Actions, and inclining them rather to Senſuality than Vertue. The Traces of Pleaſures which they have once taſted, remain ſtrongly imprinted in their Imagination: they continually quicken and awaken the Ideas of ſenſible Goods: they conſtantly excite importunate Deſires, which diſturb the peace of the Mind. Laſtly, they provoke concupiſcence on all occaſions, which is the Leaven that corrupt the whole maſs. But this is not the place of explaining theſe things according to their Deſert.

The SECOND PART:
Concerning
The IMAGINATION.

CHAP. I.

I. *Of the Imagination of Women.* II. *Of the Imagination of Men.* III. *Of the Imagination of Old Men.*

WE have in the First Part, in some measure, explain'd the *Physical* Causes of the Disorders of Man's Imagination: we shall endeavour in this to make some Application of these Causes to the more General Errors of Imagination, and shall treat likewise of the Causes of those Errors, which may be call'd *Moral*.

It may be understood from what has been said in the fore-going Chapter, that the Delicacy of the Fibres of the Brain is one of the principal Causes, that disables us from bringing an Application sufficient for the Discovery of Truths, that lye any whit deep or conceal'd.

I. *Of the Imagination of Women.*

This Delicacy of the Fibres is more usually incident to Women; and this is the Principle of their so exact acquaintance with all things that strike upon their Senses. 'Tis the Woman's Province to determine concerning the Fashions, to judge of Language, to distinguish the genteel Mein, and the fine and Courtly Behaviour: They far out-do Men in the Science, Skill, and Dexterity about these things. All that depends upon the Taste falls under their Jurisdiction; but generally they are incapable of Penetrating into Truths, that have any Difficulty in the Discovery. All things of an abstracted Nature are Incomprehensible to them. They cannot imploy their Imagination in dis-entangling compound and perplex'd Questions. Their Consideration terminates on the surface and out-side of things; and their Imagination has neither strength nor reach enough to pierce to the bottom of them, and to make a Comparison of their parts, without Distraction. A Trifle or a Feather shall call them off, the smallest out-cry dismay them, and any little Motion gives them Imployment: In short, the *Mode* and not the *Reality* of things, is enough to take up the whole Capacity of their Mind; because the least Objects producing great Motions in the delicate Fibres of their Brain, by a necessary consequence excite such lively and great Sensations in their Souls, as wholly possess and take them up.

But though it be certain, that this Delicacy of the Fibres of the Brain is the principal Cause of all these Effects; yet it is not equally certain, that it is universally to be found in all Women. Or if it be to be found, yet their Animal Spirits are sometimes so exactly proportion'd to the Fibres of their Brain, that there are Women to be met with, who have a greater solidity of Mind than some Men. 'Tis in a certain Temperature of the Largeness and Agitation of the Animal Spirits, and Conformity with the Fibres of the Brain, that the strength of parts consists: and Women have sometimes that just Temperature. There are Women Strong and Constant, and there are Men that are Weak and Fickle. There are Women that are Learned, Courageous, and Capable of every thing. And on the contrary, there are Men that are Soft, Effeminate, incapable of any Penetration, or dispatch of any Business. In fine, when we attribute any Failures to a certain Sex, Age or Condition, they are only to be understood of the generality: it being ever suppos'd, there is no general Rule without Exception.

For it ought not to be imagin'd, that all Men, or all Women of the same Age, Country, or Family, have their Brain of the same Constitution. It is more pertinent to believe, that as there are not two Faces in the World, in every thing resembling one another; so there are not two Imaginations exactly alike; and that all Men, Women, and Children, differ from one another, only more or less, in the Delicacy of the Fibres of their Brain. For as we ought not too hastily to suppose an *Essential Identity* in those things between, which we see no *Difference*; so we ought not to make *Essential Differences*, where we cannot find perfect *Identity*. For these are the common Faults Men usually fall into.

That which may be said of the Fibres of the Brain is, that in Children they are very soft and extreamly tender; that with Age they harden and corroborate: Yet notwithstanding the Generality of Women, and some Men, have them extreamly delicate all their Lives. To determine any thing farther, we dare not. But this is enough to be said of Women and Children, they are not concern'd with searching after Truth and the Instruction of others;

others; ſo their Errors do not occaſion much Prejudice: ſince little credit is given to things by them advanc'd. Let us ſpeak of Men grown up; of ſuch as have their Mind in its Strength and Vigour; ſuch as may be thought capable of finding out Truth, and teaching it to others.

II. *Of the Imagination of Men in the Perfection of their Age.*

The ordinary Seaſon for the greateſt Perfection of the Mind, is from the Age of Thirty, to that of Fifty Years. The Fibres of the Brain in that Age have uſually attain'd a tolerable conſiſtence; the Pleaſures and Pains of the Senſes make hardly any more Impreſſion on them. So that a Man has no more to do, than to ward off violent Paſſions, which rarely happen; and from which a Man may ſcreen himſelf, if he diligently avoid all manner of occaſion: And thus the Soul meeting with no more Diverſion from things ſenſible, may with greater eaſe and leiſure, give her ſelf to the Contemplation of Truth.

A Man in this capacity, who had not his Mind fill'd with the Prejudices of Childhood; who from his Youth upwards had obtain'd a Facility for Meditation; who would only take up with the clear and diſtinct Notions of Intellect, and induſtriouſly reject all the confus'd Ideas of Senſe; and who had both Time and Inclination for Study: would doubtleſs very rarely fall into Error. But ſuch a Man as this is not the ſubject of our Diſcourſe: 'tis Men of the Vulgar ſtamp, who uſually have nothing of this in them.

I ſay then, that the Solidity and Conſiſtence accruing with Age to the Fibres of Mens Brains, gives the Solidity and Conſiſtence to their Errors, if I may ſo ſpeak. 'Tis the Seal that ſeals up their Prejudices, and all their falſe Opinions, and locks them from the Attempts and Force of Reaſon. In fine, by how much this Conſtitution of the Fibres of the Brain is advantagious to well Educated Perſons, by ſo much it is prejudicial to the greateſt part of Mankind; becauſe it confirms either them all in the Notions they have taken up.

But Men are not only confirmed and ſtrengthened in their Errors, when they have attained to the Age of forty or fifty Years. They are ſtill more liable to fall into new ones every day; for believing themſelves competent Judges of every thing, as indeed they ought to be, they peremptorily determine, yet only conſult their Prejudices to give a deciſion: for Men reaſon only upon things with relation to the Ideas they are moſt familiar with, and accuſtomed to. When a *Chymiſt* would reaſon about any *Phyſical* Body, immediately his three Principles are preſent to his Mind. A *Peripatetick* has recourſe forthwith in his Thoughts to his four Elements, and the four Primitive Qualities: and Another *Philoſopher* drives every thing up to other Principles. And ſo there can nothing enter into the Mind of a Man, but is inſtantly trigg'd with the Errors he is ſubject to, and augments their number.

This Conſiſtence of the Brain has beſides a very miſchievous Effect, eſpecially on more Aged ſort of People, which is, to incapacitate them for Thought and Meditation: They are unable to faſten their Attention upon any thing they have a Mind to know, and ſo are incapable of reaching to Truths that are any thing obſcure or intricate. They are utterly inſenſible to the moſt reaſonable Opinions, when founded upon principles that to them ſeem novell, though as to thoſe other concerns, that Age has given them Experience in, they are very underſtanding Men. But all that I here affirm is only to be underſtood of thoſe, who have ſpent their younger days without the due Uſe and Improvement of their Mind, and applying it as they ſhould do.

To Illuſtrate theſe things, 'tis neceſſary to know, that not any thing whatever can be learned without Advertency and Attention; and that 'tis impoſſible we ſhould be attentive to any thing, unleſs we *Imagine* it, and frame a lively Repreſentation of it in our Brain. But to the end we may Imagine any Objects, 'tis neceſſary we ſhould inflect ſome part of our Brain, or impreſs ſome other kind of Motion in it, that we may frame the Traces, whereunto are conſociated the Ideas, that repreſent theſe Objects to us: So that if the Fibres of our Brain were any whit hardned, they would be capable of no other Inflection or Motions, than thoſe they were formerly us'd to. And thus the Soul could form no Imagination of, nor conſequently be attentive to what ſhe pleaſes; but only to ſuch things as are cuſtomary and familiar to her.

Hence we ought to conclude, that 'tis of very great Advantage to uſe a Mans ſelf to Meditate upon all ſorts of Subjects, in order to acquire an Habitual Facility of Thinking on what he will. For as we acquire a great Readineſs at moving our Fingers all manners of ways, and with a prodigious Nimbleneſs, by the frequent Uſe we make of them in playing on a Muſical Inſtrument; ſo the Parts of our Brain, the Motion whereof is neceſſary to the Imagining what we pleaſe, attain by Uſe a certain Facility of Playing and Inflecting themſelves, which makes us imagine the things we have a Mind to, with a great deal of Eaſe, Readineſs, and Diſtinction.

Now the beſt means of procuring this Diſpoſition, which cauſeth the Principal Difference between a Man of Parts, and another; is to accuſtom a Mans ſelf from his Youth to the Diſquiſition of the Truth of things very abſtract and difficult: Becauſe in that Age the Fibres of the Brain are pliable and flexible all manner of ways.

I ſuppoſe not however, that this Facility can be acquired by thoſe we call Men of Books and Learning; who only apply themſelves to Reading, without Meditation, and without ſearching out the Reſolution of Queſtions themſelves, before they Read them in Authors. 'Tis palpable

palpable enough, that hereby they only acquire a facility of Remembring what they have read. 'Tis daily obſerved, that Men of much Reading, are unable to bring Advertency or Attention to things that are new to them, and unheard of; and that the Vanity of their Learning, inclining them to form a Judgement of them, before they conceive them, makes them fall into groſs Errors, to which other Men are not obnoxious.

But tho' the want of Advertency is the main Cauſe of their Errors, there is one ſtill that is peculiar to them; which is, that finding ever in their Memory abundance of confus'd Notions, they preſently ſelect ſome one of them, and conſider it as the ſubject of the Queſtion: And becauſe the things a Man ſpeaks, are not conformable to it; they ridiculouſly conclude he is in an Error. Should you endeavour to repreſent to them, that they are deceiv'd themſelves, and that they underſtand not ſo much as the ſtate of the Queſtion; they fall into a Paſſion, and not being able to conceive what is ſaid to them, they perſiſt to embrace that falſe Notion their Memory has ſuggeſted. But ſhould the falſity of it be made too manifeſtly apparent, they ſubſtitute a ſecond, and a third in its room, which they defend ſometimes againſt all appearances of Truth, and even againſt their own Conſcience: as having but little Reſpect or Love for Truth, but a great deal of Shame and Confuſion in acknowledging, there are things another knows better than themſelves.

III. *Concerning the Imagination of Old Men.*

All that has been ſaid concerning Men of forty or fifty Years old, ought with greater allowance to be underſtood of Aged Men: becauſe the Fibres of their Brain being ſtill more inflexible, and wanting Animal Spirits to imprint new Traces in it; their Imagination is altogether faint and languid.

And whereas generally the Fibres of their Brain are loaded with abundance of ſuperfluous Humours, they loſe by degrees the Memory of things paſt, and return to the weakneſſes uſually incident to Childhood. Thus in this Decrepid Age, they have the Defects which depend on the Conſtitution of the Fibres of the Brain, which are found both in Children and in grown Men. Though it may be ſaid they have more Prudence than either of them, becauſe they are leſs ſubject to their Paſſions, which proceed from the Commotion of the Animal Spirits.

I ſhall not explain theſe things more at large, becauſe it is eaſy to judge of *this Age*, by the others before treated of; and to conclude that Old Men have more difficulty than others at conceiving what is ſaid to them; that they are more zealouſly devoted to their Prejudices and Ancient Opinions; and conſequently are more confirm'd and ſtrengthened in their Errors, in their corrupt Habits, and other things of like Nature. 'Tis only to be advertis'd, that the ſtate of Old Age is not preciſely determined to ſixty or ſeventy Years; that all Old Men are not Dotards; and that thoſe who have paſs'd the ſixtieth Year, are not always delivered from the Paſſions of Youth; and that we ought not to draw too general Conſequences from the Principles eſtabliſh'd.

CHAP. II.

That the Animal Spirits generally run in the Tracks of Idea's that are moſt familiar to us, which is the Reaſon of our prepoſterous Judgements.

I HAVE, I think, explain'd in the fore-going Chapters, the various Changes happening in the Animal Spirits, and in the Conſtitution of the Fibres of the Brain, according to different Ages: Wherefore ſuppoſing a Man to have meditated a little upon what has been ſaid upon that Subject, he muſt neceſſarily have a diſtinct Knowledge enough of the Imagination, and of the moſt common Natural Cauſes of the differences obſervable between the Minds of Men; ſince all the Changes happening in the Imagination and the Mind, are only the Conſequences of thoſe which are to be found in the Animal Spirits, and the Fibres that compoſe the Brain.

But there are many particular, and ſuch as we may call *Moral Cauſes* of the Changes which happen in the Imagination of Men: namely their different Conditions, their various Imployments; and in a word, their ſeveral ways of Living: which deſerve to be attentively conſider'd; becauſe theſe ſorts of Changes are the Cauſes of a numberleſs multitude of Errors, every Man judging of things with reference to his own Condition: We think it not ſo much our Buſineſs to ſtand to explain the Effects of ſome leſs cuſtomary Cauſes, ſuch as great diſeaſes, as ſurprizing Misfortunes, and other unexpected Accidents, which make very violent Impreſſions in the Brain, and which ſometimes totally ſubvert it; Becauſe theſe things are of very rare occurrence; and beſides, the Errors ſuch ſorts of Perſons fall into, are too groſs to be contagious, ſince they are palpable and diſcernable to all Mankind.

But that we may perfectly comprehend all the Changes the different conditions and ſtates of Life produce in the Imagination; 'tis abſolutely neceſſary to be call'd to Mind, that our

Imagining Objects is only the framing Images thereof to our ſelves; and that theſe Images are nothing but the Traces delineated by the Animal Spirits in the Brain; that we Imagine things ſo much ſtronglier as theſe Traces are more deep and better cut, and as the Animal Spirits more frequently and violently paſs through them; that theſe Spirits, by their frequent courſe, ſo plain and open the paſſage, as to enter the ſame Tracks with greater readineſs than any other neighbouring parts, through which they either have not paſs'd, or not ſo frequently. This is the moſt ordinary Cauſe of the confuſion and falſity of our Idea's. For the Animal Spirits which were directed by the Action of External Objects, or even by the orders of the Soul to the production of certain Traces, frequently produce others, which indeed have ſome reſemblance with them, but are not altogether the Traces of theſe ſame Objects, nor thoſe the Soul deſir'd to repreſent; becauſe the Animal Spirits finding ſome Reſiſtance in the parts of the Brain through which they ought to paſs, are eaſily diverted to throng into the deep Traces of Idea's which are moſt familiar to us. Here are ſome very groſs and ſenſible Inſtances of theſe things.

When thoſe who are not extraordinary ſhort-ſighted behold the Moon, they ſee in her two Eyes, a Noſe, and a Mouth; in a word, it looks to them as if they ſaw a Face, though there be nothing in her of what they fancy they perceive. Many Perſons ſee in her quite another thing. And thoſe who believe the Moon to be ſuch as ſhe appears, would quickly be undeceiv'd, did they but behold her with *Teleſcopes*, though of a moderate ſize; or did they only conſult the Deſcriptions *Hevelius*, *Riccioli*, and others have made publick. Now the Reaſon why a Man uſually ſees a Face in the Moon, and not thoſe irregular Blotches that are in her, is becauſe the Traces of a Face, which are imprinted in the Brain, are very deep, for that we frequently look on Faces, and with great Attention. So that the Animal Spirits meeting with oppoſition in the other parts of the Brain, eaſily ſwerve from the Direction the Light of the Moon impreſſes on them, when a Man beholds her; to accommodate themſelves to the Tracts whereunto Nature has affix'd the Idea's of a Face. Beſides that the apparent Magnitude of the Moon differing not much from a common head at a certain Diſtance; She by her Impreſſion forms ſuch Traces, as have ſome Connection with thoſe which repreſent a Noſe, a Mouth, and Eyes; and ſo ſhe determines the Spirits to take their courſe in the Traces of a Face. There are ſome who diſcern in the Moon a Man on Horſe-back, or ſomething elſe than a Face, becauſe their Imagination having been briskly ſmitten with ſome particular Objects, the Traces of theſe Objects open at any thing that bears the leaſt Analogy to them.

'Tis upon the ſame grounds we Imagine we ſee *Chariots*, *Men*, *Lions*, and other *Animals* in the Clouds, when there is any little reſemblance between their Figures and theſe Animals; and all Men, eſpecially thoſe who are us'd to Deſigning, ſee ſometimes Heads of Men on Walls, whereon there are many irregular ſtains.

'Tis for the ſame Reaſon ſtill that the Spirits of Wine, entring without any Direction of the Will into the moſt familiar Traces, make Men betray their Secrets of the greateſt concernment; and that when a Man ſleeps he uſually dreams of Objects he has ſeen in the Day-time, which have form'd very great Traces in the Brain: becauſe the Soul is ever repreſenting thoſe things, whereof ſhe has the greateſt and deepeſt Traces. But ſee other Examples of a more complex kind.

A Diſtemper is new: and it makes ſuch havock and deſtruction, as amazes all Men. This imprints Traces ſo deep in the Brain, that this Diſeaſe is never abſent from the Mind. If this Diſeaſe be call'd, for inſtance, the *Scurvy*; all Diſeaſes muſt preſently be call'd *Scurvy*: the *Scurvy* is new, therefore all new Diſtempers are the *Scurvy*: The *Scurvy* is accompany'd with a dozen Symptoms, whereof many are common to other Diſtempers, that matters not: If a ſick Perſon fortunes to have any one of the Symptoms, he muſt needs be ſick of the *Scurvy*; and other Diſtempers are never ſuſpected, or thought of, that have the ſame Symptoms. 'Tis expected that all the Accidents which befall thoſe that have been ſick of the *Scurvy*, muſt befal him too: The ſame Medicines therefore are preſcrib'd him, and 'tis matter of amazement, to find they have not the ſame Effect, as they have been known to have had in others.

An Author applies himſelf to one kind of Study; the Traces of the Subject he's imploy'd about, are ſo deeply imprinted, and make ſuch lively Radiations through the Brain, as to confound and efface ſometimes the Traces of things of a quite different kind. There has been a Man, for inſtance, that has wrote many bulky Volumes on the *Croſs*; this made him diſcover a *Croſs* in every thing he look'd upon; and 'tis with Reaſon, that *Father Morinus* handſomly rallies him, for thinking a Medal repreſented a Croſs, though it repreſented quite another thing. 'Twas by ſuch another unlucky turn of Imagination *Gilbertus* and many others, after having ſtudied the *Loadſtone*, and admir'd its properties, muſt needs reduce to theſe Magnetick Qualities abundance of Natural Effects, that had no Relation to them in the World.

The Inſtances I have here alledg'd, ſuffice to prove that the great facility of the Imagination's repreſenting Objects that are familiar to it, and the difficulty it finds in Imagining thoſe that are Novel, is the Reaſon of Mens forming almoſt ever ſuch Idea's as may be ſtyl'd mix'd and impure;

impure; and of the Mind's judging of things only with Relation to it self, and its former Thoughts. And thus the different Passions of Men, their Inclinations, Conditions, Imployments, Qualities, Studies, finally all their different Ways and Scopes of Life, putting very considerable Differences in their Idea's, occasion them to fall into innumerable Errors, which we shall explain in the following Discourse: Which was the reason of My Lord *Bacon's* speaking this most judicious Sentence: *Omnes perceptiones tam sensus quam mentis sunt ex analogia hominis, non ex analogia universi. Estque Intellectus humanus instar speculi inæqualis, ad radios rerum qui suam Naturam naturæ rerum immittit, eamq; distorquet, & inficit.*

CHAP. III.

Of the Mutual Connection between the Idea's and the Traces of the Brain; and of the Mutual Connection there is between Traces and Traces, Idea's and Idea's.

AMONG the Whole Mass of Material Beings, there is nothing more worthy of the Contemplation of Men, than the Contexture of their own *Body*, and the Correspondence found between the Parts that compose it. And among all things Spiritual, there is nothing, the Knowledge whereof is more necessary, than that of their Soul, and of all the Relations she is *indispensably* under to *GOD*, and *Naturally* to the Body.

'Tis not enough to have a confus'd Knowledge or Sensation, that the Traces of the Brain are mutually connected to each other, and that they are pursued by the Motion of the Animal Spirits; that the Traces when excited in the Brain, excite the Idea's in the Understanding, and that the Motions that arise in the Animal Spirits, raise the Passions in the Will. We ought, as far as is possible, to have a distinct Knowledge of the *Cause* of all these different Connections; but especially of the *Effects* they are capable of producing.

We ought to know the *Cause* thereof, in as much as it is necessary to know our Guide and Conductor, who alone is capable of acting in us, and of rendring us happy or miserable; and we ought to know the *Effects* of them, it being necessary to know our selves as much as possible, and other Men with whom we are oblig'd to live. So should we know the means both of conducting our selves to, and preserving our selves in, the most happy and perfect State we are capable of attaining, by the order of Nature, and the Precepts of the Gospel: and so should we be able to frame our Lives sociably with Men, by exactly knowing the Means of making use of them in our Exigencies, and assisting them in their Miseries.

I pretend not to Explain in this Chapter a subject so vast and comprehensive: nor have I that Opinion of my self, as to think I should throughly do it in this whole Work. There are many things I am still ignorant of, and despair of ever knowing well: and there are others which I presume I know, but am unable to explicate. For there is no Mind so little and so narrow, but may by Meditation discover more Truths, than can be deduc'd at length by the most Eloquent Man in the World.

I. *Of the Union of the Soul and Body.*

We are not to imagine with a great part of the Philosophers, that the Mind becomes Body when united to the Body, and that the Body becomes Mind when united to the Mind. The Soul is not expanded through all the parts of the Body, in order to give Life and Motion to it, as the Imagination represents: nor does the Body become capable of Sensation by its Union with the Mind, as our treacherous and abusive Senses would seem to perswade us. Either Substance preserves its own particular Being, and as the Soul is incapable of Extension and Motions; so the Body is incapable of Thought and Inclinations. All the Affinity that we know between the Body and Mind, consists in the Natural and Mutual correspondence of the Thoughts of the Soul, with the Traces of the Brain; and of the Emotions of the Soul, with the Motions of the Animal Spirits.

When the Soul receives some new Idea's, some new Traces are imprinted on the Brain; and when Objects produce new Traces, the Soul receives new Idea's. Which is not said, as if the Soul consider'd these Traces, since she has no knowledge of them; or, as if these Traces included these Idea's, since there is no Analogy between them: or lastly, as if she receiv'd her Idea's from these Traces; for 'tis inconceivable, as shall be explain'd hereafter, how the Mind should receive any thing from the Body, and become more enlightned than she is, by turning towards it, as the Philosophers pretend, who would have the Soul's Perception of all things to be caus'd *Per conversionem ad phantasmata*, by the Conversion to the Phantasms, or Traces of the Brain.

Thus when the Soul wills the moving of her Arm, the Arm is mov'd, though she not so much as knows what ought to be done to the moving it: and when the Animal Spirits are agitated, the Soul finds a Commotion in her self, though she is ignorant whether there be any such thing as Animal Spirits in her Body.

In treating of the Paſſions, I ſhall ſpeak of the Connection there is between the Traces of the Brain, and the Motions of the Spirits; and of that which is between the Idea's, and the Emotions of the Soul: for all the Paſſions have their Dependance thereon. I am to Diſcourſe at preſent only of the Connection between Traces and Idea's, and the Connection Traces have with one another.

Three Cauſes of the Connection of Traces with Idea's.

There are three very conſiderable Cauſes of the Connection of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain. The firſt and moſt general, is the *Identity* of time: for our having had certain thoughts at the inſtant of our having certain new Traces in the Brain, is oftentimes ſufficient for our having a freſh the ſame thoughts, as often as theſe Traces are re-produc'd in our Brain. If the Idea of *GOD* has been offer'd to my Mind, at the ſame time my Brain receiv'd an Impreſſion from the ſight of theſe three Letters *J a h*, or from the ſound of the ſame word, 'tis enough that the Traces produc'd by the ſound or ſight of theſe Characters be re-printed, to cauſe me to think on *GOD*; nor can I think of *GOD*, but ſome confus'd Traces of the Characters or ſounds, that the thoughts I had of *GOD* were attended with, will be re-produc'd in my Brain: For the Brain being never empty of Traces, there are conſtantly ſuch as are ſomewhat related to what we think of, though theſe Traces are frequently very imperfect and confus'd.

The ſecond Cauſe of the Connection between Idea's and Traces, and which ever ſuppoſes the former, is the Will of Men. This Will is neceſſary to the Intent this Connection of Idea's with the Traces, may be regulated and accommodated to uſe. For were not Men naturally inclin'd to a mutual Agreement about affixing their Idea's to ſenſible Signs; this Connection of Idea's would not be only abſolutely uſeleſs to ſociety, but would moreover be very irregular, and extreamly imperfect.

And that, firſt becauſe Idea's have never any ſtrong Connection with the Traces, except when the Spirits being agitated and fermented, make the Traces deep and permanent. So that, ſince the Spirits are only agitated by the Paſſions, had Men no paſſion for communicating their own thoughts and participating thoſe of others, it is plain that the exact Connection of their Idea's to particular Traces, would be very weak; ſince they would never uſe themſelves to thoſe exact and regular Connections, were it not to become intelligible one to another.

Secondly, the repeated concurrence of the ſame Idea's with the ſame Traces, being neceſſary to make ſo ſtrong a Connection, as may be durable and laſting; (ſince a firſt meeting, unleſs attended with a violent Motion of the Animal Spirits, cannot confederate them ſo ſtrongly as is requiſite,) it is manifeſt, that ſhould not Men contrive to agree, it would be the greateſt chance in the World, for the ſame Traces and the ſame Idea's to meet a ſecond time. Thus the Will of Men is neceſſary to regulate the Connection and Alliance of the ſame Traces with the ſame Idea's: though this Will of Agreeing is not ſo much the reſult of their Choice and Reaſon, as an Impreſſion of the Author of Nature, who has diſpos'd and made us all for the Benefit of each other, and given us a ſtrong Inclination to unite in Mind, as much as we are united in our Bodies.

The third Cauſe of the Connection of Idea's with the Traces, is the Nature, or the conſtant and immutable Will of the Creator. There is, for inſtance, a Natural Connection, and independent on our Will, between the Traces produc'd by a Tree or a Mountain which we ſee, and the Idea's of a Tree or a Mountain: between the *Traces* produc'd in our Brain by the cry of a Man or an Animal ſuffering Pains, and thoſe Plaints we hear: between the Mein of a Man's Countenance that threatens or fears us, and the *Idea's* of Pains, Strength, Weakneſs, and alſo the *Senſations* of Pity, Fear, and Courage, which are occaſion'd in our ſelves.

Theſe Natural Connections are of all others the ſtrongeſt; they are generally alike in all Mankind: and they are abſolutely neceſſary to the Preſervation of Life. And this is the Reaſon they have no dependance on our Will. For if the Connection of Idea's with *Sounds* and certain *Characters*, is weak and very different in different Countries; 'tis becauſe it depends on the weak and changeable Will of Men. And the Reaſon why it depends thereon, is becauſe this Connection is not abſolutely neceſſary to their Living; but only to their Living as Men; who ought to form themſelves into Civil and Rational Societies.

It is here very obſervable, that the Connection of Idea's, which repreſent things Spiritual diſtinct from us with the Traces of our Brain, is not Natural, nor poſſible to be ſo: And conſequently that it is or may be different in all Men; ſince it has no other cauſe than their own Will, and the *Identity* of time; whereof I have ſpoken before. On the contrary, the Connection of Idea's of all things material with certain particular Traces, is Natural; and conſequently there are particular Traces which excite the ſame Idea in all Mankind. It cannot be doubted, for inſtance, but all Men have the Idea of a Square upon ſight of a Square, becauſe that Connection is Natural: but it may be very well doubted whether all Men have the Idea of a Square, when they hear the word Square pronounc'd; becauſe that Connection is altogether arbitrary. We ought to think the ſame thing of all thoſe Traces that are connected with the Ideas of things of a Spiritual kind.

But becauſe the Traces which have a Natural Connection with Idea's, give the Mind concern and application, and conſequently render it attentive; the generality of Men are very

ready

ready at comprehending and retaining ſenſible and palpable Truths: that is to ſay, the Relations, which Bodies have to one another. And on the other hand, becauſe the Traces, which have no other Connection with Idea's, than that which the Will has effected between them, ſtrike not vigorouſly on the Mind; all Men in general find it very difficult to comprehend, and harder yet to retain abſtracted Truths; that is to ſay, the Relations which are between things which come not within the Verge of Imagination. But when theſe Relations are any whit compounded, they ſeem abſolutely incomprehenſible; eſpecially to thoſe who are not us'd to them: becauſe they have not ſtrengthened the Connection between theſe abſtract Idea's and their Traces, by a perpetual Meditation. And though others have perfectly comprehended them, they forget them again in a little time; becauſe the Connection is hardly ever ſo ſtrong, as the Natural.

'Tis ſo true, that all the difficulty Men have to comprehend and retain things Spiritual, and Abſtract, proceeds from the difficulty they find to corroborate the Connection of their Idea's with the Traces of the Brain; that when they find the means of Explaining by material *Relations*, thoſe that are between things Spiritual, they make them eaſily underſtood; imprinting them in ſuch manner on the Mind, as not only to be ſtrongly convinc'd of them, but alſo to retain them without any trouble. The general Idea we have given of the Mind in the firſt Chapter of this Work, is perhaps a ſufficient Proof of what I ſay.

On the contrary, when the Relations that are between material things are ſo expreſt, that there is no neceſſary Connection between the Idea's of theſe things, and the Traces of their Expreſſions; they are difficultly comprehended, and eaſily forgotten.

Thoſe, for inſtance, who enter upon the Study of *Algebra*, or *Analyticks*, are incapable of taking *Algebraick* Demonſtrations without a great deal of pains; and when they have once maſter'd them, they retain them but a ſhort time: becauſe *Squares*, (for example) *Parallelograms*, *Cubes*, *Solids*, and the like, being expreſt by *aa*, *ab*, *a3*, *abc*, *&c.* the Traces whereof have no Natural Connection with their Idea's; the Mind finds no hold to faſten the Idea's to, and to examine the Relations of them by.

But thoſe who begin to Study *Common Geography*, moſt clearly and readily conceive the little Demonſtrations that are explain'd to them; provided they diſtinctly underſtand the Terms made uſe of: Becauſe the Idea's of a *Square*, a *Circle*, or the like, are naturally connected with the Traces of the figures they ſee deſcrib'd before their Eyes. And it often happens, that the meer ſhewing of the figure uſed in the Demonſtration, makes them ſooner comprehend it, than the Diſcourſes made to explain it. Becauſe words being connected to Idea's by an arbitrary inſtitution only, excite not theſe Idea's readily and diſtinctly enough, to make us eaſily underſtand their Relations. For 'tis chiefly upon that account, there is ſo much difficulty found in learning the Sciences.

By the way, it may be diſcover'd from what I have been ſaying, that thoſe Writers who coyn abundance of new Words and Figures, to explain their Notions by, ſpend much pains to very little purpoſe. They think to make themſelves intelligible, when indeed they take the way of becoming incomprehenſible. We define, ſay they, all our Terms, and all our Characters, and others ought to agree to them. It is true, others agree to them with their *Will*, but their *Nature* is repugnant. They cannot faſten their Idea's to theſe Novel Terms; becauſe to that is required cuſtom and long practice. The Authors perhaps have attain'd that cuſtom, but the Readers have not: And when a Man endeavours to inſtruct the Mind, 'tis neceſſary he firſt know it; ſince he ought to comform to Nature, and offer her nothing provoking or offenſive.

Yet we ought not to condemn the Induſtry and Care *Mathematicians* take in defining their Terms; for Definition is evidently neceſſary to take away Equivocation. But the ordinary and receiv'd Terms ought to be imploy'd as far as poſſibly they can; or where-ever the common ſignification is not very remote from that which they pretend to introduce; which is a thing not conſtantly obſerv'd among the *Mathematicians*.

Nor do we pretend by what has been ſaid, to condemn *Algebra*; eſpecially ſuch as *Mr. Des-Cartes* has reſtor'd, and left it to us. For though the novelty of ſome Expreſſions in that Science, give the Mind ſome trouble at firſt; yet there is ſo little variety and confuſion in theſe Expreſſions; and the Aſſiſtances the Mind receives from them ſo much out-weigh the Difficulty found in them, that I am of Opinion 'tis impoſſible for a Man to invent a way of Reaſoning and Expreſſing his Reaſonings, more ſuited or better accommodated to the Nature of the Mind, or that can carry it farther in the Diſcovery of unknown Truths. The Expreſſions of that Science do not parcel out and diſtract the Capacity of the Mind; they burden not the Memory; they contract and abridge in a wonderful manner all our Idea's and our Reaſonings, and even render them in ſome meaſure ſenſible by Practice. In fine, their uſefulneſs is much greater than the Natural Expreſſions of the delineated Figures of *Triangles*, *Squares*, and others of like Nature; which are inſerviceable to the Diſquiſition and Unfolding of Truths any whit intricate and obſcure. But ſo much for the Connection of Idea's with the Traces of the Brain. 'Tis ſeaſonable to ſay ſomething of the Connection of Traces with one another, and conſequently of the Connection between the Idea's correſponding to theſe Traces.

II. *Of the Mutual Connection of the Traces.*

This Connection consists in this, that the Traces of the Brain are so firmly connected to one another, as 'tis impossible to excite them again, without the whole retinue which were imprinted at the same time. If a Man, for instance, happens to be in some publick Solemnity, in case he observes all the Circumstances, and all the Principal Persons that assisted at it, the time, the place, the day, and all other Particularities; the remembrance only of the place, or some other less observable Circumstance of the Ceremony, will be sufficient to bring the Representation of all the other to his Mind. 'Tis upon this account that when we can't recollect the Principal Name of a thing, we sufficiently specify it by making use of a Name, which signifies some Circumstance of that thing; as not being able to call to Mind the proper Name of a Church, we can make use of another Name, signifying a thing that has some Relation to it. We can say, 'Tis that Church where there was such a throng; where Mr. such a one Preach'd; where we went on Sunday. And thus not having the proper Name of a Person ready at hand, or when 'tis more convenient to denote him in another manner, we can do it by saying, He whose Face was disfigur'd by the Small-pox; the Portly and well-made Gentleman; the little crooked Man, according as we stand affected towards him; though to express a Man in terms of contempt, is neither a sign of good Nature nor good Manners.

Now the mutual Connection of these Traces, and consequently of their Idea's one with another, is not only the foundation of all the Figures of *Rhetorick*, but also of infinite other things of greatest concernment in *Morality*, and *Politicks*, and in all Sciences in general, which are any ways related to Man; and consequently of many things we shall treat of in the sequel of our Discourse.

The cause of the Connection of many Traces together, is the *Identity* of time, wherein they were imprinted on the Brain. For 'tis enough for many Traces to have been produc'd at the same time, to cause that they should never afterwards be excited, but in company of one another: because the Animal Spirits, finding the channel of these co-temporary Traces gaping and half open, continue their courses in them, by reason of their meeting with a more free passage through them, than through the other parts of the Brain. This is the cause of Memory, and the Corporeal Habits which are common to us with Beasts.

The Connections of the Traces are not always conjoyn'd with the Emotions of the Spirits, because all the things we see do not always appear either good or evil: These Connections too may change or break, because being not of perpetual necessity for the preservation of Life, there is no need they should always be the same.

But there are certain Traces in our Brain which have a Natural Connection with one another; as also with certain Commotions of the Spirits: that being necessary to the Preservation of Life. And this Connection can't be broken, at least not easily, because 'tis convenient it should always be the same. For instance, the Trace of a great precipice, which a Man sees under him, and from which there is danger of falling, or the traces of some bulky body imminent over his Head, and ready to fall and crush him, is naturally connected with that which represents Death, and with a Commotion of the Spirits, which disposes him to flight or the desire of flying it. This Connection admits no alteration, because 'tis necessary it should always be the same; and it consists in a disposition of the Fibres of the Brain, which we bring with us into the World.

All the Connections which are not Natural, may and ought to break; because the different Circumstances of times and places ought to change, to the end they may be useful to the Preservation of Life. 'Tis convenient the Partridge, for instance, should fly the Sports-man with his Gun, at the seasons and the places of his pursuing the Game. But there's no necessity it should fly him in other places, or at other times: Thus 'tis necessary all Animals for their Preservation should have certain Connections of Traces easily made, and easily broken; and that they should have others very difficult to be sever'd, and lastly others incapable of Dissolution.

'Tis of very great use, to make diligent enquiry into the different Effects these different Connections are able to produce: For there are Effects, as they are very numerous, so they are no less important to the Knowledge of Man, and all things relating to him. We shall see hereafter, that these things are the principal Causes of our Errors. But 'tis time to return to the Subject we have promis'd to Discourse on, and to explain the different Changes which happen to the Imagination of Men, by reason of their different ways and purposes of Life.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

I. *That Men of Learning are the most subject to Error.* II. *The Causes why Men had rather be guided by Authority, than make use of their own Reason.*

THE Differences observable in Men, as to their Ways and Purposes of Life, are almost infinite. Their different Conditions, different Imployments, different Posts and Offices, and different Communities are innumerable. These Differences are the Reason of Men's acting upon quite different Designs, and Reasoning upon different Principles. Even in the same Community, wherein there should be but one Character of Mind, and all the same Designs; you shall rarely meet with several Persons, whose Aims and Views are not different. Their various Employments, and their many Adhesions, necessarily diversify the Method and Manner they would take to accomplish those very things wherein they agree. Whereby 'tis manifest that it would be an impossible Undertaking, to go about to explain in particular the *Moral* Causes of Error: nor would it turn to any great Account should we do it in this place. I design therefore only to speak of those Ways of Living, that lead us into great multitudes of Errors, and Errors of most dangerous Importance. When these shall be explain'd, we shall have open'd the way for the Mind to proceed farther: and every one may discover at a single View, and with the greatest ease imaginable, the most hidden Causes of many particular Errors, the Explication whereof would cost a world of Pains and Trouble. When once the Mind sees clearly, it delights to run to Truth; and it runs to it with an inexpressible swiftness.

I. *Men of Learning are the most subject to Error.*

The Imployment that seems most necessary to be treated of at present, by Reason of its producing most considerable Changes in the Imagination of Men, and its conducting them into Error most, is that of Men of Books and Learning, who make greater use of their Memory, than Thought. For Experience has ever manifested, that those who are the most hot and zealous in the Reading of Books, and in the *Search of Truth*, are the Men that lead us into infinite Errors.

'Tis much the same with those that Study, as with those that Travel. When a Traveller has unfortunately mistaken his way, the farther he goes, at the greater distance he is from his Journey's end; and he still deviates so much more, as he is industrious and in haste to arrive at the place design'd. So the vehement pursuits Men make after Truth cause them to betake themselves to the Reading of Books, wherein they think to find it; or put them upon framing some Phantastical *System* of the things they desire to know; wherewith when their Heads are full and heated, they try by some fruitless sallies and attempts of Thought to recommend them to the taste of others, with hopes to receive the Honours, that are usually pay'd to the first Founders of *Systems*. These two Imperfections are now to be consider'd.

II. *The Causes why Men had rather be guided by Authority, than make use of their own Reason.*

'Tis not easy to be understood how it comes to pass, that Men of Wit and Parts choose rather to trust to the Conduct of other Men's Understanding in the *Search of Truth*, than to their own, which GOD has given them. There is doubtless infinitely more Pleasure as well as Honour, to be conducted by a Man's own Eyes, than those of others. And a Man who has good Eyes in his Head, will never think of shutting them, or plucking them out, under the hopes of having a Guide. And yet the use of the Understanding is to the use of the Eyes, as the Understanding is to the Eyes; and as the Understanding is infinitely superior to the Eyes, so the use of the Understanding is accompany'd with more solid Satisfactions, and gives another sort of Content, than Light and Colours give the Sight. Notwithstanding Men employ their Eyes in Guiding and Conducting themselves, but rarely make use of their Reason in Discovery of Truth.

But there are many Causes which contribute to this overthrow of Reason. First, Men's Natural Carelessness and Oscitation, that will not let them be at the Pains of Thinking.

Secondly, their Incapacity to Meditate, which they have contracted, for want of applying themselves to it from their Youth; as has been explain'd in the Ninth Chapter.

Thirdly, the inconcernedness and little Love they have for Abstract Truths, which are the Foundation of all that can be known in this World.

The Fourth Reason is the Satisfaction which accrues from the knowledge of Probabilities, which are very agreeable, and extreamly moving, as being founded upon sensible Notions.

The Fifth Cause is that ridiculous Vanity, which makes us affect the seeming Learned. For those go by the Name of Learned, who have read most Books: The Knowledge of Opinions is of greater use in Conversation, and serves better to catch the Admiration of the Vulgar, than the Knowledge of True *Philosophy*, which is learned by Meditation.

In the sixth place, we may reckon that unreasonable Fancy, which supposes the Ancients were more enlightned, than we can be; and that there is nothing left for us but what they have succeeded in.

II. *The Causes why Men had rather be guided by Authority, than make use of their own Reason.*

The Seventh is a Diſ-ingenuous Reſpect mix'd with an abſurd Curioſity, which makes Men admire things that are moſt Remote and Ancient, ſuch as are far-fetcht, or come from Unknown Countries, as alſo Books that are moſt Myſterious and Obſcure. Thus *Heraclitus*'s Repute heretofore was owing to his Obſcurity. Men are very inquiſitive after Ancient Medals, though corroded with ruſt: and the Shoe or Slipper of one of the Ancients is reſpectfully preſerv'd, though eaten up with Worms: their Antiquity makes them Venerable. There are ſome Men who apply themſelves to the Reading the *Rabbins*, becauſe they wrote in an outlandiſh, very corrupt, and obſcure Language. Ancient Opinions are in greater eſteem, for being more remote from us. And doubtleſs if *Nimrod* had written the Hiſtory of his Reign, all the moſt refin'd *Politicks*, and even all the other Sciences, had been found contain'd in't; juſt as ſome have been able to diſcover in *Homer* and *Virgil*, the perfect Knowledge of Nature. Deference, ſay they, is due to Antiquity: How could *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, *Epicurus*, thoſe Grand Sages be miſtaken? They do not conſider, that *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, and *Epicurus*, were Men like us, and of the *Species* with us; and moreover that the World ſince their Time, is grown more than two thouſand Years older; that it has gain'd greater Experience, and ought to be more enlightned; and that 'tis the Age and Experience of the World, that makes the Diſcovery of Truth.

Clarus ob obſcuram ſtoguam. Lucretius.

Veritas filia temporis, non auctoritatis.

The Eighth Reaſon is, that when a New Opinion or a Modern Author is in Vogue, our own Glory ſeems to be obſcur'd, by being too near him: But we are under no ſuch Apprehenſions from the Honour that is given to the Ancients.

The Ninth is, that Truth and Novelty are inconſiſtent in matters of Faith. For when Men will not diſtinguiſh between Truths which depend on Reaſon, and thoſe which rely upon Tradition, they don't conſider that they ought to be learn't in a very differens manner. They confound Novelty with Error, and Antiquity with Truth. *Luther* and *Calvin*, and others, ſay they, have Innovated and Err'd; therefore *Galilæus*, *Harvey*, and *Des Cartes*, in what they have advanc'd as new, are deceiv'd. *Luther*'s *Conſubſtantiation* is novell, and is falſe; therefore *Harvey*'s *Circulation* of the Blood is falſe, becauſe 'tis new; and for this Reaſon they indiſcriminately give the odious Title of *Innovators*, to *Heretick*s and New *Philoſophers*. The Idea's and Terms of *Truth* and *Antiquity*, *Falſhood* and *Novelty*, have been connected one with another: And this is the Effect of it; the Vulgar part of Men no longer ſeparate them; and Men of Senſe find ſome difficulty to ſeparate them, as they ſhould do.

The Tenth is, that we live in an Age wherein the Science of Ancient Opinions is ſtill in great Repute: And 'tis only thoſe few who can take the Liberty of Thinking, that are able by the force of their Reaſon, to ſet themſelves above corrupt and evil cuſtoms. When a Man is in a preſs and a throng, 'tis a hard matter not to follow the torrent.

Laſtly, becauſe Men are acted only by Intereſt; which is the Reaſon that thoſe themſelves who find out the Abuſe, and diſcover the Vanity of theſe ſorts of Studies, ſtick cloſe to them ſtill. Becauſe Honours, Preferments and Benefices, are entail'd to them; and thoſe who are Eminent herein, have a greater ſhare of them, than thoſe that are ignorant of them.

All theſe Reaſons would make it, one would think, eaſy to be conceiv'd, why Men implicitly follow the Ancient Opinions, as true; and reject the New ones univerſally, as falſe; finally, why they make no uſe, or very little of their Reaſon. Undoubtedly there are abundance of other more particular Reaſons, that contribute to it; but if theſe we have brought be attentively conſider'd, it will be no matter of ſurprize to find ſome Men obſtinately Bigotted to the Authority of the Ancients.

CHAP. V.

Two pernicious Effects Reading has upon the Imagination.

THAT diſ-ingenuous and looſe Reſpect, which Men award the Ancients, is productive of abundance of very miſchievious Effects, which 'tis worth while to conſider.

See the firſt Article of the preceding Chapter.

The Firſt is, that by accuſtoming them to a diſuſe of their Reaſon, it by little and little puts them under an utter Incapacity of uſing it. For it ought not to be imagin'd, that thoſe who grow Gray in the Study of *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*, make much uſe of their Underſtanding: They generally ſpend ſo much time in the Reading of theſe Books, meerly to enter into the Sentiments of their Authors: And their main Scope and Purpoſe is, to know truly the Opinions they held, without troubling themſelves much about thoſe of them which ought to be held, as ſhall be prov'd in the ſucceeding Chapter. Thus the Science and *Philoſophy* they learn, is properly a Science of *Memory*, and not a Science of the *Underſtanding*. They know only the Hiſtory, and the matter of Fact, and not the evident Truth; and may more juſtly be call'd Hiſtorians, than true Philoſophers.

The Second Effect produc'd in the Imagination by the Reading Ancient Authors, is the ſtrange confuſion it makes in the Idea's of moſt Men, that give themſelves to it. There are two different ways of Reading Authors: the one is very Advantagious and Uſeful; the

other very uſeleſs, and alſo dangerous. Reading is of great uſe, when one Meditates on what one reads: when a Man by an Eſſay of Thought endeavours the Reſolution of the Queſtions he ſees in the Contents of the Chapters, before he begins to read them; when he Methodizes and Collates the Idea's of things with one another; in a word, when he uſes his Reaſon. On the contrary, Reading is of no account, when a Man underſtands not what 'tis he is about: But 'tis of dangerous conſequence for a Man to read, and comprehend what he reads, when he does not ſtrictly ſearch and examine into it, ſo as to be able to judge of it; and eſpecially if he has Memory enough to retain what he conceives, and Impudence enough to conſent to it. The firſt way brightens and clears up the Underſtanding, it corroborates and enlarges its Capacity. The ſecond ſtraightens its Capacity, and renders it by degrees weak, obſcure, and confus'd.

Now the generality of thoſe, who glory in the Knowledge of others Opinions, ſtudy only the ſecond Manner: And ſo the more Reading they have, the more feeble, dark, and confus'd their Underſtanding grows. The Reaſon whereof is, that the Traces of their Brain are confounded with each other; as lying in great numbers, and being never Poſtur'd and Methodiz'd by Reaſon: which is the thing that hinders the Mind from imagining and repreſenting clearly the things it has occaſion for. When the Mind would open ſome particular Traces, finding others that are more familiar to it in the way, 'tis eaſily impos'd upon. For the Capacity of the Brain being not infinite, 'tis hardly poſſible a great quantity of Traces, form'd without Order and Method, ſhould not entangle and perplex themſelves, and thereby put the Idea's in confuſion. 'Tis upon this ſcore, that Men of a great Memory are commonly incapable of judging well, concerning things that demand a great Attention.

But that which is eſpecially remarkable is, that the Knowledge Men acquire by Reading without Meditation, and with deſign only of retaining the Opinions of others; in a word, whatever Science depends on Memory, is properly the Science that puffs up, and makes them Arrogant, becauſe this is that which glitters moſt to appearance, and makes the poſſeſſors vain and conceited. And thus we generally obſerve thoſe that are this way Learned, to be proud, haughty, and preſuming; pretending to have right of judging of all things, though very little qualify'd for that purpoſe: which is the Reaſon of their falling into multitudes of Errors.

But this falſe Science is the Cauſe of a greater Miſchief ſtill. For thoſe Perſons fall not into Error alone, but draw whole troops of Vulgar Minds along with them; as alſo a vaſt retinue of Young People, who believe their Deciſions, as Articles of Faith. Theſe falſly Learned, having oppreſs'd and overborn them by the weight of their profound Literature, and maz'd them with the Doctrine of uncouth and extravagant Opinions, and the Names of Ancient and Unknown Authors, gain ſuch an irreſiſtible Sway and Authority over their Minds, that they reverence and admire as Oracles, whatever proceeds from their Mouth; and blindfold, and implicitly ſubſcribe to all their Sentiments. Nay, Men of far greater Underſtanding and Judgement, who had never known them, and who ſhould not be inform'd what and who they were, ſeeing them talk in ſo Magiſterial a way and Deciſive a ſtrain, in ſo haughty, ſo imperious, and ſo grave an Air, could ſcarce forbear having a Reſpect and Eſteem for what they ſay, becauſe 'tis an hard matter to be unaffected with the Air, the Carriage, and Senſible manners of the Speaker. For as it often happens that your Arrogant and Confident Men are too hard for others of greater Abilities, but that are more Judicious and reſerved: ſo thoſe Men that maintain things neither true, nor probable, often ſilence their Opponents, by talking in an Imperious, haughty, or grave ſtrain, that ſurprizes and amuſes them.

Now thoſe of whom we ſpeak, have ſo much Value and Eſteem for themſelves, and Contempt for others, as to be confirm'd in a certain Faſtuous Habit, mix'd with a ſort of Gravity, and Fictitious Modeſty, which prepoſſeſſes and wins the Hearers Mind.

For it ought to be obſerv'd, that all the different Airs and Behaviours of Men of different Conditions, are only the Natural Reſults and Conſequences of the Eſteem every Man has for himſelf, in Relation to others: as is eaſy to be ſeen if a Man conſiders them a little. Thus an Haughty and a Brutal Air is peculiar to a Man that highly eſteems himſelf, and diſregards the Eſteem of other Men: An Air of Modeſty is the Air of a Man that ſets little by himſelf, but has much Eſteem for others. The Grave Air is that of a Man who has a great Eſteem for himſelf, and deſire of being eſteem'd by others. The Simple and Down-right Air and Carriage is that of a Man neither ſolicitous about himſelf nor others.

Thus all the different Airs, which are almoſt infinite, are only the Effects which the different degrees of Eſteem every Man has for himſelf, and for thoſe with whom he converſes, naturally produce in his Face, and in all the External parts of his Body. We have explain'd in the Fourth Chapter, that Correſpondence which is between the Nerves which excite the Paſſions within us, and thoſe that evidence them outwardly, by the Air they imprint upon the Face.

CHAP. VI.

That Men of Learning generally are so Opinionated with an Author, that their Principal Drift is the Knowing what he held, without caring to know what ought to be held.

THERE is still another Defect of very great Importance, that Men of Reading are ordinarily subject to: which is that they grow conceited with an Author. If there be any thing true or good in a Book, they are presently extravagant in extolling it. 'Tis all true! 'tis all excellent, and admirable! They please themselves in admiring what they do not understand, and would fain have all the World to admire it with them. The *Encomiums* they bestow on these obscure Authors, they make redound to their own glory: Since others are hereby perswaded, that they perfectly understand them; and this administers fuell to their Vanity. They esteem themselves above the rest of Mankind, upon the strength of being perswaded they understand some Impertinence of an Ancient Author, or of a Man perhaps that did not understand himself. What a multitude have sweat and laboured, in the Illustration of the obscure Passages of some of the Ancient *Philosophers* and *Poets*? And what abundance of fine Wits are there in these Days still, the main Pleasure of whose Life consists in Criticizing on a Word, or the Opinion of an Author? But 'twill not be amiss at present to bring some Proof of what I say.

The Question concerning the Immortality of the Soul, is without doubt a Question of very great Importance. We cannot find fault with the *Philosophers*, for laying out themselves so industriously towards the Resolution of it. And though they heap up mighty Volumes, to prove after a slender fashion, a Truth that may be Demonstrated in a few Words, or a few Pages; yet they are excusable. But when they are very solicitous, and concern'd about deciding what *Aristotle* thought of it; they are as pleasant Gentlemen as one could wish. It is, in my Mind, of very little use and benefit to those who live at present, to know whether there was ever such a Man as was call'd *Aristotle*; whether this Man was the Author of those Books which go under his Name: whether he understood this or that in such a part of his Works. This can neither make a Man wiser nor happier. But it is very material to know whether what he says be true or false in it self.

'Tis then very useless to know what was *Aristotle's* Opinion concerning the Immortality of the Soul; though it be of great Advantage to know the Soul to be immortal. Yet I make no scruple to affirm, that there have been more sollicitous to know *Aristotle's* Sentiment on this Subject, than the Truth of the thing it self. Since there have been those, who have wrote Books purposely to explain what that Philosopher's Belief was of it; but have not done so much, to know what ought to be believ'd concerning it.

But though there have been a multitude of Men, who have harassed and fatigued their Mind in resolving what *Aristotle's* Opinion was; yet their fatigues and pains have been all in vain: since they cannot yet agree about this ridiculous Question. Which evidenceth how mis-fortunate the followers of *Aristotle* are, in having a Man so dark and obscure to enlighten them; and who even affects Obscurity, as he declar'd in a Letter that he wrote to *Alexander*.

The Opinion then of *Aristotle* about the Immortality of the Soul, has been a mighty Question, and very noted amongst the Learned. But that it may not be imagin'd that I speak at random, and without foundation, I am oblig'd to transcribe a Passage here of *La Cerda*, somewhat long and tedious: wherein that Author has amass'd together the different Authorities upon that Subject, as upon a Question of greatest Importance. These are his words upon the Second Chapter of *Tertullian De Resurrectione carnis.*

Quæstio hæc in scholis utrinque validis suspicionibus agitatur, num animam immortalem, mortalemve fecerit Aristoteles. Et quidem Philosophi haud ignobiles asseveroverunt Aristotelem pessuisse nostros animos ab interitu alienos. Hi sunt è Græcis & Latinis interpretibus Ammonius uterque, Olympiodorus, Philoponus, Simplicius, Avicenna, uti memorat Mirandula l. 4. De examine vanitatis, Cap. 9. Theodorus Matochytes, Themistius, S. Thomas 2. Contrà gentes Cap. 79. & Phys. Lect. 12. & præterea 12. Metaph. Lect. 3. & Quodlib. 10. Qu. 5. Art. 1. Albertus Tract. 2 De Anima Cap. 20. & Tract. 3. Cap. 13. Ægidius Lib. 3. De Anima ad Cap. 4. Durandus in 2. Dist. 18. Qu. 3. Ferrarius loco citato contra gentes, & latè Eugubinus L. 9. De perenni Philosophia Cap. 18. & quod pluris est, discipulus Aristotelis Theophrastus, magistri mentem & ore & calamo novisse penitus qui poterat.

In contrariam factionem abiere nonnulli Patres, nec infirmi Philosophi; Justinus in sua paræneſi, Origenes in Φιλοσοφουμένῳ, *& ut fertur Nazianzenus in Disp. contrà Eunom. & Nyssenus Lib. 2. de Anima Cap. 4. Theodoretus de Curandis Græcorum Affectibus Lib. 3. Galenus in Historia Philosophica, Pomponatius L. de Immortalitate Animæ, Simon Portius L. de Mente Humana, Cajetanus 3. de Anima Cap. 2. In eum sensum, ut caducum Animum nostrum putaret Aristoteles, sunt partim adducti ab Alexandro Aptio de Auditore, qui sic solitus erat interpretari Aristo-*

Aristotelicam mentem; quamvis Eugubinus Cap. 21. *&* 22. *eum excuset. Et quidem unde collegisse videtur Alexander mortalitatem, nempe ex* 12. *Metap. inde S. Thomas, Theodorus Metochytes immortalitatem collegerunt.*

Porrò Tertullianum neutram hanc opinionem amplexum credo; sed pataſſe in hac parte ambiguum Aristotelem. Itaque ita citat illum pro utraque: Nam cùm hic adscribat Aristoteli mortalitatem animæ, tamen L. de Anima C. 6. *pro contraria opinione immortalitatis citat. Eadem mente fuit Plutarchus, pro utraque opinione advocans eundem Philosophum in L.* 5. *de placitis Philosoph. Nam Cap.* 1. *mortalitatem tribuit, & Cap.* 25. *immortalitatem. Ex Scholasticis etiam, qui in neutram partem Aristotelem constantem judicant, sed dubium & ancipitem, sunt Scotus in* 4. *Dist.* 43. *Qu.* 2. *Art.* 2. *Harveus quodlib.* 1. *Q.* 11. *&* 1. *Sent. Dist.* 1. *Q.* 1. *Niphus in opusculo de Immortalitate Animæ Cap.* 1. *& recentes alii Interpretes: quam mediam existimationem credo veriorem, sed Scholii lex vetat, ut authoritatum pondere librato illud suadeam.*

I deliver all these Quotations as true, upon the integrity of the Commentatour; as thinking it would be loss of time to stand to verify them. Nor have I all those curious Books by me, from which they were taken. I add no new ones of my own, as not envying him the Glory of having made a good Collection. And it would still be a greater loss of time to do it, though a Man should only turn over the *Indexes* of *Aristotle's* Commentators.

We see then in this Passage of *La Cerda*, that Men of Books and Study, that have pass'd for the Ingenious of their Times, have taken abundant Pains to know whether *Aristotle* believ'd the Immortality of the Soul: and there have been some of them who were able to write Books peculiarly on the Subject, as *Pomponatius*. For that Author's chief Design in his Book is, to shew that *Aristotle* believ'd the Soul was Mortal. And possibly there are others, who not only are solicitous to know what were *Aristotle's* thoughts upon this Subject; but who moreover look upon it as a very important Question to know, for instance, whether *Tertullian, Plutarch*, or others, believ'd or not, whether it was *Aristotle's* Opinion that the Soul was Mortal. As there is great Reason to suppose from *La Cerda* himself, if we reflect only on the latter part of the Passage we have quoted, *Porrò Tertullianum, &c.*

Though it be an useless thing, to know what *Aristotle* believ'd concerning the Immortality of the Soul, and what were *Tertulian's* and *Plutarch's* thoughts concerning *Aristotle's* belief; yet the foundation of the Question, *The Immortality of the Soul*, is at least a Truth very necessary to be known. But there are infinite things, the Knowledge whereof is very impertinent and useless; and consequently more useless still, to know what were the Ancient thoughts about them: and yet there are Men very anxious and inquisitive in conjecturing the Opinions of Philosophers on such sort of Subjects. There are found whole Books full of these ridiculous Inquiries; and 'tis these noisy trifles that have been the occasion of so many Wars among the Learned.

These vain and impertinent Questions, these ridiculous Genealogies of fruitless Opinions, are the important Subjects for the Criticisms of the Learned. They think they have the Right and Privilege of despising those who despise these Fooleries, and of treating as ignorant Persons such as glory in being ignorant of them. They imagine they are perfect Masters of the History and Genealogy of Substantial Forms; and the Age is ungrateful unless it veil to their Merit. These things manifestly discover the weakness and vanity of the Mind of Man; and that when Reason does not govern his Study, his Studies are so far from perfecting his Reason, that they darken, corrupt, and totally pervert it.

'Tis worth while here to observe, that in Questions of *Faith* 'tis no fault to search into the Belief of *St. Austin*, (for instance) or any other *Father of the Church*: not even to make Inquiry what *St. Austin's* Belief was of the Belief of his Predecessours. Because matters of Faith are only learn'd by Tradition, and Reason is unable to discover them. The most Ancient Faith being the most true; we must endeavour to know what was the Faith of the Ancients: which cannot be done but by Examining the Opinion of several Persons who have succeded one another in several times. But things which depend on Reason are quite of another Nature: and we ought not to be sollicitous about the Opinion of the Ancients, to know what we ought to hold concerning them. Yet I know not by what strange subversion of Reason some Men are angred, if we speak otherwise in Philosophy, than *Aristotle* has done: and yet take it very patiently to hear a Man talk in *Divinity* contrary to the Gospel, the Fathers, and Councels. I am of Opinion that those who make the greatest out-cry against the Novelties of Philosophy, which ought to be had in Esteem, are the most obstinate and zealous Patrons and Defenders of certain Novelties in *Divinity*; which ought to be had in abhorrence. For 'tis not their Terms and Language we disapprove; which as unknown as they were to Antiquity, are Authoriz'd by Custom. 'Tis the Errors they diffuse and support by the help of this Equivocal and confus'd Dialect which we condemn.

In point of *Divinity* we ought to be fond of Antiquity, because we ought to love the Truth; which Truth is found in Antiquity. And all Curiosity ought to cease, when once we have taken hold of Truth. But in point of *Philosophy* we ought on the contrary to love Novelty; for the same Reason that we ought always to love the Truth; that we ought to retreive it, and ought to have an Indefatigable Curiosity for it. If *Plato* and *Aristotle* were believed Infallible, a Man should perhaps apply himself to the understanding of them only: but Reason

oppoſes the Belief of it. Reaſon, on the contrary, would have us judge them more ignorant than the New Philoſophers: ſince in the Age we live in, the World is two thouſand Years older, and has learn'd greater Experience, than it had in the days of *Ariſtotle* and *Plato*; as we have already ſaid: And the New Philoſophers may know all the Truths the Ancients have left us; and find out, and add a great many more to them. Yet Reaſon will not have us believe theſe New Philoſophers any more than the Old upon their bare Word. It bids us on, the contrary, examine attentively their Thoughts, and with-hold our conſent, till there is no longer room for doubting, without being ridiculouſly prepoſſeſs'd with the Opinion of their vaſt Knowledge, or the other ſpecious Qualities of their Mind.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Prepoſſeſſion of Commentators.

THIS Prepoſſeſſion is no where apparent in ſo ſtrange and exceſſive a degree, as in the Commentators on an Author: becauſe the Undertakers of this Task, which ſeems too low and ſervile for a Man of Senſe, imagine their Authors merit the Praiſe and Admiration of all the World. They look upon them as part of themſelves, and fancy they are Body and Soul to one another: and upon this View, Self-love admirably plays its part. They artfully accumulate Encomiums on their Authors, they ſhed Light and Radiations round them, they load them with Glory, as knowing they ſhall have it themſelves by reflection and rebound. This great and lofty Idea not only magnifies *Ariſtotle* and *Plato* in the Mind of many of the Readers, but imprints a reſpect in them for all that have Commented upon them; and ſome of them had never Deified their Authors, had they not fancy'd themſelves incircl'd, as it were, in the Rays of the ſame Glory.

Yet I will not ſay that all Commentators are ſo liberal in their Panegyricks on their Authors, out of hopes of a Return; ſome of them would ſtart at ſuch an Apprehenſion, if they would conſider a little: They are ſincere and well-meaning in their Praiſes, without any Politick deſign, and without thinking what they do; but Self-love thinks for them, and without their being aware of it. Men are inſenſible of the heat that is in their heart, though it gives Life and Motion to all the other parts of their Body. They muſt touch and handle themſelves to be convinc'd of it, becauſe this heat is Natural. The cauſe is the ſame in reſpect of Vanity, which is ſo congenial to the Mind of Man, that he is inſenſible of it; and though 'tis this, (as a Man may ſay) that gives Life and Motion to the greateſt part of his Thoughts and Deſigns, yet it often does it in a manner imperceptible by him. He muſt handle, and feel, and ſound himſelf inwards to know that he is vain. 'Tis not ſufficiently underſtood that 'tis Vanity which is the Firſt mover, in the greateſt part of Humane Actions; and though Self-love knows this well enough, it knows it only to diſguiſe it from the reſt of Man.

A Commentator then being ſomeways related, and allied to his Author that he works upon; Self-love never fails to diſcover in him notable Subjects for Praiſe and Incenſe, with deſign to make them redound to the advantage of the Offerer. And this is perform'd in ſo Artificial, ſo Subtil, and Delicate a manner, as to be wholly Imperceptible. But this is not the proper place of expoſing all the Wiles of Self-love and Intereſt.

Nor is the Prejudicate Eſteem Commentators have conceiv'd for their Authors, and the Honour they do themſelves in praiſing them, the only Reaſon of Sacrificing to them: Cuſtom is another Motive, and becauſe they think the Practiſe neceſſary. There are Men who have no great Eſteem either for certain Sciences or Authors, who notwithſtanding fall zealouſly to writing Comments on them; becauſe either their Imployment, Chance, or perhaps a capricious Humour has engag'd them in the Attempt: and theſe too think they are under an obligation to be exceſſive in the Praiſes of the Sciences, and Authors which they work on; when at the ſame time the Authors are Silly and Impertinent; and the Sciences Ignoble and Uſeleſs.

And indeed what can be more ridiculous, than for a Man to undertake to Comment on an Author whom he thought Impertinent, and to write Seriouſly on a Subject he believ'd to be Inſignificant and Uſeleſs? 'Tis neceſſary therefore to the Preſerving his Reputation, to Praiſe both the Authors and Sciences; though both one and the other are Contemptible, and nothing worth: and the fault of Undertaking an ill Work muſt be mended with another. Which is the Reaſon that when Learned Men Comment on different Authors, they fall into Abſurdities and Contradictions.

Upon this Account it is, that almoſt all Prefaces have as little of Truth in them as good Senſe. If a Man Comments upon *Ariſtotle*, he is the *Genius of Nature*. If a Man writes upon *Plato*, 'tis the *Divine Plato*. They hardly ever Comment upon the Works of *Plain Men*: but 'tis always of Men wholly Divine; of Men who have been the Admiration of their Age, and who have been bleſs'd by Providence with Light and Underſtanding above the reſt of Mankind. 'Tis the ſame thing too with the matter they treat on: 'Tis always the fineſt, the moſt exalted, and moſt neceſſary of all other.

But that I may not be credited upon my bare word, I will deliver here the way, wherein a Famous *Commentator* among the Learned, treats the Author that he comments on. I mean *Averroes*, who ſpeaks of *Ariſtotle*. He ſays in his Preface upon the *Phyſicks* of that *Philoſopher*, that he was the Inventor of *Logick*, *Moral Philoſophy*, and *Metaphyſicks*; and that he has carried them to the top of their Perfection. *Complevit*, (ſays he) *quia nullus eorum, qui ſecuti ſunt eum uſque ad hoc tempus, quod eſt mille & quingentorum annorum, quidquam addidit; nec invenies in ejus verbis errorem alicujus quantitatis; & talem eſſe virtutem in individuo uno miraculoſum & extraneum exiſtit: & hæc diſpoſitio cùm in uno homine reperitur, dignus eſt eſſe Divinus magis quam humanus.* And in other places he ſtill beſtows more pompous and magnificent Praiſes on him: As *Lib.* 1. *de Generatione Animalium. Laudemus Deum qui ſeparavit hunc virum ab aliis in perfectione, appropriavitque ei ultimam dignitatem humanam, quam non omnis homo poteſt in quacunque ætate attingere.* The ſame he ſays of him, *Lib.* 1. *Deſtine. Diſp.* 3. *Ariſtotelis doctrina eſt SUMMA VERITAS, quoniam ejus intellectus fuit finis humani intellectûs: quare benè dicitur de illo, quòd ipſe fuit creatus & datus nobis Divinâ Providentiâ, ut non ignoremus poſſibilia ſciri.*

Muſt not a Man be mad in good earneſt, that will talk at this rate? And muſt not his Bigottry for this Author be degenerated into Extravagance and Folly? Ariſtotle's *Doctrine is the* SOVEREIGN TRUTH. *'Tis impoſſible for any Man to equal him or come near him in Science. This is the Man that was ſent us from Heaven, to teach us all that is poſſible to be known. This is he upon whom all the wiſe Men are form'd;* and *they are ſo much more learn'd, as they better underſtand him.* As he ſays in another place: *Ariſtoteles fuit Princeps per quem perficiuntur omnes Sapientes, qui fuerunt poſt eum: licèt differant inter ſe in intelligendo verba ejus, & in eo quod ſequitur ex eis.* And yet the Works of this Commentator have been diſperſed over all *Europe*, and into Countries farther remote. They have been tranſlated out of *Arabick* into *Hebrew*; out of *Hebrew* into *Latin*, and it may be into many other Languages: Which Manifeſtly ſhews what Eſteem the Learned have had for them. So that a more ſenſible inſtance than this, cannot be given of the Prepoſſeſſion of Men of Study. For it evidently ſhews, that they are not only Opinionated with an Author themſelves, but alſo communicate their Bigottry to others, proportionably to the Eſteem the World conceives of them. And thus theſe falſe Praiſes Commentators load him with, are often the cauſe, that Men of not very brightned Parts, who betake themſelves to the Reading of them, are prepoſſeſſed, and thereby led into Error. See here another inſtance.

A Man renowned among the Learned, who Founded the *Geometry*, and *Aſtronomy* Lectures in the *Univerſity* of *Oxford*, begins a Book, which he wrote upon the Eight firſt Propoſitions of *Euclide*, with theſe Words. *Conſilium meum eſt, Auditores, ſi vires & valetudo ſuffecerint, explicare Definitiones, Petitiones, communes Sententias, & octo priores Propoſitiones primi libri Elementorum; cætera poſt me venientibus relinquere.* And he concludes with theſe words: *Exolvi per Dei gratiam, Domini Auditores, promiſſum, liberavi fidem meam, explicavi pro modulo meo Definitiones, Petitiones, communes Sententias, & octo priores Propoſitiones Elementorum Euclidis. Hîc annis feſſus cyclos artemq; repono. Succedent in hoc manus alii fortaſſe magis vegeto corpore, vivido ingenio. &c.* A Man of competent Senſe would not require more than an hour's time, to learn of himſelf, or with the help of the meaneſt *Geometrician*, the *Definitions*, *Poſtulates*, *Axioms*, and the *Eight firſt Propoſitions of* Euclide: They have very little need of any Explication: and yet here is an Author that talks of his Enterprize, as of ſome very difficult and mighty Undertaking. He is apprehenſive leſt his ſtrength ſhould fail him, *Si vires & valetudo ſuffecerint.* He leaves the Proſecution of them to his Succeſſors. *Cætera poſt me venientibus relinquere.* He thanks *GOD* for having, through his particular Mercy, accompliſh'd and made good what he promiſs'd. *Exolvi per Dei gratiam promiſſum; liberavi fidem meam: Explicavi pro modulo meo.* What? the *Quadrature* of the *Circle*? the *Duplication of the Cube*? This Great Man has explain'd *pro modulo ſuo*, the *Definitions*, *Poſtulates*, *Axioms*, and the *Eight firſt Propoſitions of the firſt Book of* Euclide's *Elements*. Poſſibly amongſt thoſe who ſhall ſucceed him, there may ſome be found of a ſtronger and healthier Conſtitution than himſelf, to carry on ſo great a Work. *Succedent in hoc munus alii FORTASSE magis vegeto corpore & vivido ingenio.* But as for his part, he has done enough to ſit down and reſt. *Hîc annis feſſus cyclos artémque reponit.*

Prælectiones 13 in principium Elementorum Euclidis.

Euclide never thought of being ſo obſcure, or of ſaying ſuch extraordinary things, when he compos'd his *Elements*, as ſhould neceſſarily demand a * Book of near three hundred pages to explain his *Definitions*, *Axioms*, *Poſtulates*, and *Eight firſt Propoſitions*. But this *Learned Engliſhman* knew how to enhance the *Science* of *Euclide*; and if Age would have permitted him, and he had but continued in the ſame Vigour, we ſhould at preſent have had a dozen or fifteen mighty Volumes, upon *Euclide*'s *Elements* only, which doubtleſs would have been very beneficial to Novice Pretenders to *Geometry*, and had made much for the Honour of *Euclide*.

* *In Quarto.*

See what whimſical deſigns a falſly term'd Learning can put Men upon. This Gentleman was vers'd in the *Greek* Tongue; for we are oblig'd to him for a *Greek* Edition of St. *Chryſoſtom*'s *Works*. He poſſibly had read the *Ancient Geometricians*: He could give an Hiſtorical Account of their *Propoſitions*, no leſs than their Deſcent and *Genealogy*. He had all the reſpect for *Antiquity*, that ought to be had for *Truth*; and what is it ſuch a Diſpoſition of Mind

produces? A *Commentary* upon the *Definitions* of Terms, the Demands, Axioms, and the Eight first Propositions of *Euclide*; much harder to be understood and remembred, I do not say, than the Propositions he commented on; but than all that ever *Euclide* wrote on *Geometry*.

There are many Men that out of Vanity talk in *Greek*, and even sometimes in a strange Language they don't themselves understand: For *Dictionaries* no less than *Indexes*, and *Common Places*, are very great helps to some sorts of Authors: But there are but few of Prudence enough to keep in their Greek upon a Subject, where it is needless and impertinent to make use of it. And this makes me believe it was Prepossession, and an inordinate Esteem for *Euclide*, that form'd in our Author's Imagination, the first Design of his Book.

If this Gentleman had made as much use of his *Reason* as his *Memory*, in a Matter where *Reason* should have only been imploy'd: or if he had had as great a Respect and Love for Truth, as Veneration for the Author he went to expound; there is great Probability he would not have mis-spent so much time upon so frivolous a Subject: He would have acknowledg'd that *Euclide*'s Definitions of a *Plane Angle*, and *Parallel Lines* are vicious and Defective, and inexpressive of the Nature of them; and that the *Second Proposition* is impertinent, since the Proof of it depends upon the *Third Postulate*, which is harder to be granted than that *Second Proposition*; since in granting that *Third Postulate*, which is, *That we may describe from any Point a Circle at what interval we please*, we not only grant that *a Line may be drawn from a Point equal to another Line*; which *Euclide* effects in that Proposition after a very round-about manner: But we allow, that from any Point may be drawn an infinite number of Lines, of what length we please.

But the Design of most Commentators is not to Illuminate their Authors, and to find out Truth; 'tis to make Ostentation of their Learning, and implicitly to defend the Author which they Comment on, even to their Vices. 'Tis not so much to make themselves or their Authors understood; they talk, as to make him admir'd, and themselves together with him. If the Gentleman before-mention'd, had not stuff'd his Book with Sentences of *Greek*, with a great many Names of unheard of Authors, and such other useless Observations, for the understanding *Common Notions*, *Verbal Definitions*, and *Geometrical Postulates*, who would have read his Book? who would have admir'd him? or who would have conferr'd on its Author the Honorary Title of *Learned*, or of *a Man of Sense*?

I presume it can't be doubted after what I have said, but the Indiscrete Reading of Books often prepossesses the Mind. But as soon as Prepossession enters in, that which we call Common Sense, is banish'd out of it. 'Tis incapable of Judging soberly of any thing any way relative to the Subject of its Prepossession: it stains and tinctures with it every Thought; Nay, it cannot apply it self to Subjects quite remote from those it is prejudic'd for. Thus a Man opinionated with *Aristotle*, can relish nothing but *Aristotle*: He must judge of every thing with relation to *Aristotle*. What does not accord with that Philosopher, seems false: he has constantly some Saying of *Aristotle* in his Mouth; he is citing him upon all occasions, and all sorts of Subjects, both to prove things so obscure, as no Man can comprehend; and to prove things so self-evident, as Children cannot doubt of; because *Aristotle* is to him what Reason and Evidence are to others.

So if a Man be possess'd with the conceit of *Euclide* and *Geometry*, he will be for reducing every thing you shall say to him, to the *Lines* and *Propositions* of his Darling Author, and shall talk nothing but with reference to his Science. The whole would not be bigger than its Part; but because *Euclide* has said it: nor will he be asham'd to quote him for the Proof of it, as I have sometimes observ'd. But this is still more customary with those who are devoted to other Authors, than those of *Geometry*; on whose Books nothing is more frequent than *Greek*, *Hebrew*, *Arabick* Citations, to prove things as evident as the Sun at Mid-day.

All this is occasion'd by Reason that the Traces imprinted on the Fibres of the Brain by the Objects of their Prepossession are so deep, as always to remain gaping and half open. And the Animal Spirits continually passing through them, preserve them so without permitting them to close again. So that the Soul having always of necessity, the Thoughts that are connected with these Traces, becomes as it were enslav'd to them; and she is ever troubled, and disquieted, even when knowing she is wrong, she is willing to be Righted. Thus she is in constant danger of falling into a great number of Errors, unless she stands always upon her guard, with an inviolable Resolution of observing the Rule given in the beginning of this Work; that is, of *Denying an entire Consent, except to things entirely evident.*

I pass over the evil Choice that is generally made of the kind of Study Men apply themselves to, as properly belonging to *Moral Philosophy*, to treat of; though it may likewise be reduc'd here, to what has been said of Prepossession. For when a Man is fallen beyond retrieval into the Reading of the *Rabbins*, and Books of all sorts of most unknown, and consequently most useless Languages; and spends his whole Life therein; he does it doubtless out of Prepossession, and the Imaginary hopes of becoming Learned: though it is impossible by that Method to acquire any true Science. But because this Application to unprofitable Studies does not so much subject us to Error, as waste our Time, to possess us with a foolish Vanity; I shall not speak here of those who fondly think of becoming Learned in all these sorts of sordid and unprofitable Sciences, the number whereof is very great, and the Study usually too passionate and earnest.

CHAP.

CHAP. VIII.

I. *Of the Inventors of new Systems.* II. *The last Error of Men of Learning.*

WE have been manifesting the state of the Imagination of Men of Books and Study, who resign up all to the Authority of some certain particular Authors. There are others still very opposite to these; who have no respect at all for Authors, let their Esteem be what it will among the Learned. If they esteem'd them formerly, they are now of a contrary Mind, and set themselves up for Authors. They love to be thought Inventors of some new Opinions, thereby to procure Reputation in the World: and are well satisfy'd, that by saying something that was never said before, they shall not fail to have their Admirers. *I. Of the Inventors of new Systems.*

This sort of People are generally of a strong Imagination; the Fibres of their Brain are in such a disposition, as to preserve for a long time the Traces of what has been imprinted on them. Thus when once they have imagined a System that has in it any thing of probability, 'tis impossible to beat them out of it. Whatever any way makes for its confirmation, is most heartily embrac'd and retain'd. And on the contrary, all the Objections that are made for it, are over-look'd; at least are eluded by some frivolous Distinction. They are inwardly pleas'd with the sight of their own Workmanship; and the Esteem, they hope, will redound to them from it. They only apply themselves to consider the Image of Truth, deduc'd from their probable Opinions. They fix this Image stedfastly before their Eyes, but never behold with a steddy View the other sides of their Sentiments, which would betray their Falshood.

There must go great Qualifications, to capacitate a Man to be the Inventor of any true System. For 'tis not enough to have a quickness of Parts; there must besides be a certain Capaciousness of Thoughts, and Reach of Mind, which can at one View take in a clear prospect of a great many things. Little and narrow Minds with all their Vivacity and Delicacy, are too short-sighted to survey all that is necessary to be seen, for the establishing a System. They are check'd and ev'n stopp'd with some little Difficulties that discourage them; or with some glimmering Lights, which dazle and carry them away: their Light is too weak to survey at once the whole Subject.

But however Capacious and Penetrating the Mind is, unless it be withall exempt from Passion and Prejudice, there is no Good to be hoped from it. Prejudices take up one part of their Mind, and tinge and infect all the rest. The Passions confound all the Idea's a thousand ways; and make us generally discover in the Objects, all that we have a mind to find in them. Even the Passion, that we have for Truth, sometimes deceives us, when it is too vehement; and the Ambition to be thought Learned, is the greatest Impediment to our becoming really so.

Nothing then is more rare and extraordinary, than to find such Men as are capable of making new Systems; and yet nothing is more common than to find such, as have fram'd some System or other to their Humour. We see few of those, who study much, reason upon Common Notions; there is ever some Irregularity in their Idea's; which is an evident sign they have some particular System we are unacquainted with. 'Tis true, all the Books they compose, do not savour of it. For when their Business is to write for the Publick, Men are more cautious of what they say; and a bare Attention is often enough to undeceive them. Yet we see Books publish'd from time to time, which are a sufficient Proof of what I say. And there are Persons who are proud to let the World know at the beginning of their Book, that they are the Founders of some new System.

The number of the Inventors of new Systems is much increas'd by those, who have been prepossess'd with any Author. For it often falls out, that having not met with Truth, nor any solid Foundation in the Opinions of the Authors they have read; they first enter into a great Dislike, and an high Contempt of all sorts of Books: and thereupon fall to Imagining some probable Opinion, which they hug and cherish, and wherein they strengthen themselves, in the manner I have explain'd.

But as soon as this Heat of Affection for any Opinion is boyl'd over and abated, or the Design of Appearing in Publick has oblig'd them to examine it with a more exact and serious Attention; they discover the Falsity of it, and throw it up; but with this Condition, that they will never take up any other, but utterly condemn all those, who shall pretend to the Discovery of any Truth.

So that the last and most dangerous Error, which Men of Study fall into, is their Imagining there can be nothing known. They have read many Books, both Ancient and Modern, and have miss'd of Truth in them: they have had many fine Notions of their own, which they have found to be false, after a more strict and attentive Examination. From whence they conclude that all Men are like themselves; and that if those who fancy they have discover'd some Truth, should seriously consider them; they would be undeceiv'd as well as themselves. *II. A considerable Error of Studious Men.*

ſelves. And this is enough for them to condemn them, without making any more particular Enquiry; becauſe if they did not condemn them, it would be a kind of Confeſſion, that they were wiſer than themſelves; a thing they cannot think very probable.

They look therefore upon thoſe as Bigotted to their own Thoughts, who give out any thing as certain and infallible: Nor will they ſuffer a Man to talk of Sciences, as of Evident Truths, which cannot reſonably be doubted of; but only as of Opinions, of which is is good not to be ignorant. Yet theſe Gentlemen would do well to conſider, that though they have read a great number of Books, yet they have not read all: or that they have not read them with all the Attention, that was neceſſary to a perfect Underſtanding of them. And that though they have had many fine Thoughts, which they have found falſe in the Concluſion, yet they have not had all that are poſſible: and ſo 'tis no improbable thing, that others ſhould have found better than themſelves. Nor is it neceſſary, abſolutely ſpeaking, that others ſhould have greater Senſe than they, if that offends them; for 'tis enough to have had greater Fortune. They need not be affronted to hear it ſaid, that others have Evident Knowledge of what they are ignorant; ſince we ſay at the ſame time, that many Ages have been ignorant of the ſame Truths: Not for want of excellent Wits; but becauſe theſe excellent Wits have not luckily fall'n upon them.

Let them not be angry therefore, that a Man ſees clearly, and ſpeaks as he ſees; but let them apply themſelves to what is ſaid to them, if their Minds be ſtill capable of Application, after all their Excurſions: and then let them judge if they pleaſe. But if they will not examine it, let them hold their Tongue. But I would have them reflect a little, whether that Anſwer ſo readily made by them, to moſt of the things demanded of them, *No body Underſtands it, No body knows how 'tis done;* be not an injudicious Anſwer? Since to anſwer ſo, a Man muſt of neceſſity believe he knows all that all Men know, or all that is poſſible to be known by them. For had they not this Notion of themſelves, their Anſwer would be ſtill more impertinent. And why ſhould they be ſo hard put to it, to ſay they know nothing of them; ſince in ſome particular junctures, they acknowledge they know nothing at all. And why muſt all Men be concluded Ignorant, becauſe they are inwardly convinc'd they are Ignorant themſelves?

There are then three ſorts of Perſons that apply themſelves to Study. The firſt are ſuch as are prepoſterouſly Bigotted to ſome Author, or ſome inſignificant or falſe Science: The ſecond are ſuch as are prepoſſeſs'd, and fall with their own Fancies: The laſt, which uſually proceed from the other two, are ſuch as Imagine they know all that is poſſible to be known: and who facying they know nothing with Certainty, conclude univerſally that nothing can be Evidently known, and regard all this that they hear, as bare Opinions.

'Tis eaſy to be ſeen that all the Faults, incident to theſe three ſorts of Men, depend on the Properties of the Imagination, explain'd in the X. and XI. Chapters, and eſpecially on the Firſt. That all this is owing to Prejudice, which choaks up their Minds, and makes them inſenſible to all other Objects, but thoſe they are prepoſſeſs'd with. It may be ſaid that their Prejudices do in their Minds, what the Miniſters of Princes do in reſpect of their Maſters; for as theſe Gentlemen permit, as little as poſſible, any others than thoſe of their own Party and Intereſt, or ſuch as are unable to diſplace them from their Maſter's Favour, to come to the ſpeech of them; ſo the Prejudices of the former ſuffer not their Minds to take a full view of the pure and unmix'd Idea's of Objects. But they diſguiſe them; they cloath them with their own Liveries; and thus all mask'd and diſcolour'd preſent them to the Mind: So that 'tis next to impoſſible it ſhould diſcover, and throw off its Errors.

CHAP. IX.

I. *Of Effeminate Minds.* II. *Of Superficial Minds.* III. *Of Men of Authority.* IV. *Of the Experimental Philoſophers.*

I HAVE, If I miſtake not, ſaid enough to diſcover in general, what are the Faults of Imagination; and the Errors whereunto Men of Books and Study are moſt obnoxious. Now whereas there are few beſides, who trouble their heads with *Searching after Truth*; and the reſt of the World take up with their Opinion; it ſeems we might put an end to this Second Part. However, 'tis not amiſs to add ſomething concerning the Errors of other Men; as being no unuſeful thing to take notice of them.

I. *Of Effeminate Minds.*

Whatever ſtrikes the Senſes, extreamly affects us: And whatever affect us, makes us mind it in proportion to its affecting us. Thus thoſe who reſign themſelves up to all ſorts of moſt Senſible and Pleaſing Diverſions, are incapable of Penetrating into Truths ever ſo little abſtruſe and difficult: becauſe the Capacity of the Mind, which is not infinite, is fill'd up with their Pleaſures; or at leaſt is very much divided by them.

The Generality of Great Men, of Courtiers, of the Rich, and Young, and of thoſe we call the fine Wits; giving themſelves to perpetual Diverſions, and ſtudying only the Art of Pleaſing, by all that gratifies Concupiſcence and the Senſes; by degrees obtain ſuch a Niceneſs in theſe things,

things, or such a *Softneſs*, that it may be often said, they are rather the Effeminate, than the Fine Wits, which they would fain be thought. There is a great deal of difference betwixt a true Fineneſs and Softneſs of Mind. Though these two things are ordinarily confounded.

The Fine, or the Curious Wits are those whose Reason descend to the least Differences of things. Who fore-see Effects which depend on hidden, un-usual, and invisible Causes. In brief, they are those who dive farthest into the Subjects they consider. But the soft Minds have only a counterfeit Delicacy and Niceness. They are neither Lively nor Piercing: They cannot see the Effects of even the most gross and palpable Causes. In short, they are unable to comprehend or penetrate any thing; but are wonderfully nice as to Modes and Fashions. An ungentile Word, a Rustick Accent, or a little Grimace, shall provoke them infinitely more than a confus'd mass of lame and inconcluding Reasons. They cannot discover the Defect of an Argument, but can critically discern a false Step or an incompos'd Gesture. In a word, they have a perfect Understanding of Sensible things, as having made continual use of their Senses; but have no true Knowledge of things depending on Reason, because they have scarce ever imploy'd their own.

Yet these are the Men that flourish most in the Esteem of the World; and who most easily advance to the Reputation of the *Fine Wits*. For when a Man talks with a free and easy Air; when his Expressions are pure, and well chosen; when he serves himself with Figures that please the Senses, and excite the Passions in an imperceptible manner: though what he says be nothing but Impertinence and Folly, though there be nothing good or true in his Discourse, yet he shall be voted by the common Opinion the Fine, the Curious, the Acute Wit. 'Tis not perceiv'd that this is only a Soft and Effeminate Mind, that glitters with false Lights, but never shines out with a genuine Brightness; that only perswades because we have Eyes, and not because we have Reason.

For what remains, I do not deny but that all Men have a Tincture of this Infirmity we have now remark'd in some part of them. There is no Man whose Mind is not touch'd with the Impressions of his Senses and Passions: and consequently who has not some Adherencies to Sensible *Manners*. All Men differ in this but in degree of *more* or *less*. But the Reason of charging this Fault upon some particular Men, is because there are those who aknowledge it to be a Fault, and labour to correct it. Whereas the Men we have been speaking of, look upon it as a very advantagious Quality: They are so far from owning this false Delicacy as the Effect of an Effeminate Softness, and the Original of infinite Distempers to the Mind, as to imagine it the Product and Sign of the Beauty and excellency of their Genius.

II. *Of Superficial Minds.*

To these may be added a vast number of Superficial Minds, who never go to the bottom of things; and have but a confus'd Perception of the Differences between them: but they are not in the Fault, as are those before-mention'd; for 'tis not their Divertisements that straiten their Souls, and make them little-minded: but they are naturally so. This Littleness of Mind proceeds not from the Nature of the Soul, as may perhaps be imagin'd. 'Tis effected sometimes by the paucity or dulness of the Animal Spirits, sometimes by an immoderate plenty of the Blood and Spirits, by the un-inflexibility of the Fibres of the Brain, or by some other Cause not necessary to be known.

There are then two sorts of Minds. The one easily observes the differences of things: and this is the solid Mind. The other imagines and supposes the resemblance between them, which is the superficial Character. The first has a Brain fitly dispos'd for the Reception of the clear and distinct Traces of the Objects it considers; and because 'tis very attentive to the Idea's of these Traces, it sees the Objects at hand, and surveys every part of them. But the Superficial Mind receives only the faint and confus'd Traces thereof: and that by the by, very remotely and obscurely; in so much that they appear alike, as the Faces of those we behold at too great a distance; because the Mind ever supposes Similitude and Equality, where 'tis not oblig'd to acknowledge Difference and Inequality; for the Reasons I shall give in the Third Book.

In this Class may be reckon'd all your Publick Haranguers, and Great Talkers; and many of those who have a great Facility at delivering themselves, though they speak but seldom. For 'tis extreamly rare for Men of Serious Meditation, to be able to express themselves clearly upon the things they have thought. They generally hesitate when they come to discourse about them, as being scrupulous and fearful of using such Terms, as may excite a false Idea in the Hearers. Being asham'd to talk purely for Talking-sake, as is the way with a great many who talk peremptorily on all adventures: They are at a loss at finding words expressive of their un-obvious and not common Thoughts.

III. *Of Men of Authority.*

Though I have the greatest Deference and Esteem imaginable for Pious Men, Divines, and Aged Persons, and in general for all those who have deservedly a great Sway and Authority over others; yet I think my self oblig'd to say thus much of them, That it is usual for them to think themselves infallible, because the World hears them with Respect; that they exercise their Mind but little in discovering Speculative Truths; that they are too liberal in condemning whatever their pleasure and humour suggests, before they have attentively consider'd it. Not that they are to be blam'd, for not applying themselves to the Study of many Sciences, not

very neceſſary for them to know: we allow them to omit them, and likewiſe to deſpiſe them: but 'tis not fair to judge of them out of a fanciful diſlike, and ill grounded ſuſpicion. For they ought to conſider that the Serious Air and Gravity wherewith they ſpeak, the Authority they have obtain'd over the Minds of others, and that cuſtomary way of confirming their Diſcourſe with a Text of Scripture, muſt unavoidably engage in Error their reſpectful Auditors; who being incapable of Examining things to the bottom, are caught with Modes and external Appearances.

When Error comes cloth'd in the Dreſs of Truth, it frequently has more reſpect than Truth it ſelf: And this illegitimate Reſpect has very dangerous Conſequences: *Peſſima res eſt Errorum Apotheoſis, & pro peſte intellectûs habenda eſt ſi vanis accedat veneratio.* Thus when ſome Men out of a falſe Zeal, or a Fondneſs for their own Thoughts, bring the Holy Scripture to countenance or ſupport falſe Principles of *Phyſicks*, or others of like Nature, they are often attended to as Oracles, by the admiring Crowd, who credit them upon their word, becauſe of the Reverence they aſcribe to Divine Authority: When at the ſame time ſome Men of a worſe Complexion, have taken occaſion hereby to contemn Religion. So that by ſtrangely perverting its Nature, *Holy Scripture* has been the cauſe of ſome Mens *Errors*; and *Truth* has been the Motive and Original to Other's *Impiety*. We ſhould then be cautious, ſays the fore-cited Author, of ſearching after Dead things among the Living; and of preſuming by our own Sagacity of Mind, to diſcover in the Holy Scriptures, what the *Holy Spirit* has not thought fit to declare in it. *Ex Divinorum & Humanorum maleſanâ admixtione*, continues he, *non ſolum educitur Philoſophia phantaſtica, ſed etiam Religio hæretica. Itaq; ſalutare admodum eſt ſi mente ſobriâ fidei tantum dentur quæ fidei ſunt.* All Men, who have any Authority over others, ought never to determine till they have ſo much the more ſeriouſly conſider'd, as their Determinations are more obſtinately adher'd to; and Divines ſhould be more eſpecially regardful, leſt they give ſcandal and contempt to Religion, through a falſe Zeal, by an ambitious deſire of their own Fame, and of giving Vogue to their Opinions. But it being not my Buſineſs to preſcribe to them their Duty, let them hearken to *St. Thomas Aquinas* their Maſter, who being conſulted by his General for his Opinion touching ſome points, anſwers him in theſe words of *St. Auſtin*. Opuſc. 2.

Multum autem nocet alia, quæ ad pietatis doctrinam non ſpectant, vel aſſerere vel negare, quaſi pertinentia ad Sacram doctrinam. Dixit enim Auguſtinus in 5. Confeſſ. Cùm audio Chriſtianum aliquem fratrem iſta, quæ Philoſophi de cœlo aut ſtellis & de Solis & Lunæ motibus dixerunt, neſcientem, & aliud pro alio ſentientem, patienter intueor opinantem hominem; nec illi obeſſe video cum de te, Domine Creator omnium noſtrûm, non credat indigna, ſi fortè ſitus & habitus creaturæ corporalis ignoret. Obeſt autem ſi hæc ad ipſam doctrinam pietatis pertinere arbitretur, & pertinacius affirmare audeat quod ignorat. Quod autem obſit manifeſtat Auguſtinus in 1. ſuper Geneſ. Ad literam turpe eſt, inquit, nimis, & perniciоſum ac maximè cavendum, ut Chriſtianum de his rebus quaſi ſecundùm Chriſtianas literas loquentem, ita delirare quilibet infidelis audiat, ut quemadmodùm dicitur toto cœlo errare conſpiciens; riſum tenere vix poſſit. Et non tantùm moleſtum eſt, quod errans homo videatur: ſed quod Authores noſtri ab eis qui foris ſunt, talia ſenſiſſe credantur, & cum magno eorum exitio, de quorum ſalute ſatagimus, tanquam indocti reprehenduntur atque reſpuuntur. Unde mihi videtur tutius eſſe, ut hæc quæ Philoſophi communes ſenſerunt, & noſtræ fidei non repugnant, neque eſſe ſic aſſerenda, ut dogmata fidei, licet aliquandò ſub nomine Philoſophorum introducantur, neque ſic eſſe neganda tanquam fidei contraria, ne ſapientibus hujus mundi contemnendi doctrinam fidei, occaſio præbeatur.

'Tis a dangerous thing poſitively to determine concerning matters, that are not of Faith, as if they were: *St. Auſtin* is our Author for it, in the fifth Book of his *Confeſſions*: 'When 'I ſee (ſays he) a Chriſtian, who is inſtructed in the Opinions of Philoſophers about the 'Heavens, the Stars, and the Motion of the Sun and Moon, and who miſtakes one thing for 'another; I leave him to his Opinions and Uncertainties. Nor do I ſee what injury it can 'do him, (provided he has right Notions of thee our *LORD* and *CREATOR*) to be 'ignorant of the Site and Poſition of Bodies, and the different Regulations of Material Beings. 'But he does himſelf wrong, in that he fancies theſe things concern Religion, and takes upon 'him obſtinately to affirm what he does not underſtand. The ſame Holy Man explains his Thoughts more clearly yet, in his firſt Book of the Litteral Expoſition of *Geneſis*, in theſe Words. 'A Chriſtian ſhould be extreamly cautious of ſpeaking of theſe things, as if they 'were the Doctrine of the Sacred Writings; ſince an *Heathen* who ſhould hear him utter his 'Abſurdities, that had no appearance of Truth, would ridicule him for them. Thus the 'Chriſtian would be put in confuſion, and the *Heathen* but ill-edify'd. Yet that, which on 'theſe occaſions is matter of greateſt trouble is, not that a Man is found in an Error; but 'that the *Heathens*, whom we labour to convert, falſely and to their unavoidable deſtruction, imagine that our Authors abound with theſe ridiculous Notions, condemn them, and 'ſpurn them as Ignorant and Unlearned: which makes one think it much the ſafer way, not to 'affirm as the Maxims of Faith, the common receiv'd Opinions of *Philoſophers*, though not inconſiſtent with them; (though the Authority of *Philoſophers* may ſometimes be us'd to make 'way for their reception;) nor to reject their Opinions as contrary to Faith, leſt occaſion be 'given to the Wiſe Men of the World, to contemn the Sacred Truths of the Chriſtian Religion.

The Generality of Men are so careless or unreasonable, as to make no distinction between the Word of *GOD* and that of Men, when joyn'd together. So that they fall into Error, by approving them both alike; or into Irreligion by the contempt of both indifferently. 'Tis easy to see what is the Cause of these last Errors, and how they depend upon the Connection of Idea's, explain'd in the XI. Chapter; and I need not stand more largely to explain them.

IV. *Of such as make Experiments.*

It seems seasonable to say something here of the *Chymists*, and of all those in general that imploy their time in making Experiments. These are the Men that are in Search after Truth: Their Opinions are usually embrac'd without Scruple and Examination. And thus their Errors are so much the more dangerous, as they are communicated to others with greater Facility.

The Study of Nature is undoubtedly more Noble, than of Books; Visible and Sensible Experiments afford us much more certain Proofs of things, than the Reasonings of Men: and no Objection can be made to those Men, whose Circumstances of Life have engag'd them in the Study *of Natural Philosophy*, for endeavouring to excell in it, by making continual Experiments; provided their greatest Application be made to the more necessary Sciences. We find no fault with *Experimental Philosophy*, nor the Improvers of it; but only with their Defects.

The first of which is, that usually 'tis not the Light of Reason which conducts them in the Method of their Experiments, but only Chance. Which is the reason that they grow little more Learned or Skilful, after having wasted much of their Time and Fortune therein.

The second is their Insisting rather upon Curious and Extraordinary Experiments, than on those that are more Common: when 'tis plain that the Commoner being the more simple, they ought first to be dwelt upon, before a Man applies himself to the more Compounded, and to those which depend upon a multitude of Causes.

The third is their earnest and diligent Search after Profitable Experiments; and their neglect of those, which only serve to illuminate the Mind.

The fourth, that they are too un-exact in their Observations of all the particular Circumstances, of Time, Place, the Quality of the Drugs made use of; though the least of these Circumstances is capable of frustrating the desir'd Effect. For 'tis observable that the Terms the *Virtuosi* use, are Equivocal: The word *Wine*, for instance, signifies so many different things, as there are different Soils, various Seasons, and several ways of making and preserving it. So that it may be said in general, there are no where two Vessels of it altogether alike. And when a *Chymist* says, To make such an Experiment, *take Wine*, we have but a very confus'd Idea of his Meaning. For which Reason they should use a most exact Circumspection in Experiments, and not descend to the Compound sort, till they are very well acquainted with the more Simple and Ordinary.

The fifth is, that they make too many Deductions from a Single Experiment; when on the contrary, to the Establishing any one good Conclusion, there should go generally many Experiments. Though a Single Experiment may be assistant to the Inferring many Conclusions.

Lastly, the most part of *Naturalists* and *Chymists* consider only the particular Effects of Nature. They never ascend up to the first Notions of the Things Bodies are compos'd of. When yet it is most certain we can have no clear and distinct knowledge of any particular *Phænomena*, unless we are first masters of the most general Principles, and run them up as high as *Metaphysicks*. To conclude, they commonly want Courage and Constancy, and are tir'd and discourag'd with the Toil and Expence. There are many other Faults these Gentlemen are subject to, but I design not to reckon them all up.

The Causes of the Faults which I have remark'd, are the Want of Application; the Properties of the Imagination explain'd in the Tenth and Eleven Chapters; and Men's Judging of the Difference of Bodies, and the Changes they undergo, only from the Sensations they have of them; according to the Explication given in the First Book.

The THIRD PART:

Concerning

The CONTAGIOUS COMMUNICATION Of Strong IMAGINATIONS.

CHAP. I.

I. *Of the Diſpoſition we have to imitate others in all things, which is the Original of the Communication of thoſe Errors, that depend on the Power of Imagination.* II. *Two things that more eſpecially increaſe this Diſpoſition.* III. *What that ſtrong Imagination is.* IV. *That there are ſeveral kinds of it. Of Fools, and of thoſe that have a Strong Imagination, in the Senſe 'tis here taken.* V. *Two conſiderable Imperfections of Men of a Strong Imagination.* VI. *Of the Power they have to perſwade, and impoſe on others.*

HAVING already explain'd the Nature of the Imagination, the Failings it is ſubject to, and ſhown how our own Imagination engages us in Error; all that remains in this Second Book, is to ſpeak to the *Contagious Communication of Strong Imaginations*, I mean that Sway and Power ſome Minds have of drawing others to their Errors.

I. *Of the Diſpoſition we have to imitate others in all things, which is the Original of the Communication of thoſe Errors, that depend on the Power of Imagination.*

Strong Imaginations are wondrouſly contagious: They domineer over the weaker, faſhion them by degrees after their own Image, and imprint the ſame Characters upon them. And therefore ſince Men of Conceit, and of a Vigorous and Strong Imagination, are the leaſt reaſonable of any; there are very few Cauſes of the Errors of Men, more univerſal than this Communication of the Imagination.

In order to conceive what this Contagion is, and how it's tranſmitted from one to another, we muſt know that Men are under a mutual neceſſity of one another's Aſſiſtance, and are ſo fram'd as out of many Bodies to compound one, whereof all the Parts have a mutual Correſpondence. For the preſerving and cheriſhing of which Union, *GOD* commanded them to have *Charity* for each other. But whereas Self-love might by little and little extinguiſh Charity, and break the Bond of Civil Society; *GOD* thought fit for the Preſervation of it, to unite Men more firmly ſtill by Natural Ties, which might ſubſiſt in caſe *Charity* ſhould fail, and alſo defend it againſt the attacks of Self-love.

Theſe Natural Ties, which we have in common with Beaſts, conſiſt in a certain Diſpoſition of Brain, which makes all Men prone to imitate the Actions of thoſe they converſe with, to frame the ſame Judgements with them, and to be acted with like Paſſions they ſee them poſſeſs'd with. Which Diſpoſition is a much ſtraiter Obligation to bind them to each other, than *Charity* founded upon Reaſon, this *Charity* being rarely to be met with.

Now when a Man wants this Diſpoſition of Brain, whereby he may be affected with Sentiments and Paſſions, he is Naturally incapable of uniting and making up one Body with us. He may be compar'd to thoſe Irregular Stones that cannot be plac'd in a Building, becauſe they cannot be joyn'd with the others.

Oderunt hilarem triſtes, triſtémque jocoſi,
Sedatum celeres, agilem gnavúmque remiſſi.

'Tis a more conſiderable Vertue than is imagin'd, to keep fair with thoſe who are untouch'd with our Paſſions, and whoſe Notions are contrary to our own. And we ſhall have Reaſon to think ſo, if we conſider that 'tis a kind of Inſulting, when we ſee a Man that has juſt cauſe of Sorrow or Joy, not to take part with him in his Sentiments. When a Man is in Sorrow, one ſhould not come before him with a Gay and Airy look; which beſpeaks Joy, and violently imprints the Motions thereof in his Imagination. This being to diſturb him from the ſtate that

that is most convenient and pleasant to him; for sorrow is the pleasantest of all the Passions to a Man under any Affliction.

II. *Two things that more especially increase the Disposition we have to imitate others.*

There is then a certain Disposition of Brain in all Men whatever, which naturally inclines them to conform and adapt themselves to the Manners of those they live with. Which Disposition has two more principal means to cherish and augment it; one whereof is in the Soul, and the other in the Body. The former primarily consists in the Inclination all Men have for Eminency and Greatness: which Inclination is a secret Spur and Incitement to our Talking, Walking, Dressing, and Deporting our selves like Men of Rank and Quality. This is the Origine of the New Modes, of the Inconstancy and Flux of the present Languages, and of certain general Corruptions of manners. In short, this is the principal Source of all those strange and extravagant Novelties, which have no Foundation in the Reason, but only in the Humour of Men.

The other means that augment this our Imitative Disposition, and which is the Matter chiefly to be spoke to in this place, consists in a certain Impression, which Men of a strong Imagination make upon weak Minds, and delicate and tender Brains.

III. *What the Strong Imagination is.*

By the Strong and Vigorous Imagination, I mean that Constitution of Brain, which makes it capable of very deep Impressions; which so take up the Capacity of the Soul, as not to suffer her to attend to other things, besides those represented by these Images.

IV. *Two kinds of it.*

Now there are two sorts of Persons who have a strong Imagination in this Sense explain'd. The one receive these deep Traces by a disorderly and involuntary Impression of the Animal Spirits; and the other, which I design more particularly to treat of, receive them through the Disposition incident to the Substance of their Brain.

'Tis plain that the former are absolutely Fools, since they are oblig'd by the Natural Union between their Traces and Idea's, to think of things that others they converse with, do not think of; which incapacitates them for speaking pertinently to the thing in hand, and making a suitable Answer to the Questions that are ask'd them.

Of these there are infinite sorts, that differ only in degree: amongst which may be reckon'd all such as are acted with any violent Passion, since in the time of their Perturbation, the Animal Spirits so forcibly imprint the Traces and Images of their Passion, that they are unable to think of any thing else.

But 'tis to be observ'd that the Imagination of the weakest Minds, and the most soft and tender Brains that be, are not in danger of being corrupted by this sort of People, for two very good Reasons. The first is, that being unable to conform their Answers to the Idea's of others, they are as unable to perswade them to any thing: and the second is, that their Discourse is always heard with contempt, upon the account of so visible a Disorder in their Brain.

'Tis true however, that Men in a Passion infect the Spectators with the same, and strike their Imagination with Impressions like to those they feel themselves. But because the outrage is so visible, the Impressions it makes are resisted, and a little time will quite discard them. They wear off of themselves, when no longer fed and supply'd, by the Cause that produc'd them; that is, when the transported Person is out of sight, and the sensible View of the Features the Passion drew upon the Face, produces no more alterations in the Fibres of the Brain, nor Agitations in the Animal Spirits.

My Design is only to examine that sort of Strong and Vigorous Imagination, which consists in a Disposition of Brain fit and proper to receive very deep Impressions, from the weakest and least-active Objects.

'Tis no Imperfection to have a Brain dispos'd for the imagining things strongly, and receiving most distinct and lively Images of the most inconsiderable Objects: provided the Soul still superintends the Imagination, and these Traces be imprinted by her Orders, and expung'd by her Commands: 'tis on the contrary the Original of Subtilty and Strength of Wit. But when the Imagination lords it over the Soul, and these Traces, without staying for the Orders of the Will, are stamp'd by the Disposition of the Brain, by the Action of Objects and the Animal Spirits, 'tis manifestly a base and mischievous Quality, and a kind of Folly. Let us try to discover their Character, whose Imagination is wrought in this manner.

And in order to this, it ought to be re-minded, that the Capacity of the Mind is very narrow, and that there is nothing so cumbersom, as I may say, or so soon takes it up, as the Sensations of the Soul, and in general all the Perceptions of Objects that vehemently affect us; and that the deep Traces of the Brain are ever attended with Sensations or other Perceptions, which challenge a great Application of the Mind. In remembring this, 'twill be easy to lay open the Minds of Men of Strong Imagination, and to discover their real Characters.

V. *Two considerable Imperfections of Men of a Strong Imagination.*

The first whereof is their Incapacity to judge prudently of things any whit difficult and intricate; because the extent of their Minds, being fill'd with Idea's naturally annex'd to these deep Traces, they are not at liberty of thinking on many things at the same time: when as in Compound Questions the Mind, by a quick and desultory Motion, must run over the Idea's of a great many things, and survey at one View all the Relations and Dependencies, that necessarily go to the Resolution of the Questions.

Every one is conscious from his own Experience, how impossible it is to contemplate any abstract Truth, when he is under the Sense of Pain, that is any thing violent: the reason whereof is, that the deep Traces then printed on the Brain, possess the Capacity of the Mind. Thus those we are speaking of, having as is suppos'd, deeper Traces of the same Objects than others, must have a Mind of narrower Bounds, and incapable of embracing so many things. The first Defect therefore of these Men, is their having a little Mind, and so much the less, as their Brain is the more yielding and obedient to the Impressions of Objects, and receives deeper Traces from such of them as are less considerable.

The second is their being *Visionists*, but in so subtile and delicate a way, as is hard to be discover'd; and which makes the common sort of Men not think them so: and 'tis only the accurate and clear sighted Minds, that are apprehensive of their Visions, and the rambling of their Fancy.

For the understanding the Original of this Defect, we must farther call to Mind what has been said at the beginning of the Second Book; that in regard of what happens in the Brain, the *Senses* and *Imagination* differ only in degree of *more* or *less*; and that 'tis the largeness and depth of the Traces that make the Soul sensible of Objects, make her judge them as present, and in capacity to affect her; and lastly near enough to her, to make her feel Pleasure and Pain: for when the Traces are little, the Soul only imagines the Object of them, she judges it not as present, nor looks upon it as very great and considerable. But in proportion as these Traces grow larger and deeper, the Soul judges the Object to be bigger and more considerable, that it approaches nearer to us, and in conclusion is capable of touching and hurting us.

The *Visionists* I speak of are not arriv'd to that high degree of Folly, as to believe they see before their Eyes the Objects that are absent. The Traces of their Brain are not so deep as that comes to. They are not so thorow-pac'd in their Madness; for if they were, it would be in vain to talk of them here, since their Delusions would be so visible, that no Man could be impos'd on by them. They are not *Visionists* of Sense therefore, but of Imagination only. Madmen and Phrenetick are *Visionists* of the former sort, for that they *see* not things as they *are*, and frequently *see* those that *are not*. But our *Visionists* are of the latter sort, since they *Imagine* things quite otherwise than they *are*, and *Imagine* likewise those that *are* not. And yet 'tis evident, that the *Visionists* of Sense, differ from the *Visionists* of the Imagination only *Secundum plus & minus*; and the passage is frequent from one Condition to the other. For which reason we should represent the distemper'd Mind of the latter, by comparing it with that of the former, as being of a more sensible Nature, and making greater Impression on the Soul, since in things that differ thus only in degree, those that are *less* Sensible ought to be explain'd by Analogy to those that are *more* so.

The second Imperfection then, as has been seen, of Men of a Strong and Vigorous Imagination, is their being *Visionists of Imagination* or simply *Visionists*: since the *Visionists of Sense* go by the Name of Madmen. I come now to shew the ill Qualities of these *Visionary* Wits.

They exceed all Bounds, and keep no Mean upon any occasion, lightning what is low and mean, and magnifying what is little, and bringing close what's remote; since nothing appears to them as it is. They admire or exclaim at every thing indifferently, without Judgement and Discretion. If their Natural Complection disposes them to Fear, I mean if their Animal Spirits be few in number, weak and unactive, they shall be frighted at the least thing in Nature, and tremble at the fall of a Leaf. Whereas if they abound with Blood, and Spirits the more common thing of the two; they shall feed upon empty hopes, and giving themselves up to their luxuriant Imaginations, build (as we say) Castles in the Air, with mighty Joy and Satisfaction. They are vehement in their Passions, head-strong in Opinions, and ever well satisfy'd with themselves. But when once they are ambitious of being look't upon as the Wits of the Age, and set up for Authors, (for there are Authors of all sorts, *Visionists* and others;) Good God! what Extravagancies, Whimsies, and Irregular Motions do we see! wherein Nature has nothing to do, where all is Affected, forc'd, and Bombastick. They never stir but they are upon the Prance, every Step must be in Time and Measure, and all proceeds in Figures and Hyperboles. If again the Humour takes them to be Religious, and their own Fancies be their Guide, they turn absolutely *Jews* and *Pharisees*; sticking usually to the surface and shadow; and being wholly taken up with the outside Ceremonies, and little Practices of small or no importance. Hence they become Scrupulous, Timorous, and Superstitious; to whom every thing is Faith, every thing Essential, except that which is truly Faith and Essential. For the most material and weighty things of the Gospel, *Justice*, *Mercy*, and *Faith*, are frequently neglected; whilst their Mind is entertain'd with their Tithing *Mint* and *Cummin*, with the less important Duties of Religion. But here the Subject grows too plentiful, and there is no need of making farther Reflection than on what occurs in their ordinary Conversations, to be satisfy'd of these Failings, and to observe several others.

But Men of a Strong and Vigorous Imagination have still other Qualities, very necessary to be throughly explain'd. For hitherto we have treated only of their Defects, and we should

do them Juſtice now in ſpeaking of their Advantages: one whereof among the reſt, more eſpecially belongs to our Subject; becauſe it is upon the Strength of that they domineer over the Vulgar ſort of Minds; they enter them into their Thoughts, and communicate all the falſe Impreſſions to them, which themſelves are affected withall.

VI. *That Men of a Strong Imagination eaſily perſwade.*

This Advantage conſiſts in a Facility of Expreſſing themſelves in a ſtrong and lively, though unnatural, manner. Such as imagine things ſtrongly, expreſs them with much vehemence, and perſwade all thoſe that are convinc'd, more by the ſenſible Manner and Impreſſion, than by the force of Argument: For the Brains of Men of Strong Imaginations receiving, as has been ſaid, deep Impreſſions of the Subjects they imagine, theſe Impreſſions are naturally purſued by a great Commotion of the Spirits, which diſpoſes their whole Body to ſet off their Thoughts in a ready and lively manner of Expreſſion. The Air of the Face, the Tone of the Voice, the Elegancy of their Words animating their Expreſſions, prepare the Spectators and Hearers for Attention, and diſpoſe them to a Machinal Reception of the Image miprinted by the Speakers. For in fine, when a Man is affected with what he ſays, he generally affects others with it too; as a Man in a Paſſion never fails to be moving: Though his *Rhetorick* be Inartificial and Irregular, yet he is ſure of gaining his point, becauſe the Air and external Demeanour ſtrike upon the Senſes, and act in a livelier way on the Imagination, than the moſt powerful Diſcourſes coldly pronounc'd: for as much as theſe Diſcourſes don't gratify the Senſes, nor affect the Imagination.

Theſe Men then have the Advantage of Pleaſing, Moving, and Perſwading, becauſe of their *Imaging* their Thoughts in a moſt lively and ſenſible manner: Though there be other Cauſes contributing to the Conqueſt they obtain over the Mind of others. For they moſt commonly Diſcourſe upon obvious and eaſy Subjects, and ſuited to vulgar Capacities. Then they only make uſe of ſuch Terms and Expreſſions as raiſe the confus'd Notions of the Senſes, which are ever very Strong and *Pathetical*; and when they treat of Lofty and Difficult Subjects, 'tis in a looſe and common-place way, without venturing a Diſcuſſion of Particulars, and fixing to Principles; whether becauſe they underſtand not the Points in debate, or are fearful of being at a loſs for Terms, or of perplexing or tiring the Minds of ſuch as are not capable of much Attention.

And now we may readily judge from what has been ſaid, that the Diſorders of the Imagination are extreamly contagious, and that they inſinuate and diffuſe themſelves into moſt Minds with a great deal of eaſe: But whereas thoſe who are of a Strong Imagination, are generally enemies to Reaſon, and irreconcileable to good Senſe; becauſe of the littleneſs of their Minds, and the Viſions they are ſubject to; 'tis manifeſt to be ſeen there are few more general Cauſes of our Errors, than this contagious Communication of the Diſorders and Diſtempers of the Imagination: But theſe Truths deſerve to be farther Illuſtrated by the Examples, and known Experience of the *World*.

CHAP. II.

General Inſtances of the Strength of Imagination.

CHILDREN in reſpect of their Fathers, but eſpecially Daughters in regard of their Mothers, afford us very frequent Inſtances of this Communication of the Imagination: The ſame things do Servants in Relation to their Maſters, Maids in Reſpect of their Miſtreſſes, Scholars of their Teachers, Courtiers of their Kings, and generally all Inferiours in Reſpect of their Superiours; ſuppoſing only that Fathers, Maſters, and the reſt of the Superiours have any Strength of Imagination themſelves. For otherwiſe 'tis poſſible for Children and Servants to remain untouch'd, or very little infected, with the languid Imagination of their Fathers and Maſters.

The Effects of this Communication may be likewiſe obſerv'd in Equals: but that more rarely, for want of that Submiſſive Reſpect among them, which qualifies and diſpoſes the Mind for the Reception of the Impreſſions of Strong Imaginations, without examining them: Laſtof all, they are to be ſeen in Superiours alſo, with Reſpect to their Inferiours, who ſometimes are impower'd with ſo Lively and Authoritative an Imagination, as to turn the Minds of their Maſters and Superiours which way they pleaſe.

'Twill be eaſy to conceive how Fathers and Mothers make ſo very Strong Impreſſions on the Imagination of their Children, if it be conſider'd, that the *Natural* Diſpoſitions of our Brain, whereby we are inclin'd to imitate thoſe we live with, and to participate of their Sentiments and Paſſions, are ſtronger in Children with Reſpect to their Parents, than in any others; whereof ſeveral Reaſons may be given. The firſt is their being of the ſame Blood: For as Parents commonly tranſmit to their Children the Seeds and Diſpoſitions for certain hereditary Diſtempers; ſuch as the *Gout*, *Stone*, *Folly*; and generally all thoſe that were not of Accidental Acquirement, or whoſe ſole and only Cauſe was not ſome extraordinary Fermentation of the Humours, as Feavers and ſome others: (for of ſuch 'tis plain there can

be no Communication) So they imprint the Diſpoſitions of their own Brain on the Brain of their Children, and give a certain Turn to their Imagination, that makes them wholly ſuſceptible of the ſame Sentiments.

The ſecond Reaſon is the little Acquaintance and Converſe Children generally have with other Men, who might ſometimes ſtamp different Impreſſes on their Brain, and in ſome meaſure interrupt the bent and force of the Paternal Impreſſion. For as a Man, that was never abroad, commonly Fancies that the Manners and Cuſtoms of Strangers are quite contrary to Reaſon, becauſe contrary to the uſuage of his Native Town, or Cuſtom of his Country, whilſt he yields to be carry'd by the current: ſo a Child, who was never from his Father's Home, imagines his Parents Sentiments and Ways of living to be Univerſal Reaſon, or rather thinks there are no other Principles of Reaſon or Vertue to be had, than in the Imitation of them. Which makes him believe, whatever he hears them ſay; and do, whatever he ſees them do.

But this Parental Impreſſion is ſo ſtrong, as not only to influence the Child's Imagination, but to have its Effect on the other parts of the Body. So that a young Lad ſhall Walk and Talk, and have the ſame Geſtures as his Father: And a Girl ſhall Mimick the Mother in her Gate, Diſcourſe, and Dreſs: If the Mother Liſps, the Daughter muſt Liſp too; if the Mother has any odd fling with her Head, the Daughter takes the ſame: In ſhort, Children imitate their Parents in every thing, even in their Bodily Defects, Grimace, and Faces; as well as their Errors, and Vices.

There are ſtill many other Cauſes, which add to the Effect of this Impreſſion. The chief of which are, the Authority of the Parents, the Dependance of Children, and the mutual Love between them: But theſe Cauſes are as common to Courtiers, Servants, and in general to all Inferiours, as to Children; I therefore chooſe to explain them by the Inſtance of the Court Gentlemen.

There are thoſe who judge by what's in ſight, of that which is unapparent; of the Greatneſs, Strength, and Reach of Wit, and Parts, which they ſee not; by the Gallantry, Honours, and Riches which they know; and meaſure the one by the other: And that Dependency Men are in to the Great, the Deſire of partaking of their Greatneſs, and that ſenſible Luſtre that ſurrounds them, makes them aſcribe *Honours Divine*, if I may ſo ſpeak, to *Mortal Men*. For *GOD* beſtows on Princes *Authority*, but Men attribute to them *Infallibility*: Such an Infallibility as has no Boundaries preſcrib'd to it, on any ſubject, or any occaſion, nor is confin'd to certain Ceremonies. For the *Great* know all things naturally; they are ever in the Right, even in the Deciſion of Queſtions, which they do not underſtand: None attempt to examine their Poſitions, but thoſe who want Experience and the Art of Living; and 'tis Preſumption and want of Reſpect to doubt of them. But 'tis no leſs than Rebellion, at leaſt down-right Folly, Sottiſhneſs, and Madneſs, to condemn them.

But when we are Honour'd with a Place in the Favour and Eſteem of Great Men, 'tis no longer plain Obſtinacy, Conceitedneſs, and Rebellion; 'tis a Crime of a deeper Dye; Ingratitude, and Perfidiouſneſs, not to ſurrender implicitly to their Opinions. 'Tis ſuch an unpardonable Offence as utterly incapacitates us for any of their future Favours. Which is the Reaſon that Courtiers, and by a neceſſary Conſequence the Generality of the World, indeliberately ſubſcribe to the Sentiments of their Sovereign, even ſo far as to Model their Faith by, and make the Truths of Religion ſubſervient to his Fantaſtick Humour and Folly.

England and *Germany* furniſh us but with too many Inſtances, of the blind and exorbitant Submiſſion of the People to the Wills of their Irreligious Princes, wherewith the Hiſtories of the late Times abound: and ſome Men of a conſiderable Age, have been known to have chang'd their *Religion* four or five times, by reaſon of the diverſe changes of their *Princes*.

Artic. 37. of the Religion of the Church of England.

The *Kings* and even the *Queens of England have the Government of all the States of their Kingdoms, whether Eccleſiaſtical or Civil in all Cauſes*. 'Tis they that are the Approvers of the *Liturgies*, of the *Feſtival Services*, of the way wherein the *Sacraments* ought to be Adminiſtred and Received. They appoint, for inſtance, that our *LORD* ſhall not be adored in the *Euchariſt*, though they oblige to the Receiving it on the Knees, according to the Ancient Cuſtom. In a word, they arbitrarily change the whole Subſtance of their *Liturgies*, to ſute them to the New Articles of their Faith; and together with their *Parliament*, have equal Right of judging of theſe Articles, as a *Pope* with a *Councel*; as may be ſeen in the Statutes of *England* and *Ireland*, made at the beginning of the Reign of Queen *Elizabeth*. Laſtly, we may add that the Kings of *England* have a greater Juriſdiction over the *Spirituals*, than the *Temporals* of their Subjects; becauſe thoſe wretched People, thoſe *Children of this World*, are leſs concern'd for the Preſervation of their *Faith*, than the Security of their *Fortunes*; and readily embrace the Opinions of their Princes, when their Temporal Intereſt ſtands not in the way.

The Revolutions which have happen'd to Religion in *Sweden* and *Denmark*, may ſerve as a farther Evidence of the Power ſome Minds have over others; though indeed all thoſe Revolutions were contributed to, by many other very conſiderable Cauſes. Which ſurprizing Changes are ſo many Proofs of the Contagious Communication of the Imagination, but Proofs too vaſt and mighty; and ſuch as confound and dazle the Mind, rather than enlighten it; becauſe

there are too many Causes concurring to the Production of these great Events. When Courtiers and all Men else, so commonly give up the Interest of Infallible Truths, Essential Truths; Truths that are necessary to be asserted, unless a Man resolve upon Everlasting Destruction: How can it be expected they should run any hazard in the Defense of Abstract Truths of as little Certainty, as they are of Use? If the Religion of the Prince makes the Religion of his Subjects; the Reason of the Prince will be the Reason of his Subjects too; and so the Sentiments of the Prince, his Pleasures, his Passions, his Sports, his Habit, and generally all his Actions will be *A-la-mode:* For the Prince himself being as the Original and Essential Mode, nothing that is derived from him will be out of Fashion: And since all the Irregularities of the Fashion become Graces and Beauties, 'tis no wonder that Princes act so forcibly on the Imagination of other Men.

If *Alexander* holds his Head awry, his Courtiers will have theirs in the same Posture: If *Dionysius* the Tyrant apply himself to *Geometry* upon *Plato*'s Arrival in *Syracuse*, *Geometry* grows the Study of the Court; and the King's Palace, says *Plutarch*, is presently fill'd with dust, by the vast number of those that are drawing Figures in it. But as soon as *Plato* is disgusted with the Tyrant, and the Tyrant disliking his Study betakes himself afresh to his Pleasures: The Courtiers turn Voluptuaries to accompany him. 'One would think, con-'tinues that Author, they were enchanted, and that some *Circe* had Metamorphos'd them 'into other Men. Their Affection for *Philosophy* grows into an Affection for *Debauchery*; and their Abhorrence of *Debauchery*, into the Abhorrence of *Philosophy*. And thus Princes can change Vices into Vertues, and Vertues into Vices; and one word of their Mouth is able to reverse all the Idea's of them. One Royal Word or Gesture, a Frown or a Lip, shall debase true Science and Learning, into *Pedantry;* entitle Rashness, Brutality, and Cruelty, to the repute of Valour and Greatness of Courage; and make Libertinism and Profaneness, pass for Force and Liberty of Thought.

Plutarch. Moral. *How to distinguish the Flatterer from the Friend.*

But this, as all that I have been saying, supposes that Princes have a Strong and Lively Imagination; since if it were Weak and Languishing, they could not Animate their Discourse, nor give it that Lively Turn and Vehemence, requisite to Master and Inslave the weaker Minds.

And now if the Imagination all alone, and unassisted with the supplies of Reason, can produce so surprizing Effects; there is nothing so Fantastical or Extravagant, but it will perswade, when back'd and supported with any apparent Reasons.

'Tis related by an Ancient Author, That in *Ethiopia* the Courtiers crippl'd and deform'd themselves, lop't off a Limb or two, and sometimes even died, to imitate their Princes. 'Twas as scandalous to be seen with a Pair of Eyes, or to walk upright in the Retinue of a crooked and One-ey'd King; as it would be ridiculous to appear at Court now a-days in Ruffs and Caps, or in white Buskins and gilded Spurs. This *Ethiopian* Fashion was as Extravagant and incommodious, as can be imagin'd; but yet it was the Fashion: it was cheerfully follow'd by the Court, and the Pain to be indur'd was less thought on, than the Honour a Man purchas'd by manifesting so generous an Affection for his King: In short, this Mode, when supported by a pretended Reason of Friendship, grew up into a Custom and a Law that obtain'd a considerable Time.

Diodor. Sicul. Bibl. Lib. 3.

We learn from the Relations of those who have travell'd in the *Levant*, that this Custom is observ'd in several Countries; as also some others, as inconsistent with Reason and good Sense. But there is no necessity of twice cutting the *Line*, to see Unreasonable Laws and Customs religiously observ'd; we may find the Patrons of Fantastical and inconvenient Fashions nearer Home: our own Country will supply us with enough. Where ever there are Men not insensible to Passions, and the Imagination has the supremacy over Reason; there will be Fantastical Humours, and Humours unaccountable. If there be not so much Pain to be suffer'd in going with bare Breasts, in the most rigid Winter Season, and stoving up the Body in the excessive Heats of Summer; as in the plucking out an Eye, or cutting off an Arm; yet the Shame should certainly be greater. I confess the Pain is not so great, but neither is the Reason of undergoing it so apparent: and so the Extravagance comes at least to an even poize. For an *Ethiopian* might, in justifying himself, say he pluck'd out an Eye, out of a point of Loyalty and Honour: But what should a *Christian* Lady say for Exposing what Nature and Religion oblige her to conceal? Perhaps, that she did it, because 'twas the Fashion, and for no other Reason. But she ought to know, That 'tis an Extravagant, Inconvenient, Unseemly, and Shameful Fashion on all Accounts, and proceeds from nothing but a manifest Corruption of Reason, and a secret Depravation of Heart; and cannot be favour'd or follow'd without Scandal, and openly siding with the Corruption of the Imagination against Reason; with Impurity against Purity; with the Spirit of the World against the Spirit of *GOD*. In a word, to follow this Mode is to violate both the Laws of Reason, and of the Gospel: But what matters that, you'll say, it is the *Mode;* that is a Law more Sacred and Inviolable, than that written by the Finger of *GOD* upon the Tables of *Moses*, and those graven by his Spirit on the Hearts of *Christians*.

And indeed I cannot see that the *English* or *French* have much Reason to laugh at the *Ethiopians* and *Savages:* At the first time of seeing a Crippl'd or One-ey'd King, in the Front of a

Train of Lame and Halt-sighted Courtiers; I confeſs a Man would ſcarce forbear laughing: But time would make it familiar, and inſtead of ridiculing them for an Infirmity of Mind, he would more admire perhaps the Greatneſs of their Courage, and Perfection of their Friendſhip. But 'tis not ſo with the Faſhions of our Modern Ladies: Their Extravagancies have no pretended Reaſon to uphold them, if they have the Advantage of being leſs troubleſome, they ſtand chargeable however with being more irrational. In ſhort, they bear the Character of ſo corrupt an Age, as nothing is found ſufficient to rectify the Diſorders of Imagination in it.

What has been ſaid of Courtiers, ought likewiſe to be underſtood of Servants in reſpect of their Maſters, Maids in reſpect of their Miſtreſſes; and not to make an impertinent Induction of particulars, of all Inferiors in reſpect of their Superiors; and eſpecially of Children in reſpect of their Parents: For as much as they have a very peculiar Dependance on them, are cheriſh'd and brought up tenderly by them, which is not done in the reſt; and laſtly, becauſe Reaſon inclines Children to ſuch Submiſſion and Reſpect, as Reaſon it ſelf cannot always regulate.

'Tis not abſolutely neceſſary for the influencing the Imagination of others to have ſome Authority over them, and that they have ſome kind of Dependance on us; the ſole Strength of Imagination is ſometimes ſufficient to do it: 'Tis common for Strangers, for Men of no Reputation, for ſuch as we are not prepoſſeſs'd with any Eſteem of, to have ſuch force of Imagination, and conſequently ſo lively and charming Expreſſions, as to perſwade us without our knowing either for what end, or by what means we were perſwaded; I confeſs it ſeems ſtrange it ſhould be ſo, but yet there is nothing commoner.

Now this imaginative Perſwaſion muſt proceed from the force of a Viſionary Wit, who has a lively way of Talking, without knowing what he ſays; and who thus brings over the Minds of Hearers to give a ſtrong aſſent, without knowing what 'tis they aſſent to. For the generality of Men give way to the force of the ſenſible Impreſſion, and ſuffer it to break in upon them; and ſo it dazles and confounds them, and makes them paſſionately judge of what they confuſedly conceiv'd. We deſire ſuch as ſhall read this Work, to conſider this thing, to obſerve the Inſtances of it in the Companies they light upon; and to make Reflection on what happens in their own Breaſt on ſuch occaſions; which will be a thing of greater uſe to them, than they can imagine.

But it ſhould be well conſider'd that there are two things, which wonderfully contribute to the Power of other's Imagination over us: The firſt is, a grave and pious Deportment; the ſecond, a Preſumptuous and Libertine Behaviour. For accordingly as we are diſpos'd to Piety or Libertiniſm, we ſhall find an Air of Gravity and Piety in Diſcourſe, or a Preſumptuous and Libertine ſtrain ſhall act very differently upon us.

'Tis true, the one is of more dangerous contagion than the other; but yet we ſhould equally reſiſt the ſenſible Manners of either ſide; and only ſubmit to the force of the Reaſons they are attended with; For Ridiculous Nonſenſe and Impertinence may be ſpoke in a grave and ſober way; and Blaſphemy and Profaneneſs, with an Air of Devotion. Wherefore we ſhould, following the Advice of St. *John*, examine *Whether the Spirits be of GOD*; and not truſt all ſorts of Spirits. We know the *Devils* ſometimes transform themſelves into *Angels of Light*; and there are Men who have, as it were, naturally the Mein of Piety, and Look of Religion, and conſequently a well-eſtabliſh'd Reputation in the World; who yet exempt Men from their Eſſential Obligations, even from the Loving *GOD* and their Neighbour; to inſlave them to ſome fooliſh Practices, or *Phariſaick* Ceremony.

But the Strong Imaginations, whoſe Impreſſion and Contagion ſhould more induſtriouſly be avoided, are of Men abroad in the World, who affect the being reputed the *Bold Wits*; which is a Reputation eaſily acquired. For 'tis but denying, with a particular Grace, *Original Sin*, the *Immortality of the Soul*, or ridiculing ſome Receiv'd Opinion of the Church, to ſet up for ſuch an accompliſh'd Wit among the Vulgar.

Theſe little Minds are generally full of Life and Fire, of a forward and haughty Carriage, which ſways and diſpoſes Weak Imaginations, to yield to the vivid and plauſible Diſcourſe, which to any Thinking Man will appear to have nothing in it. For as happy as they are at Expreſſing, they have but very ill luck at Reaſoning. And yet whilſt Men, though never ſo Rational, had rather be mov'd and affected with Senſible Pleaſure, that attends the way of Delivery, and the ſpecious Expreſſions; than to enter with an irkſome Diſquiſition of the Reaſons; 'tis viſible theſe Minds muſt have the aſcendant over others, and ſo propagate their Contagion and their Errors, by the Authority they have over the Imagination of other Men.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

I. *Of the Force of ſome Authors Imagination.* II. *Of* Tertullian.

ONE of the greateſt and moſt notorious Proofs of the Power ſome Imaginations have over others, is the Prevalency ſome Authors have of perſwading without Reaſons. For Inſtance, The Turn *Tertullian*, *Seneca*, *Montagne*, and ſome others give their Diſcourſe, has thoſe Charms and Luſtre, which dazle the Minds of moſt Men; though it be only a faint Draught of Fancy, and as it were, the Shadow of thoſe Authors Imagination. Their Words, as dead and inanimate as they are, have greater Vigour than the Reaſons of others: They enter, they penetrate, they domineer in the Soul at ſo imperious a rate, as to challenge Obedience without being underſtood, and make their Orders ſubmitted to, before they are known. A Man has a Mind to believe, but he knows not what. When he would know what 'tis he would believe, and approaches, as I may ſay, thoſe fleeting Phantoms, to take a View of them, they diſſipate into ſmoak with all their gawdy Drapery and Luſtre.

But, though theſe Authors I have nam'd, are the moſt proper Inſtances that can be given, to ſhew the Power of ſome Men's Imaginations over others, and I propoſe them for that purpoſe; yet I pretend not to condemn them in every thing. For I cannot forbear having an Eſteem for thoſe particular Beauties that are in them, and a Deference to that univerſal Approbation they have had for many Ages; I muſt declare I have a great Veneration for ſome of *Tertullian*'s Works, and eſpecially for his *Apology againſt the Gentiles*, and his Book of *Preſcriptions againſt Hereticks*; and for ſome parts of the Books of *Seneca*; though I have very little Eſteem for any thing of *Montague*. *See the Illuſtrations.*

Tertullian was indeed a Man of profound Learning, but of a better Memory than Judgement; and had a greater Penetration and Extent of Imagination, than of Intellect. There is no doubt but he was a *Viſionift*, in the Senſe I have before explain'd; and was fraught with moſt of the Qualities I have attributed to the *Viſionary* Wits: And the Veneration he had for *Montanus*'s *Viſions* and his *Propheteſſes*, are an undoubted Demonſtration of the Weakneſs of his Judgement: His fervent Zeal, and Tranſports, and *Enthuſiaſms* upon trifling Subjects, are a ſenſible Indication of a diſtemper'd Imagination. What irregular Motions are there in his *Hyperboles* and *Figures*? How many pompous and magnificent Arguments that owe all their force to their ſenſible Luſtre, and perſwade meerly by giddying and dazling the Mind?

To what purpoſe, for inſtance, does that Author, in juſtifying his wearing the Philoſophers Gown inſtead of the uſual one, alledge this Habit was formerly in Faſhion in the City *Carthage*? Should we at preſent wear *Ruffs* and *Caps*, becauſe they were in uſe in the days of our Farefathers? And might not Women as well put on old-faſhion'd *Hoods* and *Fardingales*, though it be not the *Carnival*, when they would diſguiſe themſelves to go a *Maſquerading*?

What could be concluded from thoſe pompous and magnificent Deſcriptions of the Changes the World undergoes, and what could they contribute to his Apology? The Moon has different *Phaſes*, the Year changes its Seaſons, and the Fields have another Countenance in *Summer* than in *Winter*. Inundations lay whole Provinces under Water; and Earthquakes ſwallow them up: New Cities are built, and new Colonies planted; and People in ſwarms have over-run and depopulated entire Countries: and therefore the common *Toga* ſhould be chang'd for the Philoſophick *Pallium*. What Affinity is there between the thing to be prov'd, and all theſe Changes, and ſeveral others he's at great Pains to find out, and which he deſcribes in unnatural, obſcure, and bombaſtick Expreſſions? The *Peacock* varies every ſtep he makes; and the *Serpent* gliding into a narrow hole, ſlips out of its Skin, and grows young again; why then ſhould not we change our Habit? Could any Man in his Wits and in Cold Blood, make ſuch Inferences as theſe? could any that ſhould hear him, hold from laughing? did not this Author make giddy the Head, and confound the Intellect of his Reader?

Almoſt all the remainder of that little Book *De Pallio*, is fill'd with Reaſons as forreign to his Subject as theſe; which certainly prove nothing, but only amuſe ſuch as are lyable to be amus'd: But 'tis needleſs to inſiſt longer on this *Topick*: It may ſuffice to ſay, That if Accuracy of Thought, and Clearneſs and Diſtinctneſs of Diſcourſe, ſhould always appear in whatever a Man writes, (ſince the end of Writing is to manifeſt the Truth) 'tis impoſſible to excuſe this Author, who, by the Teſtimony of *Salmaſius*, the beſt of our Modern *Criticks*, has laid out all his Endeavours to become obſcure; and has ſo well ſucceeded in that Deſign, that this Commentator ſcarce forbore ſwearing, that no Man ever perfectly underſtood him. But ſuppoſing the *Genius* of the Nation, the Humour of the Mode that then prevail'd, and laſtly the Nature of *Satyr* or Raillery, might in ſome meaſure juſtify this notable Deſign of being Myſterious and incomprehenſible: yet all this could never atone for the pitiful Reaſons and the Ramblings of an Author, who in many of his Works, as well as this, ſpeaks what ever comes in's Head; provided it be ſome unordinary Thought, which he can ſet off in ſome bold Expreſſion, with hopes of making Oſtentation of the force, or I might ſay, the corruption of his Imagination.

Chap. 2. & 3. De Pallio.

Multos etiam vidi poſtquam bene æſtuaſſent, ut eum aſſequerentur, nihil præter ſudorem & inanem animi fatigationem lucratos, ab ejus lectione diſceſſiſſe. Sic qui *Scotinus* haberi videriq; dignus, qui hoc cognomentum habere voluit, adeo quod voluit a ſeipſo impetravit, & efficere id quod obtabat valuit, ut liquido jurare auſim neminem ad hoc tempus extitiſſe qui poſſit jurare hunc libellum a capite ad calcem uſq; totum a ſe non minus bene intellectum quam lectum. *Salm. in Epiſt. ded. Comment. in Tert.*

CHAP. IV.

Of the Imagination of Seneca.

THE Imagination of *Seneca* is ſometimes as irregular as *Tertullian's*: His impetuous Motions carrying him into unknown Regions; where yet he walks with as great confidence and ſecurity, as if he knew where he was, and whither he was tending. Whenever he makes large ſteps, ſteps in Figures, and exactly meaſur'd; he fancies he is far advanc'd: whereas he imitates the Dancers, that always end where they begin.

We ought to diſtinguiſh the Force and Beauty of Words, from the Force and Evidence of Reaſons. There is doubtleſs much Force, and ſome Beauty in the Words of *Seneca*; but very little Strength and Evidence in his Reaſons: By the Force of Imagination, he gives ſuch a Turn to his Words, as moves, agitates, and perſwades by the Impreſſion they make on us; but he fails to give that Diſtinctneſs and pure Light, which illuminates and perſwades by Evidence. His Conviction depends on the Commotion he raiſes, and the Pleaſure he ſuggeſts; but ſuch as can read him ſedately and undiſturb'd, that can take heed of Surprize, and are us'd to no other Conviction than that of Clearneſs and Evidence of Reaſon, will not, I dare ſay, be convinc'd by his Diſcourſe. For in ſhort, ſo he talks handſomly, he is but little ſolicitous about what he ſays; as if it were poſſible a Man ſhould ſpeak well, without knowing what he ſpeaks. And thus he commonly perſwades, without our knowing why or how we are perſwaded; as if it were reaſonable to be convinc'd of any thing without a diſtinct Knowledge of it, and Examination of the Parts that demonſtrate it.

What can there be more ſtately than the Idea he gives us of his *Wiſe-man*; and yet what at the bottom is more vain and fantaſtical? The Portraicture he draws of *Plato* is too fine to be Natural: but 'tis ſuch Paint and Varniſh, as puts upon none but the unthinking ſort of Men, and thoſe that are unacquainted with Nature. *Cato* was a Man, and ſubject to the Miſery of Men: 'Twas only a Fancy that he was Invulnerable, or that when he was ſtruck, he was not hurt: He had neither the hardneſs of Adamant to be impenetrable by the Iron, nor the ſtability of Rocks to be unſhaken by the Floods, as *Seneca* pretends. In a word, he was not inſenſible; as *Seneca* himſelf is oblig'd to acknowledge, when his Imagination is a little cool'd, and he reflects a little better on what he ſays. *Itaque non refert quam multa in illum tela conjiciantur, cum ſit nulli penetrabilis; quomodo quorundam lapidum inexpugnabilis ferro duritia eſt: nec ſecari adamas, aut cædi vel teri poteſt, ſed incurrentia ultrò retundit: quemadmodum projecti in altum ſcopuli mare frangunt, nec ipſi ulla ſævitiæ veſtigia tot verberati ſæculis oſtentant: Ita ſapientis animus ſolidus eſt, & id roboris collegit, ut tam tutus ſit ab injuriâ, quam illa quæ extuli.* Sen. c. 5. Tract. *Quod in ſapientem non cadit injuria.*

But what? will he not grant that his *Wiſe-man* may become miſerable, when he acknowledges he is not inſenſible to Pain? No by no means; Pain can never affect him, nor the fear of it diſquiet him: For his *Wiſe-man* is Paramount to Fortune, and above the Malice of Men: and they are incapable of giving him any Diſturbance.

Adſum hoc vobis probaturus, ſub iſto tot civitatum everſore munimenta incurſu arietis labefieri, & turrium altitudinem cuniculis ac latentibus foſſis repentè reſidere, & æquaturum editiſſimas arces aggerem creſcere. At nulla machinamenta poſſe reperiri, quæ bene fundatum animum agitent. And lower: *Non Babylonis muros illi contuleris, quos Alexander intravit; non Carthaginis, aut Numantiæ mœnia una manu capta: non Capitolium arcemve, habent iſta hoſtile veſtigium.* Cap. 6.

Quid tu putas cùm ſtolidus ille Rex multitudine telorum diem obſcuraſſet, ullam ſagittam in Solem incidiſſe: ut cœleſtia humanas manus effugiunt, & ab his qui templa diruunt, aut ſimulachra conflant, nihil divinitati nocetur; ita quicquid fit in ſapientem, protervè, petulanter, ſuperbè fruſtrà tentatur. Cap. 4. *Inter fragorem templorum ſuper Deos ſuos cadentium uni homini pax fuit.* Cap. 5.

Non eſt ut dicas ita ut ſoles, hunc ſapientem noſtrum nuſquam invèniri. Non fingimus iſtud humani ingenii vanum decus, nec ingentem imaginem rei falſæ concipimus: ſed qualem confirmamus, & exhibuimus, & exibebimus. Cæterùm hic ipſe M. Cato vereor ne ſuprà noſtrum exemplar ſit. Cap. 7.

Videor mihi intueri animum tuum incenſum, & effervescentem: paras acclamare. Hæc ſunt quæ auctoritatem præceptis veſtris detrahant. Magna promittitis, & quæ ne optari quidem nedum credi poſſunt. And lower: *Ita ſublato altè ſupercilio in eadem, quæ cæteri, deſcenditis mutatis rerum nominibus; tale itaque aliquid, & in hoc eſſe ſuſpicor, quod prima ſpecie pulchrum atque magnificum eſt, nec injuriam, nec contumeliam accepturum eſſe ſapientem.* And lower: *Ego verò ſapientem non imaginario honore verborum exornare conſtitui, ſed eo loco ponere, quo nulla perveniat injuria.*

Battering Rams, and other Engines of War, will ſhake the Walls and Towers of the ſtrongeſt Garriſons, and in time level them with the Earth: But what Machines are found ſufficient to ſhake the Impregnable Mind of the Wiſe-man? Compare not with him the Walls of *Babylon* forc'd

forc'd by *Alexander*; nor those of *Carthage* and *Numantia*, that one General overturn'd. Nor lastly, the *Capitol*, and the *Citadel*, which carry the marks of the prevaling Enemy. Arrows shot against the *Sun* are spent in vain; Sacriledges committed in the overthrow of Temples, and the Shrines of the Gods melted down, touch not the Divinity; yet the Gods may be overwhelm'd in the ruines of their own Temples: But his Wise-man shall never be oppress'd; or rather he may be oppress'd, but 'tis impossible he should be hurt.

But think not, (says *Seneca*) that the Wise-man I am picturing, is no where to be found. 'Tis no vain Fiction of ours, when we thus exalt the Mind of Man: 'Tis not a Stalking Idea, without Reality and Truth: no, the Original *Cato* transcends perhaps the Picture that I make of him.

But methinks, continues he, I perceive your Mind begins to kindle, and grow hot, and you are ready to cry out, That 'tis the way to make our selves contemptible, to promise things above the reach of *Faith* or *Hope*: and that the *Stoicks* only change the Names of things, to speak the same Truths in a more lofty and supercilious strain. But see how you are mistaken: For 'tis not our Design to dignify the *Wise-man* with the imaginary Honour of great and pompous Words; but to set him in a place inaccessible to Injuries and Affronts.

See here how *Seneca*'s weak Reason is hurried away with an impetuous Imagination. But is it possible for Men under a continual sense of their Miseries and Infirmities, to fall into such presumptuous and arrogant Notions? Can a reasonable Man be perswaded that Pain cannot touch or hurt him? Or could this All-wise, this Self-sufficient *Cato* suffer without Disquiet, at least some Molestation; I don't say the hainous Insults and Abuses of an enraged Rabble, Dragging, Stripping, Beating; but the Stinging of a silly Fly? What can be imagin'd more weak against so strong and convincing Proofs of our own Experience, as this pretty Arguing of *Seneca*, which yet is one of his Best Arguments?

Validius debet esse quod lædit, eo quod læditur: non est autem fortior nequitia virtute: non potest ergo lædi Sapiens. Injuria in bonos non tentatur nisi à malis, bonis inter se pax est. Quod si lædi nisi infirmior non potest, malus autem bono infirmior est, nec injuria bonis nisi à dispari verenda est, injuria in Sapientem virum non cadit. Cap. 7.

That which hurts, says he, must be stronger than that which is hurt. But Vice is not stronger than Vertue: therefore the Wise-man cannot be hurt. To this we need only answer, Either that all Men are Sinners, and consequently worthy of the Misery they suffer, as Religion assures us: or that if Vice be not stronger than Vertue, yet the Vicious may sometimes be more prevalent than the Vertuous, as Experience manifests.

Epicurus was in the right, in saying that *Injuries were supportable by a Wise-man*; but *Seneca* certainly in the wrong, to affirm, *The Wise-man could not be injur'd*. The Vertue of the *Stoicks* could never render them impregnable; since 'tis not inconsistent with true Vertue for a Man to be Miserable, and pitiable at the time of his Suffering some evil: St. *Paul* and the Primitive *Christians*, had doubtless more Vertue than *Cato* and all the *Stoicks*: and yet they confess'd they were Miserable through the Pains they endur'd; though they were Happy through the Prospect of an Eternal Retribution. *Si tantum in hâc vitâ sperantes sumus, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus*, says St. *Paul*.

Epicurus ait, Injurias tolerabiles esse Sapienti, nos injurias non esse.

As 'tis *GOD* alone, who through his Grace can give us a real, and a solid Vertue; so 'tis from Him only we can receive the Fruition of a solid and real Happiness: which yet he neither promisses, nor gives us in this Life: but in the other it must be expected from his Justice, as the Recompense of the Miseries we have undergone for the Love of Him in this. We are not as yet in possession of that Peace and Repose, which nothing can disturb; even the Grace of our *LORD* makes us not so Invincible, but it commonly leaves us to the Sense and Feeling of our own Imbecillity, both to certify us there is nothing in the World but is capable of hurting us; and to teach us to suffer, with a modest Patience and an humble Resignation, all the Injuries we receive; and not with a fastuous and haughty Patience, like the Constancy of Proud Presumptuous *Cato*.

When *Cato* was struck on the Face, he was not troubl'd at it; nor would he revenge or pardon the Affront, but Dogmatically deny'd that he had receiv'd any. He would be thought infinitely above those that struck him: so that his Patience was Pride and Arrogance, and affronting and abusing those that injur'd him: this Patience of his being a manifest sign, that he look'd upon his Enemies as Beasts, with whom 'twas below him to be angry. And this Contempt of his Enemies, and great Esteem of himself, is what *Seneca* calls the greatness of Courage; *Majori animo*, says he, (speaking of an Abuse *Cato* had receiv'd,) *non agnovit, quàm ignovisset*. How extravagant it is to confound Magnanimity with Pride; and separating Patience from Humility, to joyn it with an unsufferable Arrogance? And yet how feelingly does such Extravagance flatter the Vanity of Man, who is never willing to stoop and abate himself? and how dangerous is it, for *Christians* especially, to be instructed out of the Morality of an Author of so little Judgement as *Seneca*, and yet of so strong, so lively, and so Impetuous an Imagination, as dazles, and giddies, and drags along the Readers, that have but little Strength of Mind, but great Propension to whatever indulges Concupiscence, and their Senses?

Let *Christians* rather learn from their Master, that they are liable to the Insults and Injuries

of evil Men; and that the Good are sometimes subjected to the Wicked, by the order of Providence. When one of the Officers of the High-Priest gave our *LORD* a box on the Ear; that *Wise-man* of the *Christians*, he who was infinitely wise, and whose Power was as great as his Wisdom, confesses that Servant was capable of hurting him: He is not vex'd at the Affront, nor does he take *Cato*'s way of Revenge; but pardons, as one that was truly offended. He was able to revenge Himself, and destroy His Enemies: but he rather suffers with a modest and an humble Patience, offensive to none, not even to the Servant that had injur'd Him. Whereas *Cato* either could not, or durst not take a real Revenge of the Affront he had receiv'd; and therefore attempts an imaginary one, which struck in with his Vanity and his Pride. For he swells and exalts his Mind as high as the Clouds; from whence he looks down upon Men below as little Flies; and despises them as insignificant Insects, incapable of offending him, and unworthy of his Indignation. This *Vision*, is a Notion worthy of the Wise *Cato*: 'Tis this which gives him a greatness of Soul, and a constancy of Courage, that equals him with the *Gods*. 'Tis this which makes him Invulnerable, as setting him above the Power and Malice of other Men. Alass, poor *Cato!* thou fancies thy Vertue raises thee above all things; whereas thy Wisdom is Folly, and thy Magnanimity abominable before *GOD*; whatever the Wise-men of the World may think of it.

Sapientia hujus mundi stultitia est apud Deum. Quod hominibus altum est, abominatio est ante Deum. *Luc.* 16.

There are Men that see *Visions* of several kinds. Some fancy themselves transform'd into *Cocks* and *Hens*; others think they become *Kings* and *Emperours*: and some again perswade themselves they are independent, and *like the Gods*. And yet whilst Men look upon those as Fools and Madmen, who are confident of being chang'd into *Cocks* and *Kings*, they do not always think those so who say their Vertue renders them independent, and equal to the Gods. The reason whereof is, That to be reckon'd a Fool, 'tis not enough to have foolish Thoughts; but 'tis moreover requisite that these Thoughts be taken for Follies by other Men. For Fools never go for what they are among Fools that are like them, but only among Rational Men; as Wise-men never pass for what they are in the Company of Fools. Wherefore such are acknowledg'd for Fools, who take themselves for *Cocks* or *Kings*; because no Man sees any reason to believe another can be so easily chang'd into a *Cock* or a *King*. But 'tis not now adays that Men first begin to think they can become as *Gods*: it has been the Belief of all Ages, and perhaps more of the former than the latter; so probable has their Vanity always made that Opinion. They derive it from their first Parents, for I make no doubt but *Adam* and *Eve* were of the same Sentiment, when they submitted to the Temptations of the *Devil*, upon the promise he made them that they should become like *GOD*. *Eritis sicut Dii*: Even the Purest and most Illuminate Intelligencies were so blinded by their Native Pride, as to believe they might grow Independent; and thereupon form'd a design of usurping the Throne of the *ALMIGHTY*. Thus we need not wonder that Men, who have neither the Purity nor the Illumination of *Angels*, should give themselves up to be blinded and seduc'd, by the Motives of their Vanity.

If the Temptation of Greatness and Independency, be the strongest of all others, 'tis so upon its appearing to us, as it did to our first Parents, comformable to Reason, as well as to our Inclination; because we are not at all times sensible of our whole Dependance. Had the *Serpent* threatned our first Parents, saying, Unless you eat of the Fruit, which *GOD* has forbidden ye, ye shall be transform'd, one into a *Cock*, and the other into an *Hen*; we make no doubt to affirm, they had laugh'd at the grosness of the Temptation; for even we should have laugh'd at it our selves. But the *Devil*, judging of others by himself, knew well that the desire of Independency, was the Weak-side where they were the most easily taken.

The second Reason why we look upon those as Distemper'd in their Brain, who affirm they are either *Cocks* or *Kings*, but have no such Thoughts of those who assure us that nothing can hurt them, because they are above Pain, is that the *Hypocondriacks* are palpably deceiv'd; and 'tis but opening the Eyes to have sensible Proofs of their Delusion. But when *Cato* affirms that he is not hurt by him that strikes him, and that he is above all the Injuries that can be done to him: he affirms it, or may affirm it with that Haughtiness and Gravity, as makes it impossible to be discover'd, whether he is not actually within what he appears to be without. And we are inclin'd to believe his Soul is unshaken, because his Body remains unmovable: for that the outward Deportment of our Body is a Natural indication of what happens inwardly to the Soul. Thus a bold Lyer, when he lyes with a strong assurance, makes the most incredible things believ'd; the Confidence wherewith he delivers them, is a Proof that affects the Senses, and consequently is a very powerful Motive to Perswasion with the greatest part of Men. There are then but few that look upon the *Stoicks* as *Visionists*, or as hardy Lyers; because they can have no sensible Proof of what passes at the bottom of their Soul; and the Air of their Face is a very sensible Argument, which easily abuses them; besides that, their Vanity inclines them to believe Man's Mind capable of that Greatness and Independence, which he boasts of.

All which makes it evident, that there are few more dangerous Errors, or more easily communicated, than those the Books of *Seneca* abound with: because they are Errors of a subtil and delicate Nature, proportion'd to the Vanity of Man, and like that wherein the *Devil* engag'd our first Parents. They are attir'd in these Books with most sumptuous and splendid

Habili-

Habiliments, which make way for their Reception in moſt Minds. Wherein entring, they ſeize, ſtun, and blind them: but blind them with a *Faſtuous* Blindneſs, a *Dazling* Blindneſs; a Blindneſs attended with *glimmerings* of Light; and not an *Humbling*, and *Perfect* Blindneſs, that makes a Man ſenſible he is blind, and acknowledge it to others. The being ſtruck with this Blindneſs of Pride makes us reckon our ſelves the *Fine* and the *Bold Wits*; and others alſo think us ſo, and admire us. So nothing is more contagious than this Blindneſs; whilſt the Vanity and Senſibility of men, the Corruption of the Senſes and the Paſſions diſpoſe them, from admiring it to ſeek it; and when they have found it, to recommend it to the Admiration of others.

Beaux Eſprits, & Eſprits Forts.

I am then of Opinion that there is no Author more fit than *Seneca*, to exemplify that contagious Communication of a great many Men, who go by the name of the *Fine* and *Bold Wits*: and to ſhew how theſe ſtrong and Vigorous Imaginations domineer over the Weak, and Unenlightened Minds; not by the force and Evidence of their Reaſons, which are the Productions of the Mind; but by the Turn, and lively way of Expreſſion, which depend on the Strength of Imagination.

I know well enough that this Author's Reputation is conſiderable in the World, and 'twill be look'd upon as a raſh attempt to have treated him as a very Imaginative, and Injudicious Author: But 'twas chiefly upon the Account of his Eſteem I have ſaid ſo much of him here; not out of any Envy or ill Humour, but becauſe the Eſtimation he is in, will more ſenſibly touch the Mind of the Reader, and more cloſely apply it to the Conſideration of the Errors I have attack'd. For we ſhould, as far as poſſible, bring the moſt Eminent Inſtances, when the things we ſay are important, it being ſometimes an Honouring a Book, to Critizice upon it. But yet I am not the only Man that finds fault with the Writings of *Seneca*, for not to mention ſome Famous Men of our own Age, 'tis near ſixteen hundred Years agoe, that a moſt Judicious Author obſerv'd, there was little Exactneſs in his *Philoſophy*, little Judgement and Juſtneſs in his *Elocution*; and his Reputation was rather the reſult of the heat, and indiſcreet Inclination of Youth, than the Conſent of Learned and Judicious Men.

1. In Philoſophia parum diligens.
2. Velles eum ſuo ingenio diriſiſe alieno judicio.
3. Si aliqua contempſiſſet, &c. Conſenſu Eruditorum quam Puerorum amore comprobaretur. *Quintil. lib.* 10. *cap.* 3.

Publickly to engage the groſſeſt and moſt palpable Errors, is labour loſt, there being no contagion in them. 'Twould be ridiculous to advertiſe Men, that *Hypocondriack* People are deceiv'd; 'tis viſible to all the World. But if thoſe very Men they have the greateſt Opinion of, ſhould chance to be miſtaken, 'tis a piece of ſervice to admoniſh them, leſt they ſhould imitate them in their Errors. Now 'tis plain that the Spirit of *Seneca* is a Spirit of Pride and Vanity: And whereas pride, according to the Scripture, is the Origine of Sin; *Initium Peccati Superbia:* the Spirit of *Seneca* cannot be the Spirit of the Goſpel; nor his *Morals* be allied to the *Morals* of our *SAVIOUR*, the only true and ſolid *Morals*.

True 'tis, that all the Notions of *Seneca* are not falſe nor dangerous. And he may be read with profit by ſuch as have an Exactneſs of Thought, and are acquainted with the Foundation of *Chriſtian Morality*. Good uſe has been made of him by Great Men, and I have no intent of blaming thoſe, who to accommodate themſelves to the Weakneſs of others, that had an exceſſive Eſteem for him, have drawn Arguments from his Words whereby to defend the *Morality* of our *LORD*, and oppugn the Enemies of the Goſpel with their own weapons.

The *Alcoran* has many good things in it, and ſome true Prophecies are to be found in the *Centuries* of *Noſtradamus*. The *Alcoran* is made uſe of, to oppoſe the Religion of *Mahomet*, and *Noſtradamus*'s Prophecies may be of uſe to convince ſome fataſtick and Viſionary People. But what is good in the *Alcoran* can't make it a good Book, nor can ſome true Explications in *Noſtradamus*'s *Centuries* make him ever paſs for a Prophet: neither can it be ſaid, that all who make uſe of theſe Authors approve them, or have for them any real Eſteem.

A Man ought not to go about to overthrow what I have ſaid about *Seneca*, by alledging abundance of Quotations out of him, which contain in them nothing but ſolid Truths, and conſonant to the Goſpel: For I grant many ſuch are to met with in that Author; and ſo there are in the *Alcoran*, and other miſchievous Books. Nor would he be leſs to blame, who ſhould overwhelm me with the Authority of thoſe great Numbers, who have made uſe of *Seneca*, ſince uſe may be made of what we think an impertinent Book, provided thoſe we ſpeak to, judge otherwiſe of it than our ſelves.

But to ruine intirely the *Wiſdom* of the *Stoicks*, we need only know one thing, which is ſufficiently prov'd by Experience, and by what we have already ſaid: which is, that we are link'd and faſten'd to our Body, our Relations, our Friends, our Prince, and our Country, by ſuch ties as we neither can break, nor could for ſhame endeavour it. Our Soul is united to our Body, and by our Body to all things Viſible, by ſo potent an Hand, that 'tis impoſſible by our own force, to looſen the Connection; 'Tis impoſſible our Body ſhould be prick'd, but we muſt be prick'd and hurt our ſelves: becauſe the ſtate of Life we are in, moſt neceſſarily requires this Cooreſpondence between us, and the Body which we have. In like manner 'tis impoſſible to hear our ſelves reproach'd and deſpis'd, but we muſt feel ſome diſcontent thereupon; becauſe *GOD*, having made us for ſociable, converſe with other Men, has given us an Inclination for every thing, capable to bind and cement us together; which Inclination, we have not ſtrength enough to overcome. 'Tis Extravagance to ſay that Pain does not hurt us; and that words of Contumely and Contempt are not at all offenſive to us, as being above

such things as these: There is no getting above *Nature*, without being assisted by *Grace*; nor was there ever any *Stoick* who despis'd glory and the Esteem of Men, through the meer Strength of his Mind.

Men may indeed get the mastery of their Passions, by contrary Passions: They may vanquish their Fear or their Pain by Vain Glory; I mean only that they may abstain from Flying or Complaining, when seeing themselves in the midst of a multitude; the desire of Glory supports them, and stops those Motions in their Bodies which put them upon Flight: In this manner they may conquer them; but this is no Conquest or Deliverance from their slavery; 'tis possibly to change their Master for some time, rather to put on a longer and an heavier chain: 'Tis to grow wise, happy, and free only in appearance, but in reality to suffer an hard and cruel bondage. The natural union a Man has still with his Body, may be resisted by that union he has with Men: because Nature may be resisted by the strength of Nature. *GOD* may be resisted by the forces He himself supplies us with; But *GOD* cannot be resisted by the strength of a Man's own Mind; Nature can't be perfectly vanquish'd but by Grace: because *GOD* cannot, if I may be allow'd so to speak, be overcome but by the special auxiliaries of *GOD* himself.

And thus that so much celebrated and Vaunted Division of all things, into such as depend not on us, and such as we ought not to depend on, is a Division that seems agreeable to Reason; but is not consistent with this disorder'd state Sin has reduc'd us to. We are united to all the Creatures by the Order of *GOD*; but we absolutely depend on them by the Disorders of Sin: So that being incapable of Happiness, when in Pain or Disturbance, we ought not to hope for Happiness in this Life, by Imagining we have no Dependance upon those things to which we are naturally slaves. There is no possibility of being happy, except by a lively Faith, and a solid Hope, (which give us a fore-tast of the Enjoyment of future Goods;) not of living up to the Rules of Vertue, and overcoming Nature; unless supported by the Grace merited for us by Our *LORD* and *SAVIOR JESUS CHRIST*.

CHAP. V.

Of Montagne's *Book.*

MONTAGNE's Essays may serve as another instance, to prove the Influence some Imaginations have over others. For that Author has such a turn of a Fine and Debonaire way, and gives such a Lively and Natural Turn to his Thought, as 'tis almost impossible to read him, without being prejudic'd in his behalf; that his affected Negligence admirably becomes him, and indears him to most Men, without making him contemptible; and his Arrogancy is that of a Gentleman, if we may say so, that makes him respected, and not disliked. That Air of Gentility and Gallantry, sustain'd by some stock of Learning, works so prodigiously on the Mind, that a Man often admires him, and still yields to his Decisions, without daring to enquire into them, and sometimes without understanding them. 'Tis not by the strength of his Reasons he perswades; for Reasons are seldom alledg'd for what he advances, at least such as have any force and solidity in them. And indeed he neither has any Principles whereon to bottom his Reasonings, nor any Method to make Deductions from his Principles. A Touch of History is no Argument; nor a little Story a Demonstration: A couple of Verses of *Horace*, or an *Apophthegm* of *Cleomenes* or *Cæsar*, are not fit to perswade Reasonoble Men: And yet these *Essays* are nothing but a Contexture of scraps of History, little Relations, good Words, *Disticks* and *Apophthegms*.

Montagne should not be look'd upon in his *Essays* as a Man that argues, but as one that writes for his Diversion; whose drift is the Pleasure, and not the Instruction of his Reader: and if those that read him were only diverted by him, it must be own'd that *Montagne* could not do them so great harm. But 'tis next to impossible to forbear loving that which pleases, and not to desire those Dishes that are agreeable to the Palate. Nor can the Mind long be pleas'd with the reading of an Author, but it will take in its Sentiments, or at least receive some Tincture from them, which mingling with its Idea's, makes them confus'd and obscure.

But 'tis not only dangerous to read *Montagne* for Diversion; by reason that the Pleasure a Man takes in him, insensibly engages him in his Opinions; but also, because this Pleasure is more criminal than's imagin'd. For 'tis certain that this Pleasure arises chiefly from Concupiscence, and that it only feeds and strengthens the Passions; this Author's way of writing being only so taking, because 'tis sensible and moving, and that it rouses our Passions in an imperceptible manner.

It would not be time mispent to prove this in particular; and in general that we are pleas'd with all the divers Styles of Men, meerly on the account of the secret Corruption of our Morals: but this is not the proper place for it; and besides it would carry us too far from our purpose. However, if we but reflect on the Connection of our Idea's, and Passions

formerly

formerly ſpoke of; as alſo upon what paſſes within our ſelves at the time of our reading ſome well wrote piece, we may in ſome meaſure diſcover, that if we love the *Sublime Style*, the noble and free Air of ſome Authors; 'tis becauſe of our Vanity, and our Paſſion for Greatneſs and Independency. And that the reliſh we find in that delicacy of *Effeminate Diſcourſes*, is deriv'd from no other Fountain, than a ſecret Inclination for Softneſs and Pleaſure. In a word, 'tis a certain Faculty, Inclination to, and Love for what affects the Senſes, and not for the Knowledge of Truth; that makes ſome Authors charm and raviſh us, even whether we will or no. But to return to *Montagne*.

The Reaſons why his greateſt Admirers ſo much cry him up, to me ſeems to be, that they thought him a Judicious Author, and far from the imputation of *Pedantry*; as alſo one who was throughly acquainted with the nature and weakneſſes of the Mind. If I ſhall ſhew then that *Montagne* with all his Gallantry, was as much a *Pedant* as many others; and that he had a very imperfect Knowledge of the Mind: I ſhall make it appear, that thoſe who moſt admire him, were not perſwaded by the *Evidence* of his *Reaſons*, but were only brought over by the *Force* of his *Imagination*.

The word *Pedant* is very Equivocal; but Uſe, if I miſtake not, and even Reaſon, will have it ſignify thoſe who to make oſtentation of their falſe Science, quote all ſorts of Authors, right or wrong; talk meerly for Talking ſake, and to be admir'd by the Ignorant; and without any Judgement or Diſcretion, amaſs together *Apothegms* and Paſſages of Hiſtory, to prove, or at leaſt pretend to prove things, that cannot be made out by any thing but Reaſon.

Pedant is oppos'd to *Rational*; and that which makes *Pedants* ſo odious to Men of Senſe, is their being Irrational; for ſenſible Men, naturally loving to reaſon, can't endure the Converſation of thoſe who reaſon not at all. *Pedants* are *unable* to reaſon, becauſe their Mind is little, or elſe is taken up with *Falſe Learning*: and they are *unwilling* to reaſon, as knowing they are eſteem'd and admir'd by ſome ſort of People, more for their citing ſome paſſage of an Unknown or Ancient Author, than pretending to Argument and Reaſoning. And thus their Vanity acquieſcing in the proſpect of the reſpect that's paid to them, fixes them to the ſtudy of uncommon, and out of the way Sciences, that attract the Admiration of the Vulgar.

Pedants therefore are vain, and arrogant, of great Memories, and little Judgments; ſucceſsful and powerful in Citations, misfortunate and weak in Reaſons: of a vigorous and capacious Imagination; but deſultory and diſorderly, and unable to keep to any Accuracy and Exactneſs.

Having thus clear'd the Notion of the word *Pedant*, it will be no hard matter to prove *Montagne* as much a *Pedant*, as moſt others, in this ſignification of it; which ſeems moſt agreeable to Reaſon and Cuſtom. For I ſpeak not here of the *Pedant* of the *Long Robe*, it being not Pædagogue's Gown that only makes a *Pedant*. *Montagne*, who had ſuch an averſion to *Pedantry*, poſſibly never wore a Gown; but nevertheleſs could not deveſt himſelf of all his Imperfections. He has labour'd much for a Gentleman-like way, but has taken no great pains for exactneſs of Thoughts; or if he has, 'twas to very little purpoſe. And ſo he became a Genteel *Pedant*, or a *Pedant* of a *ſpecies* entirely new; rather than a Rational, Judicious and a Worthy Man.

Montagne's Book contains ſo evident Proofs of the Vanity and Arrogance of its Author, as may make it ſeem an uſeleſs Undertaking to ſtand to remark them. For a Man muſt needs be very conceited, that, like him, could imagine the World would be at the Pains of reading ſo large a Book, meerly to gain ſome acquaintance with its Authors Humours. He muſt neceſſarily diſtinguiſh himſelf from the reſt of the World, and look upon his own Perſon as the Miracle and *Phœnix* of Nature.

All created Beings are under an indiſpenſable obligation of turning off the Minds of ſuch as would adore them, towards the only One, that deſerves their Adoration: and Religion teaches us never to ſuffer the Mind and Heart of Man, whom *GOD* created for himſelf, to be buſied about us; and to be taken up with loving and admiring us. When St. *John* proſtrated himſelf before the Angel of the *LORD*, the Angel forbad him to adore him, ſaying; *I am thy fellow-ſervant, and of thy Brethren: Worſhip GOD.* None but the Devils, and ſuch as partake of their Pride, are pleas'd with being worſhip'd: to require therefore that others ſhould be affected and taken up with our Sentiments, what is it but to deſire not only to be worſhip'd with an outward and apparent, but alſo with a real and inward worſhip? 'tis to deſire to be worſhip'd even as *GOD* himſelf deſires it, that is, in *Spirit* and in *Truth*.

Apoc. 2. Conſervus tuus ſum, &c. Deum adora.

Montagne wrote his Book purely to picture himſelf, and repreſent his own Humours and Inclinations: as he acknowledges himſelf in the Advertiſement to the Reader, inſerted in all the Editions. *I give the Picture of my ſelf*, ſays he: *I am my ſelf the Subject of my Book.* Which is found true enough by thoſe that read him; for there are few Chapters wherein he makes not ſome Digreſſion to talk of himſelf, and there are even ſome whole Chapters wherein he talks of nothing elſe. But if he wrote his Book meerly to deſcribe *Himſelf*, he certainly Printed it, that his *own Character* might be *read* in it. He therefore deſir'd to be the Subject of the Thoughts and Attention of Men; though he ſays there is no

reason a Man should employ his time upon so frivolous and idle a Subject. Which words make only for his condemnation: For if he thought it unreasonable for Men to spend their time in reading his Book, he himself had acted against Common Sense in publishing it. And so we are oblig'd to believe either that he Thought *not* what he *said*, or *did not* what *became* him.

But 'tis a pleasant Excuse of his Vanity, to say he wrote only for his Friends and Relations: For, if so; how chance there were publish'd three Editions? Was not one enough for all his Friends and Relations? Why did he make Additions to his Book in the last Impressions, but no Retractions; but that Fortune favour'd his Intentions? *I Add*, says he, *but make no Corrections, because when once a Man has made his Book of publick right, he has in my Opinion no more pretence or title to it. Let him say what he can better in another, but let him not corrupt the Work already sold. Of such as these 'tis folly to purchase any thing before they are dead: Let them think long before they publish. Why are they in such haste? My Book is always one and the same.* He then was willing to publish his Book for, and deposite it with the rest of the World, as well as to his Friends and Relations. But his Vanity had never been pardonable, had he only turn'd and fix'd the Mind and Heart of his Friends and Relations on his Picture, so long time as is necessary to the reading of his Book.

If 'tis a Fault for a Man to speak often of himself, 'tis Impudence, or rather a kind of Sottishness to praise himself at every turn as *Montagne* does: This being not only to sin against *Christian* Humility, but also *Right* Reason.

Men are made for a sociable Life, and to be form'd into Bodies, and Communities. But it must be observ'd, that every particular that makes a part of a Society, would not be thought the meanest part of it. And so those who are their own *Encomiasts*, exalting themselves Above the rest, and looking upon others as the Bottom-most parts of their Society, and themselves as the Top-most and most Honourable, take upon them an Opinion of themselves, that render them odious, instead of indearing them to the Affections and Esteem of the World.

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'Tis then a Vanity, and an indiscreet and ridiculous Vanity in *Montagne* to talk so much to his own Advantage, on all occasions: But 'tis a Vanity still more Extravagant in this Author to transcribe his own Imperfections: For if we well observe him, we shall find that most of the Faults he discovers of himself, are such as are glory'd in by the World, by reason of the corruption of the Age: That he freely attributes such to himself, as can make him pass for a *Bold Wit*, or give him the Air of a Gentleman; and that with intent to be better credited when he speaks in his own Commendation, he counterfeits a frank Confession of his Irregularities. He has reason to say, that *The setting too high or low Opinion of one's self, proceeds often from an equally Arrogant Temper.* 'Tis always an infallible sign that a Man has an Opinion of himself; and indeed *Montagne* seems to me more arrogant and vain, in discommending than praising himself; it being an insufferable Pride, to make his Vices the Motives to his Vanity, rather than to his Humiliation. I had rather see a Man conceal his Crimes with *Shame*, than publish them with Impudence; and in my Mind we ought to have that *Unchristian* way of *Gallantry* in abhorrence, wherein *Montagne* publishes his Defects. But let us examine the other Qualities of his Mind.

L. 3. Ch. 13.

If we would believe *Montagne* on his word, he would perswade us that he was a Man of *No Retention; That his Memory was treacherous, and fail'd him in every thing:* But that in his Judgement there was no defect. And yet should we credit the Portraicture he has drawn of his own Mind, I mean his Book, we should be of a different Opinion. *I could not*, says he, *receive an Order without my Table-book: and if I had an Oration to speak, that was considerably long-winded, I was forc'd to that vile and miserable necessity of learning it word for word by Heart; otherwise I had neither Presence nor Assurance, for fear my Memory should shew me a slippery trick.* Does a Man that could learn *Memoriter*, word for word long-winded Discourses, to give him some Presence and Assurance, fail more in his *Memory* than his Judgement? And can we believe *Montagne* when he says, *I am forc'd to call my Domestick Servants by the Names of their Offices, or their Countries: it being the most difficult thing to remember Names; and if I should live long, I am perswaded I should forget my own?* That a plain Gentleman, who could retain by Heart, and word for word, and with Assurance long-winded Discourses, should have such a multitude of Servants, that he could not remember their Names! That a Man, *who was Born and Bred in the midst of Fields and Tillage, who kept Business and Farms in his Hands: and who* says, *To be regardless of what lies at our Feet, of what we have in our Hands, of what most nearly concerns the necessities and use of Life, is a thing utterly inconsistent with his Maxim*; should forget the *French* Names of his Domesticks? Could he be ignorant, as he says, *of the most part of our Coyns in use, the difference of one Grain from another*, either in the Earth or Granary, unless it were the most manifest; the grossest Principles of Agriculture, which there's hardly a Child but knows; what use Leaven is of in making Bread; and why Wine must stand some time in the Fat, before it ferments; and yet have his Mind stor'd with the Names of the *Ancient Philosophers* and their *Principles*: with the *Idea's of Plato*, *Epicurus*'s *Atoms*, the *Plenum* and *Vacuum* of *Leucippus* and *Democritus*; the *Water* of *Thales*, *Anaximander*'s *Infinity* of *Nature*, *Diogenes*'s *Air*, the *Numbers* and

L. 1. Ch. 24. L. 2. Ch. 17.

L. 2. Ch. 10.

L. 12. Ch. 17.

L. 2. Ch. 12.

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Symmetry of *Pythagoras*, the *Infinite* of *Parmenides*; the *Unity* of *Muſæus*; the *Water* and *Fire* of *Apollodorus*; the *Similar Parts* of *Anaxagoras*, the *Diſcord* and *Friendſhip* of *Empedocles*: the *Fire* of *Heraclitus*, &c. A Man that in three or four Pages of his Book, quotes more than *fifty* different *Authors*, with their *Opinions*: who has fill'd his Book with various *Hiſtorical Paſſages*, and many confus'd *Apothegms*; who in point of Books, ſays, *Hiſtory* and *Poeſy* were his Excellency: who contradicts himſelf every moment, and in the ſame Chapter, and even in the ſpeaking of things he pretends to be beſt acquainted with; I mean the Qualities of his Mind, ſhould this Man boaſt that his *Judgement* is better than his *Memory*!

We will confeſs that *Montagne* was *Excellent* at *Forgetfulneſs*, ſince *Montagne* aſſures us, he would have us think ſo: nor is this altogether contrary to Truth. But let us not believe him on his word, or for the Praiſes that he gives himſelf; that he was a Man of great Senſe, and of extraordinary Sagacity of Mind: For this might engage us in Error, and give too much Countenance to thoſe falſe and dangerous Opinions, he puts off with a preſumptuous and dogmatical Arrogance, which only confounds and blinds the feebler ſorts of Minds.

The other *Encomium* they beſtow on *Montagne*, is that he was perfectly acquainted with the Mind of Man; that he ſurvey'd it to the bottom, its Nature, and its Properties: that he knew the ſtrong and weak ſides of it, and in a word, all that could be known of it. Let us ſee if he defend theſe Praiſes, and whence it comes to paſs Men are ſo liberal on his behalf.

Thoſe who have read *Montagne*, know well enough that he would fain paſs for a *Pyrrhoniſt*, and that he takes Pride in doubting of all things. *The perſwaſion of Certainty in any thing*, ſays he, *is a certain teſtimony of Folly, and extream incertainty; and there is not a fooliſher and leſs Philoſophical ſort of Men, than the Philodox of* Plato: On the contrary, he extolls the *Pyrrhoniſts* at that exceſſive rate in the ſame Chapter, that 'tis not to be doubted but he was of the ſame Sect. 'Twas neceſſary in the Time he liv'd, to doubt of every thing, to paſs for a Man of Parts and a Gentleman; and the Quality of a *Bold Wit*, which he pretended to, engag'd him farther in theſe Opinions. Now 'tis but ſuppoſing him an *Academick*, to be able at one ſtroke to manifeſt him the moſt ignorant of all Men; not only in what relates to the Nature of the Mind, but in every thing elſe. For ſince there is an Eſſential difference between *Knowing* and *Doubting*, if the *Academicks* ſay what they think; when they aſſure us, *They know nothing*, we may conclude they are the moſt Ignorant Perſons in the World. L. 1. Ch. 22.

But they are not only the moſt *Ignorant* of all others; but alſo the moſt *Unreaſonable* Defenders of their Opinions: For they not only reject what is moſt certain, and univerſally receiv'd, to be thought the *Bold Wits*; but by the ſame ſtrength of Imagination, love to talk in a Deciſive Magiſterial ſtrain, about the moſt uncertain and improbable things in Nature. *Montagne* affords us a manifeſt Inſtance of this Diſtemper of Mind: And we muſt neceſſarily ſay he was not only ignorant of the Nature of an Humane Mind, but was in the groſſeſt Errors upon that Subject, ſuppoſing he had *ſaid* what he *thought* of it, as he ought to have done.

For what can we ſay of a Man that confounds the *Mind* with *Matter*, that reports the moſt extravagant Opinions of the *Philoſophers*, about the Nature of the Soul, without deſpiſing them; and in a way that gives us to underſtand he lik'd thoſe beſt, that were moſt oppoſite to Reaſon: who ſaw no neceſſity of the Immortality of our Souls; who thinks it indiſcoverable by Humane Reaſon; and who looks upon the Arguments that are given for it, as Dreams, which the deſire of it breeds in us. *Somnia non docentis, ſed optantis*: who finds fault with Men for ſeparating from the Crowd of other Creatures, and diſtinguiſhing themſelves from Beaſts, which he calls our *Fellow Brethren* and *Companions*; who believes *they converſe with*, and *underſtand each other, and ridicule us*; as we *diſcourſe and underſtand one another*, and *laugh at them*; *who* makes *a greater difference betwixt Man and Man, than betwixt a Man and a Beaſt*: Who attributes even to Spiders *Deliberation, Thought* and *Concluſion*. And who after having maintain'd, that the *Diſpoſition of the Humane Body, had no advantage over that of Beaſts*, readily embraces this Opinion. That 'tis not *by our Reaſon, our Diſcourſe, our Soul, we have the Aſcendant over Beaſts; but on the account of our Beauty, the fineneſs of our Complexion, and the excellent Diſpoſition of our Members, in compariſon of which we* ought to give up our Intelligence, Prudence, and the reſt, as trivial Accompliſhments, &c. Can any one ſay that a Man who concludes with ſuch the moſt extravagant Opinions, as that, *'Tis not by the Deductions of Reaſon, but our Arrogance and Obſtinacy, that we give our ſelves the Preeminence above other Animals*, had a very exact Knowledge of the Mind of Man? or can he think to convince others herein?

But we ſhould do all Men Juſtice, and impartially declare what was the Character of *Montagne*'s Mind. He had indeed but *Little Memory*, and ſtill *leſs Judgement*: But theſe two Qualities put together, make not that accompliſht thing which generally goes by the name of *Fineneſs*, and Beauty of *Wit* or Parts. 'Tis the Beauty, the Vivacity, and the Extent of Imagination which are the Ingredients of the *Fine Wit*. 'Tis the glittering and not the ſolid Mind, that pleaſes the generality; becauſe they love what touches the Senſes above that, which inſtructs their Reaſon. And thus taking the Fineneſs of Imagination for the Fineneſs of the Mind, we may ſay, that *Montagne* had a Mind Fine, and indeed extraordinary:

His Idea's are falſe, but handſom. His Expreſſions irregular and bold, but taking: His Diſcourſes ill-reaſoned, but well imagin'd. There appears throughout his Book the Character of an *Original*, that is infinitely pleaſing. As great a *Copyer* as he is, the Copyer is not diſcern'd: his ſtrong and bold Imagination giving always the turn of an Original, even to what was the moſt ſtol'n. To conclude, he has every thing neceſſary either for pleaſing us, or impoſing on us: and, I think, I have ſufficiently ſhewn, that 'tis by not convincing their Reaſon, he gets into the Favour and Admiration of Men, but by turning their Mind by an ever-victorious Vivacity of his imperious Imagination.

CHAP. VI.

I. *Of* Witches *in Imagination, and of* Wolf-men. II. *The Concluſion of the two firſt Books.*

THE ſtrangeſt effect of the force of Imagination, is the immoderate Fear of the Apparition of Spirits, Witchcraft, Spells, and Charms, *Lycanthropes* or *Wolf-men*, and generally of whatever is ſuppos'd to depend on the power of the Devil.

I. *Of Imaginary Witches.*

There is nothing more terrible, or that frightens the Mind more, and makes deeper impreſſions in the Brain, than the Idea of an inviſible Power, intent upon doing us miſchief, and to which we can make no reſiſtance: Whatever diſcourſes raiſe that Idea, are attended to with dread, and curioſity: Now Men affecting all that's extraordinary, take a whimſical delight in relating ſurprizing and prodigious Stories, of the Power and Malice of *Witches*, both to the ſcaring others and themſelves. And ſo we need not wonder that *Sorcerers* and *Witches* are ſo common in ſome Countries, where the belief of the *Witches-Sabbath* is deeply rooted in the Mind: where all the moſt extravagant Relations of *Witchcrafts* are liſtned to as Authentick Hiſtories; and where Madmen and *Viſioniſts*, whoſe Imagination has been diſtemper'd through the recital of theſe Stories, and the corruption of their Mind, are burnt for real *Sorcerers* and *Witches*.

I know well enough I ſhall incur the blame of a great many, for attributing the moſt part of *Witchcrafts* to the Power of Imagination, as knowing Men love to be ſcar'd and frighted; that they are angry with ſuch as would diſabuſe them, and are like thoſe imaginary ſick People, who reſpectfully hearken to, and punctually execute the orders of *Phyſicians* who prognoſticate direful accidents to them: For Superſtitions are not eaſily either deſtroy'd, or oppos'd without a great number of Patrons and Defenders. And that Inclination to a blindfold Belief of all the Dreams and Illuſions of *Demonographers* is produc'd, and upheld by the ſame Cauſe; which makes the Superſtitious ſtiff and untractable, as it were eaſy to demonſtrate. However, this ought not to diſcourage me from ſhewing in a few words, how I believe ſuch Opinions as theſe take footing.

A *Shepherd* in his Cottage after Supper, gives his Wife and Children a Narrative of the adventures of the *Witches-Sabbath*. And having his Imagination moderately warm'd by the vapours of ſtrong Liquors, and fancying he has been often an Aſſiſtant at that imaginary *Rendezvous*, fails not to deliver himſelf in a manner ſtrong, and lively. His natural Eloquence, together with the Diſpoſition his whole Family is in, to hearken to a Subject ſo new and terrible, muſt doubtleſs produce prodigious Impreſſions in weak Imaginations; nor is it naturally poſſible but his Wife and Children muſt be diſmay'd, muſt be affected and convinc'd with what they hear him ſay. 'Tis an Husband, 'tis a Father that ſpeaks of what himſelf has been an Eye-witneſs and Agent: he is belov'd and reſpected, and why ſhould he not be believed? The *Shepherd* repeats the ſame thing one day after another; his Wife's and Children's Imagination, receive deeper and deeper Impreſſions of it by degrees; till at laſt it grows familiar; their Fears vaniſh, but Conviction ſtays behind; and at length Curioſity invites them to go to it themſelves. They anoint themſelves, and lay them down to ſleep: This Diſpoſition of Heart, gives an additional heat to their Imagination, and the Traces the *Shepherd* had imprinted on their Brain, open ſo as to make them fancy in their ſleep all the Motions of the Ceremony he had deſcrib'd to them, preſent and real. They wake, and ask each other, and give a mutual Relation of what they ſaw. And they ſtrengthen the Traces of their Viſion; and he who has the ſtrongeſt Imagination, having the beſt knack at perſwading the reſt, fails not in a few Nights time, to make them believe the Imaginary Hiſtory of the *Sabbath*. Here now are your Finiſht *Witches* of the *Shepherd*'s making; and theſe in their turn will make many others, if having a ſtrong and lively Imagination, they be not deterr'd by Fear from telling the like Stories.

There have been known ſuch hearty down-right *Witches*, as made no ſcruple to confeſs to every Body their going to the *Sabbath*; and who were ſo throughly convinc'd of it, that though ſeveral Perſons watch'd them, and aſſur'd them they never ſtirr'd out of their Bed, yet have withſtood their Teſtimony, and perſiſted in their own perſwaſion.

We all know that when Children hear Tales of Spirits, what frights they are put into, and that they have not courage to ſtay without Light and Company: Becauſe at that time their

Brain

Brain receiving not the Impressions of any present Object, opens in those that are form'd in it by the Story, and that with so much force, as frequently to set before their Eyes, the Objects represented to them: And yet these Stories are not told them as if they were true, nor spoken in a manner denoting the Belief of them in the Speaker; and sometimes coldly and without the least concern. Which may make it less to be admir'd, that a Man who believes he has been present at the *Witches-Sabbath*, and consequently affirms it in a serious tone, and with a look of assurance, should easily convince his respectful Auditory of all the circumstances he describes to them: and thereby transmit into their Imagination, Impressions, like those he was himself abus'd with.

Men in speaking engrave in our Brain such Impressions as they have themselves. When they are deep they speak in a way that makes a deep Impression upon others: for they never speak, but they make us like themselves in some thing or other. Children in their Mother's womb, have only the Perceptions of their Mothers: and when brought into the World, imagine little more than what their Parents are the cause of; even the wisest Men take their Measures, rather from the Imagination of others, that is, from Opinion and Custom, than from the Rules of Reason. Thus in the places where *Witches* are burnt, we find great numbers of them, it being taken for granted, they are really what they are executed for; and this Belief is strengthened by the Discourses that are made of them. Should they cease to punish them, and treat them as mad Folks, we should see in a little time no more *Witches*; because those that are only imaginarily so, which certainly make the greatest number, would return to sober Sense again.

'Tis certain that *True Witches* deserve Death, and that the *Imaginary* are not to be reputed altogether innocent: for generally they never fancy themselves to be *Witches*, without having their Heart dispos'd to go to the *Sabbath*, and anointing their Bodies with some Drug, to bring about their wicked Design: But by punishing all these Criminals without distinction, the common Perswasion gathers strength, the *Imaginary Witches* daily multiply, and a great many Souls perish everlastingly: Wherefore 'tis not without Reason, several of our Courts have left off punishing them; since which, there are found but few that are within their Jurisdiction: and the Envy, Hatred, and Malice of the Wicked, cannot use that pretence to the Destruction of the Innocent.

The Apprehension of the *Wolf-men*, or of Men, who imagine themselves transform'd into *Wolves*, is a Fancy no less ridiculous. A Man by an extravagant *Sally* of Imagination, falls into a sort of Madness, that makes him fancy he grows a *Wolf* every night. This Disorder of his Mind, disposes him to the doing all the Actions that *Wolves* either do, or he has heard of them. He leaps then out of his House at Midnight, roams along the Streets, falls upon some Child he meets with, bites, tears, and miserably misuses it. The Stupid and Superstitious People imagine this Fanatick is really turn'd *Wolf*; because the wretch believes it himself, and has whisper'd it to some Persons, who cannot conceal the Secret. *Of* Wolf-men.

Were it an easy thing to form in the Brain such Impressions, as perswade Men they are transform'd into *Wolves*; and could they run along the Streets and make all the havock, those wretched *Wolf-men* do, without an entire subversion of their Brain; (as 'tis an easy matter for a Man to go to the *Witches-Sabbath*, in his Bed, and without waking) these notable Stories of Men Metamorphos'd into *Wolves*, would have no less effect than those that are told of the *Rendezvous* of *Witches*: and we should have as many *Wolf-men* as we have *Wizards*. But the Perswasion of being chang'd into a *Wolf*, supposes a Subversion of Brain much harder to be effected, than that Disorder of one, who only thought he went to the *Midnight-Sabbath*: that is, of one, who fancy'd he saw in the Night what *was not*, and who, when he waked, could not distinguish his Dreams, from the Thoughts he had in the Day-time.

'Tis a very common thing for some Men to have such lively Dreams, as to remember every particular of them when they wake, though the subject of their Dream, has nothing in it very terrible: and so 'tis no hard matter for Men to perswade themselves they have been at the *Witches-Sabbath*; since to this no more is requir'd, than that their Brain preserve the footsteps in it, which were made by the Animal Spirit in their Sleep.

The main Reason why we cannot take our Dreams for Realities, is the Incoherence we find in our Dreams, with the things we have done when awake: For hereby we discover they are only Dreams. Now this is no Rule for the *Sorcerer* to judge by, that his *Sabbath* is a Dream: for he never goes to the *Sabbath*, but in the Night-time, and the Occurrences therein are incapable of having any Connection with the other Actions of the Day; so that 'tis Morally impossible he should be made sensible of his Error by this Means. Nor is there any necessity, that the things fancy'd to be seen by these pretended *Witches* at the *Sabbath*, should have any Natural Order to one another; since they seem so much the more real, as they are the more extravagant, and confus'd in Coherence. Wherefore it makes enough for their Deception, that the Idea's of these *Sabbatick* Ceremonies be lively and frightful; as 'tis impossible they should be otherwise, if it be consider'd, that they represent things wholly new and extraordinary.

But the Imagination must be highly distemper'd, before a Man can fancy himself a *Cock*, a *Goat*, a *Wolf*, or an *Ox*; which is the Reason the thing is no commoner: though these Dis-

orders of Mind sometimes happen either through *GOD*'s punitive Justice, as in the case of *Nebuchodonosor*, related in *Scripture*, or by a natural overflowing of Melancholy in the Brain, whereof many Instances are to be met with, in the Books of *Physicians*.

Tho' I am satisfy'd, that reall *Witches* are extreamly rare, and that their *Sabbath* is nothing but a Dream; and that the Courts, which throw out the Indictments of *Witchcrafts*, are the most equitable; yet I doubt not but there may be *Sorcerers*, *Charms*, and *Witchcraft*, and that *GOD* sometimes permits the *Devil* to exercise his Malice upon Men. But we are taught by Holy Scripture, that *The Kingdom of Satan is destroy'd*; and that an *Angel of Heaven* has *chain'd up the Devil*, and shut him in the *Abyss*, from whence he shall never escape till the end of the World: That this is the *Strong Man*, *CHRIST* has disarm'd and spoil'd; and that the time is come, when the Prince of the World is banish'd out of his Kingdom.

He reign'd till the Coming of our *SAVIOUR*; and he reigns still, if any one will have it so, in those places, where the Knowledge of our *SAVIOUR* is not come. But he has no Right or Power over those, who are regenerated in *JESUS CHRIST*. He cannot so much as tempt them, unless by *GOD*'s Permission; and if he permits it, 'tis that they may overcome him: 'Tis therefore, doing the *Devil* too much honour, to make such Histories, as illustrate his Power, as is done by our new *Demonographers*; since these Histories render him formidable to weaker Minds.

We ought to despise the *Devils*, as we despise *Executioners*, and tremble before *GOD* alone: 'tis his Power we should only fear, his Judgements and his Wrath, we should only dread, and never provoke them by the contempt of his Laws and his Gospel. He deserves to be attended to, when he speaks himself; and so do Men when they speak of him. But 'tis ridiculous to be frighted, and troubled when they speak of the Power of the *Devil*; our trouble is too great an honour to our Enemy, who loves to be respected and fear'd; and we sacrifice to his Pride, when we prostrate and abase our Mind before him.

II. *The Conclusion of the two first Books.*

'Tis now time to put an end to this Second Book, and to remind you, by what has been said in this and the Fore-going Book, That all the Thoughts the Soul has through the means of, or with dependance on the Body, are wholly for the Body; and are either all false, or obscure: that they are only instrumental in uniting us to sensible Goods, and to whatever can procure them, which Union engages us in infinite Errors and excessive Miseries; though we are not always sensible of these Miseries, no more than we are of the Errors, that occasion'd them. I give here a remarkable Instance.

The Union that we had with our Mothers in their Womb, which is the strictest possible to be had with Mankind, was the Cause of two of the greatest Evils; namely *Sin*, and *Concupiscence*; which are the Original of all our Miseries. And yet for the forming of our Body, it was necessary that Union should be so close and strict as it is.

This Union which was broken at our Birth, was succeeded by another, whereby Children are con-sociated to their Parents and their Nurses. This second Union was not so strict as the former, and therefore did us not so much mischief; having only inclin'd us to believe and imitate all that our Parents and Nurses do and say. 'Tis plain this second Union was farther necessary, not as the first, for the forming, but the preserving of our Body; that we might know all the things useful or advantagious to it, and might accommodate it to such Motions as were necessary to obtain them.

Last of all, the Union which we have at present with all Men, is unavoidably the cause of a great deal of Toil to us; though it be not so strait, as being less necessary to the Preservation of our Body.

For 'tis upon the score of this Union, we live by Opinion, that we esteem and love, what is esteem'd and lov'd in the World in spight of the Remorse of our Consciences, and the true Idea's that we have of things. I speak not here of the Union we have with the Mind of other Men; in behalf of which it may be said, we receive instruction from it: I speak only of the sensible Union that is between our Imagination, and the Air, and Manner of those that speak to us. We see then how all the Thoughts we have by the Dependance on the Body, are false, and so much the more *dangerous to the Soul*, as they are the more *useful to the Body*.

Which being so, let us try to rid our selves by degrees of the Delusions of our Senses, of the *Chimera's* of our Imagination, and of the Impression made by other Mens Imaginations on our Mind. Let us carefully reject all the confus'd Idea's we have contracted through the Dependance we are in to our Body; and let us only admit the clear and evident Idea's which the Mind receives through its necessary Union with the *Divine Logos*, or with *Eternal Wisdom and Truth*; as we shall explain in the following Book, which treats *Of the Understanding of Pure Mind*.

F. *MALE*

F. *MALEBRANCHE'S*

TREATISE,

CONCERNING

The Search after Truth.

BOOK the THIRD,

Concerning

The UNDERSTANDING,

OR,

The Pure Intellect.

CHAP. I.

I. *Thought is only essential to the Mind. Sensation and Imagination are only the Modifications of it.* II. *We know not all the Modifications our Soul is capable of.* III. *They are different from our Knowledge and our Love, nor are they always Consequences of them.*

THE Subject of this Third Book is somewhat dry and barren: In which we enquire into the Mind consider'd alone, and without any reference to the Body, in order to discover the Infirmities peculiar to it, and the Errors deriving only from it. The Senses and Imagination are exuberant and inexhaustible Sources of Error and Deception: But the Mind acting by it self, is not so subject to straying and mis-conduct. It was a difficult thing to put an end to the two last Treatises; and 'tis no less difficult to begin this; not that there is not enough to be said on the Nature or Properties of the Mind; but because we enquire not here so much into its Properties, as its Weaknesses. 'Tis not therefore to be wonder'd, if this Tract is not so large, nor discovers so many Errors as the two fore-going; nor ought it to be complain'd of for being somewhat Dry, Abstract, and Applicative. For 'tis impossible in all Discourses to move the Senses and Imaginations of others; nor ought it always to be done: A Subject of an abstract Nature, in becoming sensible, commonly grows obscure, and 'tis enough to be made intelligible: So that nothing is more injust, than the usual Complaints of those, who would know every thing, and yet take pains for nothing; who take pet, if you desire them to be attentive; who would ever be touch'd and mov'd, and have their Senses and their Passions eternally gratify'd: But, we confess our selves unable to give them Satisfaction. Writers of *Comedies* and *Romances*, are oblig'd to please, and to procure Attention; but for us, it's sufficient if we can instruct, even those that labour to make themselves attentive.

The Errors of the Senſes and Imagination, proceed from the Nature and Conſtitution of the Body; and are expos'd to view, by conſidering what Dependency the Soul's in to it: But the Errors of the Pure Underſtanding cannot be diſcover'd, but by conſidering the Nature of the Mind it ſelf, and of the Idea's that are neceſſary to its knowing Objects. And therefore to penetrate into the Cauſes of the Errors of the Pure Underſtanding, 'twill be neceſſary to inſiſt in this Book, on the conſideration of the Nature of the Mind, and of Intellectual Idea's.

In the firſt place, I ſhall treat of the *Mind* conſider'd in its own Nature, without any Relation to the Body, to which it is united. So that what I ſhall ſay on this point, will extend to pure Intelligences, and by ſtronger Reaſon to what we call here Pure Underſtanding. For by the Word *Pure Underſtanding*, I mean only to deſign that Faculty, the Mind has of knowing External Objects, without forming Corporeal Images of them in the Brain, to repreſent them by. After which, I ſhall diſcourſe of Intellectual Idea's, by means of which the *Pure Underſtanding* perceives Exterior Objects.

I. *Thought only is eſſential to the Soul. Senſation and Imagination are only the Modifications of it.*

I am perſwaded no Man can doubt, after he has ſeriouſly thought on it, but the * *Eſſence* of the Mind conſiſts only in Thought, as the Eſſence of Matter conſiſts only in Extenſion; and that according to the different Modifications of Thought, the Mind one while *Wills*, and another while *Imagines*, or has many other particular Forms, as according to the different Modifications of Extenſion, Matter is ſometimes Water, ſometimes Wood, and ſometimes Fire; or has abundance of other particular Forms.

I only adverti'e thus much, That by the word *Thought*, I underſtand not here the particular Modifications of the Soul, that is, this or that particular Thought, but Thought capable of all ſorts of Modifications, or of all ſorts of Thoughts: as by *Extenſion*, is not meant this or that Extenſion *round* or *ſquare*, for Inſtance, but Extenſion capable of all Sorts of Modifications, or of Figures: And this Compariſon would have no difficulty in it, but that we have not ſo clear an Idea of Thought, as we have of Extenſion: for we only know Thought by *Internal Sentiment* or *Conſcience*, † as I make out hereafter.

* *By the Eſſence of a thing, I mean that which is firſt conceiv'd in it, on which depend all the Modifications obſerv'd in it.*

† *Second Part of the Pure Mind, Chap. 7.*

I am farther perſwaded, it is impoſſible to conceive a Mind, without *Thought*; though 'tis eaſy enough to conceive one without Actual *Senſation*, *Imagination*, and even without *Volition*; in like manner, as 'tis impoſſible to conceive any Matter without *Extenſion*, though it be eaſy to conceive one that's neither *Earth* not *Mettal*, neither *ſquare* nor *round*, and which likewiſe is not in *Motion*. Hence we ought to conclude, that as there may be *a Portion of Matter*, that is neither Earth nor Mettal, neither Square nor Round, nor yet in Motion; ſo there may be a *Mind*, that neither feels Heat nor Cold, neither Joy, nor Sorrow; that Imagines nothing, and even Wills nothing: ſo that all their Modificationsare not eſſential to it. Thought therefore is only the Eſſence of the Mind, as Extenſion only is the Eſſence of Matter.

But as *Matter* or *Extenſion*, were it without *Motion*, would be altogether uſeleſs, and incapable of that variety of Forms, for which it is created: and 'tis not conceivable that an Intelligent Being, deſign'd to produce it in that manner; ſo were a *Mind* or *Thought* without *Volition*, it is plain it would be wholly uſeleſs, ſince the Mind would have no tendency towards the Objects of its Perceptions; nor would it love Good, for which it was created: ſo that 'tis impoſſible to be conceiv'd, that an Intelligent Being, would have produc'd it in ſuch a condition. Notwithſtanding, as Motion is not the Eſſence of Matter, ſince it ſuppoſes Extenſion; ſo Volition is not the Eſſence of the Mind, ſince Volition ſuppoſes Perception.

Thought therefore all alone, is what conſtitutes the *Eſſence* of the *Mind*; and the different manners of Thinking, as *Senſation* and *Imagination*, are only the Modifications it is capable of, but wherewith it is not always modify'd: But *Volition* is a Property that always accompanies it, whether in Conjunction with, or Separation from the Body; which yet is not Eſſential to it, ſince it ſuppoſes Thought, and 'tis poſſible to conceive a Mind without Will, as a Body without Motion.

However the *Power of Willing* is inſeparable from the Mind, though it be not eſſential to it; as the *Capacity of being mov'd* is inſeparable from Matter, though it be not included in its Eſſence. For as 'tis impoſſible to conceive any matter, that cannot be mov'd, ſo 'tis impoſſible to conceive any Mind, that has not the Power of Willing, or is incapable of any Natural Inclination. But again, as Matter may be conceiv'd to exiſt without any Motion, ſo the Mind may be conceiv'd to exiſt without any Impreſſion of the Author of Nature, towards Good, and conſequently without *Will*. For the *Will* is nothing but the *Impreſſion of the Author of Nature, which carries us towards Good in general*; as we have explain'd more at large in the firſt Chapter of the Firſt Book.

II. *We know not all the Modifications our Soul is capable of.*

What has been ſaid in that Treatiſe of the Senſes, and what we have now ſaid, of the Nature of the Mind, does not ſuppoſe we know all the Modifications it is capable of: we are far from making ſuch like Suppoſitions; believing on the contrary, that the Mind has a Capacity of receiving an infinite ſucceſſion of diverſe Modifications, which the ſame Mind knows nothing of.

The leaſt portion of Matter is capable of receiving a Figure of three, ſix, ten, or of ten thouſand Sides; alſo a Circular, or Elliptick Figure, which may be conſider'd as Figures of infinite Sides and Angles. The different Species of each of theſe Figures are innumerable;

Infinite are Triangles of a different Species, and more ſtill are the Figures of four, ſix, ten, or of ten thouſand Sides, and infinite *Polygones*. For a *Circle*, an *Ellipſis*, and in general every regular or irregular *Culvilin'd Figure*, may be conſider'd as an infinite *Polygone*: An *Ellipſis*, for inſtance, as an infinite *Polygone*, but whoſe Sides or Angles are unequal, being greater towards the little *Diameter*, than the great: and ſo of other infinite *Polygones*, more compound and irregular.

A plain piece of Wax therefore is capable of infinite, or rather infinitely infinite different Modifications, which no Mind can comprehend. What reaſon is there then to imagine that the Soul, which is far more noble than the Body, ſhould be capable only of thoſe Modifications ſhe has already receiv'd?

Had we never *Felt* Pleaſure or Pain, had we never *Seen* Light, nor Colour; or had we been with reſpect to all things, as the Blind and Deaf are, in regard to Sounds and Colours: ſhould we have had Reaſon to conclude we were incapable of all the Senſations we have of Objects? For theſe Senſations are only the Modifications of our Soul, as has been prov'd in the Book concerning the Senſes.

It muſt be granted then, that the Capacity, the Soul has of *Receiving* different Modifications, is probably greater, than the Capacity it has of *Conceiving*. I would ſay, that as the Mind cannot exhauſt, or comprehend all the Figures Matter can be faſhion'd in, ſo it can't comprehend all the different Modifications poſſible for the Almighty Hand of *GOD* to Mint the Soul into, though it knew as diſtinctly the Capacity of the Soul, as it knows that of Matter; which yet it cannot do, for the Reaſons I ſhall bring in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of this Book.

If the Soul, whilſt we are on Earth, receives but few Modifications, 'tis becauſe it is united to the Body, and depends upon it. All her Senſations have Reference to her Body, and as ſhe has not the Fruition of *GOD*; ſo ſhe has none of thoſe Modifications this Fruition ſhould produce. The Matter whereof our Body is compos'd, is capable but of very few Modifications in our Life-time; it cannot be reſolv'd into Earth and Vapour, till after our Death: It cannot at preſent become Air, Fire, Diamond, or Mettal; it cannot grow round, ſquare, or triangular; It muſt neceſſarily be Fleſh, and have the Figure of a Man, to the end the Soul may be united to it. 'Tis the ſame caſe with our Soul: She muſt neceſſarily have the Senſations of Heat, Cold, Colour, Light, Sounds, Odors, Taſts, and many other Modifications, to the end ſhe may continue united to her Body. All her Senſations are Subſervient to the Preſervation of her *Machine*. They trouble her, and diſmay her, if but the leaſt inward Spring chance to break or ſlacken; which neceſſarily ſubjects the Soul to her Body, as long as her Body is ſubject to Corruption. But when the Body ſhall be cloath'd with Immortality, and we ſhall no longer fear the Diſſolution of its parts; 'tis reaſonable to believe the Soul ſhall be no longer touch'd with thoſe incommodious Senſations, which we feel againſt our Will; but with infinite others, of a different kind, whereof we have at preſent no Idea; which will exceed all that we can think, and will be worthy the Greatneſs and Goodneſs of the *GOD* we ſhall enjoy.

'Tis therefore unreaſonable for any one to think he ſo throughly comprehends the Nature of the Soul, as to be able to pronounce it incapable of any thing more than *Knowledge*, and *Love*. Theſe indeed might be maintain'd by thoſe who attribute their Senſations to external Objects, or to their Body; and who would have their Paſſions to be in their Heart. For if we rob the Soul of all her Paſſions and Senſations, all that we leave diſcoverable in her, is no more than a conſequence of Knowledge, or of Love. But I cannot conceive, how thoſe, who are retriev'd from thoſe Deluſions of the Senſes, can perſwade themſelves, that all our Senſations and our Paſſions, are nothing but Knowledge and Love; I would ſay, *Species* of confus'd Judgements the Soul paſſes upon Objects, with Reference to the Body which ſhe Animates. I cannot conceive, how a Man can affirm Light, Colours, Odors, and the like, to be Judgements of the Soul; for it ſeems to me on the contrary, that I diſtinctly perceive Light, Colours, Smells, and the other Senſations, to be Modifications quite different from Judgements.

But let us make choice of more lively Senſations, and ſuch as the Mind is moſt taken up with; and ſee what theſe Perſons ſay of Pain and Pleaſure. They will have theſe Senſations, with ſeveral moſt conſiderable * Authors, to be only the conſequences or dependences of the Faculties we have of *Knowing* and *Willing*; and that Pain, for inſtance, is only the Regret, the Oppoſition, and Averſion the Will has, to what ſhe knows hurtful to the Body which ſhe loves. Now to me this ſeems evidently to confound Pain with Sorrow; but ſo far is Pain from being a Conſequence of the *Knowledge* of the *Mind*, and the *Action* of the *Will*, that on the contrary it precedes them both.

* S. Aug. lib. 6. de Muſica. *Des Cartes in his Man. &c.*

If you put, for example, a burning Coal in the Hand of a Man aſleep, or that was warming his Hands behind him; I know not how it can be with any probability affirm'd, that this Man firſt knew there happen'd in his Hand ſome Motions, contrary to the good Conſtitution of his Body: that hereupon his Will oppos'd them; and that his Pain was the Conſequence of that Knowledge of his Mind, and Oppoſition of his Will. On the coutrary, it is in my Opinion undoubtedly certain, that the firſt thing this Man perceiv'd as ſoon as the

Goal touch'd his Hand, was *Pain*; and that the Knowledge of the Mind, and Oppoſition of the Will, were only the Conſequences of it, though they were truly the Cauſe of the *Sorrow* which ſucceeded the *Pain*.

But there's a vaſt difference between this Pain, and the Sorrow it produces. Pain is the firſt thing the Soul is ſenſible of; it is not preceded by any Knowledge, nor can ever be agreeable and well-come of it ſelf. Whereas Sorrow is the laſt thing the Soul feels: it is ever preceded with Knowledge, and is always pleaſant of it ſelf. This is evidently manifeſt from the Pleaſure that attends the Sorrow a Man's affected with, at the direful Repreſentations of the Theatre: for this Pleaſure increaſes with the Sorrow; but Pleaſure never increaſes with Pain. The *Comedians*, who ſtudy the Art of Pleaſing, know well that they muſt never lay the Stage in Blood; becauſe the Sight, though of a fictitious Murder, would be too Terrible to be Pleaſant: But they are not afraid of touching the Spectatours with a deep Sorrow; becauſe Sorrow is ever agreeable, when there's occaſion to be mov'd with it. There is then an Eſſential difference between Sorrow and Pain; and it can no wiſe be ſaid, that Pain is nothing but the Knowledge of the Mind, together with an Oppoſition of the Will.

As to all the other Senſations, ſuch as are Smells, Taſts, Sounds, Colours, the generality of Men do not think they are the Modifications of their Soul. But on the contrary, judge they are diffus'd upon the Objects; or at leaſt that they are only in the Soul, as an Idea of a Square or a Circle; that is, are united to the Soul, but are not the Modifications of it: and the Reaſon of their judging thus is, that this kind of Senſations do not much affect them; as I have ſhewn in the Explication of the Errors of the Senſes.

It ought then, I think, to be concluded, That we know not all the Senſations incident to our Soul: and that, beſides thoſe which ſhe has by the Organs of Senſes, it is poſſible for her to have infinite others, which ſhe has never experimented, nor ever ſhall, till deliver'd from the captivity of her Body.

And yet it muſt be confeſs'd, that as Matter is not capable of infinite different Configurations, but becauſe of its Extenſion; ſo the Soul is not capable of different Modifications but on the account of Thought: it being manifeſt that the Soul would be incapable of the Modifications of Pleaſure, Pain, and even of thoſe that are indifferent to her, were it not for her being capable of *Perception* or *Thought*.

It is ſufficient then to know, that Thought is the Principle of all theſe Modifications: If any one will have ſomething in the Soul previous to Thought, I ſhall not diſpute it with him: But as I am aſſur'd that no one has any Knowledge of his Soul, but by Thought, or by being inwardly conſcious of what paſſes in his Mind; ſo I am certain that if any one would reaſon about the Nature of the Soul, he ought only to conſult, that Internal Senſation, which conſtantly repreſents her to himſelf ſuch as ſhe is, and not to imagine againſt the conviction of his own Conſcience, that ſhe is an inviſible Fire, a ſubtile Air, Harmony, or the like.

CHAP. II.

I. *The Mind being limited, cannot comprehend any thing of an infinite Nature.* II. *Its Limitation is the Origine of a great many Errors:* III. *And eſpecially of Hereſies.* IV. *The Mind muſt be ſubmitted unto* Faith.

I. *The Mind being limited, cannot comprehend any thing of an infinite Nature.*

SO then, that which we immediately diſcover in the Thought of Man, is its being limited to a very narrow compaſs: from which conſideration may be drawn two very important Concluſions: As firſt, that the Soul cannot perfectly know Infinity. Secondly, that ſhe can have no diſtinct Knowledge of many things at once. For as a piece of Wax is incapable of admitting at the ſame time a great number of different Figures; ſo the Soul is incapable of knowing at the ſame time a multitude of things. And as again a piece of Wax cannot be ſquare and round, at the ſame time, but only ſemi-ſquare and ſemi-circular, and the more different Figures it has, the leſs perfect and diſtinct they will be: ſo the Soul cannot perceive many things at once; and her Thoughts will be ſo much more confus'd, as they are more numerous.

Laſt of all, as a piece of Wax, which had a thouſand Faces, and on each Face a different Figure, would be neither ſquare, nor round, nor oval, nor could a Man ſay what Figure it was of: ſo it ſometimes happens that a Man has ſuch a multitude of different Thoughts, that he fancies he thinks of nothing at all: Which is exemplify'd in thoſe that fall into a Trance. The Animal Spirits irregularly turning in their Brain, excite ſuch a multitude of Traces, as not to open any one ſtrongly enough, to produce any particular Senſation, or diſtinct Idea in the Mind; ſo that theſe Perſons perceive ſo many things at once, that they have no diſtinct Perception of any, and this makes them conclude they have perceiv'd nothing.

Not

Not but that ſometimes Men ſwoon away for want of Animal Spirits; But at that time the Soul having only Thoughts of Pure Intellection, which leave no Traces in the Brain, we never remember them when we come to our ſelves; and that makes us believe we have Thought of Nothing. This I have ſaid by the way, to ſhew it is a miſtake to believe the Soul does not always think, becauſe Men fancy ſometimes they think not of any thing.

II. *The Limitation of the Mind is the Origine of a great many Errors.*

Every one that reflects but a little upon his own Thoughts, is experimentally convinc'd that the Mind cannot apply it ſelf to the conſideration of many things at once, and *à fortiori* is unable to comprehend what's infinite. And yet out of an unaccountable *Capricio*, ſuch as are not ignorant of this, apply themſelves rather to the Contemplation of infinite Objects, and of Queſtions that demand an infinite Capacity of Mind, than to ſuch as are ſuited to their own Reach and Abilities; And a great many others, who would fain know all things, ſtudy ſo many Sciences at once, as only confound the Underſtanding and incapacitate it for any true Science at all.

How many do we ſee deſirous of comprehending the Diviſibility of Matter *ad infinitum*; and of knowing how 'tis poſſible for a grain of Sand to contain ſo many parts in it, as this Earth, though proportionably leſſer. What a multitude of Queſtions are form'd, never to be reſolv'd upon that ſubject; and many others which include any thing of Infinity in them: the Reſolution of which, Men think to find in their own Mind? When yet, though they ſtudy them till they ſweat, all that they gain at laſt, is only to be opinionated with ſome Error, or Extravagance or other.

'Tis certainly a very pleaſant thing to ſee Men deny the Diviſibility of Matter *to Infinity*; meerly becauſe they cannot comprehend it, though they rightly comprehend the Demonſtrations that prove it: and this at the ſame time that they confeſs it impoſſible for the Mind of Man to comprehend Infinity. For the Arguments which ſhew Matter to be diviſible to Infinity, are demonſtrative, if there were ever any ſuch; and they acknowledge it when they conſider them with Attention. Notwithſtanding which, if they hear Objections propos'd, which they cannot anſwer, their Mind recoils from the Evidence juſt perceiv'd, and they begin to boggle at them. They are earneſtly taken up with the Objection which they cannot anſwer; they invent ſome frivolous Diſtinction to the Demonſtrations of infinite Diviſibility: and conclude at laſt they were deceiv'd; and that all the World is in an Error. Hence they embrace the contrary Opinion, and defend it by Turgid Points, *(Puncta inflata)* and ſuch kind of Extravagances their Imagination is ſure to furniſh them withall. Now the reaſon of their Deluſions, is the the want of being inwardly convinc'd, that the Mind of Man is Finite; and that there is no neceſſity of comprehending the Diviſibility of Matter to infinity, in order to be perſwaded of it: Becauſe all the Objections that require the Comprehending it for their Reſolution, are ſuch as 'tis impoſſible ſhould be reſolv'd.

Would Men only ſtick to ſuch Queſtions as theſe, we ſhould not have much reaſon to be concern'd at it: for though there may be ſome that are prepoſſeſs'd with particular Errors, yet they are Errors of little conſequence. And as for the reſt, they have not altogether loſt their time, in thinking on things they cannot comprehend: for at leaſt they are convinc'd of the Weakneſs of their Mind. 'Tis good (ſays a very Judicious * Author) to tire and 'fatigue the Mind with ſuch kind of Subtilties, in order to tame its Preſumption, and to make 'it leſs daring, ever to oppoſe its feeble Lights to the Truths propos'd to it by the Goſpel, 'under Pretence it cannot comprehend them. For ſince all the ſtrength of the Mind of Men is oblig'd to fall under the weight of the leaſt Atom of Matter, and to acknowledge it clearly, ſees it is infinitely diviſible, without being able to comprehend how 'tis poſſible: Is this not viſibly to ſin againſt Reaſon, to refuſe to believe the Wonderful Effects of the Almightineſs of *GOD*; which is of it ſelf Incomprehenſible, for that very Reaſon that our Mind cannot comprehend them.

* *Art of Thinking.*

III. *And eſpecially of Hereſies.*

The moſt dangerous Effect then produc'd by the Ignorance of, or rather Inadvertency to the Limitation and Weakneſs of an Humane Mind; and conſequently to its Incapacity of comprehending what any ways belongs to Infinity; is *Hereſy*. There are to be ſeen, if I miſtake not, in theſe days above any other, a great many Men, who from a peculiar *Theology* to themſelves; which has no other Foundation than their own Mind, and the Natural Weakneſs of their Reaſon: becauſe even in Subjects, not under the Juriſdiction of Reaſon, they will not believe what they cannot comprehend.

The *Socinians* cannot comprehend the Myſteries of the *Trinity* and *Incarnation*: And this ſuffices not only to their Diſ-believing it, but alſo to their Affirming of thoſe that Believe it, in an Arrogant and a Libertine way, that they are born to Slavery. A *Calviniſt* can't conceive how 'tis poſſible for the Body of *JESUS CHRIST*, to be really preſent in the *Sacrament* of the *Altar*, at the ſame time he is in Heaven; and hence he thinks he has ſufficient Reaſon to conclude it impoſſible, as if he perfectly comprehended how far the Power of *GOD* could go.

So a Man that's convinc'd of his own Liberty, if he falls to work, and heats his Head in endeavouring to reconcile the Fore-knowledge of *GOD*, and his Decrees with Liberty, will poſſibly fall into the Error of thoſe, who do not believe that Man is a free Agent, For being unable on one hand to conceive how the Providence, and Fore-knowledge of *GOD* can be

compatible with the Liberty of Man; and on the other, his Reſpect for Religion, forbidding him to deny a Providence, he will think himſelf oblig'd to caſhier Men of their Freedom: or not making ſufficient Reflection on the Weakneſs of his Mind, will fancy he is able to fathom the Myſterious ways *GOD* has of reconciling his Decrees with our Liberty.

But *Hereticks* are not the only Men, who want Attention to conſider the Weakneſs of their Mind, and that give it too much Scope and Liberty of Judging of things; which it cannot attain to: this being the fault of moſt Men, eſpecially of ſome *Divines* of theſe later Ages. For we may perhaps reaſonably ſay, that ſome of them ſo frequently imploying Humane Reaſoning, to prove or explain the Myſteries above Reaſon, though it may be done with good Intention, and for the Defence of Religion againſt *Hereticks*; give frequent occaſion to the ſame *Hereticks* of adhering obſtinately to their Errors, and treating the Myſteries of Faith as Humane Opinions.

The Working and Agitation of the Mind, and the Subtilties of the School, are no fit means to make Men ſenſible of their own Weakneſs, and to inſpire them with that Spirit of Submiſſion requiſite to make them humbly reſign to the Deciſions of the Church. On the contrary, theſe Subtil and Humane Reaſonings, may kindle a ſecret Pride in their Heart, and diſpoſe them to imploy their Mind to evil purpoſe, by framing a Religion ſuitable to its Capacity. And ſo far are we from ſeeing *Hereticks* convinc'd by Philoſophick Arguments, and the Reading of Books purely Scholaſtical, ſo as to acknowledge and condemn their Errors; that on the contrary, we find them daily taking conſtant occaſion from the weakneſs of ſome School-men's Arguings, to turn the moſt Sacred Myſteries of our Religion into Jeſt and Raillery; which indeed are not eſtabliſh'd on any Reaſon, and Explications of Humane Derivation, but only on Authority of the Word of *GOD*, written or unwritten, that is tranſmitted down to us by way of Tradition.

And indeed 'tis impoſſible for Humane Reaſon to make us comprehend, how one *GOD* is in Three Perſons: How the Body of our *LORD* can be really preſent in the *Euchariſt*; and how 'tis conſiſtent for Man to be free, whilſt *GOD* knows from all Eternity all that Man ſhall do. The Reaſons that are brought to prove and explain theſe things are ſuch for the generality, as convince none but thoſe who are willing to admit them without Examination: but look ridiculous and extravagant to Men minded to oppugn them, and that are not ſettled in the Belief of the Foundation of theſe Myſteries. Nay, it may be ſaid, that the Objections that are form'd againſt the Principal Articles of our Faith, and eſpecially againſt the Myſteries of the *TRINITY*, are ſo ſtrong, as cannot poſſibly admit of any clear, evident, and ſatisfactory Solution; ſuch I mean, as one way or other does not ſhook our weak and ſtaggering Reaſon: Theſe Myſteries being, in truth, incomprehenſible.

The beſt way of converting *Hereticks*, is not then to accuſtom them to the Exerciſe of Reaſon, by urging to them only uncertain Arguments, deduc'd from *Philoſophy*; becauſe the Truths we would inſtruct them in, come not under the Scrutiny of Reaſon. Nor is it always convenient, to uſe Argument in Truths, that can be made out by *Reaſon*, as well as *Tradition*, as the Immortality of the Soul, Original Sin, the neceſſity of Grace, the corruption of Nature, and ſome others; for fear leaſt the Mind having once taſted the Evidence of Argument, upon theſe Queſtions, will not acquieſce in thoſe which are only prov'd by Tradition. On the other hand, they ſhould be taught to quit their own Reaſon, by making them ſenſible of its Weakneſs, its Limitation, and its Diſproportion to our Myſteries; and when the Pride of their Mind ſhall be humbled and brought down, it will be eaſy to introduce them into the Sentiments of the Church; by repreſenting to them her Authority, or explaining to them the Tradition of all Ages, if they are capable of underſtanding it.

But whilſt Men are continually calling of their Sight, from the Weakneſs and Limitation of their Mind, their Courage will be puffed up with an indiſcreet Preſumption; they will be dazled by an abuſive Light, and blinded with the love of Glory: and ſo *Hereticks* will be continually *Hereticks*; *Philoſophers* obſtinate and opinionated. And Men will never leave diſputing on all things they can diſpute on, as long as Diſputation pleaſes them.

CHAP.

CHAP. III.

I. *The Philoſophers diſſipate or diſſolve the force of their Mind, by applying it to Subjects, including too many Relations, and depending on too many things; and by obſerving no Method in their Studies.* II. *An Inſtance taken from* Ariſtotle. III. *That Geometricians on the contrary take a good Method in the Search of Truth: Eſpecially thoſe who make uſe of* Algebra, *and* Analyticks. IV. *That their Method increaſes the ſtrength of the Mind, and that* Ariſtotle's *Logick leſſens it.* V. *Another Fault of Learned Men.*

I. *That the Philoſophers want order in their Studies.*

MEN not only involve themſelves in a multitude of Errors, by being buſied with Queſtions, partaking of Infinity, whilſt their Mind is finite: but by over-matching their Mind which is but of a narrow reach, with thoſe of a vaſt Comprehenſion.

It has been already ſaid, That as a piece of Wax was incapable of receiving many perfect and very diſtinct Figures, ſo the Mind was incapable of receiving many diſtinct Idea's; that is, of perceiving many things diſtinctly at the ſame time. Whence 'tis eaſy to conclude, that we ſhould not apply our ſelves at firſt to the finding out occult Truths, the Knowledge whereof depends on too many things, ſome of which are unknown to us, or not ſo familiar as they ſhould be: for we ought to ſtudy with order, and make what we know diſtinctly, ſerviceable to the Learning what we know not, or what we know but confuſedly. And yet the moſt part of thoſe, who take to any Study, trouble not themſelves ſo much: They never make trial of their forces, nor enter into themſelves to try how far the reach of their Mind will go: 'Tis a ſecret Vanity, and a diſorderly Deſire of Knowledge, and not Reaſon, which regulates their Studies: For without conſulting their Reaſon, they undertake the fathoming the moſt hidden and inſcrutable Truths, and the reſolving Queſtions, which depend on ſuch a multitude of Relations, that the moſt quick and piercing Mind would to the diſcovering their Truth, with an abſolute Certainty, require ſeveral Ages, and infinite Experiments to build upon.

In *Medicine* and *Morality*, there are a vaſt many Queſtions of this nature; all the Sciences of Bodies and their Qualities; as of Animals, Plants, Mettals, and their Properties, are ſuch Sciences as can never be made ſufficiently evident, or certain; eſpecially unleſs they are cultivated in another manner, than has been done; and the moſt ſimple and leaſt compos'd, are began with, on which thoſe other depend. But Men of Study care not to be at the pains of a Methodical Philoſophy: They are not agreed about the certainty of the Principles of *Phyſicks*: they frankly confeſs they know not the Nature of Bodies in general, nor their Qualities. And yet they fancy themſelves able, for inſtance, to account for Old Mens *Hairs* growing *White*, and their *Teeth*'s becoming *Black*, and ſuch like Queſtions, which depend on ſo many Cauſes, as 'tis impoſſible to give any infallible Reaſon of them. For to this, 'tis neceſſary to know, wherein truly conſiſts the Whiteneſs of Hairs in particular; the Humours they are fed with; the Strainers which are in the Body, to let theſe Humours through: the Conformation of the Root of the Hairs, or of the Skin they paſs through; and the difference of all theſe things, in a Young Man, and an Old; which is abſolutely impoſſible, or at leaſt extreamly difficult to be known.

II. *An Inſtance of the want of order in* Ariſtotle.

Ariſtotle, for inſtance, has pretended not to be ignorant of that adventitious Whiteneſs, in the Hairs of Old Men; and has given ſeveral Reaſons for it in ſeveral places of his Books. But being the *Genius of Nature*, he has not ſtopt there; but penetrated much farther. He has moreover diſcover'd, that the Cauſe which turn'd Old Mens Hairs white, was the ſelf-ſame with that which made ſome Men, and ſome Horſes, have one Eye Blue, and the other of another Colour. Theſe are his words: Ἐπιφύλλουσι δὲ μάλιστα γίνονται, καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι, καὶ οἱ ἵπποι διὰ τὸν αὐτὸν αἰτίαν ὅτι ὕπνος ὁ μὲν ἀνθρώπου πολύπους μόνον. This is very ſurpriſing, but there is nothing un-intelligible to this Great Man: who gives Reaſons for ſuch a vaſt number of things, in almoſt all parts of his *Phyſicks*, as the moſt enlightned Men of this Age believe impenetrable; which muſt needs give good grounds for an Author's ſaying, He was given us by *GOD*, that we might be ignorant of nothing poſſible to be known: *Ariſtotelis Doctrina eſt SUMMA VERITAS, quoniam ejus Intellectus fuit finis humani intellectûs. Quare bene dicitur de illo, quod ipſe fuit creatus, & datus nobis divinâ Providentiâ, ut non ignoremus poſſibilia ſciri.* *Averroës* ought too to have ſaid, That *Ariſtotle* was given us by Divine Providence, for the underſtanding what was impoſſible to be underſtood. For certainly, that Philoſopher teaches us not only the things that may be known; but, (ſince we muſt believe him on his word, his Doctrine being the *Soveraign Truth*, *SUMMA VERITAS*,) he teaches us likewiſe thoſe things, which 'tis impoſſible to know.

Lib. 5. de generatione Anim. c. 1.

Undoubtedly a Man muſt have a ſtrong Faith, thus to believe *Ariſtotle*, when he only gives us *Logical* Reaſons; and explains the Effects of Nature, by the confus'd Notions of the Senſes: eſpecially when he poſitively determines upon Queſtions, which we cannot ſee poſſible for Men to reſolve. Yet *Ariſtotle* takes particular care of admoniſhing us to believe him on his word; it being an uncontroverted *Axiom*, with this Author, That a *Diſciple is to believe*, Δεῖ πιστεύειν τὸν μανθάνοντα.

True; ſometimes Diſciples are oblig'd to believe their Maſters: But their Faith ſhould reach no farther than to Experiments, and matters of Fact. For would they become true *Philoſophers*, they ought to examine their Maſter's Reaſons, and never receive them till they had diſcover'd their Evidence, by their *own*. But to become a *Peripatetick Philoſopher*, there is no more requiſite, than to *believe*, and to remember: the ſame Diſpoſition of Mind going to the reading that *Philoſophy*, as to the reading of an *Hiſtory*. For ſhould a Man take the freedom of uſing his Mind and his Reaſon, he muſt not expect to grow any conſiderable Philoſopher. Δεῖ γὰρ πιστεῦσαι τὸν μανθάνοντα.

But the Reaſon why *Ariſtotle*, and a great many other Philoſophers have pretended to know, what can never be known, is their not well diſtinguiſhing the Difference betwixt knowing, and knowing; betwixt having a *Certain* and *Evident* Knowledge, and only a *Probable* and *Obſcure*: and the Reaſon of their not having obſerv'd that Diſtinction, is their being taken up always with ſubjects of a greater Reach and Comprehenſion, than their own Mind; ſo that they have uſually ſeen only ſome parts thereof, without being able to take them all in together: which ſuffices to the Diſcovery of many Probabilities, but not for the evident Diſcovery of Truth. Beſides which Vanity, being the motive to their ſeeking Science, and Probabilities making more for their Eſteem among Men, than Truth it ſelf, as being more proportion'd to the ordinary ſtature and ability of the Mind; they neglected to ſearch for the neceſſary means of augmenting its Capacity, and gives it a greater Growth and Comprehenſion: for which reaſon they have not been able to go to the bottom of Truths that lay any thing deep and conceal'd.

III. *That Geometricians take a good Method in ſearch of Truth.*

The *Geometricians* only have well diſcover'd the narrow Capacity of the Mind; at leaſt have taken ſuch a Method in their Studies, as ſhews they have a perfect Knowledge of it: eſpecially thoſe who uſe *Algebra* and *Analyticks*; which *Viete* and *Des-Cartes* have re-eſtabliſh'd and perfected in this Age. Which is herein apparent, that theſe Men never attempted the Reſolution of Difficulties very Compound, till after having moſt clearly known the moſt Simple, which they depend on: they never fix'd to the conſideration of Crooked Lines, nor of Conick Sections, till they were perfect maſters of common *Geometry*. But what is peculiar to the *Analyſts*, is that, ſeeing their Mind incapable of Attention to many Figures at once, and unable to imagine *Solids* of more than *three Dimenſions*, though there were frequent neceſſity of conceiving ſuch as had more; they made uſe of common Letters, that are very familiar to us, to expreſs and abridge their Idea's. And thus the Mind being not confounded, or taken up with the Repreſentation, it would be oblig'd to make, of a great many Figures, and an infinite number of Lines, can ſurvey at a ſingle view, what otherwiſe was impoſſible to be ſeen: for as much as the Mind can launch out farther, and penetrate into a great many more things, when its Capacity is manag'd to the beſt advantage.

IV. *That their Method increaſes the ſtrength of the Mind, and that Ariſtotle's Logick diminiſhes it.*

So that all the Skill and Artifice there is in making the Mind deeper-ſighted, and more comprehenſive, conſiſts, as ſhall be explain'd in another place, in a dexterous management of its Strength and Capacity; and in not laying it out impertinently on things not neceſſary to the Diſcovery of the Truth it is in ſearch of: Which is a thing well worthy to be obſerv'd. For this one thing makes it evident, that the ordinary *Logicks* are more proper, to ſtraiten the Capacity of the Mind, than enlarge it; it being viſible, that by imploying the Rules they give in the finding out any Truth, the Capacity of the Mind muſt be taken up with them; and ſo it muſt have the leſs Liberty for attending to, and comprehending the whole extent of the ſubject it examines.

Book 6. in the I. Part concerning Method.

'Tis manifeſt enough then, from what hath been ſaid, that moſt Men have made but little Reflection on the Nature of the Mind, when they would imploy it in *the Search of Truth*; that they have not been throughly convinc'd of its little Extent, and the neceſſity there is of husbanding it well, and increaſing it; and that this is one of the moſt conſiderable Cauſes of their Errors, and of their ſo ill ſucceſs in their Studies.

This is not ſaid with Preſumption, that there were ever any who knew not their Mind was limited, and ſtraitned in its Capacity and Comprehenſion. This doubtleſs has been known, and is ſtill confeſs'd by all the World. But the generality know it only confuſedly, and confeſs it no farther than Teeth outwards: For the conduct they take in their Studies, gives the Lye to their Confeſſion; ſince they act as if they truly believ'd their Mind was Infinite; and are deſirous of diving into things which depend on a great many Cauſes, whereof they commonly know not any one.

V. *Another Fault of Learned Men.*

There is ſtill another Failing, very cuſtomary with Studious Men; and that is their Applying to too many Sciences at once: ſo that if they Study ſix hours a day, they ſometimes Study ſix different things. 'Tis viſible, that this fault proceeds from the ſame Cauſe as the others I have been ſpeaking of. For there is great probability, that if thoſe, who Studied in

this manner, knew evidently how disproportion'd it was to the Capacity of their Mind; and that it was more apt to fill it with Error and Confusion, than with true Science; they would not let themselves be transported with the disorderly motives of their Passion and Vanity: for indeed this is not the way to be satisfy'd in our pursuits, but the most ready means to know nothing at all.

CHAP. IV.

I. *The Mind cannot dwell long upon Objects that have no Relation to it, or that include not something of Infinity in them.* II. *The inconstancy of the Will, is the Cause of that want of Application, and consequently of Error.* III. *Our Sensations take us up more, than the Pure Idea's of the Mind:* IV. *Which is the Source of the Corruption of our Morals:* V. *And of the Ignorance of the Vulgar sort of Men.*

THE Mind of Man is not only subject to Error, for want of being infinite, or for being of less Extent than the Objects of its Consideration; as has been explain'd in the two last Chapters: But because it is Inconstant, and nothing Resolute in its Action; and unable to keep the View fixt and steady on the Object, long enough to examine all the parts of it.

I. *The Mind cannot dwell long upon Objects that have no Relation, or that include not something of infinity in them.*

The better to conceive the Cause of this Inconstancy and Levity of the Mind, we must know that the Will is the Directress of its Action; that the Will applies it to the Objects which it loves; and that the same Will is it self in perpetual fluctuation and disquietude, whereof I assign this to be the Cause.

'Tis not to be doubted but *GOD* is the Author of all things, and has made them only for Himself, and that he draws the Heart of Man towards Him, by a Natural Bias and invincible Impression, which he perpetually influences him withall.

'Tis impossible for *GOD* to have *will'd* that there should be any Will, that did not love Him, or that lov'd Him less than any other Good, if there could be any other besides Himself; it being impossible for Him to ordain, that a Will should not love that which was supreamly Amiable, or should love that more which was less lovely. And thus Natural Love must needs carry us to *GOD*, as proceeding from *GOD*; and nothing being able to stop the Motions thereof, unless *GOD* Himself that impresses them. There is then no Will whatever, but necessarily follows the Motions of this Love. The Righteous, the Wicked, the Blessed, and the Damned, love *GOD* with this Love; and 'tis this Love in one sense, that is the Cause of the Misery of the latter. For this Natural Love we have for *GOD*, being the same thing with the Natural Impression, which carries us towards Good in general, towards Infinite Soveraign Good; 'tis manifest that all Minds love *GOD* with this Love, since there is no other that is the Universal, the Infinite, the Soveraign Good. For lastly, all Spirits, and even the *Devils* passionately desire to be happy, and to possess the Soveraign Good; and they desire it without Choice, Deliberation, and Liberty, by the bent and necessity of their Nature. Being therefore made for *GOD*, for an Infinite Good; for a Good that comprehends in Himself all Goods, the Natural Motion of our heart can never stop, till we arrive to the possession of this Good.

II. *The Inconstancy of the Will, is the Cause of that want of Application, and consequently of Error.*

The Will then labouring thus with a perpetual thirst, being tos'd and agitated with Desires, Eagerness, and Restless longings for the Good it is not in Possession of, cannot but with much Uneasiness suffer the Mind to dwell any time upon Abstract Truths, which don't affect it, and which it judges incapable of making it Happy. It therefore pushes the Mind forward continually to the Research of other Objects; and when in this hurry and agitation, communicated to it by the Will, it meets with any Object that carries the Mark of Good, I mean that by approaching the Soul, makes it sensible of some Delight or internal Satisfaction, then this Thirst of the Heart rises anew; these Desires, Eagernesses, and Fervencies are re-kindled; and the Mind oblig'd to wait on them, fixes it self only on the Object that either is or seems to be the cause of them, to approximate it to the Soul, that regales and feeds upon it for some time. But the Emptiness of the Creatures, being unable to fill the Infinite Capacity of the Heart of Man; those little Pleasures, instead of extinguishing its Thirst, only provoke and inflame it, and give the Soul a foolish and vain Hope of being satisfy'd in the multiplicity of Earthly Pleasures: which produces a far greater Inconstancy, and an inconceivable Levity in the Mind, which ought to make the Discovery to the Soul of all its Goods.

It's true, when the Mind falls by chance upon an Object of an infinite Nature, or which includes something great and mighty in it, its unsettledness and casting about ceases for some

time: For finding that this Object bears the badge and character of him whom the Soul desires, it dwells upon it, and closes in with it for a considerable time: But this closing and adhesion, or rather obstinacy of the Mind, to examine Subjects infinite, or too vast and unweildy, is as useless to it, as that Levity, wherewith it considers those that are proportion'd to its Capacity; since 'tis too weak to accomplish so difficult an Enterprise, and in vain it endeavours to effect it: That which must render the Soul happy, is not, as I may speak, the Comprehension of an Infinite Object, but the love and Fruition of an Infinite Good, whereof the Will is capable through the Motion of Love, continually impress'd on it by *GOD* Himself.

Which being thus, we need not wonder at the Ignorance and Blindness of Mankind; because their Mind being subjected to the Inconstancy and Levity of their Heart, which incapacitate it from considering any thing with a serious Application, is unable to penetrate into a subject any whit perplex'd, and difficult. For in short, the Attention of the Mind is to intelligible Objects, what a steady View of the Eyes is to those of Sight: And as a Man that can't fix his Eyes on the Bodies that are about him, can never see them well enough to distinguish the differences of their least parts, and to discover all the Relations, those little parts have to one another: So a Man who cannot fix the Eye of his Mind upon the things desir'd to be known, can never have a sufficient Knowledge to distinguish all the parts; and to observe all the Relations that may possibly be between themselves, or themselves and other subjects.

Yet it is certain that all our Knowledge consists in a clear View of the Relations things stand in to one another. So that when it happens, as in difficult Questions, that the Mind must survey at one sight a multiplicity of Relations, that are between two things or more; it is plain, that if it has not consider'd these things very attentively, or if it has but a confus'd Knowledge of them, it can never have a distinct Perception of their Relations, and consequently cannot make any solid Judgement of them.

III. *Our Sensations take us up more than the Pure Idea's of the Mind.*

One of the main Causes of our Mind's wanting Application for Abstract Truths, is our seeing them as at a Distance, whilst other things are continually offering themselves to the Mind, that are nearer at hand: The great Attention of the Mind, brings home, as I may say, the remote Idea's of the Objects we consider. But it often falls out, that when a Man is very intent on *Metaphysical* Speculations, he is easily thrown off from them, by some accidental Sensations breaking in upon the Soul, which harbour'd nearer it than those Idea's: for there needs no more than a little Pleasure or Pain to do it. The Reason whereof is, that Pleasure and Pain, and all Sensations in general, are within the very Soul: They modify her, and touch her more to the quick, than the simple Idea's of Objects of Pure Intellection, which though present to the Mind, neither touch nor modify it at all. And thus the Mind on one hand, being of a straitned and narrow reach, and on the other, unable to prevent feeling Pain, and all its other Sensations, has its Capacity fill'd up with them; and so cannot at one and the same time, be sensible of any thing, and think freely of other Objects that are not sensible. The Humming of a Fly, or of any other little Animal, supposing it communicated to the principal part of the Brain, and perceiv'd by the Soul, is capable, (do what we can) of interrupting our Consideration of very Abstract and Sublime Truths; because no Abstract Idea's modify the Soul; whereas all Sensations do.

See the 7. Chap. of the Second Part of this Book.

IV. *Which is the Source of the Corruption of our Morals.*

From hence arises that Stupidity and Drowsiness of the Mind, in regard of the most fundamental Truths of Christian Morality: which Men know only in a Speculative and Fruitless manner, without the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST*. All the World knows there is a *GOD*, and that this *GOD* is to be serv'd, and worship'd. But who is it, that serves and worships him without the Divine Grace, which alone gives us a relish of Delight and Pleasure, in these Duties? There are but very few that do not perceive the Emptiness, and Inconstancy of Earthly Goods, and that are not convinc'd with an Abstract, though most certain and evident Conviction, that they are indeserving of our Cares and Application. But where are those, who despise these Goods in their Practice, and deny their Pains and Application to acquire them? 'Tis only they that perceive some Bitterness and Distaste in the Injoyment of them, or that Grace has made sensible to Spiritual Goods, by an inward Delectation, affix'd to them by *GOD*; 'tis these only who vanquish the Impressions of Sense and the Strugglings of Concupiscence: A View of the Mind alone can never make us resist them as we should do; but besides that View, there must be a certain Sensation of the Heart: That Intellectual Light all alone is, if you please, the *Sufficient Grace*, which makes only for our Condemnation, which acquaints us with our own Weakness, and of our Duty of flying by Prayer to Him, who is our Strength: but the Sensation of the Heart, is a *Lively* and *Operative Grace*. 'Tis this which touches us inward, which fills us, and perswades the Heart, and without it there is no body that considers with the Heart: *Nemo est qui recogitet corde*. All the most certain Truths of Morality ly conceal'd in the folds and doubles, and secret corners of the Mind, and as long as they continue there, are barren and inactive; since the Soul has no relish of them: But the Pleasures of the Senses dwell nearer to the Soul; and since she cannot be insensible to, or out of love with * her Pleasure, 'tis impossible to dis-engage her self from the Earth, and to † get rid of the Charms and Delusions of her Senses, by her own Strength and Abilities.

* *Namely a Natural Love; for we cannot hate Pleasure by an Elective Hatred.*

† *Because Elective Love cannot be long without conforming to Natural Love.*

I deny not however but the Righteous, whose heart has been already vigorously turn'd towards *GOD*, by a preventing Delectation, may without that particular Grace perform some Meritorious Actions, and resist the Motions of Concupiscence. There are those who are courageous and constant in the Law of *GOD*, by the strength of their Faith, by the care they have to deprive themselves of Sensible Goods; and by the contempt and dislike of every thing that can give them any temptation: There are such as act for the most part without the taste of Indeliberate or Preventing Pleasure: That sole Joy, they find in acting according to the Will of *GOD*, is the only Pleasure they taste: and that Pleasure suffices to make them persevere in their state, and to confirm the Disposition of their Heart: Those who are Novice Converts, have generally need of an Indeliberate, or Preventing Pleasure, to disintangle them from Sensible Goods, to which they are fastened by other Preventing, and Indeliberate Pleasures. Sorrow and Remorse of their Consciences, are not sufficient for this purpose; and as yet they taste no joy: But the Just can live by Faith, and that in Indigence; and 'tis likewise in this Estate they merit most: for as much as Men being Reasonable Creatures, *GOD* will be lov'd by them with a love of Choice, and not with a Love of Instinct; an Indeliberate Love, like that wherewith we love Sensible things, without knowing they be Good otherwise, than from the Pleasure we receive in them. Notwithstanding, most Men having but little Faith, and yet constant opportunities of tasting Pleasures, cannot long preserve their Elective Love for *GOD*, against their Natural Love for sensible Goods, unless the Delectation of Grace support them against the Efforts of Pleasure. For the Delectation of Grace produces, preserves, and augments Charity, as Sensible Pleasures Cupidity.

It is apparent enough from what has been above said, that Men being never free from some Passion, or some pleasant or troublesome Sensations, have their Capacity and Extent of Mind much taken up: and when they would imploy the remainder of its Capacity in examining any Truth, they are frequently diverted by some new Sensations; through the dislike they take to that Exercise, and the Inconstancy of the Will, which tosses and bandies the Mind from Object to Object, without letting it stand still. So that unless we have habituated our selves from our Youth to the conquering all these Oppositions, as I have explain'd in the Second Part; we find our selves at last incapable of piercing into any thing that's somewhat difficult, and demands something of Application.

Hence we are to conclude, That all Sciences, and especially such as include Questions very hard to be clear'd up, and explain'd, abound with an infinite number of Errors: and that we ought to have in suspicion those bulky Volumes we see daily compos'd on *Medicine*, *Physicks*, and *Morality*; and especially on the particular Questions of those Sciences, which are much more complex than the general. We should judge too these Books to have so much less worth in them, as they are better entertain'd by the common sort of Men; I mean those, who are little capable of Application, and know not how to set their Mind to work: because when one Opinion is cry'd up, and applauded by the People, in a matter difficult to be made out, 'tis an infallible sign of its being false, and founded only on the delusive Notions of Sense, or some false Lights of the Imagination.

Nevertheless 'tis not impossible for one Man to discover a great number of Truths, that were conceal'd from Ages past: supposing this Person to have no lack of Parts, and who being in Retirement, as remote as possible from every thing that might distract his Thoughts, applies himself seriously to the seeking Truth: Which makes those appear none of the most reasonable Men, who despise *Mr. Des-Cartes's* Philosophy, without knowing it: for this only Reason, that it seems next to impossible for a single Man, to have found out Truth, in things so deep and conceal'd as those of Nature. But did they know the way of Life, that Philosopher chose; the means he imploy'd in his Studies to prevent the Capacity of his Mind's being shar'd by other Objects, than those he meant to discover; the Truth of the distinctness of his Idea's on which he establish'd his *Philosophy*: and generally all the advantages he had above the Ancients, by the New Discoveries; they would certainly receive a more strong and reasonable Prejudice on his behalf, than that of Antiquity, which gives *Plato*, *Aristotle*, and diverse others their Authority.

And yet I would not advise them to ground only on this Prejudice, and to believe *Mr. Des-Cartes* a Great Man, and his *Philosophy* good, because of those advantagious things that may be said for it. *Monsieur Des-Cartes* was a Man like us, subject to Error and Illusion, no less than others. Not any one of his Works, without even excepting his *Geometry*, but bears the Character and Earnest of the weakness of an Humane Mind. Wherefore we ought not to take his word for what he teaches; but read him according to his own Advice, with Precaution, by examining whether he is not deceiv'd, and believing nothing that he says, without being oblig'd to it by its own Evidence, and the secret Reproofs of our Reason. For in a word, the Mind knows nothing truly, but what it evidently knows.

We have shewn in the preceeding Chapters that our Mind is not infinite, that it is on the contrary of but a very indifferent Capacity; and has that Capacity usually fill'd with the Sensations of the Soul: and lastly, that the Mind receiving its direction from the Will, cannot fix, and as it were stay long upon the Object, without being suddainly thrown off by the Will's Fluctuation and Inconstancy. 'Tis most certain that these things are the most general

Causes of our Errors; and I might stay here to make them more evident in particular: But what has been already said, will be enough, with such as are capable of Attention, to give them to understand the weakness of the Humane Mind; I shall treat more at large in the Fourth and Fifth Book, of the Errors that are owing to our Natural Inclinations, and our Passions; of which we have now said something in this Chapter.

The SECOND PART:

Concerning

The Pure Understanding.

Of the NATURE of IDEA's.

CHAP. I.

I. *What is meant by Idea's. That they really exist, and are necessary to our Perceiving all material Objects.* II. *A Particularization of all the ways possible for us to perceive External Objects.*

I. What is meant by Idea's. That they really exist, and are necessary to our Perceiving all material Objects.

I SUPPOSE that every one will grant, that we perceive not the Objects that are without us immediately, and of themselves. We see the *Sun*, the *Stars*, and infinite other Objects without us; and it is not probable that the Soul goes out of the Body, and fetches a walk, as I may say, about the Heavens to contemplate all the Objects therein.

It sees them not therefore by themselves, and the immediate Object of the Mind, when it beholds the *Sun*, for example, is not the *Sun*, but something intimately united to the Soul: and that same thing is what I call our *Idea*. So that by the Term *Idea*, I mean nothing but that Object which is immediate, or next to the Soul in its Perception of any thing.

It ought to be well observ'd, That in order to the Mind's perceiving any Object, it is absolutely necessary the Idea of that Object be actually present to it: which is so certain as not possible to be doubted of. But it is not necessary there should be any thing without like to that Idea: for it often happens that we perceive things which don't exist, and which never were in Nature. And so a Man has frequently in his Mind real Idea's of things that never were. When a Man, for instance, imagines a golden Mountain, it is indispensably necessary the Idea of that Mountain should be really present to his Mind. When a Frantick, or a Man in a Feaver, or Asleep, sees some terrible Animal before his Eyes; it is certain that the Idea of that Animal really exists. And yet that Mountain of gold and this Animal, never were in Being.

Notwithstanding, Men being as it were naturally inclin'd to believe that Corporeal Objects exist, judge of the Reality and Existence of things quite otherwise than they ought. For when they perceive an Object by way of Sense, they will have it most infallibly to exist, tho' it often happens, that there is nothing of it without; they will have moreover this Object to be just the same as they perceive it; which yet never happens. But as for the Idea which necessarily exists, and cannot be otherwise than we see it, they commonly judge without Reflection, that it is nothing at all: as if Idea's had not a vast number of Properties, (as that the Idea of a Square, for instance, were not very different from that of any Number) and did not represent quite different things. Which is not consistent with *Nothing*, since nothing has no Property. 'Tis therefore undoubtedly certain, that Idea's have a most real Existence. But let us enquire into their Nature, and their Essence; and see what there is in our Soul capable of making us see the Representations of all things.

Whatever things the Soul perceives, are only of two sorts, and are either within or without the Soul. Those that are within the Soul, are its own proper Thoughts; that is, all its different Modifications. For by the words *Thought*, *Manner of Thinking*, or *Modification of the Soul*, I mean all those things in general, which cannot be in the Soul, without her perceiving them; such are her own *Sensations*, her *Imaginations*, her *Pure Intellections*, or simply her *Conceptions*, as also her *Passions*, and *Natural Inclinations*. Now our Soul has no need of Idea's to perceive all these things, because they are within the Soul, or rather because they

are the very Soul it self, in such or such a manner: just as the real Roundness of any Body and its Motion, are nothing but the Body figured and translated, after such or such a sort.

But as to the things without the Soul, we can have no perception of them, but by the means of Idea's, upon supposition that these things cannot be intimately united to us; and they are of two sorts, Spiritual and Material: as to the Spiritual, there is some probability they may be discover'd to the Soul without Idea's, immediately by themselves. For though Experience certifies us, that we cannot by an immediate Communication, declare our Thoughts to one another, but only by words, and other sensible Signs, whereunto we have annex'd our Idea's; yet we may say that GOD has ordain'd this kind of *Academy*, only for the time of this Life, to prevent the Disorders that might at present happen, if Men should understand one another as they pleas'd. But when Justice, and Order shall reign, and we shall be deliver'd from the Captivity of our Body, we shall possibly communicate our Thoughts by the intimate union of our selves, as 'tis probable the Angels may do in Heaven. So that there seems to be no absolute necessity of admitting Idea's, for the representing things of a Spiritual Nature, since 'tis possible for them to be seen by themselves, though in a very dark, and imperfect manner.

I enquire not here how two Spirits can be united to one another, or whether by that means they can open inwards, and make a mutual Discovery of their Thoughts. I believe however, there is no Substance purely Intelligible, except that of GOD, *and that nothing can be evidently discovered but in his Light, and that the Union of Spirits cannot make them visible. For though we be most intimately united with our selves, we both are, and shall be unintelligible to our selves, until we see our selves in* GOD, *and he shall present to us, in our selves, the perfectly-intelligible Idea, which he has of our Being included in his own. And though I seem to grant that Angels may manifest to each other, both what they are, and what they think; I must advertise, that I do it only because I have no mind to dispute it, provided it shall be granted me, what can't be controverted, namely, that we cannot discern material things by themselves, and without Idea's.*

This Paragraph is in Italick, because it may be passed over, as being difficult to be understood, unless a Man know what I think of the Soul, and of the Nature of Idea's.

I will explain in the Seventh Chapter, what my Notion is of the way whereby we know Spirits; and I will make it appear, that we cannot at present entirely know them by themselves, though they may possibly be united to us. But I discourse in this place chiefly of Material things, which certainly are incapable of such a manner of Union with our Soul, as is necessary to make them perceiv'd; for that, they being extended, and the Soul not, there is no proportion betwixt them. And besides, our Souls never depart from our Bodies, to measure the Greatness of the Heavens, and consequently cannot see the Bodies that are without, otherwise than by the Idea's that represent them. And this is what all the World must agree to.

II. *A Particularization of all the ways possible for us to perceive External Objects.*

We affirm then, that it is absolutely necessary that the Idea's we have of Bodies, and of all other Objects we perceive not immediately by themselves, proceed from these same Bodies, or these Objects, or else that our Soul has the power of producing these Idea's; or that GOD produc'd them together with her in the Creation; or that he produces them as often as we think of any Object: or that the Soul has in her self all the Perfections which she discovers in these Bodies; or lastly, is united with an All-perfect Being, who comprehends universally in himself all the Perfections of Created Beings.

There is no perceiving of Objects, but by one of these ways: Let us examine without Prepossession which seems the probablest of all, and not be discouraged at the difficulty of the Question: It may be we shall give a Resolution clear enough, though we pretend not to give incontested Demonstrations for all sorts of Persons; but only most convincing Proofs to such as with thoughtful Attention shall consider them: For it probably would look like Rashness and Presumption, to talk in a more positive manner.

CHAP. II.

That Material Objects emit not Species which resemble them.

THE most common Opinion is that of the *Peripateticks*, who pretend *That External Objects send forth Species, which are like them*; and that these *Species* are convey'd by the External Senses as far as the *Commune Sensorium*. They call these the *Species Impressæ*, because imprinted by Objects on the outward Senses. These *Impress'd Species* being *Material* and *Sensible*, are made *Intelligible* by the *Intellectus Agens*, and are fit to be receiv'd in the *Intellectus Patiens*. These *Species* thus Spiritualiz'd, are term'd *Expressæ*, as being *express'd* from the *impress'd*: and by these it is that the *Patient Intellect* knows all Material things.

I shall not stand to finish the Explication of these Notable things, and of the diverse ways Philosophers have of conceiving them. For though they be not agreed about the number of the Faculties which they attribute to the *External Sense*, and Understanding, and there are

also many that are very dubious, whether they have any need of the *Agent Intellect*, for the knowing Sensible Objects; yet they almost universally agree in the *Emission* of the *Species*, or Images resembling the Objects they proceed from: and 'tis only on this Foundation they multiply their Faculties, and defend their *Active Intellect*. So that this Foundation, having no solidity, as will be seen by and by, there is no necessity of standing to overthrow all the Superstructures they have built upon it.

And maintain, then, it is not probable that Objects should send out *Species*, or *Images* in their own likeness: and these are my Reasons for it. The first is taken from the *Impenetrability* of Bodies. All Objects, as the *Sun*, the *Stars*, as well as those that are near our Eyes, cannot emit *Species* of a different Nature from themselves; and for this Reason 'tis usually said by the Philosophers, that these *Species* are gross and material, to distinguish them from the *express'd Species*, which are spiritualiz'd. These *Impress'd Species* of Objects are therefore little Bodies. They cannot then penetrate each other, nor all the Spaces betwixt Heaven and Earth, which must needs be fill'd with them. From whence it is easy to conclude, that they must needs bruise, and batter one another, some coming one way, and thwarting others coming another; and so 'tis impossible they should render Objects visible.

Again, it is possible from one standing on one Point, to see a great number of Objects which are in the Heaven, and on the Earth. There is then a necessity that the *Species* of all these Bodies be reduc'd into a Point. But they are Impenetrable, since they are extended, *Ergo, &c.*

But we not only can see from one and the same Point, abundance of most large and even immense Objects: there is moreover not any Point in all these great Spaces of the World, from whence we cannot discover an almost inexhaustible number of Objects, and even Objects as big as the *Sun*, the *Moon*, and Heavens. There is not then any Point in the great Circumference of the World, wherein the *Species* of all these things ought not to center, which is contradictory to all appearance of Truth.

If a Man has a mind to know how all the Impressions of Visible Objects, though oppos'd, can be communicated without weakning, let him read M. Des-Cartes's *Dioptricks.*

The second Reason is taken from the Change these *Species* undergo. It is certain the nearer an Object is, the greater the *Species* ought to be, since we see the Object greater. Now we cannot see what 'tis that can lessen this *Species*, and what become of the Parts that compos'd it, when it was greater. But that which is still more difficult to conceive, according to their Notion, is, how in beholding an Object with Magnifying-glasses, or a *Microscope*, the *Species* grows on a suddain five or six hundred times bigger than it was before: for 'tis still harder to be seen from what adventitious Parts it can increase so mightily in an instant.

The third Reason is, that in looking on a perfect Cube, all the *Species* of its faces are unequal, and yet we fail not to see all its faces equally square: And so in beholding in a Picture *Ovals* and *Parallelograms*, which can only send forth *Species* of a similar Figure; we see notwithstanding *Circles* and *Squares*. For this makes it manifestly clear, that there is no necessity the Object we behold, should produce *Species* like it self, in order to our seeing it.

Lastly, it is not conceivable, how it is possible for a Body, that is not sensibly exhausted, to send constantly *Species* from out of it self on every side; how it can continually fill with them, so very capacious Spaces all round about; and that with an incomprehensible swiftness. For an Object that lay hid, in the very instant of its Discovery, may be seen many millions of leagues on all sides. And what seems much stranger yet, is that the Bodies which have a great deal of Action, as the Air, and some others, have not force enough to extrude from them their representative Images: which the grossest and least active Bodies can do, as Earth, Stones, and almost all hard Bodies.

But I shall not spend more time in producing all the Reasons that oppugn this Opinion, because that would be an endless work; the least Essay of Thought furnishing out an inexhaustible number of them. These we have already urg'd, are enough, and even more than were necessary, after what has been said relating to this Subject, in the first Book, when we explain'd the Errors of the Senses. But there being such a multitude of Philosophers devoted to this Opinion, I thought it necessary to say something of it, to put them upon reflecting on their own Thoughts.

CHAP. III.

That the Soul has no Power to produce Idea's. The Cause of the Error Men are guilty of, upon this Subject.

THE second Opinion is theirs, who believe that our *Souls have the Power of producing the Idea's of the things they would contemplate*: and that they are mov'd to the producing them by the impressions Objects make upon the Body; though these impressions, are not Images representative of the Objects they are caused by: They pretend it is in this, that Man is made after the Image of *GOD*, and participates of his Power; That as *GOD* has created all things out of nothing, and can annihilate them again; and thence create

create others wholly new; so Man has the Power of Creating and Annihilating the Idea's of all things as he pleases. But there's very good reason to suspect all these Opinions, that elevate Man so high: as being Notions which commonly derive from his vain and haughty Heart, and which the Father of Lights never vouchsafed to give him.

This Participation of the Power of *GOD*, which Men boast of having, whereby to represent Objects, and to do many other particular Actions, is a Participation which seems to draw in something of Independency, as 'tis ordinarily explain'd. But 'tis likewise a Chimerical Participation, which Men's Ignorance and Vanity, have caus'd them to imagine: For they are under a greater Dependance on the Goodness and Mercy of *GOD*, than they suppose. But this is not the place to give an Explication of these things: Let us only try to make it visible, that Men have not the Power of forming the Idea's of the things they perceive.

No Man can doubt but that Idea's are real Beings, seeing they have real Properties, that they differ one from another; and that they represent quite different things. Nor can it reasonably be doubted, but they are of a Spiritual Nature, and very different from the Bodies represented by them. All which seems strong enough to raise a doubt, whether the Idea's by means whereof we perceive Bodies, are not of a nobler extract, than the Bodies themselves. And in earnest, the *Intelligible World*, ought to be perfecter than the *Material* and Terrestrial, as we shall see in the process of our Discourse; and then, in affirming that Men are impower'd to frame all Idea's as they please, we incurr the danger of maintaining that Men have power of making Beings more noble and more perfect, than the World which *GOD* has created. But this reflection never enters our Heads, by reason of our imagining an Idea to be nothing, because not obvious to the Senses; or if we look upon it as a Being, 'tis a Being so slender and contemptible, that we fancy it annihilated, as soon as absent from the Mind.

But though it should be true, that Idea's were only little, pitiful, despicable Beings; they are however Beings, and Beings Spiritual: and Men having not the Power of Creating, have not consequently the Power of Producing them. For the Production of Idea's in the manner they explain it, is a true Creation: and though they endeavour to palliate, and soften the Presumption and Harshness of this Opinion, in saying, that the Production of Idea's supposes something antecedent, and Creation supposes nothing; yet they bring no Reason to solve the Knot of that difficulty.

For it ought well to be heeded, That there is no greater difficulty, in producing Something out of Nothing, than in producing it, by presupposing another thing, out of which it could not be made; and which could contribute nothing to its Production. There is no greater difficulty, for instance, in the Creation of an Angel, than in the Production of an Angel from a Stone. Because a Stone being a Being, of a quite opposite kind, cannot be any ways serviceable to the Production of an Angel. But it may contribute to the Production of Bread, of Gold, *&c.* because Stone, Gold and Bread, are only the same Extention, of a diverse Configuration, and all these are Material things.

Nay, it is even harder to produce an Angel out of a Stone, than to produce it out of Nothing; because to the producing an Angel out of a Stone, so far as that is possible to be done, the Stone must be first Annihilated, and afterwards the Angel Created; but simply to Create an Angel, there needs no Annihilation at all. If then the Mind produces Idea's from the Material Impressions the Brain receives from Objects, it does still the same thing, or a thing as difficult, or even difficulter, than if it Created them: Since Idea's being Spiritual, cannot be produc'd out of Material Images that are in the Brain, to which they have no Proportion or *Analogy*.

But some one will say, That an Idea is not a Substance: Be it so; but still it is a Being, and a Being of a Spiritual kind: And as it is impossible to make a Square of a Spirit, though a Square be not a Substance; so 'tis impossible to frame a Spiritual Idea, out of a Material Substance, though an Idea be not a Substance.

But suppose we should allow the Mind of Man to have an absolute Power of Creating, and Annihilating the Ideas of things: yet after all: he would never employ it to the Producing them. For as a Painter, though never so excellent at his Art, could not represent an Animal he had never seen, or had no Idea of; so that the Picture he was oblig'd to make of it, would not be like that unknown Animal; so a Man could not form the Idea of an Object, unless he knew it before; that is, unless he had already the Idea of it, which has no dependance on his Will: But if he has the Idea of it already, he knows the Object: and 'tis needless to form a new one of it. 'Tis therefore needless to attribute to the Mind of Man the power of producing its Idea's.

It might perhaps be said, that the Mind has general and confus'd Idea's, which it does not produce; and that those which it produceth are particular, more clever and distinct: but it all comes to the same thing. For as a Painter could not draw the Picture of a particular Man, so as to be certify'd he had hit it right; unless he had a distinct Idea of him, and even unless the Person himself should sit: so the Mind that had only the Idea, for instance, of Being, or of an Animal in general; could not represent to its self an Horse, nor form any very distinct Idea thereof, nor be assur'd this Idea perfectly resembled an Horse, unless it had a former Idea thereof wherewith to collate this second. Now if it had a former, it is in vain to form a second; and the Question proceeds upon that former. Therefore, *&c.*

It is true, that whilst we conceive a Square by pure Intellection, we may besides imagine it, that is, perceive it by drawing the Image of it in the Brain. But 'tis to be observ'd in the first place, that we are not the Real, nor the Principal Cause of that Image; but it would take up too much time to explain it; And again, that the second Idea, which accompanies that Image, is so far from being more distinct and accurate than the other; that on the contrary, it owes all its Exactness to its Resemblance with the first, which serves to regulate the second. For, in brief, it is not to be believ'd, that the Imagination, or even the Senses, make us a more distinct Representation of Objects, than the Pure Intellect: but only that they make the Mind more concern'd, and applicative: For the Idea's of Sense and Imagination are not distinct any farther, than they are conformable with those of Pure Intellection. The image of a Square, for instance, that the Imagination delineates in the Brain, is no otherwise just and regular, than as it conforms with the Idea of a Square, which we have by Pure Intellection. 'Tis that Idea which regulates the Image. 'Tis the Mind that conducts the Imagination, and obliges it, as I may say, to look time after time, whether the Image painted by it, be a Figure of four right and equal Lines, whose Angles are exactly right: In a word, if that which is *imagin'd*, be like that which is conceiv'd.

Tanto meliora esse judico quæ oculis cerno quanto pro sui natura viciniora sunt iis quæ animo intelligo. *Aug. 6. 7. de Vera Religione.*

After what has been said, I suppose no body can doubt, but it is an Error, in those that affirm the Mind can form the Idea's of Objects; since they attribute to the Mind a Power of Creating, and even of Creating with Wisdom, and Order; though it has no Knowledge of what it does: a thing utterly inconceivable. But the Cause of this their Error, is that customary Judgement Men make of one thing's being the Cause of another, when they are found conjoyn'd together. Supposing that the true Cause of this Effect be unknown to them. 'Tis for this Reason, that every one concludes, that a Bowl in motion, meeting with another, is the true and principal Cause of the Motion it communicates to it; that the Will of the Soul, is the true and principal Cause of the motion of the Arm, and such like Prejudices as these; because it always happens that a Bowl is mov'd, when it lies in the way of another that knocks against it, and we move our Arms almost as often as we *will* it; and we do not sensibly perceive what else could be the Cause of these Motions.

But when an Effect is not so constant an attendant on any thing that's not the Cause of it, there are ever very many who believe this thing to be the Cause of the Effect that happens, though all Men fall not into this Error. A *Comet*, for instance, appears, and presently after a Prince goes off, *&c.* Stones are expos'd to the *Moon*, and are eaten with Worms: The *Sun* is in Conjunction with *Mars*, at the Nativity of a Child; and that Child has some Fortune extraordinary: This is argument sufficient to perswade a great many, that the *Comet*, the *Moon*, the Conjunction of the *Sun* with *Mars*, are the Causes of the Effects, I have mention'd, and of others that are like them: and the Reason why all the World is not of the same Opinion, is their Observation, that the like Effects do not at all times attend these Causes.

But all Men having commonly Idea's of Objects present to their Mind, when they desire it; and this happening many times a day, very few of them but conclude, that the Will, which accompanies the Production, or rather Presence of Idea's, is the true Cause of them: because they see nothing at the same time to which they can attribute them; and they imagine the Idea's cease to exist, when out of the view of the Mind; and that they begin to exist again, when re-presented to it.

'Tis upon the same account too, that some judge that External Objects send forth Images that resemble them; so as has been said in the preceding Chapter. For it being impossible to see Objects by themselves, or any otherwise than by their Idea's, they judge that the Object produces the Idea: because when 'tis present, they see it, when absent, it disappears: and the presence of the Object, almost always is found in company with the Idea that represents it to us.

However, if Men were not rash and inconsiderate in their Judgements, they ought only to conclude from the Idea's of things being present to their Mind, when ever they will have them, that according to the order of Nature, their Will is for the most part necessary to their having these Idea's, but not that the Will is the True and Principal Cause, that exhibits them to the Mind, much less that the Will produces them out of nothing, or in the manner they explain it. Nor is there any more Reason for concluding, that Objects emit *Species* that resemble them; because the Soul has seldom any Perception of them, but when they are present; but only that the Object, is for the most part necessary to the Idea's being present to the Mind. Lastly, they ought not to conclude, that a Bowl in motion, is the principal and true Cause of the motion of another, which it meets in its way; since the first has no power of moving it self. They can only judge, that the Collision of the two Bowls, is an occasion to the Author of the motion of Matter, to execute the decree of his Will; which is the universal Cause of all things, by communicating to the other Bowl, a part of the motion of the first: that is, to speak more clearly, by willing that the latter should acquire as much motion as the former lost; for the impellent force of Bodies can be nothing but the Will of him that preserves them, as will be made appear in another place.

See the 3d. Chap. of the Second Part concerning Method.

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

That we perceive not Objects by means of Idea's created with us. That GOD *does not produce them in us, every moment we have need of them.*

THE third Opinion is of those who pretend, *That all Idea's are created with us.* For our better discovering how little likelihood there is in this Opinion, we must consider that there are in the World many quite different things, whereof we have Idea's. But to mention only simple Figures, it is certain that the number of them is infinite; and even if we fix only on an *Ellipsis*, 'tis not to be doubted but the Mind can conceive an infinite number of *Ellipses* of a different *Species*; in as much as it can conceive, that one of its Diameters may be lengthened to Infinity, the other remaining constantly the same.

So since the Heighth of a *Triangle* may be augmented or diminish'd to infinity, the side which serves for the Base, being still the same, we conceive there may be infinite Triangles upon the same Base, of a different *Species*. And moreover, which I desire may be well consider'd here, the Mind in some manner *perceives* that infinite number, though it can *imagine* but a very few, and a Man cannot at one and the same time, have particular and distinct Idea's of many Triangles of a different *Species*. But that which should be most especially attended to, is that this general Idea the Mind has of an infinite number of Triangles of a different *Species*, is a sufficient proof, that if we cannot conceive by particular Idea's all these different Triangles; in a word, if we cannot comprehend Infinity, 'tis not for want of Idea's, or because Infinity is not present to our Mind; but meerly for want of the Mind's Capacity and Comprehension. If a Man should apply himself to the considering the properties of all the diverse *Species* of Triangles, and even should eternally pursue this sort of Study, he would find new and particular Idea's, in an endless succession; but his Mind would tire under the unprofitable Disquisition.

What I have now said of *Triangles*, may be apply'd to Figures of five, six, an hundred, a thousand, or ten thousand sides, and so up to infinity. And if the sides of a Triangle, being capable of infinite Relations with each other, can make Triangles of infinite *Species*; it is easy to be seen that the Figures of Four, Five, or of a Million of sides, are capable of much greater Differences, as being subject to a far greater number of Relations, and Combinations of their sides than simple Triangles.

The Mind then discerns all these things, and has Idea's of them all. And 'tis certain these Idea's will never be exhausted, though it should employ infinite Ages in the consideration of one Figure only; and if it perceive not these infinite Figures all at once, or if it comprehend not Infinity, 'tis only because its Tedder is too short and limited. It has then an infinite number of Idea's: what said I, an infinite number? It has so many infinite numbers of Idea's, as there are different Figures: In so much that there being an infinite number of different Figures, the Mind must have an infinity of infinite Numbers of Idea's, for the Knowledge of Figures only.

Now I demand of them, Whether 'tis probable that *GOD* has created so many things with the Mind of Man? For my own part it can never enter into my Head, especially since it might be done in another most simple and easy manner, as we shall see by and by. For whereas *GOD* acts always by the most simple means, it seems unreasonable to explain our manner of knowing Objects, by admitting the Creation of an infinity of Beings, when the difficulty may be resolv'd in a way more easy and natural.

But what if the Mind had a Magazine of all the Idea's necessary to its Perception of things? It would be still extreamly difficult to explain, how the Soul could make choice of them, to represent Objects to her self: how, for instance, she could bring it about to perceive the *Sun*, when it were present to the Eyes of the Body. For since the Image the *Sun* imprints in the Brain, is nothing like the Idea we have of it, as has been formerly prov'd; and since likewise the Soul perceives not the Motion the *Sun* produces in the Fund of the Eye, and in the Brain; it is not conceivable, how among such an infinite number of Idea's which she had, she could exactly divine which it was necessary to represent, for the imagining or seeing of the *Sun*. It cannot then be said, that the Idea's of things were created with us, and that this is sufficient for our perceiving the Objects that are round about us.

Nor can it be said, that *GOD* produces every moment so many new Idea's, as we perceive different things. This is sufficiently refuted by what has been said in this Chapter. Besides it is necessary, we should actually have in our selves the Idea's of all things at all times, since at all times we can *Will* the conceiving all things. Which we could never do, unless we had already a confus'd Perception of them; that is, unless we had an infinite number of Idea's present to our Mind. For, to conclude, we cannot *Will* the Thinking on Objects, whereof we have no Idea.

CHAP. V.

That the Mind perceives neither the Eſſence nor the Exiſtence of Objects, by conſidering its own Perfections. That none but GOD *ſees them in that manner.*

THE fourth Opinion is, *That the Mind ſtands in need of nothing, but it ſelf, to perceive Objects; and that it may by reflecting on it ſelf and its own Perfections, look into all things that are External to it.*

It is certain the Soul perceives in her ſelf, and without Idea's, all the Senſations and Paſſions ſhe is capable of: Pleaſure, Pain, Cold, Heat, Colours, Sounds, Odours, Taſts, her Love, her Hatred, her Joy, her Sorrow, and the reſt: Becauſe all the Senſations, and Paſſions of the Soul, repreſent nothing out of her ſelf, which reſembles them, and are only the Modifications the Mind is capable of. But the difficulty lies in knowing, whether the Idea's that repreſent things exteriour to the Soul, and reſemble them in one manner, as the Idea's of the *Sun*, of an Houſe, of an Horſe, of a River, are nothing but the Modifications of the Soul: ſo that the Mind has no need of any thing but it ſelf, to repreſent all theſe things that are without it.

There are thoſe who make no ſcruple to affirm, That the Soul being made for Thinking, has in it ſelf, I mean by conſidering its own Perfections, all that is neceſſary to its Perception of Objects; For being in Effect more noble than all the things it diſtinctly conceives, it may be ſaid to contain them in ſome *Eminent* ſort, as the Schools love to ſpeak; that is, in a more noble and ſublimated manner, than they are in themſelves. They pretend that ſuperiour Beings comprehend after this manner the Perfections of the inferiorus. And hereupon, being the nobleſt Creatures that they know, they flatter themſelves with poſſeſſing in a Spiritual manner all that is in the Viſible World, and with being able by diverſly modifying themſelves, to perceive all that the Humane Mind can attain to know. In a word, they would have the Soul to be a ſort of an *Intelligible World;* that comprehends in it ſelf the Material and Senſible World, and infinitely more.

But methinks 'tis a bold Stroke, to offer a Defence of this Opinion: 'Tis, if I miſtake not, a Natural Vanity, the love of Independency, and the deſire of reſembling Him, who comprehends in Himſelf all Beings; that confounds the Mind, and makes us imagine our ſelves the Poſſeſſors of what we have not. *Say not,* ſays St. *Auguſtin, that ye are a Light to your ſelves.* For 'tis only *GOD* that is a Light to Himſelf, and who may by conſidering Himſelf, ſee all that he has produc'd, and all that he is able to produce.

Dic quia tu tibi lumen non es. *Serm. 8. de verbis Domini.*

'Tis moſt certain, That there was none but *GOD* before the Creation of the World, and that He was not able to produce it without Knowledge, or without Idea: that conſequently the Idea's which *GOD* had, are not different from Himſelf; and ſo all the Creatures, even the moſt Terreſtrial and Material are in *GOD*, though in a manner altogether Spiritual, and to us Incomprehenſible.

GOD ſees therefore in Himſelf all Beings, by Reflection made on His own Perfections that repreſent them to Him. He has beſides the perfect Knowledge of their Exiſtence: For ſince they depend upon His Will for their Exiſtence, and He cannot be ignorant of his own *Wills*; it follows that He cannot be ignorant of their Exiſtence: and conſequently *GOD* beholds within Himſelf not only the Eſſence of things, but their Exiſtence alſo.

But 'tis not the ſame with Created Spirits, as not being able to ſee in themſelves either the Eſſence or the Exiſtence of Things. They cannot ſee the Eſſence of them in themſelves, ſince being of a ſhort and limited Capacity, they contain not all Beings, as *GOD* does; who may be ſtil'd an Univerſal Being; or ſimply *He that is*, as he calls Himſelf. Seeing then the Humane Mind is capable of knowing all Beings, and Infinite Beings, and yet contains them not in it ſelf; 'tis an infallible Argument, that it ſees not their Eſſence in it ſelf. For the Mind has not only a ſucceſſive ſight of firſt one thing, then another, it alſo actually perceives *INFINITE:* Though it does not comprehend it, as has been ſaid in the fore-going Chapter. Wherefore being neither actually Infinite, nor capable of infinite Modifications at the ſame time, it is abſolutely impoſſible it ſhould ſee in it ſelf, what it does not contain; it ſees not then the Eſſence of things by conſidering its own Perfections, or by the diverſe modifying of it ſelf.

Nor does it ſee their Exiſtence in it ſelf, becauſe they depend not on its Will for their Exiſtence; and the Idea's of things may be preſent to the Mind, though they do not exiſt at all. For every one may have the Idea of a golden Mountain, though there be no ſuch thing as a golden Mountain in Nature: and though we rely on the Teſtimonies of the Senſes, in our Judging of the Exiſtence of Objects, yet Reaſon does not aſſure us that we ought always to believe them, ſince we manifeſtly diſcover that they abuſe us. When a Man's Blood, for inſtance, is well warm'd, or only when he ſleeps,

sleeps, he sees sometimes before his Eyes, Fields, Battles, and the like, which yet are not present, and which possibly never were. 'Tis then indubitable, that the Mind neither in it self, nor by it self, sees the Existence of things, but in that particular depends on something else.

CHAP. VI.

That we see all things in GOD.

WE have examin'd in the precedent Chapters Four different ways, for the Mind's perceiving External Objects; none of which seems likely to be the true. There only remains the Fifth, which alone seems agreeable to Reason, and the propereſt to manifest the Dependance our Minds have on *GOD* in all their Thoughts.

'Tis requisite to our perfect Understanding it, to call to Mind what has been deliver'd in the fore-going Chapter: *viz.* That 'tis absolutely necessary for *GOD* to have in Himself the Idea's of all the Beings he has created, since otherwise he could not have produc'd them: and that hereby he sees all these Beings by considering the Perfections he includes, whereunto they are related. We ought to know farther, that *GOD* is most strictly united to our Souls by His Presence, so that He may be said to be the place of Spirits, as Space is the place of Bodies. These two things being suppos'd, it is certain that the Mind can see what there is in *GOD*, which represents Created Beings; that being most Spiritual, most Intelligible, and most closely Present to the Mind. And so the Mind may see in *GOD* all the Works of *GOD*, supposing *GOD* willing to discover to it what He has in Himself, that represents them. Here then are the Reasons, which seem to prove He *would* rather do this, than create an infinite number of Idea's in every Mind.

In the first place, though it be not deny'd absolutely that *GOD* might have made infinite upon infinite Numbers of Beings, Representative of Objects, with every Mind He has created; yet it is not to be believ'd that He has done it. For it is not only most agreeable to Reason, but moreover apparent from the *œconomy* of all Nature, that *GOD* never effects by most Round-about and difficult ways, what can be done in ways most simple and easy: *GOD* makes nothing needless, and without Reason. That which shews His Wisdom and His Power, is not the working little things by great means: this is against Reason, and the sign of a limited Understanding: But on the contrary, the effecting great things by most simple and easy ways. Thus it is that purely with Extension He produces all we see admirable in Nature; even that which gives Life and Motion to Animals. For those who would have absolute Substantial Forms and Faculties, and Souls in Animals, distinguish'd from the Blood and Organs of their Body, for the performance of their functions, will at the same time have *GOD* to want Understanding, or suppose Him unable to effect those admirable things with Extension all alone. They measure the Power of *GOD* and His supream Wisdom, by the Littleness of their own Mind. Since then it is possible for *GOD* to make all things visible to our Minds, by simply Willing they should see what is in the midst of themselves; that is, what He has in Himself, Relative and Representative of these things; it is not likely He should have done otherwise: and that He should produce for that purpose infinite upon infinite Idea's, with every Mind that He has created.

But 'tis to be well observ'd, that we cannot conclude that our Minds see the Essence of *GOD*, from their seeing all things in *GOD* in this Nature; because what they see is most imperfect, whereas *GOD* is most perfect. They see matter Divisible, Figur'd, *&c.* and in *GOD* there is nothing Divisible or Figur'd. For *GOD* is all Being, as being infinite, and comprehending all: but He is not any Being in particular; mean while what we see, is only one or more Beings in particular, and we comprehend not that perfect Simplicity of *GOD*, who concludes all Beings within Himself. Besides which it may be said, that we see not the Idea's of Things, so much as the Things represented by the Idea's: for in seeing a Square, for instance, we use not to say, we see the Idea of that Square, which is united to the Mind, but only the Square that is *without*.

The second Reason which obliges me to think that we see all Beings, because *GOD* wills the discovery of what is in Himself, representing them; and not because we have so many Idea's created with us, as there are things to be seen; is, that this instates created Minds in an absolute Dependance upon *GOD*, and in the greatest that possibly can be. For it being so, we not only can see nothing but what *GOD* will have us see, but also can see nothing, except what He makes us see. *Non sumus sufficientes cogitare aliquid à nobis tanquam ex nobis, sed sufficientia nostra ex Deo est.* 'Tis *GOD* Himself that enlightens the Philosophers, in that Science which ungrateful Men call Natural; though it is deriv'd to them from Heaven. *Deus enim illis manifestavit.* He is properly the Light of the Mind, and the Father of Lights. *Pater Luminum.* 'Tis He who teaches Men Knowledge: *Qui docet hominem Scientiam.* In a word, He is the true Light, that lighteth every Man that cometh into the World. *Lux vera quæ illuminat omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum.*

2 Cor. 3. 5.
Rom. 1. 19.
Jac. 1. 17.
Pſal. 94. 10.
Joh. 1. 9.

For 'tis no eaſy thing to comprehend diſtinctly the Dependance our Minds have on *GOD*, in all their particular Actions; ſuppoſing they have every thing, we diſtinctly know to be neceſſary to their Acting, or all the Idea's of things preſent to their Mind. And that general and confus'd term *Concourſe*, whereby they offer to explain the Dependance Creatures have on *GOD*, raiſes no diſtinct Idea in a conſiderate Mind: and yet it is convenient Men ſhould moſt diſtinctly know, how altogether impotent they are without *GOD*.

But the ſtrongeſt Reaſon of all, is the manner of conduct the Mind takes in the perceiving every thing: It is manifeſt, and known to every ones own experience, that when we would think on any thing in particular, we firſt caſt about our View upon all Beings in general, and afterwards apply our ſelves to the conſideration of the Object we deſire to think on: Now it is undoubtedly certain, that we could not deſire the ſight of any particular Object, but we muſt have already ſeen it, though it were confuſedly and in general: So that it being poſſible to deſire the ſeeing all Beings, ſometimes one and ſometimes another, it is certain that all Beings are preſent to our Mind; and it ſeems that all Beings can be no otherwiſe preſent to our Mind, than as *GOD* is preſent to it; that is, He that contains all things in the ſimplicity of his Eſſence.

It ſeems too that the Mind would not be capable of repreſenting to it ſelf the univerſal Idea's of *Genus*, *Species*, and the like, unleſs it ſaw all Beings included in one. For every creature being a particular Being, it can't be ſaid, we ſee any thing created when we ſee, for example, a Triangle in general. In fine, I do not believe there is any way of accounting for the manner of the Mind's knowing ſeveral abſtract and general Truths, but by the preſence of Him who can enlighten the Mind, ten thouſand different ways.

In ſhort, the fineſt, the moſt ſublime, the moſt ſolid and puniary proof (or that which ſuppoſes leaſt things) of the Exiſtence of a *GOD*, is the Idea we have of what is infinite: For it is certain that the Mind perceives infinite, though it does not comprehend it; and that it has a moſt diſtinct Idea of *GOD*, which can only arrive, through the Union it has with Him. Since 'tis inconceivable, that the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, as is that we have of *GOD*, ſhould be any thing of a created Nature.

But the Mind has not only the Idea of infinite, but this Idea is precedaneous to that of finite: For we conceive infinite Being, from our conceiving Being only, not conſidering whether it be finite or infinite. But in order to conceive Finite Being, it is neceſſary to preſcind ſomewhat from that general Notion of Being, which conſequently muſt precede it. So then the Mind perceives not any thing, except in the Idea it has of Infinite: and ſo far is that Idea from being form'd of a confus'd collection of all the Idea's of particular Beings, as the Philoſophers imagine; that on the contrary, all theſe particular Idea's are only participations of that general Idea of infinite; as *GOD* derives not his Being from the Creatures, but all the Creatures have their ſubſiſtence from him.

The laſt Proof, which poſſibly may go for a Demonſtration with thoſe who are us'd to abſtract Reaſonings, is this. 'Tis impoſſible for *GOD* to have any other principal end of his Actions than Himſelf. This is a common Notion with all Men capable of any Reflection; and Holy Scripture will not ſuffer us to doubt, that *GOD* has created all things for Himſelf. It is neceſſary then not only that our Natural Love, I mean the Motion he produces in our Mind, ſhould tend *towards him*; but alſo that the Knowledge and the Light he gives it, ſhould diſcover ſomething to us which is *in Him*: for all that comes from *GOD*, can have no other end but *GOD*. If *GOD* had made a Mind, and given it the *Sun* for its Idea, or for the immediate Object of its Knowledge, *GOD*, we ſhould think, had made that Mind and the Idea of that Mind for the *Sun*, and not for himſelf.

GOD cannot therefore make a Mind for the Knowledge of his Works, but this Mind muſt in ſome ſort ſee *GOD* in contemplating his Works. So that it may be ſaid, that unleſs we ſaw *GOD* in ſome manner, we ſhould ſee nothing at all; juſt as we ſhould love nothing at all, except we lov'd *GOD*; that is, except *GOD* continually impreſs'd on us the love of Good in general. For that Love being our Will, we are unable to love any thing, or will any thing without Him: ſince we cannot love particular Goods; but by determining towards theſe Goods the motion of Love that *GOD* gives us for Himſelf. Thus as we love not any thing, but by means of that neceſſary Love we have for *GOD*; ſo we know nothing, but through that neceſſary Knowledge we have of Him, all the particular Idea's which we have of the Creatures, being only the Reſtrictions of the Idea of the Creator, as all the Motions of the Will towards the Creatures, are only Determinations of the Motion towards the Creator.

I ſuppoſe there is no *Theologiſt* but will agree with me in this, that the Impious love *GOD* with this Natural Love I ſpeak of: And St. *Auguſtin*, and ſome other of the Fathers maintain it as a thing undoubted, That the Wicked ſee in *GOD* the Rules of Morals, and eternal Truths. So that the Opinion I am explaining ought not to trouble any body. *Ab illa incommutabili luce Veritatis, etiam impius, dum ab ea avertitur, quodammodo tangitur. Hinc eſt quod etiam impii cogitant æternitatem, & multa rectè reprehendunt rectèque laudant in hominum moribus. Quibus ea tandem regulis judicant, niſi in quibus vident, quemadmodum quiſq; vivere debeat, etiamſi nec ipſi eodem modo vivant? ubi autem eas vident? Neque enim in ſua natura. Nam cùm proculdubio mente iſta videantur, eorumque mentes conſtet eſſe mutabiles, has* veri

Lib. 14. de Trin. cap. 13.

verò regulas immutabiles, videat quisquis in eis & hoc videre potuerit..... Ubinam ergo sunt istæ regulæ scriptæ, nisi in libro lucis illius, quæ veritas dicitur, unde lex omnis justa describitur..... in qua videt quid operandum sit, etiam qui operatur injustitiam, & ipse est qui ab ea luce avertitur à qua tamen tangitur.

There are in St. *Auguſtin* infinite paſſages of like nature, whereby he proves that we ſee *GOD*, even in this Life, through the Knowledge we have of eternal Truths. Truth is uncreated, immutable, immenſe, eternal, and above all things. It is true independently, and by it ſelf, and is beholden to nothing elſe for its Perfection. It renders the Creatures more perfect, and all Spirits are naturally ſolicitous to know it; nothing can have all theſe Perfections, except *GOD*; therefore Truth is *GOD*. We ſee immutable and eternal Truths; therefore we ſee *GOD*. Theſe are the Reaſons of St. *Auguſtin*. My own are ſomewhat different; and I would not unjuſtly uſurp the Authority of ſo great a Man to countenance my Opinion.

'Tis my thoughts then that Truths, even thoſe which are eternal, as *That twice two are four*, are not ſo much as abſolute Beings; ſo far am I from believing them to be in *GOD*. For 'tis manifeſt that this Truth conſiſts only in the Relation of Equality, which is between twice two, and four. We do not ſay then with St. *Auguſtin*, That we ſee *GOD* in ſeeing eternal Truths, but in ſeeing the Idea's of theſe Truths: for Idea's are real, but the Equality between Idea's, which is the Truth, has nothing real in it. When, for inſtance we ſay, the Cloth we meaſure is three Ells long. The Cloth and the Ells are real, but the Equality between the three Ells and the Cloth is no real Being; but only a Relation intervening between them. In ſaying, Twice two are four, the Idea's of the Numbers are real; but the Equality between them, is only a Relation. And thus according to our own Opinion, we ſee *GOD*, in ſeeing eternal Truths: not that theſe Truths are *GOD*, but becauſe the Idea's on which theſe Truths depend, exiſt in *GOD*; and perhaps too St. *Auguſtin* underſtood it ſo. We are perſwaded alſo that we know changeable and corruptible Truths in *GOD*; though St. *Auguſtine* ſpeaks only of the immutable and incorruptible; ſince there is no need of ſubjecting GOD to any imperfection on this account, nothing being more requir'd, than that GOD give us a Manifeſtation of what He has in Himſelf, which relates to theſe things.

But when I ſay, that we ſee in GOD material and ſenſible things, ſpecial Notice ſhould be taken, that I don't ſay, we have the Senſations of them in GOD; but only that they proceed from GOD, who acts upon us. For GOD perfectly knows ſenſible things; but not by any Senſation. In perceiving any thing of a ſenſible Nature, two things occur in our Perception; *Senſation*, and *Pure Idea*. The Senſation is a Modification of our Soul, and 'tis GOD who cauſes it in us; which he is able to cauſe, though he has it not Himſelf; becauſe he ſees in the Idea he has of our Soul, that it is capable of it: As to the Idea, which is found joyn'd to the Senſation, that is in GOD; and we ſee it, becauſe He is pleas'd to diſcover it to us. And GOD joyns the Senſation to the Idea, when the Objects are preſent, to the intent we may believe them ſo, and may enter into the Sentiments and Paſſions, that we ought to have with relation to them.

We believe laſtly, that all Spirits ſee the eternal Laws, no leſs than other things in GOD; but with ſome difference. They know the Divine Orders, and the Eternal Truths, and even the Beings GOD has made, according to this Order, and theſe Truths, through the Union they neceſſarily have with the WORD, or the WISDOM of GOD, who enlightens them, as we have before explain'd. But 'tis through the impreſſion they without intermiſſion receive from the Will of GOD, which carries them towards Him, and ſtrives as I may ſo ſay, to conform their Will entirely like His own; that they know this Order to be a Law; I mean that they know the Eternal Laws: as that Good ought to be lov'd, and Evil avoided; that Juſtice ought to be lov'd more than Riches; that 'tis better to obey GOD, than to command Men, and infinite other Natural Laws. For the knowledge of all theſe Laws, is not different from the Knowledge of that impreſſion, which they conſtantly feel within themſelves, though they do not always follow it, by the free choice of their Will; and which they know to be common to all Minds, though it be not equally ſtrong and powerful in them all.

'Tis by this Dependance of our Mind, and its Relation, and Union to the Word of GOD; and of our Will to his Love, that we are made after the Image and Similitude of GOD. And though this Image be very much blurr'd, and defac'd by Sin, yet it is neceſſary for it to ſubſiſt, as long as we our ſelves. But if we bear the Image of the *WORD* humbled upon Earth, and obey the Motions of the *Holy Spirit*; that Primitive Image of our firſt Creation, that Union of our Mind to the *WORD* of the *FATHER*, and to the Love of the *FATHER*, and of the *SON*, will be repair'd, and be made indelible. We ſhall become like GOD, if we be like the *Man-God*. Laſtly, GOD will be wholly in us, and we ſhall be wholly in GOD, in a far perfecter manner, than that whereby it is neceſſary to our Subſiſtence, that we ſhould be in Him, and He in us.

See the Illuſtrations.

Theſe then are ſome of the Reaſons that induce us to believe, that our Minds perceive all things through the intimate preſence of Him, who comprehends all things in the Simplicity of his Eſſence. Let every one judge of them, according to the internal conviction he ſhall re-

receive, after he has ſeriouſly conſider'd them. But for my own part, I can ſee no probability, in any other way of explaining it, and I preſume this laſt will appear more than probable.

Thus our Souls depend on GOD all manner of ways. For as it is He who makes them feel Pleaſure and Pain, and all the other Senſations, by the Natural Union He has inſtituted between them and their Bodies, which is no other than His Decree, and general Will: So it is He who, by means of the Natural Union He has play'd between the Will of Man, and the Repreſentation of Idea's, included in the immenſity of the Divine Eſſence, gives them to know all that they know: nor is this Natural Union any thing but his general Will. So that 'tis He only who can enlighten us, by repreſenting all things to us, as 'tis He alone that can make us happy, by giving us to taſte all ſorts of Pleaſures.

Let us perſiſt then in our perſwaſion, that GOD is the intelligible World, or the place of Spirits, as the material World is the place of Bodies. That 'tis from His Power they receive all their Modifications; that 'tis in His Wiſdom they diſcover all their Idea's: that 'tis by His Love they are influenc'd with all their regulated Motions: and becauſe His Power and His Love are nothing but Himſelf: let us believe with St. *Paul*, that He is not far from every one of us, and that in Him we live and move, and have our Being. *Non longè eſt ab unoquoque noſtrùm, in ipſo enim vivimus, movemur, & ſumus.*

Act. Apoſt. c. 17. 28.

CHAP. VII.

I. *Four different manners of Perception.* II. *How it is that we know* GOD. III. *How we know Bodies.* IV. *How we know our own Souls.* V. *How we know the Souls of other Men, and Pure Spirits.*

IN order to give an extract, and illuſtration of the Notion I have juſt eſtabliſh'd concerning the manner of our Minds perceiving all the different Objects of its knowledge, it is neceſſary I ſhould diſtinguiſh in it Four manners or ways of Knowing things.

I. *Four different manners of Perception.*

The Firſt is that whereby we know things *by themſelves*.

The Second is that of knowing them by their *Ideas*, that is, as I underſtand it in this place, by ſomething that is different from themſelves.

The Third way is that of *Conſcience* or by Internal Senſation.

The Fourth is their knowing them by *Conjecture*.

We know things *by themſelves* immediately and without Idea's, when being of a moſt intelligible Nature they can penetrate the Mind, or diſcover themſelves to it. We know things by their Idea's when they are not Intelligible by themſelves, whether becauſe they are Corporeal, or that they cannot penetrate the Mind, or diſcover themſelves to it. We know by Conſcience whatever is not diſtinguiſh'd from our ſelves. Laſtly we know by Conjecture the things which are different from our ſelves, and from thoſe we know in themſelves, and by Idea's, when we think that ſome things are like ſome others that we already know.

II. *How we know* GOD.

Of all the things that come under our Knowledge we know none but *GOD by Himſelf*. For though there be other Spiritual Beings beſides Him: and ſuch as ſeem intelligible by their own Nature; yet in our preſent State there is none but He that penetrates the Mind, and diſcovers Himſelf to it. 'Tis *GOD* alone that we ſee with an Immediate and direct View; and poſſibly He alone is able to enlighten the Mind by his own Subſtance. Finally in this Life, it is from nothing but the Union that we have with him, that we are capable of knowing what we know, as has been explain'd in the foregoing Chapter. For he only is our Maſter, who precides over our Mind, according to St. *Auſtin*, without the Deputation or Interpoſition of any Creature.

Humanis mentibus nulla interpoſita natura præſidet. *Aug. lib. de vera Relig.* c. 55.

It cannot be conceiv'd, that any thing Created can repreſent Infinite; that Being without reſtriction, the Immenſe Being, the univerſal Being can be perceiv'd by an Idea, that is, by a particular Being, and a Being different from the Univerſal and Infinite Being. But as to particular Beings, there is no difficulty to conceive how they can be repreſented by the infinite Being that includes them, and includes them in a moſt Spiritual, and conſequently moſt Intelligible manner. Thus it is neceſſary to ſay that *GOD* is intelligible by Himſelf, though the knowledge we have of Him in this Life, be very imperfect and confus'd; and that Corporeal things are intelligible by their Idea's: that is to ſay, in *GOD*; ſince *GOD* alone contains the intelligible World, wherein are found the Idea's of all things.

But though things are poſſible to be ſeen in *GOD*, it does not follow that we do ſee all things in Him: we ſee only thoſe things in Him whereof we have Idea's, and there are things we ſee without Idea's.

III. *How we know Bodies.*

All things in the World, whereof we have any knowledge, are either Bodies or Spirits; properties of Bodies, and properties of Spirits. As to Bodies, 'tis not to be doubted but we

ſee them together with their Properties by their Idea's, for as much as being unintelligible of themſelves, there is no poſſibility of ſeeing them, except in that Being which contains them in an intelligible manner. Bodies then and their properties are ſeen in *GOD*, and by their Idea's; and for this reaſon the knowledge we have of them is moſt perfect. I mean, that the Idea that we have of Extenſion, is ſufficient for the diſplaying to us all the Properties Extenſion is capable of; and we cannot deſire a more diſtinct and fertil Idea of Extenſion of Figures and Motions, than that which *GOD* furniſhes us withal.

As the Idea's of things which are in *GOD*, include all their Properties; in ſeeing their Idea's we can ſee ſucceſſively all the Properties of them: for in ſeeing things as they are in *GOD*, we conſtantly ſee them in the moſt perfect manner, and the knowledge of them would be infinitely Perfect, if the Mind that perceives them in him were infinite. What is wanting to our knowledge of Extenſion, its Figures, and Motions, is not the defectiveneſs of the Idea that repreſents it, but of our Mind that conſiders it.

IV. *How we know the Soul.* *See the Illuſtrations.*

But 'tis not ſo in point of the Soul; we know her not by her Idea; we ſee her not in *GOD*; we know her only by *Conſcience*: and for that reaſon the knowledg we have of her is imperfect. We know nothing of our Soul, but what we feel paſs within us. If we never had had the ſenſation of Pain, Pleaſure, Light, *&c.* it were impoſſible for us to know whether the Soul was capable of them, becauſe we know her not by her Idea. But if we ſaw in *GOD* the Idea that anſwers to our Soul, we ſhould at the ſame time know, or at leaſt, might know all the Properties ſhe is capable of; as we know all the Properties Extenſion is capable of, becauſe we know Extenſion by its Idea.

It is true we know well enough by our Conſcience, or by the internal ſentiment we have of our ſelves, that our Soul is ſomething great and excellent: But 'tis poſſible that what we know of her, is the leaſt part of what ſhe is in her ſelf. If all we knew of Matter, were only Twenty or Thirty Figures, wherewith it had been modify'd, certainly our knowledge of it had been very inconſiderable, in compariſon of what we know by the Idea that repreſents it. To underſtand then the Soul perfectly, it is not ſufficient to know that only, which we receive by internal Sentiment, ſince our Self-Conſciouſneſs diſcovers to us, it may be but the leaſt part of our Being.

It may be concluded from what has been ſaid, that though we know the exiſtence of our Soul better than the exiſtence of our Body, or than of the things about us, yet we have no ſo perfect knowledge of the Nature of our Soul, as of the Nature of our Body; which may ſerve to reconcile the different Sentiments of thoſe who ſay there is nothing better known than the Soul, and of others that affirm we underſtand nothing leſs.

This too may be of Uſe to prove that the Idea's, which repreſent ſomething to us that's External, are not Modifications of our Soul. For if the Soul ſaw all things, by conſidering her own Modifications, ſhe ought to have a more clear and perſpicuous knowledge of her own Eſſence or Nature, than of that of Bodies; and of all the Senſations or Modifications ſhe is capable of, than of all the Figures or Modifications incident to Bodies. Mean while, ſhe knows not that ſhe is capable of this or that Senſation, by any View ſhe takes of her ſelf, but by Experience: whereas ſhe knows Extenſion to be capable of an infinite number of Figures by the Idea which repreſents Extenſion. There are moreover certain Senſations as colours and ſounds, which the generality of Men cannot diſcover to be Modifications of the Soul; but there are no Figures which every one does not know by the Idea he has of Extenſion, to be the Modifications of Bodies.

What I have been ſaying, ſhews likewiſe the reaſon why we cannot give a Definition explanatory of the Modifications of the Soul. For ſince we know neither the Soul, nor its Modifications by Idea's, but only by Senſations; and ſuch Senſations of Pleaſure, for inſtance, Pain, Heat, or the like, have no Connexion with Words. It is plain that had a Man never ſeen Colour, nor felt Heat, he could not be made to underſtand theſe Senſations by all the Definitions in the World. Now Men having their Senſations occaſionally from the Body, and all Mens Bodies being not diſpos'd alike, it often happens, that theſe words are Equivocal: and that thoſe which are employ'd to expreſs the Modifications of our Soul, ſignify quite contrary to what they deſign: ſo that they often, for inſtance, make a Man think of Bitter, when 'tis ſuppos'd they make him think of Sweet.

But though we have not an entire knowledge of our Soul, we are ſufficiently inſtructed by Conſcience, for demonſtrating her Immortality, Spirituality, Liberty, and ſome other Attributes which it is neceſſary for us to know; and for that reaſon *GOD* manifeſts her not to us by her Idea, in the way that he gives us to know Bodies. True, the knowledge we have of our Soul by Conſcience is imperfect, but it is not falſe: the knowledge on the contrary we have of Bodies, by Sentiment or Conſcience, if we may term Conſcience that Senſation we have of what occurrs in our Bodies, is not only imperfect, but alſo falſe. Wherefore the Idea of Bodies was neceſſary to correct the Sentiments we had of them. But we have no need of the Idea of the Soul, ſince the Conſciouſneſs we have of her, engages us not in Error; and there is no fear of miſtaking in the Knowledge of her, if we be careful not to confound her with the Body; which may be done by Reaſon. Laſtly, if we had had a clear Idea of the Soul, as we have of the Body, that Idea had made us conſider her as too ſeparate from it; and ſo it

had ſo weakened the union of our Soul with our Body, by hindring us from regarding our Soul, as expanded through all our Members: which I explain not more at large.

V. *How we know the Souls of other Men.*

There remains now no other Objects of our Knowledge to be ſpoke to, than the Souls of other Men, and pure Intelligences, and 'tis manifeſt we know them only by *Conjecture*. We know them not at preſent, either *in themſelves*, or *by their Idea's*: and whereas they are different from us, it is not poſſible to know them *by Conſcience*. We conjecture that the Souls of other men are of the ſame *Species* with our own. What we feel in our ſelves, we preſume that they feel too: and when theſe Sentiments have no Relation to our Body, we are ſure we are not deceiv'd; becauſe we ſee certain Idea's and immutable Laws in GOD, according to which we are certainly aſſur'd that GOD acts equally on all Spirits.

I know, that twice two are four; that it is better to be Righteous than Rich: and I am not deceiv'd in believing others know theſe Truths, as well as I. I love Good and Pleaſure, I hate Evil and Pain: I am willing to be happy, and I am not deceiv'd in thinking all Men, and *Angels*, and even *Devils*, have the ſame Inclinations. I know likewiſe that GOD will never make Spirits undeſirous of Happineſs, or that can be deſirous of being Miſerable. But I know it with evidence and certainty, ſince 'tis GOD that teaches me: for who could inform me of the Deſigns and Wills of GOD, but GOD Himſelf. But when the Body is a partner in that which occurrs within me, I am almoſt ever deceiv'd, if I meaſure others by my ſelf. I feel Heat, I ſee a thing of ſuch a Size, or ſuch a Colour; I have ſuch or ſuch a Taſte, upon the application of certain Bodies to my Palate: and I am deceiv'd, if I judge of others by my ſelf: I am ſubject to particular Paſſions, I have a kindneſs or averſion to this or that thing, and I judge that others have the like: but my Conjecture is often falſe. Thus the Knowledge we have of other Men is very obnoxious to Error, if we judge of them only from the Sentiment we have of our ſelves.

Whether there are any Beings different from GOD, our ſelves, Bodies, and Pure Spirits, is unknown to us. We can hardly perſwade our ſelves there are; and after we have examin'd the Reaſons of ſome Philoſophers, who pretend the contrary, we have found them falſe: Which has confirm'd us in the Notion we had taken up, that all Men being of the ſame Nature, we have all the ſame Idea's, as having all need of the Knowledge of the ſame things.

CHAP. VIII.

I. *The intimate Preſence of the indefinite Idea of Being in general, is the cauſe of all the diſorderly Abſtractions of the Mind: and the moſt part of the Chimera's of the Vulgar Philoſophy, which hinder many Philoſophers from acknowledging the ſolidity of true Principles of* Phyſicks. II. *An Inſtance concerning the Eſſence of Matter.*

I. *The intimate Preſence of the indefinite Idea of Being in general, is the cauſe of all the diſorderly Abſtractions of the Mind: and the moſt part of the Chimera's of the Vulgar Philoſophy, which hinder many Philoſophers from acknowledging the ſolidity of true Principles of* Phyſicks.

THAT clear, intimate and neceſſary Preſence of GOD: I mean that preſence of Being without any particular Limitation; of Being infinite, and in general, to the Mind, acts ſtronglier upon it, than the preſence of all finite Objects. It is impoſſible to diveſt it ſelf abſolutely of this general Idea of Being; ſince 'tis impoſſible to ſubſiſt out of GOD. Perhaps it may be ſaid, that the Mind can ſeparate it ſelf from him, becauſe it can think on particular Beings. But this is a miſtake. For the Mind in conſidering any Being in particular, does not ſo much ſeparate and recede from GOD, as approach nearer ſome of His Perfections, if I may be permitted ſo to ſpeak, by removing farther off from others. However, it does not diſtance it ſelf in that manner, as quite to loſe ſight of them; but is ever in a Capacity of ſeeking them out, and approaching near them. They are ever preſent to the Mind, yet the Mind perceives them not but in an unexplicable confuſion, by reaſon of its Littleneſs, and the Greatneſs of the Idea of Being: A Man may indeed be ſome time without thinking on himſelf; but he cannot, as I think, ſubſiſt a moment without thinking on Being; and even at the time a Man believes he thinks of nothing, he is neceſſarily full of the indeterminate and general Idea of Being. But becauſe the things which are cuſtomary to us, and which don't affect us, alarum not the Mind with any vehemence, nor oblige it to make reflection on them; this Idea of being ſo great, ſo vaſt, ſo real, and poſitive as it is, is ſo familiar to us, and makes ſo little impreſſion, that we fancy that we hardly ſee it; that we make no reflection on it; and conſequently judge there is little reality in it: and that 'tis only form'd from a confus'd Collection of all particular Idea's; though on the contrary it is *in this*, and *by this* only, we perceive all Beings in particular.

Though that Idea which we receive through our immediate union with the *WORD* of *GOD*, never deceives us of it ſelf, as do thoſe we derive from the union we have with our Body, which repreſent things to us otherwiſe than they are; yet I ſcruple not to ſay, that we make ſo bad uſe of the beſt things, that the indelible preſence of this Idea, is one of the principle

cipal Cauſes of all the diſordinate Abſtractions of the Mind: and conſequently of all that Abſtract and Chimerical Philoſophy, which explains all Natural Effects; by the general terms of Act, Power, Cauſe, Effect, Subſtantial Forms, Faculties, Occult Qualities, Sympathy, Antipathy, *&c.* For 'tis certain theſe Terms, and a great many others, excite no other Idea's in the Mind, than indeterminate and general Idea's; that is, Idea's which readily offer themſelves to the Mind, without any trouble, and application on our own part.

Let a Man read with all Intention poſſible, all the Definitions, and Explications given of Subſtantial Forms; let him do his beſt to ſearch wherein conſiſts the Eſſence of all theſe Entities, which the fruitful Imagination of Philoſophers produces in ſuch multitudes at pleaſure, that they are forc'd to divide them, and ſubdivide them over and over again; and I dare engage, that he ſhall never excite in his Mind any other Idea of all theſe things, than that of Being, and of Cauſe in general.

For let us take a view of the cuſtomary proceedings of Philoſophers. They obſerve ſome new Effect, and preſently imagine ſome new Entity muſt produce it. The Fire heats; there is then in the Fire ſome Entity to produce this Effect, which differs from the matter the Fire is compos'd of: And becauſe Fire is capable of many different Effects, as of Separating Bodies, Pulverizing, Vitrifying, Drying, Hardning, Softning, Dilating, Purifying, and enlightning them, *&c* therefore they liberally beſtow on Fire ſo many Faculties, or real Qualities, as it is capable of producing different Effects.

But if we reflect on all the Definitions they give of theſe Faculties, we ſhall find they are nothing elſe but *Logical* Definitions, which raiſe no other Idea's than that of Being, and Cauſe in general, which the Mind refers to the Effect that is produc'd. So that a Man is nothing the wiſer when he has ſtudied them never ſo long. For all that's got by this ſort of Study, is the imagining we know better than others, what indeed we know much worſe; not only becauſe we admit many Entities that never were; but alſo in being prepoſſeſs'd, we make our ſelves incapable of conceiving how 'tis poſſible for Matter all alone, as that of Fire, in being mov'd againſt Bodies differently diſpos'd, to produce all the different Effects we ſee Fire produce.

It is manifeſt to all thoſe who have read any thing, that almoſt all the Books of Science, and eſpecially thoſe who treat of *Phyſicks*, *Medicine*, and *Chymiſtry*; and of all particular things of Nature, are full of nothing but Argumentations, founded on the Elementary and Secondary Qualities, as *Attractive*, *Retentive*, *Concoctive*, *Expulſive*, and ſuch like; upon others which they term *Occult*, upon Specifick Vertues, and many other Entities, which Men mince out of the General Idea of Being, and out of the Cauſe of the Effect which they ſee; which methinks could not happen, were it not for the facility they have at conſidering the Idea of Being in general, which is always preſent to their Mind, through the intimate preſence of Him who includes all Beings.

If the Vulgar Philoſophers would be content to let their *Phyſicks* go for ſimple *Logicks*; which furniſh'd out Terms for the Diſcourſing of Natural things, and if they would give thoſe Men leave to be quiet, who affix to theſe Terms diſtinct and particular Idea's, to make themſelves intelligible, we ſhould have nothing to reprehend in their Conduct. But they ſet up themſelves for the explaining Nature, by General and Abſtract Idea's; as if Nature were her ſelf Abſtract: and will abſolutely have the *Phyſicks* of their Maſter *Ariſtotle*, to be real *Phyſicks*, which ſearches to the bottom of things, and not only a ſimple *Logick*; though it has nothing ſufferable in it, except it be ſome Definitions, ſo looſe and indefinite, and ſome ſo general Terms, as may be employ'd in all ſorts of *Philoſophy*. In fine, their Heads are ſo full of theſe imaginary Entities, and theſe looſe and indeterminate Idea's, which ſpring naturally in their Mind, that they are too incapable of fixing their Thoughts for any time upon the real Idea's of things to diſcover their Solidity and Evidence. And this is the Cauſe of that their extream Ignorance of the true Principles of *Natural Philoſophy*. 'Tis neceſſary to give a Proof of it.

II. *Of the Eſſence of Matter.*

The Philoſophers are ſufficiently agreed, That that ought to be look'd upon as the Eſſence of a thing, which is acknowledg'd the Firſt in that thing, which is inſeparable from it, and on which all the Properties which belong to it, depend: So that to diſcover wherein conſiſts the Eſſence of Matter, we muſt conſider all the Properties that comport with it, or are included in the Idea we have of it: as Hardneſs, Softneſs, Fluidneſs, Motion, Reſt, Figure, Diviſibility, Impenetrability, and Extenſion; and enquire immediately which of theſe Attributes is inſeparable from it. Thus Fluidity, Hardneſs, Softneſs, Motion, and Reſt, being to be ſeparated from Matter, ſince there are many Bodies, without Hardneſs, Fluidity, or Softneſs; which are not in Motion, or laſtly which are not at reſt, it clearly follows that none of theſe Attributes are eſſential to it.

If this Definition of the word Eſſence be admitted, all the reſt is abſolutely demonſtrated; if it be not admitted, 'tis only a nominal Queſtion, wherein conſiſts the Eſſence of Matter; or rather it cannot be the ſubject of a Queſtion.

And now there remain only four, which we conceive inſeparable from Matter; namely Figure, Diviſibility, Impenetrability, and Extenſion; wherefore in order to underſtand which Attribute is to be taken for its Eſſence, we muſt no longer think of ſeparating them, but only examine which is the Primary, and that ſuppoſes none before it. Now we eaſily diſcover that Figure, Diviſibility, and Impenetrability, ſuppoſe Extenſion; and that Extenſion preſuppoſes nothing: but this being given, Diviſibility, Impenetrability, and Figure, neceſſarily follow. Extenſion then ought to be concluded the Eſſence of Matter, on Suppoſition

it has no other Attributes than thoſe before-mention'd, and ſuch as are like them: and I am perſwaded no Man in the World can doubt of it, when he has ſeriouſly conſider'd it.

But all the difficulty is to know, whether Matter has not ſome other Attributes, different from Extenſion, and its Dependants; ſo that Extenſion it ſelf may not be eſſential to it, but may ſuppoſe ſome other thing, both as its Subject, and its Principle.

Many Men after having moſt attentively conſider'd the Idea, which they have of Matter, by all the Attributes that are known of it; after having meditated likewiſe on the Effects of Nature, as much as their Strength and Capacity of Mind would permit them, have been ſtrongly convinc'd, that Extenſion ſuppoſes not any thing in Matter, whether becauſe they have had no diſtinct and particular Idea of that thing pretended, precedaneous to Extenſion, or becauſe they have found no viſible Effect to prove it.

For even as to our being perſwaded that a *Watch* has no Entity, different from the Matter it is compos'd of: it ſuffiſes to know, how the different Diſpoſition of the Wheels is able to effect all the Movements of a *Watch*, without having any other diſtinct Idea of what might poſſibly be the Cauſe of theſe Motions, though there be many *Logical* to be had. So becauſe theſe Perſons have no diſtinct Idea of what could be in Matter, were Extenſion taken away, and ſee no Attribute that can explicate its Nature; becauſe Extenſion being granted, all the Attributes conceiv'd to belong to Matter, are at the ſame time granted: and becauſe Matter is the Cauſe of no Effect, which may not be conceiv'd producible by Extenſion, diverſly configur'd, and diverſly mov'd; therefore they are perſwaded, that Extenſion is the Eſſence of Matter.

But as no Man can infallibly demonſtrate there is not ſome Intelligence, or New-created Entity in the Wheels of a *Watch*; ſo no Man can, without a particular Revelation, be aſſur'd as of a *Geometrical* Demonſtration, that there is nothing but Extenſion diverſly configur'd in a Stone. For 'tis abſolutely poſſible for Extenſion to be joyn'd with ſomething which we don't conceive, becauſe we have no Idea of it: though it ſeems very unreaſonable to believe, and aſſert it: it being contrary to Reaſon, to aſſert what we neither know, nor have any conception of.

Yet though we ſhould ſuppoſe, that there were ſomething beſides Extenſion in Matter, yet that would be no Impediment, if we well obſerve it; why Extenſion ſhould not be its Eſſence, according to the Definition we have given of the Word. For in ſhort, 'tis abſolutely neceſſary that every thing in the World, ſhould be either a Being, or a Mode of Being; and no Thinking and Attentive Man can deny it. But Extenſion is not the Mode of a Being; therefore it is a Being: but becauſe Matter is not conſtituted of ſeveral Beings; as Man, who is compos'd of a Body and Mind; Matter being one ſimple Being, it is manifeſt that Matter is nothing but Extenſion.

Now to prove that Extenſion is not a Mode of Being, but a real Being; it muſt be obſerv'd, that a Mode of Being cannot be conceiv'd, but the Being muſt at the ſame time be conceiv'd whereof it is the Mode: We cannot conceive Rotundity, for inſtance, but we muſt conceive Extenſion; becauſe the Mode of Being or Exiſtence, being only the Being it ſelf, in ſuch a ſort or ſtate, (the roundneſs of the Wax, for inſtance, being but the Wax it ſelf, in ſuch a ſort or faſhion;) it is plain that we cannot conceive the Mode without the Being. If then Extenſion were a Mode of Being, we could not conceive Extenſion without the Being, whereof Extenſion was the Mode: whereas we eaſily conceive Extenſion all alone. Wherefore it is not a Mode of Being; but conſequently a Being of it ſelf. And ſo it is the Eſſence of Matter, ſince Matter is but a ſimple Being, and not compos'd of many Beings: as I have already ſaid.

But many Philoſophers have ſo accuſtom'd themſelves to general Idea's, and *Logical Entities*, as to have their Mind more poſſeſs'd with them, than thoſe that are diſtinct, particular, and *Phyſical*. Which is evident enough from hence, that their Argumentations upon Natural things, are founded meerly on *Logical* Notions; ſuch as Act, Power, and an infinite number of Imaginary Entities, which they take no care to diſtinguiſh, from ſuch as are Real. Theſe Gentlemen therefore finding it wonderful eaſy, to ſee after their manner what they have a Mind to ſee, imagine they have better Eyes than other Men, and that they perceive diſtinctly Extenſion, to ſuppoſe ſomething elſe; and that 'tis only a Property of Matter, which Matter may be diveſted of, as of the reſt.

Yet if you make a Demand to them, that they would pleaſe to explain that thing which they pretend to perceive in Matter, beſides Extenſion; they offer to do it ſeveral ways, every of which makes it apparent, that they have no other Idea of it, than that of Being, or of Subſtance in general. This is extreamly evident, if we take notice, That this their Idea includes no particular Attributes, which agree to Matter. For whilſt we take Extenſion from Matter, we rob it of all the Attributes and Properties, which we diſtinctly conceive do belong to it; though we leave that Imaginary thing, which they ſuppoſe the Eſſence of it; it being manifeſt, that neither Earth nor Heaven, nor any thing we ſee in Nature, could be made of it. Whereas on the contrary, if we take away what they fancy, the Eſſence of Matter, provided we leave Extenſion, and we leave all the Attributes and Properties we diſtinctly conceive, included in the Idea of Matter: For it is certain, that out of Extenſion all alone might be fram'd an Heaven, an Earth, and all the Viſible World, and infinite others. So this ſome-

thing, which they ſuppoſe over and above Extenſion, having no Attributes diſtinctly to be conceiv'd belonging to it, and clearly included in the Idea we have of it, can have nothing Real in it, if we will credit our Reaſon; nor can be of any uſe in explaining Natural Effects. And that which is ſaid of its being the *Subject* and *Principle* of Extenſion, is ſaid *gratis*, and without any diſtinct Conception in them that ſay it; that is, they have no other than a general and *Logical* Idea of it, as of *Subject* and *Principle*: In ſo much that we may farther imagine a new Subject and a new Principle of this Subject of Extenſion; and ſo *in infinitum*, the Mind having the power of repreſenting the General Idea's of Subject and Principle, as long as it pleaſes.

'Tis true there is great probability, that Men had not ſo puzzl'd and obſcur'd the Idea that they have of Matter, had they not ſome Reaſons for it; and that there are many who maintain contrary Concluſions to theſe of ours, upon *Theological* Principles. Doubtleſs Extenſion is not the Eſſence of Matter, if that be contrary to our Faith: and we willingly acknowledge it. We are, thank *GOD*, very well perſwaded of the Feebleneſs, and Limitedneſs of an Humane Mind. We know it is of too little Extent to Meaſure an Infinite Power; that *GOD* can do infinitely more than we can conceive; that He communicates only thoſe Idea's, which repreſent to us the things that arrive by the order of Nature, and hides the reſt from us. Wherefore we are always ready to ſubmit our Reaſon unto Faith; but there is need of better proofs than are generally urg'd, to ruine the Reaſons we have eſtabliſh'd: Becauſe the manners of explaining the Myſteries of Faith, are not of Faith, and we believe theſe Myſteries, without conceiving how the manner of them can be diſtinctly explain'd.

We believe, for inſtance, the Myſtery of the *TRINITY*, though the Humane Mind is unable to conceive it; and yet we ceaſe not to believe, that the things that differ not in any third, differ not in themſelves: though this Propoſition ſeems to overthrow it. For we are convinc'd, that Reaſon is not to be made uſe of, except in Subjects proportion'd to its Capacity; and that we ought not to look ſtedfaſtly on our Myſteries, for fear of being dazl'd by them, according to that Admonition of the *Holy Spirit*, *Qui ſcrutator eſt Majeſtatis opprimetur à gloriâ.*

However, if we thought it convenient for the Satisfaction of ſome Men's Mind, to explain how our Notion upon this matter may be reconcil'd, with what we are taught by Faith concerning *Tranſubſtantiation*; we probably could do it in a way very diſtinct, and perſpicuous, and could no ways offend againſt the Deciſions of the Church: But we think this Explication may be diſpens'd with, eſpecially in this Work.

For it ought to be obſerv'd, That the Holy Fathers have almoſt always look'd upon it as an incomprehenſible Myſtery; and that they never play'd the Philoſophers to explain it: but contented themſelves for the moſt part with unexact Compariſons, fitter to make known the Doctrine, than to give a Satisfactory Explication to the Mind: therefore Tradition is for ſuch as Philoſophize not on this Myſtery, and who ſubmit their Reaſon to the Rule of Faith, without diſtracting their Brain to no purpoſe, about moſt abſtruſe and difficult Queſtions.

We ſhould be to blame, ſhould we require the Philoſophers, to give us clear and eaſy Explications of the manner of our *LORD*'s Body's being in the *Euchariſt*; for this would be to demand of them novelties in *Divinity*. And in caſe the Philoſophers ſhould make an imprudent Anſwer to the Demand, they muſt be neceſſarily obnoxious either to the having their *Philoſophy* or *Divinity* condemn'd. For if their Explications were obſcure, they would give reaſon to deſpiſe the Principles of their *Philoſophy*; if their Anſwer were eaſy and apparent we ſhould have reaſon to be apprehenſive of Novelty in their *Divinity*.

Since then Novelty in point of *Divinity*, bears the Impreſs and Character of Error, and the World has right and priviledge of deſpiſing Opinions meerly on the Account of their being Novell, and having no foundation in Tradition; we ought not to undertake to give eaſy and intelligible Explications of thoſe things, which the Fathers and Councels, have not perfectly explain'd: and 'tis ſufficient to hold the Doctrine of *Tranſubſtantiation*, without offering to make out the manner of it. For otherwiſe we might ſow the ſeeds for freſh diſputes, and quarrels, whereof there are too many already; and the Enemies of the Truth would not fail to uſe them to malicious purpoſe, and for the oppreſſing of their Adverſaries.

Diſputes in point of *Theological* Explications, ſeem to be the moſt uſeleſs and moſt dangerous of any; and they are with greater reaſon to be fear'd; for that even Religious Perſons often fancy they have right of breaking their Charity with ſuch as break with their Opinions. We have but too common Experience of this Practice; and the cauſe of it lies not very deep. Wherefore 'tis always the beſt and ſureſt way, not to be eager to ſpeak of things whereof we have no Evidence, and which others are not diſpos'd to conceive.

Nor ought obſcure and uncertain Explications of Myſteries of Faith, which we are under no obligation to believe, to ſerve for a Rule and principle for the guiding our Reaſonings in *Philoſophy*, where nothing but Evidence ought to perſwade us. We are not to change the clear and diſtinct Idea's of Extenſion, Figure, and Local Motion, for the general and confus'd Idea's of Principle, or of ſubject, of Extenſion, of Form, of Quiddities, and Real Qualities, and of all theſe Motions of Generation, Corruption, and Alteration, and others which differ from Local Motion. Real Idea's will produce real Science: but from general

and *Logical* Idea's, can proceed nothing, but a random ſuperficial and a barren Science. Wherefore we ought with ſerious Reflection, to attend to the diſtinct and particular Idea's of things, for the diſcovering the Properties they contain; and thereby ſtudy Nature, inſtead of loſing our ſelves in theſe Chimera's, which are only the litter or off-ſpring of ſome Philoſopher's Brains.

CHAP. IX.

I. *The laſt general Cauſe of our Errors.* **II.** *That the Idea's of things are not always preſent to the Mind, when we would have them.* **III.** *That every finite Mind is ſubject to Error, and why.* **IV.** *That we ought not to judge that there is nothing but Body and Spirit: nor that* GOD *is a Spirit, according to our conception of Spirits.*

I. *The laſt general Cauſe of our Errors.*

WE have hitherto treated of ſuch Errors, as may have ſome occaſional Cauſe aſſign'd in the Nature of the pure Intellect, or of the Mind, conſider'd as acting by it ſelf: and, in the nature of Idea's; that is to ſay, in the manner of the Mind's perceiving external Objects. There remains only one Cauſe now to be explain'd, which may be term'd the univerſal and general Cauſe of all our Errors; becauſe we can conceive no Error, that has not ſome ſort of dependance on it. The cauſe is this: That *Nothing* having no Idea to repreſent it, the Mind is carried to believe that the things whereof it has no Idea, have no Exiſtence.

'Tis certain that the general Source of our Errors, as we have often ſaid, is our Judgement's having greater extent and latitude, than our Perceptions. For when we conſider any Object, we commonly take the proſpect but on one ſide of it; but we are not content to judge only of that ſide we have conſider'd, but we pronounce of it all entire: And ſo it often fortunes that we are deceiv'd; for though the thing be true on the part we have examin'd, it is commonly falſe on the other we have not; and what we believe true, is no more than probable. Now 'tis manifeſt that we ſhould not judge thus abſolutely on things as we do, did we not think we had conſider'd all the parts of them, or ſuppoſe them all like that which we have examin'd. So the general Cauſe of our Errors lies in this, that having no Idea of the other Faces of the Object, or of their difference with that which is preſent to our Thoughts, we believe thoſe other Faces don't exiſt; or at leaſt we ſuppoſe they have no particular difference.

This manner of acting we think reaſonable enough. For ſince *Nothing* cannot form any Idea in the Mind, we have ſome pretence to believe that the things, that form no Idea in the Mind, at the time of our examining them, reſemble *Nothing*. And that which confirms us in this Opinion, is our being perſwaded by a ſort of Inſtinct, that the Idea's of things are due to our Nature, and are in ſuch wiſe ſubjected to the Mind, that they are oblig'd to pay their attendance, when the Mind commands them.

II. *That the Idea's of things are not always preſent to the Mind when we would have them.*

However, if we would make a little Reflection upon the preſent ſtate of our Nature, we ſhould hardly be ſo ſtrongly bent upon believing all the Idea's of things, ſo much at our beck and command. Man, as I may ſay, is only Fleſh and Blood, ſince *Adam*'s Tranſgreſſion: The leaſt impreſſion of his Senſes, and his Paſſions interrupts the ſtrongeſt Application of his Mind: and the current of the Spirits and Blood, hurry it along with them, and drive it continually upon ſenſible Objects. In vain it ſtrives to withſtand the torrent it is carried by, and rarely it is, that it thinks of reſiſting it; ſo pleaſant it finds it to follow, and ſo troubleſome to ſtruggle againſt the ſtream. The Mind therefore is diſcourag'd and dejected, as ſoon as it has made an attempt to lay hold, and fix it ſelf upon a Truth; and 'tis abſolutely falſe in the ſtate we are in, that the Idea's of things are preſent to the Mind, as often as we would conſider them: And therefore we ought not to judge that things are not in being, upon the only ſcore of our having no Idea's of them.

III. *Every finite Mind is ſubject to Error.*

But though we ſhould ſuppoſe Man abſolute Maſter of his Mind and its Idea's, yet he would ſtill be ſubject to Error, by the neceſſity of his Nature. For the Mind of Man is limited; and every limited Mind is by Nature liable to Error. The reaſon whereof is this, that the leaſt things have Infinite Relations betwixt them, and require an Infinite Mind to comprehend them. And therefore a limited Mind being unable to embrace, and comprehend all theſe Relations, after all that ever it can do, a Man's inclin'd to believe, that thoſe which he does not perceive don't exiſt; eſpecially when he does not conſider the Weakneſs and Limitation of his Mind, as 'tis cuſtomary for him not to do. And thus the Finiteneſs of the Mind alone brings along with it the Capacity of falling into Error.

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Notwithstanding, if Men even in this their state of Infirmity and Corruption, made always good use of their Liberty, they would never be deceiv'd. And for this reason, every one that falls into Error, is justly blamable, and deservedly obnoxious to punishment: For no more is requisite for the avoiding Error, than to judge only of what a Man sees, and not to form compleat Judgements on things, before he is assur'd he has examin'd them in all their parts: and this is possible for Men to do. But they had rather subjugate themselves to Error, than conform to the Rule of Truth; and love to arbitrate without the trouble of Enquiry: And so we need not wonder if they are guilty of infinite Errors, and frequently stand chargeable with uncertain and unwarrantable Judgements.

IV. *We ought not to judge that there is no Created Being, besides Body and Spirit: nor that GOD is a Spirit, according to the conception of Spirits.*

All the Idea's, for instance, that Men have of Substance, are those of Spirit and of Body; that is of a thinking and extended Substance: and thereupon they take upon them to determine, that whatever exists, is either Body or Spirit. This is not said, as if I presum'd to affirm there were any Substance, neither Body nor Spirit: It being too hazardous to maintain those things exist whereof we have no Idea; since 'tis suppos'd that *GOD*, who conceals not his Works from us, would have given us some Idea of them. Yet I think we ought to determine nothing concerning the number of the kinds of Beings which *GOD* has created, from the Idea's we have of them: Since absolutely speaking, there may be Reasons why *GOD* should conceal them from us, if it were only that these Beings having no Relation to us, the Knowledge of them would be of little use to us: as he has not given us Eyes acute enough to reckon the Teeth of an Hand-worm, since 'twould be useless to the Preservation of our Body, to have so penetrating an Eye-sight.

But though we do not think it fit to judge hastily and rashly, that all Being is divided into Spirit and Body; yet we think it inconsistent with Reason for Philosophers, in explaining Natural Effects, to use other Idea's than those which depend on *Thought* and *Extension*: these in Effect being the only distinct or particular that we have.

There is nothing more Unphilosophical and Irrational, than to imagine vast numbers of Beings from simple *Logical* Idea's; to bestow on them infinite properties; and so to go about explaining things, which no body understands, by things which not only no body conceives, but which indeed are impossible to be conceiv'd. This is to take the same course that Blind Men would do, when intending to discourse of Colours, and maintain the *Theses* that concern them, they should make use of the Definitions they receive from the Philosophers, and thence make their Inferences and Conclusions. For as these Blind Men's Arguings and Disputes about Colours, must needs be pleasant and ridiculous enough, since they could have no distinct Idea's of the Subjects of the Question, and would only argue from general and *Logical* Idea's. So the Philosophers can never reason justly and solidly upon the Effects of Nature, when they only employ general and *Logical* Idea's, as of Act, Power, Being, Cause, Principle, Form, Quality, and others of like Nature: It is absolutely necessary for them to ground their Disputes and Reasonings only upon the distinct and particular Idea's of Thought and Extension, and those which are contain'd in them, as Figure, Motion, &c. For we can never expect to arrive to the Knowledge of Nature, but by the Consideration of the distinct Idea's we have of it: and 'tis better not to meditate at all, than to throw our Meditation away upon whimsies and Chimera's.

We ought not however to assert, that there is nothing but Spirit and Body, Thinking and Extended Beings in Nature, since 'tis possible for us to be mistaken. For though these are sufficient for the Explication of Nature, and consequently we may conclude without danger of erring, That all Natural things, as far as our Knowledge goes, depend upon Extension and Thought; yet absolutely speaking, its not impossible but there may be others, whereof we have no Idea, nor see any Effect.

Men are therefore too rash and precipitate in judging as an indisputable Principle, that all Substance is distinguish'd into Body and Spirit. But they thence infer a rash and unadvis'd conclusion, when they determine by the sole light of Reason, that *GOD is a Spirit*. 'Tis true, that since we are created after His Image and Similitude, and we are taught from several places of the Holy Scripture, that *GOD* is a Spirit, we ought to believe, and call Him so: But Reason all alone can never teach us so much. It only tells us that *GOD* is a Being infinitely perfect; and that he ought rather to be a Spirit than a Body, since our Soul is more perfect than our Body; but it cannot assure us, there are not still other Beings more perfect than those Spirits within us, and rang'd in an higher order above them, than our Minds are above our Bodies.

But supposing there were such Beings as these, (as Reason makes it unquestionable that *GOD* was able to create them) 'tis evident they would have a nearer resemblance to their Maker, than our selves: And so the same Reason informs us, that *GOD* would rather have their Perfections than ours; which would be reckon'd but Imperfections in comparison with them. We ought not therefore precipitately to imagine that the word *Spirit*, which we indifferently use to signify what *GOD* is, and what we are our selves, is an univocal Term, expressing the same things, or very like. *GOD* is farther exalted above Created Spirits, than these Spirits are elevated above Bodies; and we ought not to term *GOD* a Spirit so much for a positive Declaration of what He is, as to signify He is not material. He is an infi-

infinitely perfect Being, no Man can doubt of it: but as we are not to imagine with the *Anthropomarphites*, that He ought to have an Humane ſhape; becauſe that Figure ſeems the moſt perfect, though we ſhould ſuppoſe Him Corporeal; ſo we ought not to think that the Spirit of *GOD* has Humane Thoughts, and that His Mind is like our own, becauſe we know nothing perfecter than our own Mind. 'Tis rather to be believ'd, that as He includes in Himſelf the Perfection of Matter, without being material; ſo He comprehends the Perfections of created Spirits, without being a Spirit, after our manner of conceiving Spirits; that His true Name is *HE THAT IS:* that is, being without reſtriction, all Being, being Infinite and Univerſal.

CHAP. X.

Some Inſtances of Errors in Phyſicks, *wherein Men are engag'd by ſuppoſing that the things which differ in their Nature, their Qualities, Extenſion, Duration and Proportion, are alike in all theſe things.*

IT has been ſhewn in the Fore-going Chapter, that Men make a raſh Judgement in concluding all Beings under two Heads, either of Body or Spirit; we will make it appear in the ſucceeding Chapters, that they not only make raſh Judgements, but falſe too; and which are the fruitful Principles of innumerable Errors, when they judge that Beings are not different in their Relations and Modes, becauſe they have no Idea of theſe Differences.

'Tis certain that the Mind of Man ſearches only after the Relations of things: Firſt theſe which the Objects it conſiders have to it ſelf, and then theſe which they have with one another. For Man's Mind is inquiſitive only after its Good and Truth. For the finding out its Good, he conſiders carefully by Reaſon, and by Taſte or Senſation, whether the Objects have any Relation of Agreement with it ſelf. For the Diſcovering Truth, it conſiders whether the Objects have any Relation of Equality, or Similitude, to each other, or what preciſely is the Quantity that is equal to their Inequality. For as Good is not the Good of the Mind any farther, than it is agreeable to it: ſo Truth is not Truth, but by the Relation of Equality or Reſemblance, which is found betwixt two things, or more: whether this Relation be between two or more Objects; as between an Ell, and a Piece of Cloth: For 'tis true that this is an Ell of Cloth, becauſe of the Equality between the Ell and the Cloth: whether it be between two or more Idea's, as between the two Idea's of Three and Three, and that of Six: for 'tis true that three and three are ſix, becauſe of the Equality between the two Idea's of three and three, and the Idea of ſix: or whether laſtly, it be between Idea's and Things, when the Idea's repreſent what the things are. For when I ſay, There is a *Sun*, my Propoſition is true, becauſe the Idea's I have of Exiſtence, and of the *Sun*, repreſent that the *Sun* exiſts, and that it truly exiſts. Every Action of the Mind about, and every Attention to Objects, is only then to try to diſcover their Relations, ſince we apply our ſelves to the conſideration of things, only for the finding out the Truth or Goodneſs of them.

But as we have ſaid before in the preceding Chapter, Attention fires and diſpirits the Mind; ſo that it ſpeedily deſiſts to oppugn and bear againſt the Impreſſion of the Senſes, that throws it off its Object, and hurries it towards others, which the love it has to its Body, render grateful and agreeable. It has but a ſtraitned Capacity, and ſo the differences which are between the ſubjects it examines being infinite, or almoſt ſo, it is incapable of diſtinguiſhing them. Wherefore the Mind ſuppoſes imaginary Reſemblances, where it obſerves no poſitive and real differences; the Idea's of Reſemblance being more preſent to it, more familiar and more ſimple than the other. For 'tis manifeſt that Similitude includes only one Relation, and there is need only of one Idea, to judge that a thouſand things are like; whereas to judge without fear of being miſtaken, that a thouſand Objects differ with one another, there is an abſolute neceſſity of having a thouſand different Idea's preſent to the Mind.

We ſee then that Men imagine things of a different Nature, to be of the ſame, and that all things of the ſame *Species*, hardly differ from one another. They judge that unequal things, are equal; that thoſe which are inconſtant, are conſtant; that ſuch as are without order or proportion, beſt order'd, and moſt proportionate. In a word, they believe often that things different in Nature, in Quality, Extenſion, Duration, and Proportion, are alike in all theſe particulars: But this deſerves to be explain'd more at large by ſome Examples, as being the Cauſe of an infinite number of Errors.

Spirit and Body, a Subſtance that Thinks, and a Subſtance that's Extended, are two kinds of Being altogether different, and intirely oppoſite: what belongs to one, can't appertain to the other: yet Men for the moſt part but little heeding the Idea they have of Thought, and being continually mov'd and affected with Bodies, have look'd upon the Soul and Body, as only

only one and the ſame thing; have imagin'd a ſimilitude between things, ſo unlike in every reſpect. They would have the Soul to be material; that is to ſay, extended over all the Body, and figur'd as the Body. And thus have attributed to the Mind, what can belong to nothing but the Body.

Again, Men having the Senſation of Pleaſure, Pain, Smells, Taſts, *&c.* and their Body being more preſent to them, than their Soul; (that is, they eaſily imagine their Body, but are not able to imagine the Soul,) they attribute to it the Faculties of Senſation, Imagination, and ſometimes give it that of Conception too; which can belong to nothing but the Soul. But the following Examples will be more ſenſible and manifeſt.

'Tis certain that all Natural Bodies, even thoſe that are rank'd under the ſame *Species*, differ from one another: that one piece of Gold is not altogether like another piece, that one drop of Water is different from another drop. 'Tis with all Bodies of the ſame *Species*, as 'tis with Faces: All Faces have two Eyes, a Noſe, a Mouth, *&c.* they are all Faces, and Humane Faces; yet it can't be affirm'd there ever were two perfectly ſimilar. So one piece of Gold has parts extreamly like another piece; and one drop of Water has undoubtedly a near reſemblance to another, yet it cannot be certify'd that two drops of Water can be given, though taken from the ſame River, in an exact reſemblance. Nevertheleſs, the Philoſophers inconſiderately ſuppoſe Eſſential Likeneſſes between Bodies of the ſame *Species*, or Likeneſſes that conſiſts *in Indiviſibili*: For the Eſſences of things center in an indiviſible Point, according to their falſe Opinion.

The Reaſon of their lapſing into ſo groſs and palpable an Error, is becauſe they will not with any care conſider thoſe very things, on which they compoſe huge and mighty Volumes. For as we don't fancy a perfect Similitude in Faces, becauſe we ſcrupulouſly behold them, and ſurvey them cloſely; and the cuſtom we have taken of diſtinguiſhing them, makes us obſerve the leaſt differences: So if the Philoſophers conſider'd Nature with attention, they would aknowledge ſufficient cauſes of diverſities, even in thoſe things which produce the ſame Senſations, and which for that Reaſon we aſcribe to the ſame *Species*; and would not ſo credulouſly ſuppoſe Eſſential Reſemblances. Blind Men would be to blame to ſuppoſe Eſſential Similitudes conſiſting *in Indiviſibili* between Faces, becauſe they did not ſenſibly perceive the differences: And Philoſophers have no more reaſon to ſuppoſe ſuch Similitudes in Bodies of the ſame *Species*, becauſe they diſcover no differences in them by the Senſations they have of them.

The Inclination we have for ſuppoſing a Likeneſs in things, inclines us farther to believe there is a fet and determinate number of Differences, and Forms; and that theſe Forms are fix'd to a Point, and incapable of Latitude, *more* or *leſs*. We think that all Bodies differ from each other as in Degrees, and that theſe Degrees alſo retain certain Proportions together. In a word, we judge of Material things as of Numbers.

'Tis clearly manifeſt, that this proceeds from the Mind's loſing it ſelf in the Relations of things incommenſurable, as are the infinite Differences to be met with in Natural Bodies, and its ſolacing it ſelf with the Imagination of any Reſemblance or Proportion it can find between them; becauſe then it can repreſent many things at once with much readineſs, and eaſe. For, as I have already ſaid, there needs no more than one Idea to judge that many things are like, but there muſt be many to judge, they are unlike each other. If a Man knew, for inſtance, the number of Angels; and that for each Angel there were ten Arch-Angels; and for every Arch-Angel ten Thrones, and ſo on, obſerving the ſame Proportion in the progreſſion up to the higheſt Order of Intelligences: the Mind might know when it pleas'd the number of all theſe Bleſſed Spirits, and even by a good ſtrong reflection, determine of them almoſt at a ſingle view; which is infinitely delightful to it. And this is what may have induc'd ſome Perſons to judge thus of Celeſtial Spirits; as ſome Philoſophers have done in another caſe, of the Gravitation and Levitation of the Elements, making a Decuple Proportion between them; ſuppoſing Fire ten times lighter than Air, and ſo of the reſt.

When the Mind finds a neceſſity of admitting Differences between Bodies, by the different Senſations it has of them, and for ſome other particular Reaſons; it is ſure to allow as little as poſſibly it can. 'Tis upon this account it is eaſily perſwaded, that the Eſſences of things are in indiviſible, and that they are like Numbers, as we have ſaid before; for that then it requires only one Idea to repreſent all the Bodies that go under the name of the ſame *Species*.

If you put, for example, a Glaſs of Water into an Hogſhead of Wine, the Philoſophers will tell you, the Eſſence of Wine ſtill remains the ſame, and the Water is converted into Wine. That as no Number can intervene between three and four, ſince a true Unity is indiviſible, ſo 'tis neceſſary the Water ſhould be converted into the Eſſence or Nature of the Wine, or that the Wine ſhould loſe its own: That as all Numbers of four are perfectly alike, ſo the Eſſence of Water is exactly the ſame in all Waters. That as the Number three Eſſentially differs from the Number two, and cannot have the ſame Properties; ſo two Bodies differing *in Specie*, differ Eſſentially, and in ſuch wiſe, as they can never have the ſame Properties which flow from the Eſſence; and ſuch like things as theſe: Whereas if Men conſider'd the true Idea's of things any thing attentively, they would not be long a diſcovering, that

all Bodies being extended; their Nature or Essence has nothing in't like Numbers, and that 'tis impossible for it to consist *in Indivisibili*.

But Men not only suppose Identity, Similitude, or Proportion in the Nature, the Number, and essential Differences of Substances, but in every thing that comes under their Perception. Most Men conclude that all the fix'd *Stars*, are fastned as so many Nails in the mighty Vault of Heaven, in an equal distance and convexity from the Earth. The *Astronomers* have for a long time given out, that the *Planets* rowl in exact Circles; whereof they have invented a plentiful number, as *Concentrick*, *Excentric*, *Epicycles*, *Deferent*, and *Equant*, to explain the *Phenomena* that contradict their Prejudice.

'Tis true in these last Ages, the more Ingenious have corrected the Error of the Ancients, and believe that the *Planets* describe *Ellipses*, by their motion. But if they would have us believe that these *Ellipses* are regular, as we are easily inclin'd to do; because the Mind supposes Regularity, where it perceives no Irregularity, they fall into an Error so much harder to be corrected, as the Observations that can be made upon the Course of the *Planets*, want exactness and justness to shew the Irregularity of their motions. which Error nothing but *Physicks* can remedy; as being infinitely less observable, than that which occurs in the *Systeme* of Exact Circles.

But there is one thing of more particular occurrence, relating to the Distance and Motion of the *Planets*; which is, that the *Astronomers* not being able to discover an *Arithmetical* or *Geometrical* Proportion, that being manifestly repugnant to their Observations, some of them have imagin'd they observe a kind of *Proportion*, which they term *Harmonical*, in their Distances and Motions. Hence it was that an *Astronomer* of this Age, in his New *Almagistus*, begins a Section intitl'd, *De Systemate Mundi Harmonico*, with these words; *There is no Man that's never so little vers'd in* Astronomy, *but must acknowledge a kind of Harmony in the motion and intervals of the* Planets, *if he attentively considers the Order of the Heavens.* Not that he was of that Opinion; for the Observations that have been made, gave him sufficiently to understand the extravagance of that Imaginary Harmony, which has yet been the Admiration of many Authors Ancient and Modern; whose Opinions are related and refuted by Father *Riccioli*. It is attributed likewise to *Pythagoras* and his Followers, to have believ'd, that the Heavens by their Regular Motions, made a wonderful Melody, which Men could not hear, by reason of their being us'd to it; As those, says he, that dwell near the Cataracts of the Waters of *Nile*, hear not the noise of them. But I only bring this particular Opinion of the Harmonical Proportion between the Distances and Motions of the Planets, to shew that the Mind is fond of Proportions, and that it often imagines them where they are not.

Riccioli 2. Volum. Nemo est paulo eruditior in Astronomicis, qui cælorum ordinem contemplatus, non agnoscat harmoniam quandam in planetarum intervallis & motibus.

The Mind also supposes Uniformity in the Duration of things, and imagines they are not liable to Change, and Instability; when it is not as it were forc'd by the testimonies and reports of Sense, to judge otherwise.

All Material things being Extended, are capable of Division, and consequently of Corruption. And every one that makes ever so little reflection on the Nature of Bodies, must sensibly perceive their corruptibility. And yet there have been a multitude of Philosophers, who believ'd the Heavens, though material, were incorruptible.

The Heavens are too remote from our Eyes, to discover the Changes which happen in them; and there seldom any great enough fall out, to be seen upon Earth; which has been sufficient warrant to a great many Persons to believe they were really incorruptible. What has been a farther confirmation of their Opinion, is their attributing to the contrariety of Qualities, the Corruption incident to Sublunary Bodies. For having never been in the Heavens, to see how things were carried on there, they have had no experience of that contrariety of Qualities being to be found therein, which has induc'd them to believe there were actually no such thing. And hence have concluded the Heavens were exempt from Corruption, upon this Reason, that what according to their Notion, corrupts Sublunary Bodies, is not to be found in the higher Regions of the World.

'Tis plain that this Arguing has nothing of solidity: for we see no Reason why there may not be found some other cause of Corruption, besides that contrariety of Qualities which they imagine: nor upon what grounds they can affirm, there is neither Heat nor Cold, neither Drought nor Moisture, in the Heavens, that the *Sun* is not hot, nor *Saturn* cold.

There is some probability of Reason to say, That very hard Stones, and Glass, and other Bodies of like Nature, are not corrupted, since we see they subsist a long time, in the same capacity; and we are near enough to observe the changes that should happen to them. But while we are at such a distance from the Heavens, as we are, it's absolutely against all Reason to conclude they don't corrupt, because we perceive no contrary Qualities in them, nor can see them corrupting; and yet they don't only say, they don't corrupt, but that they are unchangeable and incorruptible: and a little more the *Peripatetick*s would maintain, that Celestial Bodies were so many *Divinities*, as their Master *Aristotle* did believe them.

The Beauty of the Universe consists not in the Incorruptibility of its parts, but in the Variety that is found in them; and this great Work of the World, would have something wanting to its Admirable Perfection, without that vicissitude of things that is observ'd in it.

A Matter infinitely extended, without motion, and consequently Rude and without Form, and without Corruption, might perhaps manifest the infinite power of its Author, but could give no Idea of his Wisdom. And for this Reason all Corporeal things are corruptible; and there is no body whatever, whereunto there happens not some change, which alters and corrupts it in process of time. GOD forms even in the bowels of Stones and Glass creatures more perfect and admirable, than all the Works of Men. These Bodies though extreamly hard and dry, fail not however to corrupt in time: The Air and the *Sun*, which they are expos'd to, change some of their parts; and there are found Worms to feed on others, as Experience manifests. *Journal of the Learn'd* August 9. 1666.

There is no other difference between very hard, and very dry Bodies, and others, than that the former are compos'd of very Gross and Solid parts, and consequently less capable of being agitated, and separated from each other, by the motion of those that beat against them; which makes us look upon them as incorruptible. Notwithstanding they are not so in their Nature, as Time, Experience, and Reason sufficiently evince.

But as to the Heavens, they are constituted of a more fluid and subtil matter; and especially the *Sun*, which is so far from wanting Heat, and being incorruptible, as say *Aristotle*'s Disciples, that on the contrary, it is the hottest of all Bodies, and most subject to change. 'Tis he that warms, that agitates, and changes all things. For 'tis he that produces by his Action, which is no other than his Heat on the motion of his parts, all that appears new in the changes of the Seasons: Reason demonstrates these things: But though Reason may be withstood, yet Experience cannot. And we have discover'd in the *Sun*, by the help of *Telescopes* or large Glasses, stains or scurf as big as all the Earth, which have been form'd upon him, and dissipated in a short time: and it can no longer be doubted, but he is more subject to change, than the Earth, which we inhabit.

All Bodies then are under a perpetual flux, and continual change; and especially those that are most fluid, as Fire, Air, and Water, next the parts of living Bodies, as Flesh, and also Bones, and lastly the most hard: and the Mind is not to suppose a kind of Immutability in things, because it sees not Corruption or Change in them: For 'tis no Argument that a thing continues always like it self, because we can discover no difference in it: nor that things do not exist, because we have no Knowledge or Idea of them.

CHAP. XI.

Instances of some Errors of Morality, *which depend on the same Principle.*

THIS Easiness and Propensity of the Mind, to imagine and suppose Likeness, wherever it does not visibly perceive Difference, engages the generality of Men in most dangerous Errors in point of *Morality*. Some instances whereof are these.

A *French* Man falls in Company of an *English* Man, or an *Italian*: This Stranger has particular Humours of his own; he has a Fineness and Delicacy of Wit; or if you had rather, is arrogant, and troublesome. This shall forthwith incline the *French* Man to judge that all *English* Men or *Italians* have the same Character of Mind, as the Man that he has met with; and make him praise them, or discommend them all in general: and if he meets with another, he is immediately prepossess'd with a Notion of his being like the former, and he gives way to some Affection, or secret Inclination on his account. In a word, he will judge of all the particulars of these Nations, from the notable proof he has taken from one or two, that had such certain Qualities of Mind; because having no Information elsewhere of their Difference, he supposes them all alike.

A *Regular* of some Order, falls into some enormity: and this is sufficient with the generality of those that know him, to condemn indifferently all the Members of the same Society. They all wear the same Habit, and bear the same Name; they are alike in this, and there needs no more grounds for Vulgar-rate-men, to imagine they are so in every thing. The Reason why they suppose them alike, is because they cannot pierce into the bottom of their Hearts, and see wherein they positively differ.

Slanderers, who study for means of blasting the Reputation of their Enemies, commonly make use of this; and Experience verifies that it generally succeeds. And indeed it is most suited, and proportion'd to the Vulgar standard and capacity. For 'tis not difficult to find in numerous Communities, as Holy as they are, some Persons disorderly in Manners, or unorthodox in Opinion: since in the Company of the *Apostles*, whereof *JESUS CHRIST* Himself was the Head, there was found a Robber, a Traitor, an Hypocrite; and in a word, a *Judas*.

The *Jews* doubtless had been much to blame, had they pass'd hard and disadvantagious Censures upon the most Holy Society that ever was; because of the Avarice and Corruption

of *Judas*; and had they condemn'd them all in their Heart, becauſe they ſuffer'd ſo wicked a wretch in their Company; and our *LORD* let him go unpuniſh'd, though he knew his Chrimes.

'Tis then a manifeſt repugnance to Reaſon, and breach of Charity, to ſuppoſe a whole Community in an Error, from ſome private Perſons being engag'd in it; even though the Heads conniv'd at it, or perhaps were Partiſans and Abetters. 'Tis true, when all the particulars will uphold an Error, or juſtify the Fault of their Brother, the whole Fraternity is to be concluded culpable: but it may be ſaid, that this but rarely happens. For it ſeems Morally impoſſible for all the Particulars of an Order, to have Thoughts and Sentiments alike.

Men ſhould never in this manner conclude a General, from a Particular: but they cannot judge ſimply of what they ſee; but run to an Extream on one ſide or other. A *Regular* of ſuch an Order, is a Great Man, or a Good Man; from hence they infer that the whole Order is full of Great or Good Men. So a *Regular* of an Order is Unſound, and Heterodox, therefore the whole Order is Corrupt, and Heterodox. But theſe laſt Judgements are much more dangerous than the former; becauſe we ſhould always judge charitably of our Neighbour, and the malice and Ill-nature of Men, make hard Cenſures and Diſcourſes, meant for the Diſ-repute of others, more pleaſant and well-come, and imprint them deeper on the Mind, than ſuch Judgements and Diſcourſes, as are made to their Advantage.

When a Man of the World, who is addicted to his Paſſions, ſticks reſolutely to his Opinion, and pretends whilſt his Paſſion is high, that he has Reaſon to follow it, he is deſervedly concluded Stubborn, and Opinionated; and he will acknowledge it himſelf, when his Paſſion's over. So when a Man of Piety, who is penetrated with what he ſays, who is convinc'd of the Truth of Religion, and of the Vanity of worldly things, goes upon the ſtrength of his Lights and Knowledge, to withſtand the Corruptions and Diſorders of others, and reprimands them with ſome Fervency of Zeal: Worldly Men judge him alſo to be an *Opiniaſtre*; and ſo conclude all Devoutneſs, wilfulneſs and Bigottry. Nay, they think the Vertuous and Good, more Opinionated, than the Vicious and Wicked: Becauſe theſe latter urging their corrupt Opinions, but as they are buoy'd up by the different commotions of their Blood and Paſſions; ſtay not long in the ſame Sentiments, but deſert them: Whereas the Religious remain conſtant, and immoveable in theirs, as being built upon fix'd and unſhaken Foundations, which depend not on any thing ſo wavering, as the Circulation of the Blood.

See now the Reaſon, why the common ſort of People judge the Pious and Vertuous, as Opinionated as the Vicious: Which is, That Good Men are as Paſſionate for Truth and Vertue, as Wicked Men for Vice and Falſhood. Both one and the other talk much after the ſame *Manner*, in defending their Opinions: In this they are alike, though they differ in the Main.

But this is enough for the World, that is unable to diſtinguiſh their Reaſons, and acknowledge the Difference, to judge them Alike in every thing; becauſe they are Alike in that external way, whereof every body is a competent Judge.

The Godly then are not obſtinate and Opinionated, they are only Conſtant as they ought to be. But the Vicious and Licentious, are ever Opinionated, though they continue but an Hour in their Opinion. For thoſe are the Opinionated only, who defend a Falſe Opinion, though they defend it but a little time.

The caſe is much the ſame with ſome Philoſophers, who maintain Chimerical Opinions; which they afterwards reject. They would have others, who defend certain Truths, the certainty whereof they plainly ſee, to quit them as Naked Opinions, as themſelves have done thoſe they were impertinently conceited with. And becauſe 'tis not eaſy to pay Deference to them to the prejudice of Truth; and the Love a Man naturally has for her, makes him heartily eſpouſe her, they judge this Man an *Opiniaſtre*.

Thoſe Perſons would be to blame, obſtinately to defend their Chimera's; but the others are to be commended for maintaining Truth with Strength and Reſolution of Mind. The Manner of them both is the ſame, but the Sentiments are different: and 'tis this Difference of Sentiments, which makes the one *Conſtant*, and the other *Obſtinate*, and *Opinionated*.

The Conclusion of the Three First Books.

FROM the Beginning of this Treatise, I have distinguish'd, as it were, two Parts in the Simple and Indivisible Essence of the Soul, one whereof was purely *Passive*; the other both *Active* and *Passive* together. The First is the *Mind*, or *Understanding*; the Second is the *Will*: I have attributed to the Mind three Faculties; because it receives its Modifications, and its Idea's from the Author of Nature, three several ways. I have call'd it *Sense*, when it receives from *GOD* Idea's confounded with Sensations; that is, Sensible Idea's, upon occasion of some Motions happening in the Organs of the Senses, by the Presence of Objects. I nam'd it *Imagination* and *Memory*, when it receiv'd from *GOD* Idea's confounded with *Images*; which make a sort of languid and feeble *Sensations*, which the Mind receives only from some Traces, produc'd or excited in the Brain, by the Course of the Animal Spirits. Lastly, I call'd it *Pure Mind*, or *Pure Intellect*, when it receives from *GOD* the All-pure Idea's of Truth, without any mixture of *Sensations* and *Images*; not by the Union it has with the Body, but with that it has with the *WORD*, or *WISDOM* of *GOD*: not because it exists in the *Material* and *Sensible* World, but because it subsists in the *Immaterial* and *Intelligible* World: not for the knowing mutable things, that are fit for the Preservation of *Corporeal Life*; but for piercing into Immutable Truths, which conserve in us the *Life of the Spirit*.

I have shewn in the First and Second Book, that our *Senses* and *Imagination* are very useful to the Knowing the Relations External Bodies have to our own; that all the Idea's the Mind receives by means of the Body, are for the Interest of the Body: that 'tis impossible to discover any Truth whatever, with Evidence, by the Idea's of the Senses and Imagination; that these confus'd Idea's are of use only in uniting us to our Body, and by our Body, to all Sensible things: and that lastly, if we desir'd to avoid Error, we should not credit their Reports: I concluded likewise, that it was Morally impossible to know by the pure Idea's of the Mind, the Relations which Bodies have with our own: that we ought not to reason upon these Idea's, to know whether an Apple, or a Stone, are good to eat; but the way to know, is to try by Tasting: and that though we may employ our Intellect, for obtaining a confus'd Knowledge of the Relations forreign Bodies have with ours: 'tis always the surest way to make use of our Senses. I give one Instance more; since so necessary and essential things cannot be too deeply imprinted on the Mind.

I have a Mind to examine, for example, whether 'tis more advantagious to be Just or Rich. If I open the Eyes of my Body, Justice looks like a *Chimera*, I see no Allurements that it has. The Just I see miserable, deserted, persecuted, naked of Defence, and destitute of Comfort: For he that is their Comforter and Supporter, is not apparent to my Eyes: In a word, I see not what use Justice and Vertue can be put to. But if I contemplate Riches with my Eyes open, I presently see the Lustre and Splendor of them, and am dazl'd. Power, Greatness, Pleasures, and all Sensible Goods, are the Retinue and Attendants of Wealth; and I have no room to doubt but a Man must be Rich, if he will be Happy: Again, if I employ my Ears: I hear how all Men have Riches in Esteem; and that their Talk is only about ways of acquiring them: and that they are constantly giving Praises, Incense, and Honour to those that possess them. This Sense then, and all the rest, inform me, that I must be Rich, before I can be Happy. But let me shut my Eyes, and stop my Ears, and only interrogate my Imagination, and it will constantly represent what my Eyes had seen, what they had read, and what my Ears had heard, to the Advantage and Commendation of Riches; but it will represent them in a quite other manner, than my Senses: For the Imagination always augments the Idea's of those things which are related to the Body, and are the Object of our Love. If I resign my self to its Conduct, it will presently lead me into an Inchanted Palace, much what the same with those celebrated by *Poets*, and *Romancers*, in magnificent Descriptions; and here I shall be ravish'd in gazing on those Beauties, that need not be describ'd, which will convince me, that the God of Riches that inhabits it, is the only capable of making me Happy. Lo here, what my Body is able to perswade me; for it speaks only on its own behalf; and 'tis necessary to its welfare, that the Imagination bow beneath the Grandeur, and prostrate it self before the Lustre of Riches.

But if I consider, that the Body is infinitely inferiour to the Mind; that it is not its Master, nor can instruct it in Truth, nor any ways illuminate it; and if upon this Scene and Prospect I re-enter into, and enquire of my self, or rather (since I am neither my own Master, nor my own Light,) if I approach unto *GOD*, and in the Calm and Silence of my Senses and Passions, make this Demand, whether *Riches* or *Vertue* is preferable, and I shall hear a clear and distinct Answer, concerning what is to be done; an Eternal Answer, that has been always given, and which is, and always will be: an Answer that's not necessary to be explain'd, since every body knows it; such as read this, and such as do not read it, which is neither *Greek*, nor *Latin*, nor *French*, nor *German*, but which all Nations under Heaven understand; an

Anſwer laſtly, that conſolates the Juſt in their Poverty, and deſolate Sinners in the Abundance of their Riches. I ſhall hear this Anſwer, and remain convinc'd; and then ſhall laugh at the Viſions of my *Imagination*, and the *Deluſions* of my *Senſe*. The *Internal Man* that is in me, ſhall ridicule the *Animal* and *Terreſtrial Man*, that I carry about me. In fine, the *New Man* ſhall thrive, and the Old Man ſhall be deſtroy'd; provided in the mean time I continually obey the Voice of Him, who delivers Himſelf ſo clearly, in the moſt ſecret receſs of my Reaſon; and who becoming ſenſible to accommodate Himſelf to my Weakneſs and Diſeaſe, and to give me *Life* by that which gave me *Death*, ſpeaks to me anew, in a moſt ſtrong and lively, and familiar way by my Senſes; I mean by the preaching of His Goſpel: But if I interrogate Him in all *Metaphyſical*, *Natural*, and purely *Philoſophical* Queſtions, as well as in thoſe which reſpect the Rule of Manners, I ſhall always have a Faithful Maſter, who will never deceive me. I ſhall not only be a *Chriſtian*, but a *Philoſopher*; I ſhall be a Sound Thinker, and a Lover of what is Good: In a word, I ſhall follow the Road that leads to all the Perfection I am capable of, either by Nature or by Grace.

We ought then to conclude from all that has been ſaid, that to make the beſt uſe poſſible of the Faculties of our Soul, of our Senſes, Imagination, and Underſtanding; we muſt apply them to thoſe things, for which they were given us. We ought carefully to diſtinguiſh our Senſations and Imaginations, from our Pure Idea's; and judge by the former, of the Relations our Body has with thoſe about us; but never make uſe of them in diſcovering Truths, which they always confound. Whereas Pure Idea's muſt be us'd in the finding out of Truths, but omitted, when we judge of the Correſpondencies between Exteriour Bodies, and our own: becauſe theſe Idea's have never reach and extent enough, to give a thorough Repreſentation of them.

'Tis impoſſible for Men to have ſufficient Knowledge of all the Figures, and Motions of the little parts of their Body, and Blood; and of thoſe of a particular Fruit; at a certain Seaſon of their Sickneſs, to know whether there is a Relation of Agreement between that Fruit and their Body; and that if they eat of it, they ſhall recover: Thus our Senſes alone are more uſeful for the Conſervation of our Body, than the Rules of Experimental Medicine; and Experimental Medicine, than Theoretical. But Theoretical Medicine, that deferrs much to Experience, and more to the Senſes, is the beſt of all. Becauſe all theſe ſhould be caball'd together.

See the Illuſtrations.

But Reaſon is of univerſal uſe, and this is the Priviledge it obtains over the Senſes, and Imagination, which are limited and confin'd to Senſible things: yet this is to be regularly employ'd; for though it be the principal part of Our ſelves, it often happens to deceive us, by our letting it act too much; becauſe it cannot act enough without tiring; I mean it cannot know enough to make a right Judgment, and yet it will ſtill be judging.

F. *MALEBRANCHE'S*

TREATISE,

CONCERNING

The Search after Truth.

BOOK the FOURTH:

Concerning

The INCLINATIONS,

OR,

NATURAL MOTIONS of the *MIND.*

CHAP. I.

I. *Inclinations are as neceſſary to* Spirits, *as Motions to Bodies.* II. GOD *gives no Motion to Spirits, but what tends towards Himſelf.* III. *The Tendency Spirits have to particular Goods, proceeds but from their Motion towards Good in general.* IV. *The Original of our chiefeſt Natural Inclinations, which will make up the Diviſion of this Fourth Book.*

THERE had been no occaſion of Treating on the *Natural Inclinations*, which are to be the Subject of this *Fourth Book:* nor on the *Paſſions*, which I am to ſpeak to in the *Fifth*, to diſcover the Cauſes of our Errors, did not the *Underſtanding* depend on the *Will*, in the Perception of Objects. But becauſe the *Underſtanding* receives its Inſtructions from the *Will*, and is determin'd and fix'd by it, rather to ſome Objects than others: in order to penetrate into the Cauſes of the Errors whereunto we are ſubject, it will be abſolutely neceſſary, to be well acquainted with the Nature of our *Inclinations.*

I. *Inclinations are as neceſſary to Spirits, as Motions to Bodies.*

Had *GOD* in the Creation of the World, produc'd a *Matter* infinitely Extended, without imprinting on it any Motion, there had been no diverſity in Bodies: The whole Viſible World at this day, would have been nothing but an unweildy Maſs of Matter, or Extenſion, which might perhaps have ſerv'd to ſhew the *Greatneſs* and *Power* of its Author; but wanting that Succeſſion of Forms, and Variety of Bodies, wherein the Beauty of the Univerſe conſiſts, would have little to invite Spiritual Beings to admire, and adore the Infinite *Wiſdom* of its Governour.

Now the *Inclinations* of *Spirits* ſeem to be in the Spiritual World, what the *Motions* of Bodies are in the *Material:* and that if Spirits had no *Inclinations* or *Volitions*, that Variety would be wanting to the *Order* of Spiritual things, which not only excites to the Admiration of the profound Wiſdom of *GOD*, (as does the diverſity obſerv'd in Material things,) but

alſo of his Mercy, Juſtice, and Goodneſs, and all his other Attributes in general. The difference then of Inclinations, has an Effect on Spirits much like that which the diverſity of Motions produces in Bodies: and the Inclinations of Spirits, together with the Motions of Bodies, make up all the Beauty of Created Beings. So that 'tis requiſite for the former to have ſeveral *Inclinations*, as for the latter to have different Motions. But let us try to diſcover what Inclinations theſe ought to be.

Were not our Nature corrupted, we ſhould not need to ſeek by Reaſon, as we are now to do, what ſhould be the Natural *Inclinations* of Created Spirits. We need but have deſcended into our own Breaſt, to have diſcover'd by an inward Feeling, or *Self-conſciouſneſs* of what paſſes within us, all the Inclinations we ought Naturally to have. But ſince we are taught by Faith, that Sin has inverted the *Order* of Nature, and even by Reaſon, that our Inclinations are diſorder'd, as we ſhall ſee better in the ſequel, we are oblig'd to another courſe. For our *Senſations* being not to be credited, we are forc'd to explain things in an higher and more tranſcendant manner; but ſuch as will doubtleſs ſeem Chimerical to thoſe, who take the eſtimate of all things from the Senſes.

I. *GOD having no other Principal End of his Actions, than Himſelf, gives no Motion to Spirits, but what tends towards Himſelf.*

'Tis an undeniable Truth, That *GOD can have no other Principal End of his Actions, than Himſelf*: and that he may have many *Subordinate* Ends, tending all to the Preſervation of the Beings he has created. He can have no *Principal End*, beſides Himſelf; becauſe, being not liable to Error, he cannot place his ultimate End in Beings, that include not all ſorts of Perfection. But He may have a leſs *Principal*, namely, the Preſervation of Created Beings: becauſe all partaking of His Goodneſs, are neceſſarily Good; or in the Style of Scripture, *Valde Bona*. And therefore *GOD* loves them; and 'tis His *Love* that preſerves them: for their Subſiſtence is wholly owing to the Love of *GOD*. *Diligis omnia quæ ſunt*, ſays the Wiſe Man, *& nihil odiſti eorum quæ feciſti: nec enim odiens aliquid conſtituiſti & feciſti. Quomodo autem poſſet aliquid permanere, niſi Tu voluiſſes, aut quod à te vocatum non eſſet conſervaretur?* And indeed 'tis unconceivable, that things ſhould ſubſiſt, which are not pleaſing to an infinitely Perfect and Omnipotent Being; ſince all things have their Subſiſtence only from His Will. *GOD* therefore *Wills* His *Glory*, as the Principal End, and the *Preſervation* of His *Creatures*, only for His Glory.

Natural Inclinations of *Spirits*, being undoubtedly the conſtant *Impreſſions* of the *Will* of Him, who has Created and Preſerves them, muſt, we may conclude, be entirely like *thoſe* of their Creator and Preſerver. Wherefore they naturally can have no other Principal End, than His Glory; nor any other Second End, than their own, and others Preſervation: but this ſtill with reference to Him, who gives them their Being. For in brief, it ſeeming undeniable that *GOD* cannot *Will* that the Wills He has Created, ſhould love a *Leſs* Good, more than a *Greater*; that is, ſhould love what is *leſs* amiable, more than what is *more* ſo: It is impoſſible for Him to Create any Creature, without *Directing* it towards Himſelf, and commanding it to love Him more than all things elſe, though He may create it *Free*, and with a Power of diſengaging it ſelf, and diverting from Him.

III. *The Tendency Spirits have to Particular Goods, proceeds from their Motion towards Good in general.*

As there is but *One Love* properly in *GOD*, that is the Love of Himſelf; and as He can love nothing but by that Love, ſince He can love nothing but with reference to *Himſelf*. So He imprints but *one Love* in us, which is the Love of Good in general: and we can love nothing but through that Love, ſince we can love nothing but what's a *Real*, or *Apparent* Good. This Love of Good in general is the Principle of all our Particular Affections, ſince this *Love* is really nothing but our *Will*. The Will of Man, as I have ſaid before, being only the *Continual Impreſſion of the Author of Nature, which carries the Mind towards Good in general*. Surely we ought not to imagine that this *Power* of Loving either proceeds from, or depends on our ſelves; on whom only depends the Power of Loving wrong, or rather of *Rightly Loving* Evil things: becauſe being *Free*, we can determine, and do actually determine to particular, and conſequently falſe Goods; the Good Love wherewith *GOD* continually influences our Souls, as long as He preſerves them.

But not only our Will, or our Love for Good in general, comes from *GOD*; our Inclinations likewiſe for Particular Goods, which are common to, though unequally ſtrong in all Men, (ſuch as the Inclination for the Preſervation of our Being, and that of others, to whom Nature has united us) are the Impreſſions of the Will of *GOD* upon us: For I term indifferently *Inclination* all the Impreſſions of the *Author of Nature*, that are common to all Created Spirits.

IV. *The Original of the chiefeſt Natural Inclinations, which will make up the Diviſion of this Fourth Book.*

I have been ſaying, that *GOD* loves his Creatures, and that 'tis this His Love that both gives and preſerves their Being: And whereas he continually imprints on us a Love like His own, ſince His Will both makes, and governs ours; He gives us all thoſe Natural Inclinations, which depend not on our Choice, and which neceſſarily diſpoſe us to the Preſerving our own, and our Neighbour's Being.

For though Sin has *corrupted* all things, it has not *utterly* deſtroy'd them. Though our Natural Inclinations *have* not always *GOD* for their End, by the free Choice of our Will; yet they always *have* by the Inſtitution of Nature: ſince *GOD*, who both produces and preſerves theſe Inclinations in us, does it only *for* Himſelf. For all Sinners tend to *GOD*, by the Impreſſion they receive of Him; though they recede from Him by the Error, and

deviation of their Mind. They love well, it being impoſſible to love *ill*, whilſt *GOD* is the Author of Love: but they love Evil things; *Evil*, only becauſe *GOD*, who gives Sinners the Power of Loving, forbids their loving them, by reaſon of their withdrawing Men ever ſince the Fall, from the Love of Himſelf. For whilſt they imagine that the Creatures are the *Cauſe* of the Pleaſure and Pain they feel, or *Occaſionally* from them, they run furiouſly to the embracing theſe Bodies, and ſo fall into an utter Oblivion of *GOD*, who is not Viſible to their Eyes.

We have ſtill then the ſame *Natural Inclinations*, or Impreſſions of the Author of Nature, as *Adam* had in his ſtate of Innocency. We have the ſame Inclinations, as the *Bleſſed* have in Heaven: For *GOD* neither makes, nor preſerves any Creatures, but He poſſeſſes them with a Love like His own. He loves Himſelf, and us, and all His Creatures: and therefore Creates no Spirits, but withall inclines them to love *GOD*, Themſelves, and all the Creatures.

But as all our Inclinations are only the Impreſſions of Nature's Author, which carries us to love Him, and all things for His ſake, they can never be regular, but when we love *GOD* with all our Strength, and all things for the ſake of *GOD*, by a Free and Premeditate Choice of our Will: For 'tis *Injuſtice* and *Abuſing* the Love of *GOD*, which he gives us for *Himſelf*, to lay it out on any thing beſides, or without Relation to Him.

And thus we how know, not only what *are* our Natural Inclinations, but alſo what they *ought* to be, to become regular, and as they were inſtituted by their Author. For all the Diſorders of our Inclinations, have no other Root than this, that we fix our Ultimate End in Our ſelves, and inſtead of referring all to *GOD*, center all things upon *Self*.

Firſt then, we have an *Inclination for Good in general*, which is the Principle of all our Natural Inclinations, all our Paſſions, and all the Free Affections of our Will.

Secondly, we have an *Inclination* for the *Preſervation of our own Being*, or Welfare.

Thirdly, we have an *Inclination for other Creatures*; which are either uſeful to our ſelves, or thoſe we love. We have yet many other particular Inclinations which depend on theſe, which probably we may treat of elſewhere. In this Fourth Book my only Deſign is to reduce the Errors of our *Inclinations*, to three Heads; to the *Inclination* we have *for Good in general*, to *love of Our ſelves*, and of our *Neighbour*.

CHAP. II.

I. *The Inclination for Good in general, is the Principle of the Reſtleſsneſs of the Will:* II. *And conſequently of our Inadvertency and Ignorance.* III. *The firſt Inſtance, (ſhewing that) Morals are but little known by the generality of Men.* IV. *The ſecond Inſtance (ſhewing that) the Immortality of the Soul is controverted by ſome People.* V. *That we are in extream Ignorance in point of Abſtract things; and which have but little reference to us.*

I. *The Inclination for Good in general, is the Principle of the Reſtleſsneſs of the Will.*

THAT vaſt Capacity which the Will has for all Goods in general, by reaſon of its being made for a Good, that comprehends in it all Goods, can't be fill'd by all the things the Mind repreſents to it; and yet the continual Motion which *GOD* impreſſes it withall, is never ſtopt; which neceſſarily gives a perpetual Diſturbance and Agitation to the Mind. The *Will* which ſeeks after what it deſires, obliges the Underſtanding to repreſent all ſorts of Objects: which when *repreſented* by the Underſtanding, the *Soul* cannot *taſte*: or if ſhe *taſtes*, ſhe remains *unſatisfy'd*. She cannot taſte them, becauſe the View of the Mind is ſeldom accompany'd with Pleaſure; which is the *Seaſoning*, whereby the Soul *reliſhes* her Good: and ſhe is not ſatisfy'd, becauſe nothing can ſtop the Motion of the Soul, except the Author of the Impreſſion: Whatever the Mind repreſents, as the Good of the Soul, is finite; and whatever is finite, may detain her Love for a moment, but cannot fix it. When new and extraordinary Objects come under the conſideration of the Mind, or ſuch as have a Character of *Infinite*, the Will gladly bears with an attentive Diſcuſſion for ſome time, as hoping to find what ſhe is in *Search* of; becauſe that which appears *Infinite*, bears the Signature of its real Good; but after a while, is diſguſted with this, as with the reſt, and leaves it. Hence it is ever reſtleſs and fluctuating, becauſe it is fated to ſeek what it never can find, though always in hopes of: and it loves whatever is *Great*, *Extraordinary*, and *Infinite*; becauſe having miſs'd of its true Good, in common and familiar things, it fancies it may be found in ſuch as are unknown. We ſhall ſhew in this Chapter, that the Reſtleſsneſs of our Will, is one of the Principal Cauſes of our Ignorance, and the Errors we are guilty of, upon infinite ſubjects; and in the two following, ſhall explain what it is that breeds that our *Inclination* for all that's *Great*, and *Extraordinary*.

II. *And consequently of our Inadvertency and Ignorance.*

First, It is plain enough from what has been said, That the *Will* is only solicitous to apply the *Understanding* to those Objects which are related to us, and is very negligent as to the rest: for that being by a Natural Impression, ever longing and impatient after Happiness, *It* turns the *Understanding* only upon those things, which afford us Pleasure and Advantage.

Secondly, That the *Will* permits not the Understanding to busy it self long about things that afford some Pleasure; because, as has been said, all Created things may please us for a season, but they quickly grow distastful, and then our Mind declines them, and takes new ways to other Delights, and Satisfactions.

Thirdly, That the *Will* is prompted to put the *Understanding* on these desultory advances from Object to Object, from that confus'd, and as it were, distant Representation the Understanding gives of Him, who includes in Himself all Beings; as has been said in the Third Book. For the *Will* desiring, as I may so speak, to bring its real Good closer, so as to be affected by it, and to receive its quickning Motion; excites the Understanding, to represent it by piece-meal: But then this is no longer the General, the Universal, and infinitely Perfect Being, which the Mind perceives; but something of a limited and imperfect Nature, which the *Will* speedily abandons, as finding it unable to stop *Its* Motion, and please *It* any considerable time, and so pursues after another Object.

Mean while, the *Advertency* and *Application* of the Mind, being absolutely necessary to the discovery of Truths ever so little abstruse, it is manifest that the Vulgar of Men, must be most grosly *Ignorant*, even in point of such things, as have some reference to them; but inconceivably *Blind*, as to all Abstract Truths, and to which they have no sensible Relation. But we must try to make these things manifest by some Examples.

III. *The first Instance, (shewing that) Morals are but little known by the generality of Men.*

There is no Science that stands in so near a Relation to us, as *Moral Philosophy:* Which teaches us our *Duties* to *GOD* and our *King*, our *Kindred* and *Friends*, and in general to all about us. Besides, it points out the way we must follow to become *eternally* Happy: so that all Men are under an Essential Obligation, or rather an indispensable Necessity of resigning themselves to the Study of it. Notwithstanding, Generations of Men have successively continued six thousand Years, and yet this *Science* is still very imperfect.

That part of *Morals* which respects our *Duty to GOD*, and which questionless is the Principal of all, as Relating to *Eternity*, has been little known by Men of the greatest Learning; and there are still to be found Men of Sence, who have no Knowledge of it, though the easiest part of all *Moral Philosophy:* For first of all, What difficulty is there to find out the *Existence of a GOD?* Every of his Works is a Proof of it. All the Actions of Men and Beasts prove it: Whatever we think, whatever we see, whatever we feel, demonstrates it. In a word, there is nothing in the World but proves that there is a *GOD*, or at least may prove it, to Men of attentive Minds, who seriously betake themselves to *Search* after the Author of all things.

Again, it is evident that we must pursue the *Orders* of *GOD*, if we will be happy: For since He is Just and Powerful, we cannot *Disobey* Him, without being punish'd; nor obey Him, without a recompence. But what is it He requires of us? That we love Him, that our Thoughts be possess'd with Him, and our Heart set upon Him. For, what end had *GOD* in Creating Minds, and all things else? Certainly no other than Himself: So that we are indispensably oblig'd from diverting elsewhere the Impression of Love, which He perpetually maintains in us, in order to our perpetual loving Him.

These Truths are not very difficult to be discover'd, by any attentive and considering Man. And yet this sole Moral Principle, *That to become Vertuous and Happy, 'tis absolutely necessary to Love GOD above, and in all things:* is the Foundation of all *Christian Morality*. Nor is there need of very great Application to deduce from thence all necessary Consequences, to settle the General Rules of our Behaviour; though few there are that do it; whilst daily Disputes arise about Questions of *Morality*, which are the immediate and necessary Results of so Self-evident a Principle as this before us.

The *Geometricians* are continually making new Discoveries in their *Science*, and if they do not much advance it, 'tis because they have already drawn from their *Principles*, the most useful and necessary consequences: But the greatest part of Mankind, seem incapable of concluding any thing from the *First Principle* of *Morals*. All their Idea's vanish and dissipate, when their Will inclines them barely to consider it. Because they *will* not as they ought; and they will not as they ought, because they cannot taste it; or that having tasted it, are presently distated. For 'tis an Abstract *Metaphysical*, and purely Intellectual *Principle*, and not attainable by Sense or Imagination. And therefore seems to *Carnal Eyes*, or Minds that see no farther than their Eyes, to have no solidity. Nothing appears in this Principle likely to settle and compose the restless agitation of their Will, and thereupon to stop the View of their Mind, and fix it attentively on considering it. What hope then is there they should see it well, comprehend it right, and draw those direct Inferences from it which they ought?

Those who should have but an imperfect apprehension of this *Geometrical* Proposition, *That the sides of Similar Triangles are proportional*, could certainly be no great *Geometricians:* But if, besides that confus'd and imperfect Perception of that Fundamental Proposition of *Geometry*,

Geometry, they had ſome Intereſt, why the ſides of Similar Triangles ſhould not be proportional; and if *Falſe Geometry* were as ſutable to their perverſe Inclinations, as *Falſe Morals*, we ſhould ſee as abſurd *Paralogiſms* in *Geometry*, as *Morality*; becauſe their Errors would be pleaſant to them, and Truth would only trouble, perplex, and confound them.

Hence we need not wonder at the Blindneſs of Men in former Ages, who liv'd whilſt *Idolatry* flouriſh'd in the World, or of ſuch as live at preſent unenlightned with the Sun-ſhine of the Goſpel: It was needful for Eternal Wiſdom to cloathe it ſelf with *Senſibility*, to inſtruct Men that *enquire* only of their Senſes. Four thouſand Years together *Truth* was manifeſted by ſpeaking to their Mind; but not entring into themſelves, they did not hear it; 'twas requiſite therefore it ſhould ſpeak unto their Ears: the Light which enlightens all Men, ſhin'd upon their Darkneſs, without diſperſing it; and they could not behold it. *Intelligible* Light muſt veil it ſelf, and become *Viſible*: *The Word muſt be made Fleſh*; and hidden and inacceſſible Wiſdom muſt inſtruct Men in a *Carnal* manner; *Carnaliter*, ſays St. *Bernard*. The Generality of Men, and eſpecially the Poor (who are the worthieſt Object of their *Creator*'s Mercy and Providence,) thoſe who are oblig'd to labour for their Living, are extreamly ignorant and ſtupid. They hear only becauſe they have Ears, and ſee only becauſe they have Eyes: But are incapable of retiring into themſelves, by any Effort of Reaſon, there to examine *Truth*, in the ſilence of their Senſes and their Paſſions. Truth they cannot apply to, becauſe they cannot reliſh it, and commonly that application enters not their Heads, becauſe they cannot think of applying themſelves to unaffecting Objects. Their deſultory and reſtleſs Will continually caſts the View of their Mind upon ſenſible Objects, the Variety of which is pleaſant and diverting. For the Multiplicity and Diverſity of *Senſible* Goods, ſerve to conceal their Vanity, and to keep up our Hopes of finding among them the *True Good*, which we deſire. Ser. 39. de Natali [Domini.]

Thus though the Councels which *JESUS CHRIST* in quality of *Man*, of the *Way*, and of *Author* of our Faith, gives us in the Goſpel, are much more proportion'd to the weakneſs of our Mind, than thoſe which the ſame *CHRIST*, as He is *Eternal Wiſdom*, *Internal Truth*, *Intellectual Light*, inſpires into our moſt Inward Reaſon; and though He renders theſe His Councels *delectable* by His Grace, *ſenſible* by His Example, and *convincing* by His Miracles; yet Men are ſo ſtupid, and inconſiderate, even as to things of greateſt importance to be known, that they ſcarce ever think of them as behooves them. Not many perceive the Excellency of the Goſpel; nor the Soundneſs and Neceſſity of the Precepts of our *LORD*, few there are that meditate on them, ſo as to convert them into the Nouriſhment, and Subſtance of the Soul: The continual toſſing and agitation of the Will, which looks for the *Enjoyment of Good*, permitting not thoſe Truths to be inſiſted on, which ſeem to deprive the Soul of it. Here follows another proof of what I am aſſerting.

IV. *The ſecond Inſtance, (ſhewing that) that the Immortality of the Soul is controverted by ſome People.*

Doubtleſs it much concerns, and lies upon the Wicked, to know whether their Soul is *Mortal*, as they ſuppoſe it, or *Immortal*, as Faith and Reaſon aſſure: as being a thing of greateſt moment and importance to them; ſince the Queſtion lays their Eternity at ſtake, and the quiet of their Mind depends on the reſolve. Whence comes it that they are ignorant, or doubtful in the matter, but from their want of ſerious Attention, and the Reſtleſsneſs and Corruptneſs of their Will, not ſuffering the Mind to take a ſteady View of the Reaſons, which contradict the Opinion they wiſh to be true? For in brief, is it ſo difficult to diſcover the difference between the Body and Soul, betwixt a *Thinking* and an *Extended* thing? Muſt a Man bring ſo great an Attention to perceive that a *Thought* is neither *Round* nor *Square*; that *Extenſion* is capable only of *different Figures and Motions*; but not of *Thought* and *Reaſoning*: and ſo, that what Thinks and what's Extended, are two Beings altogether oppoſite. And yet this is all that's requiſite to demonſtrate the *Immortality of the Soul*, and that ſhe is not *periſhable*, though the Body ſhould be *annihilated*.

True it is, when a *Subſtance* periſhes, that the *Modes* or *Manners* of its *Exiſtence* periſh with it: as, were a piece of Wax annihilated, it is certain the *Figures* of that Wax would be annihilated alſo: becauſe the *Roundneſs*, for inſtance, of the Wax is really nothing but the Wax it ſelf, exiſting in ſuch a *manner*, and ſo cannot ſubſiſt without the Wax, whoſe *Mode* it is. But though *GOD* ſhould *deſtroy* all the Wax in the World, it would not follow from thence that any other Subſtance, or Modes of Subſtance ſhould be *annihilated*. All Stones, for example, might ſubſiſt, together with their Modes: Becauſe Stones are *Subſtances* or Beings, and not *Modes of Being* of the Wax.

So though *GOD* ſhould annihilate the half of a Body, it would not follow that the other half was annihilated. The latter half is *united* to the other, but is not *one* with it. And therefore one half being annihilated, it might be reaſonably inferr'd, that the other half was no longer *related* to it; but not that it did it ſelf *exiſt* no longer: for being a different *Being*, it could not be *reduc'd to nothing* by the *annihilation* of the other. Thence 'tis manifeſt, that *Thought* being not the *Modification* of Extenſion, our Soul is not annihilated, on ſuppoſition that our *Body* were *annihilated* by Death.

But we have no reaſon to imagine that even the Body is annihilated, when it is deſtroy'd. The parts that make it up, are diſſolv'd into Vapours, and reduc'd into Duſt: we neither ſee nor know them any more, I confeſs; but we cannot hence conclude they *exiſt not*: For the Mind perceives them ſtill. If we ſeparate a Muſtard-ſeed into two, or four, or twenty parts,

we annihilate it to our Eyes, becauſe we ſee it no longer: But 'tis not annihilated in it ſelf, or to the Mind; for the Mind diſcerns it, though divided into a thouſand, or an hundred thouſand parts.

'Tis a common Notion and receiv'd by all that uſe their *Reaſon*, rather than their *Senſes*, *That nothing can be annihilated by the ordinary force of Nature.* For as 'tis naturally impoſſible for *ſomething to be produc'd from nothing*; ſo 'tis impoſſible for a Subſtance or Being *to be reduc'd to nothing*. Bodies indeed may corrupt, if you call Corruption the *Changes* that befall them, but cannot be annihilated. What is round, may become ſquare; what is Fleſh, may become Earth, Vapour, and whatever you pleaſe: for all Extenſion is capable of all ſorts of Configuration: But the Subſtance of what is round, or Fleſh, can never periſh: There are certain ſettled Laws in Nature, by which Bodies *change* ſucceſſively their *Forms*; becauſe the ſucceſſive Variety of theſe Forms, makes the Beauty of the Univerſe, and cauſes us to admire its Author. But there is no Law in Nature for the annihilation of any Being, becauſe *Nothingneſs* wants all *Beauty*, as well as *Goodneſs*; and the Author of Nature is the Lover of his works. Bodies then may change, but can never periſh.

But if any one ſticking to the *Verdict* of his Senſes, ſhall obſtinately maintain, that the diſſolution of Bodies is a true Annihilation; becauſe the parts they reſolve into, are inviſible: Let him do ſo much as remember that Bodies cannot be divided into theſe inviſible parts, but by reaſon of their Extenſion. For if the Mind be not extended, it muſt be indiviſible, and if indiviſible, muſt be acknowledg'd incorruptible in that ſence. But how can the Mind be imagin'd *extended* and *diviſible*. A *right Line* will divide a *Square* into two *Triangles*, *Parallelograms* or *Trapezia*: But by what Line may a *Pleaſure*, a *Pain*, or a *Deſire* be conceiv'd to be divided? and what Figure would reſult from that Diviſion? Certainly I cannot believe the Imagination ſo fruitful in falſe Idea's, as to ſatisfy it ſelf in this particular.

The Mind therefore is neither *extended*, nor *diviſible*, nor ſuſceptible of the ſame changes as the Body; and yet it muſt be own'd, that it is not of an immutable Nature. If the Body is capable of an infinite number of different Figures, and different Configurations; the Mind is likewiſe capable of a world of different Idea's, and different Modifications. And as after our Death, the Subſtance of our Fleſh will reſolve into Earth, Vapours, and infinite other Bodies, without annihilation. So our Soul with falling back into *Nothing*, will have Thoughts and Senſations very different from thoſe ſhe has during this Life. At preſent 'tis neceſſary that we live, and that our Body be compos'd of Fleſh and Bone; and in order to live, 'tis neceſſary the Soul ſhould have Idea's and Senſations, relating to the Body ſhe is joyn'd to. But when ſhe ſhall be diveſted of her Body, ſhe ſhall enter upon a perfect Liberty of receiving all ſorts of Idea's and Modifications, very different from thoſe ſhe has at preſent, as the Body on its part ſhall be free to receive all ſorts of Figures and Configurations, nothing like thoſe it is oblig'd to, to make the Body of a living Man.

It is, if I miſtake not, manifeſt from what I have ſaid, That the *Immortality of the Soul* is no ſuch hard thing to comprehend. Whence comes it then, that ſo many *doubt* of it, but from their Inadvertency, and want of Attention to the Reaſons that are requiſite to convince them? or whence proceeds this negligence, but from the Unſettledneſs and Inconſtancy of the *Will*, inceſſantly diſturbing the Underſtanding? So as not to give it leiſure for a diſtinct Perception, even of Idea's that are the moſt preſent to it, ſuch as are thoſe of *Thought* and *Extenſion*: as a Man in the heat of a Paſſion, caſting his Eyes round about him, ſeldom diſtinguiſhes the Objects that are neareſt, and moſt expos'd to View. For indeed the Queſtion of the Immortality of the Soul, is one of the eaſieſt to be reſolv'd, when without liſtning to the *Imagination*, we bring the *Mind* attentively to conſider, the clear and diſtinct Idea of Extenſion, and the Relation it can have with Thought.

If the Inconſtancy and Levity of the *Will*, hinders the *Underſtanding* from piercing to the bottom of things that are moſt preſent to it, and of mightieſt Importance to be known; 'tis eaſy to judge what greater *Remora's* it will afford the Mind to prevent its Meditating on ſuch as are *Remote* and *Unconcerning*. So that if we are under the *Groſſeſt Ignorance* and *Blindneſs*, as to moſt things of greateſt conſequence to be known; I can't tell how we ſhould be very *Intelligent* and *Enlightened*, as to thoſe that ſeem altogether Impertinent and Fruitleſs.

This I need not ſtand to prove by tedious Inſtances, and which contain no conſiderable Truths; for if we muſt be ignorant of any thing that beſt can be diſpens'd with, which is of no uſe: and I had rather not be credited, than make the Reader loſe time by unprofitable things.

Though there are but very few, that are ſeriouſly taken up with things altogether Vain, and Uſeleſs; yet thoſe few are too many: But the number can't be too great of ſuch as neglect them and deſpiſe them; provided only they forbear to judge of them. A limited Underſtanding is not blameable for not knowing ſeveral things, but only for judging of them. For Ignorance is an unavoidable Evil: But *Error* both may, and ought to be avoided: *Ignorance* of many things is *excuſable*, but *headlong* inconſiderate *Judgements* never.

V. *That we are in extream ignorance in*

* When things are nearly related to us, are *Senſible*, and eaſily *Imaginable*, we may ſay that the Mind intends them, and that ſome Knowledge of them is attainable: for knowing that they relate to us, we are eaſily diſpos'd to think of them, and feeling them to affect us, our

our Application grows pleaſant and delightful: So that we ſhould as to many things be wiſer than we are, but for the *Reſtleſsneſs* and Agitation of our *Will*, that perpetually troubles and fatigues our Attention.

Point of Abſtract things; and which have but little reference to us.

But when things are *abſtract* and inſenſible, 'tis difficult to acquire any certain Knowledge of them: not that abſtract things are in their own Nature intricate and puzling; but becauſe the Attention and View of the Mind commonly begins and ends with the *Senſible View* of Objects: for as much as we moſtly think of only what we *ſee* and *feel*, and as long as we ſee and feel it.

'Tis certain, that if the Mind could eaſily keep up to clear and diſtinct Idea's, without being as it were ſupported by ſome Senſation; and without having its Attention perpetually diſturb'd by the Reſtleſsneſs of the Will; we ſhould find no great difficulties in infinite Natural Queſtions, but in a ſhort time ſhould get rid of our Ignorance, and Errors about them, which we now look upon as inexplicable.

For inſtance, 'tis an indiſputable Truth to every Man that makes uſe of his Reaſon, that Creation and Annihilation exceed the ordinary force of Nature. Should we now ſtick to the conſideration of that pure Notion of the Mind and Reaſon, we ſhould not ſo readily admit the Creation and Annihilation of ſuch innumerable multitudes of New Beings, as of *Subſtantial Forms*, *Real Qualities*, and *Faculties*, and the like. We ſhould look for the reaſon of Natural Effects, in the diſtinct Idea's of Extenſion, Figure, and Motion; and this is not ſo difficult as is imagin'd: For all Nature hangs in a continued chain, and the parts of it mutually prove each other.

The Effects of Fire, as thoſe of Cannons and Mines, are very wonderful, and their cauſe as ſecret and conceal'd. Nevertheleſs, if Men inſtead of adhering to the Impreſſions of their Senſes, and falſe and deluſive Experiments, ſhould inſiſt on that ſole Notion of *Pure Intellect: That 'tis impoſſible for a Body gently mov'd to produce a Violent Motion in another;* ſince it cannot communicate more moving Force, than it has it ſelf; it would be eaſy from that ſingle Notion to conclude, there is ſome ſubtle and inviſible Matter; that it is violently agitated, and univerſally diffus'd among all Bodies, and ſeveral things of like kind, which might ſerve to explain the Nature of Fire, and to diſcover other yet more intricate and hidden Truths.

For ſeeing ſo great Motions produc'd in a Cannon or a Mine, and all the viſible ſurrounding Bodies, an too little Commotion to effect them, we are infallibly aſſur'd there are other inviſible and inſenſible Bodies, which have at leaſt ſo much Motion as the Cannon Bullet; but being extreamly fine and ſubtil may, when alone, paſs freely, and without burſting any thing through the Pores of the Cannon, before it is fir'd; that is, as may be ſeen explain'd at large in *Mr. Des-Cartes*, before they have ſurrounded the hard and groſs parts of the *Saltpeter*, which the Powder is compos'd of. But when the Fire is kindled, that is, when theſe moſt ſubtle and agitated particles, have encompaſs'd the groſs and ſolid parts of the *Saltpeter*, and ſo have communicated their moſt forcible and violent Motion to them; all muſt neceſſarily burſt: becauſe the Pores of the Cannon, which gave a free paſſage on all ſides to the ſubtil parts we ſpeak of, when alone; are not large enough to receive the groſs parts of the *Saltpeter*, and others that make the Powder, when agitated by the ſubtil particles that environ them.

For as the Water of a River ſhakes not the Bridge it runs under, becauſe of the minuteneſs of its parts. So this moſt fine and ſubtle Matter continually paſſes through the Pores of all Bodies, without cauſing any ſenſible alteration. But, as again that River is able to overturn a Bridge, when bearing down its Stream huge maſſy pieces of Ice, or other more ſolid Bodies, it daſhes them againſt it with the ſame *Force*, that it ſelf is mov'd by: ſo the ſubtle Matter is capable of thoſe aſtoniſhing Effects, obſervable in Cannons and Mines; when having communicated to the parts of the Powder, ſwimming in the midſt of it, an infinitely more violent and rapid Motion, than that of Rivers and Torrents; theſe ſame parts of the Gunpowder cannot freely paſs through the Pores of the including Bodies, becauſe of their too great bulk: and therefore open themſelves a way, by violently breaking what withſtands them.

But 'tis not very eaſy to imagine theſe ſo ſubtle and refin'd Bodies, and they are look'd upon as Chimera's, becauſe they cannot be ſeen. *Contemplatio fere deſinit cum aſpectu;* ſays My Lord *Bacon*. And indeed the greateſt part of Philoſophers had rather invent ſome *New Entity*, than be ſilent about things they do not underſtand. If it be objected to their falſe, and inconceivable Suppoſitions, that Fire muſt neceſſarily be compos'd of parts rapidly mov'd, becauſe of thoſe violent Motions it produces; whilſt nothing can communicate what it has not: (which ſurely is a moſt clear and ſolid Objection) they will be ſure to confound all by ſome childiſh and imaginary Diſtinction, ſuch as *Cauſes univocal* and *equivocal*, that they may ſeem to ſay ſomething, when indeed they ſay nothing at all. For in fine, 'tis a receiv'd Maxim with all conſidering Men, That there can be no equivocal Cauſe in Nature, and Ignorance has only invented them.

Thoſe then who are deſirous of knowing Nature, ſhould take care to fix more to clear and diſtinct Notions. They ſhould a little check and reſiſt that Levity and Inconſtancy of their Will,

if they would penetrate to the bottom of things: for their Minds will ever be feeble, superficial and desultory, whilst their Wills remain roving, fickle and inconstant.

It must be confess'd, that 'tis a painful and tiresome thing, and full of constraint to become attentive, and go to the bottom of the things we have a mind to know. But nothing can be had without pains. Mean time, 'tis a reproach to Men of Sence, and Philosophers, who are oblig'd all manner of ways to the Search and Defence of Truth, to talk they know not what, and to be satisfy'd with what they do not understand.

CHAP. III.

I. *Curiosity is natural, and necessary.* II. *Three Rules to moderate it.* III. *An Explication of the first of these Rules.*

I. *Curiosity is natural, and necessary.*

AS long as Men shall have an Inclination for a Good that exceeds their Strength, and they shall not enjoy it; they will ever have a secret Inclination for whatever carries the Character of New and Extraordinary. They will constantly be pursuing after things, which they have not yet consider'd, with hopes of finding what they seek for: and whereas their Minds can never be fully satisfy'd, without the *Intuition* of Him, for whom they are created; so they will always be restless and tossing about, till He appears to them in His Glory.

This Disposition of Minds, is doubtless very consonant to their Condition; it being infinitely better restlesly to search after *Truth*, and *Happiness* which they do not possess, than to fix on a false and ill-grounded security, by taking up with *Falshood*, and *Seeming Goods*, the ordinary Desserts they feed on: Men ought not to be insensible to Truth and Happiness, and what is New and Extraordinary ought to quicken them. For there is a Curiosity, which we may permit them, or rather which we ought to recommend to them. So then common and ordinary things containing not the true Good; and the Ancient Opinions of Philosophers, being most uncertain; it is reasonable we should be Curious for New Discoveries, and always unquiet in the Enjoyment of ordinary Goods.

Should a *Geometrician* go to give us New Propositions contrary to *Euclide*'s; and pretend to prove that *Science* full of Errors, as *Hobbes* has essay'd in a Book he wrote against the *Pride of the Geometricians*; I confess we should be to blame to be pleas'd with such sorts of Novelties; since Truth being found, we ought to be constant in embracing it, our Curiosity being given us only to excite us to the Discovery. And therefore 'tis no common fault with *Geometricians*, to have a Curiosity for new Opinions in their Science: They would quickly be disgusted with a Book, whose Propositions contradicted those of *Euclid*: for that, being infallibly assur'd of the truth of his Propositions, by incontestable Demonstrations, their Curiosity must cease on that respect: An infallible sign that our Inclination for Novelty, proceeds only from our want of Evidence, as to the *Truth of things*, we desire naturally *to know*; and our not possessing the *Infinite Goods*, which we naturally long to *enjoy*.

II. *Three Rules to moderate Curiosity.*

'Tis then just and equitable, that Men should be excited by Novelty, and fond of pursuing it: But however there are Exceptions to be made, and some Rules to be observ'd; which may easily be deduc'd from our Assertion, *viz. That the Inclination for Novelty, is only given us to discover Truth, and our real Good.*

These Rules are three in number; the first of which is, That *Men must not love Novelty in matters of Faith, which are not under the Judisdiction of Reason.*

The second, That *Novelty is no reason to induce us to believe things to be true or good; that is, we must not judge any Opinion true, because 'tis Novel; nor any Good capable of contenting us, because 'tis new and extraordinary, and we have never yet enjoy'd it.*

The third, *That when we are moreover assur'd that some Truths lie so deep, that 'tis Morally impossible to discover them: and that some Goods are so little, and slender, that they can never satisfy us; the Novelty ought not to raise our Curiosity, nor must we give way to be seduc'd by false Hopes.* But we will explain these Rules more at large, and shew that the want of observing them engages us in a vast number of Errors.

III. *A particular Explication of the first of these Rules.*

We commonly meet with Men of two quite opposite humours: some that will always *blindly* and *implicitly* believe: others, that will ever *plainly* and *evidently* perceive. The former having scarce ever made use of their Reason, indifferently believe whatever they hear; the latter resolving always to exercise their Mind, even in matters that are infinitely above it, equally despise all sorts of Authorities. Those are commonly of a stupid or weak capacity, as *Children* and *Women*: these are Haughty and Libertine Wits, as *Hereticks* and *Philosophers*.

We very rarely meet with Men exactly poiz'd in the midst of these two extreams, who seek not for *Evidence* in *matters of Faith*, by a vain and fruitless Agitation of Mind; or that sometimes *believe not without Evidence* false Opinions about Natural things, by an indiscreet Deference, and servile Submission of Spirit. If they be Men of Religion, and defer greatly

to

to the Authority of the Church, their *Faith extends* ſometimes, if I may be allow'd to ſay ſo, to *Opinions* purely *Philoſophical:* and they pay them the ſame reſpect as the Truths of the *Goſpel;* whilſt their illegitimate Zeal too readily prompts them to cenſure and condemn all of a different Sentiment and Perſwaſion. Hence they entertain injurious ſuſpicions againſt Perſons, that make New Diſcoveries, and 'tis ſufficient to paſs for a Libertine with them, to deny *Subſtantial Forms;* that the Creatures *feel Pleaſure and Pain,* and other Philoſophical Opinions, which they believe true, without any evident Reaſon; only becauſe they imagine ſome neceſſary *Dependencies* between theſe Opinions, and matters of Faith.

But if Men are more bold and daring, the Spirit of Pride carries them to deſpiſe the Authority of the Church; and they are hardly brought to ſubmit to it. They delight in harſh and preſumptuous Opinions, and love to be thought *Bold Wits;* and upon that proſpect, talk of Divine things irreverently, and with a ſort of domineering Arrogance; deſpiſing as too credulous, ſuch as ſpeak modeſtly of ſome receiv'd Opinions. Laſtly, they are extreamly diſpos'd to doubt of every thing, and are quite oppoſite to thoſe, who too eaſily ſubmit to the Authority of Men.

'Tis manifeſt, that theſe two Extreams have nothing laudable, and that thoſe that *require not Evidence* in *Natural Queſtions*, are no leſs culpable than others, who *demand it* in the *Myſteries of Faith.* But yet the former, who hazard the being miſtaken in Philoſophical Queſtions, by too eaſy a Belief, are doubtleſs more excuſable than the latter, who run in danger of Hereſy, by a preſumptuous doubting. For 'tis leſs perillous to fall into infinite Errors of Philoſophy, for want of examining them, than into one Hereſy, for want of an humble Submiſſion to the Authority of the Church.

The Mind repoſes it ſelf upon finding Evidence, but 'tis toſs'd and diſturb'd when it finds none; becauſe Evidence is the Character of Truth. And therefore the Error of *Libertines* and *Hereticks* proceeds from their *Doubting* that Truth is to be met with in the Deciſions of the Church; becauſe they ſee it not with Evidence, and hoping at the ſame time, that the Points of Faith may be evidently known. Now their paſſion for Novelty is corrupt and diſorder'd, becauſe having already the Truth, in the Faith of the Church, they ought no longer to ſeek for it: beſides that the Truths we are taught by Faith, being infinitely above our Reaſon, they could not be diſcover'd, ſuppoſing, according to their falſe Notion, that the *Church* was *guilty of Error.*

But as many *Err* by refuſing to ſubmit to the Authority of the Church; ſo there are no fewer that deceive themſelves, by ſubmitting to the Authority of Men. The Authority of the Church muſt always be yielded to, becauſe it can never err: but we muſt never blindfoldly reſign to the Authority of Men, becauſe they are always liable to miſtake. The Doctrines of the Church infinitely tranſcend the powers of *Reaſon:* but the Doctrines of Men are ſubject to it: So that if it be an intolerable Vanity and Preſumption to follow the Guidance of our Mind, in ſeeking for Truth in matters of Faith, without Reſpect to the Authority of the Church; it is likewiſe a ſordid Levity, and a deſpicable Meanneſs of Spirit, blindly to believe upon the Authority of Men, in ſubjects depending on Reaſon.

Notwithſtanding which, it may be ſaid, that moſt of thoſe who bear the name of Learned in the World, have purchas'd their Reputation, meerly by getting by rote the Opinions of *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, *Epicurus*, and ſome other Philoſophers; and by blindfoldly embracing, and wilfully maintaining their Opinions. An acquaintance with the Sentiments of ſome Philoſophers, is enough to entitle to *Degrees*, and exteriour *Badges* of Learning in the *Univerſities.* And provided a Man ſhall ſwear *in Verba Magiſtri*, he ſhall ſpeedily Commence a Doctour. Moſt Communities have a *Ped*, and Learning peculiar to themſelves, which every private Perſon is oblig'd to ſtand and fall by: what is true in one Society, is falſe in another. They ſometimes take pride in maintaining the Doctrine of their Order, againſt Reaſon and Experience; and think they are oblig'd to warp and diſtort the Truth, and make their Authors buckle, to cloſe in their Opinions: which has occaſion'd an infinite multitude of trifling Diſtinctions; which are ſo many by ways to lead infallibly to Error.

If any Truth be now a days diſcover'd, *Ariſtotle* muſt have known it; but if *Ariſtotle* be againſt it, the Diſcovery is falſe. Some make that Philoſopher ſpeak one way, ſome another: for all pretenders to Learning, teach him to ſpeak in their own Dialect. There is no Impertinence, but he is introduc'd as uttering; nor any New Diſcovery, but is found Enigmatically treaſur'd up in ſome corner of his Books. In a word, he conſtantly contradicts himſelf; if not in his Works, at leaſt in the Mouth of his Profeſſors. For though the Philoſophers declare, and indeed deſign to teach his Doctrine, yet 'tis an hard thing to find two to meet in his Opinions; becauſe in effect his Books are ſo obſcure, and abound with ſo many looſe, indefinite, and general Terms; that even thoſe Mens Notions may with ſome likelihood be aſcrib'd to him, that are the moſt oppoſite in the World. He may be made to ſay *any thing*, in ſome of his Works; becauſe he ſays juſt *nothing*, whilſt he makes much Noiſe; as Children make the Bells ſound what they have a Mind to, becauſe they are very noiſy, but inarticulate.

'Tis true, it ſeems reaſonable to fix and determine the Mind of Man, to particular Opinions, to keep it from rambling, and extravagance: but why muſt it be done by falſhood and

Error? Can Error be thought capable of re-uniting diſtracted Minds? If we conſider how rare it is to find Men of Sence and Parts ſatisfy'd with reading *Ariſtotle*, and perſwaded they have acquir'd true Science, though grown old in poring on his Books: we ſhall evidently perceive that nothing but Truth and Evidence, can quiet the Agitation of the Mind: and that Diſputes, Averſions, Errors, and Hereſies, are kept up and fortify'd, by the Corrupt Courſe and Method of Mens Study. *Truth* conſiſts *in indiviſibili*, is incapable of Variety, and nothing elſe can re-unite Mens Minds. But *Error* and *Falſhood*, can only divide and diſturb them.

I make no queſtion but there are ſuch as honeſtly believe, that he, whom they ſtyle the *Prince of Philoſophers*, is guilty of no Error; and that his Works are the Magazines of true and ſound Philoſophy. There are Men who imagine, that in the ſpace of two thouſand Years, the Time ſince he wrote, no Man has been able to ſay he has made a blot, or been guilty of a miſtake: and ſo making him Infallible in a manner, they can pin their Faith upon him, and quote him as Infallible: But 'tis not worth while to ſtand to anſwer ſuch Gentlemen as theſe; becauſe their Ignorance muſt needs be exceeding groſs, and meriting more to be pitied, than oppugn'd: I deſire only of them, if they know that either *Ariſtotle*, or any of his Followers, have deduc'd any Truth from the Principles peculiar to him; or if poſſibly themſelves have done it, that they would declare it, explain it, and prove it; and I promiſe them never more to ſpeak but to *Ariſtotle*'s Praiſe, and Commendation. His Principles ſhall no longer be calumniated as uſeleſs; ſince they have at laſt been ſerviceable to prove one Truth. But we have no reaſon to hope this. For the Challenge has been long ſince offer'd; and *Mr. Des-Cartes*, among the reſt, has done it in his *Metaphyſical Meditations*, almoſt forty Years ago; and oblig'd himſelf to demonſtrate the Falſhood of that pretended Truth. And there is great probability, no Man will ever venture to attempt what *Mr. Des-Cartes*'s greateſt Enemies, and the moſt zealous Defenders of *Ariſtotle*'s Philoſophy never yet durſt undertake.

I beg leave then after this, to ſay, That it is *Blindneſs*, *Slaviſhneſs of Spirit*, and *Stupidity*, thus to betray *Reaſon* to the Authority of *Ariſtotle*, *Plato*, or whatever other Philoſopher: That 'tis *Loſs of Time* to read them, out of no other deſign than to remember their Opinions; and 'tis to *waſte that* of others too, to teach them in that manner. And I may ſay with St. *Auguſtin*, *That a Man muſt be ſottiſhly curious, who ſends his Son to the College to learn the Opinions of his Tutour.* That the Philoſophers cannot inſtruct us by their *Authority*; and to pretend to it, is a piece of Injuſtice. That 'tis a kind of Madneſs and Impiety, to take a ſolemn Oath of Allegiance to them: and laſtly, that 'tis to detain Truth in an unjuſt Bondage, from Intereſt, and Partiality, to oppoſe the New Opinions of *Philoſophy*, that may be true; to keep up the credit of ſuch as are known to be either falſe, or uſeleſs.

Quis tam ſtulte curioſus eſt, qui filium ſuum mittat in Scholam, ut quid Magiſter, cogitet diſcat?

CHAP. IV.

A Continuation of the ſame Subject. I. *An Explication of the Second Rule concerning Curioſity.* II. *An Explication of the Third.*

I. *The Second Rule concerning Curioſity.*

THE Second Rule to be obſerv'd is, That *Novelty ſhould never paſs with us, as a Reaſon to believe things to be true.* We have often ſaid, that a Man ought not to acquieſce in Error, and the ſeeming Goods which he enjoys: that 'tis juſt he ſhould ſeek for the Evidence of *Truth*, and the *True Good*, which he does not poſſeſs; and conſequently have an Inclination for things that are New and Extraordinary. Yet he is not for all that, to cleave to them, or to believe out of a Levity of Humour, that *Opinions* are true; becauſe *Novel*, and that *Goods* are *Real*, becauſe they have not been *experienc'd*. *Novelty* ſhould only put him upon examining New things carefully; which he ought not to deſpiſe, becauſe he does not know them; nor raſhly to believe to contain what his Hopes and Wiſhes aim at.

But here follows a thing of common obſervation: When Men have examin'd *Ancient* and *Receiv'd Opinions*, without perceiving the bright Light of Truth; when they have taſted *Common Goods*, without finding the ſolid Pleaſure that ſhould attend their poſſeſſion; and when their Deſires and Longings are not abated by ordinary *Goods* and *Opinions*: if then they hear of any thing New and unexperienc'd, the Novelty gives them grounds of hoping that this is the very thing they ſearch for. And becauſe they commonly flatter themſelves, and willingly believe things are as they wiſh them to be; their *Hopes* ſtrengthen as faſt as their Deſires increaſe; till at laſt they inſenſibly grow into imaginary *Aſſurances*: Hereupon they ſo inſeparably annex the *Idea of Novelty*, to the *Idea of Truth*, that the one is never excited without the other; and that which is Neweſt, ſeems always truer, and better than what is more ordinary and common. Wherein they widely differ from ſome others, who from an Abhorrence of *Hereſy*, having joyn'd the *Idea of Novelty*, with that *of Falſity*, imagine all New Opinions falſe, and including ſomething of dangerous importance.

Thence

Thence it may be concluded, That this cuſtomary Diſpoſition of the Mind and Heart of Man, in reſpect of all that bears the Character of Novelty, is one of the moſt general Cauſes of their Errors. It hardly ever conducts them to the Truth: but when it does, 'tis purely by chance, and good luck: and it conſtantly obviates their poſſeſſion of their *True Good*, by engaging them in that multiplicity of Divertiſements, and falſly *Seeming Goods* the World is fill'd with; which is the moſt dangerous Error Man can fall into.

II. *The third Rule concerning Curioſity.*

The Third Rule againſt the exceſſive Deſires of Novelty is, That when we are otherwiſe aſſur'd that ſome Truths lie ſo deep, that 'tis Morally impoſſible to diſcover them: and that ſome Goods are ſo little and ſlender, that they cannot make us happy, theNovelty of them ought not to excite our Curioſity.

Every one may know by Faith, Reaſon, and Experience, That all created Goods are not able to fill the infinite Capacity of the *Will*. We are taught by *Faith*, that all worldly things are Vanity; and that our *Happineſs* conſiſts neither in Riches nor Honours. *Reaſon* aſſures us, that ſince it is not in our Power to bound our Deſires, and that we are carried by a Natural Inclination to the Loving all Goods; that we cannot become Happy, but by poſſeſſing *HIM*, who contains them all. Our own *Experience* makes us ſenſible, that we are not Happy in the Poſſeſſion of the Goods we enjoy; becauſe we are ſtill deſirous of others. Laſtly, we daily ſee that the Mighty *Goods* which Princes,and the moſt Potent Kings enjoy on Earth, are incapable of filling their Deſires: That they have even more Diſturbances, and Troubles than other Men; and that being on the higheſt point of *Fortune's Wheel*, they muſt be infinitely more ſhaken and agitated by its motion, than thoſe which ſit lower, and nearer its *Axis*: For in ſhort, they never fall, but 'tis from a precipice: they receive no little wounds; and all that *Grandeur* which attends them, and which they *Incorporate* with their own *Being*, only enlarges and extends them, that they may receive a greater number of wounds, and be more expos'd to the inſults and blows of *Fortune*.

Faith, *Reaſon*, and *Experience* thus aſſuring us, that Earthly Goods and Pleaſures, which we have never taſted, could not make us Happy, though we ſhould enjoy them: ſpecial care ought to be taken, according to the Third Rule, to ſuperſede being flatter'd with the vain Hope of Felicity, which Hope inſenſibly increaſing,proportionably to our Paſſions and Deſires, will at laſt end in a falſe Confidence, and an ill-grounded Aſſurance. For when we are extreamly paſſionate for any Good, we always imagine it exceſſively great; and by degrees perſwade our ſelves, we ſhall be happy in the Enjoyment.

Theſe Deſires then muſt be reſiſted, ſince to try to ſatisfy them, would be a fruitleſs Attempt. But eſpecially for this Reaſon, that when we give way to our Paſſions, and ſpend our Time to afford them Satisfaction, we loſe *GOD*, and all things with Him. We only run from one ſeeming Good to another; live always in falſe Hopes; diſtract and agitate our ſelves a thouſand ways; and meet with perpetual oppoſitions and fruſtrations; becauſe the deſired Goods are ſought, but can't be poſſeſs'd by many at once: For as we are taught by St. *Paul*, *They that will be rich, fall into temptation and a ſnare, and into many fooliſh and hurtful luſts, which drown Men in deſtruction and perdition: for the love of money is the root of all evil.* 2 Tim. 6. 9.

But if we ought not to be ſollicitous for the Goods of the Earth, which are New to us, as being certain that the Happineſs we are in ſearch of, is not to be found in them; much leſs ought we to deſire to know the New Opinions, about a vaſt many difficult Queſtions: as being otherwiſe convinc'd, that an Humane Mind can never diſcover the Truth of them. Moſt of the Queſtions treated of in *Morals* and *Phyſicks*, are of that nature: which may afford us Reaſon to ſuſpect, the generality of thoſe Books we ſee daily Compos'd, upon very obſcure and moſt perplexing Subjects. For though, abſolutely ſpeaking, the Queſtions they contain, are ſolvable; yet ſo few Truths being hitherto diſcover'd, and ſo many to be known, before we can come to thoſe that are handled in theſe Books; they cannot be read without hazarding to loſe much by them.

But yet this is not the Method that is taken, but the quite contrary: Men examine not whether what is ſaid be poſſible, promiſe them only extraordinary things, as the Reſtitution of Natural Heat, Radical Moiſture, Vital Spirits, or other Intelligible Matters; and you excite their vain Curioſity, and prepoſſeſs them. 'Tis enough to dazle them, and win their aſſent, to offer them Paradoxes: to make uſe of obſcure words, Terms of *Influence*, or the Authority of ſome unknown Authors; or to make ſome very ſenſible and unuſual Experiment, though it have no reference to the thing advanc'd. For *Confuſion* is *Conviction*, to ſome ſorts of People.

If a *Phyſician*, a *Chirurgion*, or an *Empirick*, quote but ſome *Greek* and *Latin* Sentences, and talk to their Hearers in New and Extraordinary Terms, they take them for Great Men; they give them the Prerogative of Life and Death, and believe them as they would an Oracle: They imagine themſelves too, that they are elevated to a pitch above the common ſize; and pierce to the bottom of things. And if one happen to be ſo indiſcreet, as to teſtify, that five or ſix inſignificative words that prove nothing, will not go down for Reaſon; they think a Man void of Common-ſence, and that he denies Firſt Principles: And indeed theſe Gentlemen's Firſt Principles, are five or ſix *Latin Words* of an Author, or ſome *Greek Paſſage*, if they have greater Abilities.

It is even neceſſary for skilful *Phyſicians*, to talk ſometimes in an unknown Tongue to their Patients, to purchaſe Reputation, and to make themſelves attended to.

A *Phyſician* who can go no farther than *Latin*, may paſs well enough in a Country Pariſh, becauſe *Latin* is *Greek* and *Arabick* to the Illiterate. But if a *Phyſician* cannot at leaſt read *Greek*, to learn ſome *Aphoriſm of Hypocrates*, he muſt not expect to paſs for a Scholar with the Inhabitants of a City, who commonly underſtand *Latin*. And ſo themoſt Learned amongſt them, knowing this Humour of the World, are forc'd to talk like Cheats and *Quacks*; and we are not to take an Eſtimate of their Parts and Learning, from the Diſcourſe they have in their Viſits.

CHAP. V.

I. *Of the Second Natural Inclination, or of Self-love.* II. *The Diviſion of it into Love of Being, and of Well Being; or of Greatneſs, and Pleaſure.*

THE Second Inclination which the *Author* of Nature conſtantly impreſſes on our Will, *Is the Love of Our ſelves*, and *Our own Preſervation.*

I. *Of the Second Natural Inclination, or of Self-love.*

We have already ſaid, That *GOD* loves all His Works; and that it is only His Love which preſerves them in their Being; and that 'tis His Will, that all Created Spirits ſhould have the ſame Inclination with His own. 'Tis His Will therefore that they all have a Natural Inclination for their own Preſervation, and that they Love themſelves. So that Self-love is reaſonable, becauſe Man is really Amiable; in as much as *GOD* loves us, and would have us love Our ſelves; but it is not reaſonable to love Our ſelves better than *GOD*; ſince *GOD* is infinitely more lovely than we are. It is injuſt for us to place our ultimate End in Our ſelves, and to center our Love there, without reference to *GOD*; ſince having no real Goodneſs, or Subſiſtence of Our ſelves; but only by the Participation of the Goodneſs and Being of *GOD*, we are no farther Amiable, than we ſtand related to Him.

Nevertheleſs, the Inclination we ſhould have for *GOD* is loſt, ſince the Fall; and our Will now has only an infinite Capacity for all Goods, or Good in general: and a ſtrong Inclination to poſſeſs them, which can never be deſtroy'd. But the Inclination which we ought to have for our own Preſervation, or *Our Self-love*, is ſo mightily increas'd, that 'tis at laſt become the abſolute Maſter of our Will. It has even chang'd and converted the Love of *GOD*, or the Inclination we have for Good in general; and that due to other Men, into its own Nature. For it may be ſaid, that the Love of Our ſelves at preſent ingroſſes all, becauſe we love all things but with Relation to Our ſelves; whereas we ſhould love *GOD* firſt, and all things after as related to Him.

When *Faith* and *Reaſon* certify us, that *GOD* is the Sovereign Good, and that He alone can fill us with Pleaſures, we eaſily conceive it our Duty to Love Him; and readily afford Him our Affections; but unaſſiſted by Grace, Self-love always is the Firſt-mover. All pure, and deſecate *Charity* is above the Strength of our corrupt Nature; and ſo far are we for loving *GOD* for Himſelf, that Humane Reaſon cannot comprehend, how 'tis poſſible to love Him, without Reference to Our ſelves, and making our ultimate End, our own Satisfaction. *Self-love* therefore is the only Maſter of our *Will*, ever ſince the Diſorders of Sin: and the *Love of GOD*, and *our Neighbour*, are only Conſequences of it: ſince we love nothing at preſent, but out of the hopes of ſome *Advantage*, becauſe we actually receive ſome *Pleaſure* therein.

II. *The Diviſion of Self-love of Being, and of Well Being; or of Greatneſs, and Pleaſure.*

This Self-love branches into two ſorts; *viz.* Into the Love of Greatneſs, and the Love of Pleaſure; or into the Love of One's Being, and the Perfection of it; and into the Love of Well Being, or Felicity.

By the Love of Greatneſs, we affect Power, Elevation, Independency, and a Self-ſubſiſting Being. We are after a ſort ambitious of having a *Neceſſary Being*; and in one ſence deſire to *be as Gods*: For *GOD* only has properly *Being* and Neceſſary Exiſtence, for that every *Depending* Nature exiſts only by the Will of its *Upholder*. Wherefore Men in deſiring the Neceſſity of their Being, deſire Power and Independency, which may ſet them beyond the reach of the Power of others. But by the Love of Pleaſure, they deſire not barely Being, but Well-being: Pleaſure being the beſt and moſt advantagious *Mode* of the *Soul's Exiſtence.*

For it muſt be noted, That Greatneſs, Excellency, and Independency of the Creature, are not *Modes of Exiſtence*, that render it more happy of themſelves: for it often happens, that a Man grows *miſerable*, in proportion to his growing *Great*: But as to Pleaſure, 'tis a *Mode of Exiſtence*, which we cannot *Actually* receive, without being *Actually* more happy. Greatneſs and Independency are commonly *External Modes*, conſiſting in the Relation we have to things about us. But Pleaſures are in the very *Soul*; are real *Modes*, which modify

her,

her, and are naturally adapted to content *her*. And therefore we look upon Excellency, Greatneſs, and Independency, as things proper for the preſervation of our *Being*, and uſeful ſometimes, by the order of Nature, to the continuance of our *Well-being*. But Pleaſure is always a Mode of the Mind's Exiſtence, which of it ſelf renders it Happy and Content. So that Pleaſure is *Well-being;* and the Love of Pleaſure, the Love of *Well-being*.

Now this Love of *Well-being* is ſometimes more powerful and ſtrong, than Love of *Being*: and *Self-love* makes us deſire *Non-exiſtence*, becauſe we want *Well-being*. This Deſire is incident to the Damn'd, for whom it were better, according to the ſaying of our *SAVIOUR*, *not to be* at all, than to *be* ſo *ill* as they are; becauſe theſe Wretches being the declar'd Enemies of Him, who contains in Himſelf all Goodneſs, and who is the ſole Cauſe of all the Pleaſures and Pains we are capable of; 'tis impoſſible they ſhould enjoy any Satisfaction. They are and will be eternally miſerable, becauſe their *Will* ſhall ever be in the ſame diſpoſition, and corruption. *Self-love* therefore includes two Loves, that of Greatneſs, Power, and Independance, and generally of all things thought proper for the preſervation of our Being: and that of Pleaſure, and of all things neceſſary to our *Well being*; that is, to our Being Happy and Content.

Theſe two Loves may be divided ſeveral ways: whether becauſe we are compounded of two different parts, of a Soul and Body, by which they may be divided: or becauſe they may be diſtinguiſh'd, or ſpecify'd by the different Objects, that are ſerviceable to our preſervation. But I ſhall inſiſt no longer upon this, becauſe, deſigning not a Treatiſe of *Morality*, there is no need of making an exact Diſquiſition and Diviſion of all the things relating to us, as our Goods. Only this Diviſion was neceſſary to reduce into ſome order the Cauſes of our Errors.

Firſt, I ſhall ſpeak to the Errors that are caus'd by the *Inclination* we have for *Greatneſs*, and whatever ſets our Being free from Dependance upon others. In the next place I ſhall treat of thoſe which proceed from our *Inclination to Pleaſure*, and whatever meliorates our Being as much as poſſible, and contents us moſt.

CHAP. VI.

I. *Of the Inclination we have for whatever elevates us above others.* II. *Of the falſe Judgements of ſome Religious Perſons.* III. *Of the falſe Judgements of the Superſtitious and Hypocrites.* IV. *Of* Voetius, *Mr.* Des-Cartes's *Enemy.*

I. *Of the Inclination we have for whatever elevates us above others.*

WHATEVER tends to exalt us above others, by making us more perfect, as *Science* and *Vertue:* or gives us Authority over them by rendring us more powerful, as *Honours* and *Riches*, ſeems to put us in a ſort of Independance. All thoſe that are below us, reverence and fear us; are always prepar'd to execute what we pleaſe for our preſervation, and are affraid of offending us or reſiſting our Deſires: Which makes Men conſtantly endeavour to be Maſters of theſe Advantages, which elevate them above others: For they don't conſider that their *Being*, and *Well-being* depend, in truth, on *GOD* alone; and not on Men: and that real Greatneſs, which ſhall make them everlaſtingly Happy, conſiſts not in the Rank they bear in the imagination of others, as impotent and miſerable as themſelves: but in an humble Submiſſion to the Will of *GOD:* who being Juſt, will not fail to reward ſuch as perſevere in the *Order* he has preſcrib'd them.

But Men not only deſire actually to poſſeſs *Science* and *Vertue*, *Dignities* and *Riches;* but lay out their whole Endeavours, that they may be thought really to poſſeſs them. And if it may be ſaid of them, That they are more ſollicitous to be *Truly Rich*, than to be *thought ſo:* we may ſay too they are leſs careful to be *Truly Vertuous*, than to *appear ſo;* for, as was handſomly ſaid by the Author of the *Moral Reflections; Vertue would not go far, unleſs Vanity bore her Company.*

The Reputation of being Rich, Learn'd, Vertuous, produces in the Imagination of thoſe about us, or that are of neareſt concernment to us, very advantagious Diſpoſitions on our behalf; it lays them proſtrate at our feet, actuates them on our account: and inſpires them with all the Motions that tend to the preſervation of our Being, and the augmentation of our Greatneſs. Which makes Men careful to preſerve their Reputation, as a Good they have need of, to live conveniently in the World.

All Men then have an Inclination for *Vertue*, *Science*, *Honours*, and *Riches;* and for the Reputation of poſſeſſing theſe Advantages. We will now make it appear, by ſome Inſtances, how theſe Inclinations may engage us in Error: And will begin with the Inclination for *Vertue*, or for the Appearance of it.

Thoſe who ſeriouſly labour to become Vertuous, employ moſt of their Thoughts and Time, in the learning Religion, and the Exerciſe of Good Works. They deſire with St. *Paul* to

know only *CHRIST* Crucify'd, the Remedy of the Diſeaſe, and Corruption of their Nature. They wiſh for no more *Light*, than is requiſite to their Living as becomes *Chriſtians*, and to diſcover their Duties; and next they ſtudy only to grow fervent and punctual in Devotion; and ſo trouble not themſelves with thoſe *Sciences*, which ſeem barren, and inſignificant to their Salvation.

II. *Of the falſe Judgements of ſome Religious Perſons.*

Which Conduct is not to be blam'd, but highly eſteem'd: Happy ſhould we think themſelves exactly to have ſerv'd it, as we repent the not having ſufficiently purſu'd it. But what is reprovable is, that there being undoubtedly Sciences purely Humane, of greateſt certainty as well as uſe, which take off the Mind from ſenſible things, and accuſtom or prepare it inſenſibly to reliſh the Truths of the Goſpel: ſome Pious Perſons too liberally condemn them without Examination, as either unprofitable or uncertain.

True it is, that moſt of the Sciences are very uncertain and uſeleſs. 'Tis no miſtake to think they contain only very inſignificant Truths. No body's oblig'd to ſtudy them; and 'tis better to deſpiſe them altogether, than to be charm'd and dazl'd with them. However, we may affirm, that the Knowledge of ſome *Metaphyſical* Truths is moſt neceſſary. The Knowledge of an Univerſal Cauſe, or of the Exiſtence of a *GOD*, is of indiſpenſable Neceſſity; ſince even the Certainty of Faith, depends on the Knowledge which Reaſon affords of the Exiſtence of a *GOD*: We ought to know, that 'tis His Will that conſtitutes and governs Nature: that the Strength and Power of Natural Cauſes, is meerly His Will: in a word, that all things depend on *GOD* all manner of ways.

Again, 'tis neceſſary to know what *is Truth:* the means to diſtinguiſh it from *Error;* The Diſtinction betwixt *Bodies* and *Spirits*, and the Conſequences that may be drawn from it; as the Immortality of the Soul, and many others of like nature, which may be infallibly known.

The *Knowledge of Man*, or of One's ſelf, is a Science that cannot reaſonably be deſpis'd: it is ſtor'd with infinite things, abſolutely neceſſary to be known, in order to an Accuracy and Penetration of Mind. And if it may be ſaid, that a *groſs* and *ſtupid* Man is infinitely ſuperiour to *Matter*, becauſe he knows that he *exiſts*, which matter does not; thoſe who are acquainted with the *Nature* of Man, are certainly much above the Ignorant and Stupid; becauſe they know what they are, which the others don't.

But the *Science of Man* does not only merit our Eſteem, becauſe it *exalts* us above *others;* but much more for *abaſing* us, and humbling us before *GOD*. This Science thoroughly acquaints us with the Dependence we have on Him in all things, even in our moſt cuſtomary Actions: It manifeſtly diſcovers the Corruption of our Nature, diſpoſes us to have recourſe to Him, who alone can cure us; to faſten upon Him, to diſtruſt our ſelves, and quit our ſelf-adherencies and engagements: and furniſhes us with ſeveral other very requiſite Diſpoſitions of Mind, to fit us for the Grace of the Goſpel.

Nor can a Superficial Tincture, and a general Knowledge, at leaſt of *Mathematicks* and *Nature*, be diſpens'd with. Thoſe Sciences ſhould be learn'd when we are young, as diſengaging the Mind from things ſenſible; and preventing its growing ſoft and effeminate: they are very uſeful to the Conduct of Life; and even bring us to *GOD*, the Knowledge of Nature, doing it *directly* of it ſelf; and that of *Mathematicks collaterally*, by the diſguſt it infuſes, for the falſe Impreſſions of the Senſes.

The Vertuous and Religious would do well not to diſ-eſteem theſe Sciences, nor look on them, as uncertain or uſeleſs, till they are certain they have ſtudy'd them ſo thoroughly, that they can paſs a ſound Judgement on them. There are others enough, which they are at liberty to deſpiſe, as peremptorily as they pleaſe. They may ſentence to the *Flames the Heathen Poets*, and *Philoſophers*, the *Rabbins*, with ſome *Hiſtorians*, and a multitude of Authors, on whoſe Stock many ſet up for Fame and Learning; and we ſhall eaſily forgive them. But let them not condemn the *Knowledge of Nature*, as contrary to Religion; ſince *Nature* being rul'd by the Will of *GOD*, the *True Knowledge of it*, gives us to underſtand and admire the Divine Power, Greatneſs and Wiſdom. For, laſt of all, it is probable that *GOD* has form'd the Univerſe, that Spirits might be employ'd in ſtudying it; and by that ſtudy be brought to know and reverence its Author. So that thoſe who condemn the ſtudy of Nature, ſeem to be oppoſers of the Will of *GOD;* but that they would have it thought that, ſince the Fall, the Humane Mind is incapacitated for that Study. Nor let it be ſaid, that the Knowledge concerning Man, puffs up the Mind, and renders it vain and arrogant; becauſe thoſe, who are ſuppos'd to underſtand Humane Nature beſt, (though frequently they underſtand it very little) are intollerably proud and preſumtuous. For 'tis plain, that no Man can be well acquainted with himſelf, but he muſt be ſenſible of his Weakneſs, and his Miſery.

III. *Of the falſe Judgements of the Superſtitious and Hypocrites.*

So then it is not true and ſolid *Piety*, that ſo commonly condemns what it does not underſtand, but rather *Superſtition* and *Hypocriſy*. The *Superſtitious* out of a ſlaviſh Fear, and a Dejection and Timerouſneſs of Spirit, ſtart and boggle at a lively and Penetrating Wit. Explain to them, for inſtance, the Natural Reaſons of Thunder, and its Effects, and you ſhall be a reputed *Atheiſt*. But *Hypocrites* by a Diabolical Malignity, transform themſelves into Angels of Light. For they employ the Appearances of Truths of univerſally Sacred, and rever'd Authority, to withſtand, from out of partial Intereſts, ſuch Truths as are rarely known,

known, and of little Reputation. Thus they oppugn Truth by her own Image: and whilſt they ridicule in their Heart what is reverenc'd by the World, they eſtabliſh their Reputation ſo much more deep and impregnable in the Minds of Men, as the Truth they have abus'd is more ſacred and inviolable.

Such Perſons are the ſtrongeſt, powerfulleſt, and moſt formidable Enemies of the Truth. They are not indeed very common: but there need be but few to do a world of miſchief. The *Shew* of Truth and Vertue frequently do more Evil, than Truth and Vertue themſelves do good. For one ſubtle Hypocrite, is enough to overthrow what coſt a great many, truly wiſe and vertuous, much labour and pains to build.

Monſieur Des-Cartes, for inſtance, has demonſtratively prov'd the Exiſtence of a *GOD*, the Immortality of our Souls, and a great many other both *Metaphyſical* and *Phyſical* Queſtions; and our Age is under infinite Obligations to him, for the Truths he has diſcover'd to us. Notwithſtanding, there ſtarts up an Inconſiderable Perſon, and takes upon him, (being an hot and vehement *Declamer*, and in eſteem with the People, for the Zeal he manifeſted for their Religion,) to compoſe Books full of Calumnies againſt him, and accuſe him of the vileſt Crimes. *Des-Cartes* was a *Catholick*, and was Tutor'd in his Studies by the *Jeſuites*, whom he frequently mention'd with an honourable reſpect. This was enough with that malicious Spirit, to perſwade a People oppoſite to our Religion, and eaſy to be provok'd upon matters ſo nice as thoſe of Religion are, that he was an Emiſſary of the *Jeſuites*, and had dangerous Deſigns: becauſe the leaſt ſhadow of Truth in points of Faith, has more influence on Men's Minds, than real and effective Truths in matters of *Phyſicks*, or *Metaphyſicks*, for which they have little or no regard. *Des-Cartes* wrote of the *Exiſtence of a GOD*; and this was ſufficient for this *Slanderer* to exerciſe his falſe Zeal, and to oppreſs all the Truths that made for his Enemie's Defence. He accus'd him of *Atheiſm*, and of cunningly, and clandeſtinly Teaching it, like that infamous *Atheiſt Vanino*, burn'd at *Toulouſe*, who, to cover his Malice and Impiety, wrote for the *Exiſtence of a GOD*. For one of the Reaſons he alleadges for his Enemie's being an *Atheiſt*, was that he wrote againſt the *Atheiſts*, as did *Vanino*, for a cloak to his Villany. *of Voetius.*

So eaſy is it for a Man to overwhelm Truth, when ſupported with the ſhews of it, and when once he has obtain'd an Authority over weaker Minds. Truth loves Gentleneſs and Peace; and though ſhe be very ſtrong, yet ſhe ſometimes yields to the Pride and Arrogance of Falſhood and a Lye, dreſs'd up and arm'd in her own appearances. She knows that Error cannot finally prevail againſt her, and if it be her fate ſometimes to live proſcrib'd and in obſcurity, 'tis only to wait more favourable opportunities of manifeſting her ſelf; for ſhe generally at laſt breaks out in greater Strength and Brightneſs, even in the very place of her Oppreſſion.

'Tis no wonder to hear an Enemy of *Des-Cartes*, a Man of a different Religion, and Ambitious to raiſe himſelf upon the Ruines of Men above him, an injudicious Haranguer, in a word, a *Voetius* to talk contemptuouſly of what he neither does, nor will underſtand. But 'tis to be admir'd, that ſuch as are neither Enemies to *Des-Cartes*, nor his Religion, ſhould be poſſeſs'd with an Averſion and Contempt of him, on the account of the Reproaches they have read in Books, compos'd by the Enemy both to his Perſon and his Church.

That Heretick's Book, entitled *Deſperata cauſa Papatûs*, is a ſufficient Proof of his Impudence, Ignorance, Outrage, and deſire of ſeeming Zealous, thereby to purchaſe a Reputation amongſt his Flock: which ſhows that he's not a Man to be truſted on his word. For as we are not to believe all the Fabulous Stories he has heap'd together in his Book againſt our Religion; ſo we are not to believe on the ſtrength of his affirmation, thoſe bitter and hainouſly injurious Accuſations he has forg'd againſt his Enemie.

'Tis not then the part of a Rational Man to enter into a perſwaſion that *M. Des-Cartes* was a dangerous Perſon, becauſe they have perchance read it in ſome Book, or heard it ſaid by others, whoſe Piety is awfull and reſpected. For Mens bare words are not to be credited, when they accuſe others of the higheſt Crimes: nor is the Zeal and Gravity it is ſpoken in, ſufficient inducement to perſwade the Truth of it. For in ſhort, 'tis poſſible for Folly and Falſhood to be ſet off in the ſame manner as better things, eſpecially when the Speaker is won over to the belief of them out of *Simplicity* and *Weakneſs*.

'Tis eaſy to be inform'd of the Truth, or Falſhood of the Indictment, drawn up againſt *Mr. Des-Cartes*: His Writings being eaſy to come by, and not difficult to be underſtood by an Attentive Perſon. Let a Man therefore read his Books, that better Evidence may be had againſt him, than a bare *Hear-ſay*; and after he has well read them, and digeſted them, it may be hop'd the *Plea* of *Atheiſm* will be thrown out, and on the contrary, all due Reſpect and Deference paid to a Man, who in a moſt ſimple and evident manner has demonſtrated not only the Exiſtence of a *GOD*, and the Immortality of the Soul, but a great number of other Truths, that till his time were never thought on.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Deſire of Science, and of the Judgements of the falſly Learned.

THE Mind of Man is doubtleſs of a little Reach and Capacity, and yet he longs to know every thing: All Humane Sciences are unable to ſatisfy his Deſires; though he has not room to comprehend any one in particular. He is conſtantly diſquieted, and impatient for Knowledge, either becauſe he hopes to find what he ſeeks for; as we have ſaid in the Fore-going Chapters, or becauſe he is perſwaded that his Soul is agrandiz'd by the vain poſſeſſion of ſome Extraordinary Knowledge.

The Irregular Deſire of Happineſs and Greatneſs, puts him upon the Study of all Sciences, hoping to find *Happineſs* in *Moral*, and looking for *Greatneſs* in *Speculative* Knowledge.

Whence comes it that there are Men, who ſpend their Life in Reading the *Rabbins*, and ſuch like Books, written in forreign, obſcure, and corrupt Languages, by injudicious and ſenſeleſs Authors: but from a perſwaſion that the Knowledge of the *Oriental Tongues*, gives them a wonderful Lift, and Exaltation above others, that know nothing of them: and what can bear up their Courage under ſo ungrateful, unpleaſant, painful and uſeleſs a Study, but the hope of *Eminency*, and the proſpect of ſome vain *Greatneß?* And indeed they are look'd upon as Extraordinary Men: they are complimented upon their profound Learning; they are more awfully liſtned to, than others, and though we may for the moſt part pronounce them the moſt injudicious of all: if it were only for waſting their Life on ſo inſignificant a Buſineſs, which can neither make them *Wiſer* nor *Happier:* Yet they are ſuppos'd to have greater *Sence* and *Judgement* than others: becauſe they are more knowing in the *Derivation* of Words, we think them more Learn'd in the *Nature* of things.

'Tis for the ſame reaſon that *Aſtronomers* employ their time and Fortune to get an Accurate Kowledge of what's not only uſeleſs, but impoſſible to be known: They would find in the Courſes of the *Planets*, ſuch an exact Regularity, as does not belong to them: and erect *Aſtroſtronomical* Schemes to fore-tell effects, the Cauſes whereof they do not know. They have fram'd a *Selenography*, or *Geography* of the *Moon*, as if Men deſign'd to travell thither; and have already ſhar'd that World amongſt the moſt Famous *Aſtronomers:* few of them but are awarded ſome Province in this Country, as a Recompenſe for their Labours: and I queſtion whether they think it not a piece of Honour to have been in the good graces of Him, who ſo magnificently diſtributed theſe Kingdoms.

What makes Rational Men ſo hot in the Study of this *Science*, whilſt at the ſame time they are groſly ignorant as to moſt uſeful Truths, but that there ſeems to be ſomething great in the Knowledge of Heavenly Tranſactions: The Knowledge of the leaſt thing happening in the upper World, ſeems more Noble, Sublime, and befitting the Greatneſs of their Mind, than the Knowledge of things vile, abject and corruptible, as they think Sublunary Bodies. *The Excellency of a Science derives from the Excellency of its Object.* This is a notable Principle! The Knowledge of the Motion of Inchangeable and Incorruptible Bodies, is therefore moſt Noble and Elevated of all other: and as ſuch ſeems worthy of the Greatneſs and Excellency of their Mind.

Thus it is Men ſuffer themſelves to be dazl'd with a falſe Idea of Greatneſs: which flatters and excites them. The *Imagination* ſtruck, falls down before the *Phantom*, which it reverences, to the blinding Reaſon that ſhould judge of it, and turning it upſide down. Men ſeem to be in a dream, when they judge of the Objects of their Paſſions; to have their Eyes ſeal'd up, and to be deſtitute of common Senſe. For what is there of ſo great Importance in the Knowledge of the *Motions* of the *Planets?* don't we know enough already to regulate our Months and Years? Why ſo much ado, to know whether *Saturn* is incircled with a *Ring*, or a great multitude of *Little Moons;* and why muſt we make parties hereupon? what reaſon is there for a Man to boaſt himſelf upon the Prediction of the greatneſs of an *Eclipſe?* when poſſibly the ſucceſs was owing only to a luckier gueſs. There are Men appointed and encourag'd by the Royal Order to obſerve the Stars; let us ſit down content with their Obſervations. This Employment they follow *with Reaſon*, becauſe they engage in it *by Duty:* it is their proper Buſineſs; and therefore their Labours are ſucceſsful, as grounded upon Art, and carried on with all imaginable Accuracy and Application; and they want nothing to promote their Endeavours. Thus we ought to be fully ſatisfy'd, as to a matter that concerns us ſo little; whilſt they communicate to us their Diſcoveries.

'Tis requiſite that many Perſons ſtudy *Anatomy*, ſince its Knowledge is exceeding uſeful: that Knowledge being moſt to be deſir'd, which has moſt Uſe aud Advantage. Whatever contributes any thing to our Happineſs, or rather to the Eaſing our Infirmities, and Mitigating our Miſeries, may, and muſt be ſtudied. But to be prying whole Nights at the end of a *Teleſcope*, to diſcover in the Heavens ſome Spot, or *Planet* or other; to ruine a Man's Health and Happineſs, to neglect all his Buſineſs, to pay conſtant Viſits to the *Stars*, and to meaſure

measure their Magnitudes and Situations, is in my Mind entirely to forget both what a Man is at present, and what he shall be hereafter.

But you'l say perhaps, that this manifests the Greatness of Him, who made these mighty Objects: To which I say, That the *least Fly* shews forth the Power and Wisdom of *GOD*, to those who attentively consider it, without prejudice to its littleness, more then all that the *Astronomers* know concerning the *Heavens;* Yet Men are not made to consider Flies; and we think their pains but ill-employ'd, who have studied to inform us, how the several lice of every respective Animal are made, and how different Worms are transform'd into Flies and Butter-flies. They may, if they please, for their diversion, when they have nothing else to do, busie themselves about these things. But they ought not to spend their whole time upon them, unless they are become insensible to their miseries.

But it lies upon them to be incessant, by endeavouring to know *GOD* and themselves, to labour seriously to get rid of their Errors, and prejudices of their Passions and Inclinations to Sin. To be importunate in the Search of Truths most needful for them. For at last those shall be found to be most judicious, who are most careful in the Enquiry after the solidest Truths.

The principal Cause which engages Men in these false Studies, is their having conjoyn'd the *Idea* of *Learned*, to these vain and *Unfruitful Sciences*, instead of annexing it to the solid and necessary. When once a Man has the thoughts of growing Learned in his stead, and the Spirit of *Polimathie* begins to work, he is little concern'd to know what Sciences are most necessary, either to guide him by the Rules of Vertue, or to perfect his Reason: he only fixes his Eye on such as go for the Learned in the World, and observes what they have in them that makes them so considerable. All the most solid and necessary Sciences, being of common and easy access, can neither make their possessors admir'd nor respected: For common things, however fine and admirable in themselves, are carelesly and supinely regarded: which makes the Pretenders to Learning, dwell but little on Sciences necessary to the Conduct of Life, and the Perfection of the Mind. For these raise not in them that Idea of the *Sciences*, which they had form'd, as not being *those* they admir'd in others, and which they would have others to admire in them.

The *Gospel* and *Marality*, are Sciences too common and ordinary for them: They love to be skill'd in the *Criticisms* of some words to be met with in the *Ancient Philosophers* or *Greek Poets*. The Tongues, as *Arabick* and *Rabbinage*, and all except their genuine native Language, seem worthy their Study and Application: If they read the Holy Scriptures, 'tis not to learn *Piety* and *Religion;* but Points of *Chronology* and *Geography*, and Difficulties of *Grammar* take them wholly up: and they are more earnest to know these things, than the salutary Truths of the Gospel: they aim at the possession of the Science they have *foolishly* admir'd in others: and for which they are likely to be admir'd by other *Fools* in their turn.

'Tis so with them in point of Natural Knowledge; not the most useful, but the least common is their Beloved. *Anatomy* is too mean and low for them; but *Astronomy* is more Noble and exalted. Ordinary Experiments are unworthy their Application; but those Rare and Wonderful Experiments which can never instruct us, are those they most carefully observe.

Histories that are the most *Rare* and *Ancient*, they glory to know: and whilst they are ignorant of the *Genealogy* of *Princes* that at present Reign, are diligent in searching for the *Pedigree* of those who died four thousand Years ago: They scorn to learn the most common *Histories* of their own Times, yet endeavour to be Critically skill'd in the *Fables*, and *Fictions* of the *Poets*. They know not so much as their own Relations; yet will if you desire it, cite several Authorities, to prove that a *Citizen* of *Rome*, was allied to an *Emperour;* and a great many other such things.

Hardly can they tell the Names of the common *Garments* in present use, yet busy their Heads to know what were in wear with the Old *Greeks* and *Romans*. Their own Country *Animals* they are ignorant of; while they grudge not to spend several Years, in composing huge Volumes on the Creatures of Scripture; that they may seem to have a better guess than others, at the signification of unknown Terms: Such a Book is the Hearts-delight of its Author, and of its Learn'd Readers; for being patch'd up of *Greek*, *Hebrew*, and *Arabick* Passages, *&c.* of *Rabbinical* and such like dark and extraordinary Citations; it satisfies the Vanity of its Author, and the ridiculous Curiosity of those that *read it*, who fancy themselves learneder than others, when they can confidently affirm, there are six different words in Holy Writ signifying a Lion, or the like.

They commonly understand not the *Map* of their own Country, or even the *Model* of their Town, whilst they study the *Geography* of Ancient *Greece*, *Italy*, of the *Gaules* in *Julius Cesar*'s Time, or of the Streets and publick Places of old *Rome*. *Labor stultorum*, says the Wise-man, *affliget eos qui nesciunt in urbem pergere*. They know not the way to their City, yet are foolishly fatigu'd with fruitless Enquiries: They know not the Laws, or Customs of the places where they live; yet carefully study the *Ancient Right*, the Laws of the *Twelve Tables;* the Customs of the *Lacedemonians*, or of the *Chinese*, or the Ordinances of the Great *Mogul*. Lastly, they would know whatever's Rare, Extraordinary, and Remote, and unknown

by others, having by an overthrow of Reaſon, affix'd the *Idea* of Learning to theſe things: whilſt to be eſteem'd Learn'd, 'tis enough to know what others know not, and yet be ignorant of the beſt and moſt neceſſary Truths. True, the Knowledge of all theſe things, and the like, is call'd *Science*, *Erudition*, *Doctrine*; Uſe will have it ſo. But there is a Science, which the Scripture ſtyles Folly: *Doctrina ſtultorum fatuitas.* I never yet obſerv'd, that the *Holy Spirit*, which beſtows ſo many Elogies on Science, in *Sacred Writ*, ſays any thing in Commendation of that falſe Science I have been ſpeaking of.

CHAP. VIII.

I. *Of the deſire of ſeeming Learned.* II. *Of the Converſation of the falſly Learned.* III. *Of their Works.*

I. *Of the Deſire of ſeeming Learn'd.*

IF the immoderate Deſire of *Growing Learned*, makes Men oftentimes more Ignorant, the Deſire of *Being thought* ſo, not only renders them more Ignorant, but ſeems to give a total ſubverſion to their Reaſon. For the World abounds with ſuch as *loſe Common Sence*: becauſe they will *out-ſhoot it*, and ſpeak nothing but *ſilly* things, becauſe they will ſpeak only in *Paradox*. They deviate ſo far from the common thoughts of Mankind, whilſt they purpoſe the acquiring the Character of Rare and Extraordinary *Wits*; that they effectively gain their point, and are never conſider'd without much Admiration, or Contempt.

They are regarded with *Admiration*, when being rais'd to ſome Preferment or Honour, which conceals them, we fancy them as much above others in their *Parts*, and *Learning*, as they are by their *Quality* and *Birth*. But we frequently make a very different eſtimate, when viewing them near at hand, and drawing the Curtain of their ſurrounding Grandeur, we find them contemptible, or even Fools and Changelings.

The falſly Learned ſhew themſelves manifeſtly in the Books they write, as alſo in their ordinary Converſation. It will not perhaps be amiſs to give a proof of it.

II. *Of the Converſation of the falſly Learn'd.*

As it is Vanity, and deſire of Oſtentation, which engages them in their Studies, ſo when they find themſelves in Company, the Paſſion and Deſire of Preheminency, re-kindles and tranſports them. They are inſtantly ſo high upon the wing, that we loſe ſight of them; nor can they often themſelves tell where they are. They are ſo fearful of not being above all their *Auditors*, that they are vex'd to think any one can teach them: they will ſtomach the Demand of an Explication, and upon the leaſt Oppoſition, put on the look of Scorn and Arrogance. In brief, the things they ſay are ſo novell, and extraordinary, and ſo remote from Common Sence, that the Wiſe have much ado to hold from laughing, while the Ignorant are ſtunn'd and thunderſtrook.

The firſt heat being over, if any Man of an Head ſtrong, and ſettled enough, not to be overturn'd, ſhews that they are out, they will however ſtick obſtinately to their Errors: The very look of their confus'd and giddied Hearers, turns their own Head round; and the ſight of ſo many approvers, which they have convinc'd by the Impreſſion, convinces them by rebound; at leaſt, if it does not convince them, it fluſhes them with Courage, to maintain their falſe Opinions. Their Vanity will not ſuffer them to make any Retraction: they conſtantly invent ſome Reaſon for their Defence. They never ſpeak with greater fervency and zeal, than when they have nothing to ſay. They fancy it an Affront, and a Deſign to make them deſpicable, to offer any Reaſon againſt them: and the ſtronger and more judicious it is, the more it provokes their Pride, and Averſion.

The beſt way to defend Truth againſt them, is not to diſpute it. For 'tis better both for them, and us to leave them to their Errors, than provoke their Hatred. We muſt take care not to *wound* their Heart, when we would *heal* their Mind; the wounds of the former being more dangerous, than thoſe of the latter: beſide, that we ſometimes fortune to have to do with a Perſon truly Learned, whom 'tis poſſible we may deſpiſe, for want of rightly taking his Conceptions. We muſt therefore requeſt of thoſe who talk in ſo deciſive a ſtrain, to explain themſelves as diſtinctly as they can, without ſuffering them to change the Subject; or make uſe of obſcure and equivocal Terms: and if they be truly Learned, ſomething may be got by their Diſcourſe. But if they be falſly Learned, they will quickly be entangled and confounded by their own words, and can thank no body for it but themſelves. And even from hence we may perhaps receive ſome Inſtruction, or Diverſion, if we may be allow'd to divert our ſelves with other's Infirmities, when we try to cure them. But what is more conſiderable, we ſhall prevent the weaker ſort, who hear them with Attention, from engaging in Error, by following their Deciſions.

For it muſt be obſerv'd, that *Fools*, or ſuch as are *Machinally* manag'd, and follow ſenſible Impreſſions, being far more numerous than Men of an enlarg'd Thought, and governable by Reaſon: one of theſe Pretenders cannot dictate and determine upon a point, but there always are more, who believe him on his word, than others who diſtruſt him. But becauſe theſe falſly

falſly Learn'd recede as far as poſſible from common Thoughts; either out of a deſire of finding an opponent, whom they roughly handle, to elevate and ſhew themſelves: or a Subverſion of Mind, and Spirit of Contradiction: their Deciſions are for the moſt part falſe, or obſcure, and they are ſeldom atttended to, without drawing the contagion of Error.

Now the Method of diſcovering the Corruptneſs, or Solidity of others Opinions, is very difficultly put in practiſe. The Reaſon whereof is, That theſe Pretenders to Science, are not the only Perſons who would be thought to know every thing: 'Tis a failing almoſt univerſal; but more eſpecially incident to Men of ſome Reading and Study: which makes them always forward to talk, and explain their own Notions; but negligent and inadvertent as to other Men's. Such as are moſt Complaiſant and Rational, inwardly deſpiſing another's Opinion, make ſhew only of an Attentive *Meen*, whilſt their Eyes betray their Thoughts, and ſhew that they are buſy'd upon a quite contrary thing; not on anſwering what is ſaid to them, but on what they deſire to prove. Which is the thing that frequently renders Converſation ſo diſagreeable. For as there is nothing more grateful, or wherein a Man could honour us more, than the comprehending our Reaſons, and approving our Opinions; ſo there is nothing ſo offenſive as to ſee others not take, nor care to take our Meaning. For 'tis no pleaſure to talk and converſe with *Statues;* eſpecially Statues that are only ſo to us, becauſe they have little Eſteem for us, are careleſs to pleaſe us, and ſollicitous only to content themſelves, by recommending their own Abilities. But if Men could hear, and anſwer well at once, diſcourſe would be moſt uſeful, as well as pleaſant: whereas whilſt every one endeavours to be reputed Learn'd, all that's got by it is Conceitedneſs, and Unintelligibe Diſputes. Charity is ſometimes wounded, and Truth ſeldom diſcovered.

But the Ramblings which the *Falſly Learn'd* are in their Converſation ſubject to, are in ſome meaſure excuſable. It may be ſaid in their behalf, that in theſe Diſcourſes, Men uſe not much Caution and Advertency; and that the niceſt and moſt judicious, fall frequently into trifles, and impertinencies: and that they don't intend a Collection ſhould be made of their Sayings, as was of *Scaliger*'s, and *Cardinal Du Perron*'s.

There is Reaſon in theſe Excuſes, and we are eaſy to believe theſe Faults deſerve ſome ſort of Indulgence. We are indeed willing to talk in Company: but there are ſome unfortunate Seaſons in which we but ill ſucceed. We are not always in temper to think, or to ſpeak juſtly: and the time is ſo ſhort in ſome Conjunctures, that the Mind never ſo little clouded or abſent, miſerably falls into extravagant Abſurdities, even in Perſons moſt accurate, and piercing.

But though the faults, which the Falſly Learn'd are guilty of in Converſation, are excuſable; yet thoſe they commit in their Books, after due thinking and conſideration, are unpardonable: eſpecially if frequent, and not compenſated by ſome good things: For by writing an ill Book, a Man occaſions loſs of time to a multitude of Readers; ſubjects them to the ſame Errors he himſelf is guilty of, and cauſes them to deduce ſtill many others from them: which is not a little Evil.

But though it be a greater Crime than is imagin'd, to compoſe an *Evil*, or only an *Uſeleſs* Book; yet the Author is oftner *rewarded* than *puniſh'd* for it. For ſome Crimes there are, which eſcape the laſh, either becauſe they are the faſhion, or becauſe the Judges are not courageous enough to condemn ſuch Criminals, as they think more Ingenious than themſelves.

For Authors are commonly look'd on, as rare and extraordinary Perſons, above the ordinary ſize of Men; and therefore are reverenc'd inſtead of being deſpis'd and puniſh'd. So that there is little hopes of having a Tribunal erected, for the Trying and Condemning all the Books that tend only to debauch, and corrupt Reaſon.

And for this Reaſon, we muſt never expect to have the *Republick of Learning* better govern'd, than any other: as conſiſting of Men no leſs than the reſt. But in order to free our ſelves from Error, 'tis fit that even greater Liberty be permitted in this than other Republicks, where Novelty is always dangerous. For it would be a means to confirm us in our preſent Errors, to rob the Literate World of its Liberty, and indifferently to condemn all ſorts of Novelties.

'Tis hop'd then, I ſhall not be blam'd for ſpeaking againſt the Government of the Learned Commonwealth; and endeavouring to ſhew, that the Great Men of it, who for their profound Learning are the Admiration of the reſt, are at bottom but haughty and vain Creatures; void of Judgement, and all true Science. I am oblig'd to uſe this freedom of Speech, to prevent a blindfold ſubmiſſion to their Deciſions, and engaging in their Errors.

III. *Of the Books of the Falſly Learn'd.*

The Proofs of their Vanity, their want of Judgement, and of their Ignorance, are evidently deduc'd from their own Works. For if a Man would take the pains to examine them with purpoſe to judge of them by the Light of Common Sence, un-foreſtall'd with an Eſteem for theſe Authors, he might find that the deſigns of their Studies, are moſtly ſuch, as an injudicious Vanity has form'd, and their principal End, not the perfecting their Reaſon; and much leſs the Regulating the Motions of their Heart; but only the puzzling others, and ſeeming Wiſer Men than they.

From this proſpect it is, (as has been ſaid before) that they treat but of rare and unuſual Subjects; and explain themſelves in as rare and unuſual Terms; and quote onlyrare and extra-

ordinary Authors. They disdain to write in their own *Language*, as being too common; or in plain, perspicuous, and easy *Latin*, since their Design is not to be understood, but only to write, and to be admir'd: They seldom apply themselves to Sciences, that are serviceable to the management of Life; that's too trite and vulgar: it not being their purpose to be useful to others, or themselves, but only to be reputed Learned.

They either alleadge no Reasons of things; or if they do, they are so Mysterious and Incomprehensible, as neither themselves, nor any body else, can evidently conceive. Clear Reasons they have none; but if they had, they would not use them: because they surprize not the Mind, are thought too simple and common, and suited to the Abilities of all Mankind. They rather bring Authorities to prove, or with pretence to prove their Notions: For the Authorities employ'd seldom prove any thing by the Sence they contain, but only by being *Greek* and *Arabick*. But perhaps it will be pertinent to speak something of their Quotations, which will acquaint us in part with the disposition of their Mind.

It is, methinks, manifest that nothing but a falsly-term'd Learning, and a Spirit of *Polymathie*, could bring these Citations into Fashion, as they have formerly been, and are still at this day with some of the Learned. For 'tis usual with some Authors to be perpetually quoting long Sentences, without any Reason for it: whether because the things they advance are too clear to be doubted of; or that they are too intricate and obscure to be made out by the Authority of their Authors; since they could know nothing of them: or lastly, because the Citations inserted are inserviceable to adorn and beautify their Discourse.

'Tis repugnant to Common Sence, to bring a *Greek Passage* to prove the Air transparent, because 'tis evident to all the World: to employ the Authority of *Aristotle* to perswade us that *Intelligences* move the Heavens, because we are certain *Aristotle* could not know it: and lastly to mingle strange Languages, *Arabian* and *Persian* Proverbs with *Latin* or *English* Books, written for every Body: for as much as these Citations cannot be ornamental, at least, are such fantastical Ornaments, as disgust most Persons, and can satisfy but very few.

Nevertheless, the greatest part of those, who would fain be thought Learned, are so extreamly pleas'd with this kind of *Gibbrish*, that they blush not to quote in strange Tongues, which they do not understand; and tug might and main to draw into their Books an *Arabick* Passage, which they cannot so much as read. Thus they puzzle themselves strangely, to effect a thing repugnant to good Sence; but that sacrifices to their Vanity, and makes them esteem'd by Sots.

One very considerable fault is still behind; which is that they are but in little care to seem to have read with Choice and Judgement: All they desire being to be reckon'd Great Readers, especially of obscure Books; that they may seem more Learned of Books that are scarce and dear, that they may be thought to have every thing of Wicked and Impious Books, (which Honest Men are affraid to read) with much the same Spirit, as some boast to have acted Crimes, which others dare not. Hence they rather cite very Dear, very Rare, very Ancient, and Obscure Books, than other more Common and Intelligible: *Astrological*, *Cabalistical*, and *Magical* Books, than such as are good and wholesome: as if they did not see, that *Reading* being a kind of *Conversing*; they should rather desire to seem industriously to have sought the acquaintance of Good and Intelligible, than Wicked and Obscure Authors.

For as no Man in his Sences, would choose out for ordinary Converse, People that want an Interpreter: when the same things that are to be learned of them, might be known another way: so 'tis ridiculous to read Books not to be understood without a *Dictionary*, when the same things may be had in those that are more Intelligible. And as it is a sign of a deprav'd Nature, to affect the Company and Conversation of the *Impious*; so 'tis the *Criterion* of a corrupt Heart, to delight in Reading *Wicked Books*. But 'tis an extravagant Pride, for a Man to pretend to have read those which he has not: which yet is a thing of very common occurrence. For we find Men of thirty Years standing, quote more ill Books in their Works, than they could have read in many Ages: whilst they could have others believe, they have very exactly read them. But most of the Books of some of these Learned Gentlemen, owe their Birth to the kind *Dictionary*, and all their Reading may be reduc'd to the *Indexes* of the Books they quote, and some *Common Places* heap'd together from out of different Authors.

I venture not to enter into the particulars of these things, nor to give Instances to prove them; for fear of provoking Persons so Fierce and Cholerick, as these Learned Pretenders, as not caring to be revil'd in *Greek* and *Arabick*. Besides that, 'tis needless more sensibly to evince what I have said, by particular Allegations, the Mind of Man being ready enough to tax the Management of others, and make particular Application of this Discourse. In the mean time, let them hug themselves, and feed upon this vain *Fantome* of Greatness; and give one another the Applauses which we deny them. For we have been perhaps already too troublesome, by molesting them in their so seemingly sweet and grateful Enjoyments.

CHAP.

CHAP. IX.

How the Inclination for Honours and Riches conduces to Error.

HONOURS and *Riches*, no leſs than *Vertue* and *Science*, which we have already ſpoke of, are principal Acquirements to give us the Aſcendant over other Men. For there ſeems to accrue to our Being a Growth and Enlargement, and kind of Independency from the Poſſeſſion of theſe Advantages. So that the Love we have for our ſelves, naturally ſtreaming out to Honours and Riches, every body may be ſaid to have ſome ſort of *Inclination* for them. We will explain in brief, how theſe Inclinations obviate the Diſcovery of Truth, and engage us in Falſhood and Error.

It has been ſhewn in ſeveral places, that much Time and Labour, Aſſiduity and Contention of Mind, muſt go to the Clearing up Compound-truths, ſurrounded with Difficulties, and depending on many Principles. Whence it is eaſy to conclude, that Men of publick Characters, of great Employments, who have large Eſtates to look after, and great Affairs to manage, and whoſe Hearts are fix'd upon Riches and Honours, are not the fitteſt Enquirers after Truth; and that they commonly err in point of all things, difficultly known whenever they pretend to judge of them: And that becauſe,

Firſt, They have little time to lay out in the Search of Truth. Secondly, They take but little Pleaſure in this Search. Thirdly, They are very incapable of Attention, becauſe the Capacity of their Mind is divided by the multitude of the Idea's of the things they wiſh for; which take up their Thoughts whether they will or no.

In the fourth place, they fancy they know every thing, and can hardly be induc'd to believe their Inferiours have more Reaſon than themſelves: ſome Matters of Fact they may vouchſafe to learn of them, but are above being taught by them ſolid and neceſſary Truths: contradict them or diſabuſe them, and they fly out in a Paſſion.

In the fifth place, becauſe much Incenſe of Applauſe is uſually given them in all their Imaginations, though never ſo falſe and remote from Common Sence: And ſuch as differ from their Opinion; though only to defend undeniable Truths, are raill'd and ridicul'd: And 'tis the fulſome Flatteries of thoſe about them, that ſtrengthen themin their Errors, encourage that illegitimate Eſteem of themſelves, and ſet them up for unappealable Judges of all things.

In the ſixth place, they dwell only upon Senſible Notions, as fitter for common Converſation, and to keep up the Eſteem of Men, than the Pure and Abſtract Idea's of the Mind, which we employ in the finding out of Truth.

Laſtly, Thoſe who aſpire to any Dignity, ſtrive as much as poſſible to accommodate and demean themſelves to the Meaſure and Capacity of others: becauſe nothing provokes Mens Errors and Averſion like the pretending to Uncommon Notions. Rare it is for Men whoſe Minds and Hearts are taken up with the Thoughts and Deſires of making their Fortunes, to be able to diſcover hidden Truths: but when they do them, they abdicate them out of Intereſt, and becauſe the Defence of them will not accord with their Ambition. A Man muſt ſide commonly with *Injuſtice* to become a *Magiſtrate*: Solid and Uncommon *Piety* is a frequent bar to a *Benefice*; and the generous Love of Truth, often deprives Men of the *Pulpit* it ſhould be taught in.

All theſe Reaſons in Conjunction, extreamly ſubject Men to Error; and Incapacitate for the Diſcovery of occult Truths; ſuch as are exalted above others by their Honours, Birth, and Fortune, or who are only intent upon making Eſtabliſhments, and raiſing Eſtates. For among the things that are requiſite to the avoiding Error, in Queſtions any whit Abſtruſe, there are two eſpecially not eaſy to be met with in the Perſons fore-mention'd; *viz. Attention* of Mind to go to the bottom of things; and *Retention*, not to judge of them with too much Precipitation. Thoſe very Men, who are Elected for the Inſtructing others, and who ſhould have no other Aim or Intereſt, than the Qualifying themſelves for that purpoſe, commonly grow Erroneous, as ſoon as they take Publick Employments: either becauſe having but *Little* time to themſelves, they cannot give Attention, and Application to things that require *Much*: or that being ſtrangely ambitious of being thought Learned, they confidently pronounce of all things without Reſerve, and are *Impatient* either of Oppoſition, or Inſtruction.

CHAP. X.

Of the Love of Pleaſure, with regard to Morality. I. *That Pleaſure is to be ſhunn'd, though it make us Happy.* II. *It ought not to carry us to the loving Senſible Goods.*

WE have treated in the three laſt Chapters, of the *Inclination* we have for the *Preſervation of our Being*; and ſhewn how it occaſions us to fall into ſeveral Errors.

We ſhall now ſpeak to *That* we have for our *Well-being*; that is, for Pleaſures, and whatever makes us more Happy or Content, or is thought capable of doing it: and we will attempt to diſcover the *Errors* that ſpring from this *Inclination*.

There is a Tribe of *Philoſophers*, that endeavour to perſwade the World, That *Pleaſure is no good*, nor *Pain* an *Evil*; that 'tis poſſible to be Happy in the midſt of moſt violent Pains,

and Miſerable in the midſt of the greateſt Pleaſures. As theſe *Philoſophers* are very *Pathetical* and Imaginative, they carry away weak Minds with the Impreſſion their Diſcourſe produces in them: For the *Stoicks* are ſomewhat Viſionary, and Viſioniſts are vehement; and ſo eaſily imprint on others the falſe ſentiments they are themſelves prepoſſeſs'd with. But becauſe there is no *Conviction* againſt *Experience*, and Internal Conſcience, or Senſation; all theſe pompous and magnificent Reaſons, which dazle and ſtagger the Imaginations of Men, vaniſh with all their Gaudery and Luſtre, as ſoon as the Soul is touch'd with any Senſible Pleaſure and Pain. And thoſe who have plac'd all their Confidence in this falſe Perſwaſion of their Mind, find themſelves upon the leaſt aſſault of Vice, deſtitute of Wiſdom, forceleſs, and unnerv'd: they are ſenſible they were deceiv'd, and find they are vanquiſh'd.

I. *Pleaſure ought to be ſhunn'd, tho' it make us Happy.*

If the *Philoſophers* cannot give their Diſciples Strength to *Conquer* their *Paſſions*, they ſhould at leaſt forbear to ſeduce them, and make them fancy, they have no Enemies to *Aſſault*. Things ſhould be ſpoken as they are: *Pleaſure* is always a Good, and *Pain* always an Evil: But it is not always for our Good, to enjoy Pleaſure; and 'tis ſometimes advantagious to ſuffer Pain.

But to make my Meaning more intelligible, we muſt know,

Firſt, That none but *GOD*, is powerful enough to act upon us, and to produce in us the Senſe of Pleaſure and Pain. For 'tis manifeſt to every man that conſults his Reaſon, and deſpiſes the Reports of Senſe, that 'tis not the Senſible Objects that really act upon us, nor the Soul that produces in her ſelf her Pain and Pleaſure *occaſionally* from them.

Secondly, That in Ordinary Procedure, no Good is to be given, but to encourage us to, or recompence us for ſome good Action; nor any Evil to be afflicted, but either to prevent a wicked Action, or to puniſh it; and therefore ſince *GOD* always acts with order, and by the Rules of Juſtice, every *Pleaſure* muſt *incline* us to ſome *Good Action*, or *Reward us* for it, and every *Pain avert us* from ſome *bad Action*, or *puniſh* it in us.

Thirdly, There are *Actions* which are *good* in one ſence, and *evil* in another. 'Tis, for inſtance, an *evil* Action to expoſe to Death, when *GOD forbids* it; but a *good*, when he *commands* it. For all our Actions are good or bad, becauſe *GOD* has commanded or forbidden them, by his firſt *General Will*, which is *the Order and Inſtitution of Nature*, or by his other Wills or particular Commandments, which are neceſſary to its re-eſtabliſhment.

I affirm then, that Pleaſure is always good, but that it is not always advantagious to enjoy it: and that firſt, Becauſe inſtead of engaging us to Him, who alone is capable of cauſing it: it diſengages us from Him, to unite us to the falſly ſeeming cauſe of it: It looſes us from *GOD*, to unite us to the vile Creature. For though thoſe whom true *Philoſophy* has enlightned, think ſometimes that Pleaſure is not caus'd by External Objects, which may in ſome meaſure incline them to the acknowledging and loving *GOD* in all things: yet ſince the *Sin*, the Reaſon of Man is ſo feeble, and his Senſes and Imagination ſo prevalent over his Mind that they ſpeedily corrupt his Heart, whilſt he deprives not himſelf, according to the Advice of the Goſpel, of whatever leads not of it ſelf to *GOD*. For the beſt *Philoſophy* is unable to cure the Mind, and withſtand the Corruptions of Pleaſure.

Secondly, Becauſe Pleaſure being a Reward, it is an Act of Injuſtice for a Man to produce in his Body thoſe Motions, which oblige *GOD*, purſuant to His firſt Will, to give us the Senſation of Pleaſure, when we don't deſerve it; either becauſe the Action we do is unprofitable, or criminal; or that being full of Sin, we have no Right to demand a Recompence. The Enjoyment of Senſible Pleaſures was juſtly due to Man in his Regular Actions, whilſt he remain'd Innocent. But ſince the Fall, there are no Pleaſures entirely innocent, or incapable of harming us, when we taſt them. For it is commonly ſufficient only to taſt them, to become their ſlave.

Thirdly, *GOD* being Juſt, cannot chuſe but puniſh one day, the violence that was done Him, by obliging Him to reward with Pleaſure criminal Actions committed againſt Him. When our Soul ſhall be diſ-united from our Body, *GOD* will be diſpens'd from the Obligation He has impos'd upon Himſelf of giving *Senſations* anſwerable to the Motions of the *Animal Spirits*, but he will ſtill be oblig'd to ſatisfy His Juſtice: and ſo that will be the ſeaſon of His Wrath and Vengeance. Then though He change not the *Order of Nature*, but remain ever fix'd and immutable in His *Firſt Will*, He will puniſh the unmerited Pleaſures of the Voluptuous, with Pains that will never have an end.

Fourthly, Becauſe the certainty we have in this Life, of the future Execution of that Juſtice, exagitates the Mind with dreadful anxieties, and throws it into a ſort of Deſpair, which renders the Voluptuous miſerable, even amidſt the greateſt Pleaſures.

Fifthly, Becauſe of thoſe diſquieting Remorſes, which almoſt ever attend the moſt Innocent Pleaſures, by Reaſon we are inwardly convinc'd we don't deſerve them: which Remorſes rob us of a certain internal *Joy*, that is found even in the ſeverities of *Repentance*.

And therefore though *Pleaſure* be a *Good*, yet it muſt be acknowledg'd that the Enjoyment of it, is not always to our Advantage, for the Fore-going Reaſons: And for others of like nature, moſt requiſite to be known, and eaſily deducible from them; it muſt be granted, that it is moſt commonly highly advantagious to ſuffer *Pain*, though really an *Evil*.

Nevertheleſs, every Pleaſure is a Good, and actually makes Happy the Enjoyer, at the time of Enjoyment, and ſo long as he enjoys it: and every Pain is an Evil, and makes the

Sufferer

Sufferer actually Unhappy at the inſtant of ſuffering, and ſo long as he ſuffers it. The Righteous and Holy may be ſaid to be the moſt miſerable of all Men in this Life, and moſt worthy of Compaſſion. *Si in vitâ tantum in Chriſto ſperamus, miſerabiliores ſumus omnibus hominibus;* ſays St. *Paul.* For thoſe that weep *and ſuffer perſecution for Righteouſneſs-ſake, are not Bleſſed for ſuffering perſecution for the ſake of Righteouſneſs,* but becauſe the *Kingdom of Heaven is Theirs;* and a great Reward is laid up for them in Heaven: that is, becauſe they ſhall be Happy. Such as are perſecuted for Righteouſneſs, are thereby Righteous, Vertuous, and Perfect, as being in the *Divine Order*, and *becauſe* Perfection conſiſts in the obſerving it. But they are not Happy, *becauſe* they ſuffer. There ſhall be a time, when they ſhall ſuffer no more, and then they ſhall be Happy, as well as Righteous and Perfect. 1 Cor. 15. 16.

However, I deny not but the Righteous even in this Life, may be in ſome meaſure Happy, by the *Strength* of their *Hope* and *Faith*, which bring thoſe future Goods as it were preſent to their Minds: For it is certain, that the vigorous and lively Hope of any Good, brings it cloſer to the Mind, and inticipates the Enjoyment: and thus makes a Man Happy in part, ſince 'tis the *Taſt* and the *Poſſeſſion* of *Good*, and *Pleaſure*, that *make Happy.*

Therefore we ſhould not tell Men, that Senſible Pleaſures are not good, and that they render the poſſeſſors never the Happier, ſince this is falſe; and at the time of Temptation, they find it ſo to their misfortune. They ought to be told, that theſe Pleaſures are in their own nature good, and after a ſort capable to make them Happy; yet for all that to be avoided, for ſuch like Reaſons as the fore-mention'd; but that they have not ſtrength enough to withſtand them of themſelves, becauſe they deſire to be Happy by an invincible Inclination, which theſe tranſitory Pleaſures, to be avoided by them, in ſome meaſure ſatisfy: And therefore are under a fatal neceſſity of being loſt, unleſs reſcued and aſſiſted. Theſe things are to be inculcated to them, to give them a diſtinct Knowledge of their own Imbecillities, and their need of a Redeemer.

We ought to ſpeak to Men, as Our *LORD*, and not as the *Stoicks* do, who underſtand neither the Nature nor Diſtemper of an Humane Mind. We muſt continually tell them they are to hate and deſpiſe themſelves, and not look for a Settlement and Happineſs here below; that they muſt continually bear their Croſs, or the Inſtrument of their Suffering, and *loſe* their Life at preſent, to *ſave* it everlaſtingly. Laſtly, we muſt ſhew them their Obligation to act quite contrary to their Deſires, to make them ſenſible of their Impotence to Good. For their *Will* is invincibly bent on Happineſs; which 'tis impoſſible actually to obtain, without doing what they have a Mind to. Perhaps being ſenſible of their preſent Evils, and knowing their future, they will humble themſelves on Earth: poſſibly they will crie to Heaven, will ſeek out a Mediator, ſtand in fear of ſenſible Objects, and conceive a Salutary Abhorrence for whatever flatters Concupiſcence and their Senſes. Probably they may enter into that Spirit of Prayer and Repentance ſo neceſſary to the obtaining Grace, without which no Strength, no Health, no Salvation can be expected.

II. *It ought not to carry us to the loving Senſible Goods.*

We are inwardly convinc'd, that Pleaſure is good; which inward Conviction is not falſe: for Pleaſure is really ſo. We are naturally convinc'd, that Pleaſure is the Character of Good, and that Natural Conviction is certainly true: For what ever cauſes Pleaſure, is unqueſtionably very good, and amiable. But we are not aſſur'd that Senſible Objects, or even our Soul it ſelf, are capable of producing Pleaſure in us. For there is no reaſon why we ſhould believe it, but a thouſand why we ſhould not. Thus Senſible Objects are neither Good, nor Amiable. They are to be employ'd, as ſerviceable to the Preſervation of Life: but we muſt not love them, as being incapable of Acting upon us. The Soul ought only to love what is good to her, and able to make her happier and more perfect: and therefore nothing but what's above her can be the Object of her Love, ſince 'tis evident her Perfection can derive from nothing that is not ſo.

But becauſe we judge that a Thing is the Cauſe of ſome Effect, when it conſtantly attends it, we imagine that Senſible Objects act on us, becauſe at their approach we have freſh Senſations, and becauſe we ſee not Him, who cauſes them really in us, In taſting a Fruit, we have a *Senſation* of *Sweetneſs;* and we attribute that Sweetneſs to the Fruit, which we judge both to cauſe it and contain it. We ſee not *GOD*, as we ſee and touch this Fruit; nay, we do not ſo much as think on Him, nor perhaps on Our ſelves. And ſo we judge not that *GOD* is the true Cauſe of that *Sweetneſs;* nor that it is a Modification of our Soul: but impute both the Cauſe and Effect to the Fruit we eat.

What I have ſaid of Senſations relating to the Body, may be underſtood of thoſe which have no relation to it, ſuch are thoſe which are incident to pure Intelligences.

A Spirit contemplates it ſelf, and finds nothing wanting to its Happineſs or Perfection, or elſe ſees that it is not in poſſeſſion of what it deſires. Upon the View of its *Happineſs*, it feels *Joy;* upon the ſight of its *Miſery*, it feels *Sorrow.* It immediately imagines, that 'tis the ſight of its Happineſs, which produces in it ſelf this Senſation of Joy; becauſe this Senſation ſtill accompanies this Perception; and fancies likewiſe that the ſight of its Miſery, is what produces in it the Senſation of Sorrow: becauſe the latter is a conſtant attendant of the former. The true Cauſe of theſe Senſations which is *GOD*, alone does not appear to it; nor does it, it may be, think on *GOD*. For *GOD* acts in us in an imperceptible manner.

GOD rewards us with a Senſe of Joy, when we find our ſelves in the ſtate we ought to be in, to the intent we may continue in it, that our Anxiety may ceaſe; and that we may fully enjoy our Happineſs without ſuffering the Capacity of our Mind to be taken up with any thing elſe. But He produces in us a Senſation of Sorrow, when we know we are not in our convenient ſtate, to the end we may not ſtay in it; but reſtleſly ſeek out for the Perfection which we want. For *GOD* continually drives us towards Good, when we know that we do not poſſeſs it, but gives us a powerful check, when we ſee we are fully poſſeſs'd of it. Wherefore 'tis evident to me, that the Senſations of Intellectual Joy and Sorrow, no leſs than Senſible, are not the Voluntary productions of the Mind.

Our Reaſon then ſhould conſtantly teach us to diſcover that Inviſible Hand, which fills us with Good, and which lies diſguis'd to our Mind under *Senſible Appearances*. This Hand we are to adore and to love, and alſo to fear; ſince, though it loads us with Pleaſures, it can likewiſe overwhelm us with Pains. We ought to love it with a Love *of Choice*, an Intellectual Love, a Love worthy of *GOD*, and Our ſelves: Our Love is worthy of *GOD*, when it proceeds from our Knowledge of His being Amiable: and this Love is worthy of Our ſelves; for that being Reaſonable Creatures, we ought to beſtow our Love on that which Reaſon teaches us, is worthy of it. But we love Senſible things with a Love unworthy Our ſelves, and undeſerv'd by them: whilſt being Reaſonable, we love them without any Reaſon for it; as not clearly knowing them to be lovely; and on the contrary, knowing they are not. But we are betray'd by Pleaſure to the love of them; the blind and irregular love of Pleaſure being the true Cauſe of the falſe Judgements of Men, in Subjects of *Morality*.

CHAP. XI.

Of the Love of Pleaſure with Reference to Speculative *Sciences.* I. *How it diſables us from diſcovering Truth.* II. *Some Inſtances.*

OUR Inclination for Senſible Pleaſures being diſorder'd, is not only the Original of thoſe dangerous Errors, we are guilty of, in matters of *Morality*, and the general Cauſe of the Corruption of our Manners: but likewiſe one of the main Cauſes of the Depravation of our Reaſon: and it inſenſibly engages us in moſt groſs, but leſs dangerous Errors, in point of Subjects purely *Speculative*; becauſe it diſables us from bringing a ſufficient Attention to comprehend, and judge well of things that do not affect us.

We have ſpoken ſeveral times already of the Difficulty we find to apply our ſelves to Subjects ſomewhat *Abſtract*, the Subject of our Diſcourſe requiring it. As towards the end of the Firſt Book, where we ſhew'd that Senſible Idea's more affecting the Soul, than Idea's purely Intellectual, ſhe was more taken up with the *out-ſide manners*, than the *Things* themſelves. So again, in the Second, where treating of the Tenderneſs of the Fibres of the Brain, we ſhew'd whence the Softneſs of certain Effeminate Minds proceeded. Laſtly, in the Third, when ſpeaking of the *Attention* of the *Mind*, it was neceſſary to ſhew, that it was very careleſs of things *Speculative*; but very attentive to ſuch as affected her, and made her *feel* Pleaſure or Pain.

Our Errors have moſt commonly ſeveral Cauſes, contributing to their Riſe; ſo that it ought not to be thought it is for want of Order, that we repeat almoſt the ſame things, and aſſign ſeveral Cauſes of the ſame Errors; it is really becauſe they have ſo many: I ſtill ſpeak of Occaſional Cauſes; for we have often declar'd, they have no other true and real Cauſe, than the *wrong uſe of our Liberty:* which wrong uſe conſiſts in our not uſing it ſo much as we might, as we have explain'd at the beginning of this Treaty.

We are not therefore to be blam'd, if in order to make it fully conceiv'd, how, for inſtance, the Senſible Manners things are involv'd in, ſurprize and lead us into Error, we were oblig'd by way of Anticipating, to ſpeak of our Inclination for Pleaſures in the other Books, which ſeems fitter to have been reſerv'd for this, wherein we purpoſely treat of the Natural Inclinations: (and the ſame may be ſaid of other things in other places.) All the harm that will come of it is this, that we may diſpence with many things here, which we had been oblig'd to explain, if it had not been done elſewhere.

All things in the Humane Nature, are ſo link'd and twin'd to one another, that we find Our ſelves often as it were overwhelm'd with the number of things, neceſſary to be drawn out, at the ſame time, to ſet our Conceptions in an open and clear light. We are ſometimes forc'd to let things go *unſeparated*, which Nature has joyn'd together: and to proceed againſt our own preſcrib'd Method; when this Method throws us in confuſion, as it inevitably does on ſome occaſions. And yet after all, it is impoſſible to make others take in all our Conceptions. All that can commonly be pretended to, is to put others in a Capacity of diſcovering with *Pleaſure* and *Eaſe*, what we have diſcover'd Our ſelves with great *pains* and *fatigation*. And ſince 'tis impoſſible to make any Diſcovery, without Attention, our Studies ſhould be chiefly employ'd on means of making others attentive. This is what we have eſſay'd to do, though, we muſt acknowledge, but weakly perform'd: and we are the willinger to confeſs we have been defective, that the confeſſion may provoke our Readers to ſupply themſelves,

ſelves, what is wanting in us, to make them attentive, in order to penetrate the bottom of Subjects, which deſerve to be thorowly conſider'd.

Infinite are the Errors wherein our *Inclination* for *Pleaſures*, and in general for what ever affects us, engages us; becauſe that Inclination diſſipates the ſight of the Mind, and fixes it continually on the confus'd Idea's of the Senſes, and the Imagination; and inclines us to judge over-haſtily of all things, by the bare Relation which they have to us.

I. *How it diſables us from diſcovering Truth.*

Truth never appears, but when we ſee things as they are in themſelves: which we never do, unleſs we ſee them in Him who contains them, in an intelligible manner. When we perceive them within Our ſelves, we perceive them at a very lame and imperfect rate; or rather we perceive our own Senſations, and not the things we deſire to perceive, and which we falſly think we do.

To *ſee* things as they are in *themſelves*, requires much Application: becauſe at preſent we cannot unite to *GOD* without great pain, and reluctancy. But to *ſee them* in *Our ſelves*, requires no Application at all on our part; ſince we are *ſenſible* of what touches us whether we will or no. We do not naturally find any *Preventing* Pleaſure in our Union with *GOD*: the pure Idea's of things do not touch and quicken us. Therefore the Inclination we have for Pleaſure, is not a means to apply and unite us to *GOD*, but on the contrary ſlackens our Engagements to Him, and perpetually removes us farther from Him; carrying us perpetually to conſider things by their Senſible Idea's: becauſe theſe falſe and impure Idea's are they that affect us. Love of Pleaſure then, and the Actual Enjoyment of it, which revives and corroborates this Love, throw us continually off Truth, to plunge us into Error.

Thoſe therefore who would draw near to Truth, to be illuminated by its Light, muſt begin by the privation of Pleaſure. They muſt carefully ſhun whatever ſenſibly affects, and agreeably ſhares the Mind. For the voice of Truth cannot be heard, unleſs in the ſilence of the Senſes, and the Paſſions: An Averſion to the World, and Contempt for all Senſible things, being equally neceſſary to the perfection of the Mind, as to the converſion of the Heart.

When our Pleaſures are great, and our Senſations lively, we are incapable of the moſt ſimple Truths: nor do we agree to common Notions, unleſs of a ſenſible Make and Character. When our Pleaſures, or other Senſations are moderate, we may diſcover ſome plain and eaſy Truths: but if it were poſſible to be abſolutely delivered from Pleaſures and Senſations, we ſhould be able eaſily to diſcover the moſt abſtract and difficult Truths that are known. For proportionably to our Removing from what is not *GOD*, we approach to *GOD* Himſelf: we avoid Error, and diſcover Truth. But ever ſince the *Fall*, ſince the diſorderly Love of *Preventing Pleaſure*, which domineers and triumphs, the Mind is grown ſo weak, that it can pierce into nothing; and ſo materializ'd, and dependant on the Senſes, that it cannot lay hold of things abſtract and unaffecting. With much ado it perceives common Notions, and for want of Advertency, frequently concludes them falſe or obſcure. It cannot diſtinguiſh the *Truth* of things from their *Utility*, the Relation they have *to one another*, from the Relation they have to *it ſelf*; and often takes thoſe to be moſt *true*, that are moſt *uſeful*, *agreeable*, and *moving*. Finally, this *Inclination* infects and muddies all our perceptions of Objects, and conſequently all the Judgements that we make of them. Here follows ſome Examples.

II. *Some Inſtances.*

Tis a common Notion, that *Vertue* is preferable to *Vice*; that 'tis better to be *Sober* and *Chaſt*, than *Intemperate* and *Voluptuous*. But the *Inclination* for *Pleaſure* ſo ſtrangely confounds that Idea in certain Occaſions, that we have but a tranſient glimpſe of it, nor can draw thoſe Conſequences from it that are neceſſary to the management of Life. The *Soul* is violently bent upon the Pleaſures ſhe hopes for, that ſhe ſuppoſes them innocent, and ſeeks only for the means of enjoying them.

Every body well knows that 'tis more eligible to be *Juſt* than *Rich*: That Juſtice exalts a Man more than the poſſeſſion of the moſt magnificent Buildings, which often ſerve more to manifeſt the greatneſs of the Injuſtices and Crimes of the Poſſeſſor, than his Grandeur. But the Pleaſure that wretched Men receive in the vain Oſtentation of their falſe Grandeur, ſufficiently fills up the narrow Capacity of their Mind, to conceal and obſcure ſo evident a Truth from them. They abſurdly imagine they are *Great Men*, becauſe they have *great Houſes*.

Special Algebra, or *Analytick*, is certainly the fineſt, I mean the moſt fruitful and moſt certain of all Sciences. Without it, the Mind has neither penetration, nor extent; and with it, it is capable of knowing almoſt what ever is poſſible to be certainly and evidently known. As imperfect as this *Science* has been, it has made famous all that have been skill'd in't, and knew how to employ it, having by it diſcover'd Truths that ſeem'd incomprehenſible to other Men. It is ſo well proportion'd to an Humane Mind, that without dividing its Capacity with things uſeleſs to the Queſtion, it infallibly conducts it to its point. In a word, it is an *Univerſal Science*, and as it were the Key of all other. Yet as valuable as it is in it ſelf; it has no Charms nor Luſtre to captivate Men: for this Reaſon only, that it is not of a Senſible Nature. It has been buried in Oblivion for many Ages: and there are ſtill very many that know not ſo much as the *Name*; and ſcarce one in a thouſand to be found, that underſtands any thing of it. The moſt Learned, who have reviv'd it in our days, have not yet carried it very far, nor handled it with that order and perſpecuity it deſerves. Being Men no leſs than others, they have grown at length diſguſted with theſe pure Truths, whilſt unaccom-

panied with Senſible Pleaſure: and the Uneaſineſs of their Will, debauch'd by Sin; the Levity of their Mind, which depends on the Motion and Circulation of the Blood, have withheld them from feeding and growing upon thoſe great, thoſe vaſt and ſecond Truths, which are the Immutable, and Univerſal Rules of all tranſitory and particular Truths, poſſible to be exactly known.

Metaphyſick likewiſe is an *Abſtract Science*, which flatters not the Senſes, nor does the Soul receive any pleaſure in the Study of it: and for the ſame reaſon it is ſo miſerably neglected; that 'tis uſual to find Perſons ſtupid enough confidently to deny Common Notions. There are thoſe who ſtick not to deny, that we may, or ought to affirm of a thing, what is included in the clear and diſtinct Idea we have of it: That *Nothing* has *no Properties*; that a thing cannot be annihilated without a Miracle: that a Body cannot move by any force of its own. That a Body in Motion, cannot communicate to occurrent Bodies more Motion, than it has it ſelf: and other things of the ſame kind. They have never conſider'd theſe *Axioms* with a View ſteady, and diſtinct enough, to ſee clearly the truth of them, and they have ſometimes try'd Experiments, which have abuſively convinc'd them, that ſome of theſe *Axioms* were falſe.

They have ſeen in certain Junctures, that two viſible Bodies meeting each others have ceas'd to move at the inſtant of their Colliſion. They have obſerv'd in others, that the impuls'd Body had more Motion than the viſible impelling: and this ſenſible obſervation of ſome Experiments, the reaſons whereof they don't perceive, makes them determine about things againſt certain Principles, and which go for common Notions, with all Attentive and Conſidering Men. Ought they not to conſider, that Motions may be communicated from Viſible to Inviſible Bodies, when Bodies meet in their Motion? and from Inviſible to Viſible on other occaſions? When a Body is ſuſpended by a Cord, 'tis not the Scizars which cut the Cord, which gives Motion to that Body, but an Inviſible Matter: When we throw a Fire-coal into an heap of Gun-powder, 'tis not the Coal, but an Inviſible Matter which ſeparates all the parts of the Powder, and actuates them with a Motion capable of blowing up an Houſe. A thouſand unknown ways there are whereby the Motion of an *Inviſible Matter* is communicated to Groſs and *Viſible* Bodies. At leaſt it is not evident that it cannot be done; as it is evident that the moving force of Bodies can neither be augmented nor diminiſh'd by the ordinary ſtrength of Nature.

Thus Men ſeeing that the wood they throw on the fire ceaſes to be what it was, and that all the ſenſible Qualities they obſerve in it, vaniſh away, imagine from thence they have right to conclude it poſſible for a thing to return into Nothing, whence it came. They ſee the wood no more; and they ſee but a few aſhes that ſucceed it; and thereupon judge that the greateſt part of the wood is reduc'd to nothing; as if it could not be ſeparated into parts not poſſible to be ſeen. At leaſt it is not ſo evident that this is impoſſible, as it is evident that the *Power* which gives *Being* to all things is not liable to change; and that by the ordinary force of Nature, *Being* cannot be reduc'd to *Nothing*, as *Nothing* cannot begin to *be*. But few Men know what it is to retire into themſelves, to hear the voice of Truth, ſpeaking to them within, by which they ought to judge of all things: 'tis their Eyes that govern their Determinations. They judge by what they feel, and not by what they conceive; for they *feel* with Pleaſure, but *conceive* with Pain.

Demand of all the Men in the World, whether it may not be affirm'd without danger of Error, that the *Whole is greater than its Part*; and I am poſitive not one will be found, but will immediately anſwer pertinently to the Queſtion. Ask them afterwards, whether we may with the ſame ſecurity affirm of a thing, *What we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea repreſenting it*, and you'l find that few will grant it, without boggling and heſitation: more will deny; and moſt of all will not know what to ſay to't. And yet this *Metaphyſical Axiom*: viz. *That we may affirm of a thing what we clearly conceive to be contain'd in the Idea that repreſents it*; is more evident than this *Axiom*, *The whole is bigger than its part*: for as much as this laſt is not an *Axiom*, but only a Concluſion in reſpect of the former: it may be prov'd from the former *Axiom*, That the whole is bigger than its part; but the former can't be prov'd by any other, as being abſolutely the firſt and the Foundation of all clear evident Knowledge. Whence comes it then that no body heſitates at this Concluſion, and yet doubts of the Principle from whence 'tis taken; but only that the Idea's of *Whole* and *Part* are ſenſible, and we ſee, as we may ſo ſay, with our Eyes, that the *Whole* is bigger than its *Part*; but have no ocular proof of the Truth of the prime Fundamental Article of all the Sciences?

Whereas there is nothing in this *Axiom*, which Naturally fixes, and applies the Mind, we muſt be willing to conſider it; and that too with ſome Conſtancy and Reſolution, to be evidently convinc'd of the truth of it. The Earneſtneſs of the Will muſt ſupply the Defect of ſenſible Inducements. But the thoughts of conſidering Objects which have no charms for the Senſes, never enter Mens Heads; or if they do, their Endeavour is too languid and ineffectual.

For (to carry on our ſaid Inſtance) they think 'tis evident, That the *Whole* is bigger than its *Part*; that a *Mountain* of *Marble* is poſſible; and that a *Mountain* without a *Vale* is impoſſible, but that there is not equal Evidence for the Exiſtence of a *GOD*. Nevertheleſs, we may aſſert, that there is equal Evidence in all theſe Propoſitions, ſince they are all at an equal diſtance from the firſt Principle.

This

This is the firſt Principle: We muſt attribute that to a thing, which we clearly conceive to be contain'd in the Idea that repreſents it. We clearly apprehend there is more magnitude in the *Idea* we have of the *Whole*, than in *that* we have of its *Part*; that *Poſſible Exiſtence* is contain'd in the Idea of a *Marble* Mountain; *Impoſſible Exiſtence* in the Idea of a Mountain without a Valley: and *Neceſſary Exiſtence* in the Idea we have of *GOD*, that is, of a Being infinitely perfect. Therefore the *Whole* is greater than its *Part*: Therefore a *Marble* Mountain is poſſible to exiſt. Therefore 'tis impoſſible for a *Mountain* without a *Vale* to exiſt. Therefore *GOD*, or Being infinitely perfect, neceſſarily exiſts. It is viſible that theſe Concluſions are equally remote from the firſt Principle of all the Sciences: and therefore are equally evident in themſelves: and ſo 'tis as evident that *GOD* exiſts, as that the *Whole* is bigger than its *Part*. But becauſe the Idea's of *Infinite*, of *Perfections*, of *Neceſſary Exiſtence*, are not ſenſible, as are the Idea's of *Whole* and *Part*; Men fancy they have no *Perception* of what they have no *Senſation*: and though theſe Concluſions are equally evident in themſelves, yet they are not equally receiv'd.

There are Men who would fain perſwade us, that they have no Idea of an Infinitely perfect Being: which makes me wonder how they come to anſwer poſitively to the Demand, Whether an Infinitely perfect Being is round or ſquare; or the like. For they ought to ſay they did not know; if it were true that they had no Idea of it.

There are another ſort who acknowledge it is good Arguing to conclude, that *GOD* is not an Impoſſible Being from the *Perception* we have; that the Idea of *GOD* involves no contradiction, or Impoſſible Exiſtence: and they will not allow us to conclude in like manner that *GOD* neceſſarily exiſts, from our conceiving Neceſſary Exiſtence to be included in the Idea we have of Him.

Laſtly, there are others who pretend, that this Proof of the Exiſtence of a *GOD* is a Fallacy: and the Argument is concluſive only on the Suppoſition of the truth of *GOD*'s exiſting: as if we did not prove it. Our Proof is this. *We are to attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that repreſents it.* This is the General Principle of all the Sciences. Neceſſary Exiſtence is included in the Idea of a Being Infinitely perfect. They willingly grant it: and conſequently we muſt conclude, that an Infinitely perfect Being exiſts. Allow'd, ſay they, on ſuppoſition that this Being exiſts.

But let us make a like Anſwer to a like Argument; that we may judge of the ſolidity of their Anſwer. A like Argument is this. *We are to attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that repreſents it.* This is the Principle. We clearly conceive four Angles to be included in the Idea which repreſents a Square; or, we clearly conceive poſſible Exiſtence to be included in the Idea of a *Marble* Tower. Therefore a Square has four Angles; therefore a *Marble* Tower is poſſible. I ſay theſe Concluſions are true, ſuppoſing a Square has four Angles, and that a *Marble* Tower is poſſible: juſt as they anſwer, That *GOD* exiſts, ſuppoſing he exiſts; that is in ſhort, that the Concluſions of theſe *Demonſtrations are true, ſuppoſing they are true.*

'Tis true, ſhould I form ſuch an Argument as this; We muſt attribute to a thing what we clearly conceive to be included in the Idea that repreſents it: We clearly conceive neceſſary Exiſtence to be included in the Idea of a Body infinitely perfect: Therefore an Infinitely perfect Body exiſts: ſhould I form ſuch an Argument, I ſay, I might reaſonably be anſwer'd, that it was inconcluding, for the actual Exiſtence of a Body infinitely perfect: and that all it could inferr was this, That ſuppoſing ſuch a Body was in Being, it would have an independent Exiſtence. The Reaſon whereof is this, that the Idea of a Body infinitely perfect, is a fiction of the Mind; or a compos'd Idea; and which conſequently may be either falſe, or contradictory, as indeed it is. For we cannot clearly conceive a Body infinitely perfect, becauſe a Being particular and finite, as Body is, cannot be conceiv'd univerſal and infinite.

But the Idea of *GOD*, of Being in General, Unlimited, Infinite Being, is no fiction of the Mind. 'Tis not a compos'd Idea that includes any contradiction: there is nothing more ſimple, though it comprehends whatever *is*, or whatever *may be*. Now this ſimple and Natural Idea of Being, or of Infinite, includes neceſſary Exiſtence. For 'tis evident that Being, (I ſay not this or that Being) has its Exiſtence of it ſelf: and that *Being* cannot be actually inexiſtent: ſince 'tis impoſſible, and contradictory, that true being ſhould be without Exiſtence. 'Tis poſſible for Bodies not to be, becauſe they are *ſuch* particular Beings, which participate of Being, and depend on it. But Being without Reſtriction, is neceſſary: independent; and derives what it is only from it ſelf: All that *is*, proceeds from it: and on that account it ſelf *is*, whatever *is*: But were there not any thing in particular, this would *be*, becauſe it *is* from it ſelf: And it could not be clearly conceiv'd, as not *Being*, were it not for our repreſenting it as *Being* in particular: or *ſuch* a Being; and our conſidering quite another Idea than belong'd to it. For thoſe that perceive not that *GOD is*, commonly conſider not *Being*, but *this* or *that* Being; and conſequently a Being that may or may not exiſt.

However, in order to make this Argument of the Exiſtence of a *GOD* more diſtinctly conceiv'd; and to give a clearer Anſwer to ſome Objections that might be made to it; we muſt remember that, in perceiving a created Being, we ſee it not in it ſelf, nor by it ſelf: but, as has been prov'd in the Third Book, by the View of certain Perfections that are in

GOD, representing it. So that the Eſſence of that Creature may be ſeen, without ſeeing its Exiſtence: we may ſee in *GOD* what repreſents it, though it does not exiſt. And for that Reaſon, neceſſary Exiſtence is not included in the Idea that repreſents it; it not being neceſſary that it exiſt, in order to our ſeeing it. But the caſe is different with the Infinitely perfect Being; we can't ſee Him but in Himſelf: for nothing finite can repreſent what's infinite: *GOD* therefore cannot be ſeen, but He muſt exiſt. The Eſſence of a Being Infinitely perfect cannot be ſeen, without ſeeing its Exiſtence. We cannot ſee it barely as a poſſible Being; for what is there to contain it? nor can we think of it but it muſt exiſt.

But 'tis to no purpoſe to offer theſe Demonſtrations to the Common ſort of People: Theſe are Demonſtrations which we call *Perſonal*, becauſe they convince not *Univerſally*. If we would convince them, we muſt apply ſuch as are of a more ſenſible Nature: and ſurely they are plentiful enough. For there is no Truth that has more proofs, than that of the Exiſtence of a *GOD*. This we urg'd only to ſhew that *Abſtract* Truths, making little impreſſion on our Senſes, paſs for Illuſions and *Chimera's*: Whereas groſs and palpable Truths, that ſtrike the Senſes, forcing the Soul to conſider them, induces us to believe they have much Reality: becauſe ever ſince the *Fall*, they have made powerful impreſſions on our Mind.

For the ſame Reaſon, 'tis never to be hop'd, that the Vulgar of Men will ever ſubmit to that Demonſtration, which proves *Brutes to be inſenſible*: namely that ſince they are innocent, as all the World allows, and I ſuppoſe, if they were capable of Senſation, it might happen that under an Infinitely Juſt, and Omnipotent *GOD*, an Innocent Creature might ſuffer pain; which is a Penalty, and the Puniſhment of ſome Sin. Men are commonly incapable of ſeeing the Evidence of this *Axiom*, *Sub juſto Deo, quiſquam, niſi mereatur, miſer eſſe non poteſt*: which St. *Auſtin* with a great deal of Reaſon urges againſt *Julian*, to prove *Original Sin*, and the *Corruption of our Nature*. They fancy there is nothing of Strength, or Truth in this, nor in many other *Axioms*, which prove that Beaſts have no Senſation: becauſe, as has been ſaid, theſe *Axioms* are Abſtract, have nothing ſenſible or palpable in them, and make no Impreſſion on the Senſes.

Oper. Perf.

Thoſe ſenſible Actions and Motions perform'd by Beaſts for the Preſervation of their Life, though only probable Inducements, affect us more, and conſequently weigh more with us to believe they endure Pain, when we ſtrike them, and they cry, than that abſtract Reaſon of *Pure Intellect*; though moſt certain and evident in it ſelf. For 'tis plain, that moſt Men have no other Reaſon to believe that Beaſts have Souls, than the ſenſible view of all thoſe things they do for the Preſervation and Security of Life.

Which from hence is ſufficiently apparent, that moſt People fancy there is no Soul in an Egg; though the Tranſmutation of an Egg into a Chicken * is infinitely harder, than the bare Conſervation of the Chicken when compleatly form'd. For as greater Act is requir'd to fabrick a Watch out of a piece of Iron, than to make it go when 'tis perfectly made. So a Soul ſhould rather be admitted in the Egg, for the Formation of the Chicken, than for making the Chicken live, when entirely form'd. But Men don't ſee with their Eyes the admirable Conduct that goes to the forming of a Chicken, as they ſtill ſenſibly obſerve its Method of looking out what's neceſſary to its own Preſervation. And therefore they are not diſpos'd to believe there are Souls in Eggs, from any ſenſible Impreſſion of thoſe Motions which are requiſite to transform them into Chickens; but they aſcribe Souls to Animals, by reaſon of the ſenſible Impreſſion they receive from the external Actions, theſe Animals perform for their Vital Preſervation: though the Reaſon I have here alleadg'd, is ſtronger for the Souls of Eggs, than of Chickens.

* *I ſpeak according to common Opinion, which is, that the Chicken is form'd from the Egg: though perhaps it is no more than nouriſh'd by it.*

This ſecond Reaſon, namely that Matter is incapable of Senſation and Deſire, is without doubt, a Demonſtration againſt thoſe who aſcribe *Senſe* to Animals, whilſt they confeſs their Souls corporeal. But Men will rather eternally confound and perplex theſe Reaſons, than acknowledge a thing repugnant to barely probable, but moſt ſenſible and *pathetick* Arguments; and there is no way fully to convince them, but by oppoſing other *Senſible* Proofs to theirs, and giving an ocular Demonſtration, that all the parts of Animals are meer *Mechaniſm*; and that they may move without a Soul, by the bare Impreſſion of Objects, and their own particular Frame and Conſtitution: as *Monſieur Des-Cartes* has begun to do, in his Treatiſe *Concerning Man*. For all the moſt certain and evident Reaſons of the Pure Intellect, will never obviate the obſcure Proofs, they have from the Senſes: and it were to expoſe our ſelves to the Laughter of Superficial and inattentive Perſons, to pretend to prove by Reaſons ſomewhat higher than ordinary, that Animals have no *Senſe*.

We muſt therefore well remember, that the ſtrong Inclination we have for Divertiſements, Pleaſures, and in general for whatever affects us, expoſes us to a multitude of Errors: becauſe our Capacity of Mind being limited, this Inclination conſtantly diſturbs our Attention to the clear and diſtinct Idea's of the *Pure Underſtanding*, proper for the Diſcovery of Truth; to apply it to the falſe, obſcure and deceitful Idea's of the Senſes; which Influence the *Will*, more by the Hope of *Good* and *Pleaſure*, than they inform the *Mind* by their *Light* and *Evidence*.

CHAP.

CHAP. XII.

Of the Effects which the Thoughts of future Happineſs and Miſery are capable of producing in the Mind.

IF it often happens that little Pleaſures, and light Pains, which we actually feel, or even which we expect to feel, ſtrangely confound our Imagination, and diſable us from judging on things by their true Idea's; we cannot imagine but the Expectation of Eternity muſt needs work upon our Mind: But 'tis requiſite to conſider what it is capable of producing in't.

We muſt in the firſt place obſerve, That the Hope of an Eternity of Pleaſures, does not work ſo ſtrongly on our Minds, as the Fear of an Eternity of Torments: The Reaſon is, Men love not Pleaſure, ſo much as they hate Pain. Again: By a *Self conſcious Senſation*, which they have of their Corruptions, they know they are worthy of Hell: and they ſee nothing in themſelves deſerving of ſo great Rewards, as is the participating the *Felicity of GOD* Himſelf. They are ſenſible, as often as they *will;* and even ſometimes againſt their *Will*, that far from meriting Rewards, they deſerve the greateſt Puniſhments: for their Conſcience never acquits them: But they are not ſo conſtantly convinc'd that *GOD* will manifeſt his Mercy upon Sinners; after having ſatisfy'd his Juſtice upon his *SON*. So that even the Righteous have more lively *Apprehenſions* of an Eternity of Torments, than *Hopes* of an Eternity of Pleaſures. Therefore the proſpect of Puniſhment works more upon them, than the proſpect of Reward. Here follows what it is capable of producing, not all alone, but as a principal Cauſe.

It begets infinite Scruples in the Mind, and ſtrengthens them in ſuch a manner, that 'tis almoſt impoſſible to get rid of them. It ſtretches Faith, (as I may ſo ſpeak) as far as prejudices, and makes Men pay that worſhip, which is due to *GOD* alone, to imaginary Powers. It obſtinately fixes their Mind on vain or dangerous Superſtitions: and cauſes them fervently and zealouſly to embrace Humane Traditions, and Practices, needleſs to Salvation, *Jew* and *Phariſaick*-like Devotions, which ſervil dread has invented. Finally, it flings ſome Men into the darkneſs of Deſpair: ſo that confuſedly beholding Death as *Nothing*, they brutally wiſh to periſh, that they may be freed of thoſe dreadfull Anxieties and Diſquiets that torment and frighten them.

The *Scrupulous* and *Superſtitious* have commonly more of *Charity*, than *Self-love;* but only *Self-love* poſſeſſes the Deſperate; for rightly to conceive it, a Man muſt extreamly love himſelf, who rather chooſes No-being, than an Ill-one. Women, Young People, and thoſe of a weak and timerous Mind, are moſt obnoxious to *Scruples* and *Superſtitions*, and Men more liable to *Deſpair*.

'Tis eaſy to conceive the reaſons of all this: For the Idea of Eternity, being manifeſtly the greateſt, moſt terrible, and dreadfull of all thoſe that aſtoniſh the Mind, and ſtrike the Imagination, muſt needs be attended with a large retinue of additional Idea's, all which contribute to a wonderful Effect upon the Mind; by reaſon of the *Analogy* they have to that great and terrible Idea of Eternity.

Whatever has any Relation to *Infinite*, cannot be a little thing; or if it be little in it ſelf, by that Relation it grows ſo vaſt and immenſe, as not to be compar'd with any thing *Finite*. Therefore whatever has, or is fancied to have any Relation to that unavoidable *Dilemma*, concluding for an Eternity either of *Torments* or *Delights*, neceſſarily diſmays the Mind, that's capable of any Reflection or Thought.

Women, Young People, and feeble Minds, having, as I have formerly ſaid, the Fibres of their Brain ſoft and pliable, receive very deep Traces, or Impreſſions, from that *Two-edg'd* conſideration; and when through the plenty of their Spirits, they are more diſpos'd to Senſation, than juſt Reflection on things, they admit through the Vivacity of their Imagination, a great number of ſpurious Impreſſions, and falſe *acceſſory* Idea's, which have no natural Relation to the *principal*. Nevertheleſs, that Relation, though imaginary, nouriſhes and confirms thoſe ſpurious Traces, and falſe acceſſory Idea's which it has produc'd.

When Men are engag'd in a troubleſome Law-ſuit, which they don't underſtand, and it takes up all their Thoughts; they commonly fall into needleſs Fears, and Apprehenſions, that there are certain things prejudicial to their Cauſe, which the Judges never think of, and which a Lawyer would not fear. The ſucceſs of the Affair is of ſo great concernment to them, that the Concuſſion it produces in their Brain, ſpreads and propagates it ſelf to diſtant *Traces*, that have naturally no relation to it. 'Tis juſt ſo with the Scrupulous; they fancy themſelves ſubjects of Fears, and Diſquiet; and inſtead of examining the *Will of GOD* in Holy Writ, and referring to Men of untainted Imagination, they conſtantly *intend* an Imaginary Law, which the diſorderly Motions of Fear have engraven in their Brain. And though they be inwardly convinc'd of their Infirmity, and that *GOD* requires not certain Duties they preſcribe themſelves, as being inconſiſtent with his Service; yet they cannot forbear preferring their Imagination to their Underſtanding, and ſubmitting rather to ſome confus'd and terrifying Senſations, that throw them into Error; than to the Evidence of Reaſon, which brings them back to a good Aſſurance; and reduces them into the right way of Salvation.

There is commonly a good ſtock of *Vertue, and Charity* in Perſons tormented with *Scruples*, but not ſo much in People devoted to certain *Superſtitions;* and whoſe principal Employment

is some *Jewish* and *Phariſaick* Practices. *GOD* requires to be worſhip'd in *Spirit*, and in *Truth*. He is not ſatisfy'd with our making faces, and paying external Ceremonies; with our bending the Knee before Him, and praiſing Him with a Lip-offering, when our Heart is far from Him. If Men are content with theſe exteriour Markes of Reſpect, 'tis becauſe they cannot fathom the depth of the Heart: for even they would be worſhip'd in Spirit, and in Truth. *GOD* demands our Mind and our Heart, which as he has created, ſo he preſerves only for Himſelf: But many there are, who to their own misfortune, deny Him thoſe things, which he has all manner of Right and Claim to. They harbour Idols in their Hearts, which they adore with a Spiritual and true Worſhip, and to which they ſacrifice themſelves, and all they have. But becauſe the true *GOD* threatens in the receſſes of their Conſcience, to puniſh their exceſſive Ingratitude with an Eternity of Torments; and yet they cannot think of quitting their belov'd Idolatry: they therefore bethink themſelves of an external Performance of ſome good Works. They betake themſelves to *Faſting*, to *Almſgiving*, and *Saying of Prayers*, as they ſee others do; and continue ſome time in ſuch like Exerciſes: but whereas they are painful to thoſe that have not *Charity*, they commonly forſake them to ſubſtitute ſome little *Practicks*, and eaſy Devotions in their room; which ſtriking in with *Self-love* neceſſarily, but inſenſibly ſubvert the whole *Syſtem of Morals*, which our *LORD* has left us. They are faithful, fervent, and zealous Defenders of thoſe Humane Traditions, which *Un-enlightned* Perſons make them believe moſt uſeful, and the frightful Idea of Eternity daily repreſents, as abſolutely neceſſary to their Salvation.

It fares not ſo with the Righteous. They hear no leſs than the Wicked the Menaces of their *GOD*: But the confus'd noiſe of their Paſſions, does not deafen them to His Councells. The *Falſe Glarings* of Humane Traditions, do not dazzle them ſo far, as to make them inſenſible to the *Light* of Truth. They place their Confidence in the Promiſes of *CHRIST*, and follow His Precepts: as knowing that the Promiſes of Men are as vain as their Councells. However, it may be ſaid, that the dread, which the Idea of Eternity breeds in their Minds, ſometimes effects ſo great a commotion in their Imagination, that they dare not abſolutely condemn theſe Humane Traditions; and that ſometimes they approve them by their Example, becauſe they have *A ſhew of Wiſdom in Will-worſhip, and Humility*, like thoſe *Phariſaick* Traditions mention'd by St. *Paul*.

Col. ch. 2. v. 23.

But that which more eſpecially deſerves to be conſider'd in this place, and which does not ſo much relate to *Moral* as *Intellectual* Diſorder; is that the fore-mention'd Fear ſtretches the Faith, as well as Zeal of thoſe it infects, to things falſe or unworthy the Holineſs of our Religion. There are many who believe, and that with a ſtiff and obſtinate Faith, That the Earth reſts immoveably in the Center of the World: That *Brutes* are ſenſible of Real Pain: That Senſible Qualities are ſhew'd and diffus'd over Objects: That there are Forms or Real Accidents, diſtinguiſh'd from Matter; and a world of the like falſe or uncertain Opinions, becauſe they conceit it would be repugnant to their Faith to deny them. They are frighted with the Expreſſions of the Holy Scripture, which ſpeaks to our Capacity, and conſequently makes uſe of the receiv'd Manners of Speech, without deſign of making us *Philoſophers*. They believe not only what the Spirit of *GOD* means to teach them, but likewiſe all the Opinions of the *Jews*: They can't ſee, for example, that *Joſhuah* ſpeaks before his Souldiers, as even *Copernicus*, *Galilæus*, and *Des-Cartes* would ſpeak to the Vulgar part of Men; and that though he had been of the Opinion of theſe *Philoſophers*: he would not have commanded the *Earth to ſtand ſtill*, ſince he could not have manifeſted to his Army, in words which they did not underſtand, the Miracle *GOD* ſhew'd for his People. Don't thoſe, who believe the *Sun immoveable*, ſay to their Servants, to their Friends, or to thoſe who are of their Opinion, that *The Sun Riſes and Sets?* do they affect to ſpeak differently from others, whenever their chief Deſign is not to *Philoſophize?* Was *Joſhua* ſo admirably vers'd in *Aſtronomy?* or if he was, did his Souldiers underſtand it: But were he and his Souldiers *Aſtronomers*, could we think they would be playing the *Philoſophers*, when their Thoughts were intent on Fighting. *Joſhua* therefore muſt have ſpoke as he did, though both he and his Souldiers were of the ſame Opinion that the beſt *Aſtronomers* hold now-a-days. And yet the words of that great General, *Sun, ſtand thou ſtill upon* Gibeon, and what is ſaid afterwards, that the *Sun* ſtood ſtill according to his Command, perſwade a great many, that the Opinion of the Earth's Motion, is not only dangerous, but alſo abſolutely Hereticaland unwarrantable. They have heard that ſome Devout Men, whom we are to treat with much Deference and Reſpect, have cenſur'd and condem'd it; and have ſome confus'd Notion of what happen'd to a Famous * *Aſtronomer* of our own Age, upon that occaſion: all which ſeems ſufficient to make them obſtinately believe, that *Faith* is concern'd in that Opinion. A certain confus'd Senſation rais'd, and encourag'd by a Motion of Fear, which yet they are ſcarce aware of, throws them into Suſpicions of thoſe who follow *Reaſon* in things of *Reaſon's* Juriſdiction. Hence they regard them as *Hereticks*, they hear them but with Impatience, and Regret of Mind; and theſe their ſecret Apprehenſions breed in them as great a Reverence and Submiſſion to theſe Opinions, and ſeveral others purely *Philoſophical*, as to Truths that are Objects of *Faith*.

* Galilæus *put into the Inquiſition, for maintaining the Earth mov'd.*

CHAP.

CHAP. XIII.

I. *Of the Third Natural Inclination,* viz. *The* Friendſhip *we have for other Men.* II. *It makes us approve the Thoughts of our Friends, and deceive them by undue Praiſes.*

OF all our Inclinations taken in the general, and in the Sence explain'd in the firſt Chapter, there remains now to be ſpoken to, only that which we have for thoſe we live with, and for all the Objects round about us: of which I ſhall ſay but little, ſince it rather reſpects *Morals* and *Politicks* than our Subject. And whereas this *Inclination* is always accompany'd with the *Paſſions*, it might perhaps be more appoſitly treated of in the next Book: But 'tis not of ſo great concern, to be ſo nicely Methodical in this Caſe.

I. *Of the Third Natural Inclination, viz. The* Friendſhip *we have for other Men.*

That we may rightly comprehend the Cauſe and Effects of this Natural Inclination, it is requiſite to know, that *GOD* loves all His Works, and that He ſtrictly unites them to one another, for their mutual Preſervation. For *Loving* inceſſantly the Works He produces, (it being His Love that produces them) He alſo continually impreſſes on our Heart a Love for His Works; that is, He produces conſtantly in our Heart a *Love* like His own. And to the intent the Natural Love we have for Our ſelves, might not ſwallow up, or too much infringe upon that which we have for exteriour things; but on the contrary, that theſe two *Loves*, which *GOD* puts in us, might cheriſh and ſtrengthen each other: he has ſo artfully united us with all things about us, and eſpecially with thoſe Beings of the ſame *Species* as Our ſelves, that their Evils naturally afflict us, their Joy rejoyces us; their Riſe, their Fall, or Diminution, ſeem to augment or diminiſh reſpectively our own Being. The new Honours of our Relations, or Friends, the freſh Atchievements of thoſe who have the neareſt Engagements to us: The Conqueſts and Victories of our Prince; and even the late Diſcoveries of the New World; give as it were an Additional growth to our *Subſtance*. Belonging to all theſe things, we rejoyce at their Grandeur and Extent: We gladly would, that even the World was without bounds; and that *Notion* of ſome *Philoſophers*, that the Works of *GOD* are Infinite, not only ſeems worthy of *GOD*, but moſt agreeable to Man; who can conceive nothing nobler, than the being a *part* of *Infinity*; whilſt as inconſiderable as he is in himſelf, he fancies he feels himſelf infinitely enlarg'd, by an Expanſion of Thought into the Infinite Beings that ſurround him.

'Tis true, the Union we have with all thoſe Bodies that rowl in the vaſt ſpaces, is not very binding; and conſequently inſenſible to the greateſt part of Men: and there are ſome who intereſt themſelves ſo little in the Diſcoveries made in the Heavens, that one would think they had no natural Union to them; did we not know that it was for want of Knowledge, or for their too applicative Adherencies to other things.

The Soul, though united to the Body which ſhe animates, is not always *ſenſible* of the Motions that occur in it; or if ſhe be, yet ſhe does not always actually conſider them. The *Paſſion* whereby ſhe's *acted*, being often greater than the *Senſation* wherewith ſhe's *affected*, makes her ſeem to have a ſtricter Adherence to the Object of her Paſſion, than to her own Body. For 'tis chiefly by the *Paſſions* that the Soul expands her ſelf abroad, and finds ſhe is actually related to all ſurrounding Beings: As it is eſpecially by *Senſation* that ſhe expands through her own Body, and finds ſhe is united to all the parts that compoſe it. But as we are not to conclude that the Soul of a Man in a Paſſion, is not united to his Body, becauſe he expoſes it to Death, and is diſintereſted in his own Preſervation; ſo it ought not to be imagin'd we are not naturally engag'd to all things, becauſe there are ſome we are not at all concern'd for.

Would you know, for inſtance, whether Men have any Adheſions to their Prince, or their Country? Enquire out ſuch as are acquainted with the Intereſts of them, and have no particular Engagements of their own to take them up; and you will then ſee how earneſt they are for News, how impatient to hear of Battles: how joyful for a Victory, and how melancholy upon a Defeat. And this will convince you how ſtrictly Men are united to their Prince, and their Country.

In like manner, would you know whether Men are united to *China*, *Japan*, the *Planets*, or *Fix'd Stars?* Enquire out, or only imagine to your ſelf, ſome whoſe Country or Family enjoy a ſettled Peace, who have no particular Paſſions, and that are not actually *ſenſible* of the Union that binds them to nearer Objects, than the Heavens; and you will find if they have any Knowledge of the *Magnitude*, and *Nature* of theſe *Stars*, they will rejoyce at the Diſcovery of any of them; will conſider them with pleaſure: and if they have Art enough, will willingly be at the pains of obſerving and calculating their Motions.

Such as are in the hurry of Buſineſs, have little Curioſity for the Appearance of a *Comet*, or the *incidence* of an *Eclypſe*. But Men that have no ſuch Dependencies to nearer things, find themſelves conſiderable Employment about ſuch Events. Becauſe indeed there is nothing but what we are united to, though we have not always the *Senſe* of this Union; as a Man does not always *feel* the Soul united, I don't ſay to his Arm or Hand, but to his Heart and Brain.

The ſtrongeſt *Natural Union* which *GOD* has eſtabliſh'd between us, and His Works, is that which cements and binds us to our Fellow-Brethren, Men. *GOD* has commanded us

to love them, as our Second-ſelves ; and to the end that *Elective Love*, with which we proſecute them, might be reſolute and conſtant, He ſupports and ſtrengthens it continually with a *Natural Love*, which He impoſes on us. And for that purpoſe has given us ſome inviſible Bonds, which bind and oblige us neceſſarily to love them ; to be whatchful for their, as our own Preſervation, to regard them as parts neceſſary to the whole, which we conſtitute together with them : and without which we could not ſubſiſt.

There is nothing more admirably contriv'd, than thoſe Natural Correſpondencies obſervable between the *Inclinations* of Men's *Minds*, between the *Motions* of their *Bodies :* and again, between theſe *Inclinations* and theſe *Motions*. All this ſecret Chain-work is a Miracle, which can never be ſufficiently admir'd, nor can ever be underſtood. Upon the Senſe of ſome ſuddain ſurprizing Evil, or which a Man finds, as it were, too ſtrong for him to overcome by his own Strength, he raiſes, ſuppoſe, a loud Cry. This Cry forc'd out frequently without thinking on it, by the diſpoſition of the *Machine*, ſtrikes infallibly into the Ears of thoſe who are near enough to afford the Aſſiſtance that is wanted : It pierces them, and makes them underſtand it, let them be of what Nation or Quality ſoever : for 'tis a Cry of all Nations and all Conditions, as indeed it ought to be. It makes a Commotion in the Brain, and inſtantly changes the whole diſpoſition of Body in thoſe that are ſtruck with it : and makes them run to give ſuccour, without ſo much as knowing it. But it is not long before it acts upon their *Mind*, and obliges their *Will* to *deſire*, and their *Underſtanding* to *contrive* means of aſſiſting him, who made that Natural Petition ; provided always that urgent Petition, or rather Command, be juſt, and according to the Rules of Society. For an indiſcreet Out-cry made upon no occaſion, or out of an idle Fear, produces in the Aſſiſtants Indignation, or Laughter, inſtead of Pity : becauſe to cry without cauſe, is to abuſe things eſtabliſh'd by Nature for our Preſervation. That indiſcreet Cry naturally produces Averſion, and the deſire of Revenging the Affront that was offer'd Nature ; that is, *The ſettled Order of things :* if he that made it without cauſe, did it willfully. But it ought only to produce the Paſſion of Deriſion, mingled with ſome Compaſſion, without Averſion, and deſire of Revenge ; if it were a Fright, that is a falſe Appearance of a preſſing Exigency, which caus'd the Clamour. For *Scoff*, or *Ridicule*, is neceſſary to re-aſſure and correct the Man, as *Fearful*, and *Compaſſion* to ſuccour him as *Weak*. 'Tis impoſſible to conceive any thing better order'd.

I pretend not to explain by an Example, what are the ſprings and movements, or ſecret combinations in Men's Brain, as in that of all other Animals, whereby the Author of Nature maintains the Concordance and Union neceſſary to their Conſervation. I only make ſome Reflection upon theſe contrivances, to put Men upon conſidering them, and diligently ſearching and diſcovering (not how theſe *Engines* play, or how their movement is communicated through the Air, the Light, and all the little Bodies that ſurround us, for that's near incomprehenſible, and not neceſſary, but) what Effects they have. By ſeveral different Obſervations, we find there are Ties which unite us together, but we cannot accurately diſcern how it is perform'd. We eaſily ſee that a Watch points out the Hour, but it requires time to find out the reaſons of it : and there are ſo many different Movements in the Brain of the leaſt of Animals, as far ſurpaſs the moſt compound Clock-work in the World.

As the perfect Knowledge of our *Machinal* Conſtructure is not poſſible ; ſo it is not abſolutely neceſſary : but the Effects its Springs and Movements are capable of producing, are indiſpenſably neceſſary to be known, for the well-managing our ſelves. There is no neceſſity of knowing how a Watch is made, to make uſe of it ; but to uſe it in meaſuring out our Time, 'tis at leaſt neceſſary to know that it ſhews the Hours. Yet there are Men ſo little capable of Reflection, that we might almoſt compare them with *Machines* purely inanimate. They feel not in themſelves the *Elaterium*, which ſlackens upon the ſenſe of Objects. They are frequently toſs'd and agitated, without perceiving their own Motion ; are ſlaves, and yet inſenſible of their Bonds. Finally they are conducted a thouſand different ways, without perceiving the hand of their Conductor. They fancy themſelves the ſole Authors of the Motions which they perform : and not diſtinguiſhing what paſſes within them, purſuant to a free Act of their Will, from what the Impreſſion of ſurrounding Bodies produces ; they think they are their own Guides, even when they are guided by another. But this is not a place proper for the Explication of theſe things.

Thoſe *Alliances* which Nature's Author has founded between our Natural Inclinations, in order to unite us to one another, ſeem yet more worthy our Application and Enquiries, than *thoſe* between Bodies, or between *Minds*, with reference to Bodies : For all things are ſo admirably diſpos'd, that thoſe very Inclinations which ſeem moſt repugnant to Society, are the moſt uſeful to it, when they are ſomewhat moderated.

The Deſire, for inſtance, which all Men have of *Greatneſs*, directly tends to the ſubverſion of all Societies. Nevertheleſs, this Deſire is ſo temper'd by the *Order of Nature*, that it conduces more to *Publick wellfare*, than many other weak and languid Inclinations. For it breeds *Emulations*, it provokes Men to *Vertue*, it bears up their *Courage* in the Services pay'd to their Country ; and ſo many Conqueſts would not be obtain'd, did not the Souldiers, and eſpecially the Officers, aſpire to *Glory* and great Commands. So that all the particulars that conſtitute Armies, labouring only for their private Intereſts, fail not to procure Hppineſs to their Cuntries.

Countries. Which evidences how highly advantageous it is to the Publick Good, that all Men ſhould have a ſecret Ambition for *Greatneſs* and *Promotion*, provided it be moderated.

But if all the particulars ſhould ſeem what they really are; ſhould they frankly confeſs to others, they deſign'd to be the principal parts of the Body they compoſe, and never to be the meaneſt; this would not be the means to unite them together. All the Members of a Body cannot be the Head and Heart: there muſt be Feet, and Hands; Little, as well as Great; Members to Obey, as well as to Command. And if every Member of a Society ſhould openly ſay, he would command, and never obey, as in effect every one naturally wiſhes; all Politick Bodies would fall to Ruine, and Confuſion, and Injuſtice would reign on Earth.

It was neceſſary therefore, that thoſe who have the moſt Sence, and are the fitteſt to command, as the topmoſt and nobleſt parts of a *Community*, ſhould be naturally *Civil*: that is, ſhould be diſpos'd by a ſecret Inclination, to expreſs to others by their Behaviour, and by the Civility and Courteſy of Expreſſion, how unworthy they think themſelves of any Conſideration; and that they are the meaneſt of all: but that thoſe they addreſs to, are worthy of all ſorts of Honours, and that they pay them the greateſt Eſteem and Veneration. Laſtly, to ſupply the defect of Charity, and love of Order, it was needful for thoſe that command others, to have the Art of deceiving them, by an imaginary Abaſement, conſiſting in external Civilities, and good Words, that they might enjoy an unenvy'd Preheminence; which is neceſſary in all Bodies. For by that means each Particular poſſeſſes after a ſort the *Grandeur* he deſires. The Great poſſeſs it Really, * and the Little and Weak, only in Imagination; being in a meaſure perſwaded by the Compliments of others, that they are not conſider'd as they are, that is the Loweſt and Meaneſt of the People.

* *I ſpeak as a Man; For the True: Earthly Grandeur conſiſts only in the Imagination.*

By the way, it is eaſy to conclude from what we have ſaid, that 'tis a great offence to Civility, to ſpeak often of ones ſelf, eſpecially to one's own Advantage; though we had all poſſible Accompliſhments: it being not allow'd to ſpeak to Perſons we converſe with, as if we *look't down* upon them; unleſs in ſome circumſtances, and when certain external Characters give us a ſenſible *Prebeminence*: For Contempt is the greateſt of Injuries: 'tis that which is moſt capable of diſſolving Society; and we can never hope that a Man, whom we have given to underſtand we think beneath us, will aſſociate with us: becauſe no Man can endure to be thought the meaneſt Member of the Body he is of.

The Inclination therefore Men have to *Complimenting*, is the fitteſt to counterbalance that other for *Eſteem* and *Elevation*; and to ſoften that internal Pain, thoſe Feel, who are the loweſt parts of the Body-Politick. Nor can we doubt but the mixture of theſe two Inclinations is very efficacious to the keeping up Society.

But there is a ſtrange Corruption in theſe Inclinations, no leſs than in Friendſhip, Compaſſion, Good-will and others which tend to the Uniting Men together. What ought to hold up Civil Society, is commonly the cauſe of its Diſunion, and Downful: and, not to depart from my Subject, is often the cauſe of the communication and eſtabliſhment of Error.

Among all the Inclinations neceſſary to Civil Society, thoſe which ſubject us moſt to Error, are *Friendſhip*, *Favour*, *Gratitude*, and whatever induce us to ſpeak too advantagiouſly on others in their preſence.

II. *This Inclination makes us approve the Thoughts of our Friends, and deceive them by undue Praiſes.*

We ſet no bounds to our *Love* of the Perſon of our *Friends*: together with them, we love whatever after any ſort appertains to them: and whereas they commonly expreſs their Vehemence and Paſſion for the Defence of their Opinions, they inſenſibly incline us to believe, approve, and defend them, with as great, or greater Obſtinacy and Paſſion, than themſelves; becauſe it would often look but ill in them, to be hot in maintaining their Opinions; whereas we might defend them without being blam'd for it. For in them it would be Self-love, in us Generoſity.

Our Affection for other Men proceeds from as many accounts, as they may pleaſe and ſerve us ſeveral ways: *Likeneſs* of *Humours*, of *Inclinations*, *Employments*: their *Air*, their *Behaviour*, their *Vertue*, *Eſtate*, the *Affection*, or *Eſteem* they expreſs for us, the *Services* they have formerly *done*, or thoſe we hope from them, and many other particular reaſons, determine us to love them: If it fortune then that any one of our Friends, that is, ſome Perſon who has the ſame Inclinations, an handſome Deportment, delightful Diſcourſe, a Vertuous Repute, or is of great Quality; who teſtifies an Eſteem and Affection for us, who has done us any former Service, or from whom we hope any future; or in fine, whom we love for any other particular reaſon; if ſuch a Perſon, I ſay, chances to advance any Propoſition, we greedily embrace it; without conſulting our Reaſon. We maintain his Opinion, inſollicitous for the Truth of it; and even ſometimes againſt the conviction of our Conſcience: according as we are determin'd, by either the obſcurity and Confuſion of our Mind, the Corruption of our Heart, or the Advantages we hope to reap from our *Falſe Generoſity*.

There is no need of bringing particular Examples of what I ſay: ſince we rarely can be in Company an hour together, without obſerving ſeveral, if we make but a little Reflection. Favour and Laughter, according to the common ſaying, are ſeldom on the ſide of Truth: but almoſt always on the ſide of thoſe we love. 'Tis a Well-bread, and Obliging Gentleman that ſpeaks; he is certain therefore in the right: If what he ſays be only probable, it's look'd upon as true; if abſolutely impertinent, and ridiculous, it will at leaſt amount to a probability.

bility. If it be a Man that loves me, eſteems me, has done me ſome kindneſs, or is diſpos'd or capacitated to do it; has maintain'd my Opinion on other occaſions, I ſhall be both ungrateful and unwiſe, if I oppugn his, or even fail to applaud him. Thus Truth is ſported with, and made to truckle to our Intereſt, and we careſs the Falſe Opinions of each other.

A worthy Man ought not to take it ill to be inform'd, or inſtructed, if it be done by the Rules of good Manners: but if our Friends are diſguſted when we modeſtly repreſent to them their Miſtake, we muſt permit them to love themſelves and their Errors, ſince they will have it ſo, and becauſe we have no power to command them, nor to change their Mind.

But a true Friend ought never to approve the Errors of his Friend; for we ought to conſider, that we do them greater Injury than we imagine, when we indifferently defend their Opinions. Our Applauſes ſerve only to ſwell their Heart, and ſtrengthen them in their Errors; whereby they grow incorrigible, and act, and decide at laſt, as if they were infallible.

Whence comes it that the moſt Rich, the moſt Powerful, the moſt Noble, and generally all that are above others, believe themſelves commonly infallible, and deport themſelves as if they had more Reaſon, than Men of a lower and Meaner Condition, but from a ſervile Approbation indifferently given to all their Thoughts? So likewiſe the Approbation we give our Friends, inſenſibly leads them to believe themſelves wiſer than others; which makes them arrogant, preſumptuous, and imprudent, and obnoxious to the groſſeſt Errors, without perceiving them.

For which Reaſon it is, that our Enemies often do us better Service, and open our Mind more by their Oppoſitions, than our Friends by their Applauſes; becauſe the former keep us to our guard, and make us give heed to what we advance: which one thing ſuffices to acquaint us with our Ramblings, But the latter lull us to ſleep, and give us an ungrounded Confidence, that makes us Vain and Ignorant. Men ſhould never therefore admire their Friends, and ſubmit to their Opinions, out of an *Affection*, as they ought not out of *Diſaffection* to oppoſe their Enemies. But they ought to diveſt themſelves of the *Spirit of Flattery* and *Contradiction*, that they may grow ſincere, and approve the Evidence of Truth where-ever they find it.

We ought moreover to fix it well in our Mind, that moſt Men are diſpos'd to Flatter, or Compliment us, through a kind of *Natural Inclination*, either to ſhew their *Parts*, or to obtain the good *Favour* of others, from the hope of a *Return*; or laſtly, out of a kind of *Invidiouſneſs* and Raillery: and we ought never to let our Brains be turn'd with any thing they can ſay to us. Is it not a thing of daily practice, to ſee Men that are unacquainted, cry up each other to the Heavens, upon the very firſt intercourſe? And what more common than for Men to give exceſſive praiſes, and to expreſs even *Extatick* Admiration to a Perſon upon a publick Performance, even in the Company of thoſe with whom they have ridiculed him juſt before? Whenever a Man cries out, and turns pale with Admiration, as if aſtoniſh'd at what he hears; 'tis no good Proof that the Speaker utters wonders; but rather that he has a flattering Auditory; that he has Friends, or it may be Enemies, that give themſelves diverſion: That he talks in an engaging ſtrain; that he is Rich, or Powerful; or if you will, 'tis a good proof that his Diſcourſe is founded on the confus'd and obſcure, but very moving and agreeable Notions of the Senſes; or that he has a lively Imagination, ſince Praiſes are beſtow'd on Friendſhip, Riches, Honours, Probabilities, but rarely upon Truth.

'Twill perhaps be expected, that having treated in general of the *Inclinations* of the Mind, I ſhould now deſcend to an exact Diſcuſſion of all the particular Motions it is ſenſible of, upon the ſight of Good and Evil, *viz.* that I ſhould explicate the Nature of *Love*, *Hatred*, *Joy*, *Sorrow*, and all the *Intellectual Paſſions*, whether *General* or *Particular*: *Simple* or *Compound*. But I have not oblig'd my ſelf to account for all the different Motions whereof the Mind is capable.

I am willing to have it known, that my principal Deſign in all the fore-going *Treatiſe concerning the Search after Truth*, was to make Men ſenſible how weak and ignorant they are, and how ſubject to Error and Sin. I have ſaid it, and I ſay it again, perhaps it will be remembred: I had never deſign'd a *Thorough particular Explication of the Nature of the Mind*; but I have been oblig'd to ſay ſomething of it, to lay open its *Errors* in their *Principle*, to unfold them *Methodically*; in a word, to make *My ſelf intelligible*. If I have tranſgreſs'd the Bounds I had preſcrib'd my ſelf, it was becauſe I had, methought, new things to ſay; which ſeem'd of moment, and which I believ'd might be read with Pleaſure. Perhaps I was miſtaken; but that preſumption was neceſſary to encourage me to write them. For who would ſay any thing, if he did not hope to be attended to? I have ſaid, it's true, ſeveral things which ſeem to have leſs *Analogy* with the preſent Subject, than would be the particular Treatment of the Motions of the Soul, and I acknowledge it. But 'tis not my Intention to put my ſelf under any conſtraint, when I propoſe to My ſelf a Method. I lay down a *Rule* to go by; but I preſume it may be permitted me to turn aſide as I walk, when any thing falls in my way to be conſider'd. I preſume too I have the liberty of diverting to a Reſting-place, provided I loſe not ſight of the Road I am to purſue. Such as will not eaſe themſelves with me, may go on if they pleaſe: 'tis but turning to a new Page. But if they take it amiſs, I would let them know that there are many who find that the Reſting-places I have made choice of, make their Journey eaſier, and more pleaſant.

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The End of the Firſt Volume.

PREFACE

To the Second Volume; which may ſerve as an Anſwer to the Animadverſions *on the Firſt.*

SOmetime ſince was publiſh'd a Book entitled, *Animadverſions upon the Search after Truth, wherein, at the ſame time are examin'd part of* M. Des Cartes's *Principles, being a Letter by an Academick in* Paris, *&c.* 'Tis ſaid this Book attacks me, and truly not without reaſon; for the Title ſhows it, and the Author manifeſts it was his deſign; which gives me a right, and impoſes on me a ſort of Obligation of ſpeaking my thoughts of it. For beſides that, I ought to diſabuſe ſome people who delight in theſe petty Quarrels, and immediately determine on the ſide of the Criticks that gratify their Paſſion; I think my ſelf bound to give ſome Anſwer to the Aggreſſor, that I may not be thought to be ſilent out of Inſolence or Impotence.

The Animadverter may pardon me, if he pleaſes, if I ſometimes ſeem to give him Provocation; I ſhould be very ſorry ſo much as to deſign it. But I cannot defend my ſelf without wounding him, nor repell the Blows he makes at me, without making him feel, and others know his Weakneſs and Imbecillity. Self-defence is a natural Obligation, but the defence of Truth is abſolutely indiſpenſable.

See here in ſhort his deſign: He ſuppoſes the Book he animadverts on, is a method for laying the Foundations of the Sciences. He reduces this Method to fourteen heads, and ſhows that they are either Suppoſitions without Proof, or Aſſertions without Foundation, and conſequently that the Subſtance of the Book is intirely uſeleſs to the Enquiry after Truth; though there are here and there ſome Obſervations in it that place it in the rank of Works which have gain'd the Eſtimation of our Age.

I anſwer in General, that the Author of the Animadverſions has not underſtood, or has diſſembled the Underſtanding the deſign of the Book he impugns; it being plain that the principal deſign of it, is to diſcover the Errors we are ſubject to. 'Tis true it treats of the Nature of the Senſes, Imagination and Intellect; but 'tis manifeſt, and I precaution in ſeveral places, that this is onely to diſcover theſe Errors in their Cauſes: This being the Method, I always endeavour to obſerve, as believing it moſt advantageous to the enlightning the Mind.

The Title of the firſt Page of the Book he oppoſes, wherein are to be ſeen in Capitals, CONCERNING THE ERRORS OF THE SENSES; the very Table of the ſame Book, or rather the place where I make the Diviſion of the whole work, might have taught him my deſign, if he had deſir'd to know it, where he might have read theſe words, which methinks are clear enough: *And ſo all the Errors of Men and the Cauſes of them, may be reduc'd to five heads, and we ſhall treat of them according to that order; Firſt, We ſhall ſpeak of the Errors of the SENSES. Secondly, Of the Errors of IMAGINATION. Thirdly, Of the Errors of PURE INTELLECT. Fourthly, Of the Errors of our INCLINATIONS. And fifthly, Of the Errors of the PASSIONS. And thus having made an Eſſay to deride the Soul of the Errors that ſhe is ſubject to, WE SHALL LAY DOWN A GENERAL METHOD TO CONDUCT HER IN THE SEARCH AFTER TRUTH.* Chap. 4. B. 1.

Nevertheleſs as he is pleaſed to make me undertake a Deſign I do not execute, that he may have the more to charge upon my Conduct, ſo he goes to prove it was my deſign to lay down a Method in that Book. *I do him no Injury,* ſays he, *in looking on his Book as a Method to lay the Foundations of the Sciences: For beſides that, the title expreſſes ſo much, he declares himſelf upon the point in the following manner;* " Let us examine the Cauſes of nature of our Errors, and " ſince the Method of examining things by conſidering them in their Birth and Origin, is the " moſt regular and perſpicuous, and ſerves better than others to give us a thorough know- " ledge of them, let us try to put it here in practice. Page 9, 10. Page 1.

I do a man no injury, when I ſay he deſigns to draw an *Hercules*; but if I ſhow that inſtead of an *Hercules*, he takes or *Polyphemus*, or *Therſites*, I make him ridiculous: Should I ſay with many others, that the Animadverter is a *Carteſian*, and that he deſigned by his Animadverſions on my Book to defend the Doctrine of *Des Cartes*, I ſhould not wrong him; but if at the ſame time I ſhould ſhow that he oppoſes me without underſtanding me, I ſhould poſſibly offend him. 'Tis then injuring a man to charge upon him deſigns, which he never had, to render him ridiculous. But a man muſt be wretchedly in the wrong who impoſes them

on such as have, like me in several places, explained themselves clearly upon the Subject.

But the *Title of my Book evidences as much, for 'tis concerning the Search after Truth.* I answer, That to search out Truth, two things are requisite; first to be delivered from the Prejudices of Childhood or vulgar Errors; Secondly, to have a good Method. The Title of the Book is comprehensive of these two parts. I have given the first in the former Volume, but the Animadverter will needs have it, that I have given the second, which surely is unreasonable. He ought rather to correct the Title by the Book, if the Title displeased him, than to go about to ruin a whole Book for the Title's sake.

Page 16. But continues our Author, *I declare my self upon the point in this manner.* " Let us examine " the Causes and Nature of our Errors, and since the Method of examining things, by consi- " dering them in their Birth and Origin, is the most regular and perspicuous, and serves bet- " ter than others to give us a thorough knowledge of them; let us try and put it here in " practice.

I have been shewing, that I have declar'd distinctly enough in the Division I have made of my work, that I gave not my Method in the first Volume; this cannot be doubted. But let us see whether this passage was enough to make him think I have given a Method: I say, *Let us examine the Causes and Nature of our Errors:* My design therefore according to this passage, is to examine the Causes and Nature of our Errors; That's plain: I continue, *And since the Method of examining things by considering them in their Birth and Origin, is the more regular and perspicuous than others; let us try to put it in practice.*

My design therefore is to examine the Causes and Nature of our Errors methodically; can any one from hence believe I have given a Method? If so, we may believe there is no Author but has given a Method, since there is none but has the same design as my self to write methodically. I might even say that the Animaverter has design'd to give a Method, and impugn him by his own Weapons, but that he had rather be thought to have written without any. These are the proofs imployed by him to demonstrate I have given a Method.

The fourteen Heads of this Imaginary Method, are in the places whence they are taken, either incidental Propositions, or Answers to Objections, or Opinions he ascribes to me for want of Understanding what he engages; or lastly examples, which of themselves neither are nor can be heads of a Method. Here follows the first of these Heads.

I begin thus, " The Mind or Soul of Man being neither material nor extended, is undoubt- " edly a simple Substance, indivisible, and without any Composition of parts, notwithstand- Page 1. " ing, it has been the custom to distinguish in it two Faculties, namely, the Understanding " and the Will; which it is necessary forthwith to explain: for it seems, *&c.* And in order to render the abstract Idea's of these two words sensible, I explain them not as our Author misrepresents me, with relation to the essence of Matter which he supposes unknown; but by relation to the properties which all the world acknowledge are in Matter: *i. e.* the capacity of being mov'd, and of receiving different external figures, and internal configurations.

Page 20. Page 21. The Animadverter supposing, as has been said, that the Book he impugns is a Method, begins thus. *The first thing to be observ'd when a man pretends to the search of Truth, is not to suppose he has already found it, though be in perfect possession of it,* &c. And lower, *Which thing the Author seems not to have sufficiently consider'd. For at his very first setting out, he engages in the supposition of a thing, the Knowledge whereof is the principal motive to his enquiry after Truth, and which he ought not to determine before he had exhausted the greatest Questions in Philosophy. Thus it is he enters on his matter in his first Chapter.* The Mind of Man being neither material nor extended, *&c. 'Tis easie to see this supposition is not indifferent,* &c.

I answer, first, that it was not my design to give a Method in the Book he impugns, but only to prepare the mind by delivering it from prejudices.

Secondly, That though it had been my design I might have suppos'd some Truths, which are commonly acknowledg'd; as that the Soul is not material: especially if I employ them not as a foundation to build some System on.

I answer in the third place, That the Proposition he will have to be an head of my Method is an incidental Proposition. The bare construction of the words, is a sufficient indication; the process of the Discourse an undeniable proof; and all that I say in this place might subsist though the Soul were material. 'Tis not the part of a good Critick to take an Incidental Proposition, for a Fundamental, and an head of a Method. Nor is this to prove I have suppos'd to have found the Truth I am in quest of; since the thing I suppose, or rather which I don't examine, is not of any use to me.

*Book 1. Ch. 9. B. 3. in several places. When it was necessary, to the sequel of discourse, to know that the Soul was a kind of Being distinct from Matter *, I have prov'd it, or referr'd to those that have. But why will he oblige me to prove a thing in this place, which would be useless to the following Discourse, and I should have been sorry to have prov'd here? Whether the Soul be material or not, it is always true, that it has been the custom to distinguish two Faculties in it, the Understanding and Will. These two words are in use, and I may employ them: they are perhaps obscure, and I ought to define them: and because their Idea's are abstract, I may make them sensible. This is what I have done, and I cannot yet see what any one can blame in it.

At my very first setting out, he says, *I engage in the supposition of a thing, the knowledge whereof is the principal motive to my enquiry after Truth, and which I ought not to determine before having exhausted the greatest questions in Philosophy.*

All this Discourse is false: I engage not in a Supposition, for incidental Propositions come not into account. *The principal Motive to my Enquiry after Truth*, is not to know whether the Soul be Material or Immaterial; and so far is this question *from being insolable, till having drain'd the greatest questions of Philosophy*, that its Resolution depends on no other. This question is not complex'd, and the bare Comparison of Ideas which answer to the terms is sufficient to resolve it, as I shall show in the sixth Book, though this is not discoverable by those who make more use of their Imagination than their Reason. There is no necessity of explaining this more at present; we need but know that this Supposition is an incidental Proposition, from which I draw no consequence, and which I should have been too blame to prove; and yet if we will credit the Animadverter, *What is worst of all, is that this sole Anticipation is enough to ruin all the hopes, the Search after Truth might have rais'd on us.* Page 22.

In the four or five first Pages which our Animadverter spends in refuting the first pretended Head of the Imaginary Method, many things would deserve our consideration, if we thought ourselves obliged to let the World know all his Faults; for he imposes on me here as in other places without any Proof, Opinions and Designs which never entred my Head; and he does it with a confidence which is capable of surprising all those who believe others on their words. I am willing to think he is too honest and sincere a Man to prevaricate, and to be prodigal of that respect which is due to the publick; but if so, there is Levity or Temerity in his enterprise: he should not have undertaken to oppose what he did not understand. Yet I cannot chuse but relate how he finishes his first attack; we shall know what we are to think of the rest by the Beginning and End.

I said that the Soul being a Simple and Indivisible Substance has no parts; however it had been the custom to distinguish in it two Faculties, the Understanding and Will, &c. This has given occasion to the Animadverter to accuse me of contradiction; and after having prov'd after his manner by many Interrogations and Rhetorical Figures extremely convincing, he concludes with these words, which represent his whole figurative Reasoning in short, and for that Reason he has put it in Italick; *Which is the same thing*, says he, *as if I should say, THE SOUL IS WITHOUT ANY COMPOSITION OF PARTS; BUT YET I AM GOING TO EXPLAIN HOW SHE CONTAINS THEM. You see Sir*, continues he, *that this Supposition serves only to throw us immediately into obscurity; besides that, it is contrary on other grounds to the Success of this Method.* But whoever took Faculties for Parts? certainly the Passion for criticising must be very blind to put into the Mouth of a man of parts, so extraordinary Comparisons, and to make him believe the World must be content with them. But let us examine his second Head of my pretended Method, and see how he impugns it.

After having shown that to the avoiding Error, we must only give our consent to things appearing in such Light and Evidence as make it impossible for us to withhold it, without clearly understanding the secret Reproaches of our Reason: I adjoyn; "'Tis not, however to be denied but there are some Truths, besides those of Faith, for which it would be unreasonable to demand indisputable Demonstrations, as are those which relate to matter of Fact in History, and other things which have their dependance on the Will of Men; for there are two kinds of Truth, the one necessary, the other contingent: and because these two words *Necessary* and *Contingent*, are not it may be clear enough, I explain them thus. "I call those necessary Truths which are of an immutable nature, and which have been fix'd and determin'd by the Will of God, which is not subject to change. All other sorts of Truth are contingent and lower, we demand therefore an exact observation of the Rule we have been establishing in the Search of necessary Truths, the knowledge of which may be call'd Science, and we must be content with the greatest probability in History, which includes the knowledge of things contingent. For under, *&c.* Page 9.

I wish it might be examin'd, first, whether the things I have been saying are clear or obscure? Whether it may not be suppos'd there are necessary Truths, as that 2 times 2 are 4, and contingent Truths, as that Mr. —— shall say, such a thing at such an hour, especially when we have no design of establishing any System upon this supposition? Whether there be any thing more certain than this supposition, whereby it may be proved. Lastly, whether a man can reasonably perswade himself, that I lay down for one of the heads of my Method, or a supposition essential to any System or Proposition which begins with *FOR*.

This being suppos'd I come now to produce the Reasonings of our Animadverter against what I have said of contingent and necessary Truths. I shall only place in the Margin some Notes or Answers I shall think necessary; this being the shortest and easiest way for me; since it is an harder thing than is imagined to answer clearly such as are unintelligible and inconsequent Reasoners. For we must at least put their Objections in some form to solve them, which cannot be always done, either because they will not bear it, or because we do not understand them. For my own part I am very glad it cannot be imagined I use the Animadversions, as the Animadverter has us'd the Search; or that from different Passages of this Book I compose an incomprehensible piece of Nonsence.

ANI-

ANIMADVERSIONS.

The Second Suppoſition concerning neceſſary Truths, Page 9.

ANIMADVERSIONS.

THE Second thing ſuppoſed by the Author is, that there are two ſorts of Truths, *Neceſſary* and *Contingent*. I know not for what reaſon he looks upon what he here aſſerts, as *(a)* undeniable, and why he does not think of proving it. For this is one of the moſt conſiderable queſtions that has imployed the Learned, inſomuch that the firſt Phyloſophers were *(b)* all, except *Parmenides*, of a contrary opinion to that he maintains in this place. Yet *Parmenides* acknowledged but one neceſſary Truth, whereas he ſuppoſes a very great number. *Protagoras* believ'd there was no Truth on the part of things, ſo far was he from owning any neceſſary; and that Man was the meaſure and rule of all that could come in queſtion; that there was nothing but meer appearances, and no realities, and conſequently there was no Truths to ſeek or Errors to avoid, all being equally true or rather equally falſe. The *Pyrroniſts* have ſtill maintained there was nothing certain or truly determined, or that if there were, yet we could not know it. The new Phyloſophers grant that Individuals are no-wiſe immutable, but are Subject to continual Viciſſitudes; which being ſo, what becomes of neceſſary Truths: I ſpeak not of thoſe which are found in the Mathematicks, that ought to make a queſtion (*c*) apart; but of thoſe which he ſuppoſes in Phyſicks, Medicine and Morality, though I ſtill except thoſe which regard the Eſſence or Exiſtence of a God. Where then could he place them, except in the (*d*) Species and Eſſences of the ſame Individuals which are ſubject to change? and if theſe Eſſences or Species are nothing but Idea's, as may be ſuſpected if their immutability be onely in appearance, ſhould not we in following that Suppoſition engage in an Error, which would abſolutely exclude us from the knowledge of the true ſtate of things?

ANSWER.

(*a*) 'TIS becauſe this is more certain than any thing elſe, and that there is nothing certain if this be not. For if two times two are neceſſarily equal to four; if a whole be neceſſarily bigger than its part, there are neceſſary Truths. *I know not for what reaſon* the Animadverter would have me think of proving what cannot be prov'd, unleſs by ſomething more obſcure and difficult. This is not to phyloſophize * *after the manner of the Ancient Academy.*

* Prel. pag. 4.

(*b*) This is curious and far-fetch'd. All the firſt Phyloſophers, except *Parmenides*, have deny'd there were neceſſary and contingent Truths. What wonder is it? 'Tis a fine thing, this Erudition! certainly Meditation can never teach us what we learn from the reading the Ancients, though we underſtand them but by halves. But 'tis viſible that our Author underſtands the old Phyloſophers no better than the new.

(*c*) I ſay indeed that ought to make a queſtion apart, but he will let it have no part.

(*d*) The demand is pleaſant, but the Author would not have made it, if he had but read the third Book of the Search after Truth, ſince I have there clearly given my thoughts upon theſe things. But it ſeems our Author takes Truths for certain little Beings, which are born and die every moment.

But let us ſee what the Author calls neceſſary Truths, for at leaſt he explains what he means by theſe words, " I call thoſe neceſſary Truths which are immutable by their nature, and " which have been fixed and determined by the Will of God which is not ſubject to change.

To ſay that theſe Truths are immutable by their nature, what is it more than to ſay, they are immutable becauſe immutable, unleſs this ſignifies they are eſſentially ſo without any external aſſiſtance? But if theſe Truths were neceſſary in this manner, how were they determin'd by the Will of God, ſince God being free, as the Author will not deny, he might if he had pleas'd have not determin'd them to be immutable (*e*). And if ſo, they are immutable only by Grace, becauſe God will'd it ſo, and determin'd them to that ſtate of immutability.

This being ſo how come they to be of an immutable nature, ſince it was poſſible for them to be liable to change? But if it were not poſſible for them to be ſubject to change, how could they be determin'd by God to be immutable? and how could he have fix'd them by the operation of his Will?

(*e*) There are two ſorts of immutable Truths. Some are immutable of themſelves, or by their nature, as that twice two are four; and others becauſe they have been determin'd by the Will of God, which is not ſubject to change; as that a Bowl ſhould move another on ſuch an encounter. 'Tis eaſie to ſee he has not underſtood what he pretends to oppoſe. He was not aware that Conjunctive Particle *and* had ſometimes

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The Author may explain himſelf upon this point if he think convenient; mean time it is no little concern to know whether God can change the Eſſences of things, and make two contradictories true at the ſame time; for as a celebrated Divine of our age has ſaid upon the ſame words that are now under examination; *Is God the Author of the Truth of his own Exiſtence?* Or ought we to affirm that we can form a right line Triangle, whoſe three Angles ſhall be greater than two Rights; or that ſhall have one ſide longer than the other two: in a word if it be poſſible for contradictories to be true or falſe at the ſame time, what will become of humane Reaſoning, and what ſhall we ſay to thoſe Theological concluſions which aſſure us that God is not Corporeal, that he is not ſubject to change, that he has always been, (*f*), *&c.*

Might we not ſay in following this Hypotheſis, that it's poſſible for him to have been eternally, and not to have been eternally; that he is liable, and not liable to change? I mean not to pronounce upon ſo difficult a queſtion, but I may affirm the Author had no right to do it, eſpecially in the circumſtances he has done it, and without alledging ſufficient proofs.

(*g*) Yet methinks I perceive a ſhew of reaſoning in theſe words, *and by the Will of God which is not ſubject to change.* He ſeems to conſider the Will of God as the cauſe of the neceſſity of theſe Truths. But if ſo, he proves too much in the place where we complain he proves nothing at all; for if what God wills be immutable, becauſe his will is not ſubject to change; it follows that whatever he wills muſt have an equal immutability, ſince it is the ſame Will which is the cauſe of it: Mean-while it is certain he wills things which are ſubject to change, when he determines the Exiſtence or Non-exiſtence of Creatures in the Viciſſitude of times (*h*). Thus tho' God ſhould have fix'd theſe Truths but for ſome ages, his will thereby would be no leſs immutable, than for his producing daily all thoſe admirable changes which make the beauty of the univerſe.

But the Author will ſay, God wills that theſe Truths ſhould be immutable for ever. But how could he know this, had he any particular Revelation? yet he ſpeaks as poſitively as if he was very certain.

It may be he bottoms upon this, that if theſe Truths ſeem immutable to us whilſt they are ſubject to change we ſhould err in pretending to Science (*l*). But if it were ſo, all that could thence be concluded is that the firſt Phyloſophers, the *Academicks* and *Pyrroniſts*, have better phyloſophiz'd than the *Peripateticks*, *Carteſians* and the other *Dogmatiſts*; and I do not believe the Author would eſtabliſh his phyloſophy upon ſuch a Sophiſm, *unleſs there were neceſſary Truths, we could have no true Science, therefore theſe are neceſſary Truths.*

(*m*) But though we might ſuppoſe there were neceſſary Truths in Phyſick, Medicine, *&c.* and might determine about this queſtion, without being utterly excluded from the knowledge of Truth.

Though theſe Truths were neceſſary by their Nature, and their immutability by ſome new Myſtery was ſtill an effect of the free determination of the Will of God.

ANSWER.

times the ſame purport as the Disjunctive *or*, for if he had obſerv'd it, he could with no good Grace have ſeriouſly wrangled upon the Ambiguity of a Particle. He might have eaſily conſider'd that Truths which are neceſſary by their Nature, as that two times two make four, need not the Will of God to make them ſuch. But be it granted, that I had not ſufficiently explain'd my ſelf; yet the place on which he criticiſes being but acceſſary to my deſign, it was not neceſſary to explain my ſelf more at large. Would a man be at the pains of reading it, he might ſee I needed only to ſay, there were neceſſary Truths, and that I was not oblig'd to examine the Cauſe of their neceſſity.

(*f*) For my part I know not what he drives at: this is a very commodious way of criticiſing; a man has reaſon whenever he deſires it.

(*g*) He impoſes on me three falſities in ſix lines. I have never determin'd upon this queſtion, neither in undue circumſtances, nor with inſufficient proofs; for I have not ſo much as ſpoken of it; but if he has a mind to know my thoughts of it, I fear not to affirm that God cannot cauſe contradictories to be true or falſe at the ſame time.

(*h*) He confounds Beings with Truths. Man is capable of Reaſon and Senſe. A Globe may be devided into two Hemiſpheres. A Man and a Globe are ſubject to change, but theſe Truths are immutable.

(*l*) All this concerns not me, but onely ſhows the Fecundity of our Author.

(*m*) Conſider if you pleaſe all theſe flouriſhes, endeavour to underſtand them, and admire how the Imagination ſeduces Reaſon: I think our Author may be ſaid to reſemble a Man, who imagining he ſees his his Enemy at hand ſhould preſently charge againſt the Phantom, ſhould pierce it with his Sword, ſhould cut off its head, and

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The Second Suppoſition concerning neceſſary Truths, Page 9.

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THE Second thing ſuppoſed by the Author is, that there are two ſorts of Truths, *Neceſſary* and *Contingent*. I know not for what reaſon he looks upon what he here aſſerts, as *(a)* undeniable, and why he does not think of proving it. For this is one of the moſt conſiderable queſtions that has imployed the Learned, inſomuch that the firſt Phyloſophers were *(b)* all, except *Parmenides*, of a contrary opinion to that he maintains in this place. Yet *Parmenides* acknowledged but one neceſſary Truth, whereas he ſuppoſes a very great number. *Protagoras* believ'd there was no Truth on the part of things, ſo far was he from owning any neceſſary; and that Man was the meaſure and rule of all that could come in queſtion; that there was nothing but meer appearances, and no realities, and conſequently there was no Truths to ſeek or Errors to avoid, all being equally true or rather equally falſe. The *Pyrroniſts* have ſtill maintained there was nothing certain or truly determined, or that if there were, yet we could not know it. The new Phyloſophers grant that Individuals are no-wiſe immutable, but are Subject to continual Viciſſitudes; which being ſo, what becomes of neceſſary Truths: I ſpeak not of thoſe which are found in the Mathematicks, that ought to make a queſtion *(c)* apart; but of thoſe which he ſuppoſes in Phyſicks, Medicine and Morality, though I ſtill except thoſe which regard the Eſſence or Exiſtence of a God. Where then could he place them, except in the *(d)* Species and Eſſences of the ſame Individuals which are ſubject to change? and if theſe Eſſences or Species are nothing but Idea's, as may be ſuſpected if their immutability be onely in appearance, ſhould not we in following that Suppoſition engage in an Error, which would abſolutely exclude us from the knowledge of the true ſtate of things?

ANSWER.

(a) 'TIS becauſe this is more certain than any thing elſe, and that there is nothing certain if this be not. For if two times two are neceſſarily equal to four; if a whole be neceſſarily bigger than its part, there are neceſſary Truths. *I know not for what reaſon* the Animadverter would have me think of proving what cannot be prov'd, unleſs by ſomething more obſcure and difficult. This is not to phyloſophize *after the manner of the Ancient Academy.* * Pref. pag. 4.

(b) This is curious and far-fetch'd. All the firſt Phyloſophers, except *Parmenides*, have deny'd there were neceſſary and contingent Truths. What wonder is it? 'Tis a fine thing, this Erudition! certainly Meditation can never teach us what we learn from the reading the Ancients, though we underſtand them but by halves. But 'tis viſible that our Author underſtands the old Phyloſophers no better than the new.

(c) I ſay indeed that ought to make a queſtion apart, but he will let it have no part.

(d) The demand is pleaſant, but the Author would not have made it, if he had but read the third Book of the Search after Truth, ſince I have there clearly given my thoughts upon theſe things. But it ſeems our Author takes Truths for certain little Beings, which are born and die every moment.

But let us ſee what the Author calls neceſſary Truths, for at leaſt he explains what he means by theſe words, " I call thoſe neceſſary Truths which are immutable by their nature, and " which have been fixed and determined by the Will of God which is not ſubject to change.

To ſay that theſe Truths are immutable by their nature, what is it more than to ſay, they are immutable becauſe immutable, unleſs this ſignifies they are eſſentially ſo without any external aſſiſtance? But if theſe Truths were neceſſary in this manner, how were they determin'd by the Will of God, ſince God being free, as the Author will not deny, he might if he had pleas'd have not determin'd them to be immutable *(e)*. And if ſo, they are immutable only by Grace, becauſe God will'd it ſo, and determin'd them to that ſtate of immutability.

This being ſo how come they to be of an immutable nature, ſince it was poſſible for them to be liable to change? But if it were not poſſible for them to be ſubject to change, how could they be determin'd by God to be immutable? and how could he have fix'd them by the operation of his Will?

(e) There are two ſorts of immutable Truths. Some are immutable of themſelves, or by their nature, as that twice two are four; and others becauſe they have been determin'd by the Will of God, which is not ſubject to change; as that a Bowl ſhould move another on ſuch an encounter. 'Tis eaſie to ſee he has not underſtood what he pretends to oppoſe. He was not aware that Conjunctive Particle *and* had ſometimes

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The Author may explain himſelf upon this point if he think convenient; mean time it is no little concern to know whether God can change the Eſſences of things, and make two contradictories true at the ſame time; for as a celebrated Divine of our age has ſaid upon the ſame words that are now under examination; *Is God the Author of the Truth of his own Exiſtence?* Or ought we to affirm that we can form a right line Triangle, whoſe three Angles ſhall be greater than two Rights; or that ſhall have one ſide longer than the other two: in a word if it be poſſible for contradictories to be true or falſe at the ſame time, what will become of humane Reaſoning, and what ſhall we ſay to thoſe Theological concluſions which aſſure us that God is not Corporeal, that he is not ſubject to change, that he has always been, (*f*), *&c.*

Might we not ſay in following this Hypotheſis, that it's poſſible for him to have been eternally, and not to have been eternally; that he is liable, and not liable to change? I mean not to pronounce upon ſo difficult a queſtion, but I may affirm the Author had no right to do it, eſpecially in the circumſtances he has done it, and without alledging ſufficient proofs.

(*g*) Yet methinks I perceive a ſhew of reaſoning in theſe words, *and by the Will of God which is not ſubject to change.* He ſeems to conſider the Will of God as the cauſe of the neceſſity of theſe Truths. But if ſo, he proves too much in the place where we complain he proves nothing at all; for if what God wills be immutable, becauſe his will is not ſubject to change; it follows that whatever he wills muſt have an equal immutability, ſince it is the ſame Will which is the cauſe of it: Mean-while it is certain he wills things which are ſubject to change, when he determines the Exiſtence or Non-exiſtence of Creatures in the Viciſſitude of times (*b*). Thus tho' God ſhould have fix'd theſe Truths but for ſome ages, his will thereby would be no leſs immutable, than for his producing daily all thoſe admirable changes which make the beauty of the univerſe.

But the Author will ſay, God wills that theſe Truths ſhould be immutable for ever. But how could he know this, had he any particular Revelation? yet he ſpeaks as poſitively as if he was very certain.

It may be he bottoms upon this, that if theſe Truths ſeem immutable to us whilſt they are ſubject to change we ſhould err in pretending to Science (*l*). But if it were ſo, all that could thence be concluded is that the firſt Phyloſophers, the *Academicks* and *Pyrroniſts*, have better phyloſophiz'd than the *Peripateticks*, *Carteſians* and the other *Dogmatiſts*; and I do not believe the Author would eſtabliſh his phyloſophy upon ſuch a Sophiſm, *unleſs there were neceſſary Truths, we could have no true Science, therefore theſe are neceſſary Truths.*

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Though theſe Truths were neceſſary by their Nature, and their immutability by ſome new Myſtery was ſtill an effect of the free determination of the Will of God.

ANSWER.

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(*f*) For my part I know not what he drives at: this is a very commodious way of criticiſing; a man has reaſon whenever he deſires it.

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(*b*) He confounds Beings with Truths. Man is capable of Reaſon and Senſe. A Globe may be devided into two Hemiſpheres. A Man and a Globe are ſubject to change, but theſe Truths are immutable.

(*l*) All this concerns not me, but onely ſhows the Fecundity of our Author.

(*m*) Conſider if you pleaſe all theſe flouriſhes, endeavour to underſtand them, and admire how the Imagination ſeduces Reaſon: I think our Author may be ſaid to reſemble a Man, who imagining he ſees his his Enemy at hand ſhould preſently charge againſt the Phantom, ſhould pierce it with his Sword, ſhould cut off its head, and

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Though the neceſſity of theſe Truths proceeded from the immutability of this Will, whilſt yet it is the cauſe of all the changes happening in the Univerſe.

Though we ſhould be moreover aſſur'd that God had reſolv'd to preſerve theſe Truths in an intire immutability,

We muſt ſtill ſuppoſe in order to enter into his opinion, the knowledge of the Exiſtence of God and of his Will, of his Liberty and of his Power.

(*n*) Which obliges me to make ſome Reflections upon what he has borrowed from Faith to add to Reaſons Phyloſophical, which is what we may look upon as his third ſuppoſition.

ANSWER.

then overjoy'd with ſo ſucceſsfull and eaſie a Conqueſt, ſhould triumphantly exclaim, though my Piſtols had miſcarried, my Sword had run him through, but though my Sword had miſſed him, yet I had cut off his head; but laſtly though his head ſhould have remained upon his Shoulders, yet I found him ſo feeble and eaſily to be conquered, that I had nothing to fear from him. 'Tis viſible from all theſe flouriſhes, that our Author fancies he has ſeverely handled me, whilſt yet I am as inſenſible of his Wounds, as the Enemy the poor man thought he had ſo cruelly butcher'd.

I ought in our Authors opinion to have begun with Theology to prove methodically there are neceſſary and contingent Truths: but I do not believe that Conduct would have had the Approbation of many people; and ſeeing it is an hard task to content the Criticks, I cannot believe our Animadverter would have been well ſatisfied. This third Head, which I am going to comment on as on the preceding, ſufficiently ſhows us what he is.

After having prov'd that we muſt yield only to Evidence, except in matters of Faith, which are not ſubmitted to the diſquiſition of Reaſon; I conclude with theſe words. "Myſteries then
" of Faith muſt be diſtinguiſhed from things of Nature: we ought equally to ſubmit to Faith
Page 9. " and to Evidence, but in the concernments of Faith we muſt not look for evidence, as in
" thoſe of Nature, we ought not to take up with Faith; that is, with the Authority of Phylo-
" ſophers. In a word to be a Believer 'tis required to aſſent blindly, but to be a Phyloſo-
" pher it is neceſſary to ſee plainly.

Myſteries of Faith muſt be diſtinguiſhed from things of Nature. Thus judiciouſly ſpeaks the Author, and concludes with theſe words, which might even paſs for a Proverb: *To be a Believer 'tis required to aſſent blindly, but to be a Phyloſopher, 'tis neceſſary to ſee plainly.* Mean while I wonder he obſerves not in his Book the Reſolution he made of not (*b*) mingling the concerns of Religion, with the deciſions of Phyloſophy: for it's too viſible that one half of his Book is nothing but Reflections upon original Sin, deprav'd Manners, and corrupt Inclinations which Chriſtian Morality is to correct.

I know not whether what I ſay ought to be rank'd amongſt Proverbs and Quibbles, for that depends upon the Taſt; and I referr my ſelf to thoſe whom the Paſſion for criticiſing has not made over ſcrupulous and dainty. They too may reflect whether this niceneſs ſuits well with the Author of this Diſcourſe, and whether he ought ſo much to pretend to an exquiſite Taſt.

(*b*) There's a great difference between mingling and confounding. I ſhall always diſtinguiſh things of Faith from thoſe of Nature, as I here ſay ought to be done. But I never *made a Reſolution* not to ſpeak of God or Chriſtian Morality in treating about the Search after Truth. The Author ſeems not to underſtand me, that he may play the Critick with leſs Trouble.

(*c*) I blame not his Piety in this, nor believe it a thing unbecoming a Chriſtian to labour upon theſe ſubjects. But that ought to be reſerv'd for Sermons.

(*c*) Can he not ſee that theſe things are not of themſelves Articles of Faith, and that we may ſpeak of the Goodneſs of God, deprav'd Manners, and corrupt Inclinations without having recourſe to Faith.

(*d*) Or if he had deſign'd to take the occaſion of inſinuating theſe Morals, as knowing that the true way of moving the heart pathetically is to do it by diſcovering to the Mind the Truths that are of neareſt concernment to it; he might have ſatisfied that laudable deſire, but ſhould have contriv'd for that purpoſe particular Chapters, which he has done too in ſome places. But once more, a very little thing will ſerve to confound the Light we begin to receive in the Search after Truth.

(*d*) There are in theſe Animadverſions ſome little Raileries which provoke to Pity, but this might raiſe ones Indignation. Let him know once for all, that if I conſented to the Publication of this Book, 'twas chiefly, becauſe it contains thoſe things which he condemns as * *Enthuſiaſms.* Page 192

(*e*) We cannot at the ſame time ſatisfie both Reaſon and Faith, ſince Reaſon obliges us to open our Eyes, and Faith commands us to ſhut them.

(*e*) If he ſpeaks of himſelf, we ought to take his word for it.

(*f*) And

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(*f*) And yet I find he has so interwoven his principal Propositions with the *Credenda* of Religion, that he seems to talk more like a Divine than Phylosopher. For example, among other things he concludes, *That* (*g*) *if the Will had not this Liberty, but must have embrac'd every thing that came cloath'd with an appearance of*
Page 6. *Truth, it would have almost ever been received, whence probably it might be concluded that the Author of its Being was the Author of its Errors and Seducements, and thereupon we have a Liberty given us by God, that we might avoid falling into Error.* 'Tis visible this reasoning is founded on the Author's supposing God will not deceive us (*b*). But may it not be doubted whether God has not made us for the enjoyment of probability onely, and resolv'd to reserve the knowledge of Truth as his own peculiar, or whether he designs not this as a pure Accession to our happiness (*i*) in Heaven, wherefore we ought not to conclude that he would be a Deceiver, though he should not afford us the means of discovering it.

(*k*) I leave it Sir to you to think what the *Pyrronists* would say, if they should hear this arguing. Many such there are in the process of this piece, especially in the last part, whereof most Chapters contain Arguments which includes theological questions (*l*).

(*m*) Whether then he considers all these Suppositions as Articles of Faith, or regards them as Truths demonstrable by Phylosophy, he ought still to distinguish them from the fundamentals of his Work.

If he considers them as Articles of Faith, he is very well persuaded they are obscure: if he looks on them as conclusions of Human Science, his Method ought to precede them, and not imploy them as principles to rest upon.

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(*f*) What he has said is true, but what he goes to conclude from it is false, it being Reason and not Faith which teaches us God is no deceiver.

(*g*) He has here suppress'd two words, which give all the force to my reasoning, which runs thus, *If it must infallibly* and *necessarily have embrac'd every thing*; we shall see by and by what reason he had for this Retrenchment.

(*b*) Reason teaches us, that God is no Deceiver, and Faith supposes it, which is quite contrary to what the Animadverter imagines.

(*i*) It cannot be doubted when we have Reasons for it; but it is needless to stand to answer all these questions.

(*k*) I do not conclude it with that argument. Mine is good, and this good for nothing: there is difference between INFALLIBLY and NECESSARILY forcing us to embrace Error, and not giving us the means to discover Truth. Certainly these words, *Infallibly* and *Necessarily*, ought not to be suppress'd.

(*l*) He cannot show a place in the whole Book he animadverts on; where I suppose any Article of Faith as a principle from whence to draw any consequences Essential to the Search of Truth. But he imagines if a man speaks but of the Goodness of God, deprav'd Maners, and corrupt Inclinations; he is treating of some Article of Faith.

(*m*) Methinks these two Conclusions have no other aim than to gain by surprise some little Applauses from such as give them *gratis*.

If I thought the World would be concern'd to know exactly that the Animadverter has not understood what he has pretended to encounter, I would thus continue him on to the end of his Book, and would make it undeniably appear, that he has hardly ever taken my Sence, and that he had no Idea of my design; but I believe that reasonable men will be very indifferent in this particular: and therefore not to weary them to no purpose, and yet to discharge that debt which some persons think I owe to Truth, I will answer in few words all the Chapters of the Animadversions, and I desire such as shall have leasure and curiosity enough, to examine whether my answers are just, by confronting the Animadversions with the Search.

In the fourth Article or Chapter, the Animadverter opposes my opinions at large without knowing them. He does not consider there are two sorts of Traces, one which the Mind forms to represent things by, as the Trace which accompanies the Idea of a square; the other which accompanies abstract Ideas but represents them not; such are the Traces which the Sound of Words and the Light of characters produce in the Brain, which naturally have no power to represent or raise Ideas. This one distinction overthrows the grand reasonings of our Author.

In this fifth Chapter he puts upon me many opinions which I never had. 'Tis not true, *That I acknowledge all our Ideas to be but modes of our Soul's existing*. On the contrary, I have in the third Book which he reflects on, given a Chapter on purpose to show that opinion indefensible When a man will play the Critick, 'tis fit, methinks, he should read the Book he takes to task: nor is it true, *that I own that the Ideas we receive by the Senses, represent only the effects produc'd in us by external Objects.* I have said the contrary in several places, in the fifteenth Chapter of the first Book, and elsewhere. Why does he not cite, or rather why does he not examine what he criticises on. For what remains, I cannot distinctly conceive all the Argumentations he

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here

here makes. I know not the reaſon of them: thoſe who attentively read them may think of them what they pleaſe. But I ſcruple not to affirm that he is ſo far from impugning my opinion about the manner of the Mind's perceiving external objects; that on the contrary, what he ſays in this Article ſhows he knows nothing of it.

In his ſixth Chapter, he impoſes on me what he calls my ſixth Suppoſition; or rather he has no knowledge of my opinion upon that Subject: To me he ſeems not ſo much as to have
Page 56, 57. read what I have written on it; he affirms in ſeveral places that *I bottom upon Mr.* Des Cartes's *reſolution upon that queſtion*, when yet my opinion is intirely different from his. But 'tis evident to all that underſtand Mr. *Des Cartes*, and have read what I have ſaid upon that queſtion, that the Author neither underſtands mine nor Mr. *Des Cartes*'s opinions. Meanwhile he argues vehemently without knowing what he oppoſes, and even ſometimes without diſcovering what he aims at.

Page 62. The Author is very much in the wrong in his ſeventh Chapter, to require me to prove the Exiſtence of Extenſion, when I mean only to aſſault the Errors of the Senſes in point of ſenſible qualities, and I ſhould have repented if I had follow'd that Method. I prove what is ſerviceable to me in the ſequel, and I eſtabliſh nothing upon the Suppoſition he attributes to me. Moreover I cannot tell how it came into his head after ſeven years to complain of an anſwer
Page 64. of *Monſieur Robault*; he ſhould have replied to it whilſt he was alive, but he wanted courage: for every one knows with what accuracy and force that learned Man repell'd the blows that were offer'd him, and with two or three words pronounc'd without all manner of heat and paſſion, humbled the Imagination of ſuch as being full of themſelves, thought to cover him with confuſion.

Page 80. In anſwer to the eighth Chapter, I deſire the Author to take notice, firſt, that there is diſference between an Evil, and the Repreſentation of it, and therefore the Will may fly the former, and yet acquieſce in the latter. Secondly, that though the Will be nothing but the natural Motion of the Soul towards good in general; yet the Reſt or Acquieſcence of the Soul in evident Truths proceeds from the Will, becauſe Reſt is produc'd by Motion. God will ſtill imprint on us this natural Motion of Love, when we ſhall intirely repoſe our ſelves upon him. For the Motion of Love doth not ceaſe by the poſſeſſion of Good, and by the view of Truth, as Motion of Bodies is interrupted by Reſt. We might ſay farther, that even Bodies reſt not as capable of Figures, but with reſpect to Motion. The reſt needs no anſwer if the Reader will carefully conſider thoſe places in the *Search* which he attacks; for 'tis needleſs to anſwer Objections which vaniſh upon a diſtinct Underſtanding of what I have written, though they appear conſiderable in themſelves.

In the ninth Chapter the Author oppoſes my own Objections, and neglects the Anſwers I have given them, and not knowing there are ſeveral ſorts of Liberty, he fancies with a great deal of Joy, that I have fallen into a contradiction.

Page 98. I have nothing to ſay to his Tenth Chapter, but that what he comments on ſeems too clear to ſtand in need of his Reflections; and that I think it cannot reaſonably be doubted there is a City in *Italy* call'd *Rome*, though it cannot be mathetically demonſtrated.

In the eleventh Chapter, the Author does not obſerve that I have referred to ſome Books of St. *Auſtin*, and the Meditations of *M. Des Cartes*, to prove a thing, which yet is ſufficiently receiv'd, and which he pretends I had no right to ſuppoſe. He ought to know my deſign was not to eſtabliſh a Syſtem, and to remember that all I vigorouſly demand is to *enter into ſome diffidence of our Senſes*, as I have caution'd in the laſt Chapter concerning the Errors of the Senſes.

In anſwer to the conſequences he inferrs in his Twelfth Chapter againſt an Example alleadg'd by me, and which he will have to paſs for an Head of my Method, we need but ſay, that men ought to reaſon only upon their clear and diſtinct Idea's, without being ſollicitous about what they cannot reach, and that 'tis not neceſſary to know whether there are actually Bodies without us to conclude many Phyſical Truths.

I have no more to ſay to his Thirteenth Chapter, but that I wiſh a man would attentively read what I have ſaid concerning the manner of our knowing the Soul, in the Seventh Chapter of the Second Part of the Third Book, and the Chapter following, where I ſpeak of the Eſſence of Matter.

Laſt of all, to do juſtice to the reaſonings of the laſt Chapter, it ſuffices to know diſtinctly my manner of explaining how we ſee external Objects.

This is all I thought neceſſary to anſwer to the Animadverter, as being perſuaded that thoſe who thoroughly conceive my Notion will have no need of an illuſtration upon the pretended difficulties he urges to me, and others who have not read nor comprehended the things I treat of in the Book he oppoſes, would not underſtand the largeſt Anſwers I could give them.

'Tis ſufficiently maniſeſt from the three firſt Chapters of the Animadverſions, which I have refuted more at large, what we are to think of the other, which I have anſwer'd in a word or two. Thoſe who have Time and Inclination may examine them more exactly: but for my own part I ſhould think I waſted both my own time and that of others, if I ſhould ſtay to collect all the Paralogiſms which are ſcatter'd through his Book to acquaint thoſe perſons with them, who doubtleſs have little or no deſire to know them.

The reaſon and Judgment of worthy men cannot ſuffer thoſe long-winded Diſcourſes, which tend

tend to no good, but onely ſhow the Spleen and ill Humour of their Authors; and 'tis a ridiculous thing to imagine that others intereſs themſelves in our Quarrels, and to call them to be witneſſes of the weakneſs and vain efforts of our Adverſary.

He that attacks me has no reaſon to find fault with my manner of Defence, for if I anſwer not all his Animadverſions in an ample way, 'tis not becauſe I deſpiſe him. He may conclude, that I ſhould not have warded off the blows he deſign'd me, if I did not think him able to hurt me; and I think I have more reaſon to complain of the negligence of his animadverting, than he has to be angry at my manner of anſwering him. Had our Author zealouſly buckled to engage me, I am perſuaded he had found me exerciſe; for I judge not of the Strength of his parts by a venturous Sally of his Pen, which he ſeems only to make by way of Paſtime. Thus the negligence he manifeſts is to my advantage, and for my part I complain not of his remiſsneſs, as being unworthy his Application and his Anger. All that I am ſorry for, is, that he ſpeaks not ſeriouſly of ſerious things; that he ſports with Truth, and wants ſome of that reſpect which is due to the publick, when he trys to over-wit it ſeveral different ways, as this anſwer in part has manifeſted.

If I have been oblig'd to ſpeak of him, as I have done on ſome occaſions, he muſt thank no-body but himſelf; for I have ſuppreſs'd for fear of diſpleaſing him many Expreſſions and Thoughts, which his manner of acting breed naturally in the Mind. I have ſo great an Averſion to all uſeleſs conteſts, and that are prejudicial to Charity, that I will never anſwer thoſe who oppoſe me without underſtanding me, or whoſe Diſcourſes give me ſome reaſon to believe they have ſome other motive than the Love of Truth. As for others, I ſhall endeavour to ſatisfie them. I ſee plainly, that if I were oblig'd to anſwer all that have the good Will of aſſaulting me, I ſhould ſcarce ever enjoy the repoſe I deſire. But as there is no Law in *France* which hinders them from ſpeaking, ſo there is none which forbids me to be ſilent.

It may be whilſt I am ſilent, my Inſulters may find themſelves ill treated by ſome inviſible hand, for I cannot help it, if the Love of Truth provokes ſome Wits who might do it with better Grace to defend a work in which they had no part. But I wiſh this promiſe I make, and freely without any conſtraint may be remembred, and that thoſe Writings may not be imputed to me, which I might make, but which I declare I never will. Mean-time I think that thoſe that have nothing ſolid to oppoſe to me had much better ſay nothing, than fatigue the World with Writings, which break Charity and are uſeleſs to the diſcovery of Truth.

ADVERTISEMENT.

Since the firſt Impreſſion of this ſecond part, two Books have been publiſh'd relating to it. The firſt entitled, *Animadverſions upon the Animadverſions on the Search after Truth, wherein is diſcovered*, &c. I am highly oblig'd to the Author of theſe Animadverſions for the Honour he ſeems to do me by the Title of his Book: but ſince this Title may make the World believe I had ſome hand in his work; I think my ſelf oblig'd to ſay, that though I am very well ſatisfied with his Perſon, I am not extreamly pleas'd with his Book. Methinks that thoſe who meddle in defending or oppoſing others, ought to read their works carefully ſo as to be throughly acquainted with their opinions. But the Search after Truth you'll ſay merits not the Application of men of parts: True, it deſerves not therefore that the perſon ſpoken of, who undoubtedly is a man of great Sence and Worth ſhould either impugn or defend it.

The Title of the ſecond Book runs thus; *The Animadverters anſwer to the Preface of the Second Volume of the Search after Truth, wherein is examin'd*, &c. I intreat thoſe who intereſs themſelves in the difference of others, not to believe me on my bare word, nor eaſily to imagine I am in the right. I think I have Liberty to demand of them, that they will carefully examine the Anſwers I have made to the Animadverſions in that Preface, and the Argumentations of the Animadverter, in reference to the Book oppos'd; ſo I think I may without offence to the Author of this Anſwer, require of thoſe who would judge of it, not to imagine he has reaſon on his ſide, upon a ſlight and tranſient reading of his Book. I deſire them not to judge of any of his Anſwers before having examined it with reference to this Preface and the preceding Books. Take here for an inſtance the firſt of his Anſwers, which begins thus.

Upon what the Author of the Search pretends, the Animadverter impoſes on him touching his Deſign (a).

(a) Page 1. The Animadverter's Anſwer.

'Tis not impoſing on him, to make his Book paſs for a *Collection of Obſervations, thought by him uſefull to the diſcovery of Truth.* 'Tis plain I have poſitively declared that I look'd upon his Book, as *a Collection of many Remarks*, &c. If the Author had conſider'd theſe words, he would not have accus'd me of impoſing on him: for he could not deny, but he had a deſign of offering ſomething ſerviceable to the diſcovery of Truth, which is all that I attributed to him; *and lower.* Wherein I even prove that that is not to be imputed to him, which he af-

firms I impoſe upon him; *Laſtly, he concludes this Article with theſe words.* 'Tis therefore evident the Author of the Search cannot prove I impoſe on him, unleſs he will maintain he had a deſign of writing a Book altogether uſeleſs to the Search of Truth.

Theſe words might poſſibly make a man imagine, I had without reaſon accus'd the Animadverter of impoſing on me in the deſign of the Search; but whoever would but confront what he here ſays with the foregoing Preface, or with what he has ſaid himſelf, pag. 9, 10. *of his Animadverſions, would I hope be of another mind. That I may not give the trouble of turning to it, theſe are my words.*

Nevertheleſs as he is pleas'd to make me undertake a deſign I do not execute, that he may have the more to charge upon my conduct, ſo he goes to prove it was my deſign to lay down a Method in that Book. *I do him no injury,* ſays he, *in looking on his Book as a Method to lay the Foundation of the Sciences.* For beſides that, the Title expreſſes ſo much, he declares himſelf upon the point in the following manner: " Let us examine the cauſes and nature of " our Errors; and ſince the Method of examining things by conſidering them in their Birth " and Origin is the moſt regular and perſpicuous, and ſerves better than others to give us a " thorough knowledge of them, let us try to put it in practice.

Methinks theſe words, I do him no injury, *&c.* which I cite out of the Animadverſions are clear enough, and that a man need but underſtand Engliſh to ſee that the Animadverter impoſes on me a deſign of giving a Method, and pretends too to prove it by the *Title of the Search,* as alſo by a paſſage of the ſame Book; and yet he boldly concludes this Article with theſe words, *'Tis therefore evident the Author of the Search cannot prove I impoſe on him,* &c.

But what? he has poſitively declar'd he look'd upon the Search after Truth, as a Collection of many obſervations. *I cannot deny,* ſays he, *but he had a deſign of offering ſomething uſefull to the diſcovery of Truth, which is ALL* (mark that word) *I attribute to him*; ſince he has a mind to be diverted, ſee my anſwer.

A Painter has drawn a *Polyphemus*, and ſtanding behind his Piece, hears ſome Critick ſay, Look here Gentlemen, The Artiſt deſign'd to paint an *Hercules*, but if you mind it, it is a *Polyphemus*. The Painter out of patience, ſtarts from behind the Scene, and gives the Spectators to underſtand, he had no deſign of repreſenting an *Hercules*, and that he impoſes on him. The Critick ſurpriz'd, addreſſes the Painter, Sir, why ſo angry? what did you deſign to repreſent? *Polyphemus*, returns the Painter. Strange, Sir! replies the Critick, why do you ſay I impoſe on you, I call theſe Gentlemen to witneſs, that ALL that I ſaid, was, you had drawn a *Polyphemus*: upon which the Painter withdraws contented and ſays no more.

I think my ſelf therefore obliged to reſt ſilent upon ſuch like Anſwers. I have ſhown by the Animadverter's own words that he impoſes on me a deſign of giving a Method in the firſt Book of the Search, and that he likewiſe pretends to prove it. I have cited the place of the Animadverſions, from whence I have taken my proof. Nevertheleſs, this Author affirms he does not impoſe on me; *That 'tis evident I cannot prove it*: That he proves quite contrary, that what I ſay he impoſes on me is not to be imputed to me. That ALL he attributes to me is a deſign of offering ſomething uſefull to the diſcovery of Truth. In a word, that he has poſitively declared he look'd on the Search as a Collection of many Obſervations; as if from his regarding the Search as a Collection, it were to be concluded I had no other deſign.

I ſay no more then, but hope this example may keep men from judging without examining. I have taken the three firſt Pages of his Book, and have not given my ſelf the liberty of chuſing, which ought to be conſider'd; yet I intend not this for an Anſwer, remembring the obligation I have laid on my ſelf at the end of the preceding Preface; and I had rather thoſe who think I have not ſatisfied the Animadverſions, becauſe I have anſwer'd but three Chapters at length, ſhould ſay, this Book whereof I anſwer but three Pages, remains without reply, than weary the World with Anſwers, which tend only to the juſtifying other Replies.

F. *MALE-*

F. *MALEBRANCHE'S*

TREATISE

Concerning the

SEARCH after TRUTH.

TOME II. BOOK V.

CHAP. I.

Of the Nature and Original of Passions in general.

THE *Mind* of Man has two essential or necessary Relations extreamly different; the one to God, and the other to its Body. As *meer Mind*, it is essentially united to the Divine *Word*, the Eternal Wisdom and Truth; since it is only by that Union that 'tis capable of thinking, as is proved in the *Third Book*. As a *humane Mind*, it has an essential Relation to its Body, since it is by Virtue of that Union that it imagines and perceives by its Senses, as is explained in the *First* and *Second* Book. We call the Mind *Sense* or *Imagination*, when the Body is the natural or occasional Cause of its Thoughts: and we call it *Understanding*, when it acts by it self, or rather, when God acts in it, or his Light illuminates it several different ways, without a necessary Relation to what is done in the Body.

It's even so with the *Will* of Man; as a *Will*, it essentially depends on the Love that God bears to himself, on the Eternal Law, and in short on the Will of God. It is only because God loves himself, that we love any thing; for if God did not love himself, or did not continually influence the Soul of Man with a Love derived from his own; that is, with the Motion of Love, which a Man feels in himself for Good in general; we should love nothing, we should will nothing, and consequently should be destitute of Will; since Will is nothing else but that Impression of Nature that carries us towards Good in general, as hath been said several times *.

* *Book I. Chap. 1. and elsewhere.*

But the Will, considered as the Will of Man, essentially depends upon the Body, since it is by reason of the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits, that it is conscious to it self of all its sensible Commotions. And therefore I have called *Natural Inclinations* all the Motions, which the Soul has common with pure Intelligences, together with some in which the Body hath a great Share, but of which it is only the indirect Cause and End, and I have explained them in the foregoing Book. ——— Here I understand by *Passions*, *All the Motions which naturally affect the Soul, on occasion of the extraordinary Motion of the Blood, and* Animal *Spirits*. And so shall these sensible Commotions be the Subject of this Book.

Though the Passions be inseparable from the Inclinations, and Men be only susceptible of a sensible Love and Hatred, because they are capable of a Spiritual Love and Hatred; however it was thought fit to treat of them separately, in order to prevent Confusion. For if it be considered, That the Passions are far stronger and livelier than the Natural Inclinations, that they have for the most part other Objects, and are always produced by different Causes: it will be granted, That we do not distinguish, without Reason, things that are inseparable in their own Nature.

Men are capable of Sensations and Imaginations only because they are capable of pure Intellections, the Senses and Imagination being inseparable from the Mind; and yet none finds fault with those that distinctly treat of those Faculties of the Soul, which are naturally inseparable.

Laſt of all, the Senſes and Imagination differ not more from the pure underſtanding, than the Paſſions from the Inclinations. And therefore as the three firſt Faculties uſe to be diſtinguiſhed, ſo ought alſo the two laſt; that we may the better diſcern what the Soul receives from its Author, with Relation to its Body, from that which it alſo has from him, but without that Relation.

The only Inconvenience that may grow out of the diſtinction of two things ſo naturally united, is the neceſſity of repeating ſome things, that had been ſaid before, as is uſual in the like occaſions.

Man is one, though he be compounded of ſeveral parts, and the union of thoſe parts is ſo intimate, that one of them cannot be affected without a Commotion of the whole. All his Faculties are linked together, and ſo ſubordinated, that it is impoſſible to explain ſome of them, without touching upon the others. So that when we labour to find out a Method to prevent Confuſion, we neceſſarily fall into Repetitions: but 'tis better to repeat, than not to be Methodical, becauſe we ought above all to be plain and intelligible; and therefore whatever we can do in this occaſion, is to repeat, if poſſible, without wearying the Reader.

The Paſſions of the Soul are Impreſſions of the Author of Nature, which incline us to love our Body and whatever is uſeful for its preſervation: As the natural Inclinations are Impreſſions of the ſame Author, that principally move us to love him as the Soveraign Good.

The natural or occaſional Cauſe of theſe Impreſſions is the Motion of the Animal Spirits, which diſperſe through the Body, to produce and maintain in it a diſpoſition ſutable to the Object perceiv'd, that the Mind and Body may in that conjuncture mutually help each other. For 'tis the Inſtitution of God that our *Willings* be attended with ſuch Motions of our Body, as are fit to put them in execution; and that the Motions of our Body which Machinally riſe in us, at the perception of ſome object, be follow'd with a Paſſion of the Soul, that inclines us to will what ſeems at that time profitable to the Body. It is the continual Impreſſion of the Will of God upon us, that keeps us ſo ſtrictly united to a portion of matter; for if that Impreſſion of his Will ſhould ceaſe but a moment, we would inſtantly be rid of the Dependency upon our Body, and all the Changes it undergoes.

For I cannot underſtand what ſome people imagine, that there is a neceſſary Connection betwixt the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits, and the Commotions of the Soul. Some ſmall Particles of Choler violently move in the Brain, and therefore the Soul muſt be agitated with ſome Paſſion, and that Paſſion muſt be Anger rather than Love. What Relation can there be conceived betwixt the Idea of an Enemies Imperfections, the Paſſion of Contempt or Hatred, and the Corporeal Motion of ſome Particles of the Blood, that beat againſt ſome parts of the Brain? How they imagine that the one depend upon the other, and that the Union or Connection of two things ſo diſtant, and ſo incompatible, as the Mind and Matter, can be cauſed and preſerved any otherwiſe, than by the continual and Almighty Will of the Author of Nature, is to me unconceivable.

Thoſe that ſuppoſe that Bodies neceſſarily and by themſelves communicate their Motion to each other, in the inſtant of their concourſe, make but a probable ſuppoſition; neither is their prejudice altogether groundleſs, ſince Bodies ſeem to have an Eſſential Relation to Bodies. But the Mind and Body are two ſorts of Beings ſo oppoſite, that thoſe, who think that the Commotions of the Soul neceſſarily follow upon the Motion of the Blood and Animal Spirits, do it without the leaſt probability. For nothing but our own Conſciouſneſs of the Union of thoſe two Beings, and the Ignorance of the continual Operations of God upon his Creatures, can make us imagine another Cauſe of the Union of our Soul and Body, than the Will of God.

It is hard to determine, whether that Union or Connection of the thoughts of the Mind of Man, with the Motions of his Body, is a puniſhment of his Sin, or a Gift of Nature. And ſome perſons believe it a raſh and imprudent Attempt to chuſe one of theſe Opinions rather than the other. It is well known, that Man before his Sin was not a Slave, but abſolute Maſter of his Paſſions, and that he could, meerly by his Will, ſtop at his pleaſure, the Agitation of the Blood that cauſed them. But we can hardly perſwade our ſelves that the Body did not importune the Soul of the firſt Man to find out ſuch things as were fit for the preſervation of his Life: We can ſcarce believe but *Adam* before his Sin found Fruits pleaſant to the ſight and grateful to the Taſte; and if we rightly conſider the words of the Holy Scripture, we ſhall not come to think that the Oeconomy of the Senſes and Paſſions, which is ſo wonderfully contrived and adapted to the preſervation of the Body, is a Corruption of Nature, inſtead of its Original Inſtitution.

Doubtleſs nature is at this preſent corrupted: the Body acts too violently upon the Mind: and whereas it ought only to make an humble Repreſentation of its wants to the Soul, it domineers over her, takes her off from God, to whom ſhe ought to be inſeparably united, and continually applies her to the ſearch of ſuch ſenſible things, as tend to its preſervation. She is grown as it were material and terreſtrial ever ſince her Fall; the Eſſential Relation and Union that ſhe had with God being broken, that is to ſay, God being withdrawn from her, as much as he could be without her deſtruction and annihilation. A thouſand diſorders have attended the abſence or departure of him that preſerv'd her in Order; and without making a longer Enumeration of our Miſeries, I freely confeſs that Man ſince his Fall is corrupted in all his parts.

That

That Fall however has not quite deſtroyed the Work of God; for we can ſtill diſcover in Man, what God at firſt put in him, and his immutable Will, that conſtitutes the Nature of every thing, was not changed by the Inconſtancy and Fickleneſs of the Will of *Adam*. Whatever God has once will'd, he ſtill wills, and becauſe his Will is efficacious, brings it to paſs. The Sin of Man was indeed the Occaſion of that Divine Will, that makes the Diſpenſation of Grace, but Grace is not contrary to Nature; neither do they deſtroy each other; ſince God is not oppoſed to himſelf, that he never repents, and that his Wiſdom being without Limits, his Works will be without End.

And therefore the Will of God, that conſtitutes the Diſpenſation of Grace, is ſuperadded to that which makes the Oeconomy of Nature, in order to repair and not to change it. There are then in God but theſe two general Wills, and the Laws by which he governs the World, depend on either of them. It will plainly appear, by what follows, that the Paſſions are very well order'd, if conſidered only in reference to the Preſervation of the Body, though they deceive us in ſome very rare and particular Occaſions, which the univerſal Cauſe did not think fit to remedy. Thence I conclude, That the Paſſions belong to the Order of Nature, ſince they cannot be ranked under the Order of Grace.

'Tis true, that ſeeing the Sin of the *firſt Man* has deprived us of the Help of an always-preſent God, and always ready to defend us; It may be ſaid, That Sin is the Cauſe of our exceſſive adheſion to ſenſible things, becauſe Sin has eſtranged us from God, by whom alone we can be rid of our Slavery.

But without inſiſting longer upon the Enquiry after the firſt Cauſe of the Paſſions, let us examine their Extent, their particular Nature, their End, their Uſe, their Defects, and whatever they comprehend.

CHAP. II.

Of the Union of the Mind with ſenſible things; or of the Force and Extent of the Paſſions in general.

IF all thoſe who read this Work would be at the pains to reflect upon what they feel within themſelves; it would not be neceſſary to inſiſt upon our Dependency from all ſenſible Objects. I can ſay upon this Head but what every one knows as well as I do, if he will but think on it; and was therefore minded to paſs it over. But Experience having taught me, That Men often forget themſelves ſo far, as not to think or be aware of what they feel, nor to enquire into the Reaſon of what paſſes in their own Mind; I thought it fit to propoſe ſome Conſiderations that may help them to reflect upon it. And even I hope, That thoſe who know ſuch things will not think their Reading ill beſtowed: for though we do not care to hear ſimply rehearſed what we very well know, yet we uſe to be affected with Pleaſure at the hearing of what we know and feel together.

The moſt honourable Sect of Philoſophers, of whoſe Opinions many Pretenders boaſt ſtill now a-days, will perſwade us, That it is in our power to be happy. The *Stoicks* * continually ſay, We ought only to depend upon our ſelves; we ought not to be vexed for the Loſs of Dignities, Eſtates, Friends, Relations; we ought to be always calm and without the leaſt Diſturbance whatever happens; Baniſhment, Injuries, Affronts, Diſeaſes, and even Death are no Evils, and ought not to be feared, and a thouſand Paradoxes of that Nature, which we are apt enough to believe; both becauſe of our Pride, that makes us affect Independency, as that becauſe Reaſon teaches us that moſt part of the Evils, with which we are vexed, would not be able to diſturb us, if all things remained in good Order.

* *Tunc beatum eſſe te judica cum tibi ex te gaudium omne naſcetur; cum in his quæ homines eripiunt, optant, cuſtodiunt, nihil inveneris, non dico quod malis, ſed quod velis.* Sen. Epiſt. 124.

But God has given us a Body, and by that Body united us to all ſenſible things: Sin has ſubjected us to our Body, and by our Body made us dependent upon all ſenſible things. It is the Order of Nature, it is the Will of the Creatour, that all the Beings that he has made ſhould hang together: And therefore being united to all things, and the Sin of the *firſt Man* having made us *dependent* on all Beings, to which God had only *united* us: there is now none but he is at once united and ſubjected to his Body, and by his Body to his Relations, Friends, City, Prince, Country, Cloaths, Houſe, Eſtate, Horſe, Dog, to all the Earth, to the Sun, the Stars, and the Heavens.

It's then ridiculous to tell Men, that it is in their power to be happy, wiſe, and free: It is to jeer them, ſeriouſly to adviſe them they ought not to be vexed for the Loſs of their Friends or Eſtates. For as it were abſurd to exhort Men not to feel Pain when they are beaten, or not to be ſenſible of Pleaſure when they eat with an Appetite; ſo the *Stoicks* are either unreaſonable, or not in good earneſt, when they cry, That we ought not to be ſorry for the Death of our Father, the Loſs of our Goods, our Baniſhment, Impriſonment, and the like; nor to be glad of the happy Succeſs of our Affairs: ſince we are united to our

Country, Goods, Friends, *&c.* by a Natural Union, which at preſent has no dependance on our Will. I grant that Reaſon teaches us, we are to undergo Baniſhment without Sorrow: but the ſame Reaſon likewiſe teaches us we ought to endure the cutting off our Arm without Pain; becauſe the Soul is ſuperiour to the Body, and that, according to the light of Reaſon, her happineſs or miſery ought not to depend upon it: but 'tis ridiculous to argue againſt Experience, which in this occaſion will convince us that things are not ſo, as our Reaſon intimates they ought to be.

The Philoſophy of the Chriſtians is quite different from that; they deny not but Pain is an Evil, and that it is hard to be ſeparated from thoſe things to which Nature has united us, or to rid our ſelves from the Slavery Sin has reduc'd us to. They agree that it is a diſorder that the Soul ſhould depend upon her Body, but they own withal that ſhe depends upon it, and even ſo much that ſhe cannot free her ſelf from that ſubjection but by the Grace of our Lord. *I ſee*, ſaith *St. Paul*, *another Law in my Members warring againſt the Law of my Mind, and bringing me into Captivity to the Law of Sin, which is in my Members. O wretched Man that I am! who ſhall deliver me from the Body of this Death? the Grace of God through Jeſus Chriſt our Lord ſhall do it.* The Son of God, his Apoſtles and all his true Diſciples command us above all to be Patient, becauſe they know that miſery muſt be the Expectation and Portion of the Righteous. In ſhort true Chriſtians or true Philoſophers, ſay nothing, but what is agreeable to ſound Reaſon and Experience; whereas all Nature continually impugns the proud Opinion and preſumption of the *Stoicks*.

Rom. 7. 23, 24.

The Chriſtians know that to free themſelves in ſome manner from the ſubjection they are under, they muſt endeavour to deprive themſelves of all thoſe things that they cannot enjoy without Pleaſure, nor want without Pain; it being the only means to preſerve that Peace and liberty of Mind, which they owe to their deliverer's Beneficence. On the contrary the *Stoicks*, following the falſe Notions of their Chimerical Philoſophy, imagine that they are wiſe and happy, and that they need but think upon Virtue and Independency, to become Virtuous and Independent. Sound Reaſon and Experience aſſure us, that the beſt way not to feel the ſmart of ſtinging is to ſhun the Nettle: but the *Stoicks* ſay, "Sting me never ſo much, I ſhall "by the ſtrength of my Mind, and the help of my Philoſophy, raiſe my ſelf ſo high above "my Body, that all your pricking ſhall not reach me. I can demonſtrate that my Happineſs "depends not upon it, and that ſmart is not an Evil; and you ſhall ſee by the Colour of my "Face, and by the whole deportment of my Body, that my Philoſophy has made me invul-"nerable.

Their Pride bears up their Courage, however it hinders not but that they ſhould ſuffer Pain with Vexation, and be really miſerable; ſo that their Union with their Body is not deſtroyed, nor their Pain vaniſhed; but all this proceeds from their Union with other Men, ſtrengthned by the deſire of their Eſteem, which in ſome manner withſtands the Union of their Soul with their Body. The ſenſible view of the Spectators, to whom they are united, ſtops the Courſe of the Animal Spirits that ſhould follow upon the ſmart, and blots out the Impreſſion they would make upon their Face; for was there no body to look on them, that Phantaſm of Conſtancy and liberty of mind would preſently vaniſh: So that the *Stoicks* do only withſtand the Union of their Soul to their Body, by making themſelves greater Slaves to other men, to whom they are united by a drift of Glory. And 'tis therefore an undoubted truth, that all Men are united to all ſenſible things, both by Nature and their Concupiſcence; which may ſufficiently be known by Experience, and of which all the Actions of Mankind are ſenſible demonſtrations, though Reaſon ſeems to oppoſe it.

Though this Union be common to all men, 'tis not however of an equal Extent and Strength in all; for as it proceeds from the Knowledge of the Mind; ſo it may be ſaid that we are not actually united to unknown objects. A Clown in his Cottage does not concern himſelf with the Glory of his Prince and Country, but only with the honour of his own and the Neighbouring Villages; becauſe his Knowledge does not extend farther.

The Union with ſuch Objects as we have ſeen, is ſtronger than the Union to thoſe we have only imagin'd, or heard relation of; becauſe by Senſation we are more ſtrictly united to ſenſible things, as leaving deeper Impreſſions in our brain, and moving the animal Spirits in a more violent manner, than when they are only imagin'd.

Neither is that Union ſo ſtrong in thoſe that continually oppoſe it, that they may adhere to the Goods of the Mind, as it is in thoſe who ſuffer themſelves to be carried away and inſlav'd by their Paſſions, ſince Concupiſcence increaſes and ſtrengthens that Union.

Laſt of all, the ſeveral Employments and States of this Life, together with the various diſpoſitions of divers Perſons, cauſe a conſiderable difference between the ſenſible Union of Men with Earthly Goods: Great Lords have greater Dependencies than other Men, and their Chains, as I may call them, are longer. The General of an Army depends on all his Souldiers, becauſe all his Souldiers reverence him. This Slavery is often the Cauſe of his Valour, and the deſire of being eſteem'd by thoſe that are Witneſſes of his Actions, often drives him to Sacrifice to it more ſenſible and rational deſires. The ſame may be ſaid of all thoſe that make a great Figure in the World, Vanity being many times the Spur of their Virtue, becauſe the love of Glory is ordinarily ſtronger than the love of Truth. I ſpeak here of the love of Glory,

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not as a simple Inclination but as a Passion, since that love may become sensible, and is often attended with very lively and violent Commotions of the Animal Spirits. Again the different Ages and Sexes are primary Causes of the difference of Passions. Children love not the same things as adult and old Men, or at least love them not with that force and Constancy. Women depend only on their Family and Neighbourhood; but the dependencies of Men extend to their whole Country, because 'tis their part to defend it; and that they are mightily taken up with those great Offices, Honours and Commands, that the State may bestow upon them.

There is such a variety in the Employments and Engagements of Men, that it is impossible to explain them all. The disposition of Mind in a Married Man is altogether different from that of a single Person; for the former is in a manner wholly taken up with the care of his Family. A Fryer has a Soul of another make, and depends upon fewer things than the Men of the World, and even than Secular Ecclesiasticks, but he is stronger fastned to those few things. One may argue in the same manner concerning the different States of Men in general, but the little particulars cannot be made out, because they differ almost in every private Person; it often hapning that men have particular Engagements altogether opposite to those that they ought to have in reference to their condition. But though the different Genius and Inclinations of Men, Women, Old Men, Young men, Rich, Poor, Learned, and Ignorant, in short, of all the different Sexes, Ages and Conditions, cannot be fully treated of in general; yet they are too well known by those that are conversant with the World, and of all the thinking part of Mankind, to increase with them the Bulk of this Book; especially, seeing that our Eyes may afford us a very pleasant and solid Instruction of all such matters. But if any chuse to read them in Greek, rather than to learn them by his own reflection on what he sees, I referr him to the second Book of the Rhetoricks of *Aristotle*; which I take to be the Master-Piece of that Philosopher; because he sayes there few things, in which he can be mistaken; and that he seldom ventures to prove what he asserts.

It is therefore evident that the sensible Union of the Spirit of Men, with whatever has any Relation to the preservation of their Life, or of the Society of which they are Members, differs in different Persons; reaching farther in those that have more Knowledge, that are in a higher Station, and are endued with a larger Fancy; whereas that Union is stricter and stronger in those that are more sensible, that have a livelier Imagination, and have more blindly given up themselves to the violence of their Passions.

Such Considerations upon the almost infinite bands that fasten Men to sensible Objects, are of an extraordinary Use; and the best way to become a great proficient in this sort of learning, is the study and observation of our selves; since from the Inclinations and Passions, of which we are conscious to our selves, we can make a right guess at those of other Men; to which adding the Information we can get of their particular Engagements, and of the different Judgments that follow from every different Passion, of which we shall speak hereafter; it may perhaps not prove so hard a Task to guess most part of their Actions, as it is for an Astronomer to foretel an Eclipse. For though men be free, yet it seldom happens that they make use of their Liberty, in opposition to their Natural Inclinations and violent Passions.

Before the Close of this Chapter I must observe, that it is one of the Laws of the Union of the Soul and Body, that all the Inclinations of the Soul, even those she has for Goods, that have no relation to the Body, should be attended with Commotions of the Animal Spirits, that render those Inclinations sensible; because Man being not a pure Spirit, it is impossible he should have any Inclination altogether pure, and without mixture of any Passion whatsoever. So that the love of Truth, Justice, Virtue, of God himself, is always attended by some Motion of the Animal Spirits that render that love sensible, though we be not aware of their sensibility, being then taken up with livelyer Sensations. Likewise the Knowledge of Spiritual things is always accompany'd with traces on the Brain, which indeed quicken that Knowledge, but make it commonly more confused: 'Tis true we are frequently inapprehensive of the Imagining Faculties mixing in any manner with the Conception of an abstracted Truth. The Reason of it is, that those Truths are not represented by Images, or traces of Nature's Institution, and that all the Traces that raise such Ideas, have no Relation with them, but such as proceeds from Chance, or the Free-will of Men. For Instance, Arithmeticians and Algebraists, who apply themselves to very abstracted Objects, make however a very great use of their Imagination, in order to fix the view of their mind upon these Spiritual Ideas. The Cyphers, the Letters of the Alphabet, and the other Figures, which they see or imagine are always join'd to those Ideas, though the traces that are wrought by these Characters have no proper Relation to those abstracted Objects, and so can neither change nor obscure them: Whence follows, that by a proper Use and Application of these Cyphers and Letters, they come to discover such remote and difficult Truths, as could not be found out otherwise.

Since therefore the Ideas of such things, as are only perceivable by the pure understanding, can be connected with the traces of the brain, and that the sight of objects that are beloved, hated or fear'd by a Natural Inclination, can be attended with the Motion of the Animal Spi-

rists, it plainly appears, that the thoughts of Eternity, the fear of Hell, the hope of an Eternal Happiness, though they be objects never so insensible, can however raise in us very violent Passions.

And therefore we can say that we are united in a sensible manner, not only to such things as relate to the preservation of our Life, but also to spiritual things, with which the mind is immediately, and by it self, united. And even it often happens, that Faith, Charity, and Self-Love, make that Union with spiritual things stronger, than that by which we are join'd to sensible Objects. The Soul of the true Martyrs is more united to God, than to their Body, and those that suffer Death for asserting a false Religion, which they believe to be true, give us sufficiently to know, that the fear of Hell has more power upon them, than the fear of Death. There is for the most so much heat and obstinacy on both sides, in the Wars of Religion, and the defence of Superstitions, that it cannot be doubted but some Passion has a hand in it: And even a Passion far stronger and stedfaster than others, because it is kept up by an Appearance of Reason, both in such as are deceived, and in those that follow the truth.

We are then united by our Passions to whatever seems to be the Good or the Evil of the Mind, as well as to that which we take for the good or evil of the Body. Whatever can be known to have any Relation to us can also affect us, and of all the things we know, there is not one but it has some reference or other to us. We are somewhat concern'd even for the most abstracted truths, when we know them, because there is at least that Relation of Knowledge betwixt them and our Mind, and that in some manner we look on them as our Property, by virtue of that Knowledge. We feel our selves, as wounded when they are Impugn'd, and if we be wounded, then surely we are affected and vexed. So that the Passions have such a vast Dominion, that it is impossible to conceive any thing in Reference to which it may be said that Men are exempt from their Empire. But let's now see what is their Nature, and endeavour to discover whatever they comprehend.

CHAP. III.

A particular Explanation of all the Changes, happening either to the Body or Soul in every Passion.

SEven things may be distinguished in each of our Passions, save Admiration only, which is indeed but an Imperfect Passion.

The first is the Judgment the Mind makes of an Object, or rather the confused or distinct View of the Relation that Object has to us.

The second is a New Determination of the Motion of the Will towards that Object, provided it *be* or *seem* to be a *good*. Before that View, the Natural Motion of the Soul was either undetermin'd, that is to say, she was carried towards good in general, or it was otherwise determined by the knowledge of some particular Object. But in the very instant of the *mind*'s perceiving that Relation of the new object to *it self*, that general Motion of the Will is forthwith determin'd, conformably to the perception of the Mind. The Soul advances near that object by her Love, that she may relish it, and discover her good in it, through a sensible delectation which the Author of Nature affords her, as a Natural Reward of her Inclination to Good. She judged that that object was a good by an abstracted and unpathetic Reason, but she persists in the perswasion of it, through the Efficacy of Sensation; and the livelyer that Sensation is, the stronger is her adhesion to the Good that seems to be the Cause of it.

But if that Particular Object be consider'd as Evil, or able to deprive us of some good, there happens no New Determination in the Motion of the Will; but only the Motion towards the *Good*, oppos'd to that seemingly *evil* object, is augmented: which augmentation is greater or lesser, as the Evil seems to be more or less formidable to us. For indeed we *hate* only because we *love*, and the evil that is without us is judg'd no farther evil, than with Reference to the Good of which it deprives us: So that evil being consider'd as a privation of Good, to fly from evil is to fly the Privation of Good, which is the same thing as to tend towards Good; and therefore there happens no new determination in the Natural Motion of the Will, at the presence of an unwellcome object; but only a Sensation, painful, distastful or imbitter'd, which the Author of Nature inflicts on the Soul, as a pain naturally consequent to her being depriv'd of Good. * Reason alone had not been sufficient to carry her to it, wherefore this painful and vexing Sensation is superadded to quicken her. Thence I conclude, that in any Passion whatsoever, all the Motions of the Soul towards good, are the Motions of Love. But as we are affected with divers Sensations, according to the various Circumstances that attend

* *Before Sin, that Sensation was not a pain, but only a warning; because, as I have said elsewhere,* Adam *might, when ever he pleased, stop the Motion of the Animal Spirits that produce pain: So that, if he ever felt pain, 'twas because he consented to feel it; or rather he never felt any, because he never had a mind to feel it.*

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the View of Good, and the Motion of the Soul towards it; so we come to confound our Sensations with the Commotions of the Soul, and to imagine as many different Motions in the Passions, as there are different Sensations.

Upon this head it must be observed that pain is a true and real evil, and no more the Privation of Pleasure, than Pleasure the Privation of Pain: for there is a great difference betwixt being deprived of such a Sensation, and the actual enduring of Pain: So that every evil is not precisely so, because it deprives us of good, but only that evil, as I have explain'd, that is without us, or is not a Modification of our Soul. Nevertheless as by goods and evils we commonly understand things good or evil, and not the Sensations of Pleasure and Pain, which are rather the Natural Tokens, by which the Soul distinguishes good from evil; It may be said, Methinks, without Equivocation, that Evil is nothing but the privation of Good, and that the natural motion of the Soul, that removes us from Evil, is the same with that which carries us to good; for in brief, all Natural Motion being an Impression of the Author of Nature, whose acting centers in himself, and who can incline us only towards himself: The true Motion of the Soul is always essentially the Love of Good, and but accidentally an Aversion from Evil.

I grant that Pain may be consider'd as an Evil, and in that Sense the Motion of the Passions, which is stir'd up by it, is not real, since we never will Pain, and though we positively will the absence of Pain, yet 'tis only because we positively will the preservation or perfection of our Being.

The third thing to be observ'd in every Passion is the Sensation that attends them; the Sensation of Love, Hatred, Desire, Joy, Sorrow, which are all different in the different Passions.

The fourth thing is a new Determination of the course of the Animal Spirits and Blood to the outward and inward parts of the Body. Before the View of the Object of the Passion, the vital Spirits were dispers'd throughout the whole Body, for the preservation of all its parts in general; but at the appearance of that new object, all this Order and Oeconomy is disturb'd, and most part of the Spirits are thrown into the Muscles of the Arms, Legs, Face, and other exterior parts of the Body, to put them in a disposition suitable to the ruling Passion, and to give it such a gesture and motion, as are necessary for the obtaining or avoiding the imminent good or evil: But if its own Forces are insufficient for its occasions, these same Spirits are distributed in such a manner as make it mechanically utter certain words and cryes; and which diffuse over the Face and the rest of the Body, such an air and comportment, as is capable of actuating others with the same Passion it self is possess'd with. For Men and Beasts having a mutual cohesion by the Eyes and Ears, when any one of them is in a Violent Commotion, it necessarily affects the Spectators and Hearers, and naturally makes upon their Imagination such an Impression, as troubles them, and moves them to preserve it.

As to the rest of the Animal Spirits, they violently descend into the Heart, Lungs, Liver, Spleen, and other *Viscera*, thence to draw contributions, and to hasten those parts to send forth a sufficient and timely supply of Spirits, necessary to preserve the Body in that extraordinary Contention.

The fifth thing is a sensible Commotion of the Soul, who feels her self agitated by an unexpected overflow of Spirits. This sensible Commotion of the Soul always attends that Motion of the Spirits, that the Soul may participate of all that affects the Body; even as the Motion of Spirits is raised in the Body, when the Soul is carried toward any object. For the Body and Soul being mutually united, their Motions are Reciprocal.

The sixth thing are several Sensations of Love, Hatred, Joy, Desire, Sorrow, that are produced, not by the Intellectual view of good or evil, as those that have been already mention'd, but by the various Contussions that are caused in the brain by the Animal Spirits.

The seventh thing is a certain Sensation of Joy, or rather internal satisfaction, which detains the Soul in her Passion, and assures her that she is in the fittest State she can be, in reference to the object she considers. This internal satisfaction attends all the Passions whatsoever, whether they proceed from the sight of an Evil, or from the sight of a Good, Sorrow as well as Joy. This satisfaction makes all the Passions pleasant, and induces us to yield our consent, and give up our selves to them; and 'tis that satisfaction which must be overcome by the Delights of Grace, and the Comforts of Faith and Reason. For as the Joy of the Mind is the result of a certain or evident Knowledge that we are in the best State that can be, in relation to the Objects perceiv'd by the understanding; so the pleasantness of the Passions is a natural consequence of that confused Sensation we have of being in the best State that can be in reference to those things we perceive by our Senses. Now 'tis by the Joy of the Mind, and the Comforts of Grace, that the false delight of the Passions, which makes us Slaves to sensible goods, must be vanquished.

All the forementioned things are to be found in all the Passions, unless they be raised by confused Sensations, and that the Mind perceive not the Good or Evil from whence they proceed; for then 'tis plain, that they have not the three first qualifications. It likewise appears that all these things are not free, since they are in us without our Consent, and even against it after the Sin; but that the consent of our will is the only thing which is really in our Power.

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However it will be fit to explain those things more at large, and to make them more sensible by some Instances.

Let us suppose a Man to whom an Affront has been actually offer'd, or one whose Imagination is either naturally strong and lively, or over-heated by some Accident, as a Disease or a surfeit of Sorrow and Melancholy. This Man in his Closet fancies that such a one, who perhaps does not think upon him, is willing and ready to wrong him. The sensible View, or the Imagination of the Opposition betwixt the Actions of his Enemy and his own designs, will be the first Cause of his Passion.

That the Motion of this Man's Will may acquire some new determination, it is not absolutely necessary, that he should receive, or imagine he receives any Affront; for 'tis sufficient that his Mind only should think on it, without his Body's being concern'd in it. However as this new determination would not be the determination of a Passion, but only a most weak and languishing Inclination: 'Tisbetter to suppose that some great opposition is actually made to this Man's Designs, or that he strongly fancies that it will be so; than to make another supposition, wherein the Senses and Imagination are little or not at all concern'd.

The second thing to be consider'd in this Man's Passion, is an increase of the Motion of his Will towards that good, of which his real or pretended Enemy endeavours to deprive him: the stronger the opposition is, or appears, the more considerable will be the increase. He at first hates his Adversary, only because he loves that good, and his hatred against him grows in proportion to his love for it; because the Motion of the Will in the Passion of hatred is at bottom nothing else but a Motion of Love; that Motion of the Soul towards good not differing from that by which she avoids its privation, as has been already observ'd.

The third thing is a Sensation suitable to that Passion; In our Instance 'tis a Sensation of hatred. But though the Motion of hatred be the same with that of Love; yet the Sensation of hatred is altogether different from that of Love, as any one may experience in himself. Motions are Actions of the Will, but Sensations are Modifications of the Mind. The Motions of the Will are natural Causes of the Sensations of the Mind; and these Sensations of the Mind encourage and keep up the Motions of the Will in their Determination. The Sensation of hatred is in the Man before us, the natural result of the Motion of his Will, excited upon the view of Evil, and this Motion is afterwards maintained by the Sensation it hath produced.

What we have just now said of this Man might happen to him, though he had not a Body. But because he's made up of two substances naturally united, the Motions of his Soul are communicated to his Body, and those of his Body to his Soul; so that the New Determination, or the Increase of the Motion of his Will, naturally causes a new Determination in the Motion of the Animal Spirits, which is always different in all the Passions, though the Motion of the Soul be still almost the same.

The Spirits therefore are violently driven into the Arms, Legs and Face, to dispose the Body in a manner adapted to the Passion, and to shed over the Face the Look of an injured Person, with reference to all the Circumstances of the injury receiv'd, and to the Quality and Capacity both of the Agent and Patient. That Expansion of the Spirits is so much the more strong, abundant and quick, as the good is greater, the Opposition more vehement, and the Brain livelyer affected.

And therefore if the Person whereof we speak only imagine himself injur'd, or if he receive a real but slight injury, that makes no considerable concussion in the Brain, the Expansion of the Animal Spirits will prove weak and languishing, and perhaps insufficient to alter the natural and ordinary Constitution of the Body. But if the outrage be exceeding great, or the Imagination enflam'd, the Brain will be extraordinarily shaken, and the Spirits so violently dispers'd, that in a moment they will imprint on the Face and Body the Symptoms of the ruling Passion. If he be strong enough to obtain the Victory, his Countenance will be fierce and threatning. If weak and unable to withstand the overwhelming evil, he will appear humble and submissive. His Moans and Tears naturally exciting in the Spectators, and even in his Enemy Motions of Pity, he will draw from thence those succours which he could not expect from his own strength: True it is, that if the Spirits and Fibres of the Brain, in the Spectators and Adversary of that unhappy Wretch, be already agitated with a violent Motion, contrary to that which breeds compassion in the Soul, the bemoanings of the distress'd will but increase their Fury; and so would his undoing be inevitable, should he always keep the same Countenance and Aspect. But Nature has provided for it, for at the sight of the imminent loss of a great good, there are naturally produced on the Face such strange and surprizing Characters of rage and despair, as to disarm the most Barbarous Enemies, and to make them as it were unmoveable. That frightful and unexpected sight of the Lineaments of Death, drawn by the hand of nature upon the Face of an Unfortunate Person, stops in the very Enemy, stricken therewith, the Motions of the Spirits and Blood, that carried him to revenge; and in that favourable moment of Audience, Nature printing again an humble submissive air upon the Face of the poor Wretch, that begins to entertain some hopes, because of the unmoveableness and alteration of the Countenance of his Enemy, the Animal Spirits of that Enemy receive a new determination, of which they were not capable a moment before;

and

and this Machinal Motion of Compaſſion inclines the Soul to yield to the Pleas of Charity and Mercy.

Becauſe a Man taken up with a Paſſion, cannot, without a great plenty of Spirits, produce or preſerve in his Brain an Image of his Miſery lively enough, nor a Concuſſion ſufficiently ſtrong, to give his Body an extraordinary and conſtrain'd Diſpoſition: the correſponding Nerves within the Body renew upon his ſight of the Evil, the Concuſſions and Agitations that are neceſſary to infuſe, into all the Veſſels that communicate with the Heart, fit Humours, to the producing ſuch Spirits as the Paſſion requires. For the Animal Spirits ſpreading through the Nerves that go to the Liver, Spleen, *Pancreas*, and all the other *Viſcera*, agitate and ſhake them, and by their Agitation force out ſuch Humours as thoſe Parts keep in Reſerve, for the Wants and Exigencies of the Machine.

But if thoſe Humours always flowed in the ſame manner into the Heart, if they received an equal Fermentation in different times, and the Spirits that are made of them regularly aſcended into the Brain, we ſhould not ſee ſuch haſty Changes in the Motions of Paſſions. For Inſtance, the ſight of a Magiſtrate would not ſtop of a ſudden the extravagant Tranſports of an enraged Perſon, purſuing his Revenge, and his Face, all fiery with Blood and Spirits, would not in an inſtant turn pale and wan for fear of Puniſhment.

So, to hinder thoſe Humours that are mixed with the Blood from entring the Heart conſtantly in the ſame manner, there are Nerves that ſurround all the Avenues thereof, which being compreſſed or dilated by the Impreſſion, that the Sight of the Object, and the Strength of the Imagination produce in the Spirits, ſhut up or open the way to thoſe Humours. And leſt the ſaid Humours ſhould undergo the ſame Agitation and Fermentation in the Heart in diverſe times; there are other Nerves that cauſe the Beatings of it, which being not equally agitated in the different Motions of the Spirits, drive not the Blood with the ſame force into the Arteries. Other Nerves ſpread through the Lungs, diſtribute the Air to the Heart, by conſtringing or relaxing ſeveral Branches of the *Trachea* uſed in Reſpiration, and order the Fermentation of the Blood proportionably to the Circumſtances of the predominant Paſſion.

Laſt of all, to regulate with the greateſt Accuracy and Readineſs the Courſe of the Spirits, there are Nerves ſurrounding the Arteries, as well thoſe that end in the Brain, as thoſe that carry the Blood into the other Parts of the Body; ſo that the Concuſſion of the Brain, which accompanies the unexpected Sight of ſome Circumſtance, for which 'tis convenient that the Motions of the Paſſion ſhould be alter'd, ſuddenly determines the Courſe of the Spirits to the Nerves thus ſurrounding the Arteries; that by their Contraction they may ſhut up the Paſſage to the Blood that aſcends into the Brain, and by their Dilatation lay it open to that which runs into the other Parts of the Body.

When thoſe Arteries that carry the Blood to the Brain are free and open; and on the contrary, thoſe that diſperſe it thro' the reſt of the Body are ſtrongly bound up by theſe Nerves, the Head muſt all be full of Blood, and the Face appear all fiery; but ſome Circumſtance altering the Commotion of the Brain, that cauſed that Diſpoſition in the Nerves, the Arteries that were ſtrait bound are looſened, and on the contrary, the Arteries of the Brain ſtrongly contracted. Then is the Head emptied of Blood, the Face covered with Paleneſs, and the ſmall quantity of Blood, which iſſues from the Heart, and which the Nerves admit into it, as the Fewel to keep in Life, deſcends moſt or all into the lower parts of the Body; the Brain wants Animal Spirits, and all the reſt of the Body is ſeized with Weakneſs and Trembling.

To explain and prove the Particulars of what we have mentioned, it would be neceſſary to give a general Knowledge of *Phyſicks*, and a particular of the *Humane Body*; but thoſe two Sciences are ſtill too imperfect to be treated of with as much Accuracy as I could wiſh: beſides that, ſhould I proceed farther in this Matter, it would carry me too far from my Subject; and therefore I only deſign here to give a groſs and general Idea of the Paſſions, and am ſatisfied, provided that this Idea be not falſe.

Thoſe Concuſſions of the Brain, and Motions of the Blood and Spirits, are the fourth thing to be found in every Paſſion, and produce the fifth, namely the ſenſible Commotion of the Soul.

At the very Inſtant that the Animal Spirits are driven from the Brain into the reſt of the Body, to produce ſuch Motions as are fit to keep up the Paſſion; the Soul is carried towards the good perceived: and this more or leſs ſtrongly, according as the Spirits come down from the Brain with more or leſs vehemence; for 'tis that Concuſſion of the Brain which agitates the Soul and the Animal Spirits.

The Motion of the Soul towards Good is ſo much ſtronger, as the View of Good is more ſenſible and apparent; and the Motion of the Spirits that proceed from the Brain, and flow into the other Parts of the Body, is the more violent, as the Vibration of the Fibres of the Brain, cauſed by the Impreſſion of the Object or of the Imagination, is more forcible; becauſe that Concuſſion of the Brain occaſioning a more ſenſible and lively View of Good, neceſſarily makes the Commotion of the Soul in the Paſſions to increaſe proportionably to the Motion of the Spirits.

Thoſe Commotions of the Soul are not different from thoſe that immediately follow the Intellectual View of Good, which we have mentioned before: only they are ſtronger and livelyer, becauſe of the Union of the Soul and Body, and the Senſibleneſs of the View that produces them.

The ſixth thing to be met with is the Senſation of the Paſſion; the Senſation of Love, Hatred, Deſire, Joy or Sorrow. This Senſation is not at all different from that which has been ſpoken of, only 'tis livelyer becauſe the Body has a greater ſhare in it: but 'tis always attended with a confuſed Senſation of Satisfaction, that makes all the Paſſions grateful, which is the laſt thing to be found in each of them, as has been already hinted.

The Cauſe of this laſt Senſation is ſuch. At the ſight of the Object of a Paſſion, or of any new Circumſtance, part of the Animal Spirits are driven from the Head to the outward Parts of the Body, to put it in the Diſpoſition that the Paſſion requires; together with which ſome other Spirits make a violent deſcent into the Heart, Lungs, and other *Viſcera*, to draw from thence the neceſſary Supplies, as has been already ſufficiently explained. Now the Body is never in a convenient State, but the Soul reliſhes it with great Satisfaction, whereas it is never in a State contrary to its Good and Preſervation, but that ſhe endures it with pain. And therefore when we follow the Motions of our Paſſions, and ſtop not the Courſe of the Spirits, which the View of the Object of the Paſſion produces in the Body, to put it in the moſt convenient State with relation to that Object, the Soul by Nature's Law is affected with a Senſation of Satisfaction and Delight, becauſe her Body is in the Diſpoſition it requires: whereas when, according to the Laws of Reaſon, the Soul ſtops the Current of the Spirits, and withſtands thoſe Paſſions, ſhe ſuffers a Pain proportionable to the Evil that may from thence ariſe to the Body.

For as the Reflection that the Soul makes upon her ſelf is neceſſarily accompanied with the Joy or Sorrow of the Mind, and afterwards with the Joy or Sorrow of the Senſes; when doing her Duty, and ſubmitting to the Orders of God, ſhe is conſcious that ſhe is in a convenient ſtate; or when having given her ſelf up to her Paſſions, ſhe is afterwards affected with Remorſe, which teaches her that ſhe is in a corrupt Diſpoſition: So the Courſe of the Spirits raiſed for the good of the Body, is firſt attended with Senſible, and afterwards with Spiritual Joy or Sorrow, according as the Courſe of the Animal Spirits is retarded or promoted by the Will.

There is however this notable difference betwixt the Intellectual Joy that attends the clear Knowledge of the good Eſtate of the Soul, and the ſenſible Pleaſure that accompanies the confuſed Senſation of the good diſpoſition of the Body; that the intellectual Joy is ſolid and ſubſtantial, without Remorſe, and as immutable as its Original, the Truth; whereas ſenſible Joy is almoſt ever followed with the Sorrow of the Mind, or the Remorſe of the Conſcience, which makes it as reſtleſs and fickle, as the Paſſion or Agitation of the Blood from whence it proceeds. To conclude, the firſt is for the moſt part attended with an exceeding Joy of the Senſes, derived from the Knowledge of the great good that the Soul poſſeſſes; whereas the other is very rarely accompanied with any great Joy of the Mind, though it proceeds from a good conſiderable for the Body, but contrary to the Perfection of the Soul.

'Tis nevertheleſs true, That without the Grace of our Lord, the ſatisfaction the Soul reliſhes when ſhe gives her ſelf up to her Paſſions is more grateful, than that which ſhe enjoys when ſhe follows the Rules of Reaſon; which ſatisfaction is the Source of all the Diſorders that have attended the Original Sin, and would have made us all Slaves to our Paſſions, had not the Son of God rid us from their Tyranny, by the Delectation of his Grace. For what I have ſaid on behalf of the Joy of the Mind in oppoſition to the Joy of the Senſes, is only true amongſt the Chriſtians, and was altogether falſe in the Mouths of *Seneca*, *Epicurus*, and all the moſt rational of the *Heathen-Philoſophers*; becauſe the *Yoke* of *Chriſt* is only *ſweet* to thoſe that belong to him, and his *Burthen* only *light*, when his Grace helps us to ſupport the Weight of it.

CHAP. IV.

That the Pleaſure and Motion of the Paſſions engage us in Errours, and falſe Judgments about Good; that we ought continually to reſiſt them. How to impugn Libertiniſm.

ALL thoſe general Qualities and Effects of the Paſſions, that we have hitherto treated of, are not free, they are in us without our Leave or Notice, and nothing but the Conſent of our Will is wholly in our Power. The View or Apprehenſion of Good is naturally followed with a Motion of Love, a Senſation of Love, a Concuſſion of the Brain, a Motion of

of the Spirits, a new Commotion of the Soul that increaſes the firſt Motion of Love, a new Senſation of the Soul, that likewiſe augments the firſt Senſation of Love; and laſtly, a Senſation of Satisfaction ariſing from the convenient State of the Body. All this happens to the Soul and Body naturally and mechanically; that is, without her having any part in it, nothing but her Conſent being her own real Work. This Conſent we muſt regulate, preſerve, and keep free, in ſpight of all the Struggle and Attempts of the Paſſions. We ought to ſubmit our Liberty to none but God, and to yield to nothing but to the Voice of the Author of Nature, to inward Evidence, and Conviction, and to the ſecret Reproaches of our Reaſon. We ought never to conſent but when we plainly ſee, we ſhould make an ill Uſe of our Liberty, in with-holding our Conſent. This is the principal Rule to be obſerv'd for the avoiding of Errour.

God only makes us evidently perceive, That we ought to yield to what he requires of us; to him alone therefore we ought to devote our Services. There is no Evidence in the Allurements and Careſſes, in the Threats and Frightnings of the Paſſions; they are only confuſed and obſcure Senſations, to which we muſt never yield up our ſelves. We muſt wait till all thoſe falſe Glimpſes of the Paſſions vaniſh, till a purer Light illuminates us, till God ſpeaks inwardly to us. We muſt enter within our ſelves, and there ſeek him that never leaves us, that always enlightens us. He ſpeaks low, but his Voice is diſtinct, his Light is weak but pure. But no; his Voice is as ſtrong as 'tis diſtinct, and his Light is as bright and active as 'tis pure. But our Paſſions continually keep us from home, and by their Noiſe and Darkneſs, hinder us from being inſtructed by his Voice, and illuminated by his Light. He ſpeaks even to thoſe that ask him no Queſtions; and thoſe, whom Paſſions have carried fartheſt from him, fail not yet many times to hear ſome of his Words, but loud, threatning, aſtoniſhing Words, *ſharper than a two-edged Sword, piercing* into the inmoſt Receſſes of the *Soul*, and *diſcerning* the *Thoughts* and Deſigns of the *Heart*. For *all things are open to his Eyes*, and he cannot ſee the unruly Actions of Sinners, without laſhing them inwardly with ſmarting Reproofs. We muſt then re-enter into our ſelves, and approach near him; we muſt interrogate him, liſten to him and obey him; for by always liſtening to him, we ſhall never be deceived; and always obeying him, we ſhall never be ſubjected to the Inconſtancy of the Paſſions, and the Miſeries due to Sin. Hebr. iv. 12, 13.

We muſt not, like ſome pretenders to Wit, whom the Violence of Paſſion has reduced to the Condition of Beaſts; who, having a long time deſpiſed the *Law* of God, ſeem at laſt to have retained no Knowledge of any *other* than *that* of their Infamous Paſſions: We muſt not, I ſay, imagine, as do thoſe Men of Fleſh and Blood, That it is following God, and obeying the Voice of the Author of Nature, to give up our ſelves to the Motions of Paſſions, and to comply with the ſecret Deſires of our Heart, which is the utmoſt poſſible Blindneſs; 'tis according to St. *Paul*, the temporal Puniſhment of Impiety and Idolatry, that is to ſay, the Deſert of the moſt enormous Crimes. And herein indeed the greatneſs of this terrible Puniſhment conſiſts, that inſtead of allaying the Anger of God, as do all the others in this World, it continually exaſperates and increaſes it, till that dreadful Day comes, wherein his juſt Wrath ſhall break out to the confuſion of Sinners.

Their Arguings however ſeem likely enough, as being agreeable to common Sence, countenanc'd by the Paſſions, and ſuch, I am ſure, as all the Philoſophy of *Zeno* could never overthrow; we muſt love Good, ſay they, Pleaſure is the Sign which Nature has affix'd to it to make it known, and that Sign can never be fallacious, ſince God has inſtituted it to diſtinguiſh Good from Evil. We muſt avoid Evil, ſay they again; Pain is the Character which Nature has annex'd to it, and a Token in which we cannot be miſtaken; ſince it was inſtituted by God for the diſtinguiſhing it from Good. We feel Pleaſure in complying with our Paſſions, Trouble and Pain in oppoſing them, and therefore the Author of Nature will have us to give up our ſelves to our Paſſions, and never to reſiſt them, ſince the Pleaſure and Pain wherewith he affects us in thoſe Caſes are the infallible *Criterion* of his Will. And conſequently it is to follow God, to comply with the Deſire of our Hearts; and 'tis to obey his Voice, to yield to the Inſtinct of Nature, which moves us to the ſatisfying our Senſes and our Paſſions. This is their way of Reaſoning, whereby they confirm themſelves in their infamous Opinions: and thus they think to ſhun the ſecret Reproofs of their Reaſon; and in Puniſhment of their Crime God ſuffers them to be dazzled by thoſe falſe Glimpſes; deluſive Glarings, which blind them inſtead of inlightning them, and ſtrike them with ſuch an inſenſible Blindneſs, as they do not ſo much as wiſh to be cured of it. God delivers them to a reprobate Sence, he gives them up to the Deſires of their corrupt Heart; to ſhameful Paſſions, to Actions unworthy of Men, as the Holy Scripture ſpeaks, That having *fatned* themſelves by their Debauches, they may to all Eternity be the fit *Sacrifice* of his Vengeance.

But let us ſolve this Difficulty which they offer. The Sect of *Zeno* not knowing how to untie the Knot, has cut it, by denying that Pleaſure is a Good, and Pain an Evil. But that's too venturous a Stroke, and a Subterfuge unbecoming Philoſophers, and very unlikely, I am ſure, to convert thoſe who are convinced by Experience, That a great Pain is a great Evil. Since therefore *Zeno* and all his *Heathen-Philoſophy* cannot ſolve the Difficulty of the *Epicures*, we muſt have recourſe to a more ſolid and inlightned Philoſophy.

'Tis true that Pleaſure is Good and Pain Evil, and that Pleaſure and Pain have been join'd by the Author of Nature to the uſe of certain things, by which we judge whether they are good or evil, which make us purſue the good and fly from the evil, and almoſt ever follow the Motions of the Paſſions. All this is true, but relates only to the Body, which to preſerve, and keep long a Life much like to that of Beaſts, we muſt ſuffer our ſelves to be ruled by our Paſſions and deſires. The Senſes and Paſſions are only given us for the good of the Body; ſenſible Pleaſure is the indelible Character which Nature has affix'd to the uſe of certain things, that without putting our reaſon to the trouble of examining them, we might preſently imploy them for the preſervation of the Body; but not with intent that we ſhould love them; For we ought only to love thoſe things which Reaſon undoubtedly manifeſts to be our Good.

We are reaſonable Beings, and God who is our Soveraign Good, requires not of us a blind, an inſtinctive, a compell'd love, as I may ſay, but a love of Choice, an enlightned Love, a Love that ſubmits to him our whole Intellectual and Moral Powers. He inclines us to the love of him, in ſhowing us by the Light that attends the Delectation of his Grace, that he is our Chief Good; but he moves us towards the good of the Body only by inſtinct and a confuſed Senſation of Pleaſure, becauſe the Good of the Body is undeſerving of either the Attention of our Mind, or the exerciſe of our Reaſon.

Moreover our Body is not our ſelves, 'tis ſomething that belongs to us, and abſolutely ſpeaking, we cannot ſubſiſt without it, the good of the Body therefore is not properly our good, for Bodies can be but the good of Bodies. We may make uſe of them for the Body, but we muſt not be taken up with them. Our Soul has alſo her own Good, *viz.* the only Good that is ſuperiour to her, the only one that preſerves her, that alone produces in her Senſations of Pleaſure and Pain: for indeed none of the Objects of the Senſes can of themſelves give us any Senſation of them; it is only God who aſſures us of their preſence by the Senſation he gives us of them; which is a truth that was never underſtood by the Heathen Philoſophers.

We may and muſt love that which is able to make us ſenſible of Pleaſure, I grant it: But by that very reaſon we ought only to love God, becauſe he only can act upon our Soul, and the utmoſt that ſenſible Objects can do, is to move the Organs of our Senſes. But what matters it, you'll ſay, from whence thoſe grateful Senſations come? I will taſt 'em. O thou ungrateful Wretch, know the hand that ſhowres down Good upon thee. You require of a juſt God unjuſt Rewards; You deſire he ſhould recompenſe you for the Crimes you commit againſt him, and even at the very time of committing them; you make uſe of his immutable Will, which is the Order and Law of Nature to wreſt from him undeſerved Favours; for with a guilty Managery you produce in your Body ſuch Motions as oblige him to make you reliſh all ſorts of Pleaſures. But Death ſhall diſſolve that Body, and God whom you have made ſubſervient to your unjuſt deſires, will make you ſubſervient to his juſt Anger, and mock at you in his turn.

'Tis very hard, I confeſs, that the enjoyment of Corporeal Good ſhould be attended with Pleaſure, and that the Poſſeſſion of the Good of the Soul ſhould often be conjoin'd with Pain and Anguiſh. We may indeed believe it to be a great Diſorder, by this Reaſon that Pleaſure being the Character of Good, and Pain of Evil, we ought to poſſeſs a Satisfaction infinitely greater in loving God, than in making uſe of ſenſible things; ſince He is the true, or rather the only, Good of the Mind. So doubtleſs will it be one day, and ſo was it moſt probably before Sin entred into the World. At leaſt 'tis very certain, that before the Fall, Man ſuffered no Pain in diſcharging his Duty.

But God is withdrawn from us, ſince the Fall of *Adam*; he is no more our God by *Nature*, but only by *Grace*; we feel now no Delight and Satisfaction in the Love of him, and he rather thruſts us from, than draws us to him. If we follow him he gives us a Rebuff; if we run after him he ſtrikes us; and if we be obſtinate in our Purſuit, he continues to handle us more ſeverely, by inflicting very lively and ſenſible Pains upon us. And when, being weary of walking through the rough and ſtony ways of Vertue, without being ſupported by the Repaſt of Good, or ſtrengthened by any Nouriſhment; we come to feed upon ſenſible things, he faſtens us to them by the reliſh of Pleaſure, as though he would reward us for turning back from him, to run after counterfeit Goods. In ſhort, ſince Men have ſinn'd, it ſeems, God is not pleaſed that they ſhould love him, think upon him, or eſteem him their only and ſovereign Good. It is only by the delectable Grace of *Chriſt* our Mediatour, that we ſenſibly perceive that God is our proper Good. For Pleaſure being the ſenſible Mark of Good, we then perceive God to be our Good, when the Grace of our Redeemer makes us love him with Pleaſure.

Thus the Soul not knowing her own Good, either by a clear View, or by Senſation, without the Grace of *Jeſus Chriſt*, ſhe takes the Good of the Body for her own; ſhe loves it and cloſes to it with a ſtricter adheſion by her Will, than ever ſhe did by the *firſt Inſtitution* of Nature. For Corporeal Good being now the only one left that is ſenſible, muſt needs operate upon Man with more Violence, ſtrike his Brain livelyer, and conſequently be felt and imagined by the Soul in a more ſenſible manner. And the Animal Spirits receiving a more vehement Agitation, the Will by conſequence muſt love it with a greater Ardency and Pleaſure.

The Soul might before Sin blot out of her Brain the too lively Image of Corporeal Good, and diſſipate the ſenſible Pleaſure this Image was attended with. The Body being ſubject to the Mind, the Soul might on a ſudden ſtop the quavering Concuſſion of the Fibres of the Brain, and the Commotion of the Spirits, by the meer Conſideration of her Duty. But ſhe loſt that Power by Sin. Thoſe Traces of the Imagination, thoſe Motions of the Spirits, depend no more upon her; whence it neceſſarily follows, that the Pleaſure, which by the Inſtitution of Nature is conjoin'd to thoſe Motions and Traces, muſt uſurp the whole Poſſeſſion of the Heart. * Man cannot long reſiſt that Pleaſure by his own ſtrength; 'tis Grace that muſt obtain a perfect Victory: Reaſon alone can never do it: none but God, as the Author of Grace, can overcome himſelf as the Author of Nature, or rather exorate himſelf as the Revenger of *Adam*'s Rebellion.

* See the Fifth Dialogue of the *Chriſtian Converſations*, about the end.

The *Stoicks*, who had but a confuſed Knowledge of the Diſorders of Original Sin, could not anſwer the *Epicures*. Their Felicity was but *Ideal*, ſince there is no Happineſs without Pleaſure, and no Pleaſure to be ſenſibly perceived in Vertuous Actions. They might feel indeed ſome Joy in following the Rules of their phantaſtick Vertue; becauſe Joy is a natural Conſequence of the Conſciouſneſs our Soul has of being in the moſt convenient State. That Spiritual Joy might bear up their Spirits for a while, but was not ſtrong enough to withſtand Pain and overcome Pleaſure. Secret Pride and not Joy made them keep their Countenance; for when no body was preſent, all their Wiſdom and Strength vaniſhed, juſt as Kings of the Stage, loſe all their Grandeur in a moment.

It is not ſo with thoſe Chriſtians that exactly follow the Rules of the Goſpel. Their Joy is ſolid, becauſe they certainly know, that they are in the moſt convenient State: Their Joy is great, becauſe the Good they poſſeſs through Faith and Hope is Infinite; for the Hope of a great Good is always attended with a great Joy, and that Joy is ſo much livelier as the Hope is ſtronger, becauſe a ſtrong Hope repreſenting the Good as preſent, neceſſarily produces Joy, as alſo that ſenſible Pleaſure which ever attends the preſence of Good. Their Joy is not reſtleſs and uneaſie, becauſe grounded on the Promiſes of God, confirm'd by the Blood of his Son, and cheriſhed by that inward Peace and unutterable Sweetneſs of Charity, which the Holy Ghoſt ſheds into their Hearts. Nothing can ſeparate them from their true Good, which they reliſh and take Complacency in by the Delectation of Grace. The Pleaſures of Corporeal Good are not ſo great as thoſe they feel in the Love of God. They love Contempt and Pain. They feed upon Diſgraces, and the Pleaſure they find in their Sufferings, or rather the Pleaſure they find in God, for whom they deſpiſe all the reſt to unite themſelves to him, is ſo raviſhing and tranſporting, as to make them ſpeak a new Language, and even boaſt, as the Apoſtles did of their Miſeries and Abuſes: when *they departed from the preſence of the Council, rejoicing that they were counted worthy to ſuffer ſhame for the Name of* JESUS. Such is the Diſpoſition of Mind in true Chriſtians, when they are moſt baſely affronted for the Defence of Truth. Acts 5.41.

CHRIST being come to reſtore the Order, which Sin had overthrown, and that Order requiring that the greateſt Goods be accompanied with the moſt ſolid Pleaſures, it is plain that things ought to be in the manner we have ſaid; but we may farther confirm and ſtrengthen Reaſon by Experience; for 'tis known that aſſoon as any Perſon has formed but the bare Reſolution to deſpiſe all for God, he is commonly affected with a Pleaſure or internal Joy, that makes him as ſenſibly and lively perceive that God is his Good, as he knew it evidently before.

The true Chriſtians aſſure us every day that the Joy they feel in an unmixt loving and ſerving God is unexpreſſible; and 'tis but reaſonable to believe the Relation they make of what happens within them. On the contrary, the Impious are perpetually vexed with horrible Diſquietudes; and thoſe that are ſhar'd betwixt God and the World, partake of the Joys of the Juſt, and of the Vexations of the Impious: they complain of their Miſeries, and 'tis reaſonable to believe that their Complaints are not groundleſs. God ſtrikes men to the quick, and through the very Heart, when they love any thing beſides him; and 'tis this ſtroak that cauſes a real Miſery. He pours an exceeding Joy into their Minds, when all their Adherencies are to him only, and that Joy is the Spring of true Felicity. The Abundance of Riches and Elevation to Honours being without us, cannot cure us of the Wound God makes: and Poverty and Contempt, that are likewiſe without us, cannot hurt us under the Almighty's Protection.

By what we have ſaid, 'tis plain, That the Objects of the Paſſions are not our Good, that we muſt not follow their Motions, unleſs it be for the Preſervation of our Life: that ſenſible Pleaſure bears the like proportion to Good, as Senſations to Truth; and that as our Senſes deceive us in Matters of Truth, ſo do likewiſe our Paſſions in point of our Good: that we ought to yield to the Delectation of Grace, becauſe it evidently moves us to the Love of a true Good; is not followed with the ſecret Reproaches of Reaſon, as the blind Inſtinct and confuſed Pleaſure of the Paſſions; but is always attended with a ſecret Joy, ſuitable to the good State we are in: Laſt of all, ſince God alone can operate upon the Mind of Man, he cannot find any Happineſs out of God, unleſs we would ſuppoſe that God rewards Diſobedience, or that he commands to love *more*, what *leſs* deſerves to be loved.

'Tis true that Pleaſure is Good and Pain Evil, and that Pleaſure and Pain have been join'd by the Author of Nature to the uſe of certain things, by which we judge whether they are good or evil, which make us purſue the good and fly from the evil, and almoſt ever follow the Motions of the Paſſions. All this is true, but relates only to the Body, which to preſerve, and keep long a Life much like to that of Beaſts, we muſt ſuffer our ſelves to be ruled by our Paſſions and deſires. The Senſes and Paſſions are only given us for the good of the Body; ſenſible Pleaſure is the indelible Character which Nature has affix'd to the uſe of certain things, that without putting our reaſon to the trouble of examining them, we might preſently imploy them for the preſervation of the Body; but not with intent that we ſhould love them; For we ought only to love thoſe things which Reaſon undoubtedly manifeſts to be our Good.

We are reaſonable Beings, and God who is our Soveraign Good, requires not of us a blind, an inſtinctive, a compell'd love, as I may ſay, but a love of Choice, an enlightned Love, a Love that ſubmits to him our whole Intellectual and Moral Powers. He inclines us to the love of him, in ſhowing us by the Light that attends the Delectation of his Grace, that he is our Chief Good; but he moves us towards the good of the Body only by inſtinct and a confuſed Senſation of Pleaſure, becauſe the Good of the Body is undeſerving of either the Attention of our Mind, or the exerciſe of our Reaſon.

Moreover our Body is not our ſelves, 'tis ſomething that belongs to us, and abſolutely ſpeaking, we cannot ſubſiſt without it, the good of the Body therefore is not properly our good, for Bodies can be but the good of Bodies. We may make uſe of them for the Body, but we muſt not be taken up with them. Our Soul has alſo her own Good, *viz.* the only Good that is ſuperiour to her, the only one that preſerves her, that alone produces in her Senſations of Pleaſure and Pain: for indeed none of the Objects of the Senſes can of themſelves give us any Senſation of them; it is only God who aſſures us of their preſence by the Senſation he gives us of them; which is a truth that was never underſtood by the Heathen Philoſophers.

We may and muſt love that which is able to make us ſenſible of Pleaſure; I grant it: But by that very reaſon we ought only to love God, becauſe he only can act upon our Soul, and the utmoſt that ſenſible Objects can do, is to move the Organs of our Senſes. But what matters it, you'll ſay, from whence thoſe grateful Senſations come? I will taſt 'em. O thou ungrateful Wretch, know the hand that ſhowres down Good upon thee. You require of a juſt God unjuſt Rewards; You deſire he ſhould recompenſe you for the Crimes you commit againſt him, and even at the very time of committing them; you make uſe of his immutable Will, which is the Order and Law of Nature to wreſt from him undeſerved Favours; for with a guilty Managery you produce in your Body ſuch Motions as oblige him to make you reliſh all ſorts of Pleaſures. But Death ſhall diſſolve that Body, and God whom you have made ſubſervient to your unjuſt deſires, will make you ſubſervient to his juſt Anger, and mock at you in his turn.

'Tis very hard, I confeſs, that the enjoyment of Corporeal Good ſhould be attended with Pleaſure, and that the Poſſeſſion of the Good of the Soul ſhould often be conjoin'd with Pain and Anguiſh. We may indeed believe it to be a great Diſorder, by this Reaſon that Pleaſure being the Character of Good, and Pain of Evil, we ought to poſſeſs a Satisfaction infinitely greater in loving God, than in making uſe of ſenſible things; ſince He is the true, or rather the only, Good of the Mind. So doubtleſs will it be one day, and ſo was it moſt probably before Sin entred into the World. At leaſt 'tis very certain, that before the Fall, Man ſuffered no Pain in diſcharging his Duty.

But God is withdrawn from us, ſince the Fall of *Adam*; he is no more our God by *Nature*, but only by *Grace*; we feel now no Delight and Satisfaction in the Love of him, and he rather thruſts us from, than draws us to him. If we follow him he gives us a Rebuff; if we run after him he ſtrikes us; and if we be obſtinate in our Purſuit, he continues to handle us more ſeverely, by inflicting very lively and ſenſible Pains upon us. And when, being weary of walking through the rough and ſtony ways of Vertue, without being ſupported by the Repaſt of Good, or ſtrengthened by any Nouriſhment; we come to feed upon ſenſible things, he faſtens us to them by the reliſh of Pleaſure, as though he would reward us for turning back from him, to run after counterfeit Goods. In ſhort, ſince Men have ſinn'd, it ſeems, God is not pleaſed that they ſhould love him, think upon him, or eſteem him their only and ſovereign Good. It is only by the delectable Grace of *Chriſt* our Mediatour, that we ſenſibly perceive that God is our proper Good. For Pleaſure being the ſenſible Mark of Good, we then perceive God to be our Good, when the Grace of our Redeemer makes us love him with Pleaſure.

Thus the Soul not knowing her own Good, either by a clear View, or by Senſation, without the Grace of *Jeſus Chriſt*, ſhe takes the Good of the Body for her own; ſhe loves it and cloſes to it with a ſtricter adheſion by her Will, than ever ſhe did by the *firſt Inſtitution* of Nature. For Corporeal Good being now the only one left that is ſenſible, muſt needs operate upon Man with more Violence, ſtrike his Brain livelyer, and conſequently be felt and imagined by the Soul in a more ſenſible manner. And the Animal Spirits receiving a more vehement Agitation, the Will by conſequence muſt love it with a greater Ardency and Pleaſure.

The Soul might before Sin blot out of her Brain the too lively Image of Corporeal Good, and diſſipate the ſenſible Pleaſure this Image was attended with. The Body being ſubject to the Mind, the Soul might on a ſudden ſtop the quavering Concuſſion of the Fibres of the Brain, and the Commotion of the Spirits, by the meer Conſideration of her Duty. But ſhe loſt that Power by Sin. Thoſe Traces of the Imagination, thoſe Motions of the Spirits, depend no more upon her; whence it neceſſarily follows, that the Pleaſure, which by the Inſtitution of Nature is conjoin'd to thoſe Motions and Traces, muſt uſurp the whole Poſſeſſion of the Heart. * Man cannot long reſiſt that Pleaſure by his own ſtrength; 'tis Grace that muſt obtain a perfect Victory: Reaſon alone can never do it: none but God, as the Author of Grace, can overcome himſelf as the Author of Nature, or rather exorate himſelf as the Revenger of *Adam*'s Rebellion.

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CHAP. V.

That the Perfection of the Mind conſiſts in its Union with God, by the Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Vertue; and contrariwiſe, That its Imperefection proceeds only from its Dependency on the Body, cauſed by the Diſorder of the Senſes and Paſſions.

THE ſhorteſt Reflection is ſufficient to let us know that the Good of the Mind muſt needs be ſomething of a Spiritual Nature, for our Bodies are much inferiour to our Mind; they are unable to act upon it by their own ſtrength; they cannot immediately unite themſelves to it; laſtly, they are not intelligible of themſelves, and therefore cannot be its Good: whereas Spiritual things being intelligible of their own Nature, can be united to the Mind, and conſequently be its Good, provided they be Superiour to it. For that a thing may be the Good of the Mind, it muſt not only be Spiritual as it ſelf; but it muſt alſo be Superiour to it, that it may act upon it, enlighten it, and reward it; ſince otherwiſe it cannot make it perfecter and happier, nor by conſequence be its Good. Now, of all Intelligible or Spiritual things, God alone is thus Superiour to the Mind; whence it follows, That nothing but God alone, either is or can be our true Good, and that we cannot become either more happy or more perfect, than by enjoying him.

Every one is perſwaded that the Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Vertue make the Mind more perfect; and that the Blindneſs of the Mind, and the Depravation of the Heart, leſſen its natural Perfection. The Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Vertue cannot then be any thing elſe but the Union of the Mind to God; or, if I may ſo ſpeak, a Poſſeſſion of him: and, on the contrary, the Blindneſs of the Mind, and the Depravation of the Heart muſt needs conſiſt in their Separation from God, and their Union with ſomething Inferiour to them, *viz.* with the Body; ſince that is the only Union that can make them imperfect and unhappy. And therefore to know the Truth, or to know things as far as they are agreeable to the Rules of Truth, is really to know God. And to love Vertue, or to love things as far as they are amiable, or according to the Rules of Vertue, is to love him.

The Mind is ſituate, as it were, betwixt God and Bodies, betwixt Good and Evil, Light and Darkneſs, Rule and Diſorder, Perfection and Imperfection, Happineſs and Miſery. When it diſcovers ſome Truth, or ſees things as they are in their own Nature, it ſees them in the Idea's of God, that is, diſcovers them by a clear and diſtinct View of what is in God repreſenting them. For, as I have obſerved elſewhere, the Mind of Man contains not in it ſelf the Perfections or Idea's of all the Beings it is capable of perceiving: 'tis not the univerſal Being, and therefore cannot ſee in it ſelf ſuch things as are diſtinguiſhed from it ſelf. It does not inſtruct or enlighten it ſelf, by conſulting with it ſelf, as being neither Perefection nor Light in ſelf; it ſtands in need to be enlightned by the immenſe Light of Eternal Truth. Thus the Mind by knowing Truth is united to God, and is in ſome manner in poſſeſſion of him.

We may not only ſay, That a Mind perceiving the Truth, partly knows God who comprehends it; we may add alſo, That in ſome ſort it knows things as God himſelf knows them. For the Mind knows their true Relations, and ſo does God; the Mind ſees them in viewing the Perfections of God that repreſent them; God perceives them the ſame way: for God neither perceives by Senſe nor Imagination, but ſees in himſelf as being the Intellectual World, the Corporeal and Senſible World which he has created. 'Tis the ſame with the Mind in its Knowledge of Truth: it comes not to it by Senſation or Imagination; for Senſations and Phantaſms offer but falſe Repreſentations of things to the Mind; ſo that whoſoever diſcovers the Truth ſees it in the Intellectual World, to which 'tis united, and in which God ſees it; for this material and ſenſible World is not intelligible of it ſelf: ſo that the Mind ſees in the Light of God all the things which it plainly ſees, though it ſees them very imperfectly and ſo very differently from God in that reſpect. Thus when the Mind ſees Truth, it not only is united to God, poſſeſſes and beholds God, but alſo ſees Truth in one ſenſe as God himſelf ſees it.

So when we love according to the Rules of Vertue we love God; for by regulating our Love according to theſe Rules, the Impreſſion of Love towards him, which he continually produces in our Heart, is not turn'd off by free Will, nor alter'd by Self-love. The Mind at that time freely follows the Impreſſion which God gives: And God never gives any Impreſſion which does not tend towards him. Since he only acts for himſelf, it is plain, That to love according to the Rules of Vertue is to love God.

But 'tis not only to love God; 'tis likewiſe to love as God loves: He loves himſelf only, and his Works but becauſe they relate to his Perfections; and proportionably to the degrees of

of Conformity they have with them; It being the ſame Love by which God loves himſelf and whatever he has made or done. To love according to the Rules of Vertue, is to love God only, to love him in all things, and to love things proportionably as they partake of his Goodneſs and Perfections; ſince this is to love them according to the degree they are lovely. In ſhort, 'tis to love by the Impreſſion of the ſame Love by which God loves himſelf; for 'tis the Love by which God loves himſelf and whatever elſe with relation to him, that animates us, when we love as we ought: whence I conclude, That we then love, as God loves.

It is therefore evident, That the Knowledge of Truth, and the regular Love of Vertue conſtitute all our Perfection, ſince they are the cuſtomary Attendants on our Union with God, which alſo afford us the Enjoyment of him, as far as we are capable of it in this Life: whereas the Blindneſs of the Mind, and the Depravation of the Heart make our Imperfection, and are the Reſults from the Union of our Soul and Body, as I have proved in ſeveral Places; ſhewing that we never know the Truth, nor love the real Good, when we follow the Impreſſions of our Senſes, Imaginations, and Paſſions.

All this is evident; and yet Men who all paſſionately deſire the Perfection of their Being, care but little to increaſe the Union which they have with God; nay, they are continually at work to ſtrengthen and enlarge that which they have with ſenſible things. The Cauſe of that ſurprizing Diſorder cannot be too much explain'd.

The Poſſeſſion of Good muſt naturally produce two Effects in the Poſſeſſour; at once muſt render him more perfect, and more happy: however it does not always fall out ſo. 'Tis impoſſible indeed that the Mind ſhould actually enjoy a Good, without being actually more perfect; but it may happen that it actually enjoys it, without being actually happier. Thoſe that know Truth beſt, and love moſt the moſt lovely Goods, are always actually more perefect, than thoſe that live in blind Ignorance, and diſorderly Practice, but they are not always actually happyer. It is even ſo with Evil; it ought at once to make both imperfect and unhappy, but though it always makes men more imperfect, yet it does not always make them more unhappy, or at leaſt makes them not unhappy proportionably to its making them imperfect. Virtue is often bitter and diſtaſtful; whereas Vice is ſweet and pleaſant; ſo that it is eſpecially by Faith and Hope, that pious Men are truly happy; whilſt the wicked have the actual Enjoyments of Pleaſures and Delights. It ought not to be ſo indeed, but however it is, Sin has brought forth that Diſorder, as I ſaid in the foregoing Chapter, and that diſorder is the principal Cauſe, not only of the Corruption of our Morals, but alſo of the ignorance and darkneſs of our Mind. By that diſorder it is that our Imagination perſwades it ſelf that Bodies may be the Good of the Mind: For Pleaſure, as I have often ſaid, is the ſenſible Character, or Mark, of Good. But now of all the Pleaſures we enjoy upon Earth, the moſt ſenſible are thoſe which we imagine to receive by the Body. We judge, though too inconſiderately without doubt, that Bodies can be, and are effectually our Good. And 'tis ſo hard to oppoſe the Inſtinct of Nature, and to withſtand the Arguments of the Senſes, that the deſign of it does not ſo much as come into our Mind. We think not on the diſorders introduc'd by Sin. We conſider not that Bodies can act upon the Mind but as occaſional Cauſes: that the Mind cannot immediately, or by it ſelf, enjoy any Corporeal thing, and that all the ways it has of uniting to an Object are by its Knowledge and Love; that God only is ſuperiour to it, can reward or puniſh it, by Senſations of Pleaſure or Pain, that can enlighten and move it, in a word act upon it. Thoſe truths, though moſt evident to attentive Minds, are not however ſo powerful to convince us, as is the deceiving Experience of a ſenſible Impreſſion.

When we conſider ſomething as part of our ſelves, or look on our ſelves as a part of that thing, we judge it our Good to be united to it; we love it, and this love is ſo much the greater, as the thing, whereunto we think our ſelves united, ſeems to be a more conſiderable part of the whole, we make up together with it. Now there are two ſorts of Proofs, which perſwade us that a thing is part of our ſelf, *viz.* the Inſtinct of Senſation, and the Evidence of Reaſon.

By the Inſtinct of Senſation I am perſwaded that my Soul is united to my Body, or that my Body makes part of my Being, but I have no full Evidence of it, ſince I know it not by the light of Reaſon, but by the Pain or Pleaſure I feel at the preſence and impreſſion of Objects. My hand is prick'd, I ſuffer Pain; thence I conclude, that my hand makes part of my ſelf; my Cloaths are rent, and I endure nothing, therefore, I ſay, my Cloaths are not my ſelf. My Hair is cut without Pain, but cannot be pluck'd up without ſmart, that puzles the Philoſopher, and he knows not what to determine. In the mean while this perplexity ſhows, that even the wiſeſt rather judge by the inſtinct of Senſation than by the light of Reaſon, that ſuch or ſuch things belong or belong not to themſelves. For ſhould they determine them by Evidence, and the light of Reaſon, they would quickly know, that the Mind and the Body are two ſorts of Beings altogether oppoſite; that the Mind cannot be united to the Body by it ſelf, and that the Soul is wounded when the Body is ſtruck, only becauſe of her Union with God. 'Tis then only by the Inſtinct of the Senſation that we look on our Body, and all the ſenſible things to which we are united, as part of our ſelves, that is as belonging to that which thinks and feels in us: For what *is not*, cannot be known by evident Reaſon, ſince Evidence diſcovers Truth alone.

But on the contrary, 'tis by the light of Reaſon that we know the Relation we have with Intellectual things. We diſcover, by a clear View of the Mind, that we are united to God in a more ſtrict and eſſential manner than to our Body, that without him we are nothing, and neither can do, nor know, neither will nor be ſenſible of any thing: that he is our All, or if we may ſo ſpeak, that we make up a whole with him, of which we are but an infinitely ſmall part. The light of Reaſon diſcovers us a thouſand Motives to love God only, and to deſpiſe Bodies as unworthy of our Love. But we are not naturally ſenſible of our Union to God, nor perſwaded that he is our All by the Inſtinct of ſenſe, 'tis only the grace of our Lord which produces in ſome men that ſpiritual ſenſe to help them to overcome the contrary Senſations by which they are united to their Body. For God, as the Author of Nature, inclines Minds to the love of him by a Knowledge of Illumination, and not of Inſtinct; and in all probability 'tis but ſince the Fall that God, as the Author of Grace, has ſuperadded Inſtinct to Illumination; becauſe our light is at preſent ſo mightily impair'd, as to be incapable of bringing us to God, being beſides continually weaken'd by contrary pleaſure or inſtinct, and rendred ineffectual.

We therefore diſcover by the light of the mind, that we are united to God, and to the intellectual World which he contains, and are convinced by Senſation, that we are united to our Body, and by it to the material and ſenſible World God has Created. But as our Senſations are more lively, moving, frequent and laſting than our Illuminations: So 'tis not ſtrange that our Senſations ſhould agitate us, and quicken our love for ſenſible things, whereas our Light diſſipates and vaniſhes, without producing any zeal and ardency for Truth.

'Tis true that ſeveral Men are perſwaded that God is their real Good, love him as their All, and earneſtly deſire to ſtrengthen and increaſe their Union with him. But few evidently know, that by meditating on the truth we unite our ſelves to God, as far as the natural ſtrength can attain; that it is a ſort of Enjoyment of him, to contemplate the true Ideas of things; and that that abſtracted view of ſome general and immutable truths on which the particular depend, are flights of a Mind that ſequeſters it ſelf from the Body to unite it ſelf to God. Metaphyſicks, ſpeculative Mathematicks, and all thoſe univerſal Sciences which regulate and contain the particular, as the Univerſal Being comprehends all particular Beings, ſeem to be Chimerical to moſt Men, as well to the pious as to thoſe that do not love God. So that I dare hardly make bold to ſay, that the ſtudy of thoſe Sciences is the moſt pure and perfect Application to God, that the mind may be naturally capable of; and that it is by the ſight of the Intellectual World, which is their Object, that God has produced and ſtill knows this ſenſible World, in which Bodies receive their Life, as Spirits live from the other.

Thoſe that purely follow the Impreſſions of their Senſes, are not capable of reliſhing the truth, becauſe it flatters them not. And even the Virtuous, who conſtantly oppoſe their Paſſions, when they proffer them falſe Goods, do not always reſiſt them, when they conceal from them the truth, and make it deſpicable, becauſe one may be pious without being a Man of parts. To pleaſe God we need not exactly know, that our Senſes, Imagination, and Paſſions, always repreſent things otherwiſe than they are; ſince it appears not that our Lord and his Apoſtles ever intended to undeceive us of ſeveral Errors upon this matter, which *Deſcartes* has diſcover'd to us.

There is a great difference betwixt Faith and Underſtanding, the Goſpel and Philoſophy: the greateſt Clowns are capable of Faith, but few can attain to the pure Knowledge of Evident Truth. Faith repreſents to vulgar Men God as the Creator of Heaven and Earth, which is a ſufficient motive of love and duty towards him; whereas Reaſon, knowing that God was God before he was Creator, not only conſiders him in his Works, but alſo endeavours to contemplate him in himſelf, or in that immenſe Idea of the infinitely perfect Being, which is included in him. The Son of God, who is the Wiſdom of his Father, or the Eternal Truth, made himſelf Man, and became ſenſible that he might be known by Men of Fleſh and Blood, by groſs material Men; that he might inſtruct them by that which was the Cauſe of their Blindneſs, and draw them to the love of him by thoſe ſenſible Objects that had enſlav'd them; for having to do with Fools he thought fit to take upon him a ſort of Folly whereby to make them Wiſe: So that the moſt pious Men, and trueſt Believers, have not always the greateſt Underſtanding. They may know God by Faith, and love him by the help of his Grace, without underſtanding that he is their All in the ſence Philoſophers underſtand him, and without thinking, that the abſtracted Knowledge of Truth is a ſort of a Union with him. We ought not therefore to be ſurprized, if ſo few Perſons labour to ſtrengthen their natural Union with God by the Knowledge of Truth, ſince to this there is required a continual oppoſition of the Impreſſions of the Senſes and Paſſions, in a very different way from that which is uſual with the Virtuous, who are not always perſwaded, that the Senſes and Paſſions abuſe them in the manner that has been explain'd in the foregoing Books.

The Senſations and thoughts, in which the Body has a ſhare, are the ſole and immediate Cauſe of the Paſſions, as proceeding from the Concuſſion of the Fibres of the Brain, raiſing ſome particular Commotion in the Animal Spirits: And therefore Senſations are the only ſenſible proofs of our dependance on ſome things, which they excite us to love: but we feel not our Natural Union with God, when we know the Truth, and do not ſo much as think upon him,

him, becauſe he is and operates in us ſo privately and inſenſibly, as to be imperceptible to our ſelves: And this is the Reaſon that our natural Union with God raiſes not our Love for him. But it goes quite otherwiſe with our Union to ſenſible things. All our Senſations prove it, and Bodies appear before our Eyes, when they act in us. Their Action is viſible and manifeſt. Our Body is even more preſent to us than our Mind, and we conſider the former as the beſt part of our ſelves. So that our Union to our Body, and by it to ſenſible Objects, excites in us a violent Love, which increaſes that Union, and makes us depend on things that are infinitely below us.

CHAP. VI.

Of the more general Errours of the Paſſions, with ſome particular Inſtances.

'TIS the part of Moral Philoſophy to diſcover the particular Errours concerning Good, in which our Paſſions engage us, to oppoſe irregular Affections, to reſtore the Integrity of the Heart, and to rule the Courſe of our Life. But here we chiefly aim at giving Rules to the Mind, and finding out the Cauſes of our Errours, in reference to Truth; ſo that we ſhall not proceed farther in thoſe Matters that relate to the Love of true Good. We are tending to the Inſtruction of the Mind, and only take the Heart in the way, in as much as the Heart is its Maſter. We ſearch into Truth it ſelf, without a ſpecial Reſpect to our ſelves; and we conſider its Relation with us, only becauſe that Relation is the Spring of Self-love's diſguiſing and concealing it from us: for we judge of all things by our Paſſions, whence it is that we miſtake in all things, the Judgments of Paſſions never agreeing with the Judgments of Truth.

'Tis what we may learn in theſe Excellent Words of St. *Bernard*. * *Neither Love nor Hatred know how to make a Judgement according to Truth. Will you hear a true Judgment?* As I hear, I judge, *ſays our Lord*; *he ſays not as I hate, as I love, or as I fear. Here you have a Judgment of Hatred:* We have a Law, *ſay the Jews*, and by that Law he ought to die. *Here a Judgment of Fear:* If we let him alone, *ſay the Phariſees*, the Romans ſhall come, and take away our Place and Nation. *Here another of Love, as that of* David, *ſpeaking of his Parricide Son*, Spare the young man Abſalom.

* *Amor ſicut nec Odium, veritatis Judicium neſcit. Vis Judicium veritatis audire?* Sicut audio, ſic judico: *non ſicut odi, non ſicut amo, non ſicut timeo. Eſt Judicium Odii, ut illud*; Nos legem habemus, & ſecundum legem noſtram debet mori. *Eſt & Timoris, ut illud*; Si dimittimus eum ſic, venient Romani, & tollent noſtrum locum & gentem. *Judicium verò Amoris, ut David de filio parricidâ*, Parcite, *inquit* puero Abſalom. *S. Bern. de grad. humilitatis.* 5.

Joan. 5. 30. Joan. 19. 7. Joan. 11. 48. 2 Sam. 18.

Our Love, Hatred, and Fear cauſe us to make falſe Judgements only. Nothing but the pure Light of Truth can illuminate our Mind; nothing but the diſtinct Voice of our common Maſter can cauſe us to make true Judgments, provided we only judge of what he ſays, and as he ſays, in Imitation only of our Lord, *as I hear I judge:* But let's ſee how it is that our Paſſions ſeduce us, that we may the eaſier reſiſt them.

The Paſſions are ſo nearly related to the Senſes, that, remembring what hath been ſaid in the *firſt Book*, it will not be difficult to explain, how they lead us into Errour; becauſe the general Cauſes of the Errours of the Paſſions are altogether like to thoſe of the Errours of the Senſes.

The moſt general Cauſe of the Errours of the Senſes, is, as we then ſaid, our attributing to external Objects, the proper Senſations of our Soul, annexing Colours to the *Superficies* of Bodies, diffuſing Light, Sounds and Odours in the Air, and fixing Pain and Titillation to thoſe Parts of our Body that are altered by the Acceſs of other impellent Bodies.

Almoſt the ſame thing may be ſaid of the Paſſions: we too raſhly aſcribe to the Objects, that cauſe, or ſeem to cauſe, them, all the Diſpoſitions of our Heart, our Goodneſs, Meekneſs, Malice, Sowreneſs, and all the other Qualities of our Mind. The Object that begets ſome Paſſion in us, ſeems after a ſort to contain in it ſelf the Paſſion produced in us, when we conſider it, as ſenſible things ſeem to contain in themſelves the Senſations, which their Preſence excites in us. When we love any Perſon, we are naturally inclin'd to believe that he loves us, and can hardly imagine that he deſigns to hurt us, or to oppoſe our Deſires. But if Hatred ſucceed in the place of Love, we cannot perſwade our ſelves that he has any Affection for us; we interpret all he does in the worſt Senſe, we are always diſtruſtful and upon our Guard, though he thinks not upon us, or perhaps intends to do us Service. In ſhort, we attribute to the Perſon that ſtirs up a Paſſion in us, all the Diſpoſitions of our Heart, with as much Imprudence, as we aſcribe to the Objects of the Senſes, all the Qualities of our Mind.

Moreover by the ſame Reaſon that we believe, other Men receive the ſame Senſations from the ſame Objects as we do; we think they are agitated with the ſame Paſſions, for the ſame Subjects, if they are in a State of being ſuſceptible of them. We ſuppoſe them to love and deſire the ſame things, whence proceed ſecret Jealouſies and Hatreds, if the deſired Good cannot be enjoyed entire by ſeveral; for the contrary happens in Goods that can be poſſeſſed without Diviſion by ſeveral Perſons, as Science, Vertue, the Sovereign Good, and the like. We alſo ſuppoſe that they hate, fear, or fly from the ſame things that we do; whence proceed ſecret Plots or publick Aſſociations, according to the Nature and State of the thing hated, by which means we hope to rid our ſelves of our Miſeries.

We therefore aſcribe to the Objects of our Paſſions the Commotions they produce in us, thinking that all other Men, and even ſometimes Beaſts, are agitated as we are; and beſides judge yet more raſhly, that the Cauſe of our Paſſions, which is often but imaginary, is really in their Objects when we have a paſſionate Love for any Body: his Grimace and Faces are charming, his Uglineſs is not diſtaſtful, his ill-compoſed Motions and Geſtures are regular, or at leaſt natural. If he never ſpeak he is wiſe, if he be a great Talker he is witty; if he ſpeak upon all adventures he's Univerſal; if he continually interrupt others, it is becauſe he's full of Fire, of Life, and Spirit; If he pretend to top the ſway every where, 'tis becauſe he deſerves it. Thus can Paſſion cover or diſſemble the Imperfections of Friends, and advantageouſly ſet off their moſt inconſiderable Qualities.

But when that Friendſhip, which only proceeds as other Paſſions do, from the Agitation of the Blood and Animal Spirits, comes to cool, through want of heat and Spirits fit to nouriſh it, when Intereſt or ſome falſe Relation alters the diſpoſition of the Brain, then hatred ſucceeding, love is ſure to repreſent to us in that Perſon all the defects that are capable of ſtirring up our juſt Averſion. We perceive in him Qualities quite contrary to thoſe we admired before: We are aſham'd of having lov'd him, and the ruling Paſſion never fails to juſtify it ſelf, and to ridicule that which it has follow'd.

The Power and Injuſtice of Paſſions are not included within ſuch narrow Limits as thoſe we have deſcribed, but extend infinitely farther; not only diſguiſing their principal Object, but alſo what ever has any reference to it. They make us love not only the Qualities of our Friends, but alſo moſt part of thoſe of the Friends to our Friends. And in thoſe who are endued with a ſtrong Imagination, the Paſſions have ſo vaſt a reach and outlet, that it is not poſſible to determine their Limits.

Thoſe things I have mention'd are ſuch general and fruitful Principles of Errour, Prejudice, and Injuſtice, that it is impoſſible to obſerve all the conſequences of them: Moſt of the truths or rather Errours, entertained in ſome places, times, Commonalties, and Families, proceed from thence. What is followed in *Spain* is rejected in *France*; what is true at *Paris* is falſe at *Rome*; what is certain amongſt the *Dominicans* is uncertain amongſt the *Franciſcans*; and what appears undoubted to the Black-Fryars ſeems an Error to the White. The *Dominicans* believe themſelves obliged to ſtick to St. *Thomas*. Why? Becauſe that Doctor was one of their Order: Whereas the *Franciſcans* follow the Opinion of *Scotus*, becauſe he was a Black-Fryer.

There are likewiſe truths and errors proper to certain times. The Earth turned two thouſand years ago, then it remain'd unmoveable till our Days, wherein it has began to turn again. *Ariſtotle* was formerly burnt, and a Provincial Council approved by the Pope moſt wiſely forbad his Phyſicks to be taught: He was admired ever ſince, and falls now again into Contempt. Opinions that are now publickly received in the Schools were formerly rejected as Hereſies, and their Aſſertors excommunicated by the Biſhops; becauſe Paſſions ſtirring up Factions, Factions eſtabliſh thoſe ſorts of truths or errours, that are as inconſiſtent as the principle they proceed from. Men may indeed be indifferent as to the unmoveableneſs of the Earth, * or the Eſſence of Bodies, conſider'd in themſelves: but they are no longer ſo, when they look on thoſe Opinions as defended by their Adverſaries. Thus hatred kept up by a confuſed ſence of Piety, breeds an indiſcreet Zeal, that kindles by degrees, and at laſt produces ſuch Events, as are very ſurprizing, when beheld at a great diſtance.

* *Concil. Angl. per Spelman. An.* 1287.

We can hardly imagine that Paſſions ſhould reach ſo far, becauſe we know not that their impetuoſity extends to what ever may ſatisfy them. Perhaps *Hamman* would have done no harm to the *Jewiſh* People; but becauſe *Mordecai*, a *Jew*, forbore to ſalute him, he on a ſudden deſign'd the deſtroying of the whole Nation, that his Revenge might be the more ſplendid.

Two Men ſue each other about a piece of Land; they ought only to produce in Court their Titles to it, and to ſay nothing but what relates to the Caſe, or to ſet it off fair. However they ſeldom fail to ſlander one another, to contradict each other in every thing, to raiſe trifling Conteſtations and Accuſations, and to intricate the Suit with an infinity of Acceſſory Circumſtances. In ſhort, Paſſions reach as far as the ſight of the mind; there being nothing to which we may ſuppoſe their Object to be related, but their Motion will extend to it: which is done after the following manner.

The Tracks of the Objects are ſo connected in the Brain, that it is impoſſible the courſe of the Spirits ſhould violently move any one of them, without raiſing ſeveral others at the ſame time.

time. The Principal Idea of the thing perceiv'd, is therefore neceſſarily accompany'd with a vaſt number of acceſſory Ideas, which increaſe more and more, as the Impreſſion of the Animal Spirits is more violent. Now that Impreſſion cannot but be very violent in the Paſſions; becauſe they continually hurry into the Brain abundance of ſuch Spirits, as are fit to preſerve the Traces of the Idea's which repreſent their Object. So that the Motion of Love or Hatred extends not only to the Chief Object of either Paſſion, but alſo to all the things that are found any ways relating to it: becauſe the Motion of the Soul in the Paſſion follows the perception of the Mind, as the Motion of the Animal Spirits in the Brain follows the Traces of the Brain, as well thoſe that excite the principal Idea of the Paſſion's Object, as thoſe that are related to it.

And therefore we muſt not be ſurprized if Men carry their hatred or love to ſuch a heighth, and commit ſuch ſtrange and capricious Actions. Every one of thoſe Effects has its proper Cauſe, though unknown to us; becauſe their Acceſſory Ideas being not always like to ours, we cannot rightly judge of them: So that Men act always by ſome particular Reaſon, even in thoſe Actions that appear moſt impertinent.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Paſſions in particular, and firſt of Admiration and its ill Effects.

WHatever I have ſaid hitherto of the Paſſions is general; yet 'tis no hard matter to draw particular Inferences from it: If one do but reflect upon his Internal Motions and the Actions of others, he will diſcover at one view, a great number of thoſe truths, than can be explain'd in a conſiderable time. However there are ſo few who think of retiring into themſelves, and make any Attempt to that purpoſe, that to quicken them and raiſe their Attention, it will not be amiſs ſomewhat to deſcend into particulars.

It ſeems when we handle or ſtrike our ſelves, that we are almoſt inſenſible, whereas if we be but never ſo little touched by others, we receive ſuch lively *Senſations* as awaken our Attention. In a word, as it never comes into our Mind to tickle our ſelves, and if it did; perhaps the Attempt would be unſucceſsful. So almoſt for the ſame reaſon the Soul cares not to feel and ſound her ſelf, is preſently diſguſted at that ſort of Exerciſe, and commonly is incapable of *feeling* or *knowing* all that belongs to her, till touch'd and made ſenſible by others: So that it will be neceſſary, for the facilitating ſome people in acquiring the Knowledge of themſelves, to mention ſome of the particular Effects of Paſſions, to teach them by touching them, of what *make* and Conſtitution their Soul is of.

In the mean while thoſe that ſhall read the following thoughts muſt be forewarn'd, that they will not always be touched to the quick, nor be aware that they are ſubject to the Paſſions and Errors of which I ſhall ſpeak; becauſe particular Paſſions are not always the ſame in all Men.

All Men indeed have the ſame natural Inclinations, which referr not to the Body, and likewiſe thoſe that relate to it, when 'tis in a very good Conſtitution: but its various Tempers and frequent Alterations, produce an infinite Variety in particular Paſſions: To which diverſity of Conſtitutions, if that variety of Objects be added, which cauſe very different Impreſſions upon thoſe who follow not the ſame Employments and manner of Life, it will plainly appear, that ſuch a perſon, who is lively touched by ſome things in one place of his Soul, may be abſolutely inſenſible as to many others; ſo that we ſhould commonly miſtake, ſhould we always judge of the Commotions of others, by what we feel in our ſelves.

I am not afraid of being deceiv'd, when I aſſert that all Men would be happy; for I fully and certainly know, that *Chineſe* and *Tartars*, Angels and Devils, in a word, all Spirits whatſoever have an *Inclination* for felicity. Nay, I know that God ſhall never produce any Spirit without that Deſire. I never ſaw either *Chineſe* or *Tartar*; ſo that I never learn'd it from Experience, nor yet from my inward Conſciouſneſs, which only teaches me that I would my ſelf be happy. God alone can inwardly convince me that all other Men, Angels and Devils deſire happineſs, and he only can aſſure me that he will never create a Spirit, that ſhall not care for felicity: For who elſe can poſitively aſſure me of what he does and even thinks? And as he cannot deceive me, ſo I may ſafely rely on what I learn from him. And therefore I am certain that all Men would be happy, becauſe that Inclination is natural, and independent from the Body.

It goes quite otherwiſe with particular Paſſions: for becauſe I love Muſick, Dancing, Hunting, Sweet-Meats, high-ſeaſon'd Diſhes, *&c.* I cannot certainly conclude that other Men have the ſame Paſſions. Pleaſure is doubtleſs ſweet and grateful to Men, but all find it not in the ſame things. The Love of Pleaſure is a Natural Inclination, not depending upon the Body, and therefore general: but the love of Muſick, Hunting, or Dancing, is not general, becauſe the Diſpoſition of the Body from which it proceeds being different in ſeveral Perſons, the Paſſions they produce are not always the ſame.

General Paſſions, as Deſire, Joy and Sorrow, are the mean betwixt natural Inclinations and particular Paſſions. They are general as well as Inclinations, but they are not always of the ſame ſtrength; becauſe the Cauſe which produces and feeds them is not always equally Active. There is an infinite variety in the Degrees of Agitation of the Animal Spirits, in their plenty and fineneſs, and in the relation betwixt the Fibres of the Brain and thoſe Spirits.

And therefore it often happens that we touch not Men in any *part* of their Soul when we treat of particular Paſſions: but if they chance to be touched, they are violently moved. On the contrary the mentioning of general Paſſions and Inclinations never fail to affect us, but ſo weakly and faintly, that we are ſcarce ſenſible of it. I mention this, leſt any ſhould judge of what I ſay by his own Commotions, that he either has, or ſhall recieve from my Diſcourſe, but rather that he ſhould judge of it, by conſidering the Nature of the Paſſions I ſpeak of.

Should we purpoſe to handle all the particular Paſſions, and diſtinguiſh them by the Objects that raiſe them, it is plain the Task would be endleſs; and we ſhould only repeat the ſame thing: The former becauſe the Objects of the Paſſions are infinite; the latter becauſe we ſhould be conſtantly engag'd in the ſame ſubject. The particular Paſſions for Poetry, Hiſtory, Mathematicks, Hunting, Dancing, are but one general Paſſion; For, for Example, the Paſſions of Deſire or Joy, whatever pleaſes are not different Paſſions, though delightful Objects in particular differ much.

And therefore the number of Paſſions muſt not be multiplied by the number of Objects which are infinite; but only by the principal Relations they may have to us: And ſo it will appear, as we ſhall explain it hereafter, that Love and Hatred are the Mother-paſſions, which produce no other general Paſſions, beſides Deſire, Joy and Sorrow: that the particular Paſſions are made up only of thoſe Three primitive, and more or leſs compounded, according to the number of acceſſory Ideas, that attend the principal Idea of the Good or Evil, which has rais'd them, or as the Good and Evil are more or leſs circumſtantiated with reference to us.

If we remember what has been ſaid of the Connection of Ideas, and that in all great Paſſions, the Animal Spirits being extreamly agitated, ſtir up in the Brain all the Traces any ways related to the moving Object: we ſhall own that there is an infinite Variety of different Paſſions, which have not particular Names, and cannot be explain'd but by ſaying they are inexplicable.

If the Primitive Paſſions, of the Complication of which others are made up, were not ſuſceptible of more or leſs: it would not be difficult to determine the number of all the Paſſions: but that number of Complicated Paſſions muſt needs be infinite, becauſe one and the ſame Paſſion having infinite Degrees, may by its Conjunction with others be infinitely Complicated; ſo that there were perhaps never two Men affected with the ſame Paſſion, if by that name be underſtood an even mixture and likeneſs of all the Motions and Senſations that are occaſionally rais'd in us upon the preſence of ſome Object.

But as more or leſs do not alter the Species, ſo it may be ſaid that the number of Paſſions is not infinite; becauſe the Circumſtances that attend Good or Evil, which excite the Paſſions, are not innumerable. But let us explain our Paſſions in particular.

When we ſee any thing the firſt time, or when having ſeen it ſeveral times accompanied with ſome Circumſtances, we ſee it again attended with others, we are ſurprized and admire it. Thus a new Idea, or a new Connection of old Ideas, raiſes in us an Imperfect Paſſion; which is the firſt of all, and nam'd *Admiration.* I call it *imperfect*, becauſe 'tis not excited either by the Idea or Senſe of Good: the Brain being then ſtruck in ſome unuſual places, or in a new manner; the Soul is ſenſibly moved, and therefore muſt needs ſtrongly apply her ſelf to what is new in that Object; for the ſame reaſon that a bare tickling the Soale of the Feet raiſes a very lively and moving Senſation in the Soul, rather by the Novelty than by the ſtrength of the Impreſſion.

There are other Reaſons of the Application of the Soul to new things, but I have explain'd them, where I ſpeak of the Natural Inclinations. Here we conſider the Soul only as related to the Body, in which Reſpect the Commotion of the Spirits is the Cauſe of her Application to new things.

In Admiration ſtrictly taken, we conſider things only as they are in themſelves, or as they appear; and look not on them as related to us, or as good or bad. Hence it comes that the Spirits diſperſe not through the Muſcles to give the Body the diſpoſition that is required for purſuing Good, or ſhunning Evil; and ſhake not the Nerves that end in the Heart and other *Viſcera*, to haſten or retard the Fermentation or Motion of the Blood, as it happens in other Paſſions. All the Spirits go to the Brain, to print a lively and diſtinct Image of the ſurprizing Object, that the Soul may conſider and know it again; whilſt the reſt of the Body remains in the ſame poſture, and as unmovable; For as there is no Commotion in the Soul, ſo there is no Motion in the Body.

When the admired things appear great, Admiration is always follow'd with Eſteem, and ſometimes with Veneration, whereas it is always accompanied with Contempt, and ſometimes with Diſdain, when they appear little.

The Idea of Grandeur cauſes a great Motion of the Spirits in the Brain, and the Tracks that repreſent it are kept very long: and likewiſe a great Motion of the Spirits raiſes in the Soul an Idea of Greatneſs, and powerfully fixes the Mind on the Conſideration of that Idea.

On the contrary, the Idea of Littleneſs produces but an inconſiderable Motion of Spirits in the Brain, and the Traces repreſenting it are ſoon blotted out: and likewiſe a ſmall Motion of Spirits raiſes in the Soul an Idea of Meanneſs, and ſtays the Mind but little on the Conſideration of that Idea. Thoſe things deſerve to be taken notice of.

When we conſider our ſelves, or ſomething united to us, our Admiration is always accompanied with ſome moving Paſſion, which however only agitates the Soul and the Spirits, that go to the Heart; becauſe there being no Good to ſeek, nor Evil to avoid, the Spirits diſperſe not themſelves through the Muſcles, to diſpoſe the Body to ſome Action.

The Contemplation of the perfection of our Being, or of ſomething belonging to it, naturally produces Pride, or Self-eſteem, Contempt of others, Joy, and ſome other Paſſions. The Contemplation

plation of our own Grandeur cauſes haughtineſs; that of our Strength, Valour, or Boldneſs; and that of any other advantage naturally raiſes ſome other Paſſion, which is ſtill a kind of Pride.

On the contrary, the conſideration of ſome Imperfection of our Being, or of ſomething belonging to it, naturally produces Humbleneſs, Contempt of our ſelves, Reverence for others, Sorrow and ſome other Paſſions. The ſight of our littleneſs cauſes Puſillanimity, that of our weakneſs Timidity, aud that of any diſadvantage whatſoever naturally raiſes ſome other Paſſion; which is ſtill a kind of humbleneſs. But neither that Dejectedneſs, nor that Pride, are properly Virtues or Vices; being only Paſſions or involuntary Commotions, which yet are very uſeful to Civil Society, and even in ſome caſes abſolutely requiſite for the preſervation of the Life or Goods of thoſe that are actuated by them.

'Tis neceſſary for Inſtance, to be humble and timorous, and even outwardly to teſtify that diſpoſition of the Mind, by a modeſt look and reſpectful or timorous Comportment, when we are in the preſence of a Perſon of Quality, or one that is Proud and Powerful: It being almoſt ever profitable for the Good of the Body that the Imagination ſhould ſtoop before ſenſible Grandeur, and give it outward Marks of its inward Submiſſion and Veneration. But this is done naturally and ſpontaneouſly, without the conſent of the Will, and ſometimes notwithſtanding its Oppoſition. Even ſuch Beaſts as Dogs, which ſtand in need of prevailing upon thoſe with whom they live, have ordinarily their Bodies ſo diſpoſed, that it machinally takes the ſhape that is required for their preſervation, in Reference to thoſe that are about them. And if Birds and ſome other Creatures want ſuch a Diſpoſition, 'tis becauſe they need not aſſwage the Fury of thoſe whom they can eſcape by flight, or whoſe help is not neceſſary for the preſervation of their Life.

It can never be too much obſerv'd, that all the Paſſions are raiſed in us, at the ſight of ſomething external, and Machinally ſpread on the Face thoſe looks that are fit and ſuited to our preſent State, that is, thoſe that are apt by their Impreſſion Machinally to diſpoſe the Spectators to ſuch Paſſions and Motions, as are uſeful for the good of Civil Society. Admiration it ſelf, when produced in us by the perception of ſomething external, which others can conſider as well as we, puts the Face in ſuch a ſhape as is fit to ſtrike others with a machinal Impreſſion of Admiration; and which acts ſo regularly on the Brain, that the Spirits contain'd in it are driven to the Muſcles of the Face, to faſhion it into a Look altogether like our own.

This Communication of the Paſſions of the Soul and the animal Spirits, to unite Men together, in reference to good and evil, and to make them altogether like, not only by the diſpoſition of their Mind, but alſo by the poſture of their Body, is ſo much the greater and more obſervable, as Paſſions are more violent; by reaſon that the animal Spirits are then agitated with more ſtrength. And this muſt needs be ſo, becauſe the Good and Evil being then greater, or more preſent, requires a greater Application, and a ſtricter Aſſociation of Men to ſeek or avoid them. But when the Paſſions are moderate, as Admiration uſually is, the Communication of their effects is inſenſible; and they do not alter the Countenance, by which the Communication uſes to be wrought: for there being no urgent occaſion, it would be needleſs to put a force on the Imagination of others, or to take them off from their buſineſs, to which their Application is perhaps more requiſite, than to the looking on the Cauſes of thoſe Paſſions.

There is nothing more wonderful, than that ordering of the Paſſions and Diſpoſitions of the Body, in reference to the ſurrounding Objects. All our Machinal Actions are moſt becoming the Wiſdom of our Maker. God has made us ſuſceptible of all thoſe Paſſions chiefly to unite us with all ſenſible things, for the preſervation of Society, and of our Corporeal Being; and his deſign is ſo exactly perform'd by the Conſtruction of his Work, that we cannot but admire his Wiſdom in the Contrivance of the Springs and Texture of it.

However our Paſſions and all thoſe imperceptible Bands which tye us to the ſurrounding Objects, often prove, by our own fault, fruitful Cauſes of Errors and Diſorders. For we make not of our Paſſions the uſe we ought to do; we allow them every thing, and know not ſo much as the bounds we ought to preſcribe to their Power; ſo that the weakeſt and leaſt moving Paſſions, as Admiration for inſtance, have ſtrength enough to draw us into Error.

When Men, and eſpecially thoſe that are endued with a lively Imagination, contemplate the beſt ſide of themſelves, they find for the moſt part a great deal of Self-complacency and Satisfaction; and their internal ſatisfaction is increaſed by the Compariſon they make betwixt themſelves and others, that are not ſo Airy and Spirituous. Beſides that they have many Admirers, and that few of their Oppoſers gain Succeſs and Applauſe; for Reaſon is ſeldome or never applauded in oppoſition to a ſtrong and lively Imagination. In ſhort, the Face of their Hearers takes on ſuch ſubmiſſive and dutiful looks, and expreſſes, at every new word they ſay, ſuch lively ſtrokes of Admiration, that they admire themſelves too, and that their Imagination, puſt up with their pretended Advantages, fills them with an extraordinary ſatisfaction of themſelves. And ſince we cannot ſee men in the height of a Paſſion, without receiving ſome Impreſſion from it, and adopting, as I may ſay, their Sentiments; how ſhould it be poſſible that thoſe, who are ſurrounded with a throng of Admirers, ſhould give no Acceſs to a Paſſion, that is ſo flattering and ſo grateful to Self-love.

Now that high eſteem, which Perſons of a ſtrong and lively Imagination have of themſelves and their good Qualities, puffs them up with Pride, and gives them a Magiſterial and Deciſive Comportment; they liſten to others but with Contempt; they Anſwer but with Jeering; they think but with Reference to themſelves; and as they look on the Attention of Mind, that is ſo

requiſite for the diſcovery of Truth, as a Slavery; ſo they are altogether indocible. Pride, Ignorance and Blindneſs, go hand in hand. The Bold, or rather Vain-glorious Wits will not be the Diſciples of Truth, and never retire into themſelves, unleſs it be to contemplate and admire their ſuppoſed perfections: ſo that he who reſiſts the Proud ſhines in the middle of their Darkneſs, without diſſipating it.

There is on the contrary a certain diſpoſition of the Blood and animal Spirits, that occaſions too mean thoughts of our ſelves. The ſcarcity, the dulneſs and fineneſs join'd to the courſeneſs of the Fibres of the Brain, cauſe the Imagination to be weak and languiſhing. And the Contemplation, or rather the confuſed ſenſe of that faintneſs of Imagination, is what breeds in us a vicious Humility, which we may call Meanneſs of Spirit.

All Men are ſuſceptible of the Truth, but all apply not themſelves to him who alone is able to teach it. The Proud make their Addreſs and liſten but to themſelves; and the Diſpirited make their Application to the Proud, and ſubmit themſelves to their Determinations. Both the one and the other give ear to bare men. Proud Minds follow the Fermentation of their own blood, that is, their own Imagination; and the low-ſpirited are over-ſway'd by the over-ruling Countenance of the Proud, and ſo are both ſubjected to Vanity and Lies. The Proud is like a rich and powerful Man, who has a great Retinue, who meaſures his own Greatneſs by the number of his Attendants, and his Strength by that of the Horſes of his Coach: whereas the low-ſpirited is like a poor, weak, and languiſhing Wretch, who from the ſame Spirit and Principles becauſe he is Maſter of Nothing, Imagines he is almoſt Nothing himſelf. However, our Retinue is not our ſelf, and ſo far is the plenty of the Blood and Animal Spirits, the vigour and impetuouſneſs of the Imagination from leading us to the Truth, that on the contrary nothing carries us ſo far from it; whereas 'tis the Dull, if I may ſo call them, that is the cool and ſedate Minds that are the fitteſt for the diſcovery of ſolid and hidden Truths. Their Paſſions being ſilent and quiet, they may liſten in the Receſs of their Reaſon to the truth that teaches them; but moſt unhappily they mind not its words, becauſe it ſpeaks low, without a forcible ſound, and that nothing wakens them but a mighty Noiſe. Nothing convinces them but what glitters to appearance, and is judg'd great and magnificent by the Senſes; they love to be dazled with Brightneſs, and rather chooſe to hear thoſe Philoſophers, who tell them their Stories and Dreams, and aſſert, as the falſe Prophets of former times, that the truth has ſpoken to them (though it has not) than to liſten to Truth it ſelf. For they have already ſuffer'd four thouſand Years, and that without oppoſition, humane Pride to entertain them with Lies, which they reverence and keep to, as to Holy and Divine Traditions. It ſeems the God of Truth is wholly gone from them. They think on him and conſult him no more, they meditate no more, and cover their neglect and lazineſs, with the deluſive pretences of a ſacred Humility.

'Tis true, that we cannot of our ſelves diſcover the Truth; but we can do it at all times with the aſſiſtance of him that enlightens us, and can never do it with that of all the men in the World. Thoſe that know it beſt cannot ſhew it to us, unleſs we ask it of him, to whom they have made their Application, and unleſs he be pleaſed to anſwer our Queſtions, that is our Attention, as he has done theirs. We are not therefore to believe, becauſe Men ſay this or that, for every Man is a Liar; but becauſe he that cannot deceive ſpeaks to us, and we muſt perpetually interrogate him for the ſolution of our Difficulties. We ought not to truſt to them that ſpeak only to the Ears; inſtruct but the Body, or at the utmoſt move but the Imagination. But we ought attentively to liſten unto, and faithfully believe him who ſpeaks to the Mind, informs the Reaſon, and piercing into the moſt abſtruſe Receſſes of the inward Man, is able to enlighten and ſtrengthen him, againſt the outward and ſenſible Man that continually labours to ſeduce and corrupt him. I often repeat theſe things, becauſe I believe them moſt worthy of a ſerious Conſideration. God alone is to be honour'd, becauſe he only can endue us with Knowledge, as 'tis he alone that can fill us with Pleaſure.

There is ſometimes in the animal Spirits and the reſt of the Body, a diſpoſition that provokes to Hunting, Dancing, Running, and other Corporeal Exerciſes, wherein the Force and Activity of the Body are moſt conſpicuous: Which diſpoſition is very ordinary to young men, eſpecially before their Body be in a State of Conſiſtency. Children cannot ſtay in one place, and will always be moving, if they follow their humour. For whereas all their Muſcles are not yet ſtrengthened, nor perfectly finiſht, therefore God, who, as the Author of Nature, regulates the Pleaſures of the Soul, with Reference to the Good of the Body, cauſes them to be delighted with ſuch Exerciſes as may invigorate it. Thus whilſt the Fleſh and Fibres of their Nerves are yet ſoft, the Channels through which the animal Spirits muſt neceſſarily flow, to produce all ſorts of Motion, are wore, and kept open, Humours have no time to ſettle, and all Obſtructions and Cauſes of Corruption are removed.

The confuſed Senſation that young Men have of that Diſpoſition of their Body, makes them pleaſed with the thoughts of their ſtrength and dexterity. They admire themſelves when they know how to meaſure their Motions, and to make extraordinary ones, and are ambitious of being in the preſence of Spectators and Admirers. Thus they ſtrengthen by degrees their Inclination to Corporeal Exerciſes, which is one of the principal Cauſes of Ignorance and Brutiſhneſs. For beſides the time that is by that means laviſht away, the little uſe they make of their Underſtanding, cauſes the chief part of the Brain, in whoſe tractableneſs the force and quickneſs of the Mind

Mind eſpecially conſiſts, to become altogether inflexible, and the animal Spirits, through diſuſe, are difficultly diſpers'd in the Brain, in a manner requiſite to think of what they pleaſe.

This incapacitates moſt part of the Nobility and Gentry, eſpecially ſuch as follow the War, to apply themſelves to any thing. They anſwer with a *Word and a Blow*, as the Proverb ſays; for if you ſpeak any thing that they don't willingly hear, inſtead of thinking upon a ſuitable Reply, their Animal Spirits inſenſibly flow into the Muſcles that raiſe the Arm, and make them anſwer without Conſideration, with a Blow or a Threat; becauſe their Spirits, agitated by the Words they hear, are conveyed to ſuch Places, as are moſt open to Habit and Exerciſe. The ſenſe of their Corporeal Strength confirms them in thoſe inſulting Manners; and the ſubmiſſive Aſpect of their Hearers puffs 'em up with ſuch an abſurd Confidence, as makes them believe they have ſaid very fine things, when they have but haughtily and brutiſhly uttered Impertinencies; being flatter'd by the Fear and Caution of the Standers by

It is not poſſible to have applied our ſelves to any Study, or to make actual Profeſſion of any Science, to be either Author or Doctor, without being conſcious of it. But that very Conſciouſneſs naturally produces in ſome Men ſuch a vaſt Nnmber of Imperfections, that it would be better with them if they wanted thoſe Honourable Qualities. As they look upon them as their moſt conſiderable Perfections, ſo they are extreamly pleaſed with that Contemplation; they ſet them before the Eyes of others with all the poſſible Dexterity, and conceive they have thereby right to judge of every thing without Examination. If any be ſo couragious as to contradict them, they at firſt endeavour skilfully, and with a ſweet and obliging Countenance, to inſinuate what they are, and what right they have to determine of ſuch Matters. And if any ſtill preſume to oppoſe them, and that they be at a loſs for an Anſwer, they do not ſtick openly to declare what they think of themſelves, and of their Adverſaries.

Every inward Senſe of any Qualification we enjoy, naturally ſwells up the Courage. A Trooper well mounted and accoutred, who neither wants Blood nor Spirits, is ready to undertake any thing; that Diſpoſition inſpiring him with an undaunted Boldneſs. So it goes with a Man of Letters, when he fanſies himſelf to be Learned, and that the Haughtineſs of his Heart has corrupted his Mind, he becomes, if I may ſo ſpeak, bold and fierce againſt Truth. Sometimes he raſhly impugns it without knowing it, at other times he conſciouſly betrays it; and relying upon his imaginary Learning, is always ready to aſſert, either the Affirmative or Negative, according as he is poſſeſſed with a Spirit of Contradiction.

It goes quite otherwiſe with thoſe that make no Oſtentation of Learning: they are not poſitive: neither do they ſpeak, unleſs they have ſomething to ſay; and it even often happens that they remain ſilent when they ſhould ſpeak. They have neither that Fame, nor thoſe outward Characters of Learning, which ſpur Men on to ſpeak without Knowledge; and ſo may decently hold their Peace: but the Pretenders are afraid to make a ſtop, ſince they are ſenſible they ſhall be deſpis'd for their ſilence, even when they have nothing to ſay, and that they are not always in danger of falling into Contempt, though they ſpeak but Impertinencies, provided they utter them with a Scientifick Confidence.

What makes Men capable of thinking, enables them to know the Truth; but neither Honours, Riches, Univerſity-Degrees, nor Chimerical Erudition makes them capable of thinking. It's their own Nature, for they are made to think, becauſe they are created for the Truth. Even bodily Health qualifies them not for thinking well, but only is a leſs Hindrance than Sickneſs. Our Body aſſiſts us in ſome manner in perceiving by Senſe, and imagining; but not at all in conceiving. For though without its Help we cannot attentively meditate, nor oppoſe the continual Impreſſion of the Senſes and Paſſions, which endeavour to perplex and obliterate out our Ideas, becauſe in this preſent State, we cannot overcome the Body without it ſelf: However 'tis plain that the Body cannot illuminate the Mind, nor produce in it the light of Underſtanding, ſince every Idea that diſcovers the Truth proceeds from Truth it ſelf. All that the Soul receives from the Body relates only to it, and when ſhe follows thoſe Glimpſes, ſhe ſees nothing but Phantaſms and Dreams; that is to ſay, ſhe ſees not things as they are in themſelves, but only as they have relation to her Body.

As the Idea of our own greatneſs or littleneſs is a frequent occaſion of Errour, ſo likewiſe the Ideas of outward things that have reference to us, make no leſs dangerous an Impreſſion. We have already obſerv'd that the Idea of Greatneſs is always attended with a great Motion of Spirits, on which motion the Idea of Grandeur does alſo wait: and that on the contrary, that of littleneſs is always followed with a ſmall Motion of Spirits, which is on its turn accompanied with the Idea of Meanneſs. From that principle 'tis eaſy to infer, that ſuch things as produce in us great Motions of Spirits, muſt naturally appear greater, ſtronger, and more real and perfect than others; for in the word Greatneſs I comprehend all thoſe Qualifications and ſuch like. So that ſenſible Good muſt needs ſeem to us more conſiderable and ſolid, than that which cannot be felt; If we judge of it by the Motion of the Spirits, and not by the pure Idea of Truth. A great Houſe, a ſumptuous Retinue, a fine Furniture, Offices, Honour, Riches, will then appear to us to have more greatneſs and reality in them than Juſtice and other Virtues.

When we compare Virtue to Riches, by the pure Eyes of the Mind, we prefer Virtue; but if we make uſe of our Corporeal Eyes and Imagination, and judge of thoſe things by the Motion they raiſe in our Spirits, we ſhall doubtleſs chuſe Riches rather than Virtue.

'Tis

'Tis from the ſame Principle, that we imagine that ſpiritual and inſenſible things are almoſt nothing, that the Ideas of our Mind are leſs noble than the Objects they repreſent; that there is leſs reality and ſubſtance in the Air than in Metalls, and in Water than in Ice: that thoſe vaſt Spaces that reach from the Earth to the Firmament, are empty, or that the Bodies that fill them have not ſo much reality and ſolidity, as the Sun and Stars. In ſhort, our reaſoning upon that falſe Principle induces us into an infinite number of Errours, concerning the Nature and Perfection of every thing.

A great Motion of Spirits, and by conſequence a ſtrong Paſſion, always attending the ſenſible Idea of Grandeur, and a ſmall Motion, and conſequently a weak Paſſion, ſtill accompanying the ſenſible Idea of Meanneſs; we are very attentive to, and beſtow a great deal of our time on the ſtudy of ſuch things as raiſe the ſenſible Idea of Grandeur; whereas we neglect thoſe which afford but the ſenſible Idea of Meanneſs. Thoſe great Bodies, for inſtance, which make their Circumvolutions over our heads, have ever made a great Impreſſion upon Men, who at firſt ador'd them, becauſe of their light and brightneſs, or ſenſible Idea of Grandeur; ſome bolder Wits preſum'd to examine their Motions; ſo that the Stars have been in all Ages the Object, either of the ſtudy, or of the veneration of the greateſt part of Mankind. It may even be ſaid that the fear of their Phantaſtick Influences, which ſtill fright Aſtrologers and weak Perſons, is a ſort of Adoration, paid by a brain-ſick Imagination to the Idea of Greatneſs that repreſents Cœleſtial Bodies.

But the Body of Man, that is infinitely more admirable, and deſerves more our Application, than whatever we can know of *Saturn*, *Jupiter*, and other Planets, has remained a long time almoſt unknown. The ſenſible Idea of diſſected parts of Fleſh, having nothing great, but being rather diſtaſtful and noiſome; It is but a few Years, ſince Men of parts have looked upon Anatomy, as a Science that deſerved their Study. There have been Princes and Kings that boaſted of being Aſtronomers: the height and magnitude of the Stars ſeem'd to ſuit their Dignity and Grandeur; but I know not of any that were ever ambitious of knowing Anatomy, and skilfully diſſecting a Heart or a Brain. The ſame may be ſaid of ſeveral other Sciences.

Rare and extraordinary things incite the Spirits to greater and more ſenſible Motions, than ſuch as are ſeen every day; we admire them, and by a Natural Conſequence we fix on them an Idea of Greatneſs, that is followed with Paſſions of Eſteem and Reverence. This perverts the Reaſon of ſeveral Perſons, who are ſo very reſpectful and curious of all the Remains of Antiquity, and whatever comes from far, or is Rare and Extraordinary, that they are as Slaves to them; becauſe the Mind dares not ſit and pronounce upon the Objects of its Veneration.

I grant Truth is in no great danger becauſe ſome Men are taken up with the Medals, Arms and Habits of the Ancients, or with the dreſs of the *Chineſe* and *Savages*. It is not altogether unſerviceable, to know the Map of Ancient *Rome*, nor the ways from *Tomquin* to *Nanquin*, though it be more uſeful to us to know thoſe from *London* to *Oxford*, or from *Paris* to St. *Germain* or *Verſailles*. In ſhort, we cannot find fault with thoſe that will enquire into the Hiſtory of the Wars betwixt the *Greeks* and *Perſians*, betwixt the *Tartars* and *Chineſe*; let them have for *Thucydides*, *Xenophon* or any other whatſoever, as much Inclination as they pleaſe. But we cannot ſuffer that Admiration of Antiquity ſhould lord it over Reaſon; that it ſhould be forbidden to make uſe of our underſtanding in examining the Opinions of the Ancients, and that the Diſcovery and Demonſtration of their Errours ſhould paſs for a raſh and preſumptuous Attempt.

Truth is of all times and Ages. If *Ariſtotle* did diſcover it, it may ſtill be found out: his Opinions are to be proved by ſtrong Reaſons, for if they were ſolid in his time, they will be ſo in ours. 'Tis to deceive our ſelves to pretend to demonſtrate natural Truths by humane Authorities. It may perhaps be proved, that *Ariſtotle* has had ſuch and ſuch thoughts upon ſuch and ſuch Subjects. But 'tis a very ſlender improvement of Reaſon, to read *Ariſtotle*, or any other Author, with great Diligence and Trouble, that we may hiſtorically learn his Opinions, and teach them to others.

We cannot without Indignation look on ſome Univerſities that were eſtabliſhed for the Enquiry and Defence of Truth, and are now turned into particular Sects, and boaſt of ſtudying and maintaining the Opinions of ſome Men. We are ready to fall into Paſſion at the reading of thoſe Philoſophers and Phyſicians, who ſtore their Books with ſo many Quotations, that one would rather take them for Commentaries of the Civil and Canon Law, than for Tracts of Natural Philoſophy and Phyſick. For who can ſuffer that Reaſon and Experience ſhould be deſerted, and the Fancies of *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Epicurus*, or any other Philoſopher, blindly followed.

Such ſtrange methods would perhaps ſtrike us dumb with Amazement, though we were not hurt by them, I mean, though theſe Gentlemen did not impugn the Truth to which we find our ſelves neceſſarily united: But their admiring the Dreams of the Ancients inſpires them with a blind Zeal againſt Truths newly diſcovered; they cry them down without knowing them; they oppoſe them without underſtanding them, and by the ſtrength of their Imagination infuſe their Sentiments into the Minds and Hearts of their Auditors and Admirers.

As they judge of thoſe new Diſcoveries by the Eſteem they have for their Authors, and that their Contemporaries which they have ſeen and and convers'd with, have not that big and extraordinary Appearance, which the Imagination attributes to Ancient Authors; ſo they have no Conſideration for the Modern. For the Idea of the Men of our Age raiſes nothing but Contempt, becauſe it is not attended with violent and ſurprizing Motions. *Lim-*

Limners and *Statuaries* never repreſent Ancient Philoſophers as other Men, but give them a big Head, a broad and high Fore-head, and a long and venerable Beard. That's a good Argument to prove that the Vulgar Sort has ſome ſuch Idea of them; for *Painters* picture things as they repreſent them to themſelves, and follow the Natural Motions of the Imagination; and ſo for the moſt part look on the Ancients as Uncommon Men. Whereas Imagination repreſenting Men of our Age like to thoſe with whom we daily converſe, and producing no extraordinary Motion in the Vital Spirits, raiſes nothing in the Soul but Contempt & Indifferency towards them.

I have ſeen *Des-Cartes*, ſaid one of thoſe learned Admirers of Antiquity, I have known him, and converſed with him ſeveral times; he was an honeſt Man, and no Fool, but had nothing extraordinary. He had form'd a contemptible Idea of the *Carteſian* Philoſophy; becauſe he had converſed with the Author ſome minutes, and had not obſerved in him thoſe great and big Looks that overſway the Imagination. If he were puzzled with ſome Arguments of that Philoſopher, he proudly ſaid, meaning it a ſufficient Anſwer, That he had known him formerly. I could wiſh thoſe Gentlemen might ſee *Ariſtotle* otherwiſe than in Picture, and converſe an hour with him, provided he ſhould ſpeak *Engliſh* and not *Greek*, and not make himſelf known, before they had declar'd their Opinion of him.

Such things as bear the Character of Novelty, whether they be new in themſelves, or appear in a new Order or Situation, agitate us very much, ſtriking the Brain in places that are moſt ſenſible, becauſe leaſt expoſed to the Courſe of the Spirits. Such things as bear a ſenſible Mark of Greatneſs, do alſo ſtrangely move us, becauſe they ſtir up a great Motion of the Spirits. But ſuch as at once come attended with Characters of Novelty and Greatneſs, do not ſimply move us: they overthrow, raviſh, ſtupify us by their violent Commotions.

For Inſtance, Thoſe who ſpeak nothing but Paradoxes attract the Admiration of weak Minds, becauſe what they ſay has the Character of Novelty: thoſe that ſpeak by Sentences, and uſe high and lofty Flights, inſpire Veneration, becauſe they ſeem to ſay ſomething great. But thoſe that joyn Loftineſs to Novelty, and Greatneſs to Rarity, never fail of raviſhing and ſtupifying the Vulgar Sort, though they ſhould ſpeak but Impertinencies; for that pompous and ſtately Nonſence, *inſani fulgores*, thoſe falſe Declamatory glitterings for the moſt part dazle the Eyes of infirm Minds, and make ſuch a lively and ſurprizing Impreſſion upon their Imagination, that they know not where they are, that they venerate the Power that blinds 'em and caſts 'em down, and admire, as ſhining Truths, confuſed and unexpreſſible Senſations.

CHAP. VIII.

A Continuation of the ſame Subject; What good Uſe can be made of Admiration and other Paſſions.

ALL Paſſions have two very conſiderable Effects, for they apply the Mind, and win the Heart: by the former they may by a due uſe be made ſerviceable to the Knowledge of Truth, becauſe Application produces that Light by which it is diſcovered: but the latter Effect is always diſadvantagious; becauſe Paſſions cannot win the Heart but by corrupting the Reaſon, and repreſenting things not as they are in themſelves, or according to Truth, but as they are related to us.

Admiration is, of all Paſſions, that which leaſt affects the Heart; becauſe 'tis the Sight of things conſider'd as Good or Evil, that agitates us, and that the Conſideration of their Greatneſs or Smallneſs, without any other Relation to us, makes but little Impreſſion upon us: ſo that the Admiration, that attends the Knowledge of the Greatneſs or Littleneſs of new things we conſider corrupts the Reaſon much leſs than any other Paſſion; and can even be of great uſe for the Knowledge of Truth, provided we be very careful to hinder its being followed by other Paſſions, as it happens for the moſt part.

In *Admiration* the Animal Spirits are ſtrongly driven to thoſe places of the Brain, that repreſent the new Object as it is in it ſelf; which print thereon Traces of it, diſtinct and deep enough to be long continued, and conſequently afford to the Mind a clear Idea, and eaſy to be remembred; and therefore it cannot be denied, but *Admiration* may be very uſeful to *Sciences*, ſince it applies and enlightens the Mind; whereas other Paſſions apply the Mind, but enlighten it not. They apply it, becauſe they raiſe the Animal Spirits, but enlighten it not, or enlighten it with falſe and deceiving Glimpſes, becauſe they drive thoſe Spirits in ſuch a manner, as that they repreſent Objects, as they are related to us, and not as they are in themſelves.

There is nothing harder, than to apply our ſelves a conſiderable time to any thing which we admire not; becauſe the Vital Spirits are not then eaſily carried to places fitted to repreſent them. In vain we are exhorted to be attentive, we can have no Attention, or none ſufficiently long, though we may have an abſtracted, but not moving Perſwaſion, That the thing deſerves our Application. We muſt needs deceive our Imagination to quicken our Spirits, and repreſent to our ſelves in a new Manner, the Subject on w[hich] we will meditate, that we may raiſe in us ſome Admiring Motion.

We meet every day with Men that reliſh not Study, and find nothing ſo painful as the Application of Mind: They are convinced that they ought to ſtudy certain Matters, and to do

their utmoſt endeavours for it; but their endeavours are, for the moſt part, vain, their progreſs is inconſiderable, and quickly follow'd by wearineſs. True it is that the Animal Spirits obey the order of the Will, and make us attentive, when we deſire it; but when the Commanding Will is the Will of meer Reaſon, that is not kept up by ſome Paſſion, it is ſo weak and languiſhing, that our Ideas are like wandring Phantaſms, that afford us but a tranſient glimpſe, and vaniſh in a moment. Our Animal Spirits receive ſo many private Orders from the Paſſions, and are become by nature and habit ſo prone to perform them, that they are eaſily turn'd from thoſe new and rough ways, through which the Will endeavours to lead them. So that it is eſpecially in ſuch Caſes, that we need a particular Grace to know the Truth, ſince we cannot any conſiderable time bear up the Mind againſt the incumbent weight of the Body, or if we can, yet we never do all we are able.

But when ſome Motion of Admiration quickens us, the animal Spirits naturally run to the Tracks raiſed by the Object, repreſent it clearly to the Mind, and produce in the Brain whatever is requir'd to Perſpicuity and Evidence, without putting the Will to the trouble of managing rebellious Spirits. Hence it comes that thoſe that are prone to Admiration, are fitter to ſtudy than others; are quick and ingenious, and others ſlow and dull.

In the mean while, when Admiration grows to ſuch an Exceſs, as to produce Amazement and Stupifaction, or when it does not excite to rational Curioſity, it may prove of very ill Conſequence; becauſe the animal Spirits are then taken up with repreſenting the admired Object by one of its Faces, without preſenting the others to our Conſideration. Thoſe Spirits likewiſe ſuperſede their ſpreading through all the parts of the Body, for the performance of their ordinary Functions, whilſt they imprint ſuch deep Traces of the Object, and break ſo great a number of the Fibres of the Brain, that that Idea can never be blotted out of the Mind.

It is not enough that Admiration ſhould make us attentive, unleſs it makes us curious; neither is it ſufficient for the full knowledge of an Object, to conſider one of its Faces, unleſs we be ſo far inquiſitive, as to examine them all; that we may judge of it upon ſure grounds. And therefore when Admiration moves us not to examine things with the utmoſt Accuracy, but inſtead of that ſtops our Enquiry, it is very unprofitable to the Knowledge of Truth, becauſe it fills up the Mind with likelihoods and probabilities, and incites us to judge raſhly and precipitately of all things.

Admiration muſt not center in its ſelf, but its buſineſs is to facilitate Examination. The Animal Spirits that are naturally excited in Admiration, offer themſelves to the Soul, that ſhe may uſe them to repreſent the Object more diſtinctly to her ſelf, and to know it better. This is Nature's Inſtitution; for Admiration ought to move us to Curioſity, and Curioſity to conduct us to the Knowledge of Truth: But the Soul knows not how to make an Advantage of her own ſtrength; She prefers a certain ſatisfactory Senſation, that ſhe receives from the plenty of the Spirits that affect her, before the Knowledge of the Object that has raiſed them; and She chooſes rather to be conſcious of her own Riches than to diſſipate them by uſe; not much unlike thoſe Miſers who chooſe rather to hoard up their Treaſures, than to ſupply their wants with them.

Men are generally pleaſed with whatever raiſes any kind of Paſſion. They not only ſpend Money to be moved to Sorrow, by the Repreſentation of a Tragedy, but they alſo throw it away upon Legerdemains, that may ſtir up their Admiration; ſince it cannot be ſaid that they give it to be deceived. Therefore that inward and ſatisfactory Senſation, which we are conſcious of in *Admiration*, is the principal cauſe why we dwell upon *it*, without putting it to the uſe which Nature and Reaſon preſcribe to us. For that delectable Senſation ſo powerfully holds the Admirers Bent to the admired Object, that they will fall into a Paſſion, if any ſhow them its Vanity. A mourning Perſon reliſhes ſo well the ſweetneſs of Sorrow, that he's angry with thoſe that go about to make him merry. The caſe is the ſame with Admirers; who ſeem to be wounded by the Endeavours that are made to demonſtrate the unreaſonableneſs of their Admiration, becauſe they feel that the ſecret Pleaſure, they receive from that Paſſion, diminiſhes proportionably as the Idea that cauſed it vaniſhes from their Mind.

The Paſſions perpetually labour to juſtify themſelves, and inſenſibly perſwade us we do well to be led by them. The Satisfaction and Pleaſure, with which they affect the Mind, that is to be their Judge, draws it over by degrees to their ſide, inſpiring it with ſuch, and the like Reaſons. 'We are to judge of things but according to our Ideas, but of all Ideas the moſt ſenſible are the 'moſt real, ſince they act upon us with the greateſt force, and therefore 'tis by thoſe Ideas that 'I muſt judge of them. Now the ſubject I admire contains a ſenſible Idea of greatneſs, I muſt 'then judge of it by that Idea, for I ought to eſteem and love Greatneſs; and therefore I am in 'the right when I inſiſt upon, and am taken up with that Object. And indeed the Pleaſure which 'the Contemplation of its Idea affords me, is a natural proof that it is for my good to think upon 'it; ſince I ſeem to add to my growth by ſuch thoughts, and fancy that my Mind is more en'larged by embracing ſo great an Idea; whereas the Mind ceaſes to exiſt when it thinks upon no'thing. Should that Idea vaniſh, my Mind, it ſeems, ſhould vaniſh with it, or at leaſt become 'ſmaller and narrower, if it ſhould fix upon a leſs conſiderable Idea; ſo that the preſervation of 'that great Idea, being the preſervation of my own Greatneſs, and the perfection of my Being, 'I am in the right to admire; nay others ought to admire me for it, ſhould they give me my due. 'For I am really ſomething great, by the Relation I have to great things, and I enjoy them in

'ſome

'ſome manner by my Admiration, and that Foretaſt which a ſort of Hope affords me. Other 'Men would be Happy, as well as I am my ſelf, if knowing my Greatneſs, they ſhould fix 'themſelves upon the Cauſe that produces it; but they are blind and inſenſible to great and fine 'things, and know not how to raiſe and make themſelves conſiderable.

It may be ſaid, That the Mind naturally and without Reflection argues in ſome ſuch Manner, when it ſuffers it ſelf to be led away by the abuſive Meteors of the Paſſions: Thoſe Reaſonings have ſome Likelihood, though their Weakneſs be ſufficiently viſible; however that Probability, or rather the confuſed Senſe of the probability that attends natural and inconſiderate Arguments, is ſo prevalent, that they never fail of ſeducing us, when we ſtand not upon our Guard.

For Inſtance, When Poetry, Hiſtory, Chymiſtry, or any other Humane Science has ſtruck the Imagination of a Young Man, with ſome Motions of Admiration; if he do not carefully watch the Attempt theſe Motions make upon his Mind, if he examine not to the bottom the uſe of thoſe Sciences, if he compare not the Trouble of learning them, with the Benefits that may accrue to him: In ſhort, if he be not as nice in his Judgment, as he ought to be; he runs the Hazard of being ſeduced by his Admiration, ſhewing him only the faireſt part of thoſe Sciences. And 'tis even to be feared, leſt they ſhould ſo far corrupt his Heart, as that he ſhould never awake out of his Dream, even when he comes to know it to be but a Dream; becauſe it is not poſſible to blot out of the Brain deep Tracks, engraven and widened by a long continued Admiration. And therefore we ought to take diligent care, to keep our Imagination untainted; that is to ſay, to hinder the Formation of dangerous Traces, that corrupt the Heart and Mind. I ſhall here ſet down a very uſeful way to prevent, not only the Exceſs of Admiration, but alſo of all other Paſſions in general.

When the Motion of the Animal Spirits is ſo violent, as to imprint on the Brain deep Traces that corrupt the Imagination, it is always attended with ſome Commotion of the Soul. And as the Soul cannot be moved without being conſcious of it; ſhe is thereby ſufficiently warn'd, to ſtand upon her Guard, and to examine, whether it be for her Good to ſuffer thoſe Traces to be enlarged and finiſhed. But at the time of the Commotion, the Mind is not ſo free, as rightly to judge of the Uſefulneſs of thoſe Traces, becauſe the ſame Commotion deceives and inclines it to indulge them: we muſt therefore endeavour to ſtop that Commotion, or to turn to ſome other place the current of the Spirits that cauſe it, and in the mean while 'tis abſolutely neceſſary to ſuſpend our Judgment.

But we ought not to imagine that the Soul always can, by her bare Will, ſtop the Courſe of the Spirits that hinder her from making uſe of her Reaſon; her ordinary power being not ſufficient to quell Motions not raiſed by her; ſo that ſhe muſt dextrouſly endeavour to deceive an Enemy that attacks her unawares.

As the Motions of the Spirits ſtir up reſpective Thoughts in the Soul, ſo our Thoughts excite ſuch and ſuch Motions in the Brain: ſo that to ſtop a riſing Motion of the Spirits, a bare Will is not ſufficient, but Stratagem muſt be us'd; and we muſt skilfully repreſent to our ſelves ſuch things as are contrary to thoſe that ſtir up and indulge that Motion, whence a *Revulſion* will ariſe; but if we would only determine another way the Motion of the Spirits already riſen, we muſt not think of *contrary* but only different things from thoſe that have produced it, which will make a *Diverſion*.

But becauſe the *Diverſion* and *Revulſion* are great or little, as the new Thoughts are accompanied with a greater or leſs Motion of the Spirits; we muſt carefully obſerve, what ſort of Thoughts agitate us moſt, that we may in urging Occaſions repreſent them to our ſeducing Imagination, and uſe our ſelves ſo much to that ſort of Reſiſtance, that no ſurprizing Motion may affect our Soul.

If we take care firmly to unite the Idea of Eternity, or ſome other ſolid Thought, to thoſe violent and extraordinary Motions, they will never be ſtirr'd up, for the future, without raiſing that Idea, and furniſhing us with Weapons to reſiſt them. This appears from Experience, and from the Reaſon mention'd in the Chapter *Of the Connexion of Idea's* *; ſo that we muſt not imagine it abſolutely impoſſible, by a dextrous Managery, to conquer our Paſſions, when we are ſtedfaſtly reſolv'd upon it.

* Book 2. Part 2. Chap. 3.

However by that Reſiſtance we ought not to pretend to Impeccability, nor to the avoiding of all Errours whatſoever.

Firſt, Becauſe 'tis very difficult to acquire and preſerve ſuch a Habit, as that our extraordinary Motions ſhall raiſe in us Idea's fit to oppoſe them.

Secondly, Though we ſhould have gotten that Habit, thoſe Motions of the Spirits will directly excite the Idea's to be impugned, and but indirectly ſupply us with the neceſſary Weapons to aſſault them. So that the Evil Idea's, being ſtill the Principal, will be ſtronger than the Good, that are but acceſſory; and the latter ever ſtand in need of the Help of the Will.

Thirdly, Thoſe Motions of the Spirits may be ſo violent, as to take up the whole Capacity of the Soul; ſo that there will remain no Room, if I may ſo ſpeak, for the Reception of the acceſſory and revulſive Idea's, or not at leaſt for ſuch a Reception, as may incite us to an attentive Contemplation of them.

Laſtly, There are ſo many particular Circumſtances, that can make that Remedy uſeleſs, that though it ought not to be neglected, yet we muſt not rely too much upon it. We muſt have a per-

a perpetual Recourſe to Prayer, that we may receive from Heaven neceſſary Helps in the time of Temptation; and in the mean while endeavour to preſent to the Mind ſome Truths ſo *ſolid* and *prevalent*, as that they may overcome the moſt violent Paſſions. For I muſt needs add by the way, that ſeveral pious Perſons often return into the ſame faults; becauſe they fill their Mind with a great many truths, that are more *glittering* than *ſolid*, and fitter to weaken and diſſolve, than to fortify it againſt Temptations; whereas others, that are not endued with ſo much knowledge, faithfully ſtick to their Duty, becauſe of ſome great and ſolid truth, which they have rendred familiar, and which bears 'em up and ſtrengthens them in all occaſions.

CHAP. IX.

Of Love and Averſion, and their principal Species.

LOve and Hatred are the Paſſions that immediately ſucceed Admiration; for we dwell not long upon the conſideration of an Object, without diſcovering the Relation it hath to us, or to ſomething we love. The Object we *love*, and to which conſequently we are united by *that Paſſion*, being for the moſt part preſent, as well as that which we actually admire; our Mind quickly, and without any conſiderable reflection makes the neceſſary Compariſons, to find out the Relations they have to each other and to us; or elſe is naturally aware of them, by a preventing ſenſe of Pleaſure and Satisfaction. Then it is that the Motion of Love we have for our ſelves, and for the beloved Object, extends to that which is admired; if the Relation it has immediately to us, or to ſomething united to us, appear advantageous, either by Knowledge or Senſation. Now that new Motion of the Soul, (or rather that Motion of the Soul newly determin'd, join'd to that of the vital Spirits, and followed with the Senſation that attends the new Diſpoſition, that the ſame new Motion of the Spirits produces in the Brain,) is the Paſſion we call here, *Love*.

But when we feel by any Pain, or diſcover by a clear and evident Knowledge, that the Union or Relation of the admired Object would prove diſſerviceable to us, or to ſomething united to us, than the Motion of the Love we have for our ſelves, or for the thing united to us, terminates in us, or cleaves to the united Object, without following the view of the Mind, or being carried to the admired thing. But as the Motion towards Good in general, which the Author of Nature continually imprints on the Soul, carries her to whatever is *known* and *felt*, becauſe what is either *intelligible* or *ſenſible* is good in it ſelf; ſo it may be ſaid that the Reſiſtance of the Soul againſt that natural and driving Motion is a kind of voluntary Motion, which terminates in *Nothingneſs*. Now that *voluntary* * *Motion* of the Soul being join'd to that of the Spirits and Blood, and followed by the Senſation that attends the New Diſpoſition, which that Motion of Spirits produces in the Brain, is the Paſſion we call here *Averſion* or Hatred.

* *Leſt any ſhould miſtake what I call here voluntary Motion, I deſire him to Read the firſt Elucidation on the firſt Chapter. It would intricate my Conceptions ſhould I ſay whatever relates to it, to ſatisfy the Nicety of ſome Perſons.*

That Motion is altogether contrary to Love, and yet 'tis never without Love: It is altogether contrary to it, becauſe *Averſion* ſeparates, and *Love* unites; the former has *Nothingneſs* for its Object, and the latter a Being; the former reſiſts the natural Motion, and makes it of no effect; whereas the latter yields to it, and makes it Victorious: However *Averſion* is never ſeparated from *Love*, becauſe *evil*, the Object of the former, is the privation of good; ſo that to fly from Evil is to fly from the privation of Good, that is to ſay, to tend to Good, and therefore the Averſion of the privation of Good is the Love of Good. But if Evil be taken for Pain, the Averſion of Pain is not the Averſion of the privation of Pleaſure; becauſe Pain is as real a Senſation as Pleaſure, and therefore is not the privation of it; but the Averſion of Pain, being the Averſion of ſome internal Miſery, we ſhould not be affected with that Paſſion, ſhould we not love our ſelves. Laſtly, if Evil be taken for what cauſes Pain in us, or for whatever deprives us of Good; then Averſion depends on Self-love, or on the love of ſomething, to which we deſire to be united: So that Love and Averſion are two Mother Paſſions, oppoſite to each other, but Love is the Firſt, the Chief, and the moſt Univerſal.

As at that great Diſtance and Eſtrangement we are from God, ſince the Fall, we look upon our Being as the Chief part of the things to which we are united; ſo it may be ſaid in ſome ſence, that our Motion of Love, for any thing whatſoever, is an effect of Self-love. We love Honours, becauſe they raiſe us; our Riches, becauſe they maintain and preſerve us; our Relations, Prince and Country, becauſe we are concern'd in their preſervation. Our Motion of Self-love reaches to all the Things that relate to us, and to which we are united, becauſe 'tis that Motion which unites us to them, and ſpreads our Being, if I may ſo ſpeak, on thoſe that ſurround us, proportionably as we diſcover by Reaſon, or by Senſation, that it is our Intereſt to be united to them.

And therefore we ought not to think, that, ſince the Fall, Self-love is only the Cauſe and Rule of all other Affections, but that moſt part of other Affections are Species of Self-love; for when we ſay that a Man loves any new Object, we muſt not ſuppoſe that a new Motion of Love is produc'd

duc'd in him; but rather that knowing that Object to have ſome Relation or Union with him, he loves himſelf in that Object, and that with a Motion of Love coeval to himſelf. For indeed without Grace there is nothing but Self-love in the Heart of Man: the Love of Truth, of Juſtice, of God Himſelf, and every other Love that is in us, by the firſt Inſtitution of Nature, have ever ſince the Fall been a Sacrifice to Self-love.

There is no doubt however but the moſt wicked and barbarous Men, Idolaters and Atheiſts themſelves, are united to God by a natural Love, of which conſequently Self-love is not the Cauſe; for they are united to him by their Love to Truth, Juſtice, and Vertue: they praiſe and eſteem good Men, and do not love them becauſe they are Men; but becauſe they ſee in them ſuch Qualities as they cannot forbear to love, becauſe they cannot forbear to admire and judge them amiable. And therefore we love ſomething beſides our ſelves, but Self-love over-rules all the reſt: and Men forſake Truth and Juſtice for the ſmalleſt Concerns: for when by their Natural force, they venture their Goods and Lives to defend oppreſs'd Innocence, or on any other Occaſion, their greateſt Spur is meer Vanity, and the hopes of getting a Name by the ſeeming Poſſeſſion of a Vertue which is reverenc'd by all the World. They love Truth and Juſtice when on their ſide, but never againſt themſelves, becauſe without Grace they cannot obtain the leaſt Victory over Self-love.

There are many other ſorts of Natural Love; we naturally love our Prince, Country, Relations, thoſe that have any Conformity of Humour, Deſigns, and Employments with us; but all thoſe ſorts of Love are very weak, as well as the Love of Truth and Juſtice; and Self-love being the moſt violent of all, conquers them ſo eaſily, as to find no other Reſiſtance, but what it creates againſt it ſelf.

Bodies that ſtrike againſt others loſe their Motion proportionably as they communicate it to the ſtriken; and, after having moved many other Bodies, may at laſt entirely loſe their own Motion. It is not ſo with Self-love: It determines every other Love by its Impreſſion upon it, and its own Motion diminiſhes not; on the contrary, it gets new Strength by its new Victories; for as that Motion never goes out of the Heart, ſo it cannot be loſt, though it be continually communicated.

Self-love is therefore the Ruling and Univerſal Love, ſinceit is to be found, and bears the Sway, every where; ſo that all the Paſſions having no proper Motion of their own, it may be ſaid, That Self-love is the moſt extenſive and powerful of all Paſſions, or the Ruling and Univerſal Paſſion. And as all Vertues are but *Species* of that firſt Vertue we call *Charity*, according to St. *Auſtin*; ſo all Vices and Paſſions are but as ſo many Effects and Sorts of Self-love, or of that general Vice we call *Concupiſcence*.

We often diſtinguiſh in Morals the Virtues or *Species* of Charity, by the Difference of Objects; but that ſometimes confounds the true Idea we ought to have of Vertue, which rather depends on its own Motive, than any thing elſe; and therefore we ſhall not follow that Method, in treating of the Paſſions; nor diſtinguiſh them by the Objects; becauſe one and the ſame Object may excite them all, and that ten thouſand Objects may raiſe but one. For though Objects differ from each other, yet they differ not always in relation to us, nor do they ſtir up in us different Paſſions. The promis'd Staff of a Mareſchal of *France* differs from a Biſhop's Croſier, or Paſtoral Staff promis'd; yet thoſe two Marks of Honour excite almoſt the ſame Paſſion in the Ambitious; ſince they raiſe in the Mind of both the ſame Idea of Good. But the ſame Mareſchal's Staff, when promiſed, granted, enjoyed, taken away, ſtirs up Paſſions altogether different, becauſe it raiſes in the Mind different Idea's of Good.

We muſt not then multiply the Paſſions by their different Objects, but only admit as many as there are acceſſory Idea's that attend the chief Idea of Good or Evil, and conſiderably alter it in relation to us. For the general Idea of Good, or the Senſation of Pleaſure, which is good to him that enjoys it, agitating the Soul and Animal Spirits, produces the general Paſſion of Love; and the acceſſory Idea's of that Good determine that General Agitation of Love, and Courſe of the Spirits in ſuch a particular manner, as puts the Mind and Body in a convenient Diſpoſition in relation to the perceived Good; and thus produce all the particular Paſſions,

And therefore the general Idea of Good, produces an indeterminate Love, which is but an Extenſion of Self-love. The Idea of Good, as poſſeſs'd, produces *a Love of Joy*: The Idea of Good, not as poſſeſs'd but hop'd for, that is as judg'd poſſible to be poſſeſs'd, produces *a Love of Deſire*; and *laſtly*, The Idea of any Good, that is neither poſſeſs'd, nor hop'd for, or which is the ſame, the Love of any Good, which we cannot hope to enjoy, without loſing ſome other, or which we cannot preſerve when we are poſſeſſed of it, produces *a Love of Sorrow*. Thoſe are the Three ſimple and primitive Paſſions, that have Good for their Object; for the Hope that produces Joy is not a Commotion of the Soul, but a ſimple Judgment.

However we muſt obſerve, that Men confine not their own Being within themſelves, but extend it to all Things and Perſons, to whom they believe it their Advantage to unite themſelves. So that we muſt conceive that they are poſſeſs'd in ſome manner of a Good, when enjoy'd by their Friends, though they do not poſſeſs it immediately themſelves; and therefore when I ſay, That the Poſſeſſion of Good produces Joy, I underſtand it, not only of an immediate Poſſeſſion or Union, but alſo of any other; for we naturally feel a Joy upon the Succeſs or good Fortune of thoſe we love.

a perpetual Recourſe to Prayer, that we may receive from Heaven neceſſary Helps in the time of Temptation; and in the mean while endeavour to preſent to the Mind ſome Truths ſo *ſolid* and *prevalent*, as that they may overcome the moſt violent Paſſions. For I muſt needs add by the way, that ſeveral pious Perſons often return into the ſame faults; becauſe they fill their Mind with a great many truths, that are more *glittering* than *ſolid*, and fitter to weaken and diſſolve, than to fortify it againſt Temptations; whereas others, that are not endued with ſo much knowledge, faithfully ſtick to their Duty, becauſe of ſome great and ſolid truth, which they have rendred familiar, and which bears 'em up and ſtrengthens them in all occaſions.

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We muſt not then multiply the Paſſions by their different Objects, but only admit as many as there are acceſſory Idea's that attend the chief Idea of Good or Evil, and conſiderably alter it in relation to us. For the general Idea of Good, or the Senſation of Pleaſure, which is good to him that enjoys it, agitating the Soul and Animal Spirits, produces the general Paſſion of Love; and the acceſſory Idea's of that Good determine that General Agitation of Love, and Courſe of the Spirits in ſuch a particular manner, as puts the Mind and Body in a convenient Diſpoſition in relation to the perceived Good; and thus produce all the particular Paſſions.

And therefore the general Idea of Good, produces an indeterminate Love, which is but an Extenſion of Self-love. The Idea of Good, as poſſeſs'd, produces *a Love of Joy*: The Idea of Good, not as poſſeſs'd but hop'd for, that is as judg'd poſſible to be poſſeſs'd, produces *a Love of Deſire*; and *laſtly*, The Idea of any Good, that is neither poſſeſs'd, nor hop'd for, or which is the ſame, the Love of any Good, which we cannot hope to enjoy, without loſing ſome other, or which we cannot preſerve when we are poſſeſſed of it, produces *a Love of Sorrow*. Thoſe are the Three ſimple and primitive Paſſions, that have Good for their Object; for the Hope that produces Joy is not a Commotion of the Soul, but a ſimple Judgment.

However we muſt obſerve, that Men confine not their own Being within themſelves, but extend it to all Things and Perſons, to whom they believe it their Advantage to unite themſelves. So that we muſt conceive that they are poſſeſs'd in ſome manner of a Good, when enjoy'd by their Friends, though they do not poſſeſs it immediately themſelves; and therefore when I ſay, That the Poſſeſſion of Good produces Joy, I underſtand it, not only of an immediate Poſſeſſion or Union, but alſo of any other; for we naturally feel a Joy upon the Succeſs or good Fortune of thoſe we love.

Evil, as I said, can be taken Three ways, for the *Privation of Good*, for *Pain*, and for the *Thing* that *causes* the Privation of Good, or produces Pain.

In the first sense the Idea of Evil, being the same with the Idea of a Good not enjoy'd, it is plain that Idea produces Sorrow and Desire, or even Joy: for Joy is always excited from that we find our selves exempt of the privation of Good, that is to say, when we possess Good: So that those Passions that refer to Evil, taken in that sense, are the same as those that relate to Good, because at the Bottom they have likewise Good for their Object.

When Evil signifies Pain, which alone is always a real Evil to him that suffers it, whilst he suffers it; then the sense of that Evil produces those Passions of Sorrow, Desire and Joy, that are Species of Aversion and not of Love; because their Motion is altogether opposite to that which accompanies the perception of the Good, that Motion being but the Resistance of the Soul against the natural Impression.

The Actual Sense of Pain produces an *Aversion of Sorrow*. The Pain we suffer not, but are afraid to suffer produces an *Aversion of Desire*: And lastly, the Pain we neither suffer nor are afraid to suffer; or what is the same, the Pain that shall be attended by a considerable Reward, or the Pain from which we are freed, produces an *Aversion of Joy*. Those are the three simple or primitive Passions that have Evil for their Object, for the fear that produces Sorrow is not a Commotion of the Soul but a bare Judgment.

Lastly, If by Evil we understand the Person or the thing that deprives us of Good, or causes us to endure Pain, the Idea of Evil produces a Motion of Love and Aversion together, or only a Motion of Aversion: the former when the Evil is that which deprives us of Good, for by the same Motion we tend towards Good, and fly from that which hinders its Possession; and the latter when 'tis the Idea of an Evil which causes Pain in us; for 'tis by the same Motion of Aversion, that we hate Pain and whatever produces it.

And therefore there are three simple or primitive Passions, that relate to Good, and as many that refer to Pain, or to that which causes it, *viz. Joy, Desire and Sorrow*. For we are joyful when Good is present and Evil is past; we are sorrowful when Good is gone and Pain is present; and we are agitated with Desires when Good and Evil are to come.

Those Passions that relate to Good are particular Determinations of that Motion God gives us for Good in general, and therefore have a real Object; but others who have not God for the Cause of their Motion terminate only in *Nothingness*.

CHAP. X.

Of Passions in particular, and in general of the way to explain them, and to know the Errours they cause.

WHen we consider how Passions are formed, it visibly appears that their number is undeterminable, or that there are more than our words can express. For Passions differ not only by the various Complication of the three first Primitive, which would not increase them to a great number; but also differ by the different perceptions and Judgments that cause or accompany them. Those different Judgments of the Soul, concerning Good or Evil, produce different Motions in the animal Spirits, to dispose the Body in relation to the Object, and consequently cause in the Soul Sensations that are not altogether like: Whence it proceeds that some Passions are observ'd to differ from each other, though their Commotions be not different.

In the mean while the Commotion of the Soul being the chief thing observable in every Passion, 'tis better to refer them to the three original Passions, in which those Commotions are very different, than to treat confusedly and disorderly of them, in Reference to the different perceptions we may have of the Good and Evil that raises them. For we may have so many different perceptions of Objects, in reference to time, to our selves, to what belongs to us, to the Persons or things to which we are united, either by nature or choice; that is wholly impossible to make an Accurate Enumeration of them.

When the Soul perceives any good, which she cannot enjoy; it may perhaps be said, that she hopes for it, though she desires it not; however 'tis plain, that this her hope is not a Passion, but a simple Judgment. And therefore 'tis the Commotion that attends the Idea of any Good, of which we take the Enjoyment to be possible, that adopts Hope into a true Passion. It is the same when Hope grows into Security: For the latter is a Passion, only because of the Commotion of Joy that mixes with that of Desire; since the Judgment of the Soul that considers any good as certain, is a Passion, but as much as it is a fore-going tast of the good that affects us. Last of all, when Hope diminishes and degenerates into despair, 'tis visible again, that the latter is a Passion, but because of the Commotion of Sorrow that mixes with that of Desire; for the Judgment of the Soul, that considers any good as unattainable, would not be a Passion, should we not be actuated by that Judgment.

But because the Soul never looks upon good or evil without any Commotion, and even with-

out any alteration in the Body; we often give the name of Paſſion to the Judgment that produces it, confounding together whatever happens both to the Soul and Body at the ſight of any Good or Evil: for the Words, Hope, Fear, Boldneſs, Shame, Impudence, Anger, Pity, Deriſion, Grief, and the Names of all other Paſſions in common uſe, are ſhort Expreſſions made up of ſeveral Terms, by which can be explain'd whatever Paſſions contain in particular.

We underſtand by the word *Paſſion* the view of the Relation any thing has to us, the Commotion and Senſation of the Soul, the Concuſſion of the Brain, and the Motion of the Spirits, a new Commotion and Senſation of the Soul, and laſtly a Senſation of Pleaſure that always attends the Paſſions, and makes them grateful. All theſe we commonly underſtand by the name of Paſſions, but ſometimes it only ſignifies, either the Judgment that raiſes it, or only the Commotion of the Soul, or the bare Motion of the Spirits and Blood, or ſomething elſe that accompanies the Commotion of the Soul.

It is very uſeful for the Knowledge of Truth to abridge Ideas and Expreſſions, but that often cauſes ſome conſiderable Errour, eſpecially when thoſe Ideas are abridged by popular uſe. For we ought never to abridge them, but when we have made them very clear and diſtinct, by a great Application of Mind, and not as 'tis ordinarily done, as to Paſſions and ſenſible things, when we have made them familiar to us by their Senſations, and the meer action of the Imagination, which eaſily impoſes on the Mind.

There is a great difference betwixt the pure Ideas of the Mind, and the Senſations or Commotions of the Soul. Pure Ideas are clear and diſtinct, but 'tis a hard task to make them familiar, whereas Senſations and Commotions are intimate with us, but can never plainly and diſtinctly be known. Numbers, Extention and their Properties may be clearly known, but unleſs we make them ſenſible by ſome expreſſive Characters, 'tis very difficult to repreſent them to our Mind, becauſe whatever is abſtracted moves us not. On the contrary, the Commotions and Senſations of the Soul may eaſily be repreſented to the Mind, though the Knowledge we have of them be but confuſed and imperfect: for all the words that raiſe them, lively ſtrike the Soul, and make it attentive. Thence it proceeds that we often imagine, we rightly underſtand ſome Diſcourſes that are altogether incomprehenſible; and that reading ſome Deſcriptions of the Senſations and Paſſions of the Soul, we perſwade our ſelves that we perfectly comprehend them; becauſe they ſtrongly move us, and that all the words that reverberate upon our Eyes agitate our Soul. The hearing of the very Names of Shame, Deſpair, Impudence, *&c.* ſtraightway excite in our Mind a confuſed Idea, and obſcure Senſation that powerfully influences us; and becauſe this Senſation is very familiar to us, and preſents it ſelf without any trouble or endeavour of the Mind, we fancy it to be clear and diſtinct. Theſe words however are the Names of compounded Paſſions, and by conſequence abridg'd Expreſſions, which popular uſe has made up of many confuſed and obſcure Ideas.

Seeing we are oblig'd to employ ſuch Terms as common uſe has approv'd of, the Reader ſhould not be ſurpriz'd to meet with Obſcurity, and ſometimes with a ſort of Contradiction in our Words. And if it were but conſider'd that the Senſations and Commotions of the Soul, that anſwer to the Terms us'd in ſuch Diſcourſes, are not wholly the ſame in all Men, becauſe of their different Diſpoſitions of Mind; they would not ſo eaſily condemn us, when they could not enter into our Opinions. This I ſay, not to prevent Objections againſt my ſelf, but that we may underſtand the Nature of the Paſſions, and what we are to think of Books treating of ſuch matters.

After ſo many Cautions, I ſhall not ſtick to ſay, that all the Paſſions may be referr'd to the three Primitive, namely *Deſire*, *Joy*, and *Sorrow*; and that it is ſpecially by the different Judgments the Soul makes of Good and Evil, that ſuch as relate to the ſame *Primitive* Paſſion differ from each other.

For Inſtance, I may ſay, that Hope, Fear, and Irreſolution, that is the mean betwixt them both, are *Species* of Deſire: That Boldneſs, Courage, and Emulation, *&c.* have a greater Relation to Hope than to all others; And that Timidity, Cowardiſe, Jealouſy, *&c.* are *Species* of Fear.

I may ſay, that Alacrity and Glory, Kindneſs and Grateſulneſs, are *Species* of Joy, cauſed by the ſight of the Good that we know to be in us, or in thoſe to whom we are united; as Deriſion or Jeering is a ſort of Joy commonly ariſing at the ſight of the Evil that befalls thoſe from whom we are ſeparated. Laſtly, That Diſtaſt, Tediouſneſs, Regret, Pity, Indignation, are ſo many kinds of Sorrow, cauſed by the conſideration of ſomething diſpleaſing.

Beſides thoſe Paſſions and ſeveral others I paſs by, which particularly relate to ſome of the Primitive Paſſions, there are yet many others, whoſe Commotion is almoſt equally compounded, either of Deſire and Joy, as Impudence, Anger, and Revenge; or of Deſire and Sorrow, as Shame, Regret, and Vexation; or of all Three together, when Motives of Joy and Sorrow meet. And though theſe laſt Paſſions have no particular Names that I know of, they are however the moſt common; becauſe in this Life we ſcarce ever enjoy any Good without a mixture of Evil, nor ſuffer any Evil without hopes of being freed of it, and enjoying Good. And though Joy be altogether contrary to Sorrow, yet it allows of its Company, and even admits it an equal Sharer in the Capacity of the Soul as *Volent*, when the ſight of Good and Evil divide its Capacity, as *Intelligent*.

All the Paſſions therefore are *Species* of *Deſire*, *Joy* and *Sorrow*: and the chief difference betwixt thoſe of the ſame ſort, muſt be taken from the different Perceptions or Judgments that cauſe

cauſe or accompany them. So that to become learned in the Nature of Paſſions, and to make of them the moſt accurate Enumeration poſſible; it is requiſite to enquire into the different Judgments that may be made of Good and Evil. But as we eſpecially intend to find out the Cauſe of our Errours, we need not ſo much to inſiſt upon the Judgments that precede or cauſe the Paſſions, as upon thoſe that follow them, and which the Soul makes of things when She's agitated by ſome Paſſion; becauſe thoſe laſt Judgments are the moſt liable to Errour.

Such Judgments as precede and cauſe the Paſſions, are almoſt ever falſe in ſomething: becauſe they are, for the moſt part, grounded upon ſuch Perceptions of the Soul, as conſider Objects in relation to her, and not as they are in themſelves. But the Judgments that follow the Paſſions are falſe all manner of ways; becauſe ſuch Judgments being only made by the Paſſions, are only grounded upon the Perceptions the Soul has of Objects as relating to her, or rather to her own Commotion.

In the Judgments that precede the Paſſions, Truth and Falſhood are join'd together; but when the Soul is agitated, and judges by every Inſpiration of the Paſſion, Truth vaniſhes, and Falſhood remains to be the Principle of ſo many more falſe Concluſions as the Paſſion is greater.

All Paſſions juſtify themſelves, continually offering to the Soul the moving Object, in the fitteſt way for preſerving and increaſing her Commotion. The Judgment, or the Perception that cauſes it, gets ſtill new Forces from the Increaſe of the Paſſion, and the Paſſion likewiſe augments proportionably as the Judgment that produces it is ſtrengthened.

Thus falſe Judgments and Paſſions ſhake hands together for their mutual Preſervation. And ſhould the Heart never ceaſe ſending up Spirits for keeping open the Tracks of the Brain, and ſupplying the Expences, which that violent Senſation or Commotion make of the ſame Spirits; Paſſions would perpetually increaſe, and never allow us to be ſenſible of our Errours. But as our Paſſions depend on the Fermentation and Circulation of the Blood, and that the Heart can never furniſh as many Spirits as are neceſſary for their preſervation, they muſt needs expire, when Spirits diminiſh and Blood cools.

Though it be an eaſy matter to diſcover the ordinary Judgments of Paſſions, yet 'tis not a thing to be neglected; there being few Subjects that deſerve more the Application of an Enquirer of Truth, who endeavours to free himſelf from the Dominion of the Body; and will judge of every thing by true Ideas.

We may inſtruct our ſelves of this Matter two ways, either by pure Reaſon, or by our inward Conſciouſneſs, when we are agitated by ſome Paſſion. For Inſtance, Experience teaches us, That we are apt to judge of thoſe we love not to their Diſadvantage, and to ſpit all the Venome of our Hatred at the Object of our Paſſion. We alſo know by Reaſon, that as we cannot hate but what is Evil; ſo 'tis neceſſary for the preſervation of Hatred, that the Mind ſhould repreſent to it ſelf the worſt part of its Object. For 'tis ſufficient to ſuppoſe that all Paſſions juſtify themſelves, and give ſuch a Diſpoſition, firſt to the Imagination, then to the Mind, as is fit to preſerve their own Commotion; that we may directly conclude what Judgment Paſſions cauſe us to make.

Thoſe that are endued with a ſtrong and lively Imagination, that are extreamly ſenſible, and much ſubject to the Motions of Paſſions, may perfectly inform themſelves of thoſe things by their own inward Senſe; and it often comes to paſs, that they ſpeak of them in a more pleaſing and inſtructing manner than others, whoſe Reaſon over-tops their Imagination: yet it follows not, that thoſe that diſcover beſt the Springs of Self-love, that penetrate fartheſt into Man's Heart, and more ſenſibly diſcover its Receſſes, are always the greateſt Underſtandings. This only proves that they are livelier, quicker of Imagination, and ſometimes more malicious than others.

But thoſe that without conſulting their inward Senſe, make uſe only of their Reaſon to enquire into the Nature and Effects of Paſſions; though they be not always ſo quick-ſighted as others, are always more rational, and leſs obnoxious to Errour; becauſe they judge of things as they are in themſelves: They ſee very near what Men poſſeſt with Paſſions can do, as they ſuppoſe them more or leſs agitated; but do not raſhly judge of the Actions of others, by what they would do themſelves in ſuch Occaſions; for they well know, that Men are not equally ſenſible to the ſame things, nor alike ſuſceptible of involuntary Commotions. And therefore 'tis not by conſulting our Senſations which the Paſſions create in us, but by liſtening to Reaſon, that we muſt treat of the Judgments that accompany them; leſt we ſhould draw our own Picture, inſtead of diſcovering the Nature of Paſſions in general.

CHAP.

CHAP. XI.

That all the Paſſions juſtify themſelves. What Judgments they cauſe us to make, in their Vindication.

WE need no long deduction of Arguments to demonſtrate, That all Paſſions juſtify themſelves: That Principle is ſufficiently evident, both by our internal Conſciouſneſs of our ſelves, and the Behaviour of thoſe we ſee agitated by them; and therefore we need only barely propound it, to conſider it as we ſhould do. The Mind is ſuch a Slave to the Imagination, that it always obeys when the Imagination is over-heated; and dares not anſwer when the ſame is incenſed, becauſe it meets with Abuſes when it reſiſts, and is always rewarded with ſome Pleaſure when it humours that imperious Faculty. Even thoſe whoſe unruly Imagination perſwades them they are tranſmuted into Beaſts, find out Reaſons to prove they muſt live as Beaſts do, walk Four-footed, eat Graſs, and imitate every Action that is purely Brutal. They find Pleaſure in living by the Impreſſions of their Paſſion, and ſuffer inward Pain in reſiſting it; which is ſufficient to make Reaſon, that commonly deſcends to be the Slave to Pleaſure, to Argue in ſuch a manner as may beſt defend the Cauſe of it.

If therefore it be true that all Paſſions juſtify themſelves, 'tis evident that Deſire muſt of it ſelf move us to judge favourably of its Object, if it be a *Deſire* of *Love*, and unkindly, if it be a *Deſire* of *Averſion*. The Deſire of Love is a Motion of the Soul raiſed by the Spirits, that provoke it to the Enjoyment or Uſe of ſuch things as are not in its Power; for we deſire even the Continuation of our Enjoyment, becauſe future things depend not on us. 'Tis then neceſſary for the Juſtification of that Deſire, that the Object which produces it be eſteemed good in it ſelf, or in reference to ſomething elſe: the contrary muſt be ſaid of that Deſire, which is a kind of Averſion.

I grant, we cannot judge any thing to be good or bad, without ſome Reaſon; but Paſſions have no Object which is not good in ſome ſenſe. And if it may be ſaid there are ſome, which contain no real Goodneſs, and therefore cannot be contemplated as Good by the Mind; yet no One can ſay but they may be enjoyed as Good, ſince they are ſuppoſed to agitate us; and that Commotion, Enjoyment, or Senſe is more than ſufficient to move the Soul to entertain a kind Opinion of the Object.

If we ſo eaſily judge that Fire contains in it ſelf the Heat we feel, and Bread the Savour we reliſh, becauſe of the Senſation thoſe Bodies excite in us; though that be never ſo incomprehenſible to the Mind, which cannot conceive Heat and Savour as Modifications of a Body: thence it follows, That there is no Object of our Paſſions, how vile and contemptible ſoever it appears, but we may judge it good, when the Enjoyment of it affects us with Pleaſure. For as we imagine, That Heat goes out of Fire when we feel it, ſo we blindly believe, That the Objects of the Paſſions cauſe the Pleaſure which we receive in their Enjoyment, and that therefore they are good, ſince they are able to do us good. The like may be ſaid of the Paſſions that have Evil for their Object.

But, as I ſaid juſt before, there is nothing but deſerves either Love or Averſion, either by it ſelf, or by ſomething elſe to which it relates; and when we are agitated with ſome Paſſion, we quickly diſcover in its Object the Good or Evil that may nouriſh the ſame. It is therefore eaſy to know by Reaſon the Judgments which our Paſſions make, whilſt agitating us.

If a Deſire of Love move us, we may well conceive that it will not fail to juſtify it ſelf, by the favourable Judgments it ſhall make of its Object. We eaſily perceive that thoſe Judgments will have more Extent as the Deſire ſhall be more violent, and that they will be ſometimes abſolute and without exception, though but a very ſmall part of the thing appears good. We may without difficulty underſtand that thoſe favourable Judgments will reach all things, that ſhall have, or ſeem to have, any Connection with the principal Object of the Paſſion, proportionably to the ſtrength of the Paſſion, and the Extent of the Imagination. The contrary will happen if it be a *Deſire* of *Averſion*, the Reaſons of which are eaſily comprehended, and perfectly confirmed and made good by Experience. But let us make theſe Truths more ſenſible and familiar by ſome Inſtances.

Men naturally deſire Knowledge, as being Spirits created for Truth. But that Deſire, how juſt and reaſonable ſoever it may be in it ſelf, often becomes a dangerous Vice, by the falſe Judgments that attend it; Curioſity frequently offers to the Mind vain Objects of its Study and Lucubrations, aſcribes to them falſe Ideas of Greatneſs, ennobles them with the deceiving Luſtre of Rarity, and dreſſes them up with ſuch gay and ſplendid Apparel, that one can hardly forbear to Contemplate them with too much Pleaſure and Application.

There is no Trifle but will wholly take up ſome Perſons, whoſe fruitleſs Toil is ſtill juſtified by the falſe Judgments that ariſe from their vain Curioſity. For Inſtance, thoſe that beſtow their time in learning Tongues, imagine that all the Sciences conſiſt in the Knowledge of Terms, and find out a Thouſand Reaſons to juſtify themſelves; and the Veneration thoſe pay them whom an unknown Term confounds, is none of the weakeſt, though the leaſt reaſonable.

Some Persons employ their whole lives in learning to speak, who ought perhaps to hold their Peace all the while; since 'tis evident he ought to be silent, who has nothing worth the hearing to say. They should know that he must think well, use his understanding to exactness, discern truth from falshood, clear Ideas from obscure, those of the Mind from those of the Imagination, that will speak accurately. They imagine themselves fine and uncommon Wits, because they know how to please the Ear with an Elegant Harmony, how to flatter the Passions by Figures and taking gestures; how to rejoyce the Imagination by lively and sensible Expressions; whilst they leave the Mind empty of Idea's, void of light and understanding.

Some probable reason may justify their Passion, that spend a great deal of time in the study of their own Tongue, since they make use of it all their Life; but as to those who indifferently apply themselves to all sorts of Languages, I know not what to say in their behalf. The Passion of those who make a Compleat Library of all sorts of Dictionaries, may be excusable, as well as the Curiosity of those, who make a Collection of Coyns and Medals of all Countries and times; that may be useful in some occasions, and if it do not much good, at least it does no harm; a Storehouse of such Curiosities being not cumbersome, since they carry not with them either their Books or Medals. But how may the Passion of those be justifiable, that make their Head a Library of Dictionaries, that neglect their Affairs and Essential Duties for words of no use. They are smatterers in their own Tongue, frequently mingling strange and unknown words in their Discourses, and never paying their Countrymen with Current Money. Their Reason seems not to be better guided than their Tongue; for all the Corners and Recesses of their Memory are so full of Etymologies, that their Minds must lie as stifl'd under the innumerable number of words that are perpetually flying about it.

However it must be granted that Philologers and Linguists will not stick for Reasons to justify their capricious Studies. Which to know, you need but to listen to the Judgments those pretenders make of Tongues; or suppose some Opinions that are taken amongst them for undoubted Axioms, together with the Inferences that may be deduc'd from them. For instance, that those Persons who speak several Tongues, are as many individual Men as they know different Languages, since Speech distinguishes us from Beasts; that the Ignorance of Tongues deprives us of a multitude of things; since Antient Philosophers and Strangers are more Learned than we. Suppose but these and the like Principles and Conclusions, and you'll quickly form such Judgments as are fit to beget the Passion for Tongues, and consequently like those, wherewith the same Passion inspires the Linguists to vindicate their Studies.

There is not a Science so abject and contemptible, but some part of it will shine very bright to the Imagination, and dazle the Mind, when Passion heightens those false Glimpses. That Splendor, I own, vanishes when the Blood and Spirits cool, and the light of Truth begins to shine; but that light disappears also, when Imagination grows warm again, and leaves but some transitory Shaddows of those solid Reasons which pretended to condemn our Passion.

Furthermore when the Passion that agitates us finds it self a dying, it repents not of its demeanour, but on the contrary it disposes all things, either to an honourable Funeral, or to be reviv'd speedily again; that is to say, it prepares the Mind to frame Judgments in its Vindication. In this condition it makes a sort of Alliance with such other Passions as may keep it up in its weakness, supply it with Spirits and Blood, in its necessity raise it out of its Ashes, and give it a new Birth. For Passions are not unconcern'd for one another, and those that can live together, faithfully contribute to their mutual preservation. So that all the Passions that are not contrary to the studies of Tongues, or of any thing else, do continually sollicite and fully confirm those Judgments that are made to vindicate it.

A pretender imagines himself, now as surrounded with respectful Hearers, then as Conqueror of those whom he has amaz'd with his unintelligible words; and almost always as one rais'd far above the common sort of Men. He flatters himself with the Commendations he receives, with the Preferments that are proposed to him, with the Courtship that is made to him. He's of all Times and Countries; He is not limited, as vulgar Wits, to the present, nor confin'd within the Walls of his Town, but continually communicating himself abroad, and his communication makes his delight. See, how many Passions combine together to manage the Cause of pretended Learning, how hotly they prosecute their Judgments, and bribe the Mind in its favour.

Should every Passion act separately, without caring for the rest, they would vanish immediately after their Rise: not being able to make a sufficient number of false Judgments, to maintain themselves, and defend the Glimmerings of Imagination against the Light of Reason; But all passions concurr admirably well to their mutual preservation, assisting and strengthening each other though never so remote, provided they be not declared Enemies; as though they were minded to follow the Rules of a well order'd State.

If the passion of Desire were alone, all the Judgments it might pass would only amount to represent the Good as attainable; For the *Desire of Love*, consider'd as such, is produced by the Judgments we make, that it is possible to enjoy such a Good: And so this Desire could only form Judgments about the possibility of enjoying it, since the Judgments which follow and preserve the Passions, are exactly like those which precede and produce them. But that Desire is animated by Love, fortified by Hope, increased by Joy, renewed by Fear, attended by Courage, Emulation, Anger, Irresolution, and several other Passions, that form each in their turn

a great variety of Judgments, which ſucceed each other, and maintain the Deſire that has produced them. 'Tis not therefore ſtrange that the deſire of a meer Trifle, or if a thing that is evidently hurtful or fruitleſs, ſhould however juſtify it ſelf againſt Reaſon for many Years, nay during the whole Life of a Man that is agitated with it; ſince ſo many other Paſſions endeavour to vindicate it. I ſhall here ſet down in few words how Paſſions juſtify themſelves, that I may explain things by diſtinct Ideas.

Every Paſſion agitates the Blood and Spirits, w^ch^ when agitated, are driven into the Brain by the ſenſible ſight of the Object, or the ſtrength of the Imagination, in ſuch a manner, as is fit to imprint deep Tracks repreſenting that Object. They bend, and even ſometimes break by their impetuous Courſe the Fibres of the Brain, and thereby leave the Imagination ſoil'd and corrupted. For theſe Traces obey not the Commands of Reaſon, nor will they be blotted out when it pleaſes: on the contrary, they put a force upon it, and oblige it inceſſantly to conſider Objects in ſuch a manner, as moves and inclines it to favour the Paſſions. Thus the Paſſions act upon the Imagination, and the corrupted Imagination makes an Effort againſt Reaſon, by continually repreſenting things not as they are in themſelves, that the Mind might pronounce a true Judgment; but as they are in reference to the preſent Paſſion, that it might paſs a favourable Sentence in its behalf.

Paſſions not only bribe the Imagination and Mind in their favour, but produce in other parts of the Body ſuch Diſpoſitions as are neceſſary to preſerve them. The Spirits they move, ſtop not in the Brain, but run, as I have elſewhere ſhown, to all other parts of the Body; eſpecially to the Heart, the Liver, the Spleen, and the Nerves that ſurround the principal Arteries; and laſtly, to all parts whatſoever, that may ſupply neceſſary Spirits for the Maintenance of the predominant Paſſion. But while theſe Spirits diſperſe themſelves into all the parts of the Body, they deſtroy all along and by degrees whatever might hinder their Courſe, and make their Paſſages ſo ſlippery and ſmooth, that a very inconſiderable Object exceedingly moves us, and conſequently inclines us to make ſuch Judgments as favour the Paſſions, Thus it comes to paſs, that they eſtabliſh and juſtify themſelves.

If we conſider how various the Conſtitution of the Fibres of the Brain, and withal the Commotion and Quantity of the Spirits and Blood may be, in the different Sexes and Ages; we ſhall eaſily and nearly conjecture to what Paſſions ſome Perſons are moſt ſubject, and conſequently, what Judgments they paſs upon Objects. For Inſtance, we may make a very near gueſs by the plenty or want of Spirits, that is obſervable in ſome People, the ſame thing being propoſed, and explained to them, in the ſame manner, that ſome of them will make Judgments of Hope and Joy, whilſt others ſhall paſs ſuch Judgments as proceed from Fear and Sorrow.

For thoſe that abound with Blood and Spirits, as Young Men, Cholerick Perſons, and thoſe that are of a Sanguine Complexion uſe to do, being very ſuſceptible of Hope, becauſe of the ſecret Senſe of their Strength; will not believe that they ſhall meet with any Oppoſition to their Deſigns, which they may not overcome: and ſo will quickly feed themſelves with a borrowed Taſte of the Good they hope to enjoy, and will paſs ſuch Judgments as are fit to juſtify their Hope and Joy. But thoſe that want agitated Spirits, as Old Men, and thoſe that are of a Phlegmatick and Melancholly Temper, being inclined to Fear and Sorrow, becauſe their Soul is conſcious of her own Weakneſs, and deſtitute of Spirits to perform her Orders, will make quite contrary Judgments; imagine inſuperable Difficulties to juſtify their Fear; and give up themſelves to Envy, Sorrow, Deſpair, and other ſorts of *Averſion*, of which weak Perſons are moſt ſuſceptible.

CHAP. XII.

That ſuch Paſſions as have Evil for their Object, are the moſt Dangerous and Unjuſt; and that thoſe that have the leaſt Mixture of Knowledge, are the moſt lively and ſenſible.

OF all the Paſſions, the ſeveral ſorts of Averſions make their Judgments the moſt remote from Reaſon, and the moſt dangerous; there being no Paſſion which corrupts and bribes Reaſon ſo much in its behalf as Hatred and Fear; Hatred chiefly in the Cholerick, or in thoſe whoſe Spirits are in a perpetual Agitation; and Fear in the Melancholly, or thoſe whoſe groſs and heavy Spirits are neither eaſily moved, nor ſoon quieted. But when Hatred and Fear conſpire together to bribe Reaſon, which is very frequently done, then there are no Judgments ſo unjuſt and capricious, but they will paſs and defend them with an inſuperable Obſtinacy.

The Reaſon of this is, That as in this Life, Evil ſtrikes the Soul more to the quick than Good; ſo the Senſe of Pain is livelier than that of Pleaſure; Injuries and Scandals more ſenſibly affect us, than Commendations and Applauſe; and though there are Men indifferent as to the Enjoying ſome Pleaſures and receiving certain Honours; yet there is ſcarce one that can bear Grief and Contempt without Uneaſineſs.

And therefore Hatred, Fear, and other ſorts of *Averſion*, that have Evil for their Object, are moſt violent Paſſions, which ſhake the Mind with ſuch unexpected Commotions, as diſcompoſe and ſtupify it; and quickly pierce into the bottom of the Heart, dethrone Reaſon, and paſs upon all ſorts of Subjects, erroneous and unjuſt Sentences, to favour their Tyrannical Madneſs.

Of

Of all Paſſions they are the moſt Cruel and Diſtruſtful, contrary to Charity and Civil Society, and at the ſame time the moſt ridiculous and extravagant, ſince they give ſuch impertinent and frantick Judgments, as excite the Laughter and Indignation of all other Men.

Joh. 11.47. Thoſe Paſſions inſpired the Phariſees with theſe abſurd Diſcourſes: *What are we doing? This Man works many Miracles: If we let him alone, all men will believe in him; and the Romans will come and deſtroy both our City and Nation.* They agreed that our Saviour had wrought many Miracles; for the Reſurrection of *Lazarus* was undeniable. But what were the Judgments of their Paſſions? to murther both *JESUS* and *Lazarus* whom he had raiſed from the Dead! Why *JESUS*? Becauſe, ſay they, *if we let him alone, all men will believe in him, and the Romans ſhall come and ex-*
Joh. 12.11. *tirpate our Nation.* And why *Lazarus*? *Becauſe that, by reaſon of him, many of the Jews went away and believed on Jeſus.* Oh Judgments equally Cruel and Irrational! Cruel, through Hatred; and Irrational through Fear: *The Romans ſhall come, and deſtroy our City and Nation.*

The ſame Paſſions moved a great Aſſembly, conſiſting of *Annas* the High-Prieſt, *Caiaphas*,
Act. 4. 16, 17. *John*, *Alexander*, and as many as were of the Kindred of the High-Prieſt, to ſpeak thus: *What ſhall we do with theſe Men? For that, indeed, a notable Miracle hath been done by them, is manifeſt to all them that dwell in Jeruſalem, and we cannot deny it. But leaſt it ſhould ſpread farther, let us threaten to puniſh them ſeverely, if they preach the Name of JESUS any more.*

All thoſe great Men, agitated by their Paſſions, and blinded by their falſe Zeal, paſs Judgment both impertinent and unjuſt. They do not puniſh the Apoſtles becauſe of the People, and that the Man who had been miraculouſly cured was above 40 Years of Age, and preſent in the
Act. 5.28. Aſſembly; but threaten them, leſt they ſhould teach in the Name of *Jeſus*: ſuppoſing they ought to condemn the Doctrine, becauſe they put the Author to Death; *You intend*, ſay they, *to bring this Man's Blood upon us.*

When falſe Zeal unites it ſelf to Hatred, it ſhelters it from the Reproofs of Reaſon, and juſtifies it ſo well, that we ſcruple not to be led by its Motions. When Ignorance and Weakneſs accompany Fear, they extend it to innumerable Subjects, and drive on its Commotions to that height, that the leaſt Suſpicion diſturbs and frightens Reaſon.

Falſe Zealots imagine they ſerve God, when they obey their Paſſions. They blindly follow the ſecret Motions of their Hatred, as Inſpirations from internal Truth, and inſiſting with great Satisfaction on the Proofs of *Senſe* that juſtify that Exceſs, their Errours become confirmed with an unconquerable Stubbornneſs.

As to ignorant and weak Perſons, they create to themſelves matter of ridiculous and fantaſtick Fears; like Children that walk in the dark without a Guide, fanſy frightful Bugbears, are diſturb'd and cry out as though *they were undone.* Light retrieves them if they be ignorant, but if they be weak their Imagination continues crazed, and the leaſt thing that relates to that frightful Object renews the Tracks, and opens the Current of the Spirits, which cauſe the Symptoms of their Fear: So that it is altogether impoſſible to cure or pacify them for ever.

But when falſe Zeal meets with Hatred and Fear in a weak Mind, it inceſſantly produces ſuch unjuſt and violent Judgments, as cannot be thought upon without Horrour; to change a Mind poſſeſt with thoſe Paſſions requires a greater Miracle than that which converted St. *Paul*, and his Cure would be abſolutely impoſſible, could we ſet Bounds to the Power and Mercy of God.

Thoſe that walk in the Dark rejoyce at the ſight of Light; but this Man cannot ſuffer it, becauſe it wounds him by oppoſing his Paſſion. His Fear is in ſome ſort voluntary, as being produced by his Hatred: and therefore he loves to feel its Commotions, becauſe we love to be agitated with the Paſſions that have Evil for their Object, when the Evil is only imaginary, or rather when we know, as in *Tragedies*, that the Evil cannot hurt us.

The Phantaſms, which thoſe that walk in the dark frame in their Imaginations vaniſh at the Approach of Light, but the idle Dreams of this ſort of Men will not diſappear at the Light of Truth; which inſtead of diſſipating the Darkneſs of their Mind, incenſes their Imagination. So that the fruſtrated Light recoils, becauſe they are wholly taken up with the Objects of their Paſſion; and it ſeems thoſe Apparitions have a real Body, ſince they reflect ſome weak Rays of the Light that falls upon them.

But though we ſhould ſuppoſe in thoſe Men a ſufficient Teachableneſs and Attention, to liſten to, and comprehend the Reaſons that may diſſipate their Errours; yet their Imagination being diſorder'd by Fear, and their Heart corrupted by Hatred and falſe Zeal; thoſe Reaſons how ſolid ſoever they might be, could not long ſtop the impetuous Stream of thoſe violent Paſſions, nor hinder them from ſpeedily juſtifying themſelves, by ſenſible and convincing Proofs.

For we ought to obſerve that there are tranſitory Paſſions, which never return; whereas there are others that are conſtant and permanent. Thoſe that are not kept up by the ſight of the Mind but are only produced and fortified by the ſenſible View of an Object, and the Fermentation of the Blood, are not laſting, but commonly dye ſoon after their Birth: whereas thoſe that are aſſociated with the Contemplation of the Mind, are ſteady, becauſe the Principle that produces them is not ſubject to change, as Blood and Humours are. So that Hatred, Fear, and all other Paſſions, that are excited or preſerved by the Knowledge of the Mind, and not raiſed by the ſenſible View of Evil, muſt needs be durable, and withal very violent and unjuſt-

juſt. However thoſe Paſſions are not the moſt lively and ſenſible, as we ſhall now ſhew.

The Perception of Good and Evil, which raiſes Paſſions, is produced Three ways; by the Senſes, by the Imagination, and by the Mind. The Senſes produce very quick and ſenſible Paſſions; thoſe of the Imagination are weaker, but thoſe of the mere Mind are Paſſions only, becauſe that View of Good and Evil in the Mind, is always attended by ſome Motion of the Animal Spirits.

Paſſions are only given us for the good of the Body, and for uniting us by it to ſenſible things; for though ſenſible things are neither good nor bad, in reference to the Mind; yet they are ſo in relation to the Body, to which the Mind is united: ſo that the Senſes and Imagination, diſcovering much better than the Mind the Relation of ſenſible Objects to our Body, muſt needs raiſe Paſſions far livelier than a clear and evident Knowledge; but becauſe our Knowledge is always attended with ſome Commotion of the Spirits, a clear and evident Knowledge of a great Good, or a great Evil, not to be diſcover'd by the Senſes, always raiſes ſome ſecret Paſſion.

However all clear and evident Knowledge of any Good or Evil, is not always followed with a ſenſible and perceptible Paſſion; as all our Paſſions are not accompanied with an intellectual Knowledge. For as we ſometimes think upon Good or Evil, without being conſcious of any Commotion; ſo we often feel our ſelves agitated with Paſſion, without knowing or perceiving the Cauſe. A Man that ſucks in a good Air is affected with Joy, and knows not why, nor what ſort of Good he enjoys: And if ſome inviſible Corpuſcle mixes with his Blood, and hinders its Fermentation, he is taken with Sorrow, and may even aſcribe the Cauſe of it to ſomething viſible, that offers it ſelf to him, in the time of his Paſſion.

Of all Paſſions, none are more ſenſible nor quick, and conſequently leſs mingled with Knowledge, than *Horrour* and *Antipathy*, *Agreeableneſs* and *Sympathy*. A Man ſleeping under the Shadow of a Tree, often ſtarts up, when a Fly ſtings him, or a Leaf tickles him; as though a Serpent had bitten him. The confuſed Senſe of a thing, as terrible as Death it ſelf, frightens him unawares, and he finds himſelf agitated with a very ſtrong and violent Paſſion, which is an *Averſion of Deſire*. On the contrary, a Man in Want diſcovers by chance, ſome ſmall Good, the Sweetneſs of which ſurprizes him; and he is inconſiderately taken up with that Trifle, as though it were the greateſt Good in the World. The ſame happens in the Motions of Sympathy and Antipathy. We ſee in a Company a Perſon whoſe Deportment and Manners have ſome ſecret Agreeableneſs to the preſent Diſpoſition of our Body; ſo, his Sight pierces and ſtrikes us; and we are inclined, without Reflection, to love and wiſh him well. Thus we are agitated by I don't know what, ſince Reaſon has no ſhare in it. The contrary befals thoſe whoſe Aſpect and Looks are unpleaſing to us. They have I know not what, that offends and puts us back; for the Mind underſtands nothing in it; the Senſes only are competent Judges of Beauty and Uglineſs, which are the Objects of thoſe Paſſions.

F. MALEBRANCHE's TREATISE Concerning the SEARCH after TRUTH.

BOOK VI.

Concerning METHOD.

CHAP. I.

The Design of this Book: Two general Ways to keep to Evidence in the Search of Truth, which shall be the Subject of this Tract.

WE have seen in the foregoing Books, that the Mind of Man is very obnoxious to Errour; that the *Deceptions* of his *Senses* *, the *Visions* of his *Imagination* †, and the *Abstractions* of his *Mind* ‖, lead him into frequent Mistakes; that the *Inclinations* of his *Will* *, and the *Passions* of his *Heart* †, almost ever conceal the Truth from him, and never suffer it to appear without being wing'd with those false Colours that flatter Concupiscency. In short, we have partly discovered the Errours of the Mind, with their Causes; now 'tis time we should shew the way that leads to the Knowledge of Truth, and give the Mind all the possible Skill and Strength to walk therein, without straying or wearying it self in vain.

* *Lib.* I.
† *Lib.* II.
‖ *Lib.* III.
* *Lib.* IV.
† *Lib.* V.

But, to spare the Readers an unprofitable Labour, we think fit to advise them, this Last Book is only made for such as earnestly desire to seek the Truth by themselves, and to make use of the force of their own Mind. I require them to despise for awhile all probable Opinions, to wave the strongest Conjectures, to neglect the Authority of all the Philosophers, to free themselves, as far as possible, from all Prejudice, Interest, and Passion; to enter into an extreme Mistrust of their Senses and Imagination: In a word, well to remember the greatest part of the things that have been said in the former Books.

I attempt in this last Book, to give the Mind all the Perfection it can naturally attain to, by supplying it with the necessary Helps to become more attentive and inlarg'd, and prescribing it those Rules that must be observed in the Enquiry after Truth, that it may never mistake, but learn in time whatever can be known.

Could I carry this Design to its utmost Perfection, which I pretend not, this being but an Essay towards it, I might boast to have found out an universal Science, which would make those truly Learned that knew how to make use of it; since they would have the Foundation of all the particular Sciences: which they would acquire proportionably as they should make use of that universal Science. For by this Treatise we endeavour to render the Mind capable of passing a true and certain Judgment upon all the Questions, that are not beyond its Reach.

As, to be a good *Mathematician*, 'tis not sufficient to learn by heart all the *Demonstrations* of *Euclid*, *Pappus*, *Archimedes*, *Apollonius*, and others that have written of *Geometry*: so, to be a Learned *Philosopher*, 'tis not enough to have read *Plato*, *Aristotle*, *des Cartes*, and perfectly to know their Sentiments upon Philosophical Questions. For the Knowledge of all the Opinions and Judgments of other Men, either *Philosophers*, or *Geometricians*, is rather a History, than a Science; the true Science that perfects, as far as possible, the Mind, consisting in a certain Ability of solidly judging of all things, proportion'd to its Reach. But, not to lose

loſe time, nor preposſeſs the Reader with precipitate Judgments, let us begin to treat of ſuch an important Matter.

First of all we ought to remember the Rule that has been eſtabliſhed, and proved at the beginning of the *First Book*, becauſe 'tis the Foundation and Principle of what we ſhall ſay hereafter. And therefore I repeat it; *We muſt never give a full Conſent, but to thoſe Propoſitions that appear ſo evidently true, that they cannot be denied it, without feeling an inward Pain, and the ſecret Reproaches of our Reaſon; that is to ſay, without clearly knowing we ſhould make a wrong uſe of our Liberty by with-holding our Conſent.* For as many times as we yield to Probabilities, we certainly venture to be miſtaken, and 'tis but by good chance, or a lucky hit, if we be not really deceived. So that the confuſed Sight of a great number of Probabilities, upon different Subjects, makes not our Reaſon more perfect: nothing but the clear View of the Truth being able to afford it any real Perfection and Satisfaction.

Thence 'tis eaſie to conclude, That ſince, according to our firſt Rule, nothing but Evidence can aſſure us that we are not deceived, we ought to take a ſpecial care, to preſerve that Evidence in all our Perceptions; that we may paſs a ſound Judgment upon all the things, to which our Reaſon can attain, and diſcover as many Truths as we are capable of.

The things that can produce and preſerve that Evidence, are of two ſorts; ſome are within us, and in ſome manner depending on us; others are out of our Juriſdiction. For as to ſee diſtinctly viſible Objects, 'tis required to have a good ſight, and to fix it ſtedfaſtly upon them; which two things are in us, or in ſome manner depending on us: So 'tis requiſite to have a ſound Underſtanding, and a ſtrong Application, in order to pierce into the bottom of Intelligible Truths; which two things are in us, or in ſome ſort in our Power.

But as the Eyes ſtand in need of Light to ſee, which Light depends upon foreign Cauſes; ſo the Mind needs Idea's to conceive, which, as it has been proved elſewhere, have no dependency upon us, but are furniſhed to us by a foreign Cauſe. So that, ſhould the Idea's of things ſuperſede being preſent to our Minds, as often as we deſire to ſee them; ſhould he that enlightens the World conceal them from us; it would not be more poſſible for us to redreſs it, or to know any thing, than it is to ſee viſible Objects, when the Light is gone. But we have no reaſon to fear it, for the preſence of Idea's being natural to our Minds, and depending on the general Will of God, which is conſtant and immutable, they can never diſappear, nor fail us in the Diſcovery of ſuch things as are attainable by natural Reaſon. For the Sun that enlightens the Minds, is not like that which illuminates Bodies; it is never eclipſed, nor goes ever down, but penetrates every thing without dividing its Light.

The Idea's of all things being then continually preſent to us, even when we do not attentively conſider them; whatever we need do to make all our Perceptions evident, is to look for ſuch Means as can increaſe the Attention and Extent of the Mind; as nothing elſe is required on our ſide, to diſtinguiſh viſible and preſent Objects, but to have good Eyes, and to fix them thereupon.

However, becauſe the Objects we conſider have more Relations than we can diſcover at once, by a ſimple Eſſay of Thought; we ſtill need ſome Rules, skilfully to unfold the Difficulties; by which Succours, the Mind being grown more attentive and extended, may with a full Evidence diſcover all the Relations of the examined thing.

We ſhall divide this *ſixth Book* into two Parts. We ſhall treat in the *Firſt* of thoſe Supplies that may afford the Mind more Attention and Extent; and in the *Second* we ſhall preſcribe thoſe Rules that it muſt follow, in the Enquiry after Truth, to paſs ſound and undeceivable Judgments.

CHAP. II.

That Attention is neceſſary to preſerve Evidence in our Knowledge. That the Modifications of the Soul make her attentive, but ſhare and take up too much her Capacity of perceiving.

WE have ſhewn at the beginning of this Work, That the Underſtanding does nothing but perceive, and that, as to its concern, there is no difference betwixt bare Perceptions, Judgments, and Reaſonings, unleſs it be, that the ſecond and third are Perceptions more compoſed than the firſt: becauſe they not only repreſent many things, but alſo the Relations they have together. For naked Perceptions repreſent only things to the Mind; whereas Judgments repreſent the Relations that are betwixt things, and Reaſonings the Relations that are betwixt the Relations of things; provided they be ſimple Reaſonings; for if they were *Complex*, they would repreſent Relations of Relations, or compound Relations, which are between the Relation of things, and ſo *ad infinitum*. For proportionably

proportionably as Relations multiply, ſo the Reaſonings, that repreſent them to the Mind, become more compoſed. However Judgments and ſimple Reaſonings, as well as thoſe that are compoſed, are but, as to the Underſtanding, bare Perceptions, ſince it does no more than ſimply perceive, as has been already obſerved.

Whence it appears that the Underſtanding never falls into Error, ſince there is none in Perceptions, and that Errour it ſelf is not of an *intelligible* nature; for, as we have already ſaid many times, it conſiſts in a too haſty Conſent of the Will, it ſuffers it ſelf to be dazzled by ſome falſe Glimpſe, and, inſtead of keeping its Liberty as long as poſſible, negligently relies upon the appearance of Truth.

Notwithſtanding, as it commonly happens that the Underſtanding has but confuſed and imperfect Perceptions of things; ſo 'tis really a Cauſe of our Errours, though only occaſional. For as the Corporeal Sight leads us into miſtake, when it repreſents outward Objects confuſedly, and imperfectly; confuſedly, when they are at too great a diſtance, or for want of Light; and imperfectly, when it only ſhows ſuch Faces of them, as look towards us. So that the Underſtanding often having but a confuſed and imperfect Conception of things, becauſe they are not ſufficiently preſent to it, and that it diſcovers not all their Parts; cauſes the Will, that too eaſily yields to thoſe obſcure and imperfect Conceptions, to fall into many Errours.

We muſt then look out for Means, that may hinder our Perceptions from being confuſed and imperfect. And becauſe, as every one knows, nothing can make them more clear and diſtinct, than Attention, we muſt find out Means to become more and more attentive. Thus we may hope to keep to Evidence in our Reaſonings, and even to ſurvey all at once the neceſſary Connexion betwixt all the Parts of our longeſt Inferences.

To find out thoſe Means, 'tis neceſſary to perſwade our ſelves of what has been ſaid elſewhere, That the Mind gives not an equal Attention to all the things it perceives. For it applies it ſelf infinitely more to ſuch as affect, modify and penetrate it, than to thoſe, which though they be preſent, yet do not concern or belong to it: In ſhort, 'tis more taken up with its own Modifications, than with the bare Ideas of Objects, that repreſent ſomething different from it ſelf.

Thence it comes that we conſider but with tediouſneſs, diſlike, and remiſsneſs, the abſtracted Ideas of the pure Underſtanding, that we apply our ſelves much more to things that we imagine, eſpecially when our Imagination is ſtrong, and the Tracks of our Brain very deep: And laſtly, that we are wholly taken up with ſenſible Qualities, and even ſo, that we can afford no Attention to the pure Ideas of the Mind, when we feel ſomething very pleaſant or painful. For Pain, Pleaſure, and other Senſations, being Modes of the Souls Exiſtence, 'tis impoſſible we ſhould exiſt without perceiving them; and having the Capacity of the Mind taken up, ſince our Senſations are nothing but Perceptions.

But 'tis not ſo with the pure Ideas of the Mind, ſince they may be intimately united to it, without its taking the leaſt notice of them. For though God is moſt intimately united with us, and comprehends the Ideas of whatever we ſee; yet thoſe Ideas, though never ſo preſent, and, as I may ſay, in the middle of our ſelves, are concealed from us, when the Motions of the Spirits do not raiſe their Traces, or when our Will applies not the Mind to conſider them; that is to ſay, when it performs not thoſe Acts, to which the Author of Nature has joined the Repreſentation of thoſe Ideas. This is the Foundation of whatever we ſhall ſay concerning the Means, that can improve our Attention, which Means will be drawn from the very nature of the Mind; ſo that 'tis to be hoped that they will not prove Fruitleſs and Chimerical, as many others, that are more puzling than ſerviceable. And though they ſhould not be as uſeful as we could wiſh, yet the time that ſhall be beſtowed upon their reading, will not be entirely loſt, ſince this will afford us a fuller Knowledge of the Nature of the Mind.

The Modifications of the Soul have three Cauſes, the *Senſes*, the *Imaginations*, and the *Paſſions*. For every one is conſcious to himſelf that Pain and Pleaſure, and all other ſtrong Senſations, lively Imaginations, and vehement Paſſions take up the Mind ſo much, that it can be attentive but to thoſe things that then too vigorouſly affect it, and fill, as I may ſay, its whole Capacity, or Faculty of perceiving. Even when thoſe Modifications are moderate, they ſtill divide its Capacity in ſome ſort: ſo that it cannot give up it ſelf wholly to the Conſideration of abſtracted Truths.

Thence we muſt draw this Important Concluſion, That thoſe, that will earneſtly apply themſelves to ſearch after Truth, muſt carefully, and as far as poſſible, avoid all the Senſations that are too lively, as a great noiſe, a bright light, Pleaſure, Pain, *&c.* That they muſt inceſſantly watch on the Purity of their Imagination, leſt deep Traces ſhould be imprinted on their Brain, which would continually diſturb, and as it were, diſſolve the Mind; and that they muſt above all ſtop the Motions of the Paſſions, which make ſo powerful an Impreſſion on the Body and Soul, that it is for the moſt part impoſſible the Mind ſhould think upon any thing elſe. For though the pure Ideas of Truth are always preſent, yet they cannot be attended to, while the whole reach and compaſs of our thoughts are charg'd with theſe penetrating Modifications.

However

However as it is not possible that the Soul should be free of Passion, Sensation, or any other particular Modification, we must make a vertue of necessity, and endeavour to draw, from those very Modifications, such succours as can make us more attentive; But the use of them requires great Skill and Circumspection, if we desire to make an advantage of them; and we must carefully examine how far we have occasion for them, that we may use them, only when the necessity of being attentive compels us to it.

CHAP. III.

Of the Use that can be made of the Passions and Senses, to preserve the Attention of the Mind.

THE Passions that may successfully incite us to the Enquiry after Truth are those that afford Strength and Courage to overcome the trouble of rendring our selves attentive. There are some good, and others bad; the good are such as the desire of finding out the Truth, of getting so much light as to conduct our selves, and be useful to our Neighbours, and the like; the bad or dangerous are the desire of getting Fame, of making Establishments, of rising above our Fellows, and others yet more corrupted, of which we need not speak.

In our present unhappy State, it often happens, that the least rational Passions are the most inciting to the Enquiry after Truth, and are more pleasant Consolations in all the troubles we are at to discover it, than such as are juster and more reasonable: for Instance, Vanity moves us much more than the love of Truth, and we see every day such Persons as are extraordinarily given to study, as long as they find Men before whom they can boast of their Learning; whereas they entirely forsake it, when they meet with no body more to listen to them. The confused Prospect of the Glory that surrounds them, when they vend their Opinions, bears up their Courage in the most fruitless and tedious Studies. But if either by Chance, or the Necessity of their Affairs, they come to be taken off from that little Flock of Applauders, their Heat presently cools; the most solid Studies are no longer allured: Distaste, Tediousness, and Moroseness overtake them, and make them forsake all. Vanity did triumph over their natural Lazineſs, but now Lazineſs triumphs over the Love of Truth; for Vanity may sometimes resist Lazineſs, but Lazineſs commonly proves too strong and powerful for the Love of Truth.

However as the Passion for Glory may be referr'd to a good end, as to the Glory of God, the publick Use, the Preservation of our good Name; some Persons may be allowed, in some certain Cases, to make use of that Passion, as a powerful Help to make the Mind attentive. But care must be taken to use it only, when the reasonable Passions, whereof mention has been made, are not sufficient, and that our Duty engages us to apply our selves to Subjects that are very disgusting; first, because that Passion is very dangerous to the Conscience; secondly, because it insensibly draws us into ill Studies, that have more Lustre than Use or Truth in them: and lastly, because it is very difficult to moderate it; and that we often become its Fool and Propertie, and instead of enlightening the Mind, only strengthens the Concupiscence of Pride, which both corrupts our Moral Powers, and darkens our Understanding with an undissolvable Obscurity.

For it must be considered how That Passion insensibly encreases, settles and fortifies it self in the Heart of Man; and, when it is too violent, instead of helping the Mind in the Search of Truth, it strangely blinds it, and even perswades it that things are just as it desires they should be.

Sure it is, there would not be so many false Inventions, nor imaginary Discoveries, were not Mens Heads giddied by the ardent desire of appearing Inventors. For the firm and obstinate Perswasion wherein several Persons have been to have found, for Instance, the Perpetual Motion, the Quadrature of the Circle, the Duplication of the Cube by ordinary Geometry, in all likelihood proceeded from an extraordinary desire of seeming to have performed what others have vainly attempted.

And therefore 'tis fitter to excite in us such Passions as are so much more useful to our searching out of Truth, as they are more strong, and wherein the Excess is not to be feared; such are the Desires of making a good use of our Mind; of freeing our selves from Prejudices and Errours, of getting a sufficient light to behave our selves in our Condition, and such others as neither engage us into fruitless Studies, nor carry us on to rash and inconsiderate Judgments.

When we have begun to taste the pleasure of making use of our Mind, to be sensible of the profit that arises from it, have freed our selves of violent Passions, and have disrelish'd sensible Pleasures, which always prove the Masters of, or rather the Tyrants over Reason, in those that indiscreetly give up themselves to them; we need not other Passions, but

ſuch as we have ſpoken of, to become attentive upon the Subjects on which we deſire to meditate.

But moſt Men are not in that Condition; They reliſh nothing but what hath neither Taſte, nor Intelligency, nor Curioſity for any thing but what affects the Senſes; their Imagination is corrupted by an almoſt infinite Number of deep Traces, which raiſe none but falſe Idea's; and as they depend upon all the Objects that reſort to the Senſes and Imagination, ſo they always judge by the Impreſſion they receive from them; that is, with reference to themſelves. Pride, Debauchery, the various Engagements, the reſtleſs Deſires of Advancement, which are ſo common amongſt the Men of the World, darken the ſight of Truth, and ſtifle in them the ſenſe of Piety; becauſe they ſeparate them from God, who alone is able to enlighten, as he alone is able to govern us. For we cannot increaſe our Union with ſenſible things, without diminiſhing that which we have with intellectual Truth, ſince we cannot be at the ſame time ſtrictly united with things ſo different and oppoſite.

Thoſe whoſe Imagination is pure and chaſte, that is, whoſe Brain is not fill'd up with deep Traces, that faſten them to viſible things, may eaſily unite themſelves to God, liſtening to the Truth that ſpeaks to them, and even forbear the uſe of the moſt juſt and rational Paſſions. But as to thoſe that live amongſt the Great, who depend upon too many things, and whoſe Imagination is ſoiled by the falſe and obſcure Idea's of ſenſible Objects, they cannot apply themſelves to the Truth; unleſs they be born up by ſome Paſſion, that may countervail the weight of the Body, that carries them down, and imprint Traces on their Brain, that may make a Revulſion upon the Animal Spirits. However as every Paſſion can only by it ſelf perplex our Idea's, they ought to uſe that help but ſo far as Neceſſity requires: and all Men ought to ſtudy themſelves, that they may proportionate their Paſſions to their Weakneſs.

It is no hard matter to find a method of raiſing in us ſuch Paſſions as we deſire; ſince the Knowledge we have given in the foregoing Books of the Union betwixt Soul and Body has ſufficiently open'd the way to it: In a word, no more is required than to think attentively upon thoſe Objects, that by the Inſtitution of Nature are able to raiſe the Paſſions. Thus we may almoſt at any time excite in our Heart whatever Paſſion we have occaſion for; but becauſe we can eaſier excite them at any time than ſuppreſs them, or remedy the Diſorders they cauſe in the Imagination: we muſt be very ſober and cautious in employing them.

Above all we muſt take care not to judge of things by Paſſion, but only by the clear ſight of the Truth, which is almoſt impoſſible when the Paſſions are ſomewhat lively: they ought only to raiſe our Attention, but they never fail of ſtirring up their proper Idea's, and violently driving the Will to judge of things by theſe Idea's that affect it, rather than by the pure and abſtracted Idea's of Truth, that make no Impreſſion upon it: So that we often make Judgments which laſt no longer than the Paſſion, becauſe they are not produced by the clear ſight of the immutable Truth, but by the Circulation of the Blood.

True it is that Men are wonderfully obſtinate in ſome Errours, which they maintain as long as they live: but then thoſe Errours have other Cauſes than the Paſſions, or at leaſt depend on ſuch as are permanent and laſting, proceeding from the Conſtitution of the Body, from Intereſt, or from ſome other durable Cauſe. For Inſtance; Intereſt being a Motive of a continual ſtanding, produces a Paſſion that never dies, and the Judgments that ariſe from it are very long-liv'd. But all the other Senſations of Men, which depend upon particular Paſſions, are as inconſtant as the Fermentation of their Humours. They ſay one while this, another while that; and yet what they ſay is commonly conformable to what they think. And as they run from one counterfeit Good to another, by the motion of their Paſſion, and are diſguſted at it when that Motion ceaſes: So they run from one falſe *Syſtem* into another, and ardently aſſert a falſe Opinion, when Paſſion makes it probable; which the Paſſion ebbing, they afterwards forſake. By their Paſſions they taſte of every Good, without finding any really ſo, and by the ſame Paſſions ſee all Truths, without diſcovering any thing abſolutely true: though in the time of their Paſſion, what they Taſte ſeems to them the Soveraign Good, and what they ſee an undeniable Truth.

The *Senſes* are the ſecond Spring, whence we can draw Succours to make the *Mind* attentive. *Senſations* are the very *Modifications* of the *Soul*, and differ from the pure *Idea's* of the *Mind*; the former raiſing a much ſtronger Attention than the latter. So that 'tis plain, that to ſupply the want of Application to inſenſible Truths; it may be fit to expreſs them in a ſenſible and moving manner.

'Tis for that Reaſon, that Geometricians expreſs by ſenſible Lines, the Proportions that are betwixt ſeveral Magnitudes; for by drawing Lines upon Paper, they draw, as I may ſay, anſwerable *Idea's* upon their *Mind*, and make them more familiar by *Seeing* them at the ſame time that they *Conceive* them. Thus ſeveral very difficult Things may be taught to Children, tho' they be not ſuſceptible of abſtracted Truths, by reaſon of the nicety of the Fibres of their Brain. Their *Eyes* ſee nothing but Colours, Pictures, Images; but their *Mind* conſiders the *Idea's* that anſwer thoſe ſenſible Objects.

But we muſt take a ſpecial Care not to overſhadow the *Objects*, which we will conſider or repreſent to others, with ſo much *Senſibility*, that the *Mind* ſhould be more taken up with it, than with the *Truth* it ſelf, which is a moſt conſiderable and common Fault: For we meet

every

every day with Men, that apply themſelves only to what moves the Senſes, and expreſs themſelves in ſuch a ſenſible manner, that Truth is ſtifled under the vain and pompous Apparel of their falſe Eloquence; ſo that their Hearers, being more affected with the meaſure of their Periods, and the Motions of their Figures, than by the Reaſons they allege, give way to be perſwaded, without ſo much as knowing what cauſes their Perſwaſion, or what they are perſwaded of.

And therefore we muſt ſo carefully moderate the Senſibility of our Expreſſions, as only juſt to make the Mind attentive. There is nothing more beautiful than Truth, neither can we pretend to make it handſomer, by daubing it with ſenſible Colours, that have no ſolidity in them, and are pleaſing but a ſhort time. We might perhaps make it more fine and delicate, but ſhould enerve and emaſculate it. So that we ought not to ſet it off with ſo much Luſtre and Brightneſs, that the Mind be more taken up with the Ornaments, than with the Body it ſelf. This being to deal with it as ſome Perſons do with themſelves, when loaded with ſuch abundance of Gold and precious Stones, they appear the leaſt conſiderable part of the whole which they make up with their Cloaths. We muſt dreſs the Truth as are thoſe Magiſtrates of *Venice*, who only wear a plain Gown and a Cap, to diſtinguiſh them from the Commonalty; that Men may look on their Face with Reverence and Attention, without admiring their Apparel. Laſtly, we muſt take care not to ſurcharge it with too great a Retinue of delightful things that diſſipate the Mind, and obſtruct its view, leſt we ſhould give to any thing elſe the honours due to it. As it often happens to Princes, who cannot be diſtinguiſhed amongſt the great number of their Courtiers and Attendants, who aſſume to themſelves that air of greatneſs, and Majeſtical Countenance which only becomes the Soveraigns themſelves.

But to give a more conſiderable Inſtance, I ſay, that Truth muſt be propoſed to others, as it manifeſts it ſelf. The ſight of Men, ſince the Fall of their Forefathers, is too weak to look on Truth it ſelf, and therefore Soveraign Truth has made it ſelf ſenſible by coming inveſted with our humanity; that it might attract our thoughts, enlighten our Mind, and appear lovely to our Eyes. So we may, according to that Pattern, adorn with ſomething ſenſible, the Truth we endeavour to teach others, and to underſtand our ſelves, that we may fix the Mind upon them, which loves what's ſenſible, and is not eaſily delighted by things that flatter not the Senſes. The Eternal Wiſdom has made it ſelf ſenſible, but not Glittering and Pompous, becoming ſenſible only to raiſe us to what is Intellectual, and to condemn and ſacrifice ſenſibility in his own Perſon. So we muſt make uſe, in the knowledge of Truth, of ſomething ſenſible, but not too ſplendid, that cannot indear too much the ſenſible Object; but only keep open the Eye of our Mind in the Contemplation of meer Intellectual Truths; ſuch *ſenſibility* ſhould be employ'd as we may diſſipate, annihilate, and willingly ſacrifice upon the ſight of the Truth, to which it has conducted us. The Eternal Wiſdom has offer'd it ſelf to us from without, in a ſenſible manner, not to keep us abroad, but that we may retire within our ſelves, and that the inner Man might intellectually conſider it: ſo we muſt in our ſearch of Truth, make uſe of ſomething ſenſible, which may not keep us gazing on its luſtre, but make us enter into our ſelves and ſtrengthen our Attention and Union to the Eternal Truth; which only is able to rule the Mind, and enlighten it upon any ſubject whatſoever.

CHAP. IV.

Of the Uſe of Imagination to make the Mind attentive, and ſpecially of the Uſefulneſs of Geometry.

WE had need be very circumſpect and cautious in the Choice and Uſe of thoſe helps that we may draw from our Senſes and Paſſions to become attentive to the Truth, becauſe our Senſes and Paſſions too vividly affect us, and ſo much fill up the Capacity of the Mind, that it often ſees nothing but its own Senſations, when it propoſes to diſcover things in their own nature. But as to thoſe ſuccours which our Imagination may afford us; they make the Mind attentive, without fruitleſly dividing its Capacity, and wonderfully help us to a clear and diſtinct perception of Objects; ſo that they are for the moſt part very uſeful, as will be made plain by ſome Inſtances.

We know that a Body is moved by two or ſeveral different Cauſes, towards two or ſeveral different places, whereunto it is equally or unequally driven by theſe Forces: that the force of the Motion perpetually increaſes, or decreaſes, according to ſome known proportion: We are asked what way that Body goes, in what place it ſhall be at ſuch or ſuch a moment, with what degree of celerity it ſhall be endued, when 'tis come to ſuch a place.

1. From



1. From the point A, whence we ſuppoſe that it begins to move, draw the indefinite Lines AB, AC, that make the Angle BAC, if they cut each other; for AB, and AC, are direct, and cut not each other, when the Motions they expreſs are directly oppoſite. Thus we diſtinctly repreſent to the Imagination, or, if you pleaſe, to the Senſes, the way that body ſhould take when it is only moved by one of theſe forces, either towards B, or C.

2. But if the force that moves it towards B, be equal to that which moves it towards C, then divide the Lines AB, and AC, into the parts 1, 2, 3, 4. I, II, III, IV, equally diſtant from A: If the force that moves it towards B, be double of that which moves it towards C, take in the Line AB, parts that are double of thoſe that you cut in AC; If that force be ſubduple, take them ſubduple; if it it be thrice greater or leſſer, cut them likewiſe thrice greater or leſſer, and ſo proportionably. The Diviſions of thoſe Lines will repreſent to the Imagination the different degrees of thoſe moving forces, and withal, the ſpace that they ſhall cauſe the Body to run over.

3. Draw, through thoſe Diviſions, Parallels upon AB, and AC, to have the Lines 1. X, 2. X, 3. X, *&c.* equal to A. 1. A. II. A. III. *&c.* and 1. X, II. X, III. X, equal to A. 1, A. 2, A. 3. *&c.* that repreſent the ſpaces through which thoſe forces carry that Body. Through the Interſections of thoſe Parallels, draw the Line AXYE; that repreſent to the Imagination, firſt, the true Greatneſs of the compoſed Motion of that Body, which is ſuppoſed to be driven at the ſame time towards B and C, by two different forces, according to ſome certain Proportion; *Secondly*, the way that it is to paſs through; and *laſtly*, all the places in which it muſt be in a determinate Time. So that this Line ſerves not only to bear up the ſight of the Mind in the Enquiry after all the Truths that are diſcoverable in the Queſtion propoſed; but alſo repreſents the Solution of it in a ſenſible and convincing manner.

Firſt, That Line AXYE, expreſſes the true degrees of the compound Motion. For we ſenſibly perceive that if each of the forces which produce it, can promote the Body a foot in a minute, its compoſed Motion will be of two Foot in a minute, if both moving forces do perfectly agree: ſince in that Caſe it is enough to add AB, to AC. But if thoſe forces are not altogether equal, the compoſed Motion AE. will be greater than one of the compoundings AB, or AC, by the Line YE. Whereas if thoſe Motions be oppoſite in any thing, the compoſed will be leſſer than either of the compounding, by the Line YE; and if they be entirely oppoſite, it will come to nothing.

Secondly, The Line AXYE repreſents to the Imagination the way, which that Body ſhall go. For we ſenſibly perceive in what Proportion it ſhall advance, more to one than to the other ſide. We likewiſe perceive, that all the compound Motions are direct, when each of the compounding is always the ſame; though they be unequal betwixt themſelves: or when the compoundings are always equal betwixt them, though they be not conſtantly the ſame. Laſtly, it plainly appears, that the Lines deſcribed by thoſe Motions, are crooked, when the compounding are both unequal to each other, and not always the ſame.

Thirdly, Laſt of all, that Line repreſents to the Imagination all the places, in which that Body, driven by two different forces towards two different places, ſhall be found; ſo that we can preciſely mark the Point in which that Body ſhall be in any inſtant whatſoever. For Inſtance, if you deſire to know in what place that Body ſhall be at the beginning of the fourth minute,

minute, divide the Lines AB, or AC, in ſuch Parts as expreſs the ſpace through which thoſe known Forces might each of them carry that Body within a Minute, take three of thoſe Parts in any of theſe Lines, then draw through the beginning of the fourth 3X Parallel to AB, or 111X Parallel to AC, for 'tis evident that the point X, which either of thoſe Parallels determine in the Line AXYE, deſigns the place in which that Body ſhall be at the beginning of the fourth Minute of its Motion. Thus that Method of examining Queſtions, not only keeps up the View of the Mind, but alſo affords the Solution of them, and withal a ſufficient Light to diſcover unknown things by a few that are known.

For Inſtance: After what has been ſaid, it is enough only to know, that a Body that was in A, at ſuch a time, is in E, at ſuch another, and that the different forces that drive it, deſcribe Lines that make ſuch an Angle as BAC, to diſcover the Line of its compoſed Motion, and the different degrees of Celerity of the ſimple Motions; provided we know that thoſe Motions are equal or uniform to each other. For when we have two points of a right Line, we have it entire, and we can compare the right Line AE, or the compoſed Motion that is known, with the Lines AB, and AC, that is, with the ſimple Motions that are unknown.

Now let us ſuppoſe a Stone driven from A to B, by an uniform Motion, but deſcending towards E, with an unequal, like to that which ponderous Bodies are thought generally to tend to the Centre of the Earth, according to the common Opinion: that is to ſay, let the ſpaces which it paſſes over be amongſt themſelves as the *Squares of the Times* in which it paſſes them over: the Line which it ſhall deſcribe will be a *Parabola*, and the Point in which the Stone ſhall be at every moment of its Motion, may be determined with the utmoſt Nicety and Exactneſs.



For if at the firſt moment that Body falls Two Foot from A towards C, in the ſecond Six, in the third Ten, in the fourth Fourteen, and that it be driven by a uniform Motion from A towards B, which is Sixteen Foot in length; 'tis evident, that the Line which that Body deſcribes is a *Parabola*, whoſe *Parameter* is Eight Foot long; becauſe the Square of the Lines that are applied to the Diameter, which Lines mark the Times, and the regular Motion of A towards B, is equal to the *Rectangle* of the *Parameter*, through the Lines that mark the unequal and accelerated Motions; ſo that the Squares of the *applied Lines*, or the *Squares of the Times*, will be amongſt themſelves, as the Parts of the Diameter contained betwixt the *Pole* and the *applied Lines*.

16. 64 :: 2. 8. 64. 144 :: 8. 18. &c.

The bare looking on the ſixth Figure is ſufficient to perſwade us of all this; for the Semicircles ſhew, that A 2, is to A 4, that is, to the applied Line 2X, its equal, as 2X is to A8. That A 18. is to A 12. that is, to the applied Line 18 X, as 18 X, is to A 8. *&c*, And therefore that the Rectangles A 2, by A 8, and A 18, by A 8, are equal to the Squares of 2 X, and 18 X, *&c*. and conſequently thoſe Squares have the ſame Proportion to each other, as thoſe Rectangles.

The Parallels upon AB, and AC, which cut each other at the Points X. X. X.; do alſo ſenſibly ſhew the way of that Body, and the places in which it muſt be at ſuch a time. Laſtly, they repreſent to the Eyes, the true degrees of the compoſed and accelerated Motion, in any determinate Time.

Let's ſuppoſe again a Body moving from A, towards B and C, but unequally on both ſides. If that Inequality be always and every where alike, or if it either encreaſes or diminiſhes in the ſame Proportion, the Line which it ſhall deſcribe will be a Right.

And though there ſhould be an Inequality, either in the Augmentation, or Diminution of the ſimple Motions, whatever that Inequality be, it will not be hard to find the Line that repreſents to the Imagination the Motion compoſed of the ſimple Motions, if you expreſs thoſe Motions by Lines, and draw to theſe Lines Parallels cutting each other. For the Line that ſhall paſs through all the Interſections of thoſe Parallels, will repreſent the Motion compoſed of thoſe Motions that are unequal, and unequally increaſed or diminiſhed.

For Example, If we ſuppoſe that a Body is moved by two equal or unequal Forces, whatever they be, that one of thoſe Motions ſtill encreaſes, or diminiſhes, in any given Geometrical, or Arithmetical Proportion; and that the other Motion encreaſes or diminiſhes in

ſome other Arithmetical, or Geometrical Progreſſion, to find out the Points through which the Line muſt paſs that repreſents to the Eyes and Imagination the Motions compoſed of thoſe Motions; draw, as has been ſaid, the two Lines AB and AC, that expreſs the ſimple Motions, and divide thoſe Lines, as thoſe ſeveral Motions are ſuppoſed to accelerate, at the Points 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. If the Motion repreſented by the Line AC, encreaſes or diminiſhes in ſuch an Arithmetical Progreſſion, as 1, 2, 3, 5; And the Motion repreſented by the Line AB, increaſes in this double Progreſſion, 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, or diminiſhes in the ſubduple Progreſſion, 4, 2, 1. $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$, divide it at the Points, 1, 2, 4, 8, or 16, 8, 4, 2, 1, $\frac{1}{2}$, $\frac{1}{4}$, $\frac{1}{8}$; laſtly, draw through thoſe Diviſions, Parallels to AB, and AC, and the Line AE, that paſſes through all the Points of the Interſection of thoſe Parallels, will be the Line repreſenting the compoſed Motion, and the way through which the Body moves.



If we deſire exactly to know how long a Body has been in coming to ſuch a Point, from its ſetting out: the Parallels drawn from the Point upon AB, or AC, will ſhew it; for the Diviſions of AB, and AC, mark the Time. And likewiſe if we deſire to know the Place to which a Body is arrived within ſome certain time, the Parallels drawn from the Diviſions of the Lines AB, and AC, that repreſent the time, will, by their Interſection, ſhew us the Point we ſeek for. As to its diſtance from the Term whence it has begun to move, it will always be eaſie to know it, by drawing a Line from that Point towards A; for the length of that Line will be known, by comparing it, either to AB, or AC, which are known. But as to the length of the way through which that Body has run, in advancing to this Point, it will ſtill be hard to diſcover it, becauſe AE, the Line of its Motion, being crooked, cannot be compared with either of thoſe right Lines.

If you would determine the infinite Points through which thatBody muſt paſs,that is nicely deſcribed, and by a continual Motion, the Line AE; you had need make a pair of Compaſſes, that ſhould move according to all the conditions expreſs'd in the Suppoſitions that have been mention'd: which would be very difficult to invent, and impoſſible to perform, and almoſt unprofitable, to diſcover the Relations of things betwixt themſelves, ſince commonly we need not all the Points of which a Line is compoſed, but only ſome to help the Imagining Faculty, when it conſiders thoſe Motions.

Thoſe Inſtances are ſufficient to ſhew, that we may by Lines expreſs and repreſent to the Imagination moſt of our Ideas; and that Geometry, which teaches to compare thoſe Lines, and thereby know their ſeveral Relations, is of a greater extent than is commonly ſuppoſed. For Aſtronomy, Muſick, Mechanicks, and generally all the Sciences, whoſe Objects are ſuſceptible of more or leſs, and may be conſider'd under the Notion of *extended*, that is to ſay, all accurate Sciences, may be referr'd to Geometry; becauſe all Speculative Truths, conſiſting in the Relations of things, or in Relations betwixt their Relations, they may all be referr'd to Lines; Geometrical Conſequences may be drawn from them; and when thoſe Conſequences are made ſenſible by Lines, 'tis almoſt impoſſible to miſtake. Thus may Sciences be carried very far with great eaſineſs.

For Inſtance: The Reaſon why we diſtinctly know,and preciſely mark an Octave, a Fifth, a Fourth in Muſick, is that the Sounds are expreſſed by Strings exactly divided; and that we know that the String which ſounds an Octave is in double proportion with that from whence the Octave riſes; that a Fifth is with it in a Seſquialter proportion, or as 3. to 2. and ſo of the reſt. For the Ear alone cannot judge of Sounds, with ſo much nicety and accuracy as a Science requires. The moſt skilful Practitioners, the moſt delicate and tender Ears are not ſenſible enough to obſerve the difference betwixt certain Sounds, and judging of things by the Senſation they have of them, falſly imagine that there's none at all. Some cannot diſtinguiſh betwixt an Octave and 3. thirds,others fancy that the *Major* Tone differs not from the *Minor*; ſo that the *Comma* which is their Difference is inſenſible to them, and much more the *Schiſma*, which is but the half of the *Comma*.

And therefore 'tis Reaſon alone, that manifeſtly ſhows us that the ſpace of the ſtring which makes the Difference betwixt certain Sounds, being diviſible into ſeveral Parts, there may ſtill be a great number of different Sounds very uſeful for Muſick, which the Ear cannot diſtinguiſh. Whence it plainly appears, that without *Arithmetick* and *Geometry*, we ſhould have no exact and regular knowledge of *Muſick*; neither could we ſucceed in that *Science* but by Chance and Imagination, and ſo *Muſick* would ceaſe from being a *Science*, grounded upon undeniable Demonſtrations. In the mean while it muſt be granted, that the Songs which owe their birth to the ſtrength of *Imagination*, are for the moſt part finer and more pleaſant to the *Senſes*, than thoſe that are compoſed by Rule.

And likewiſe in *Mechanicks*, the heavineſs of a Body, and the diſtance of the Centre of heavineſs from its Prop, being capable of more or leſs, both may be figured by Line: So that

Geometry is useful to discover and demonstrate an infinite number of new Inventions, very convenient to this Life, and pleasing to the Mind, because of their Evidence.

For Instance, If a Weight of six pounds is to be put in *æquilibrium* with one of three, let that Weight of six pound hang on the Arm of a Balance, at two Foot distance from the Prop: then only by this general Principle of all Mechanicks, *That Weights to stand in æquilibrium, must be in a reciprocal Proportion with their Distances from the Prop*; that is, That one Weight must be to the other, as the Distance betwixt the last Weight and the Prop is to the Distance of the first Weight from the said Prop; It will be easie to find out by *Geometry*, what must be the Distance of a Weight of Three pounds, that all may remain in *æquilibrio*; if you find by the *Twelfth Proposition* of the *Sixth Book* of *Euclid*, a fourth proportional Line, which here will be of four Foot. So that you may plainly discover all the Truths, that depend on that fundamental Principle of Mechanicks, (when once known) by the Use of Geometry; that is, by representing with Lines whatever can be considered in Mechanicks.

Geometrical Lines and Figures are therefore most proper to represent to the Imagination, the Relations betwixt Magnitudes, or betwixt things that differ in degree of more and less, as Spaces, Times, Weights, *&c.* as well because they are most simple Objects, as that they are imagin'd with great Easiness. It may even be said, to the Honour of *Geometry*, That Lines can represent to the Imagination more things than the Mind can know. Since Lines can express the Relations of incommensurable Magnitudes, that is, such Relations as cannot be known, because there is no common Measure to compare them together. But that Advantage is not very considerable, as to the Search after Truth; because those sensible Representations of incommensurable Magnitudes, discover nothing to the Mind.

Geometry is therefore exceedingly useful, to make the Mind attentive to those things, whose Relations we desire to discover: However it must be granted, that it is sometimes an Occasion of Errour, because the evident and pleasant Demonstrations of that Science, takes us up so much, that we have not a sufficient Regard for the Consideration of Nature. Thence it comes, that the new-invented Engines do not all succeed; that those Musical Compositures, in which the Proportions of Consonances are best observed, are not always the most grateful; and that the most accurate Calculations of *Astronomy* do not always best foretell the Incidence and Duration of Eclipses. Nature is not abstracted; Levers and Wheels, in *Mechanicks*, are not *Mathematical* Lines and Circles: All Men are not pleased with the same *Musical* Tunes, nor even the same Man at different times; for their Satisfaction proceeds from the Commotions of their Spirits, than which nothing can be more variable. And as to *Astronomy*, the Course of the *Planets* is not perfectly regular, whilst floating in the vast Spaces they are irregularly carried by the fluid Matter that surrounds them: So that the Errours of *Astronomy*, *Musick*, *Mechanicks*, and all Sciences, in which *Geometry* is used, are not to be ascribed to that undoubted Science, but to the false Application that is made of it.

For Instance, we suppose, that *Planets*, by their Motion, describe *Circles* and *Ellipses* perfectly regular. And though that be not exactly true, yet we do well to suppose it so, that we may draw Inferences from thence; and because it wants but little of being one: but we must still remember, that the Principle from which we argue is a *Supposition*. Likewise in *Mechanicks*, we suppose *Wheels* and *Levers* perfectly hard without gravity and rubbing, and like to *Mathematical Circles*; that is, we have not a sufficient Consideration for the said gravity and rubbing; for the Nature of the Matter, and the Relation those things have betwixt them. We mind not that Hardness and Bulk increase Heaviness, Heaviness fretting, whilst fretting diminishes Force, and causes the Engine to break, or wears it out very quickly: So that what often succeeds upon a small portion of Matter, seldom takes effect upon a great Body.

No wonder therefore if we mistake, since we argue from Principles not fully known; not yet, because it rids us not of all our Errours, must we imagine *Geometry* useless. It makes us draw from our Suppositions very true and consequential Inferences; and affords us an evident Knowledge of what we consider, by making us attentive. We can even discover by its means, the Falshood of our Suppositions; for being certain of the Truth of our Reasonings, which however do not agree with Experience, we conclude that our Principles are false. But without *Geometry* and *Arithmetick* we can discover nothing, that is somewhat difficult, in the most accurate Sciences, though we argue from certain and undeniable Principles.

We must then look upon *Geometry*, as a sort of universal Science, which opens and enlarges the Mind, makes it attentive, and affords it so much Skill, as to regulate its Imagination, and to draw from it all the possible Succours. For by the Assistance of *Geometry*, the Mind regulates the Motion of the Imagination, and the Imagination regulated keeps up the View and Application of the Mind.

But that we may learn to make a good use of Geometry, we must observe that all the things that fall under the Imagination, are not as easily imaginable one as the other; since all the Images do not equally fill the Capacity of the Mind. 'Tis more difficult to imagine a solid than a Plain, and this than a simple Line; because the clear perception of a solid requires a greater thought than that of a Plain, and a Line. Even Lines differ, as to this, amongst themselves, a Parabolick, Elliptick, or some other very composed Line, requires more thinking,

that

that is, takes up the Mind more than the Figure of a Circle, and this than a right Line; because 'tis harder to imagine Lines that are described by very composed Motions, and have several different Relations, than those that are drawn by Motions very simple, and have but a few Relations. For Relations cannot be clearly perceived without the Attention of the Mind to several things, and as their number is greater, so must the thought or the perception be more extended. Hence it happens, that there are Figures so much composed, that they extend beyond the reach of a distinct Imagination; whereas others may be imagin'd with great facility.

Amongst the three sorts of right-Lined-Angles; *viz.* the acute, the right, and the obtuse, none but the Right raises a very distinct and determined Idea. For as there are an Infinity of either, Acute or obtuse Angles, that differ all from one another; so we can imagine nothing nicely nor distinctly, when we imagine an acute or obtuse Angle. But we cannot be mistaken in imagining a Right Angle; the Idea of it is so very distinct, and its Image which it raises in the Brain so very neat and just.

True it is, that we may determine the general and indefinite Idea of an Acute Angle to the particular Idea of an Angle of 30. degrees, which Idea is as accurate as that of an Angle of 90. that is of a Right Angle; but the Image of it, which we may endeavour to imprint on the Brain, will never be so very exact, as that of a right Angle; being not used to describe that Image, we cannot draw it but by thinking on a Circle, or on the determinate Portion of a Circle divided into equal Parts. But to imagine a Right Angle; we need not think on that Division of a Circle, the bare Idea of a perpendicular suffices to draw the Image of that Angle, which we imagine without trouble, being used to see all things standing upright.

Hence it is easie to judge, That, to chuse a simple, distinct, and well-determin'd Object, apt to be easily imagin'd, and consequently to make the Mind attentive, and to promote its Evidence in the truths it is in quest of; we must reduce all the Magnitudes we consider to plain Superficies termin'd by Lines and Right Angles, as are perfect Squares, and other Right angled Figures, or to bare right Lines; for these are the Figures whose nature is the most easily known.

We pretend not however that all the Subjects of our Knowledge and Enquiry, may be represented by Geometrical Lines and Figures. There are many, which neither can nor ought to be brought under that Rule. For Instance, the Knowledge of a God, Almighty, All-just, on whom all things depend all manner of ways, who commands his Creatures to obey his Orders, that they may be capable of Happiness; that Knowledge, I say, is the Principle of all Morality, and of an infinite of undoubted Consequences; yet neither the Principle, nor the Consequences, can be represented by Geometrical Figures. Neither is it possible to figure and represent by Lines many Motions of Natural Philosophy, which yet may evidently discover to us several Truths. However it may be truly said, that an Infinity of things may be examin'd and learn'd by that Geometrical Method; which is ever advantageously imploy'd, since it accustoms the Mind to Attention, by causing it to make a regular Use of it's Imagination; and that things which are learn'd that way, are more clearly demonstrated, and easier attained than others.

I might have ascribed to the Senses, the Assistances we derive from *Geometry*, to preserve the Attention of the Mind; but though Lines be something sensible, yet, I thought, *Geometry* belongs rather to the Imagination, than to the Senses. It would be unprofitable to set down my Reasons for it; which could only justify the order I have observ'd in this Treatise: and that's a thing not very material to our purpose. I have not yet spoken of Arithmetick and Algebra, because the Cyphers and Letters of the Alphabet, that are used in those Sciences, are not so serviceable to strengthen the Attention of the Mind as to encrease its Extent, as we shall explain it in the following Chapter.

There are the general helps to improve the Attention of the Mind. I know of no other, besides a firm Resolution of being attentive, of which we forbear to speak, because we suppose it in those that give up themselves to study.

There are however some others particular to some Persons, as some Meats, some Drinks, some Places, some Dispositions of the Body, and the like; which every one must learn from Experience; observing the State of his Imagination after the Meal, and what things best preserve, or most dissipate the Attention of the Mind. This only may be said in general, That the moderate Use of such Aliments, as make many Animal Spirits, is very fit to improve the Attention of the Mind, and the Strength of the Imagination, when 'tis weak and languishing.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

Of the Means to improve the Extent and Capacity of the Mind; That Arithmetick, *and* Algebra *are of abſolute Neceſſity to it.*

WE ought not haſtily to imagine, That the *Extent*, and *Capacity* of the *Mind* can really be increaſed. The Humane Soul is, if I may ſo ſpeak, a determined Quantity, or a Portion of Thought, contained within ſome certain Bounds, which ſhe cannot paſs: She cannot grow greater, or more capacious than ſhe is: She neither ſwells up, nor dilates, as 'tis commonly believed of Liquors and Metals; and perceives never more at one time, than another.

This, I confeſs, ſeems contrary to Experience, ſince ſometimes we think upon many Objects, and ſometimes but upon one, and even we often ſuppoſe, that we think upon nothing. However if it be conſider'd, the Thought is to the Soul, what Extenſion is to Matter: it will plainly appear, that as a Body cannot truly be more extended at one time than another; ſo, if we conceive it right, the Soul cannot think more at one time than another: whether it be then that ſhe perceives many Objects; or is taken up with one; or even when ſhe is ſaid to think upon nothing.

But the Reaſon why we imagine that we think more at one time than another is, that we do not ſufficiently diſtinguiſh betwixt confuſed and diſtinct Perceptions. More thought is doubtleſs required, or the Capacity of thinking muſt be more fill'd, diſtinctly to perceive ſeveral Objects, than one alone: but we need not more thought, to perceive many things *confuſedly*, than one alone *diſtinctly*. Thus the degrees or quantity of thought is equal in the Soul, when ſhe conſiders many things, and when ſhe conſiders only one. For when ſhe is taken up with one thing, ſhe has always a clearer Idea of it, than when ſhe applies her ſelf to many.

For 'tis fit to be obſerved, that a ſimple Perception ſometimes contains as much thought, or fills as much the thinking Capacity of the Mind, as a Judgment, and even a compoſed Reaſoning; ſince Experience teaches us, that the ſimple but lively, clear and evident Perception of one thing engages our application, and poſſeſſes us as much, as a compoſed Reaſoning, or the obſcure and confuſed Perception of ſeveral Relations betwixt many things.

For as there is as much more Senſation in the ſenſible ſight of an Object, which I hold near my Eyes, and curiouſly examine; than in the ſight of a ſpacious Field, on which I caſt a negligent and careleſs Eye; becauſe the neatneſs of the Senſation of the Object near my Eyes, makes up for the Extent of thoſe many things, which I ſlightly and unattentively look upon in a Field: So that the ſpiritual ſight the Mind hath of an Object is often ſo lively and diſtinct, that it contains as much and more thought, than the view of the Relations betwixt many things.

True it is, that at ſome certain times it ſeems to us, as though we thought but upon one thing, which yet we can hardly comprehend; whereas at other times we comprehend that thing and ſeveral others with great eaſineſs; thence we imagine that the Soul has more Extent and a larger Capacity of thinking at one time than at another. But our miſtake is viſible; for the Reaſon why at ſome certain times we can ſcarce conceive the eaſieſt things proceed not from the Capacity of the Soul's being ſtraitned or impair'd; but from its being fill'd with ſome lively Senſation of Pain or Pleaſure, or with a great number of weak and dark Senſations, that cauſe a ſort of Giddineſs, which is commonly nothing elſe, but the confuſed Senſation of a great number of things.

A piece of Wax is ſuſceptible of a very diſtinct Figure; but cannot admit two, without a mixture of both; ſince it cannot be perfectly round and ſquare at the ſame time; and if one ſhould pretend to give it a Million of Figures, none of them would be diſtinct. And in that Caſe ſuppoſing that piece of Wax capable of knowing its own Figures; yet it could not tell which it is that terminates it on all ſides, the number would be ſo great. It is even ſo with our Soul, when a very great number of Modifications take up her Capacity; ſhe can perceive none diſtinctly, becauſe ſhe has not a ſeparate Senſation of them, and ſo thinks ſhe is ſenſible of nothing. She cannot ſay that ſhe feels Pain, Pleaſure, Light, Sound, Savour, 'tis none of thoſe Qualities, and yet 'tis them altogether ſhe is ſenſible of.

And though we ſhould ſuppoſe that the Soul is not ſubject to the confuſed and unruly Motion of the animal Spirits, and ſo free from the contagion of her Body, as to have her thoughts altogether independent on what happens in it; yet it might fall out that we ſhould eaſier underſtand ſome things at one time than at another, without any Enlargement or Diminution in the Capacity of our Soul; for then we might think upon particular Objects, or of Being indefinite and in general.

The general Idea of Infinite is inſeparable from the Mind; and wholly takes up its Capacity, whenever it thinks upon no particular thing. For when we ſay that we think on nothing, it

ſignifies not that we think not upon that general Idea, but only that our thoughts are not applied to any particular Object.

And certainly if that Idea did not fill our Mind, we could not think as we do upon all ſorts of things; ſince we cannot think upon Objects of which we have no Knowledge. And if that Idea were not more preſent to the Mind when we ſuppoſe we think upon nothing, than when we are buſy about ſome particular Object, we could as eaſily think upon whatever we pleaſe, when we are mightily taken up with ſome particular Truth, as when we are not attentive unto any thing. Which is repugnant to Experience. For, to inſtance when we are ſtrongly engag'd in meditating on ſome Geometrical Propoſition, we find not ſo much eaſineſs to think upon other things, as when we are diverted by no particular thought. And therefore we think more on the general and infinite being, when we think leſs on the particular and finite, and we think even as much at one time as at another.

We cannot then improve the Extent and Capacity of the Mind, by ſwelling it up, as I may ſay, and giving it more reality than it has received from Nature: But only by a skilful and dexterous managing thereof; which is done to the beſt Advantage by *Arithmetick* and *Algebra*. For thoſe Sciences afford means of abridging Ideas ſo methodically, and reducing them into ſuch an Order, as that the Mind, with its little Extent, is capable of diſcovering very compoſed Truths, and ſuch as appear at firſt ſight incomprehenſible. But we muſt draw theſe things from their Principle, that we may explain them with more clearneſs and certainty.

Truth is nothing elſe but a real Relation, either of equality or inequality: Whereas falſehood is but the *Negation* of Truth, or a falſe and phantaſtick Relation. Truth is that *which is*, and falſhood is not; or if you will, is *that* which *is not*. We never miſtake, when we ſee Relations that are, ſince we cannot be deceived when we ſee the Truth: but we always miſtake, when we judge that we ſee ſome Relations that are not in being; for then we ſee a falſhood, we ſee what is not, or rather we ſee not at all. Whoever ſees a Relation of equality betwixt two times two and four, ſees a Truth, becauſe there is ſuch a Relation as he ſees; and whoever ſees a Relation of inequality betwixt twice two and five, ſees a Truth, becauſe he ſees a Relation that really is. But whoever judges that he ſees a Relation betwixt two times two and five, miſtakes; becauſe he ſees, or rather ſuppoſes he ſees, a Relation of Equality where there is none. Truths are but Relations, and the Knowledge of Truths is the Knowledge of Relations: but falſhood is not, and the Knowledge of falſhood, or a falſe Knowledge, is, if it may be ſo ſaid, the Knowledge of what is not; and what is not cannot be known, but by Relation to what is; ſo Errour cannot be underſtood but by comparing it to Truth.

There may be diſtinguiſhed as many Species of Falſhood as of Truth; and as there are three ſorts of Relations, *viz.* of one Idea to another, of an Object to its Idea, or of an Idea to its Object, and laſtly of one Object to another; ſo there are three kinds of Truth and Falſhood; namely betwixt Ideas, between things and their Ideas, and betwixt things themſelves. It is true that 2 times 2 are 4; 'tis falſe that twice 2 are 5. That is a Truth and a falſhood betwixt Ideas. 'Tis true that there is one Sun, 'tis falſe that there are two: Here you have a Truth and a Falſhood betwixt things and their Ideas. 'Tis true that the Earth is bigger than the Moon, and 'tis falſe that the Sun is ſmaller than the Earth; there is a Truth and falſhood betwixt Objects themſelves.

Of thoſe 3. ſorts of Truths, ſuch as are betwixt Ideas are Eternal and Immutable, and likewiſe the Rule and Meaſure of all others; becauſe every Rule and Meaſure ought to be unchangeable. And as *Arithmetick*, *Algebra*, and *Geometry*, are general Sciences that rule and contain all the particular; ſo they only conſider thoſe ſorts of Truths. All truths or Relations betwixt Creatures, or betwixt Ideas and created things, are obnoxious to thoſe Changes, whereof Creatures are ſuſceptible. Nothing but the Truth betwixt our Ideas and the Soveraign being, or betwixt Ideas themſelves, is immutable; becauſe neither God, nor the Ideas he contains, are ſubject to Alteration.

And therefore 'tis only to that ſort of Truths which are betwixt our Ideas, that we try to diſcover by the exerciſe of our reaſon, ſince we for the moſt part make uſe of our Senſes to diſcover the others; as we uſe our Eyes and Hands to aſcertain us of the Exiſtence of things, and to know the Relations of Equality, or Inequality betwixt them. There is nothing but Ideas of which the Mind can infallibly know the Relations, by it ſelf, and without the uſe of Senſes. But there are not only Relations betwixt our Ideas, there are alſo Relations betwixt the Relations of our Ideas, betwixt the Relations of thoſe Relations, betwixt the Collection of many Relations, and ſo *ad infinitum*, that is to ſay, that there are Truths infinitely compounded and perplexed. In Geometrical Stile we call a ſimple Truth, or the Relation of one Idea to another, (as the Relation of 4 to 2, or to 2 times 2.) a *Geometrical Reaſon*; or only a *Reaſon*. For the Exceſs and defect of an Idea, or to uſe the common terms, the Exceſs or defect of a Magnitude is not properly a *Reaſon*, nor equal Exceſſes and Defects equal *Reaſons*. When the Ideas or Magnitudes are equal, there is *a Reaſon of equality*, and *one* of *inequality*, when they are unequal.

The Relation betwixt Relations of Magnitudes, is called *compounded Reaſon*, becauſe 'tis a com-

compounded Relation, as the Relation of 6 to 4, and 3 to 2. When the compounding Reasons are equal, the compounded bears the name of *Proportion* or *duplicate Reason*. The Relation of 8 to 4, and 6 to 3, are a Proportion; because those two Relations are equal.

It must be observed, that all the Relations or Reasons, as well simple as compounded, are true Magnitudes, that very name of Magnitude being a relative Term, and necessarily importing a Relation. For there is nothing great by it self, and without Relation to another, besides the Infinite or Unite. All entire Numbers are as true Relations as Fractions themselves, or as Numbers compared with, or divided by others; though we do not consider this, because entire Numbers may be express'd by one Arithmetical Figure. So 4, for Instance, or $\frac{4}{1}$, is as true a Relation as $\frac{4}{4}$, or $\frac{4}{8}$, though the Unite to which 4 relates, be not expressed, but understood; 4 being equal to $\frac{4}{1}$, or $\frac{1}{2}$, and therefore every Relation being a Magnitude, it is plain that we can represent all Magnitudes by Cyphers, Signs to the Imagination.

So that all Truths being but Relations, to know all Truths exactly, both simple compounded, it is sufficient to have an exact Knowledge of all sorts of Relations, simple and compound: We have already observed, that there are two, (*viz.*) Relations of Equality, and Inequality. It is plain, that those of Equality are alike, and that as soon as we know that a thing is equal to another that is known, we have an accurate Knowledge of its Relation. But it goes not so with Inequality; for because we know that a Tower is higher than a Fathom, and lower than a thousand, it follows not that we have a true Idea of its Height, or of its Relation with a Fathom.

To compare things together, or rather critically to measure the Relations of Inequality, there is required a very exact Measure; a simple and very intelligible Idea, an universal Measure, which may be adapted to all sorts of Subjects. That Measure is Unity, which serves to all things, and without which 'tis impossible to have an accurate Knowledge of any. But all Numbers being made up of Unites, 'tis evident that without the Idea's of Numbers, and a Method for comparing and measuring those Idea's, that is without *Arithmetick*, 'tis not possible to make any progress in the Knowledge of compound Truths.

And as Idea's, and the Relations betwixt Idea's; in short, all sorts of Magnitudes can be greater or less than others; so they cannot be made equal; but by more or less Units join'd, or repeated as often as 'tis necessary: so that it is only by the Addition and Substraction of Unity, or of the parts of the Unity (when 'tis conceived as divided) that we exactly measure all sorts of Magnitudes, and discover all sorts of Truths. Now *Arithmetick* and *Algebra* are, of all Sciences, those that afford us most Skill and Light to effect those Operations, and to manage the Capacity of the Mind to the best Advantage, since they endue it with all the Perfection and Extent that it is capable of, and teach it to discover all the Truths that can be exactly known.

For ordinary *Geometry* does not so perfect the Mind, as the Imagination; and the Truths which that Science discovers, are not always so evident, as the Masters of it fansie. For Instance, They suppose they have express'd the Value of some Magnitudes, when they have proved them to be equal to some Lines, that are the subtendant of right Angles, whose sides are perfectly known; or to others, that are determined by some one of the Conick Sections. But their Mistake is visible, for those subtendant are unknown themselves. We know more exactly the $\surd 8$, or the $\surd 20$, than a Line imagined or described upon Paper, to be the subtendant of a right Angle, whose sides are 2, or one side of which is 2, and the other 4. At least we know, that the $\surd 4$, is very near 3, and that the $\surd 20$, is about $4\frac{1}{2}$, and there are Rules to come infinitely nearer and nearer the true Magnitude; and if we cannot attain to it, 'tis because the Mind cannot comprehend infinite. Whereas we have but a very confused Idea of the Magnitude of subtendant Lines, and are even obliged to have recourse to the $\surd 8$, or the $\surd 20$, to express them. So that the Geometrical Constructions, that are used to represent the Value of unknown Quantities, are not so conducible to the Mind, to discover the Relations of Truths sought for, as to rule the Imagination; but as we are more inclined to imploy our Imagination, than our Mind; so Men of Learning have commonly more Esteem for *Geometry*, than for *Arithmetick*, and *Algebra*.

To understand perfectly, that *Arithmetick* and *Algebra* join'd together are a real Logick, or the Means to discover the Truth, and afford the Mind as much Extent as it can acquire, it is sufficient to make some Reflections upon the Rules of those Sciences.

We have observed, that all Truths are but Relations; that the most simple and best known of all is that of Equality, that it is the initial Relation, from whence we must begin to measure others, whereby to have an exact Idea of Inequality: that the Measure of Inequality is the Unite, which must be repeated or substracted, as often as the Excess, or Defect of unequal Magnitudes require it.

Thence it is plain, that all the Operations, that may be subservient to discover the Relations of Equality, are only Additions, and Substractions; Additions of Magnitudes, to make Magnitudes even; Additions of Relations, to make equal Relations, or to put Magnitudes in Proportion with each other; and lastly, Additions of the Relations of Relations, to put Magnitudes in a compound Proportion.

To equal 4 to 2, we need only add 2 to 2, or substract 2 from 4; or lastly, to add the Unite to 2, and substract it from 4; that's plain.

To

To even the Relation or Reason of 8 to 2, to that of 6 to 3, we must not add 3 to 2, or substract 3 from 8, so that the Excess of one Number ever should be equal to 3, which is the Excess of 6 above 3; that would only be an Addition, and evening of simple Magnitudes; but we must consider which is the Magnitude of the Reason of 8 to 2, or what is the Value of $\frac{8}{2}$, and we shall find that dividing 8 by 2, the Quotient of that Reason will be 4, or that $\frac{8}{2}$ is equal to 4. We must likewise see, which is the Magnitude of the Relation of 6 to 3, and finding it equal to 2, we shall discover that those two Reasons $\frac{8}{2}$, equal to 4, and $\frac{6}{3}$ equal to 2, differ only by 2. So to make them even, we may either add $\frac{8}{3}$ to $\frac{6}{3}$, equal to 2, which will make $\frac{12}{3}$, that is a Relation equal to $\frac{8}{2}$; or substract $\frac{6}{3}$ equal to 2, from $\frac{8}{2}$, which will make $\frac{4}{3}$, that is a Reason equal to $\frac{6}{3}$: or lastly, adding the Unite to $\frac{6}{3}$, and substracting it from $\frac{8}{2}$, we shall have $\frac{7}{3}$, and $\frac{7}{3}$, which are equal Relations; for 9 is to 3, as 6 to 2.

Lastly, To find out the Greatness of Inequality, proceeding, one from a compounded Reason, or from the Relation of a Relation of 12 to 3, and 3 to 1; and the other from a compounded Reason, or from the Relation of a Relation, as of 8 to 2, and 2 to 1, we must follow the same Method. First, The Magnitude of the Reason of 12 to 3, is marked by 4; 4 being the Quotient of the Reason of 12 to 3, and 3 the Quotient of that of 3 to 1, the Quotient of Reason of the Quotients 4 and 3, is $\frac{4}{3}$. Secondly The Quotient of 8 to 2, is 4; and that of 2 to 1, is 2; and the Quotient of the Quotients 4 and 2, is 2. So that the Inequality betwixt the Relations, that here result from the Relations of the Relations, is the Difference betwixt $\frac{4}{3}$ and 2, that is to say, $\frac{2}{3}$. And therefore add $\frac{2}{3}$, to the Relation of the Reasons of 12 to 3, and 3 to 1; or substract them from the Relations of the other Reasons, 8 to 2, and 2 to 1, and you'll make even those Relations of Relations, and produce a *compounded Proportion*. Thus we may use Additions, and Substractions to equal Magnitudes, and their Relations both simple and compounded; and likewise to frame an accurate Idea of the Greatness of their Inequality.

True it is that we use also Multiplications and Divisions, both simple and compounded; but they are only compound Additions and Substractions. To multiply 4 by 3, is to make as many Additions of 4, as 3 contains Unites, or to find a Number that has the same Relation to 4, as 3 with the Unite. To divide 12 by 4, is to substract 4 from 12 as often as possible; that is, to find a Relation to the Unite, that may be equal to that of 12 to 4: for 3, which is the Quotient, has the same Relation to 1, as 12 has to 4. The Extractions of the Square, Cubick, and other Roots, are but Divisions, to find out one, two, or three *mean proportional* Magnitudes.

'Tis evident, that the Mind of Man is so narrow, his Memory so unfaithful, and his Imagination so shallow; that, without the Use of Figures, and Writing, and the Skill of Arithmetick, it would be impossible to make the necessary Operations, to know the Inequality of Magnitudes, and their Relations, especially where many Numbers must be added, or substracted; or, which is the same thing, when those Numbers are very great, and can be added but by Parts: for some of them would still be forgotten; there being no Imagination so extended, as to add together very great Fractions, as $\frac{4723}{1203}$, $\frac{12411}{1724012}$, or to substract one from the other.

Multiplication, Division, and the Extraction of Roots in entire Numbers, are infinitely more puzling than simple Additions, or Substractions. The Mind alone, without the help of Arithmetick, is too shallow and weak to make such Operations; and it would be to no purpose to insist upon the Proofs of it.

Notwithstanding *Analyticks*, or *Algebra*, is still more excellent than *Arithmetick*; because it less divides the Capacity of the Mind, and abridges the Idea's in a most simple and easie manner imaginable. What may be done in a long time by *Arithmetick*, is performed in a moment by *Algebra*, without puzling the Mind by the Change of Cyphers, and the Tediousness of Operations. And lastly, there are knowable things, and necessary to be known, of which *Arithmetick* alone cannot afford the Knowledge; but I believe not that there is any thing useful, and which may be certainly and exactly known, but it may be found out by an *Arithmetical* and *Algebraical* Method. So that those two Sciences are the Foundation of all others, and help us to the true Means to acquire all those that are accurate, because the Capacity of the Mind cannot be better managed than it is by *Arithmetick*, and especially by *Algebra*.

THE

THE SECOND PART OF THE SIXTH BOOK,

Concerning METHOD.

CHAP. I.

Of the Rules that are to be observed in the Search after Truth.

HAving explain'd the means how to improve the Attention and Extenſion of the Mind, by which it may acquire a greater perfection, or become more enlightned, ſagacious and piercing; It is time to ſet down thoſe Rules whoſe Obſervation is abſolutely requiſite to reſolve any Queſtion whatſoever. I ſhall inſiſt long upon it, and endeavour to explain them by ſeveral Inſtances; that their neceſſity may be better known, and the Mind accuſtomed to make uſe of them; it being not ſo difficult to know them theoretically, as to put them in Practice.

Let none expect here very extraordinary, ſurprizing and taking things: For on the contrary, that thoſe Rules may be good, they muſt be very ſimple, natural and few, very plain and intelligible, and depending on each other. In ſhort ſuch as may lead our Mind, and rule our Attention, without diſtracting either: For Experience ſhows that the Logick of *Ariſtotle* is of no great uſe, becauſe it takes up the Mind too much, and diſturbs the Attention it ought to give to the Subjects of its Enquiry: Let then thoſe Lovers of Myſteries and rare Inventions lay aſide for a while that capricious humour, and conſider, as attentively as they can, whether the Rules we ſhall preſcribe are ſufficient to preſerve Evidence in the Perceptions of the Mind, and to diſcover the moſt hidden Truths. Unleſs they ſuffer themſelves to be unjuſtly prejudiced againſt thoſe Rules, by the ſimplicity and eaſineſs of the ſame; I hope that the great uſe which may be made of them, as we ſhall ſhow hereafter, will convince them, that the moſt clear and ſimple Principles are the moſt pregnant and fecund, and that rare and difficult things are not always ſo uſeful as our fruitleſs curioſity endeavours to perſwade us.

The Principle of all thoſe Rules is, *that we muſt always preſerve Evidence in our Reaſonings, to diſcover Truth without Fear, and danger of being miſtaken.* From that Principle follows this general Rule, that reſpects the ſubject of our ſtudies: *We ought only to Reaſon upon ſuch things whereof we have clear and diſtinct Ideas*; and by a neceſſary conſequence, *we muſt ſtill begin with the moſt ſimple and eaſy ſubjects, and inſiſt long upon them, before we undertake the enquiry into ſuch as are more compoſed and difficult.*

The Rules that concern the Method to be taken in reſolving Queſtions depend likewiſe on the ſame Principle; the firſt is, *that we muſt very diſtinctly conceive the State of the Queſtion propoſed to be reſolv'd*: that is, have Ideas of the Terms ſo diſtinct, as that we may compare them together, and diſcover the Relations which we look for.

When thoſe Relations cannot be found out by an immediate compariſon of their Ideas, then the ſecond Rule is, *that we muſt try by an eſſay of thought to diſcover one, or ſeveral intermediate Ideas, that may be a means or common meaſure to know the Relations that are betwixt thoſe things:* A ſpecial care is to be taken that thoſe Ideas be the more clear and diſtinct, as the Relations we indeavour to diſcover are more nicely exact and numerous.

When the Queſtions are very difficult, and require a long Examination, the third Rule is, *that we muſt carefully take off from the ſubject to be conſider'd all things whoſe Examination is not needful to the diſcovery of the Truth we are in queſt of.* For the Capacity of the Mind muſt not be vainly ſhar'd and divided, but its ſtrength muſt only be employed in ſuch things as may enlighten it; ſo that all thoſe things which are to be laid aſide, are ſuch as concern not the Queſtion, and which when taken off, leave it whole and entire.

When the Queſtion is thus brought within the leaſt compaſs, the fourth Rule is, *to divide the ſubject of our meditation into Parts, and conſider them one after the other in a natural order; beginning with the moſt ſimple, or thoſe that contain the leaſt number of Relations, and never medling with the more compoſed, before the moſt ſimple are diſtinctly known, and become familiar.*

When they are become familiar by Meditation, the fifth Rule is, *to abridge Ideas and diſpoſe them in the Imagination, or write them upon Paper, that they may no longer clogg and fill up the Capacity of the Mind.* Though that Rule be always uſeful, yet 'tis not of abſolute neceſſity; unleſs it be in very intricate Queſtions, that require a great extent of Mind, (for the Mind is only enlarg'd by the abridgment of Ideas) but the uſe of that Rule and the following, is beſt known by Algebra.

The Ideas of all the things that neceſſarily require Examination, being clear, familiar, abridg'd, and diſpoſed and rang'd in good order in the Imagination, or written upon Paper, the ſixth Rule is, *to compare them all by the Rules of Complications, one with the other alternately, either by the View of the Mind alone, or by the Motion of the Imagination, attended with the View of the Mind, or by the Calculation of the Pen joined to the attention of the Mind and Imagination.*

If amongſt all the Relations that reſult from thoſe Compariſons, you find not that which you enquire after, then *take off again all the Relations that are not ſubſervient to reſolve the Queſtion, make the others familiar, abridge them, poſture and diſpoſe them in the Imagination, or write them upon Paper, compare them together by the Rules of Complications, and then ſee whether the compoſed Relation that is look'd for is one of the compoſed Relations that reſult from thoſe new Compariſons.*

If none of thoſe new Relations contain the ſolution of the Queſtion, *then take off again thoſe that are uſeleſs, make the other familiar*, &c. [That is, do the ſame over and over, and] continuing thus, you ſhall diſcover the Truth or Relation you enquire after, how compoſed ſoever it may be; provided you may extend the Capacity of your Mind to it, by abridging your Ideas, and ſtill having before your Eyes the ſcope you aim at. For 'tis the continual and ſteady view of the Queſtion which muſt regulate all the advances of the Mind. Since we ſhould always know whither we are going.

We muſt above all take care not to ſatisfy our ſelves with ſome glimpſe or likelyhood; but begin anew ſo often the Compariſons that are conducible to diſcover the Truths enquired after, as that we may not withhold our Aſſent to it, without feeling the ſecret laſhes and reproofs of our internal Maſter that Anſwers our Queſtions, that is, the Application of our Mind, and the deſires of our Heart. Then will that Truth ſerve as an infallible Principle, to proceed in the Acquiſition of Sciences.

All the Rules we have given are not neceſſary in all ſorts of Queſtions: for the firſt Rule is ſufficient in thoſe that are eaſy: and we need but in ſome others the firſt and ſecond. In ſhort, ſince we muſt make uſe of thoſe Rules, 'till we have diſcover'd the Truth we ſeek for; It follows, that the more difficult the Queſtions are, the greater muſt the number of thoſe Rules be which we muſt put in practice.

Thoſe Rules are not very numerous, but very natural, as depending upon each other, and may be made ſo familiar as to fall of themſelves into the Mind, as often as ſhall be requiſite. In ſhort, they can rule the Attention of the Mind without diverting it; which is in great part what we could deſire; but they look ſo inconſiderable in themſelves, that to make them more recommendable, it is neceſſary to ſhow that the Philoſophers are fallen into a great many Errours, and Extravagances, by not obſerving ſo much as the two firſt, which are the chief and eaſieſt of all; whereas *des Cartes*, by their uſe, has diſcover'd all thoſe great and fruitful Truths, which are to be learn'd in his Works.

CHAP. II.

Of the general Rule that concerns the ſubject of our Studies: that School-Philoſophers obſerve it not, which is the Cauſe of ſeveral Errors in their Phyſicks.

THE firſt of theſe Rules, and which reſpects the ſubject of our Studies, teaches that we muſt not argue except from clear Ideas; whence it follows, that to ſtudy Methodically, we muſt begin with things moſt ſimple and eaſy to be underſtood, and inſiſt long upon them before we undertake to enquire after the more compoſed and difficult.

Every one will eaſily give his aſſent about the neceſſity of that general Rule; plainly ſeeing, that he walks in the dark, who reaſons upon obſcure Ideas, and uncertain Principles. But 'twill be matter of ſurprize to hear us affirm, that it is hardly ever obſerved, and that the greateſt

greateſt part of thoſe Sciences, which ſtill at this day ſuſh the Pride of ſome falſe Pretenders to Science, are only grounded upon ſuch Ideas, as are either too confuſed, or too general, to be conducible to the finding out of Truth.

Ariſtotle, who ſo juſtly deſerves the Quality of *Prince* of ſuch *Philoſophers*, reaſons very ſeldom upon other Idea's, than ſuch as are confuſed and ſenſible, and upon others that are general, undetermin'd and repreſenting nothing particular to the Mind. For the ordinary Expreſſions of that Philoſopher are ſo perplexed, as to repreſent only to the Senſes and Imagination, the confuſed Sentiments we have of ſenſible things; or to make his Diſciples ſpeak in ſuch a rambling and indeterminate manner, as not to underſtand themſelves. Moſt of his Works, but eſpecially his 8. *Books of Phyſicks*, on which are as many different Commentators, as there are Profeſſours of Philoſophy, are a meer logical Tattle; where he talks much, and ſays nothing. Not that his Stile is too copious and diffuſed, but becauſe he has a particular Talent at being ſuccinct, and ſaying nothing but Words. In his other Works he makes not ſuch frequent uſe of his looſe and general Terms; But thoſe he employs raiſe only the confuſed Idea's of the Senſes: by which Idea's he pretends, in his *Problemes*, and elſewhere, to reſolve in two words an infinite Number of Queſtions, of which it may be demonſtrated that they are altogether inſoluble.

But that my meaning may be better underſtood, what I have proved in other places muſt here be remembred, *viz.* That all the Terms that excite nothing but ſenſible Ideas are equivocal, nay, and what's to be well obſerv'd, Equivocal from Error and Ignorance, which muſt needs cauſe an Infinite number of deluſions.

The word *Ram* is Equivocal, ſignifying an Animal that ruminates, and a Conſtellation into which the Sun enters at Spring; but that ſeldom cauſes any Miſtake. For he muſt be an Aſtrologer with a Witneſs, who ſhould imagine any Relation betwixt thoſe two things; and believe for Inſtance, that we are ſubject at that time to vomit up the Medicines that we take, becauſe the Ram is a ruminating Beaſt. But as to the Terms of ſenſible Ideas, but few acknowledge them for Equivocal. *Ariſtotle* and the *Ancient Philoſophers* did not ſo much as dream on't; which will be agreed to by any one that has read any of their Books, and diſtinctly knows the Cauſe why thoſe words are lyable to Equivocation. For nothing is more Evident than that the Philoſophers Opinion, as to that matter, was quite contrary to the Truth.

For Inſtance, when they ſay that Fire is hot, Graſs green, Sugar ſweet, they underſtand juſt as Children, and the vulgar of Men, that Fire contains in it what they feel when they warm themſelves; that Graſs has painted upon it the Colours they ſee; that Sugar is endued with tha ſweetneſs they taſte when they eat it, and ſo as to all other viſible and ſenſible Qualities, which cannot be denied by thoſe that have read their Writings. They talk of ſenſible qualities as of Senſations; they take heat for Motion. And thus they confound the Modes of Exiſtence peculiar to Bodies, with the Modifications of the Soul.

'Tis no longer ſince than *des Cartes*'s time, that to thoſe confuſed and indeterminate Queſtions, whether Fire is hot, Graſs green, and Sugar ſweet, *&c.* We uſe to Anſwer by diſtinguiſhing the Equivocation of ſenſible Terms. If by Heat, Colour, and Savour, you underſtand ſuch and ſuch diſpoſitions of Parts, or Motion of inſenſible Particles, then Fire is hot, Graſs green, and Sugar ſweet. But if by heat and other Qualities, you underſtand what I feel by Fire, what I ſee in Graſs, *&c.* Fire is not hot, nor Graſs green, *&c.* For the heat I feel and the Colours I ſee are only in the Soul, as has been proved in the Firſt Book. But as Men commonly ſuppoſe that what they feel is the ſame with that which is in the Object, ſo they believe they are in the right, when they judge of the Qualities of Objects by their own Senſations; And thus they hardly ſay two words without ſpeaking a Falſhood, and never ſay any thing upon that Matter, but what is obſcure and confuſed; and that for the ſeveral following Reaſons.

Firſt, becauſe all Men have not the ſame Senſations of the ſame Objects, nor even the ſame Man in different times, or when different Parts of his Body are affected by them. What is ſweet to one is bitter to another, what is hot to one is cold to another; what ſeems hot to a Man when he is cold, feels cold to himſelf when he is hot, or when other parts of his Body are affected. Water that feels warm to the hands, will ſeem cold, if we waſh with it any part near the heart. Salt that is ſavoury to the Tongue is pricking and ſmarting to a Wound; Sugar is ſweet, and Aloes very bitter to the Tongue, but nothing is either ſweet or bitter to the other Senſes; ſo that when we ſay a thing is cold, ſweet, bitter, *&c.* that ſame has no certain ſignification.

Secondly, Becauſe different Objects can cauſe the ſame Senſation, Plaiſter, Bread, Snow, Sugar, Salt, *&c.* are of the ſame Colour; And yet their whiteneſs is different, if we judge of 'em otherwiſe than by the Senſes; and therefore when we ſay that Meal is white, we ſay not any thing diſtinctly ſignificative.

The third Reaſon is, becauſe ſuch Qualities of Bodies, as occaſion Senſations altogether different, are however almoſt the ſame; whereas ſuch, as excite very near the ſame Senſation, are often very different. The Qualities of Sweetneſs and Bitterneſs differ but little in Objects; whereas the Senſe of Sweet eſſentially differs from that of Bitter. The Motions that cauſe Smart and Tickling differ but in more or leſs, and yet the Senſations of Tickling

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and Smart are eſſentially different: on the contrary, The Sharpneſs of Fruit differs not ſo much from Bitterneſs as Sweetneſs does; however that ſharp Quality is the fartheſt from Bitterneſs that poſſibly can be; for a Fruit, that is ſharp for being unripe, muſt undergo a great many Changes, before it grows bitter from Rottenneſs, or too much Ripeneſs. When Fruits are ripe they taſte ſweet, and bitter when over-ripe; Bitterneſs and Sweetneſs therefore in Fruits differ but in degree of more and leſs; which may be the Reaſon why they ſeem ſweet to ſome Perſons, whilſt they taſte bitter to others; nay, there are thoſe to whom Aloës ſeem as ſweet as Hony. The ſame may be ſaid of all ſenſible Idea's; ſo that the Words ſweet, bitter, ſalt, ſowre, acid, *&c.* red, green, yellow, *&c.* of ſuch and ſuch a Smell, Savour, Colour, *&c.* are all equivocal, and raiſe no clear and diſtinct Idea in the Mind. However School-Philoſophers, and the Vulgar Part of Men, judge of all the ſenſible Qualities of Bodies, by the Senſations they receive from them.

Nor do the Philoſophers only judge of theſe ſenſible Qualities by their own Senſations of them, but alſo judge of the things themſelves, from the Judgments they have paſs'd about ſenſible Qualities: For from their having had Senſations of certain Qualities, altogether different, they judge that there is a Generation of new Forms, producing thoſe phantaſtick Differences. Wheat appears yellow, hard, *&c.* Meal white, ſoft, *&c.* thence upon the Teſtimony of their Eyes and Hands, they infer, That thoſe Bodies are eſſentially different, unleſs they chance to think on the Manner of the Tranſmutation of Wheat into Flower: For Meal is nothing but bruiſed and ground Corn; as Fire is only divided and agitated Wood, as Aſhes are but the groſſeſt parts of the divided Wood without Agitation; as Glaſs is but Aſhes, whoſe Particles have been poliſhed and rounded, by the Attrition caus'd by the Fire; and ſo in other Tranſmutations of Bodies.

'Tis therefore evident, that ſenſible Words and Idea's are altogether unſerviceable to a juſt ſtating, and clear reſolving of *Queſtions*, or to the Diſcovery of Truth. Yet there are no *Queſtions*, how intricate ſoever they may be, by the equivocal Terms of Senſes, but *Ariſtotle*, and moſt part of other Philoſophers, pretend to reſolve them in their Books, without the foregoing Diſtinctions, and without conſidering that they are equivocal by Errour and Ignorance.

So when thoſe Perſons, who employed the beſt part of their Life in reading Ancient Philoſophers, and Phyſicians, and have wholly imbib'd their Spirit and Opinions; are asked whether Water be wet, whether Fire be dry, Wine hot, the Blood of Fiſhes cold, Water rawer than Wine, Gold perfecter than Mercury; whether Plants and Beaſts have Souls; and a thouſand like undetermin'd *Queſtions*; they raſhly anſwer, by conſulting only the Impreſſions of Objects upon their Senſes, or the Tracks the reading of Authors has left upon their Memory. They never think thoſe Terms are equivocal; 'tis a Wonder to them they ſhould need a Definition; and they cannot endure thoſe that endeavour to let 'em underſtand, that their Procedure is too quick, and that they are ſeduced by their Senſes; and though they are never at a loſs for Diſtinctions, to perplex the moſt evident things; yet in theſe *Queſtions*, in which Equivocation needs ſo much to be removed, they find nothing to diſtinguiſh.

If we conſider, that moſt of the *Queſtions* of Philoſophers, and Phyſicians, contain ſome equivocal Terms, like to thoſe that have been ſpoken of; we ſhall not doubt, but that thoſe Learned Gentlemen, that could not define them, were unable to ſay any thing, ſolid and real, in the bulky Volumes they have compos'd: which is in a manner ſufficient to overthrow moſt of the Opinions of the Ancients. It is not ſo with *des Cartes*, he perfectly knew how to diſtinguiſh thoſe things; He ne'er reſolves any *Queſtion* by ſenſible Idea's; and whoever ſhall be at the pains to read him, ſhall ſee, that he clearly, evidently, and almoſt ever demonſtratively, explains the chief Operations of Nature, by the ſole and diſtinct Idea's of Extenſion, Figures, and Motion.

The ſecond ſort of equivocal Words, that is much in requeſt amongſt Philoſophers, contains all thoſe general Terms of Logick; by which any thing may be eaſily explain'd, without ſo much as knowing it. *Ariſtotle* was the Man that made the moſt of it, his Books are full of nothing elſe, and ſome are but a meer Logick. He propoſes and reſolves all things by the ſpecious Words of *Genus*, *Species*, *Act*, *Power*, *Nature*, *Form*, *Faculty*, *Quality*, *Cauſa per ſe*, *Cauſa per Accidens*; his Followers can hardly underſtand, that thoſe Words ſignifie *Nothing*, and that one is not more learned than he was, when he has heard that Fire diſſolves Metals by its diſſolving Faculty; that a Man digeſts not becauſe his Stomach is weak, or becauſe his *Concoctive Faculty* does not operate as it ſhould do.

I grant, that thoſe who uſe ſuch general Terms and Idea's for the Explication of all things, commonly fall not into ſo many Errours, as thoſe that only imploy ſuch Words as raiſe the confuſed Idea's of the Senſes. The School-Philoſophers are not ſo liable to be deceived as ſome opinionative and dogmatical Phyſicians, who build Syſtems upon Experiences, the Reaſons of which are unknown to them; becauſe the School-Men talk ſo generally, that they do not venture much out of their Depth.

Fire heats, dries, hardens, and ſoftens, becauſe it has the Faculty of producing thoſe Effects; *Sena* purges by its purgative Quality; Bread nouriſhes by its nutritious Quality. Theſe Propoſitions are not liable to miſtake; for a Quality is that which denominates a thing by

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ſuch a Name; Maſter *Ariſtotle*'s Definition is undeniable; but he ſpeaks true only becauſe he ſays nothing; and if his rambling, looſe and indefinite Notions engage not into Errour, at leaſt they are wholly unſerviceable to the Diſcovery of Truth.

For though we know, that there is in Fire a ſubſtantial Form, attended with a million of Faculties, like to that of heating, dilating, melting Gold, Silver, and other Metals, lightening, burning, roaſting; the Idea of that ſubſtantial Form with all its Faculties will not help me to reſolve this Queſtion, why Fire hardens Clay and ſoftens Wax, there being no Connexion betwixt the Ideas of hardneſs in Clay, and ſoftneſs in Wax, and thoſe of a ſubſtantial Form in Fire, and its Faculties of rarefaction, Fluidity, *&c.* The ſame may be ſaid of all general Ideas, which are as much inſufficient for reſolving any Queſtion.

But when I know that Fire is nothing elſe but divided Wood, whoſe Parts are in a continual Agitation, by which it raiſes in me the Senſation of Heat; and that the Softneſs of Clay conſiſts in a Mixture of Water and Earth; thoſe Idea's being not general and confuſed, but particular and diſtinct, it will not be difficult to perceive that the Heat of Fire muſt harden Clay, becauſe one Body can move another, if it meet with it, being it ſelf in Motion. We likewiſe eaſily perceive, that ſince the Heat we feel near the Fire, is cauſed by the inviſible Particles of Wood ſtriking againſt our Hands, Face, *&c.* If we expoſe Clay to the Heat of Fire, the Particles of Water, that are mixed with thoſe of Earth, being more thin and diſ-united, and conſequently more agitated by the Action and Impulſe of the fiery Corpuſcles, then the groſs Particles of Earth muſt be ſeparated and expelled, and the other remain dry and hard. We ſhall perceive with the ſame Evidence, that Fire muſt produce a quite contrary Effect upon Wax, if we know that it is compoſed of Particles that are branched and almoſt of the ſame Bulk. Thus may particular Idea's be ſubſervient to the Enquiry after Truth, whilſt looſe and undeterminate Notions are altogether unſerviceable; but inſenſibly engage us into Errour.

For theſe Philoſophers are not content to make uſe of thoſe general Terms, and uncertain Idea's; they moreover pretend that thoſe words ſignifie ſome particular Beings; they give out, that there is a Subſtance diſtinguiſhed from Matter, which is the Form of it; and withal an infinite Number of little Beings really diſtinguiſhed from that Matter and Form, of which they ſuppoſe as many as they have different Senſations of Bodies, or as thoſe Bodies are ſuppoſed to produce different Effects.

However 'tis viſible to any attentive Perſon, that thoſe Beings, for Inſtance, that are ſaid to be diſtinguiſhed from Fire; and ſuppos'd to be contained in it for the producing Heat, Light, Hardneſs, Fluidity, *&c.* are but the Contrivances of the Imagination, that rebels againſt Reaſon: ſince Reaſon has no particular Idea that repreſents thoſe little Beings. When the Philoſophers are asked what is the illuminating Faculty in Fire, they only anſwer, That 'tis a Being which is the Cauſe that Fire is capable of producing Light. So that their Idea of that illuminating Faculty differs not from the general Idea of Cauſe, and the confuſed Idea of the Effect they ſee; and therefore they have no clear Idea of what they ſay, when they admit thoſe particular Beings, and ſo ſay, what they not only underſtand not, but what's impoſſible to be underſtood.

CHAP. III.

Of the moſt dangerous Errour in the Philoſophy of the Ancients.

Philoſophers not only ſpeak without underſtanding themſelves, when they explain the Effects of Nature, by ſome Beings of which they have no particular Idea; but alſo eſtabliſh a Principle, whence very falſe and pernicious Conſequences may directly be drawn.

For ſuppoſing with them, that there are in Bodies certain Entities diſtinguiſhed from Matter, and having no diſtinct Idea of thoſe Entities, 'tis eaſie to imagine that they are the real or principal cauſes of the Effects we ſee. And this is the very Opinion of the vulgar Philoſophers. The prime reaſon of their ſuppoſing thoſe ſubſtantial Forms, real Qualities, and other ſuch like Entities is, to explain the Effects of Nature; But when we come attentively to conſider the Idea we have of *Cauſe* or *Power* of acting, we cannot doubt but that it repreſents ſomething divine; For the Idea of a Sovereign Power is the Idea of a Sovereign Divinity, and the Idea of a ſubordinate Power, the Idea of an inferiour Divinity, yet a true Divinity; at leaſt in the Opinion of the Heathens, ſuppoſing it to be the Idea of a True Power or Cauſe. And therefore we admit ſomething divine in the Bodies that ſurround us, when we acknowledge Forms, Faculties, Qualities, Virtues, and real Beings that are capable of producing ſome Effects by the force of their Nature, and thus inſenſibly approve of the Sentiments of the Heathens, by too great a Deference for their Philoſophy. Faith indeed corrects us, but it may perhaps be ſaid, that the Mind is a Pagan, whilſt the Heart is a Chriſtian.

Moreover it is a hard matter to perſwade our ſelves, that we ought neither to fear nor love true Powers and Beings, that can act upon us, puniſh us with ſome Pain, or reward us with ſome Pleaſure. And as love and fear are a true Adoration, it is hard again to imagine why they muſt not be ador'd. For what ever can act upon us as a true and real Cauſe, is neceſſarily above us, according to reaſon and St. *Auſtin*, and 'tis likewiſe an immutable Law, that inferiour Beings, upon the Authority of the ſame Perſon, and reaſon, ſhould be ſubſervient to ſuperiour. Whence that great Father concludes, that the Body cannot operate upon the Soul *, and that nothing can be above her but God only.

* *Ego enim ab anima hoc corpus animari non puto, niſi incentione faciunt: nec ab iſto quicquam illum pati arbitror, ſed fieri de illo, & in illo, tanquam ſubjecto divinitus dominationi ſuæ.* l. 6. Muſ. c. 5. See alſo *De quæſt. Anim.* c. 34.

The chief Reaſons that God Almighty uſes in the Holy Scriptures, to prove to the *Iſraelites*, that they ought to adore, or to love and fear him, are drawn from his Power to reward or puniſh them; repreſenting to them the Benefits they have received from him, the Puniſhments he has inflicted upon them, and his Power that is always the ſame. He forbids them to adore the Gods of the Heathens, as ſuch as have no power over them, and can do them neither harm nor good. He commands them to honour him alone, as the onely true Cauſe of Good and Evil, Reward and Puniſhment; none of which can befall a City, according to the Prophet, but what comes from him, by reaſon that natural Cauſes are not the true Cauſes of the hurt they ſeem to do us; and as it is God alone that acts in them, ſo 'tis He alone that muſt be fear'd and lov'd; *Soli Deo Honor & Gloria.*

Amos 3.6.

Laſtly, The Senſe of fearing and loving what may be the true Cauſe of Good and Evil, appears ſo natural and juſt, that it is not poſſible to caſt it off. So that in that falſe Suppoſition of the Philoſophers, which we are here endeavouring to deſtroy, that the ſurrounding Bodies are the true Cauſes of our Pain and Pleaſure; Reaſon ſeems to juſtifie a Religion like the Pagan Idolatry, and approve the univerſal Depravation of Morals.

Reaſon, I grant, teaches not to adore Onions and Leeks, for Inſtance, as the Sovereign Divinity, becauſe they can never make us altogether happy when we have them, or unhappy when we want them; neither did the Heathens worſhip them with an equal Homage as their great *Jupiter*, whom they fanſied to be the God of Gods, or as the Sun, whom our Senſes repreſent as the univerſal Cauſe, that gives Life and Motion to all things, and which we can hardly forbear to look on as the Sovereign Divinity, if we ſuppoſe, as the Pagan Philoſophers, that he comprehends in his Being, the true Cauſes of what he ſeems to produce, as well upon our Soul and Body, as upon all the Beings that ſurround us.

But if we muſt not pay a Sovereign Worſhip to Leeks and Onions, they deſerve, at leaſt, ſome particular Adoration; I mean they may be thought upon and loved in ſome manner; if it be true, that they can in ſome ſort make us happy, and may be honour'd proportionably to the good they do us. Surely Men that liſten to the Reports of Senſe, think Pulſe capable of doing them good; otherwiſe the *Iſraelites* would not have bewailed the loſs of them in the Wilderneſs, or look'd on themſelves as unhappy, for being deprived thereof, had they not fanſied to themſelves ſome great Happineſs in the Enjoyment of them. See what an Abyſs of Corruption Reaſon plunges us into, when it goes hand in hand with the Principles of Pagan Philoſophy, and follows the footſteps of the Senſes.

But that the Falſhood of that wretched Philoſophy, and the Certainty of our Principles, and Diſtinctneſs of our Idea's may not be longer doubted; it will be neceſſary plainly to eſtabliſh the Truths that contradict the Errours of the Ancient Philoſophers, or to prove in few words, that there is but one true Cauſe, ſince there is but one true God; that the Nature and Force of every thing is nothing but the Will of God; that all Natural things are not real, but only occaſional Cauſes; and ſome other Truths depending on them.

It is evident, that all Bodies, great and little, have no force to move themſelves: a Mountain, a Houſe, a Stone, a Grain of Sand, the minuteſt and bulkieſt Bodies imaginable, are alike as to that. We have but Two ſorts of Idea's, *viz.* of Spirits and Bodies; and as we ought not to ſpeak what we conceive not, ſo we muſt only argue from thoſe two Idea's. Since therefore our Idea of Bodies, convinces us that they cannot move themſelves, we muſt conclude that they are moved by Spirits. But conſidering our Idea of finite Spirits, we ſee no neceſſary Connexion betwixt their Will, and the Motion of any Body whatſoever, and rather perceive that there is not, or cannot be any. Whence we muſt infer, if we will follow Light and Reaſon, That as no Body can move it ſelf, ſo no Created Spirit can be the true and principal Cauſe of its Motion.

But when we think on the Idea of God, or of a being infinitely perfect, and conſequently Almighty, we are aware that there is ſuch a Connexion betwixt his Will and the Motion of all Bodies, that it is impoſſible to conceive, he ſhould will that a body be moved, and it ſhould not be moved. And therefore if we would ſpeak according to our Conceptions, and not according to our Senſations, we muſt ſay that nothing but his Will can move Bodies. The moving force of Bodies is not then in themſelves, this force being only the Will of God: Bodies have no proper Action, and when a moving Ball meets with another, and moves it, the former communicates nothing of its own to the latter, as not having in it ſelf the Impreſ-

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ſion it communicates, though the former be the Natural Cauſe of the latter's Motion; and therefore a natural Cauſe is not a true and real Cauſe, but only an occaſional; which in ſuch or ſuch a Caſe determines the Author of Nature to act in ſuch or ſuch a manner.

'Tis certain that all things are produced by the Motion of viſible or inviſible Bodies; for Experience teaches us, that thoſe Bodies, whoſe parts are in greater Motion, are always the moſt active, and thoſe that Cauſe the greateſt Alterations in the World: ſo that all the Forces of Nature are but the Will of God, who Created the World, becauſe he will'd it, *who ſpake and it was done* *; who moves all things, and produces all the Effects we ſee; becauſe he has eſtabliſhed ſome Laws, by which Bodies Communicate their Motion to each other when they meet together; and becauſe thoſe Laws are efficacious, they and not the Bodies act. There is then no Force, Power, nor true Cauſe in all the Material and ſenſible World. There need no Form, Faculties, nor real qualities to produce Effects, which the Bodies bring not forth, or to divide with God his own Eſſential Force and Power. * Pſal. 33. 9.

As Bodies cannot be the true Cauſes of any thing; ſo likewiſe the moſt Noble Spirits are ſubject to the ſame impotency on that reſpect: They cannot *know* any thing, unleſs God enlightens them, nor have the *Senſation* of any unleſs he modifies them, nor *will* unleſs he moves them towards himſelf: They may indeed determine the Impreſſion God has given them to himſelf, towards other Objects; but I doubt whether it can be call'd a Power. For if to be able to Sin is a Power, it is ſuch a one, as the Almighty wants, ſaith St. *Auſtin* ſomewhere. If Men had of themſelves the Power of loving Good, it might be ſaid that they have ſome Power; but they cannot ſo much as love but becauſe God Wills it, and that his Will is Efficacious. They love, becauſe God continually drives them towards Good in general, that is, towards himſelf, for whom alone they are Created and preſerved. God moves them, and they follow that Impreſſion by a free Choice, according to the Law of God, or determine it towards falſe and ſeeming Goods, according to the Law of the Fleſh; yet they cannot determine it but by the ſight of Good. For being able to do nothing without an Impreſſion from above, they are incapable of loving any thing but Good.

But though it ſhould be ſuppoſed, which is true in one ſence, that Spirits have in themſelves the Power of knowing Truths, and loving Good; ſhould their thoughts and will produce nothing outwardly, it might ſtill be ſaid, that they were impotent and unoperative. Now it ſeems undeniable, that the Will of Spirits is not able to move the ſmalleſt Body in the World; it being evident there is no neceſſary Connexion betwixt the Will we may have of moving our Arm, for Inſtance, and the Motion of the ſame Arm. It moves indeed whenever he wills it, and we may be call'd in that ſenſe the Natural Cauſe of the Motion of our Arm; yet natural Cauſes are not true but only occaſional, as acting by the meer force and efficacy of the Will of God, as we have already explain'd.

But how is it poſſible for us to move our Arm? To perform this 'tis required we ſhould have Animal Spirits, and ſend them through certain Nerves towards certain Muſcles, to ſwell up and contract them, for ſo that Motion is perform'd, as ſome pretend, though others deny it, and aſſert that the Myſtery is not yet diſcover'd. However it be, moſt Men know not ſo much as that they have Spirits, Nerves, and Muſcles, and yet move their Arms with as much and more dexterity than the moſt skilful Anatomiſts. Men therefore Will the moving their Arm, but 'tis God that is able and knows how to do it. If a Man cannot overthrow a Tower, yet he knows what muſt be done to effect it: but not one amongſt them knows what the vital Spirits muſt do to move one of his Fingers. How ſhould they then move the whole Arm, of themſelves? Theſe things appear very evident to me, and I ſuppoſe to all thinking Perſons; though they may be incomprehenſible to others, ſuch as are only us'd to the confus'd voice of the Senſes.

But Men are ſo far from being the true Cauſes of the Motions of their Body, that it ſeems to imply a Contradiction they ſhould be ſo. For a true Cauſe is that betwixt which and its Effect, the Mind perceives a neceſſary Connexion. For ſo I underſtand it. But there is none beſides the moſt perfect Being, betwixt whoſe Will and the Effects the Mind can perceive a neceſſary Connection, and therefore none but God is the true Cauſe, or has a real Power of moving Bodies. Nay it ſeems unconceivable, that God ſhould Communicate this Power, either to Angels or Men; And thoſe that pretend that the Power we have of moving our Arm is a true Power, muſt by Conſequence grant that God can give Spirits the power of creating, annihilating, and doing all poſſible things. In ſhort that he can make them Almighty, as I am going to prove.

God needs not neceſſary Inſtruments to act, 'tis enough he ſhould Will the Exiſtence of a thing, in order to its Exiſting: becauſe it is contradictory that he ſhould Will a thing, and his Will ſhould not be fulfilled. And therefore his Power is his Will, and to communicate his Power is to communicate his Will; ſo that to Communicate his Will to a Man or an Angel, can ſignifie nothing elſe, but to Will that whenever that Man or Angel ſhall deſire that ſuch or ſuch a Body be moved, it may actually be moved. In which Caſe I ſee two Wills concurring together, that of God, and that of the Angel, and to know which of them is the true Cauſe of the Motion of that Body, I enquire which is the Efficacious. I ſee a neceſſary Connexion betwixt the Will of God and the thing willed; in this Caſe God wills that whenever the

the Angel ſhall deſire that ſuch a Body be moved, it be really ſo. There is then a neceſſary Connexion betwixt the Will of God, and the Motion of that Body, and conſequently God is the true Cauſe of that Motion, and the Will of the Angel is only occaſional.

Again, to make it more evidently manifeſt, let us ſuppoſe God wills it ſhould happen quite contrary to the Deſire of ſome Spirits, as may be thought of the Devils, or ſome other wicked Spirits, in Puniſhment of their Sins. In that Caſe it cannot be ſaid God communicates his Power to them; ſince nothing happens of what they wiſh. However the Will of thoſe Spirits ſhall be the natural Cauſe of the produced Effects: as ſuch a Body ſhall be removed to the Right, becauſe they wiſh it were moved to the Left; and the Deſires of thoſe Spirits ſhall determine the Will of God to act, as the Will of moving the Parts of our Body, determine the firſt Cauſe to move them; and therefore the Deſires of all finite Spirits are but occaſional Cauſes.

If, after all theſe Reaſons, it be ſtill aſſerted, that the Will of an Angel moving a Body is a true, and not a bare occaſional Cauſe; 'tis evident, that the ſelf-ſame Angel might be the true Cauſe of the Creation, and Annihilation of all things, ſince God might as well communicate to him his Power of Creating, and annihilating Bodies, as that of moving them, if He ſhould will that they ſhould be created, and annihilated: in a word, if will'd that all things ſhould be performed according to the Angels Deſires, as he wills the Bodies be moved as the Angel pleaſes; if therefore it may be ſaid, that an Angel or Man are true Movers, becauſe God moves Bodies as they deſire; that Man or Angel may likewiſe be call'd true Creatours, ſince God may create Beings on occaſion of their Will: nay, perhaps it might be ſaid, that the vileſt of Animals, or even meer Matter, is the real Cauſe of the Creation of ſome Subſtance; if it be ſuppoſed with ſome Philoſophers, that God produces ſubſtantial Forms, whenever the Diſpoſition of Matter requires it. And laſtly, ſince God has reſolved from all Eternity, to create ſome certain things, at ſome certain times; thoſe Times might alſo be called the Cauſes of the Creation of ſuch Beings; with as much right as 'tis pretended, that a Ball meeting with another is the true Cauſe of the Motion that is communicated to it; becauſe God, by his general Will, that conſtitutes the Order of Nature, has decreed, that ſuch or ſuch Communication of Motions ſhould follow upon the Concourſe of two Bodies.

There is then but one true Cauſe, as there is one true God: Neither muſt we imagine, that what precedes an Effect does really produce it. God himſelf cannot communicate his Power to Creatures according to the Light of Reaſon; He cannot make them true Cauſes, and change them into Gods. But though he might do it, we conceive not why he ſhould will it. Bodies, Spirits, pure Intelligences, all can do nothing. 'Tis he who has made Spirits, that enlightens and moves them; 'tis he who has created Heaven and Earth, that regulates all their Motions: 'tis the Author of our Being that performs our Deſires; *Semel juſſit, ſemper paret*: He moves even our Arms, when we uſe them againſt his Orders; for he complains by his Prophets, That we make him ſubſervient to our unjuſt and criminal Deſires.

All thoſe Little Divinities of the Heathens; all thoſe particular Cauſes of Philoſophers, are *Chimera's*, which the wicked Spirit endeavours to ſet up, that he may deſtroy the Worſhip of the true God. The Philoſophy we have received from *Adam*, teaches us no ſuch things; but that which has been propagated by the Serpent; for, ever ſince the Fall, the Mind of Man is turned Heathen. That Philoſophy, joined to the Errours of the Senſes, has made Men pay their Worſhip to the Sun, and is ſtill the univerſal Cauſe of the Diſorders of their Mind, and the Corruption of their Heart. Why, ſay they, by their Actions, and ſometimes by their Words, ſhould we not love Bodies, ſince they are able to afford us Pleaſure? And why are the *Iſraelites* blam'd for lamenting the Loſs of the Garlick and Onions of *Egypt*, ſince the Privation of thoſe things, which enjoyed, afforded them ſome Happineſs, made them in ſome ſort unhappy? But the Philoſophy that is miſ-call'd New, and repreſented as a Bugbear to frighten weak Minds; that is deſpiſed and condemned without hearing: that New Philoſophy, I ſay, deſtroys all the Pretences of the Libertines, by the eſtabliſhing its very firſt Principle that perfectly agrees with the firſt Principle of the Chriſtian Religion *, namely, That we muſt love and fear none but God, ſince none but He alone can make us happy.

* *Hæc eſt Religio Chriſtiana, fratres mei, quæ prædicatur per univerſum mundum torrentibus inimicis, & ubi vincuntur murmurantibus, ubi prævalent ſævientibus; hæc eſt Religio Chriſtiana, ut* COLATUR UNUS DEUS, NON MULTI DII, QUIA NON FACIT ANIMAM BEATAM NISI UNUS DEUS, Aug. Tr. 23. in Joan.

As Religion declares that there is but one true God, ſo this Philoſophy ſhews that there is but one true Cauſe. As Religion teaches that all the Heathen Divinities are but dead Metals, and immoveable Stone; ſo this Philoſophy diſcovers, that all the ſecond Cauſes, or Divinities of the Philoſophers, are but unactive Matter, and ineffective Wills. As Religion commands not to bow to thoſe Gods that are not Gods, ſo this Philoſophy teaches, not to proſtrate our Minds and Imagination before the phantaſtick Grandeur and Power of pretended Cauſes, which are not Cauſes: which we ought neither to love, nor to fear, nor be taken up with; but think upon God alone, ſee and adore, love and fear him in all things.

But

But that's not the Inclination of ſome Philoſophers; they will neither ſee God, nor think upon him; for ever ſince the Fall there is a ſecret Oppoſition betwixt God and Man. They delight in gods of their own Invention; in loving and fearing the Contrivances of their Heart, as the Heathens did the Works of their Hands. They are like thoſe Children, who tremble at the ſight of their Play-Fellows, after they have dawb'd and blacken'd 'em. Or if they deſire a more noble Compariſon, though perhaps not ſo juſt, they reſemble thoſe famous *Romans*, who reverenced the Fictions of their Mind, and fooliſhly adored their Emperours, after they themſelves had let looſe the Eagle at their Canonization.

CHAP. IV.

An Explication of the Second Part of the general Rule. That the Philoſophers obſerve it not, but that des Cartes *has exactly followed it.*

WE have been ſhewing to what Errours Men are liable, when they reaſon upon the falſe and confuſed Idea's of the Senſes, and their rambling and undetermin'd Notions of Logick; whence it appears, that to keep to Evidence in our Perceptions, 'tis abſolutely requiſite exactly to obſerve that Rule we have preſcrib'd; and to examine which are the clear and diſtinct Idea's of things, that we may only argue by deduction from them.

In that ſame general Rule, concerning the Subject of our Studies, there is yet a remarkable Circumſtance; namely, That we muſt ſtill begin with the moſt ſimple and eaſie things, and inſiſt long upon them, before we undertake the Enquiry after the more compoſed and difficult. For if, to preſerve Evidence in all our Perceptions, we muſt only reaſon upon diſtinct Idea's, 'tis plain, that we muſt never meddle with the Enquiry of compound things, before the ſimple, on which they depend, have been carefully examin'd, and made familiar to us by a nice Scrutiny; ſince the Idea's of compound things, neither are, nor can be clear, as long as the moſt ſimple, of which they are compoſed, are but confuſedly, and imperfectly known.

We know things imperfectly, when we are not ſure to have conſidered all their Parts: and we know them confuſedly, when they are not familiar enough to the Mind, though we may be certain of having conſider'd all their Parts. When we know them but imperfectly, our Argumentations are only probable: when we perceive them confuſedly, there is neither Order, nor Light in our Inferences; and often we know not where we are, or whither we are going: but when we know them both imperfectly and confuſedly, which is the commoneſt of all, we know not ſo much as what we would look for, much leſs by what means we are to find it: So that it is altogether neceſſary to keep ſtrictly to that Order in our Studies, *Of ſtill beginning by the moſt ſimple things, examining all their Parts, and being well acquainted with them, before we meddle with the more compoſed, that depend on the former.*

But that Rule agrees not with the Inclination of Man, who naturally deſpiſes whatever appears eaſie: his Mind being made for an unlimited Object, and almoſt incomprehenſible, cannot make a long ſtay on the conſideration of thoſe ſimple Idea's, which want the Character of Infinite, for which he is created. On the contrary, and for the ſame Reaſon, he has much Veneration, and an eager Paſſion for great, obſcure, and myſterious things, as being ſuch as participate of Infinity. Not that he loves Darkneſs, but that he hopes to find in thoſe deep Receſſes a Good and Truth capable of ſatisfying his Deſires.

Vanity likewiſe gives a great Commotion to the Spirits, ſtirring them to what is great and extraordinary, and encouraging them with a fooliſh hope of hitting right. Experience teaches, that the moſt accurate Knowledge of ordinary things gives no great Name in the World; whereas to be acquainted with uncommon things, though never ſo confuſedly, and imperfectly, always procure the Eſteem and Reverence of thoſe who willingly conceive a great Idea of whatever is out of their depth of Underſtanding. And that Experience determines all thoſe who are more ſenſible, to Vanity than to Truth, (which certainly make up the greateſt Number) to a blind-fold Search of a ſpecious, though chimerical, Knowledge of what is great, rare, and unintelligible.

How many are there that reject the *Carteſian* Philoſophy, for that ridiculous Reaſon, That its Principles are too ſimple and eaſie: There are in this Philoſophy no obſcure and myſterious Terms: Women, and Perſons unskill'd in *Greek* and *Latine* are capable of learning it. It muſt then be, ſay they, ſomething very inconſiderable, and unworthy the Application of great Man. They imagine that Principles ſo clear, and ſimple are not fruitful enough to explain the Effects of Nature, which they ſuppoſed to be dark, intricate, and confuſed: They ſee not preſently the Uſe of thoſe Principles, that are too ſimple and eaſie to ſtop their Attention long enough to make them underſtand their Uſe and Extent. They rather chuſe to

explain Effects whoſe Cauſes are unknown to them, by unconceivable Principles, than by ſuch as are both ſimple, and intelligible. For the Principles theſe Philoſophers are wont to explain obſcure things by, are not only obſcure themſelves, but utterly incomprehenſible.

Thoſe that pretend to explain things extreamly intricate, by Principles clear, and generally receiv'd, may eaſily be refuted, if they ſucceed not; ſince to know whether what they ſay be true, one needs only comprehend well what they ſay: The falſly learn'd are not pleaſed with this, and obtain not the Admiration they purſue in uſing intelligible Principles: for as ſoon as one underſtands their Notions, he plainly perceives that they ſay nothing: but when they make uſe of unknown Principles, and ſpeak of very complex'd things, as though they exactly knew all their Relations; they are admired by their hearers, who underſtand not what they ſay; becauſe we are naturally inclin'd to Reverence, what ever goes above the reach of our underſtanding.

Now as obſcure and incomprehenſible things ſeem to hang better with each other, than with ſuch as are clear and intelligible; ſo incomprehenſible Principles are much more made uſe of in very difficult and abſtruſe Queſtions, than ſuch as are eaſy and intelligible. There is nothing ſo difficult but by the means of theſe Principles, Philoſophers and Phyſicians will ſolve it in few words; for their Principles being yet more incomprehenſible than any Queſtions that can be propoſed them, thoſe Principles being taken for granted, no difficulty can afterwards put them to a nonplus.

Thus for inſtance, they boldly and without bogling, make Anſwer to theſe dark and undetermin'd Queſtions, *viz.* Why the Sun attracts vapours, why the *Peruvian* Bark ſtops the Quartan Ague, why Rhubarb purges Choler, and the *Polychreſt* Salt Phlegm, and the like: Moſt Men ſeem pretty well ſatisfied with their Anſwers; becauſe obſcure and incomprehenſible things ſhake hands together. But unintelligible Principles ſuit not Queſtions that may be clearly and eaſily reſolv'd, becauſe by that ſolution it plainly appears that they are altogether inſignificant. The Philoſophers cannot explain by their Principles, how Horſes draw a Coach, why duſt ſtops a Watch? How the *Trepoly*-ſtone cleanſes Metals, and a Bruſh our Cloaths? For they would appear ridiculous to all the World, ſhould they ſuppoſe a Motion of Attraction, and Attractive Faculties to explain why the Coach follows the Horſes; and a *Deterſive* faculty in the Bruſh, for cleanſing of Cloaths, *&c.* So that their great Principles are only ſerviceable in dark and intricate Queſtions, by reaſon of their Incomprehenſibility.

We ought not therefore to inſiſt upon any Principle that appears not plain and evident, and of which it may be ſuppoſed that ſome Nations reject it. But we muſt attentively conſider the Ideas we have of Extenſion, Figure and Local Motion, and the Relations they have between them: If we conceive them diſtinctly, and find them ſo plain and clear, as to be perſwaded they were ever generally received by all Nations, we muſt dwell upon them, and examine all their Relations; but if they ſeem obſcure and dark to us, we muſt endeavour to find others. For if to avoid the fear of Miſtakes, and Errors, it is always requiſite to preſerve Evidence in our Perceptions, it follows that we muſt argue only from clear Ideas, and from Relations diſtinctly known.

To conſider in order the properties of Extenſion, we muſt as *des Cartes* did, begin with the moſt ſimple Relations, and thence proceed to the more compoſed; not only becauſe this Method is the moſt natural, and bears up the Mind in its Operations; but alſo becauſe God ever acting with Order, and by the moſt ſimple ways, that ſort of Examination of our Ideas and their Relations, will better manifeſt to us his Works. And if we conſider that the moſt ſimple Relations offer themſelves at firſt ſight to the Imagination, when 'tis not determin'd to think rather on one thing than another, it will appear, that to find out that Order, and to diſcover very compoſed Truths, it is ſufficient to look attentively, and without prejudice upon Objects, provided always we skip not too haſtily from one ſubject to another.

When we look attentively upon Matter, we eaſily conceive that one part may be ſeparated from another, that is to ſay, we eaſily conceive a local Motion, which Motion produces a Figure in either of the Bodies moved. The moſt ſimple of all Motions, which firſt occurs to the Mind, is a Motion in a right Line. Suppoſing then that ſome part of Matter is moved in a Right Line, it will neceſſarily diſplace ſome other Portion of Matter, it ſhall find in its way, which latter ſhall Circularly move to take the room which the former has left: And if we conceive infinite Motions in a right Line in an infinite number of ſimilar Parts of that immenſe Extenſion we conſider; it will again neceſſarily follow, that all theſe Bodies mutually hindering each other, ſhall all conſpire by their Reciprocal Action and Reaction, that is, by the Mutual Communication of all their particular Motions, to produce one that is Circular.

That firſt Conſideration of the moſt ſimple Relations of our Ideas, already diſcovers to us the neceſſity of the *Vortexes* of *des Cartes*, that their number will be ſo much greater, as the Motions in a right Line of all the Parts of the Extenſion, having been more contrary to each other, ſhall with more difficulty have been reduc'd to the ſame Motion, and that amongſt thoſe *Vortexes* the greateſt will be thoſe in which moſt parts ſhall have concurr'd together to the ſame Motion, or whoſe parts ſhall have had more ſtrength to continue their Motion in a right Line.

In

In the mean while care muſt be taken not to diſſipate nor weary our Mind by vainly applying it to the vaſt number and unmeaſurable greatneſs of thoſe *Vortexes*. We muſt rather inſiſt upon ſome one of them, for ſome time, and orderly and attentively enquire after all the Motions of the matter it contains, and all the Figures wherewith the parts of that matter may be endued.

As there is no ſimple Motion but that in a right Line, we muſt firſt conſider it as that in which all Bodies continually tend to move themſelves; ſince God always acts by the moſt ſimple ways: And if Bodies move Circularly, 'tis only becauſe meeting with conſtant Oppoſitions, they are perpetually turn'd from their direct Motion. So that all Bodies being not of an equal bulk, and the biggeſt having more ſtrength than others, continue their Motion in a right Line; we eaſily conceive that the ſmalleſt Bodies muſt ſink to the Center of the *Vortex*, and the biggeſt riſe towards the Circumference; ſince the Lines, which moving Bodies are ſuppos'd to deſcribe at the Circumference of a Circle, are nearer to a Right Line, than thoſe which they deſcribe towards the Center.

If we conceive again that every part of that matter could not at firſt move, and meet with a perpetual oppoſition to its Motion, without being ſmooth'd and rounded, and having its Angles broken off. We ſhall diſcover that all that Extenſion will be compoſed of two ſorts of Bodies, *viz.* of *round globules*, which perpetually turn upon their own Center, and, that in ſeveral different ways; and beſides that particular Motion are carried about by the Motion common to all the *Vortex*; and of a very *fluid and agitated matter*, produced from the Motion of the foreſaid Globules. Beſides the Circular Motion common to all the Parts of the *Vortex*, that ſubtle matter muſt yet have another particular, and almoſt direct, from the Circle of the *Vortex* to the Circumference, through the intervalls of the Globules, that leave a paſſage open; So that the Motion compoſed of thoſe Motions will repreſent a Spiral Line. That fluid matter called by *des Cartes the firſt Element*, being divided into parts, that are ſmaller, and have not ſo much ſtrength to continue their direct Motion, as the Globules or *Second Element*. 'Tis evident, that the firſt Element muſt take up the Center of the *Vortex*, and fill the empty ſpaces which the parts of the ſecond leave between them; and that the reſt of the *Vortex* muſt be filled with thoſe parts of the ſecond, and come nearer to the Circumference, proportionably to their Bulk, or to the force they have of continuing their Motion in a direct line. As to the Figure of the whole *Vortex*, after what has been ſaid it cannot be doubted, but that the diſtance from one Pole to the other will be ſhorter than that of the Line which cuts the *Equator*. And if we conſider that the *Vortexes* ſurround and compreſs each other unequally, we ſhall plainly ſee that their *Equator* * is a crooked irregular Line that comes near to an *Ellipſis*.

* By *Equator* I underſtand the greateſt crooked Line which the matter of the *Vortex* deſcribes.

Theſe are the things that offer themſelves naturally to the Mind, when we attentively conſider what ſhould happen to the parts of Extenſion perpetually tending to move in a right Line, that is, in the moſt ſimple Motion. If we now ſuppoſe a thing which ſeems moſt worthy the Divine Power and Wiſdom, namely, that God has formed the whole Univerſe at once, in the ſame State thoſe parts would have naturally fallen into, and diſpoſed themſelves in time by the moſt ſimple ways, and that he preſerves them by the ſame natural Laws; In a word, if we compare our Ideas with the viſible Objects; we ſhall perceive that the Sun is the Centre of the *Vortex*, that the Corporeal Light, which it diffuſes every where, is nothing but the continual Effort of the little Globules tending to remove from the Center of the *Vortex*, which light muſt be communicated in an Inſtant, through thoſe vaſt ſpaces, becauſe they being full of thoſe Globules, one cannot be preſs'd upon, without the Motion of all the others that are oppoſite to it.

Several other conſequences may be drawn from what has been ſaid, becauſe the moſt ſimple Principles are the moſt fruitful to explain the Works of a Being which always acts by the moſt ſimple ways. But we ſtill want to conſider ſome things that will be incident to matter. Let us then imagine that there are ſeveral *Vortexes*, like to that we have deſcribed in few words; that the Stars which are as many Suns, are the Centers of thoſe *Vortexes*, which ſurround each other, and are diſpoſed in ſuch a manner, as that they hinder one anothers Motion the leaſt they can; but that before things came to that Perfection, the weakeſt *Vortexes* were carried away, and as it were ſwallowed up by the ſtrongeſt.

To underſtand this, we need but ſuppoſe that the firſt Element which is at the Center may fly and perpetually flies out, through the Intervalls of the Globules, towards the Circumference of a *Vortex*, and that at the ſame time, that this Center or Star empties it ſelf through the *Equator*, other matter of the firſt Element comes into it through the Poles; for neither the Star nor its Poles can empty themſelves at one ſide, without being fill'd at another, ſince there is no vacuity in Extenſion. But as an infinite number of Cauſes may hinder a great Quantity of the firſt Element, from coming into that Star; the parts of the firſt Element, that ſhall be forc'd to remain in it, will be neceſſitated to adapt themſelves ſo, as to move one and the ſame way: which cauſes them to faſten and link themſelves together, and conſtitutes them into ſpots; which condenſing and thickening into cruſts, cover

cover by degrees the Center. And out of the moſt ſubtil and agitated of all Bodies are form'd into groſs and ſolid matter; this courſe ſort of matter is called by *des Cartes*, *the third Element*, and is endued with an infinite number of ſhapes and figures, as is *the firſt Element* from which it is generated and produced.

That Star being thus over-grown with Spots and Cruſts, and become like the other Planets, has no longer a ſufficient ſtrength to defend its *Vortex*, againſt the continual ſtruggle and irruptions of thoſe that ſurround it. It inſenſibly diminiſhes the matter that compoſes it, is diſperſed on all ſides, and the ſtrongeſt of the Neighbouring *Vortexes* carries the greateſt part away, and at laſt involves the Planet that is the Center of it. This Planet being wholly ſurrounded with the matter of the great *Vortex*, ſwims along in it, only keeping together with ſome of the matter of its own *Vortex*, its former Circular Motion, and takes at laſt ſuch a ſituation as puts it *in Æquilibrio*, with an equal quantity of the matter in which it ſwims. If it has but little ſolidity and magnitude it deſcends very near the Center of the ſurrounding *Vortex*; becauſe having no great force to continue its Motion in a right Line, it muſt take ſuch a place in that *Vortex*, as that an equal quantity of the ſecond Element, endeavouring to remove from the Center, may be *in Æquilibrio* with it: that being the only place where it can be exactly balanc'd: If that Planet be of greater bulk and ſolidity, it muſt ſeek its *Æquilibrium* in a place more diſtant from the Center of the *Vortex*: and laſtly, if there is no place in the *Vortex*, in which an equal quantity of its matter hath as much ſolidity as this Planet, and conſequently as much ſtrength to continue its motion in a direct line, perhaps becauſe the Planet ſhall be very bulky, and over-grown with very ſolid and condens'd Cruſts; it ſhall not ſtop in that *Vortex*, as finding no *Æquilibrium* in the matter that compoſes it, but paſs from *Vortex* to *Vortex*, until it meets with a place in which it may be equally ballanced by a competent quantity of matter; ſo that it will ſometimes be ſeen in its Paſſage, as the Comets are, when it ſhall be in our *Vortex*, and at a convenient diſtance from us; but it will not be ſeen in a long time, when it ſhall be in other *Vortexes*, or in the utmoſt boundance of ours.

If we hereupon conclude that a ſingle *Vortex* may, by reaſon of its bulk, ſtrength, and advantageous Situation, inſenſibly undermine, involve and carry away ſeveral *Vortexes*, and even ſuch as ſhall have conquer'd others; it will neceſſarily follow, that the Planets that have been found in the Center of the conquer'd *Vortexes*, being entered into the great and conquering *Vortex*, place themſelves *in Æquilibrio* with an equal Volume of the matter in which they ſwim. So that if thoſe Planets are unequal in ſolidity, they will float at unequal diſtances from the Center of the *Vortex*. But if two Planets have very near the ſame force to continue that direct Motion; or if a Planet carries in its ſmall *Vortex* one or ſeveral other ſmaller Planets, which it ſhall have conquer'd, according to our way of conceiving the formation of things: Then the ſmalleſt Planets will turn about the greateſt, whileſt the greateſt ſhall turn upon its own Center, and all theſe Planets ſhall be carried by the Motion of the great *Vortex*, at a diſtance very near equal from its Center.

We are obliged by the light of Reaſon, to diſpoſe in that order the Parts that compoſe the whole Univerſe, which we imagine to have been formed by the moſt ſimple ways. For all that had been ſaid is only grounded on the Idea of Extenſion, the Parts of which are ſuppoſed to move in the moſt ſimple Motion, which is that in a right line. And when we examine by the Effects, whether we are miſtaken in the Explication of the Cauſes, we are ſurprized to ſee the *Phænomena* of Celeſtial Bodies, ſo perfectly agreeing with our Ratiocinations. For we perceive all the Planets that are in the middle of a ſmall *Vortex*, turning upon their own Center, as the Sun does; and ſwimming in the *Vortex* of the Sun, and about the Sun; the ſmalleſt and leaſt ſolid neareſt to it, and the thickeſt at a greater diſtance. We likewiſe obſerve, that there are ſome as the Comets, which cannot remain in the *Vortex* of the Sun: And laſtly, that there are ſeveral Planets, which have other ſmaller turning about them, as the Moon does about the Earth: *Jupiter* has 4. of them, *Mars* has 3, and perhaps *Saturn* has ſo many, and ſo ſmall, that they reſemble a continued Circle, of which the thickneſs cannot be perceived, becauſe of their too vaſt diſtance. Thoſe Planets being the biggeſt we can obſerve, it may be imagin'd, that they have been produced from *Vortexes*, which had a ſufficient ſtrength to conquer others, before they were involved in the *Vortex* we live in.

All theſe Planets turn upon their own Center, the Earth within 24. hours, *Mars* within 25. or thereabouts, *Jupiter* within about 10, *&c.* They all turn about the Sun, *Mercury* the neareſt in about 4. Months; *Saturn* the remoteſt in about 30. Years, and thoſe that are betwixt them in more or leſs time, which however keep not an exact proportion with their diſtance. For the matter in which they ſwim makes a ſwifter Circumvolution when 'tis nearer to the Sun, becauſe the Line of its Motion is then ſhorter. When *Mars* is oppoſite to the Sun, he is then near enough to the Earth, but is at a vaſt diſtance from it when he is in Conjunction with him. The like may be ſaid of the other ſuperiour Planets, as *Saturn* and *Jupiter*; for the inferiour as *Venus* and *Mercury* are, to ſpeak properly, never oppoſite to the Sun. The Lines, which all the Planets ſeem to deſcribe about the Earth, are no Circles, but are very like Ellipſes, which Ellipſes ſeem very much to differ, becauſe of the different Situation of the Planets in reference to us. In ſhort, whatever may be obſerved with any certainty in the Heavens, perfectly agrees with what has been ſaid of their formation, by the moſt ſimple ways.

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As to the fixed Stars, Experience teaches us, that some diminish and entirely vanish away, whilest others that are wholly new appear; the lustre and bulk of which sensibly increase, they increase or diminish proportionably as the *Vortexes*, in whose Center they lye, admit more or less of the first Element. We cease to see them when they are overspread with Spots and Crusts, and begin to discover them, when those Spots, which obstruct their lustre, are entirely dissipated. All these Stars keep very near the same distance from each other, since they are the Centers of *Vortexes* which are not Conquer'd, and remain Stars as long as they can resist the Invasion of others. They are all bright like as many little Suns, because they are all, as he is, the Centers of unconquer'd *Vortexes*. They are all at an unequal distance from the Earth, though they appear as if they were fastned to a Vault; for if the Parallaxe of the nearest with the remotest has not yet been observable, by the different situation of the Earth from 6 to 6 Months; It is because that difference is too inconsiderable in reference to our distance from the Stars, to make that Parallaxe sensible. Perhaps by means of the Telescopes, it will one day or other become somewhat observable. In short, whatever the Senses and Experience may observe in the Stars, differs not from what we have discover'd by the Mind, whilst we examin'd the most simple and natural Relations that are betwixt the Parts and the Motions of Extension.

To search after the Nature of Terrestrial Bodies; we must conceive that the first Element being made up of an infinite number of different Figures, the Bodies that result from their Mixture must be very different. So that there will be some whose Parts shall be branched, others long, others very near round, but all irregular, several ways. When their Parts are branched and gross, they are hard, but flexible, and not elastick, as Gold; If their Parts be not so gross, they are soft and fluid, as Gums, Fats, Oyles; but if their branched Parts be extreamly fine, they are like the Air. If the long parts of Bodies are thick, inflexible, they are pungent, incorruptible, and dissolvible as Salt; if those long parts be flexible, they are insipid like Water; if the gross parts be of very irregular and different Figures, they are like Earth and Stones. In short, thence must needs arise Bodies of several different Natures, and two will hardly be found exactly alike, by reason of the Infinite number of Figures incident to the second Element, which can never be complicated after the same manner in two different Bodies. What Figure soever those Bodies may have, if their Pores be large enough to give way to the second Element's passing all manner of ways, they will be transparent like Air, Water, Glass, *&c.* If the first Element entirely surrounds some of their Parts, and affords them a sufficient force and commotion to repel the second Element on all sides, they will appear Luminous like flame; if they drive back all the second Element that falls upon them, they will be very white. If they receive it without repelling it, they will be very black; and lastly, if they repel it by several Concussions and Vibrations, they will appear of different Colours.

As to their Situation, the heaviest, or those that have least force to continue their direct Motion, will be the neareſt to the Center, as are Metals, Earth, Water and Air, will be more remote, and all Bodies will keep the same Situation in which we observe them; because they will recede from the Center of the Earth, as far as their Motion will allow.

It must not seem strange that I now say, that Metals have less force to continue their direct Motion, than Earth, Water, and other less solid Bodies, though I have formerly said, that the most solid Bodies have more strength than others to continue their direct Motion. For the Reason why Metals are not so apt to continue to move, as Earth and Stones, is that Metals have less Motion in themselves; it being true however, that of two Bodies unequal in solidity, but moved with an equal swiftness, that the most solid will have more force to pursue its Motion in a right Line; because the most solid has then the greater Motion, and that Motion is the Cause of strength.

But if we would understand the reason why Bodies, gross and solid, are heavy towards the Center of *Vortexes*, but light at a considerable distance from it; we must know, that these Bodies receive their Motion from the subtle matter that invirons them, and in which they swim. Now that subtle matter actually moving in a Circular Line, and only tending to move in a right Line; it only Communicates that Circular Motion to the gross Bodies it carries along with it: and as to its tendency to remove from the Center in a Right Line, it only communicates that to them as far as it is a necessary sequel of the Circular Communicated Motion. For it must be observed, that the Parts of the subtle matter tending to different sides, can only compress the gross Body they convey; since that Body cannot go several different ways at the same time. But because the subtle Matter, that lies about the Center of the *Vortex*, has a far greater Motion than that which it spends in Circulating, and because it Communicates only its Motion Circular, and common to all its Parts, to the gross Bodies which it carries, and that if thick Bodies should chance to have more Motion than what is common to the *Vortex*, they would soon lose that overplus by communicating it to the little Bodies they meet with; thence 'tis evident, that gross Bodies, towards the Center of the *Vortex*, have not so much Motion as the Matter in which they swim; each part of which has its own particular and various Motion, besides the Circular and Common. Now if gross Bodies have less Motion, they have less tendency to move in a right Line, and if they have less Tendency, they are forc'd to yield to those that have more, and consequently to approach the Center of

the *Vortex*, that is, in short, they must be heavyer, as they are more gross and solid.

But when solid Bodies are very remote from the Centre of the *Vortex*, as the Circular Motion of the subtle Matter is then very great, because it spends very near its whole Motion in wheeling about; Bodies have then so much more Motion as they have more Solidity; because they go as swift as the subtle Matter in which they swim; and so they have more force to continue their direct Motion. Wherefore gross Bodies at a certain distance from the Centre of the *Vortex*, are so much lighter as they are more solid.

This makes it apparent, that the Earth is metallick toward the Centre, and not so solid about the Circumference; that Water and Air must remain in the Situation wherein we see them; but that all those Bodies are * ponderous; the Air as well as Gold and Quick-silver, because they are more solid and gross than the first and second Element. This shews likewise that the Moon is at too great a distance from the Centre of the *Vortex* of the Earth to be heavy, though it be solid; that *Mercury*, *Venus*, *the Earth*, *Mars*, *Jupiter*, *and Saturn*, cannot fall into the Sun, and that they are not solid enough to travel out of this *Vortex*, as the Comets do; that they are *in Æquilibrio* with the matter in which they swim, and that if a Musket-Ball, or a Cannon-Bullet, could be shot high enough, those two Bodies would become little Planets, or perhaps Comets, that would not stay in any *Vortex*, as being endued with a competent solidity.

* That is, are driven towards the Centre of the Earth.

I pretend not to have sufficiently explain'd all the things I have mention'd, or to have deduced from the simple Principles of Extension, Figure and Motion, all the possible Inferences. I only intended to shew the Method *des Cartes* has used in the discovery of Natural things, that this and his Ideas may be compared with those of other Philosophers; I design'd here no more, and yet I may venture to assert, that if one would supersede admiring the Virtue of the Loadstone, the regular Motion of the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, the noise of Thunder, the Generation of Meteors; in short, if any desire to get a well-grounded Knowledge of Natural Philosophy, as he can do nothing better than to read and meditate his Books; so he can do nothing at all, unless he follows his Method, or Reasons, as he did upon clear Ideas, still beginning with the most simple and familiar.

Neither do I pretend that this Author is Infallible; for I think I can demonstrate that he has been mistaken in several places of his Works. But 'tis more advantagious for his Readers to believe that he hath been deceived, than if they were perswaded that whatever he said was true: A Man that should take him to be infallible would read him without Examination, believe him without understanding what he says, learn his Opinion as we learn History, and yet would never for all that form and perfect his Mind. He himself advertises his Readers to observe whether he be deceived, and to believe nothing of what he says, but what the Evidence compells them to. For he is not like those false Pretenders to Science, who endeavouring to Lord it over the Minds, will be believed upon their own Word; and who instead of making Men the Disciples of the inward Truth, by proposing only clear and distinct Ideas, labour what they can to submit them to the Authority of Heathens, and press upon Men incomprehensible Opinions, by unintelligible Reasons.

The chief thing that is found fault with in *des Cartes*'s System, is the manner in which he feigns that Sun, Stars, Earth, and all the Bodies that surround us have been produced; forasmuch as it seems contrary to what the Holy Writ teaches us of the Creation of the World; since according to him one would say, that the whole Universe has been formed of its own accord, so as we see it now a-days; to which several Answers may be made.

First, As to the pretended Contrarieties betwixt *Moses* and *des Cartes*, those that assert it have not perhaps examin'd them both, with as much Attention, as those who have shown by publick Writings, that the sacred History of the Creation perfectly agrees with the Opinion of that Philosopher.

But the chief Answer is, that *des Cartes* never pretended that things should ever have been made, by degrees, and as he describes them. For at the first Article of the Fourth Part of his Philosophical Principles which runs thus: *That the former Hypothesis is to be retain'd, notwithstanding its being false, to find out the true Causes of natural Things*; he expresly asserts the contrary in these words. *Though I pretend not that the Bodies of this visible World were ever produced in the manner that has been described before, of which the Reader has been already sufficiently forewarn'd; yet I must still keep to the same Hypothesis, to explain what appears upon Earth; For if I may, as I hope I can, plainly shew by these means the most intelligible, and certain Causes of all Natural things, and they cannot be found out another way; I may thence reasonably conclude, that though the World was not at the Beginning fram'd in this manner, but created immediately by God, yet the Nature of all things it contains rather not to be the very same, as though they had been produced in that very method.*

Des Cartes knew that to understand the Nature of things, they must be consider'd in their Original, and that beginning with those that are most simple, we ought to drive them up to the Fountain head, and that the Question is not, whether God's working by the most simple ways formed the World by degrees, or struck it out at a single blow; but that in what manner soever God may have produced his Works, they ought to be consider'd in their Princi-

ples,

ples, if we would understand them, and then see how consistent our thoughts are with the Operations of God, by comparing them together. He knew that the Laws of Nature, by which God preserves all his Works in their present Order and Situation are the same Laws, with those by which he might have formed and disposed them; It being evident to all considering Men, that if God had not disposed his Works in an Instant, in the same manner they would have order'd and postur'd themselves at length; the whole Oeconomy of Nature would be destroy'd; since the Laws of preservation would be contrary to those of the first Creation. If the whole Universe remains in the order in which we see it, 'tis because the Laws of Motion which preserve it in that Order, were capable of producing it in it; and if God had established an Order different from that into which those Laws of Motion would have put it, all things would be turned upside down, and place themselves by the force of those Laws, in the Order which they at present keep.

A Man desires to discover the Nature of a Chicken; to that end he opens every day Eggs taken from under a Brood-Hen; he examines what part moves and grows first, he quickly perceives that the heart begins to beat and to drive out blood through small Conduits, that are the Arteries, which blood comes back to the heart through the Veins; the Brain likewise appears at first, and the Bones are the last formed. By that he frees himself from many Errors, and even draws from those Observations several Consequences very useful for the Knowledge of living Creatures. What fault may be found with the conduct of such a Man, and how may it be given out that he pretends to perswade God has formed the first Chicken, by Creating an Egg, and giving it a competent Degree of heat to hatch it? because he tries to discover the Nature of Chickens in their first Formation?

Why then should *des Cartes* be accused of being opposite to the holy Writ, for that designing to discover the Nature of visible things he examines that formation by the Laws of Motion, which are inviolably observ'd on all occasions. He never * doubted *but that the World was created at first with all its perfection, That there were Sun, Earth, Moon and Stars, that in the Earth there were not only the Seeds of Plants, but also the Plants themselves; and that Adam and Eve were not born Infants, but made Adult. The Christian Faith teaches us that, and natural Reason perswades us the same, for when we consider the Infinite Power of God, we cannot think he should ever have made any thing which was not altogether perfect. But as we should better understand the Nature of Adam and Eve, and the Trees of Paradise, by examining how Children are insensibly form'd in their Mothers Womb, and how Plants are deriv'd from their Seeds, than by meerly considering how they were when Created by God at the Creation of the World; so if we can find out Principles very simple and easy, out of which as out of some Seeds we can manifestly shew the Stars, the Earth, and all visible things might have been produced; though we very well know that it was never so (yet) that will be more conducible to explain their Nature, than if we should only describe them so as they now are, or as we believe they were Created, and because I suppose I have found out such Principles, I shall endeavour briefly to Explain them.* Princ. Part 3. §. 45.

Des Cartes was perswaded that God formed the World all at once, but he also believed that God Created it in the same Order and with the same Disposition of Parts, in which it would have been, had it been made insensibly, and by the most simple ways. And that thought is worthy both of the Power and Wisdom of God; of his Power because he has made in a Moment all his Works in the highest Perfection; and of his Wisdom because he has shown that he perfectly foresaw whatever could befal matter, if it were moved by the most simple ways: and likewise because the Order of Nature could not subsist, if the World had been produced in a Manner contrary to the Laws of Motion, by which it is presery'd, as I have already mention'd.

'Tis ridiculous to say that *des Cartes* believed the World might have been formed of it self, since he owns with all those that follow the light of Reason, that Bodies cannot move themselves by their own strength; and that the immutable Laws of the Communication of Motions are but consequences of the immutable Will of God, who always acts in the same manner. His proving that God alone gives Motion to Matter, and that Motion produces in Bodies all their different Forms, was sufficient to hinder the Libertines from making an Advantage of his System. On the contrary, if Atheists should reflect on the Principles of this Philosopher, they would quickly be forced to confess their Errors; for if they can assert with the Heathens that matter is uncreated, they cannot also maintain that it may move it self by its own Power: So that Atheists would at least be obliged to acknowledge the true Mover, if they refused to confess the true Creator. But the Ordinary Philosophy affords 'em sufficient pretences to blind themselves, and defend their Errors; for it speaks of some impress'd Virtues, certain motive Faculties, in a word, of a certain Nature which is the Principle of Motion in every thing. And though they have no distinct Idea of it, yet by reason of the Corruption of their Heart, they willingly put it in the room of the true God, imagining that it performs all the Wonders that they see occur.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

An Explication of the Principles of the Peripatetick Philoſophy, in which is ſhown, that Ariſtotle *never obſerved the ſecond Part of the general Rule, and his Four Elements, with the Elementary Qualities, are examined.*

THat the Reader may compare the Philoſophy of *des Cartes* with that of *Ariſtotle*, it will be convenient to ſet down in few words what the latter has taught concerning Elements and Natural Bodies in general; which the moſt learned believe he has done in his Four Books *of the Heavens*. For his Eight Books of Phyſicks belong rather to Logick, or perhaps to Metaphyſicks, than to Natural Philoſophy; ſince they conſiſt of Nothing but looſe and general Expreſſions, that offer no diſtinct and particular Idea to the Mind. Thoſe four Books are Entituled *of the Heavens*, becauſe the Heavens are the chief amongſt the ſimple Bodies which he treats of.

That Philoſopher begins his Work by proving that the World is perfect, in the following manner. All Bodies have three Dimenſions and cannot have more, becauſe the number three comprehends all, according to the *Pythagoreans*. But the World is the Coacervation of All Bodies, and therefore the World is perfect. By that ridiculous Proof, it may alſo be demonſtrated, that the World cannot be more imperfect than it is, ſince it cannot be compoſed of Parts that have leſs than three Dimenſions.

In the ſecond Chapter, he firſt ſuppoſes ſome Peripatetick Truths, As that all Natural Bodies have of themſelves the force of moving, which he proves neither here nor elſewhere. But on the contrary aſſerts, in the firſt Chapter of his ſecond Book of Phyſicks, that to endeavour to prove it is abſurd, becauſe 'tis evident of it ſelf, and that none but thoſe who cannot diſtinguiſh what is known of it ſelf from what is not, inſiſt upon proving plain by obſcure things. But it has been ſhown elſewhere, that it is altogether falſe that natural Bodies ſhould have of themſelves the Force of moving, and it appears evident only to ſuch as follow with *Ariſtotle* the Impreſſions of their Senſes, and make no uſe of their Reaſon, *&c.*

Secondly, He ſays that all local Motion is made in a Line, either direct or circular, or compoſed of both; but if he would not think upon what he ſo raſhly propoſes, he ought at leaſt to have open'd his Eyes that he might ſee an Infinite number of different Motions, which are not made of either the right or circular: Or rather he ought to have thought that the Motions compoſed of the direct may be infinitely varied, when the compounding Motions increaſe or diminiſh their ſwiftneſs in an infinite number of different ways, as may be obſerved by what has been ſaid before *. There are, ſays he, but two ſimple Motions, the right and the Circular, and therefore all the others are compoſed of them. But he miſtakes, for the Circular Motion is not ſimple, ſince it cannot be conceived, without thinking upon a Point to which it relates, and whatever includes a Relation is relative and not ſimple. This is ſo true that the Circular Motion may be conceived as produced from two Motions in a right Line, whoſe Swiftneſs is unequal, according to a certain Proportion. But a Motion compoſed of two others, made in a right Line, and variouſly increaſing or diminiſhing in ſwiftneſs, cannot be ſimple.

* *Sup.* Ch. 4.

Thirdly, He ſays that all the ſimple Motions are of three ſorts, one from the Centre, the other towards the Centre, and the third about it. But 'tis falſe that the laſt, *viz.* the Circular Motion ſhould be ſimple, as has been already ſaid. And 'tis falſe again that there ſhould be no ſimple Motions beſides upwards and downwards. For all the Motions in a right Line are ſimple, whether they approach to, or remove from the Centre, the Poles or any other Point. Every Body, ſays he, is made up of three Dimenſions, and therefore the Motion of all Bodies muſt have three ſimple Motions. What Relation is there betwixt ſimple Motions and Dimenſions? Beſides every Body has three Dimenſions, and none has three ſimple Motions.

Fourthly, He ſuppoſes that Bodies are either ſimple or compoſed, and calls ſimple Bodies, thoſe that have the force of moving themſelves, as Fire, Earth, *&c.* adding, that the compounded receive their Motion from the compounding. But in that ſenſe there are no ſimple Bodies, ſince none have in themſelves any Principle of their Motion: there are alſo none compoſed, ſince there are no ſimples of which they ſhould be made; and ſo there would be no Bodies at all. What Fancy is it, to define the ſimplicity of Bodies by a Power of moving themſelves. What diſtinct Ideas can be fixed to the Words of ſimple and compoſed Bodies, if the ſimple are only defined in Relation to an Imaginary moving force? But let us ſee what Conſequences he draws from thoſe Principles. The Circular Motion is ſimple. The Heavens move Circularly, and therefore their Motion is ſimple: But ſimple Motion can be aſcribed

bed only to a ſimple Body, that is to ſay to a Body that moves of it ſelf; And therefore the Heavens are a ſimple Body diſtinguiſhed from the four Elements, that move in right Lines. 'Tis plain enough that ſuch Arguments contain nothing but falſe and abſurd Propoſitions. Let us examine his other Proofs, for he alledges a great many ſhameful and nonſenſical ones, to prove a thing as falſe as it is uſeleſs.

His ſecond Reaſon to ſhew that the Heavens are a ſimple Body diſtinguiſhed from the four Elements, ſuppoſes that there are two ſorts of Motion, one natural, and the other violent or againſt Nature. But 'tis ſufficiently plain to all thoſe that judge of things by clear and diſtinct Ideas, that Bodies having not in themſelves any ſuch Principle of their Motion, as *Ariſtotle* pretends, there can be no Motion violent or againſt Nature. 'Tis indifferent to all Bodies to be moved or not, either one way or another. But this Philoſopher, who judges of things by the Impreſſions of the Senſes, imagines that thoſe Bodies, which by the Laws of the Communications of Motions always place themſelves in ſuch or ſuch a ſituation, in Reference to others, do it of their own accord, and becauſe it beſt agrees with their Nature. Here follows the Argument of *Ariſtotle*.

The Circular Motion of the Heavens is natural, or againſt Nature. If natural, the Heavens are a ſimple Body diſtinguiſhed from the Elements, ſince the Elements never move Circularly by a Natural Motion. If the Circular Motion of the Heavens is againſt their Nature, they will be ſome one of the Elements, as Fire, Water, *&c.* But the Heavens can be none of the Elements: as for inſtance, if the Heavens were Fire, that Element tending naturally upwards, the Heavens would have two contrary Motions, *viz.* the Circular and the aſcending, which is impoſſible. If the Heavens be ſome other Body, which moves not Circularly by its own Nature, they will have ſome other natural Motion, which cannot likewiſe be; for if that Motion be aſcending they will be Fire or Air; and if deſcending, Water or Earth. I ſhall not inſiſt upon ſhowing the particular Abſurdities of thoſe Reaſonings, but only obſerve in general, that all that which this Philoſopher here ſays has no ſignification, and that there is neither Truth nor Inference well drawn. His third Reaſon is as follows.

The firſt and moſt perfect of all ſimple Motions muſt be that of a ſimple Body, and of the firſt and moſt perfect among them. But the Circular Motion is the firſt and moſt perfect amongſt ſimple Motions, becauſe every Circular Line is perfect, and that no right line is ſo. For if it be finite, ſomething may be added to it; if infinite, it is not yet perfect, ſince it has no end *, and that things are perfect but when they are *finiſhed*; and therefore the Circular Motion is the firſt and moſt perfect of all, and a Body moving Circularly is ſimple, and the firſt and moſt Divine amongſt ſimple Bodies. Here you have his Fourth Reaſon.

* Τέλος and τέλεος make a Pun in Greek, as in Engliſh *Finis* and *finiſhed*. Thus that Philoſopher proves, that an infinite Line is not perfect, becauſe 'tis not *finiſhed*.

Every Motion is either natural, or not; but every Motion which is not natural to ſome Bodies, is natural to ſome others. For we ſee that the aſcending and deſcending Motions, which are not natural to ſome Bodies, are ſo to others; for Fire naturally deſcends not, but Earth does. Now the Circular Motion is not natural to any of the four Elements, there muſt then be a ſimple Body to which the Motion is natural; and therefore the Heavens which move Circularly, are a ſimple Body diſtinguiſhed from the four Elements.

Laſtly, The Circular Motion is either *natural* or *violent* to ſome Body or other: If it be natural, 'tis evident that Body muſt be one of the moſt ſimple and perfect: But if it be againſt Nature, 'tis ſtrange how that Motion endures for ever, ſince we ſee that all Motions againſt Nature are of a ſhort continuance. And therefore we muſt believe, after all thoſe Reaſons, that there is ſome body ſeparated from all thoſe that environ us, whoſe Nature is the more perfect, as it lies at a greater diſtance. Thus argues *Ariſtotle*; but I defy the beſt and moſt Intelligent of his Interpreters to fix diſtinct Ideas to his Words, and to ſhow that this Philoſopher begins with the moſt ſimple things, before he ſpeaks of the more compoſed; which is however altogether neceſſary to exact Reaſonings, as I have already proved.

If I were not afraid of being tedious, I would be at the pains to tranſlate ſome Chapters of *Ariſtotle*. But beſides that none who can underſtand him care to read him in Engliſh, or in any other vulgar Tongue, I have ſufficiently ſhown, by what I have related from him, that his way of Philoſophizing is wholly unſerviceable to the diſcovery of Truth. For he ſays himſelf, in the fifth Chapter of this Book, that thoſe that miſtake at firſt in any thing, miſtake ten thouſand times more, if they proceed: ſo that it being apparent, that he knows not what he ſays in the two firſt Chapters of his Book, we may reaſonably believe that it is not ſafe to yield to his Authority, without examining his Reaſons. But that we may be the more perſwaded of it, I proceed to ſhow that there is no Chapter in this firſt Book, but has ſome Impertinency.

In the third Chapter he ſays that the Heavens are incorruptible and uncapable of Alteration, of which he alledges ſeveral Childiſh proofs, as that they are the habitation of the Immortal Gods, and that no change was ever obſerved in them. This laſt proof would be good enough, could he ſay that ever any body was come back from thence; or that he had approached Celeſtial Bodies ſufficiently near, to obſerve their Alterations. And yet I doubt

whether at this time any one ſhould yield to his Authority, ſince *Teleſcopes* aſſure us of the contrary.

In the fourth Chapter he pretends to prove that the Circular Motion has no oppoſite, though it be plain that the Motion from Eaſt to Weſt is contrary to that which is made from Weſt to Eaſt.

In the Fifth Chapter, he very weakly proves that Bodies are not infinite, drawing his Arguments from the Motion of ſimple Bodies: For what hinders but there may be above his *Primum mobile* ſome unmoveable Extenſion.

In the ſixth he loſes time in ſhowing that the Elements are not infinite: For who can doubt of it, when he ſuppoſes with him that they are included within the ſurrounding Heavens. But he ridicules himſelf by drawing his Proofs from their gravity and lightneſs. If Elements, ſays he, were infinite, there would be an infinite heavineſs and lightneſs, which cannot be, *Ergo*, &c. Thoſe that deſire to ſee his Arguments at length, may read them in his Books; for I reckon it a loſs of Time to relate them.

He goes on in the *Seventh Chapter*, to prove that Bodies are not infinite, and his firſt Argument ſuppoſes it neceſſary for every body to be in Motion, which he neither does nor can demonſtrate.

In the *Eighth* he aſſerts, that there are not many Worlds of the ſame Nature, by this ridiculous Reaſon, that if there were another Earth beſides this we inhabit, the Earth being ponderous of its own Nature, it would fall upon ours, which is the Centre of all ponderous Bodies. Whence has he learned this, but from his Senſes?

In the *Ninth* he proves, that it is not ſo much as poſſible that there ſhould be ſeveral Worlds; becauſe if there was any body above the Heavens, it would be ſimple or compoſed, in a natural or violent State, by Reaſons which he draws from the three ſorts of Motions already ſpoken of.

In the *Tenth* he aſſerts, that the World is Eternal, becauſe it cannot have had a beginning, and yet laſt for ever, becauſe we ſee that whatever is made, is corrupted in time. He has learned this likewiſe from his Senſes: but who has taught him, that the World will always endure?

He ſpends the *Eleventh Chapter* in explaining what *Incorruptible* ſignifies, as though Equivocation was here very dangerous; or that he was to make a great uſe of his Explanation. However that word *Incorruptible* is ſo clear of it ſelf, that *Ariſtotle* needed not have troubled himſelf with explaining in what ſenſe it muſt be taken, or in what ſenſe he takes it. It had been more convenient to define an infinite number of Terms very uſual with him, which raiſe nothing but ſenſible Idea's; for ſo perhaps we ſhould have learned ſomething, by the reading of his Works.

In the *laſt Chapter* of this *Firſt Book* of the Heavens, he endeavours to ſhew that the World is incorruptible, becauſe 'tis impoſſible it ſhould have had a beginning and yet laſt eternally. All things, ſays he, ſubſiſt either for a finite or infinite Time; but what is only infinite in one ſenſe, is neither finite nor infinite, and therefore nothing can ſubſiſt in that Manner.

This is the way of Arguing with the *Prince of Philoſophers*; whom, inſtead of diſcovering by clear and diſtinct Idea's, the true Cauſe of natural Effects, lays the Foundation of a *Pagan* Philoſophy, upon the falſe and confuſed Idea's of the Senſes, or upon ſuch Idea's as are too general to be uſeful to the Search after Truth.

I condemn not *Ariſtotle* for not knowing that God has created the World in time, to manifeſt his Power, and the Dependency of Creatures; and that he will never deſtroy it, to ſhew that he is immutable, and never repents of his Deſigns. But I may find fault with him, for proving by trifling Reaſons, that the World is of Eternal Duration. For though he be ſometimes excuſable as to the Opinions he maintains, yet he's for the moſt part intolerable, as to the Reaſons he alledges, when he treats of Subjects that are ſomewhat difficult. What I have already ſaid, may perhaps be ſufficient to evince it: though I have not related all the Errours I have met with in the Book whence the former are extracted, and that I have endeavour'd to make him ſpeak plainer than is cuſtomary with him.

But for an entire and full Conviction, that the *Genius of Nature* will never diſcover the ſecret Springs and Contrivances of it, it will be convenient to ſhew, that his Principles for the Explication of natural Effects are altogether groundleſs.

'Tis evident, that nothing can be diſcover'd in *Phyſicks*, without beginning with the moſt ſimple Bodies, that is with the Elements into which all others are reſolved, becauſe they are contained in them *, either *actually*, or *potentially*, to ſpeak in a peripatetick Stile. But no diſtinct Explication of thoſe ſimple Bodies can be found in the Works of *Ariſtotle*; whence follows, that his *Elements* being not clearly known, 'tis impoſſible to diſcover the Nature of Bodies, which are compoſed of them.

* De Cœlo, l. 3. c. 3.

He ſays indeed that there are Four Elements, *Fire*, *Air*, *Water*, and *Earth*; but he gives no clear Manifeſtation of their Nature, by any diſtinct Idea; he pretends not that thoſe Elements are the *Fire*, *Air*, *Water*, and *Earth* that we ſee; for if it were ſo, our Senſes at leaſt would afford us ſome Knowledge of them. I grant that in ſeveral places of his Works he endeavours to explain them by the Qualities of Heat and Cold, Moiſture and Dryneſs, Gravity

and

and Levity. But that Method is ſo impertinent and ridiculous, that it cannot be conceived, how ſo many Learned Men could be ſatisfied with it: which I proceed to demonſtrate.

Ariſtotle pretends in his Book *of the Heavens*, that the Earth is the Centre of the World, and that all Bodies which he is pleaſed to call ſimple, becauſe he ſuppoſes that they are moved by their own Nature, muſt move by ſimple Motions. He aſſerts, that beſides the Circular Motion, which he pretends to be ſimple, and by which he proves that the Heavens, which he ſuppoſes to move circularly, are a ſimple Body; there are two other ſimple Motions, one downwards from the Circumference to the Centre, and the other upwards from the Centre to the Circumference; That thoſe ſimple Motions are proper to ſimple Bodies, and conſequently that Earth and Fire are ſuch Bodies, one of which is altogether heavy, and the other perfectly light; but that Gravity and Levity may be proper to a Body, either wholly, or in part, whence he concludes, that there are two other Elements, one of which is partly light, and the other partly ponderous, *viz.* *Water* and *Air*. Thus he proves that there are Four Elements, and no more.

It is plain to all thoſe, who examine the Opinions of Men by their own Reaſon, that all thoſe Propoſitions are falſe, or cannot at leaſt be taken for clear and undeniable Principles, which may afford very plain and diſtinct Idea's wherein to lay the Foundation of Natural Philoſophy. 'Tis certain that nothing can be more abſurd than to eſtabliſh the Number of Elements upon the imaginary Qualities of Heavineſs and Lightneſs; ſaying without any further Proof, that ſome Bodies are ponderous, and others light of their own Nature. For if any thing may be aſſerted without Proof, it may be ſaid that all Bodies are naturally heavy, and endeavour to approach the Centre of the World, as the Place of their Reſt. And the contrary may be aſſerted too, *viz.* That all Bodies are light of their own Nature, and tend to riſe to the Heavens, as to the Place of their greateſt Perfection. For if you object to him, who maintains the Gravity of Bodies, that Fire and Air are light; he needs but anſwer, that Fire and Air are not light; but that being leſs ponderous than Earth and Water, they ſeem to us to be light. And that it goes with thoſe Elements, as with a piece of Wood that appears light upon the Water; not by reaſon of any natural Levity, ſince it falls down when in the Air; but becauſe Water being heavier, forces it to aſcend.

On the contrary, If you object to him that defends the natural Levity of Bodies, that Earth and Water are ponderous; he will likewiſe anſwer, that thoſe Bodies ſeem heavy, becauſe they are not ſo light as thoſe that ſurround them: That Wood, for Inſtance, appears to be ponderous when in the Air, not becauſe of its natural Gravity, ſince it aſcends when in the Water, but becauſe it is not ſo light as Air.

And therefore 'tis ridiculous to ſuppoſe, as an undeniable Principle, that Bodies are either light or heavy of their own Nature; it being, on the contrary, evident, that none has the force of moving it ſelf, and that 'tis indifferent to be moved either upwards or downwards, to the Eaſt or to the Weſt, to the South or to the North, or in any other poſſible Manner.

But let us grant to *Ariſtotle*, That there are Four Elements, Two of which are heavy, *viz.* Earth, and Water; and the Two other light of their own Nature, *viz.* Fire, and Air; What Conſequence may be drawn from thence, for the Knowledge of the Univerſe? Thoſe Four Elements are not the viſible Fire, Air, Water, and Earth, but ſomething quite different, which we know neither by the Senſes, nor by Reaſon, having no diſtinct Idea of them. Let all natural Bodies be compoſed of them, ſince *Ariſtotle* has ſaid it. But the Nature of thoſe Compounds is ſtill unknown, and cannot be diſcover'd, but by knowing the Four Elements, or the ſimple Bodies of which they are made, ſince the compoſed is known only by the ſimple.

Fire, ſays *Ariſtotle*, is light of its own Nature; the aſcending Motion is ſimple: Fire is therefore a ſimple Body, ſince Motion muſt be proportion'd to the moveable. Natural Bodies are compoſed of ſimple, there is then Fire in all natural Bodies; but a Fire which is not like to that we ſee; for Fire is often but *in potentia* in the Bodies that are made of it. What ſignifie all theſe peripatetick Diſcourſes? That there is Fire in all Bodies, either actual or potential, that is to ſay, that all Bodies are compoſed of ſomething we ſee not, and the Nature of which is wholly unknown to us. Now we have made a very fair Progreſs.

But though *Ariſtotle* ſhews us not the Nature of Fire, and other Elements, of which Bodies are made up; yet one may imagine, that he will at leaſt diſcover their principal Qualities and Properties. Let us alſo examine what he ſays upon that Account.

He declares that there are Four principal Qualities, which belong to the Senſe of Touching, *viz.* Heat, Cold, Humidity, and Siccity, of which all the other are compoſed. He diſtributes thoſe primitive Qualities into the Four Elements, aſcribing Heat and Dryneſs to Fire, Heat and Moiſture to the Air, Cold and Moiſture to Water, and Cold and Dryneſs to Earth. He aſſerts that Heat and Cold are active Qualities; but that Dryneſs and Moiſture are paſſive. He defines Heat, *What congregates things of the ſame Kind*; Cold, *What congregates things either of the ſame or of different Species*: Moiſture, *What cannot eaſily be contained in its own Limits, but is eaſily kept within foreign Bounds*; and Dryneſs, *What is eaſily contained within its own Limits, but will hardly be adapted to the Bounds of ſurrounding Bodies.* L. 2. & 3. de Gener. & Corrup.

Thus

Thus, according to *Ariſtotle*, Fire is a hot and dry Element; and therefore *Congregates homogeneous things, is eaſily contained within its own Limits, and hardly within others.* Air is a hot and moiſt Element, and therefore *Congregates homogeneous things, can hardly be kept within its own Limits, but eaſily within others.* Water is a cold and moiſt Element, and therefore *congregates both Homogeneous and Heterogeneous things, is hardly contained within its own Limits, but eaſily within others.* And laſtly, Earth is a cold and dry Element, or ſuch a one as *aggregates things, both of the ſame and different natures, is eaſily contained within its own Limits, but can hardly be adapted to others.*

There you have the Elements explain'd, according to the Opinion of *Ariſtotle*, or the Definitions he has given of their principal Qualities, and becauſe if we may believe him, the Elements are ſimple Bodies, out of which others are conſtituted, and their Qualities are ſimple Qualities, of which all others are compoſed; the Knowledge of thoſe Elements and Qualities muſt be very clear and diſtinct; ſince the whole Natural Philoſophy, or the Knowledge of all ſenſible Bodies, which are made of them, muſt be deduced from thence.

Let's then ſee what may be wanting to thoſe Principles. Firſt *Ariſtotle* fixes no diſtinct Idea to the word *Quality*. It cannot be known whether by Quality he underſtands a real Being diſtinguiſhed from matter, or only a Modification of Matter. He ſeems one while to take it in the former, and at another in the latter ſenſe. I grant that in the eighth Chapter of his Categories he defines *Quality that by which things are denominated ſo or ſo*, but that is not plain and ſatisfactory. Beſides that, his Definitions of the four primitive Qualities, *viz.* Heat, Cold, Moiſture, and Drineſs are either falſe or uſeleſs. We'll begin with his definition of Heat. *Heat*, ſays he, *is that which congregates homogeneous things.*

Firſt, though that Definition ſhould be true, That heat always congregates homogeneous Bodies, yet we cannot ſee how it perfectly explains the nature of heat.

Secondly, It is falſe that heat congregates homogeneous things; For heat diſſipates the Particles of Water into Vapour, inſtead of heaping them together. It gathers not likewiſe the parts of Wine, or any liquor or fluid Body whatſoever, even to Quickſilver. On the contrary it reſolves and ſeparates both ſolid and fluid Bodies, whether of the ſame or different Natures, and if there be any, the Parts of which Fire cannot diſſipate, it is not becauſe they are homogeneous, but becauſe they are too groſs and ſolid to be carried away by the motion of the fiery Particles.

Thirdly, Heat in reality can neither congregate nor ſegregate the parts of any body whatſoever; for, that the parts of Bodies may be congregated, ſeparated, or diſſipated, they muſt be removed: but heat can move nothing, or at leaſt it appears not that it can move Bodies. For though we conſider heat, with all the poſſible Attention, we cannot diſcover that it may communicate to Bodies a Motion which it has not it ſelf. We ſee indeed that fire moves and ſeparates the parts of ſuch Bodies as lye expoſed to its Action, but 'tis not perhaps by its heat, it being not evident whether it has any. It is rather by the Action of its Parts, which we viſibly perceive to be in a continual Motion; for theſe fiery Particles ſtriking againſt a Body muſt needs impart to it ſomewhat of their Motion, whether there is or is not any heat in fire. If the parts of that Body be not very ſolid, fire will diſſipate them; but if they be very groſs and ſolid, fire can but juſt move them, and make them ſlide one over the other; and laſtly, if there be a mixture of ſubtle and groſs parts, fire will only diſſipate thoſe which it can puſh ſo far as to ſeparate them from the others. So that fire can only ſeparate, and if it congregate, 'tis only by Accident. But *Ariſtotle* aſſerts quite contrary. *Separating*, ſays he, *which ſome aſcribe to fire, is but congregating homogeneous things, for 'tis only by Accident that fire carries off things of different nature.*

De Gener. & Corrupt. l. 2. c. 2.

If this Philoſopher had at firſt diſtinguiſhed the ſenſe of heat, from the Motion of the ſmall Particles, of which the Bodies called hot, are compoſed, and had afterwards defined heat, taken for the Motion of Parts, by ſaying, that heat is what agitates and ſeparates the inviſible Parts, of which viſible Bodies are made up; he would have given a tolerable definition of heat; though not full and ſatisfactory: becauſe it would not accurately diſcover the Nature of Motion in hot Bodies.

Ariſtotle defines cold, what *congregates Bodies of the ſame, or different Nature:* but that Definition is worth nothing, for cold *congregates not bodies.* To congregate them, it muſt move them: but if we conſult our Reaſon we ſhall find, that cold can move nothing; for we underſtand by that word, either what we feel when we are cold, or what cauſes our Senſation. As to our Senſation 'tis plain that it is meerly Paſſive, and can neither move nor drive any thing. And as to the Cauſe of that Senſation, reaſon tells us, that it is meerly reſt, or a Ceſſation of Motion: So that cold in Bodies being no more than the Ceſſation of that ſort of Motion which attends heat, 'tis evident that if heat ſeparate, cold does not. And therefore Cold coacervates neither things of the ſame, nor of different nature; ſince what cannot drive on Bodies cannot amaſs them together. In a word, as it does nothing, it muſt needs congregate nothing.

Ariſtotle judging of things by his Senſes imagin'd Cold to be as poſitive as heat, and becauſe the Senſations of heat and cold are both real and poſitive, he ſuppoſes them both likewiſe to be active qualities: and indeed if we follow the Impreſſions of the Senſes, we ſhall be apt to believe

lieve that Cold is a very active Quality; ſince cold Water congeals, accumulates, and hardens in a moment melted Gold and Lead, when they are pour'd upon it from a Crucible; though the heat of thoſe Metals be yet ſtrong enough to ſeparate the Parts of the Bodies which they touch.

'Tis plain, by what has been ſaid in the *Firſt Book, concerning the Errours of the Senſes*, That if we relye upon the Judgment they make of the Qualities of ſenſible Bodies, 'tis impoſſible to diſcover any certain and undeniable Truth, that may ſerve as a Principle to proceed in the Knowledge of Nature. For one cannot ſo much as diſcover that way, what things are hot, and what cold; amongſt ſeveral Perſons, who touch lukewarm Water, it feels cold to thoſe that are hot, and hot to thoſe that are cold. And if we ſuppoſe Fiſhes ſuſceptible of Senſation, 'tis very probable that they feel it warm, when all or moſt Men feel it cold. It is the ſame with Air, that ſeems to be hot or cold, according to the different Diſpoſitions of the Bodies of thoſe that are expoſed to it. *Ariſtotle* pretends that is hot, but I fanſie that the Northern Inhabitants are of another Opinion, ſince ſeveral learned Men, whoſe Climate is as hot as that of *Greece*, have aſſerted it to be cold. But that Queſtion, which has made ſo much noiſe in the Schools, will never be reſolv'd, as long as no diſtinct Idea ſhall be affixed to the Word *Heat*. See Book I. from *ch.* 11. to *ch.* 15.

The Definitions *Ariſtotle* lays down of Heat and Cold cannot ſettle that Idea. For Inſtance, Air, and even Water, though never ſo hot and ſcalding, congregate the parts of melted Lead together with thoſe of any other Metal whatſoever. Air conglutinates all ſorts of Fat, with Gums, or any other ſolid Bodies. And he ſhould be a very formal Peripatetick, who ſhould think of expoſing *Maſtich*, or any other mixed Bodies, to the Air, to purifie and cleanſe them. And therefore Air is not hot, according to the Definition which *Ariſtotle* gives of Heat. Air ſeparates Liquors from the Bodies that are imbued with them, hardens Clay, dries ſpread Linen, though *Ariſtotle* makes it moiſt, and ſo is hot and drying, according to the ſame Definition; and therefore it cannot be determined by that Definition, whether or no Air is hot. It may indeed be aſſerted that Air is hot in reference to Clay, ſince it ſeparates the Water from the Earthy Part. But muſt we try all the various Effects of Air upon all Bodies, before we can be aſſured, whether there is Heat in the Air we breathe? If it be ſo we ſhall never be ſure of it, and 'tis as good not to philoſophize at all upon the Air we reſpire; but upon ſome certain pure and elementary Air, not to be found here below, of which we can very dogmatically aſſert, with *Ariſtotle*, that it is hot, without giving the leaſt Proof of it, nor even diſtinctly knowing what we underſtand either by that Air, or by the Heat aſcribed to it. For thus we ſhall lay down Principles ſcarce to be deſtroyed; not becauſe of their Plainneſs and Certainty, but by reaſon of their Darkneſs, and their being like to Apparitions, which cannot be wounded, becauſe they have not a Body.

I ſhall not inſiſt upon *Ariſtotle*'s Definitions of Moiſture and Dryneſs, it being evident, that they explain not their Nature. For, according to thoſe Definitions, Fire is not dry, ſince it is not eaſily contained within its own Limits; and Ice is not moiſt, ſince it keeps within its proper Bounds, and can ſcarce be adapted to external Bounds. But if *fluid* be underſtood by the Word *humid*, or moiſt, it may again be ſaid, that Ice is not moiſt, and that Flame, melted Gold, and Lead are very humid. If by *humid* or *moiſt* be underſtood what eaſily cleaves to any thing, Ice is not humid, and Tar, Fat, and Oil, are moiſter than Water, ſince they cleave to Bodies more ſtrongly than it does. Quick-ſilver is moiſt in that ſence, for it cleaves to Metals; whereas Water is not perfectly moiſt, ſince it cleaves not to moſt of them. So that 'tis unſerviceable to have recourſe to the Teſtimony of the Senſes, in order to defend the Opinions of *Ariſtotle*.

But without farther examining his wonderful Definitions of the Four Elementary Qualities, let us ſuppoſe that whatever the Senſes teach us of thoſe Qualities is inconteſtable: let us muſter up all our Faith, and believe all thoſe Definitions very accurate: Only let it be allowed us to enquire whether all the Qualities of ſenſible Bodies are made of theſe Elementary Qualities. *Ariſtotle* pretends it, and he muſt do ſo indeed, ſince he looks upon thoſe Four primitive Qualities, as the Principles of all the things, which he intends to explain in his Books of *Phyſicks*.

He teaches us that Colours are produced from the Mixture of thoſe Four Elementary Qualities; White is produced when Moiſture exceeds Heat; as in Old Men, when they grow grey; Black when Moiſture is exhauſted, as in the Walls of Ciſterns; and all other Colours by the like Mixtures: that Odours and Savours ariſe from different Degrees of Dryneſs and Moiſture mix'd together, by Heat and Cold; and that even Gravity and Levity do depend thereon. In ſhort, All ſenſible Qualities muſt needs be produced, according to *Ariſtotle*, by Two *active* Principles, *viz.* Heat and Cold; and compoſed of Two *paſſive*, namely, Dryneſs and Moiſture; that there may be ſome probable Connexion betwixt his Principles, and the Conſequences he draws from them.

However 'tis yet a harder Task to perſwade ſuch things, than any of thoſe that have been hitherto related from *Ariſtotle*. We can ſcarce believe that the Earth, and other Elements, would not be colour'd, or viſible, if they were in their natural Purity, without Mixture of thoſe Elementary Principles, though ſome learned Commentators on that Philoſopher aſſert

it. We underſtand not what *Ariſtotle* means when he aſſures us that gray hair is produced by moiſture, or becauſe in old men moiſture exceeds heat, though to illuſtrate his thought we put the definition inſtead of the thing defined. For it looks like an incomprehenſible piece of nonſence to ſay that the hair of old men becomes gray, becauſe *what is not eaſily contained within its own Limits, but may be within others*, exceeds *what congregates homogeneous things.*

And we are as hard put to it to believe that Savour is well explain'd, by ſaying it conſiſts in a mixture of Dryneſs, Moiſture and of Heat, eſpecially when we put inſtead of thoſe words the Definitions given by that Philoſopher, as it would prove uſeful, if they were juſt and good. And none perhaps could forbear laughing, if inſtead of the Definitions which *Ariſtotle* gives of hunger and thirſt, when he ſays, that hunger is the deſire of what is hot and dry, and thirſt the deſire of what is cold and moiſt; we ſhould ſubſtitute the Definitions of thoſe words, calling hunger *the deſire of that which coacervates things of the ſame nature, and is eaſily contained within its own Limits, and hardly within others*; and defining thirſt, *the deſire of that which congregates things of the ſame and different natures, and which can hardly be contained within its own bounds, but is eaſily kept within others.*

Surely 'tis a very uſeful Rule to know whether Terms have been well defined, and to avoid miſtakes, in reaſoning often to put the Definition inſtead of the thing defined; for that ſhows whether the words are equivocal, and the Meaſures of the Relations falſe and imperfect, or whether we argue conſequently. If it be ſo, what Judgment can be made of *Ariſtotle*'s Arguments, which become an impertinent and ridiculous Non-ſence, when we make uſe of that Rule? and what may alſo be ſaid of all thoſe who argue upon the falſe and confuſed Ideas of the Senſes, ſince that Rule which preſerves light and evidence, in all exact and ſolid Reaſonings, brings nothing but confuſion in their Diſcourſes.

'Tis not poſſible to lay open the fooliſh Capriciouſneſs and Extravagance of *Ariſtotle*'s Explications upon all ſorts of matters. When he treats of ſimple and eaſy Subjects, his Errors are plain and obvious to be diſcover'd. But when he pretends to explain very compoſed things and depending on ſeveral Cauſes, his Errors are at leaſt as intricate as the Subjects he ſpeaks of; ſo that it is impoſſible to unfold them all, and ſet them before others.

That great Wit, who is ſaid to have ſo well ſucceeded in his Rules, for Definitions, knows not ſo much as which are the things that may be defined, becauſe he puts no Diſtinction betwixt a clear and diſtinct, and a ſenſible Knowledge, and pretends to know and explain others things of which he has not ſo much as a diſtinct Idea. Definitions ought to explicate the Nature of things, and the words of which they conſiſt muſt raiſe in the mind diſtinct and particular Notions. But 'tis impoſſible to define in that manner ſenſible Qualities, as Heat, Cold, Colour, Savour, *&c.* When you confound the Cauſe with the effect, the Motion of Bodies with the Senſation that attends it, becauſe Senſations being Modifications of the Soul which are not to be known by clear Ideas, but only by internal ſenſe, as I have explain'd it in the third Book; it is impoſſible to fix to thoſe words, Ideas that are not in being.

As we have Diſtinct Ideas of a Circle, a Square, a Triangle, and therefore know diſtinctly their Nature, ſo we can give good Definitions of them, and even deduce from our Ideas of thoſe Figures all their Properties, and explain them to others by ſuch words as are fixed to thoſe Ideas. But we cannot define either heat or cold, in as much as they are ſenſible Qualities, becauſe we know them not diſtinctly, and by Ideas; but only by Conſcience and inward ſenſe.

Neither muſt we define the heat that is without us by any of its Effects. For if we ſubſtitute ſuch a definition in its place, we ſhall find that it will only conduce to lead us into Error. For Inſtance, if heat be defined *what congregates homogeneous things*, without adding any thing elſe, we may by that Definition miſtake for heat ſuch things as have no Relation to it. For then it might be ſaid, that the Loadſtone collects the filings of Iron, and ſeparates them from thoſe of Silver, becauſe 'tis hot; that a Dove eats Hempſeed when it leaves other grain, becauſe that Bird is hot; that a Covetous Man ſeparates his Guineas from his Silver, becauſe he is hot. In ſhort, there is no impertinency, but that Definition would induce one into it, were he dull enough to follow it. And therefore that Definition explains not the nature of heat, ſince all its properties cannot be deduced from it; ſince by literally inſiſting upon it, we ſhould draw ridiculous Concluſions; and by putting it inſtead of the thing defined, fall into Nonſenſe.

However if we carefully diſtinguiſh Heat from its Cauſe; though it cannot be defined, in as much as it is a Modification of the Soul, whereof we have no Idea: yet its Cauſe may be defined, ſince we have a diſtinct Idea of Motion. But we muſt obſerve that Heat taken for ſuch a Motion, cauſes not always in us the Senſe of Heat. For Inſtance, Water is hot, ſince its Parts are fluid, and in Motion, and moſt probably it feels warm to Fiſhes, at leaſt 'tis warmer than Ice, whoſe Parts are more quiet; but 'tis cold to us; becauſe it has leſs Motion than the Parts of our Body; what has leſs Motion than another being in ſome manner quiet in reſpect of that. And therefore 'tis not with reference to the Motion of the Fibres of our Body, that the Cauſe of Heat, or the Motion that excites it, ought to be defined. We muſt, if poſſible, define that Motion abſolutely and in it ſelf: for then our Definition will be ſubſervient to know the Nature and Properties of Heat.

I hold

I hold not my ſelf obliged to examine farther the Philoſophy of *Ariſtotle*, and to extricate his ſo much confuſed, and puzling Errours. I have ſhewn, methinks, that he proves not the Exiſtence of his Four Elements, and defines them wrong; that his Elementary Qualities are not ſuch as he pretends, that he knows not their Nature, and that all the ſecond Qualities are not made of them: And laſtly, that though we ſhould grant him, that all Bodies are compoſed of the Four Elements, and the ſecond Qualities of the firſt, his whole Syſtem would ſtill prove uſeleſs for the finding out of Truth; ſince his Idea's are not clear enough to preſerve Evidence in all our Reaſonings.

If any doubt whether I have propoſed the true Opinions of *Ariſtotle*, he may ſatisfie himſelf, by conſulting his Books of the *Heavens*, and of *Generation* and *Corruption*, whence I have extracted almoſt all that I have ſaid of him; I would relate nothing out of his Eight Books of *Phyſicks*, becauſe ſome Learned Men pretend they are but a meer Logick, which is very apparent, ſince nothing but rambling Notions, and undetermin'd Words are to be found in them.

As *Ariſtotle* often contradicts himſelf, and that almoſt all ſorts of Opinions may be defended by ſome Paſſages drawn out of him; I doubt not but ſome Opinions, contrary to thoſe I have aſcribed to that Philoſopher, may be proved out of himſelf. And I ſhall not warrant for him; But 'tis ſufficient for me that I may have the Books I have quoted, to juſtifie what I have ſaid of him, and I care little whether thoſe Books are *Ariſtotle*'s or not; taking them for ſuch as I find them upon the publick Fame. For we ought not to trouble our ſelves with enquiring into the true Genealogy of things, for which we have no great Eſteem.

CHAP. VI.

General and neceſſary Advices to proceed orderly in the Search after Truth, and in the Choice of Sciences.

LEST it ſhould be ſaid, that we have only been deſtroying the Reaſonings of others, but eſtabliſh nothing certain and inconteſtable of our own: it will be convenient to propoſe, in few words, what Order we ought to obſerve in our Studies, for the avoiding Errour: and I deſign withal to ſhew ſome Truths and Sciences, that are very neceſſary, as bearing ſuch a Character of Evidence, as that we cannot withhold our Conſent, without feeling the ſecret Upbraidings of our Reaſon. I ſhall not explain at large thoſe Truths and Sciences; that's already done, and I intend not to reprint the Works of others, but only to refer to them, and to ſhew what Order we muſt keep in our Studies, to preſerve Evidence in all our Perceptions.

The firſt Knowledge of all, is that of the Exiſtence of our Soul; all our Thoughts are ſo many undeniable Demonſtrations of it, for nothing is more evident, but that whatever actually thinks, is actually ſomething. But though it be eaſie to know the Exiſtence of our Soul, yet her Eſſence and Nature are not very plain. If we deſire to know what ſhe is, we muſt take care above all, not to confound her with the things to which ſhe is united. If we *doubt*, *will*, *argue*; we muſt only believe, that the Soul is ſomething that doubts, wills, argues, and nothing more, as long as we have not felt in her other Properties: for we know our Soul only by inward-Senſation. We muſt not miſtake her for our Body, for Blood, for Animal Spirits, for Fire, and many other things for which Philoſophers have miſtaken her. We muſt believe of the Soul no more than we are forced to believe of her, by a full Conviction of our inward Senſe, for otherwiſe we ſhall be deceiv'd. Thus we ſhall know by a ſimple View, or by internal Senſation, whatever may be known of the Soul; without being obliged to long Reaſonings, that might lead us into Errour. For when we reaſon, Memory operates; and where-ever Memory operates, there may be Errour; ſuppoſing our Knowledge ſhould depend on ſome wicked Spirits that ſhould take delight in deceiving us.

Though I ſhould ſuppoſe for Inſtance, a God, who took delight in thus abuſing me; yet I am perſwaded that I could not be deceived in a Knowledge of *ſimple Perception*, as is that by which I know that I am, that I think, or that 2 and 2 are 4. For I am conſcious to my ſelf, that in this extravagant Suppoſition, ſuch a deluding Spirit, though never ſo potent, could not make me doubt that I am, or that 2 times 2 are 4, becauſe I perceive thoſe things with a ſimple View or Perception, and without the Uſe of Memory. But when I reaſon, as I ſee not evidently the Principles of my Reaſonings, but only remember that I have plainly ſeen them. If that ſeducing God ſhould join that Remembrance to falſe Principles, as he might do if he pleas'd, I ſhould conclude nothing but what was falſe. So that thoſe that make up long Calculations, fancying they remember that they have plainly ſeen that 9 times 9 are 72, or that 21 is a primitive Number, or ſome other Errour of that Nature, draw falſe Inferences from thence.

And

And therefore 'tis neceſſary to know God, and to be aſſured that he is no deceiver; if we deſire to be fully convinced that the moſt certain Sciences, as Arithmetick, and Geometry are true Sciences; for without that their Evidence is not full, and we can ſtill with-hold our Conſent. And 'tis likewiſe neceſſary to know by a ſimple View, and not by Reaſoning, that God is no Deceiver; ſince Reaſoning may ſtill be falſe, in the Suppoſition of a deluding God.

All the ordinary Proofs of the Exiſtence and Perfections of God, drawn from the Exiſtence and Perfections of his Creatures, are methinks liable to this Defect, that they convince not the Mind with a ſimple Perception. All thoſe Arguments are Reaſonings convincing of themſelves; but becauſe they are Reaſonings, they are not demonſtrative in ſuppoſing a wicked and deceitful Genius. They ſufficiently ſhew that there is a Power ſuperiour to us, which is granted even by that fooliſh Suppoſition: but they do not fully perſwade us that there is a God, or a Being infinitely perfect; ſo that the Concluſion of thoſe Arguments is more evident than the Principle.

'Tis more evident, that there is a ſuperiour Power, than that there is a World; ſince no Suppoſition can obviate our demonſtrating that ſuperiour Power; whereas in ſuppoſing an evil and deceitful Spirit, 'tis impoſſible to prove the Exiſtence of the World: becauſe it may ſtill be conceived, that this wicked Genius gives us the ſence of things that are not in being; as Sleep and ſome Diſtempers make us perceive things that never were, and even feel an actual Pain in imaginary Members, ſuch as we have loſt, or that we never had.

But the Arguments of the Exiſtence and Perfections of God, drawn from our Idea of infinite, are Proofs of *ſimple ſight*. We ſee there is a God, as ſoon as we perceive infinite; becauſe neceſſary Exiſtence is included in the Idea of infinite, and that nothing but infinite can furniſh to us the Idea of an infinite Being. We likewiſe ſee that God is no Deceiver, becauſe knowing that he is infinitely perfect, and that infinite cannot want any Perfection, we plainly perceive that he will not ſeduce us, and even that he cannot, becauſe he *can* but what he *wills*, and what he is able to *will*. And therefore there is a God, a true God, and a God that never deceives us; though he does not always enlighten us, and that we are obnoxious to Miſtakes, when we want his Light. Attentive Minds perceive all thoſe Truths, by a ſimple intuitive Perception, though we ſeem to make Arguments, that we may demonſtrate them to others; ſo that they may be ſuppoſed as inconteſtable Principles of our Reaſonings; for having known that God is not deceitful, nothing hinders but we may proceed to Reaſon.

'Tis alſo plain that the certainty of Faith depends on that Principle, That there is a God uncapable of Deceit. For the Exiſtence of God and the Infallibility of his Divine Authority, are rather a Natural Knowledge and common Notions, as to Minds capable of ſerious Attention, than Articles of Faith; though to have a Mind ſuſceptible of a ſufficient Attention rightly to conceive thoſe Truths, and willingly to apply our ſelves to the underſtanding them, be a particular gift of God.

From that Principle, That God is no Deceiver, we might likewiſe infer, that we have a real Body, to which we are united in a particular manner, and that we are ſurrounded with ſeveral others *. For we are inwardly convinced of their Exiſtence by the continual Senſations, which God produced in us, and that we cannot correct by Reaſon without offending Faith; though we can correct by Reaſon the Senſations that repreſent them, as endued with ſome Qualities and Perfections that are not in them: ſo that we ought not to believe that they are ſuch as we ſee or imagine them, but only that they exiſt, and that they are ſuch as we conceive them by Reaſon.

* See Illuſtration X. of Book I.

But that we may proceed orderly, we muſt not yet examine whether we have a Body, whether there are others about us, or whether we have only bare Senſations of things which exiſt not. Thoſe Queſtions include too great Difficulties, and are not perhaps ſo neceſſary as may be imagined, to perfect our Mind, and to have an accurate Knowledge of Natural and Moral Philoſophy, and ſome other Sciences.

We have within us the Idea's of Numbers and Extenſion, whoſe Exiſtence is undeniable, and their Nature immutable; and which would eternally ſupply us with Objects to think on, if we deſired to know all their Relations. It is neceſſary to begin to make uſe of our Minds upon thoſe Idea's, for ſome Reaſons, which it will not be amiſs to explain, whereof the principal are Three.

The Firſt is, That thoſe Idea's are the moſt clear and evident of all: For if to avoid Errour, we muſt ſtill keep to Evidence in our Reaſonings, 'tis plain that we muſt rather argue from the Idea's of Numbers and Extenſion, than from the confuſed or compoſed Idea's of *Phyſicks*, *Morals*, *Mechanicks*, *Chymiſtry*, and other Sciences.

Secondly, Thoſe Idea's are the moſt diſtinct and exact of all, eſpecially thoſe of Numbers: ſo that the Habit, (which proceeds from the Exerciſe of *Arithmetick* and *Geometry*) of not being content till we preciſely know the Relations of things, endues the Mind with ſuch an Exactneſs of Thought, as is not to be found in thoſe that are ſatisfied with the Probabilities ſo obvious to be met with in other Sciences.

The Third and Chief Reaſon is, That thoſe Idea's are the immutable Rules, and common Meaſure of all the Objects of our Knowledge. For thoſe that perfectly know the Relations of Numbers

Numbers and Figures, or rather the Art of making ſuch Compariſons as are requiſite to know them, have a kind of Univerſal Knowledge, and a very ſure Means evidently and certainly to diſcover whatever goes not beyond the ordinary Limits of the Mind. But thoſe that are not skilful in this Art, cannot with Certainty diſcover ſuch Truths as are ſomewhat intricate; though they have very clear Idea's of things, and endeavour to know their compound Relations.

Theſe, or the like Reaſons, moved ſome of the Ancients, to apply their Youth to the Study of *Arithmetick*, *Algebra* and *Geometry*. Undoubtedly they well knew, that *Arithmetick* and *Algebra* endue the Mind with ſuch an Inſight and Penetration, as was not to be gotten by other Studies; and that *Geometry* manages the Imagination ſo well, as that it is not eaſily puzled or confounded: for that Faculty of the Soul, ſo neceſſary to Sciences, acquires, by the uſe of *Geometry*, ſuch an univerſal Nicety, as promotes, and preſerves the clear View of the Mind, even in the moſt intricate Difficulties.

And therefore he that deſires always to preſerve Evidence in his Perceptions, and diſcover naked Truths, without mixture of Darkneſs and Errour, muſt begin with the Study of *Arithmetick*, *Algebra*, and *Geometry*, after he has obtained ſome Knowledge at leaſt of himſelf, and the Sovereign Being. As for Books that make the way to thoſe Sciences eaſie, I may refer to the *Meditations* of *des Cartes*, as to the Knowledge of God, and our ſelves; to the *Elements of Mathematicks* newly printed, as to Arithmetick and Algebra; to the *New Elements of Geometry*, printed in 1667, or to the *Elements* of Father *Taquet* Jeſuit, printed at *Antwerp* in 1665, as to ordinary Geometry; and as to *Conick Sections*, and the Solution of *Geometrical Problemes*, to the Treatiſes of *Monſieur de la Hire*, Entituled, *Of Conick Sections*, *Of Geometrical Places*, and *Of the Conſtruction of Equations*; to which may be added the *Geometry* of *des Cartes*.

I would not have adviſed to the *Elements of Mathematicks*, as to Arithmetick and Algebra, if I knew any Author who had clearly demonſtrated thoſe Sciences; but Truth obliges me to a thing, for which I may be blamed by ſome People: for *Algebra* and *Analyticks* being altogether requiſite for the Diſcovery of compoſed Truths, I muſt needs ſhew my Eſteem for a Book which carries thoſe Sciences very far, and which, in the Opinion of many Learned, explains them more clearly than they had been hitherto.

By the careful Study of thoſe general Sciences, we ſhall evidently know a great Number of Truths, very ſerviceable in all accurate and particular Sciences. We may afterwards ſtudy Natural and Moral Philoſophy; as being very uſeful, though not very fit to make the Mind nice and quick-ſighted. And if we deſire to preſerve Evidence in all our Perceptions, we muſt take a ſpecial Care not to be opinionated of any Principle that is not evident, and to which the *Chineſe*, for Inſtance, would not be ſuppoſed to diſſent, after having throughly weigh'd and conſider'd it.

And therefore we muſt only admit in *Phyſicks*, thoſe Notions which are common to all Men; ſuch as *Axioms* of *Geometry*, and the clear Idea's of Extenſion, Figure, Motion, Reſt, and others of that Nature, if there be any. Perhaps it will be ſaid, That Extenſion is not the Eſſence of Matter, but what's that to the Purpoſe? It is ſufficient that the World, which we conceive to conſiſt of Extenſion, appears like to that we ſee, though it be not made of ſuch a Matter, which is good for nothing, and altogether unknown, whilſt ſo much Noiſe is made about it.

It is not abſolutely neceſſary to examine, whether there are actually external Beings, correſponding to thoſe Idea's; for we argue not from thoſe Beings, but from their Idea's. We muſt only take care, that our Reaſonings, which we make upon the Properties of Things, agree with our inward Conſciouſneſs, or our Thoughts with Experience; becauſe in *Phyſicks* we endeavour to diſcover the Order and Connexion of Effects with their Cauſes; either in Bodies, if they exiſt; or in the Senſe we have of them, if they are not in being.

I ſay not however that we can doubt, whether Bodies are actually exiſting, when we conſider that God is not a Deceiver; and that the Order he has conſtituted in our Sentiments of things, both as to natural Occurrences, and ſuch as are wrought to create our Belief of what Reaſon is at a loſs to comprehend, is very regular: but I obſerve this, becauſe 'tis not neceſſary to inſiſt at firſt very long, upon a thing which no Body dobuts of, and is not extreamly conducible to the Knowledge of *Phyſicks*, conſider'd as a true Science.

Neither muſt we puzzle our Head with enquiring, whether there are, in the Bodies about us, ſome other Qualities, beſides thoſe of which we have clear Idea's; for we muſt only reaſon upon our Idea's, and if there be any thing, of which we have no clear, diſtinct, and particular Idea, we ſhall never know it, nor argue from it with any Certainty: whereas by reaſoning upon our Idea's, we may follow Nature, and perhaps diſcover that ſhe is not ſo hidden as is commonly imagin'd.

As thoſe, who have not ſtudied the Properties of Numbers, often imagine, that it is not poſſible to reſolve ſome Problemes, which are however ſimple and eaſie; ſo thoſe that have not meditated upon the Properties of Extenſion, Figure, and Motion, are very apt to believe, and even to aſſert, that moſt part of the *Phyſical Queſtions* are inexplicable. But we muſt not be deterr'd by the Opinion of thoſe who have examined nothing, or nothing at

leaſt with due application. For though few Truths concerning natural things have been fully Demonſtrated, yet 'tis certain, that there are ſome that are general and undeniable, though it may be we think not upon them, know nothing of them, and deny them.

If we meditate orderly and with due time, and all neceſſary application, we ſhall diſcover ſeveral of thoſe certain Truths I ſpeak of: But for more conveniency it will be requiſite carefully to read *des Cartes*'s *Principles of Philoſophy*, without approving of any thing he ſays, till the ſtrength and plainneſs of his Reaſons ſhall ſuffer us to doubt no longer.

As Moral Philoſophy is the moſt neceſſary of all Sciences, ſo it muſt be ſtudied with the greateſt Application; it being very dangerous to follow in this the Opinions of Men. But to the avoiding Errour and keeping to Evidence in our Perceptions, we muſt only meditate upon ſuch Principles as are confeſs'd by all thoſe whoſe heart is not corrupted by Debauchery, and their Mind blinded with Pride. For there is no moral Principle undeniable to Minds of *fleſh and blood*, who aſpire to the Quality of *Bold Wits*. Such people conceive not the moſt ſimple Truths, or if they do, they conſtantly deny them through a Spirit of contradiction, and to keep up the Reputation of great Wits.

Some of the moſt general Principles of Morality are, That God having made all things for himſelf, has made our Underſtanding to know, and our Will to love him; That being both juſt and powerful, we cannot be happy, but by obeying his Commands, nor be unhappy in following them: That our nature is corrupted, our Mind depending on our Body, our Reaon on our Senſes, and our Will on our Paſſions: That we are uncapable of performing what we plainly ſee to be our Duty, and that we have need of a Redeemer. There are yet many other moral Principles, as that Retirement and Penitency are neceſſary to diminiſh our Union with ſenſible Objects, and to encreaſe that which we have with intelligible goods, true Goods, and the Goods of the Mind. That we cannot enjoy vehement pleaſures, without becoming Slaves to them: that nothing muſt be undertaken by Paſſion; that we muſt not long for ſettlements in this Life, *&c.* But becauſe theſe laſt Principles depend on the former, and on the Knowledge of Man, it behoves us not to take them at firſt for granted. If we orderly meditate upon thoſe Principles, with as much care and Application, as ſo great a ſubject deſerves, and admit no concluſion for true, but ſuch as follows from thoſe Principles, we ſhall compoſe a very certain ſyſtem of Morals, and perfectly agreeable with that of the Goſpel, though not ſo large and compleat.

I grant that in moral Reaſonings, it is not ſo eaſy to preſerve Evidence and Exactneſs, as in ſome other Sciences; and that the Knowledge of Man being abſolutely neceſſary to thoſe that will proceed, many learners make no conſiderable Progreſſes therein. They will not conſult themſelves, to be ſenſible of the weakneſs of their Nature: They are ſoon weary of interrogating the Maſter, who inwardly teaches them his Will, that is, the immutable and eternal Laws, and the Principles of Morality. They cannot liſten with Pleaſure to him that ſpeaks not to their Senſes, who anſwers not according to their Deſires, and flatters not their ſecred Pride. They have no veneration for ſuch words, the Luſtre of which dazles not their Imagination, which are lowly pronounced, and never diſtinctly heard, but when the Creatures are ſilent; But they conſult with Pleaſure and Reverence, *Ariſtotle*, *Seneca*, or ſome New Philoſophers, who ſeduce them by the obſcurity of their words, by the Elegancy of their Expreſſions, or the probability of their Reaſons.

Since the Fall of our firſt Parents we eſteem nothing but what refers to the preſervation of the Body and the Conveniencies of Life; and as we diſcover that ſort of good by means of the Senſes, ſo we endeavour to uſe them on all occaſions. The Eternal Wiſdom, which is our true Life, and the only light that can illuminate us, often ſhines but upon the blind, and ſpeaks but to the deaf, when it ſpeaks within the receſſes of our Soul, becauſe we are for the moſt part exercis'd abroad. And as we are continually putting Queſtions to the Creatures, to learn any news from the good we are in ſearch of, that Wiſdom muſt, as I have ſaid elſewhere, offer it ſelf to our Senſes, yet without going out of our ſelves; that we might learn by ſenſible words and convincing Examples, the way to eternal Happineſs. God perpetually imprints on us a natural love for him, that we may always love him; yet by that ſame Motion of Love we inceſſantly recede from him, running with all the ſtrength he gives us to the ſenſible good which he forbids us to love, and therefore as he deſires we ſhould love him, ſo he muſt make himſelf ſenſible and offer himſelf before us, to ſtop by the delectation of his Grace our reſtleſs Agitation, and begin our Cure by Senſations or ſatisfactions, like to the preventing Pleaſures that had been the Original of our Diſeaſe.

For theſe reaſons I pretend not that men may eaſily diſcover, by the ſtrength of their Mind, all the Rules of Morality neceſſary to Salvation, and much leſs that they ſhould be able to act according to their Light; for their heart is ſtill more corrupted than their Mind. I only ſay, that if they admit nothing but evident Principles, and argue conſequently from them, they ſhall diſcover the ſame truths that are taught us in the Goſpel; becauſe it is the ſame Wiſdom, which ſpeaks immediately and by it ſelf to thoſe that diſcover the Truth in evident Reaſonings, and which ſpeaks in the Holy Scriptures to thoſe that underſtand them in their right ſence.

We muſt therefore ſtudy Morality in the Goſpel, to ſpare our ſelves the trouble of Meditation,

tation, and to learn with certainty the Laws and Rules of our Life and Manners. As to those who are not satisfied with a bare certainty, because it only convinces the Mind, without enlightening it, they must meditate upon those Laws, and deduce them from their natural Principles; that they may know evidently by Reason what Faith has already taught them, with a plain Certainty. Thus they will convince themselves, that the Gospel is the best Book in the World, that Christ perfectly knew the Disorders and Distempers of Nature, that he has rectified and cured them in a manner most useful to us, and most worthy of himself. But that the light of Philosophers is nothing but a dark night, and their most splendid Virtues an intolerable Pride: In short, that *Aristotle*, *Seneca*, and all the rest, are but Men, to say nothing worse.

CHAP. VII.

Of the Use of the first Rule concerning particular Questions.

WE have sufficiently insisted upon the general Rule of Method, more especially regarding the subject of our studies, and shown, that *des Cartes* has exactly followed it in his System of the World; whereas *Aristotle* and his Disciples have not observed it. We proceed now to the particular Rules that are necessary to resolve all sorts of Questions.

The Questions that may be formed upon all sorts of Subjects, are of so many Kinds, as that it is not easy to enumerate them. However I shall set down the principal. Sometimes we search after the unknown Causes of some Effects that are known, and sometimes after unknown Effects by known Causes. Fire burns and dissipates Wood, we enquire after the Cause of it. Fire consists in a violent Motion of the fiery Particles; we desire to know what effects that Motion is able to produce; whether it may harden Clay, melt Iron, *&c.*

Sometimes we seek the nature of a thing by its Properties, and sometimes its Properties by its Nature, that is known to us. We know, or suppose, that light is transmitted in a moment, and however that it is reflected and collected by a Concave Mirrour, so as to consume and melt the most solid Bodies; and we design to make use of those Properties to discover its Nature. On the contrary we know, that all the space that reaches from the Earth to the Heavens, is full of little spherical and most moveable Bodies, which continually indeavour their removal from the Sun: We desire to discover whether the endeavour of those small Bodies may be transmitted in an Instant; whether being reflected by, and united in a Concave Glass, they must dissipate or melt the solidest Bodies.

Sometimes we enquire after the Parts by the whole, and sometimes after the whole by its Parts. We search after the unknown Parts of a whole that is known, when we seek all the *Aliquot* Parts of a number, all *the roots* of an Equation, all the *right Angles* of a Figure, *&c.* And we enquire after an unknown whole, the Parts of which are known; when we seek the *sum* of several numbers, the *Area* of many Figures, the dimensions of different Vessels. Or we seek a whole, one part of which is known, and whose other parts, though unknown, include some known Relation with that which is unknown; as when we seek which is that number, one part of which, as 15 being known, makes with the other part the half, or the third of an unknown number; or when we seek an unknown number equal to 15, and to the double of the Root of that unknown number.

Lastly, We often enquire whether some things are equal, or like to others; and how much they are unequal, or different: As when we desire to know, whether *Saturn* is greater than *Jupiter*, and how much the former surpasses the later: whether the Air of *Rome* is hotter than that of *London*, and how many degrees.

What is general in all *Questions* is that they are formed for the knowledge of some truths; and because all truths are Relations, it may generally be said, that in all Questions, we search but after the knowledge of some Relations, either betwixt things, or betwixt Ideas, or betwixt things and their Ideas.

There are Relations of several sorts as betwixt the nature of things, betwixt their Bulks, their Parts, their Attributes, their Qualities, Effects, Causes, *&c.* but they may all be reduced to two, *viz.* to Relations of *Magnitude* and of *Quality*; comprehending under the former all those in which things are consider'd as susceptible of more and less, and all the others under the latter. So that it may be said, that all Questions tend to discover some Relation, either of *Magnitude* or of *Quality*.

The first and chief Rule is that we must very distinctly know the state of the Question, and have such plain Ideas of its Terms, that we may compare them together, and discover their unknown Relations.

We must then first very clearly perceive the unknown Relation enquired after; for 'tis plain, that if we have no certain Mark to distinguish it, when 'tis sought for, or when 'tis found, our labour will be fruitless.

Secondly,

Secondly, We muſt, as far as poſſible, make the Idea's, which anſwer to the Terms of the *Queſtion*, diſtinct, by taking off their Equivocation; and make them plain, by conſidering them with all the poſſible Attention: for if thoſe Idea's are ſo confuſed and obſcure, as that we cannot make the neceſſary Compariſons, to diſcover the Relations we look for, we are not yet in a State of reſolving the *Queſtion*.

Thirdly, We muſt conſider, with all poſſible Attention, the Conditions expreſſed in the *Queſtion*, if any there be; ſince without that we can but confuſedly underſtand the State of that *Queſtion*: beſides that the Conditions commonly trace out the way to reſolve it. So that when the State of a *Queſtion*, and its Conditions are rightly underſtood, we not only know what we enquire after, but alſo ſometimes by what means it may be diſcovered.

I grant that Conditions are not expreſs'd in all *Queſtions*, but then thoſe *Queſtions* are undeterminate, and may be reſolved ſeveral ways; As when 'tis required to find out a Square Number, a Triangle, *&c.* without ſpecifying any other Particulars; Or it may be that the *Queriſt* knows not how to reſolve, or that he conceals them, in order to puzzle the Reſolver; As when 'tis required to find out Two mean Proportionals betwixt Two Lines, without adding by the Interſection of the Circle and *Parabola*, or of the Circle and *Ellipſis*, *&c.*

And therefore 'tis altogether neceſſary, that the diſtinguiſhing Character of what is ſearched after, be very diſtinct, and not equivocal, or that it be only proper to the thing enquired; otherwiſe we could not be certain whether the *Queſtion* propoſed is reſolved. We muſt likewiſe carefully ſeparate from the *Queſtion* all the Conditions that make it intricate, and without which it ſubſiſts entire; For we have not a diſtinct Perception of the State of the *Queſtion*, as long as the Conditions that attend it are uſeleſs.

Suppoſe, for Inſtance, a Queſtion were propoſed in theſe Words; to make that a Man beſprinkled with ſome Liquors, and crowned with a Garland of Flowers, be not able to reſt, though he ſees nothing that may agitate him. We muſt enquire, whether the Word *Man* is Metaphorical, whether the word *Reſt* is equivocal, whether it relates to local Motions, or to Paſſions, as the laſt Words, *though he ſees nothing that may agitate him*, ſeem to hint: Laſtly, We muſt enquire whether the Conditions, *beſprinkled with ſome Liquors, and crowned with a Garland of Flowers*, are eſſential. The State of that ridiculous, and undeterminate Queſtion, being thus plainly known, 'twill be eaſie to reſolve it, by ſaying that we need but put a Man in a Ship, with the Conditions expreſſed in the *Queſtion*.

The Skill of thoſe that propoſe ſuch *Queſtions*, is to join ſome Conditions to them, that ſeem neceſſary though they be not ſo; that the Mind of the Reſolver may be diverted to things that are unſerviceable, as to the Solution of it. As in this *Queſtion*, which Servant-Maids often put to Children; I have ſeen, ſay they, Hunters, or rather Fiſhers, which carried with them what they could not catch, and threw into the Water what they catch'd; the Mind, being prepoſſeſs'd with the Idea's of Fiſhers, that take Fiſh, cannot underſtand the State of that fooliſh *Queſtion*; the whole Difficulty of which comes from that we think not that Hunters and Fiſhers, as well as other Men, often ſeek in their Cloaths ſome little Animals, which they throw away if they catch, and carry with them if they find them not.

Sometimes all the Conditions that are neceſſary to reſolve a *Queſtion* are not mention'd, which makes them as hard as the expreſſing of unſerviceable Characters; as in the following; to make a Man unmoveable, without binding or wounding him, but by putting his little Finger into his Ear; ſo that he ſhall not be able to ſtir, until he takes his little Finger out of his Ear; that at firſt appears impoſſible, and 'tis really ſo: for any one may walk having his little Finger in his Ear; but there wants a Condition, which, if it were expreſs'd, would remove the whole Difficulty: for you need but make a Man embrace a Bed-poſt, or ſomething like, and put his little Finger into his Ear; ſo that the Poſt be included between his Arm, and Ear, it being plain he cannot ſtir, without taking out his Finger. It is not mentioned that there is yet ſomething to be done on purpoſe, that the Mind ſhould not ſeek for, nor diſcover it. But thoſe, that undertake the reſolving of ſuch *Queſtions*, muſt make all the *Queries* that are requiſite, to enlighten the point wherein lies the Streſs of the Difficulty.

Thoſe arbitrary *Queſtions* appear to be fooliſh, and are indeed ſo in one Sence, as far as nothing is learn'd by their Solution. However they are not ſo different from natural *Queſtions* as may be imagin'd; for both are reſolved by a Method that is very near the ſame. And as the Skill or Maliciouſneſs of Men, makes arbitrary *Queſtions* intricate and difficult; ſo natural Effects are ſurrounded with Obſcurity and Darkneſs, that muſt be diſſipated by the Attention of the Mind, and by Experiments, which are as many *Queries* put to the Author of Nature; even as Equivocations, and uſeleſs Circumſtances are taken off from arbitrary *Queſtions*, by the skilful *Queries* that are made to the Propoſers. Let us explain theſe things methodically, and in a more ſerious and inſtructing Manner.

There are many *Queſtions* which appear very difficult, becauſe they are not underſtood, which ſhould rather be taken for *Axioms*, that need ſome Explication, than for true *Queſtions*; for ſome Propoſitions which are undeniable, when the Terms that compoſe them are rightly underſtood, muſt not methinks be ranked in the Number of *Queſtions*.

For Inſtance, It is propoſed as a very difficult *Queſtion*, *Whether the Soul be Immortal*; becauſe they who propoſe, or pretend to reſolve it, do not diſtinctly apprehend the Sence of the

the Terms. For as the Words *Soul* and *Immortal* signifie different things, and that they *know* not how to understand them, so they cannot tell whether the Soul is immortal, having no distinct Idea, either of what they ask, or enquire after.

By the Word *Soul* may be understood a Substance that thinks, wills, feels, *&c.* or it may be taken for the Motion or Circulation of the Blood, and the Configuration of the Parts of the Body; and lastly, for the Blood it self, and the Animal Spirits. Likewise by the Word *Immortal*, we understand what cannot perish by the ordinary Force of Nature, or what cannot be changed; or lastly, what cannot be corrupted or dissipated, as a Vapour or Smoke. The Word *Soul* and *Immortal*, being thus distinguished into their several Significations, a very mean Attention of the Mind, will be able to judge, whether she is immortal or not.

First, 'tis plain that the Soul taken in the first Sence, or for a thinking Substance is immortal, if you explain *Immortal* in the first Sence, *what cannot perish by the ordinary Force of Nature*; since 'tis not conceivable, that any Substance should be annihilated, but that to conceive the Possibility of it, we must have Recourse to the Omnipotence of God.

Secondly, The Soul is Immortal, taking *Immortal* in the third Sence for *what cannot be corrupted, nor resolved into Vapour, or Smoke*; since 'tis evident, that what cannot be divided into several Parts, cannot be corrupted, nor resolved into Vapours.

Thirdly, The *Soul* is not *Immortal*, taking it in the second sense for *what is unchangeable*; for we have convincing Proofs of the Alterations of our Soul, which feels now Pain, and then Pleasure, which often desires some things, which she afterwards ceases to desire; which is united to a Body from which she may be separated, *&c.*

If the Word *Soul* be taken in some other Sense, it will be as easie to perceive, whether she is immortal, fixing a determin'd Sence to that Epithet. And therefore what makes such *Questions* difficult, is, that they are not distinctly understood, or that the Words, in which they are express'd, are equivocal; so that they rather need Explication than Proof.

There are some People so dull, and others so fanciful, as that they always take the *Soul* for some Configuration of the Parts of the Brain, and for the Motion of the Spirits. 'Tis indeed impossible to prove that the *Soul* is immortal, and unperishable in that Sence; the contrary being evident: so that this is not a *Question* difficult to be resolved, but a Proposition which 'tis not easie to make some People apprehend; because they have not the same Idea's as we, and that they labour all they can, not to have them, and to blind themselves.

When we are asked, whether the *Soul* is *immortal*, or any other *Question* whatsoever; we must first take off the Equivocation of Words, and know in what Sence they are understood, that we may distinctly conceive the State of the *Question*. If those that propose it are ignorant of the Signification, we must put *Queries* to them, in order to illuminate, and determine them. If by these *Queries* we discover, that their Idea's are not agreeable with ours; 'tis in vain to answer them: for to answer one who imagines that a Desire, for Instance, is nothing but the Motion of some small Particles call'd Spirits; that a Thought is but a Trace, or an Image, which the Objects of those Spirits have left in the Brain; and that all the Reasonings of Men consist but in the various Situation of some little Corpuscles, which dispose themselves differently in the Head; to answer him, I say, that the Soul taken in his Sence is immortal, is to deceive him, or to appear ridiculous to him; but to tell him that she is mortal, is, in some sence, to confirm him in a very dangerous Errour: we must then reply nothing at all, but only endeavour to make him retire into himself, that he may receive the same Idea's that we have from Him, who is only able to enlighten him.

'Tis likewise a *Question*, which seems pretty difficult, To know whether Beasts have a Soul; however the Equivocation being taken off, it is so far from being hard, that those who suppose they have one, and those that think they have none, are ignorantly at bottom of the same Opinion.

The *Soul* may be taken for something *Corporeal*, dispersed through all the Body, which gives it Life, and Motion; or for something *Spiritual*. Those that pretend Beasts have no Soul, understand it in the second Sence; for never any Man denied that there is in Animals something *Corporeal*, which is the Principle of their Life or Motion; since it cannot be denied even of Watches. On the contrary, Those who assert that Beasts have Souls, understand it in the first Sence; for few believe them endued with a *Spiritual*, and *Indivisible Soul*: so that both *Peripateticks* and *Cartesians* believe that Beasts have a Soul, or a *Corporeal Principle* of their Motion, and both think they have none, or that there's nothing in them *Spiritual*, and *Indivisible*.

And therefore the Difference betwixt the *Peripateticks* and *Cartesians* consists not in that the *former* believe *Beasts* have a *Soul*, and the *latter* deny it; but only in that the *Aristotelians* think that Beasts are capable of Pain and Pleasure, of perceiving Colours, hearing Sounds, and of all the other Sensations and Passions of Men; whereas the *Cartesians* are of a contrary Opinion. The latter distinguish the Word *Sensation* to take off the Equivocation. For Instance, They say that when one is too near the Fire, the Parts of Wood strike against his Hand, vibrate the Fibres; which Vibration is communicated to the Brain, and determines the Animal Spirits contained in it to disperse through the outward Parts of the Body, in such a manner as is fit to make them shrink in, or withdraw. They

agree that all those things, or the like, are to be found in Animals, as being properties of Bodies: And the *Peripateticks* dissent not from it.

The *Cartesians* add, that the Percussion or Vibration of the Fibres of the Brain is attended with a Sensation of heat, and that the course of the Animal Spirits to the heart and other *Viscera* is accompanied with a Passion of Hatred, or Aversion; which Sense and Passion of the Soul they deny to be in Beasts: Whereas the *Peripateticks* assert, that Bruit Animals feel that heat as well as we do, that they have as we an Aversion to what is uneasy to them, and generally that they are capable of all our Sensations, and Passions. The *Cartesians* think not that Beasts are sensible of Pleasure, or Pain, nor that they love or hate any thing; because they admit nothing in them but what is material, and believe not that Sensations and Passions may be Properties of any matter whatsoever. On the contrary some *Peripateticks* esteem matter capable of Sensation and Passion, when 'tis extreamly refined; that Beasts may feel by means of the Animal Spirits, or of a very subtle and thin matter; and that our Soul is susceptible of Sensation and Passion, only because she is united to such a matter.

And therefore to resolve that Question, *whether Beasts have a Soul*, we must retire within our selves, and consider with all possible Attention our Idea of matter: if we can conceive that matter so and so figur'd, as square, round, oval, *&c.* is some pain, pleasure, heat, colour, odour, sound, *&c.* then we may assert that the Soul of Beasts, though never so material, is however capable of sense; but if we cannot conceive it, we must not assert it; for we must assure no farther than we can conceive. And likewise if we conceive that matter tos'd and extreamly agitated upwards, downwards, in a Circular, Spherical, Parabolical, Elliptick Line, *&c.* is any thing of Love, Hatred, Joy, Sorrow, *&c.* We may say that Beasts have the same Passions as we, but if we apprehend it not, we must not say it unless we will speak without understanding our selves. But I am sure no motion of matter will ever be mistaken for Love or Joy by him, that shall earnestly think upon it: So that to resolve that Question, *Whether Beasts have sense*, we need only take off Equivocation, as those that are called *Cartesians* use to do; for then that *Question* will be made so simple and easy, as to be resolved with a little Attention.

'Tis true that St. *Austin* supposing the common prejudice of Mankind, that Beasts have a Soul, which he never doubted of, as far as I can perceive, because he never examin'd it in his Works: this great Man, I say, perceiving that it is contradictory to say that a Soul or a substance which thinks, feels desires, *&c.* is material, believed that the Soul of Beasts is really spiritual and indivisible. He proves by very evident Reasons, that a Soul, or whatever has Sense, Imagination, Fear, Desire, *&c.* must needs be spiritual; but I never observed that he produc'd any Reason to maintain that Beasts have Souls. He even cares not to prove it; because 'tis likely that scarce any body doubted of it in his time.

Lib. 4. de Anima & ejus Origine. Cap. 23. l. de quantitate animæ & alias.

There being now Men, who endeavour wholly to free themselves of their prejudices, and call in Question all Opinions that are not grounded upon clear and demonstrative Reasonings: it has been call'd into doubt, whether Animals have a Soul susceptible of the same Sensations and Passions, as ours; however there are still several defenders of the ancient Prejudices, who pretend to prove that Beasts feel, will, think, and argue even as we do, though in a more imperfect manner.

Dogs, say they, know their Masters, love them, and patiently bear the blows they receive from them, as judging it their best interest not to forsake them; but as to Strangers, they hate them so much as not to away with their Flatterings. All Animals love their young; Birds, which build their Nests in the highest Branches of Trees, sufficiently show, that they are afraid lest some Creature should devour them: They judge those branches too weak, to bear their Enemies, though strong enough to support both their young, and their Nests. Even Spiders and the vilest Insects give some Intimations of an Intelligence that animates them: For one cannot but wonder at the conduct of a little Beast, which though it be blind, yet finds means to trapan in its Nets; others that have Eyes and Wings, and are so bold as to attack the biggest Animals we see.

I grant that all the actions are certain indications of an Intelligence; for whatever is regular, demonstrates it. A Watch shows the same; for 'tis impossible Chance should have composed its Wheels, but an understanding Agent must have ruled its Motion. We plant a Seed *inverted*, the Roots that were upward sink down into the ground of themselves, and the Seminal Nib that was turn'd downwards endeavours to alter its Position to break out: that intimates an Intelligence. That Plant produces Knots at certain Distances, to strengthen it self; it covers its Seed with a Skin that preserves it, and surrounds it with prickles to defend it. In short whatever we see done, either by Plants or by Animals, undoubtedly denotes an understanding Agent. All the true *Cartesians* agree to it, but they make Distinctions, to take away the Equivocation of Words.

The Motions of Beasts and Plants intimate an Intelligence, but that Intelligence is not Matter, and is as much distinguished from Beasts, as that which disposes the Wheels of a Watch is distinguished from the Watch it self. For that Intelligent Being seems infinitely Wise, Powerful, the same who has framed us in our Mother's Womb, and affords us a growth, to which all the attempts of our Mind and Will cannot add so much as a Span. And therefore

there

there is in Beasts, neither Understanding nor Soul, in the sence those Words are commonly taken. They eat without Pleasure, they cry without Pain, they grow without being conscious of it, they neither desire, nor fear, nor know any thing; and if they act in such a manner as intimates an Intelligence, it is because God having made them for a certain time, he has framed their Body in such a manner, as that they machinally, and without Fear, shun whatever is able to destroy them. Otherwise it must be said, that there is more Understanding in the smallest Insect, or even in a little Seed, than in the most Ingenious Man; It being certain that there are in them more different Parts, and regular Motions, than we are able to know.

But as Men are used to confound all things, and imagine that their Soul produces in their Bodies, most or all the Motions and Changes which befal it; they fix to the Word *Soul* the wrong Idea of *Former* and *Preserver* of the Body. So that thinking that their Soul produces in them whatever is absolutely requisite to the Preservation of their Life; though she knows not so much as the Contexture of the Body which she animates; they judge that there must needs be a Soul in Beasts, to produce all the Motions and Changes which befal them, because they are so like those which occur in us. For Beasts are begot, fed, strengthened as our Body; they eat, drink, and sleep as we do; because we are altogether like them as to our Body: the only Difference betwixt us and them consisting in this, that we have a Soul, and they have none. But our Soul frames not our Body, digests not our Aliments, and gives not Motion and Heat to our Blood. She feels, wills, argues, and animates the Body, as to the Sensations and Passions, that relate to it: but not by dispersing her self through our Members to communicate Sense and Life to them; for our Body can receive nothing of what belongs to the Mind. Thence 'tis plain, that the Reason, why we cannot resolve several Questions, proceeds from our not thinking to distinguish the different significations of a Word.

'Tis true, that we distinguish sometimes, but we do it so ill, that instead of taking off the Equivocation of Words by our Distinctions, we make them more perplexed and dark. For Instance, when we are asked, whether the Body lives, how it lives, and in what manner the Rational Soul animates it. Whether the Animal Spirits, the Blood, and other Humours live, whether the Teeth, the Hair, and the Nails are animated, *&c.* we distinguish the Words, *live* and *be animated*, in living or being animated with a *Rational*, with a *Sensitive*, or with a *Vegetative Soul*. But that Distinction is only fit to perplex the Question; for those Words want an Explanation themselves; and perhaps the two last, *Vegetative* and *Sensitive*, are unintelligible in the Sence they are commonly applied to the Soul.

If we desire to fix a clear and distinct Idea to the Word *Life*, we may say, That the Life of the Soul is the Knowledge of Truth, and the Love of Good; or rather that her Thoughts are her Life; and that the Life of the Body consists in the Circulation of the Blood, and the just Proportion and Mixture of Humours; or rather that the Life of the Body is such a Motion of its Parts, as is fit for its Preservation. The Idea's of Life being thus made plain, it will evidently appear, *First*, That the Soul cannot communicate her Life to the Body, since she cannot make it think. *Secondly*, That she cannot give it the Life by which it is fed, grows, *&c.* since she knows not so much as what is requisite to digest our Aliments. *Thirdly*, That she cannot make it feel, since Matter is incapable of Sensation, *&c.* Thus all other Questions concerning that Subject, may be resolved without Trouble; provided the Words, in which they are express'd, excite clear Idea's; for if they raise confused and dark, it is impossible to solve them.

In the mean while, 'tis not always absolutely necessary to have Idea's, that perfectly represent those things; the Relations of which we desire to examine. It is often sufficient to have but a preliminary or imperfect Knowledge of them, because we seek not exactly to know their Relations. I shall explain this more at large.

There are Truths or Relations of two Sorts; some are exactly known, and others but imperfectly. We exactly know the Relation betwixt such a Square, and such a Triangle, but have only an imperfect Knowledge of the Relation betwixt *London* and *York*. We know that such a *Square* is equal to such a *Triangle*, double or treble of it, *&c.* but we only know that *London* is bigger than *York*, without knowing precisely how much.

Moreover there are infinite Degrees of Imperfection in Knowledge, and no Knowledge is imperfect, but in reference to a more perfect. For Instance, We know that *London* is bigger than *Lincoln's-Inn-Fields*, and that Knowledge is only imperfect, in relation to another more exact, by which we might accurately know, how much *London* is larger than that open Place contained in it.

There are therefore several sorts of Questions. *First*, There are some in which we seek a perfect Knowledge, of all the exact Relations of two or several things betwixt each other.

Secondly, There are some in which we search after the perfect Knowledge of some exact Relation betwixt two or several things.

Thirdly, There are some in which we enquire after the perfect Knowledge of some Relation, nearly approaching to the exact Relation, that is betwixt two or three several things.

Fourthly,

Fourthly, There are ſome in which we are content to find a general and indefinite Relation.

'Tis evident, Firſt, That to reſolve the Queſtions of the firſt ſort, and perfectly to know all the exact Relations of Magnitude and Quality betwixt two or more things; we muſt have diſtinct Ideas perfectly repreſenting them, and compare them together in all the poſſible Manners. We may, for inſtance, reſolve all the Queſtions that tend to diſcover the exact Relations betwixt 2 and 8, becauſe both numbers being accurately known may be compared together, as much as is neceſſary to know the exact Relations of their Magnitude and Quality. We may know that 8 is 4 times 2, that 8 and 2 are even but not ſquare Numbers.

To reſolve *Queſtions* of the ſecond ſort, and accurately to know ſome Relation of Magnitude or *Quality*, which is betwixt two or more things; 'tis neceſſary and ſufficient diſtinctly to know thoſe Faces, by which they muſt be compared, to diſcover the enquired Relation. For inſtance, to reſolve ſuch *Queſtions* as tend to diſcover ſome exact Relations, betwixt 4 and 16, as that 4 and 16 are even and ſquare Numbers, it's ſufficient exactly to know that 4 and 16 can be divided into equal parts without Fractions, and that both are the product of a number multiplied by it ſelf; and 'tis to no purpoſe to examine what is their true Magnitude: It being plain, that to know the exact Relations of *Q*ualities betwixt things, a diſtinct Idea of their *Q*uality is ſufficient, without thinking on their Magnitude; and that to know the exact Relations of Magnitude, we need not ſearch after their true *Q*uality; an accurate Knowledge of their Magnitude being all that is required.

Thirdly, It clearly appears that to reſolve the *Q*ueſtions of the third ſort, or to know ſome Relation very near approaching the exact Relation that is betwixt two or ſeveral things; It is enough nearly to know the Faces by which they muſt be compared to diſcover the Relation required. For Inſtance, I may evidently know, that the $\surd 8$ is greater than 2, becauſe I may very near know the true Magnitude of the $\surd 8$; but I cannot diſcover how much the $\surd 8$ is greater than 2, becauſe I cannot exactly find out the true Magnitude of the $\surd 8$.

Laſtly 'tis evident that to reſolve the *Q*ueſtions of the fourth ſort, or to diſcover general and undefinite Relations, it is enough to know things in a manner proportion'd to the need we ſtand in of comparing them together, to find out the required Relation. So that 'tis not neceſſary to the ſolution of all ſorts of Queſtions to have very diſtinct Ideas of their Terms, or perfectly to know the things expreſſed by thoſe words. But our knowledge muſt be the more exact, as the Relations we ſearch after are more accurate and numerous: For as we have ſaid in imperfect *Q*ueſtions, imperfect Ideas are ſufficient, to reſolve them perfectly, that is, as far as they reach. And they may be reſolved even without a diſtinct Idea of their Terms, As when we are ask'd whether Fire is capable of melting Salt, hardning Clay, reſolving Lead into Vapours, and the like, we underſtand perfectly thoſe *Q*ueſtions, and may very well ſolve them, though we have no diſtinct Idea of Fire, Salt, Clay, &c. Becauſe the *Q*ueriſts only deſire to know, whether we are aſcertained by ſenſible Experiments that Fire produces thoſe Effects. And therefore may receive a ſatisfactory Anſwer, by a knowledge drawn from the Senſes.

CHAP. VIII.

An Application of the other Rules to particular Queſtions.

*Q*Ueſtions are of two ſorts, ſome are ſimple and others compound. The former may be ſolved by the bare Attention of the Mind to the Ideas of the words, in which they are expreſſed: but the ſolution of the latter muſt be perform'd by comparing them to a third or to many other Ideas. We cannot find out the unknown Relations that are expreſs'd in the Terms of a Queſtion, by immediately comparing the Ideas of thoſe Terms, ſince they can neither be joined nor compared. We muſt then have one or ſeveral *mean* Ideas, that we may make ſuch Compariſons, as are neceſſary to diſcover thoſe Relations; taking a ſpecial Care that thoſe mean Ideas be the more clear and diſtinct, as the Relations enquired after are more exact and numerous.

That Rule is but a Conſequence of the firſt, but of an equal importance with it. For if exactly to know the Relation of the things compared, it is neceſſary to have clear and diſtinct Ideas of them: It plainly follows from the ſame Reaſon, that we muſt have an accurate knowledge of the mean Ideas, by which we intend to make our Compariſons; ſince we muſt diſtinctly know the Relation of meaſure with each of the things meaſured, to find out their Relations. I ſhall give ſome Inſtances of it.

When we put a piece of Cork or other ſmall Veſſel, in the Water, with a Loadſtone in it, and offer to the North-Pole of that Stone the ſame Pole of another Magnet, which we keep in our hands, we preſently perceive that the former Loadſtone flies back, as though it were driven by a violent Wind. 'Tis required to diſcover the Cauſe of that Effect.

'Tis

'Tis plain that to render a Reaſon of the Motion of that Loadſtone, it is not ſufficient to know the Relation it has to the other: for we might perfectly know them all, and yet not underſtand how two Bodies may drive each other without meeting.

We muſt therefore examine what things are capable, in the Courſe of Nature, of moving Bodies; for 'tis required to find out the Natural Cauſe of the Motion of a Loadſtone, which is certainly a Body. And therefore we muſt not have Recourſe to ſome Quality, Form, or Being, of which we are not convinced by a clear Knowledge, that they are capable of moving Bodies; neither muſt we aſcribe their Effect to an underſtanding Agent, ſince we are not aſſured that Intelligences are the ordinary Cauſes of the Natural Motions of Bodies, and know not ſo much as whether they can produce Motion.

We plainly know, that it is a Natural Law, that Bodies ſhould move each other, when they meet. We muſt then endeavour to explain the Motion of the Loadſtone, by the means of ſome concurrent Bodies. 'Tis true that ſomething beſides a Body may move it, but as long as we have no diſtinct Idea of that thing, we muſt not admit it as a proper Means to diſcover what is ſearched after, nor to explain it to others: for to contrive a Cauſe, which none clearly conceives, is not to give Account of an Effect. We muſt not then enquire, whether there is or is not, any other Natural Cauſe of the Motion of Bodies, beſides the mutual Impulſe; but rather ſuppoſe that there is none, and attentively conſider what Bodies may meet with, and move that Loadſtone.

We preſently ſee that it is not moved by the Magnet we keep in our hands, ſince it touches it not; but becauſe 'tis moved only when that Magnet is brought near it, and that it moves not of it ſelf, we muſt infer, that it is moved by ſome ſmall Effluviums or little Bodies that proceed from that Magnet, and are driven to the other Loadſtone.

To diſcover thoſe Corpuſcles, we muſt not open our Eyes, nor nearly conſider that Magnet; for our Senſes might impoſe upon our Reaſon, and make us judge, that nothing perſpires out of it, becauſe we perceive it not. Perhaps we ſhould not reflect that we ſee not the moſt impetuous Winds, nor ſeveral other Bodies, that produce very ſurprizing Effects. We muſt then keep cloſe to that clear and intelligible means, and carefully examine all the Effects of a Loadſtone, to diſcover how that Magnet may continually vent ſo many little Bodies, without diminiſhing; for the Experiments, we ſhall make, will diſcover that the ſmall Particles that evaporate at one ſide, immediately re-enter through another, and will ſerve to explain all the Difficulties that may be objected againſt the Method of ſolving this Queſtion: which Method muſt not be forſaken, though we ſhould not be able to anſwer ſome Objections, proceeding from our Ignorance in ſeveral things.

If we deſire not to examine why Loadſtones remove from each other, when their Poles of the ſame Name are in Oppoſition to each other; but rather why they approach and endeavour to unite together, when the North Pole of one is oppoſite to the South Pole of the other; the Queſtion will be more difficult, and one Means will not be ſufficient to reſolve it; for 'tis not enough exactly to know the Relations betwixt the Poles of thoſe two Loadſtones, nor to have Recourſe to the *Medium* propoſed in the foregoing Queſtion: for that Means ſeems only fit to hinder the Effect, whereof the Cauſe is ſought for: neither muſt we propoſe any of thoſe things that are not clearly known, to be the natural and ordinary Cauſes of Corporeal Motion, nor extricate our ſelves by the rambling and uncertain Notion of an *occult Quality*, by which Loadſtones attract each other; for the Mind cannot conceive any ſuch *Attraction* in Bodies.

The Impenetrability of Bodies plainly convinces us, That Motion may be communicated by Impulſion, and Experience evidently proves, that it is communicated that way: but neither Reaſon nor Experience clearly demonſtrate the Motion of Attraction; for when the true and certain Cauſe of the Experiments, which are alledged to prove that ſort of Motion, is found out, it is viſible, that what appear'd to be done by *Attraction*, is produc'd by *Impulſion*. We muſt not therefore inſiſt upon any other *Motion*, but that of *Impulſion*; ſince this is ſure and undeniable: whereas all the others have at leaſt ſome Obſcurity in them. But though it might be demonſtrated, That meer Corporeal things have ſome other Principles of Motion, beſides the Concourſe of Bodies, this might not however be reaſonably rejected, but muſt rather be inſiſted upon preferably to all others; it being ſo clear, evident, and inconteſtible, that we may confidently aſſert, That it has always been received by all Nations and Ages in the World.

Experience ſhews, That a Loadſtone, freely ſwimming upon the Water, draws towards that which we keep in our hands, when their different Poles are oppoſite to each other; we muſt then conclude, That the Loadſtone upon the Water is driven to it. But as the Magnet we hold cannot drive the other, ſeeing this other approaches it, and that the free Loadſtone only moves at the preſence of the other Magnet: It is plain, That, to reſolve this Queſtion, by the receiv'd Principle of the Communication of Motions, we muſt have Recourſe to two Means at leaſt.



The Loadſtone *c* approaches the Magnet C, and therefore the ſurrounding Air drives it, ſince no other Body can do it: that's the firſt Means. The Loadſtone *c* moves at the preſence of the Magnet C, and therefore the Magnet C muſt needs determine the Air, to drive the Loadſtone *c*; that's the ſecond Means. 'Tis evident theſe two Means are abſolutely neceſſary. So that now the whole Difficulty conſiſts in joining thoſe two Means together; which may be done two ſeveral ways; either beginning by ſomething known in the Air, that encompaſſes the Loadſtone *c*, or by ſomething known in the Magnet C.

If we know that the Parts of the Air are in perpetual Agitation, as thoſe of fluid Bodies uſe to be; we ſhall not doubt but they continually ſtrike againſt the Loadſtone *c*, which they ſurround; but becauſe they ſtrike it equally on all ſides, they drive it to no determinate Place, as long as there is an equal Quantity of Air on all ſides. It being ſo, it is eaſie to judge that the Magnet C, hinders leſt there ſhould be as much Air towards *a*, as towards *b*, which cannot be done, but by its diffuſing ſome other Corpuſcles betwixt C and *c*, and therefore there exhale ſuch Particles out of both Loadſtones, which filling up that ſpace, and carrying away the Air about *a*, make the Loadſtone *c* leſs driven to that ſide than to the other; and it muſt by conſequence approach the Magnet C, ſince all Bodies move towards the ſide, to which they are ſtrongeſt driven.

But if in the Loadſtone *c*, about the Pole *a*, there were not many Pores fit to receive the ſmall Particles ſtreaming out of the Pole B of the Magnet C, and too ſmall to admit thoſe of the Air; it is plain, that thoſe ſmall Particles being more agitated than the Air, ſince they are to chaſe it from betwixt the Loadſtones, they would drive the Loadſtone *c*, and remove it from the Magnet C; but as the Loadſtone *c*, approaches to, or removes from the Magnet C, according as they are oppoſite by different or the ſame Poles; we muſt needs infer, that the Poles *a* and *b* of the Loadſtone *c*, are full of different Pores; otherwiſe the ſmall Particles iſſuing out of the Magnet C, could not have a free Paſſage, without impelling the Loadſtone *c*, at the ſide *a*, nor would they repel it at the ſide *b*. What I ſay of one of theſe Loadſtones, muſt be underſtood of the other.

It is plain, that we always learn ſomething by that method of arguing, from clear Idea's and undeniable Principles. For we have diſcovered that the Air, which invirons the Loadſtone *c*, was driven from thence by Corpuſcles perpetually flowing out of the Pores of both Loadſtones, which Corpuſcles find a free Paſſage at one ſide, but are ſhut out at the other. If we deſired nearly to diſcover the Bigneſs and Figure of the Pores of the Loadſtone, through which thoſe Particles paſs, we had need make other Experiments; but that would lead us to Subjects which we intend not to treat of. The Curious may conſult *des Cartes's Principles of Philoſophy*: I only obſerve as an Anſwer to an Objection, which will preſently be made againſt this *Hypotheſis*, that is, *Why thoſe ſmall Particles cannot re-enter thro' the Pores from whence they came*; that beſides that the Pores of the Loadſtones may be ſuppoſed to be wrought like the channelling of a Screw, which may produce the propos'd Effect; It may be ſaid likewiſe that the ſmall Branches of which thoſe Pores are made, bend one way to obey and yield to the Motion of the entring Particles; whereas they ſtand on end, and ſhut them out another way; neither muſt we be ſurprized at this difference, betwixt the Pores of the Loadſtone, for it may be explain'd in ſeveral manners, and the only Difficulty conſiſts in chuſing the beſt.

If we had endeavoured to reſolve the forementioned Queſtion, beginning with the Corpuſcles that are ſuppoſed to ſtream out of the Magnet C; we ſhould have found the ſame; and likewiſe diſcovered that Air is compoſed of an infinite Number of Parts, without which it would be impoſſible that the Loadſtone *c*, could approach the Magnet C. I inſiſt not on the Explication of this, becauſe 'tis eaſie.

Here follows a Queſtion more compound and complicate than the foregoing; for the Solution of which 'tis neceſſary to make uſe of many Rules. It is asked, *Which may be the Natural and Mechanical Cauſe of the Motion of our Members?*

The Idea of Natural Cauſe is clear and diſtinct, when underſtood, as I have explain'd it in the former Queſtion; but the Words, *Motion of our Members*, are equivocal and confuſed, becauſe there are ſeveral ſuch Motions; ſome being Voluntary, others Natural, and others Convulſive. There are alſo different Members in the Humane Body; and therefore according to the firſt Rule, I muſt ask, Of which of theſe Motions the Cauſe is required from me? But if the Queſtion be left undetermin'd, and to my Diſcretion, I examine it after this Manner.

I attentively

I attentively consider the Properties of those Motions, and discovering at first that voluntary Motions are sooner perform'd than convulsive, I infer that their Cause is different, and therefore that I may and must examine the Question by parts: for it seems to require a long discussion.

I restrain then my self to consider only voluntary Motions; and because several of our Members are imploy'd about them, I content my self for the present with the Consideration of the Arm. I observe that it is composed of several Muscles, which are most or all in Action, when we raise something from the ground, or remove it from one place to the other; but I only insist upon one, being willing to suppose that the others are very near shap'd after the same manner. I inform my self of its Texture and Shape by some Book of Anatomy, or rather by the sensible sight of its Fibres and Tendons, which I cause to be dissected in my presence, by some skillful Anatomist, to whom I put all the Queries, which in the sequel may contribute to find out the *Medium* I seek for.

After such a serious Consideration, I cannot doubt, but the Principle of the Motion of my Arm depends on the Contraction of its Muscles. I am likewise content, lest I should puzzle my self with too many difficulties, to suppose, according to the common Opinion, that this Contraction is performed by the Animal Spirits, which filling up the Ventricle of those Muscles, may cause their Extremities to come nearer. Now the whole Question concerning voluntary Motion is reduced to this Point. *How the small Quantity of Animal Spirits, which are contained in our Arm, may at the command of the Will, so suddenly swell the Muscles, as to afford a sufficient strength, to lift up a hundred weight or more.*

The first means, that offers it self to the Imagination, is that of a quick and violent Fermentation, like to that of Gun-powder, or of some Liquors fill'd with volatile Salt, when they are mixed with others that are acid or full of a fixed Salt. A small quantity of Gun-Powder is able, when kindled, to raise not only a hundred weight, but even a Tower and a Mountain. Earthquakes that overthrow Cities, and shake whole Countries, proceed from Spirits kindling under the ground, almost as Gun-powder. So that supposing in the Arm such a Cause of the Fermentation and dilatation of the Spirits, it may be look'd upon as the Principle of that force, by which men perform so sudden and violent Motions.

But as we ought to mistrust those means, that are offer'd to the Mind by the Senses, and of which we have no clear and evident Knowledge, so we must not easily admit this; for 'tis not sufficient to give an Account of the strength and quickness of our Motions by a Comparison. Which is both a confused and imperfect Account. Besides we are to explain a voluntary Motion, and Fermentation is not so. Bloud is exceedingly fermented in Agues, and we cannot hinder it. The Spirits are inflamed and agitated in the Brain, but we can't rule their Agitation, nor lessen it by our desire. When a Man moves the Arm several ways, a thousand Fermentations great and small, swift and slow, ought to begin, and what is harder to explain, to finish withal in a moment; as often and as soon as 'tis desired, if this Hypothesis were true. Besides, those fermentations ought not to dissipate all their matter, but need always be ready to take Fire. When a Man has walked twenty Mile, how many thousand times must the Muscles that move his Legs, have been fill'd and emptied; and what a vast Quantity of Spirits would be required, if fermentation should dissipate and deaden them so often? and therefore this supposition is insufficient to explain such Motions of our Body, as entirely depend upon our Will.

It is plain that the present Question may be reduced to this Problem of Mechanicks. *To find out by Pneumatick Engines, a means to overcome such a force, as a hundred weight, by another force, though never so small, as that of an Ounce weight; and that the Application of that small force may produce the desired Effect, at the Discretion of the Will.* The solution of that Problem is easy, and the Demonstration of it clear.

It may be solved by a Vessel which with two Orifices, one of which is a little more than 1600 times larger than the other, in which the Pipes of two equal Bellows are inserted; and let a force precisely 1600 times stronger than the other, be applied to the Bellows of the larger Mouth; for then the force 1600 times weaker shall overcome the stronger. The Demonstration of which is clear in Mechanicks, since the forces are not exactly in a reciprocal proportion with their Mouths; and that the Relation of the weaker force to the smaller Mouth is greater than the Relation of the stronger force to the larger Mouth.

But to solve this Problem by an Engine which sets better before the Eyes the Effect of the Muscles than the former; we must blow a little in a Foot-ball, and hinder the air from going out with a Sucker. Then put upon that Foot-ball, half full of Wind, a Stone of 5, or 600 weight; or having set it on a Table, lay on it a Board, and on that Board a huge Stone, or cause a heavy Man to sit upon the Board, allowing him to hold by something, that he may sit the faster upon the rising Foot-ball; for if you blow again into it, it will raise the Stone that compresses it, or the Man that sits upon it. The Reason of this is, that the Mouth of the Foot-ball is so small, or at least must be so, in comparison to the largeness of the Foot-ball that withstands the weight of the Stone, that by such means a very weak is able to overcome a very great force.

If we also consider that breath alone is capable of violently driving a leaden Ball through a long

long and ſtreight Trunk, becauſe the ſtrength of the breath is not diſſipated, but continually renewed, it will viſibly appear, that the neceſſary proportion betwixt the Mouth and the largeneſs of the Foot-ball, being ſuppoſed, breath alone may overcome a very conſiderable force.

If we therefore conceive that the whole Muſcles, or each of the Fibres, of which they are made, have as this Foot-ball, a competent Capacity to admit Animal Spirits, that the Pores through which thoſe Spirits flow, are yet proportionably ſtraiter than the neck of a Foot-ball; that the Spirits are detained in, or driven to the Nerves almoſt as the breath through a Trunk, that the Spirits are more agitated than the Air of the Lungs, and driven with a greater violence to the Muſcles than it is in a Bladder: we ſhall perceive that the Motion of the Spirits which are diſperſed through the Muſcles, can conquer the force of the heavieſt weight we carry, and that if we cannot move other more ponderous, this want of ſtrength proceeds not ſo much from the Spirits, as from the Fibres and Membranes of which the Muſcles are compoſed, which would burſt, ſhould we make too great an Effort. Beſides, if we obſerve, that by the Laws of the Union betwixt Soul and Body, the Motion of thoſe Spirits as to their Determination depends on the Will of Man, we ſhall ſee that the Motion of the Arm muſt needs be voluntary.

'Tis true that we move our Arm ſo readily, that it ſeems incredible that the Courſe of the Spirits into the Muſcles ſhould be ſo ſwift, as to effect that Motion. But we ought to conſider that thoſe Spirits are extreamly agitated, always ready to paſs from one Muſcle into another, and that a ſmall Quantity of that Spiritous Liquor, may ſufficiently ſwell them up ſo, as to move them, or to lift up from the ground ſomething very light. For we cannot raiſe great weights very readily, becauſe that Effort requires a great ſtretching and ſwelling of the Muſcles, which cannot be perform'd by the Spirits that are in the oppoſite, or *Antagoniſt* Muſcles, and therefore ſome time is required to call in more Spirits to their help, and in ſuch a Quantity as that they may be able to withſtand the heavineſs of the weight. Thus we ſee that thoſe that are loaden cannot run, and that a ponderous thing is not lifted up from the ground ſo readily as a Straw.

If we conſider that thoſe that are of a fiery temper, or heated with Wine, are quicker than others; that amongſt living Creatures thoſe whoſe Spirits are more agitated as Birds, move ſwifter than thoſe in which blood is colder, as 'tis in Frogs; and that in ſome of them, as the Chamelion, the Tortoiſe, and ſome Inſects, the Spirits are ſo little agitated, that their Muſcles are not ſooner fill'd than a Foot-ball would be by the breath of a Man. All theſe things being well obſerved may make our Explication acceptable.

But though that part of the Queſtion propoſed, which concerns voluntary Motions be ſufficiently reſolved; yet we muſt not aſſert that it is full and perfect, or that nothing elſe in our body contributes to thoſe Motions. For moſt probably there are a thouſand Springs, that facilitate them, which will for ever be unknown, even to thoſe who give a better gueſs upon the Works of God.

The ſecond Part of the Queſtion to be examin'd concerns the natural Motions, or thoſe that have nothing extraordinary in them, as Convulſions have, but are abſolutely neceſſary to the preſervation of our Machine, and conſequently altogether independent from our Will.

I firſt conſider with all the poſſible Attention, what Motions have thoſe Conditions, and whether they are perfectly alike. And as I quickly perceive that they are for the moſt part different from each other; leſt I ſhould perplex my ſelf with too many things, I ſhall only inſiſt upon the Motion of the heart; which of all the inward parts is the beſt known, and its Motions the moſt ſenſible. Whilſt I examine its Conſtruction I obſerve two things amongſt many others. Firſt that it is compoſed of Fibres, as the other Muſcles, and ſecondly, that there are two remarkable Cavities in it. And therefore I judge that its Motion may be performed by the Animal Spirits, ſince 'tis a Muſcle; and that the Blood ferments and dilates in it, ſince it has Cavities: The firſt of theſe Judgments is founded upon what I have ſaid before: The ſecond upon the hearts being hotter than any other part of the Body; and that it diffuſes heat together with Blood into all our Members; and that thoſe two Ventricles could neither be formed nor preſerv'd, but by the dilatation of the Blood; ſo that they are ſubſervient to the Cauſe that has produced them. I can then give a ſufficient Reaſon of the Motion of the heart by the Spirits that agitate, and the Blood that dilates it, during the Fermentation: For though the Cauſe I alledge of its Motion ſhould not be true; yet I plainly ſee that it is ſufficient to produce it.

It may be that the Principle of Fermentation or Dilatation of Liquors, is not ſo well known to all Readers, as that I may pretend to have explain'd an Effect by generally ſhowing, that it proceeds from Fermentation: But all particular Queſtions are not to be reſolved by aſcending to the firſt Cauſe: though that may be done too, and a true Syſtem on which all particular Effects depend, diſcover'd, provided we only inſiſt upon clear Ideas; but that way of Philoſophizing is neither the exacteſt, nor yet the ſhorteſt.

To comprehend this, it muſt be obſerved, that there are Queſtions of two ſorts. In the firſt 'tis required to diſcover the Nature and Properties of ſome thing: In the others we only deſire to know whether a thing has ſuch or ſuch Properties, or if we know it has, whether the Cauſe of it may be diſcover'd.

To

To ſolve the Queſtions of the firſt ſort, we muſt conſider things in their Birth and Original, and conceive that they are always produced by the moſt ſimple and natural ways: but the ſolution of the others requires a very different Method; for they muſt be reſolved by ſuppoſition, and then we muſt examine whether thoſe ſuppoſitions induce into any abſurdity, or whether they lead to any Truth plainly and clearly known.

For inſtance we deſire to diſcover the properties of the *Roulet*, or ſome of the *Conick ſections*; we muſt conſider thoſe Lines in their Generation, and form them by the moſt ſimple and leaſt perplexing ways; for that's the beſt and ſhorteſt means, to diſcover their nature and property. We eaſily ſee that the ſubtendent of the *Roulet* is equal to the Circle whence 'tis formed; and if we diſcover not many of it's properties that way, 'tis becauſe the Circular Line that produces it is not ſufficiently known. But as to Lines meerly Mathematical, the Relations of which may be more clearly known, ſuch as are *Conick ſections*; 'tis ſufficient for the diſcovering a vaſt number of their properties to conſider them in their Generation. Only we muſt obſerve, that as they may be produced by a regular Motion ſeveral ways; ſo all ſorts of Generation are not equally proper to enlighten the Mind; that the moſt ſimple are the beſt; and that it often happens, that ſome particular Methods are fitter than others, to demonſtrate ſome particular properties.

But when 'tis not required to diſcover in general the properties of a thing, but to know whether a thing has ſuch a property: then we muſt ſuppoſe that it actually enjoys it, and carefully examine the Conſequences of that ſuppoſition; whether it induces into a manifeſt abſurdity, or leads to an undeniable Truth, that may ſerve as a means to find out what is ſought for. That's the Method which Geometricians uſe to ſolve their Problems. They ſuppoſe what they ſeek, and examine what will follow of it; they attentively conſider the Relations that reſult from the ſuppoſition; they repreſent all thoſe Relations, that contain the conditions of the Problem by *Equations*, and then reduce thoſe Equations, according to the uſual Rules? ſo that what is unknown is found equal to one or ſeveral things perfectly known.

I ſay therefore, that when 'tis required to diſcover in general the nature of Fire, and of the different fermentations, which are the moſt univerſal Cauſe of natural Effects, the ſhorteſt and ſureſt way is to examine them in their Principle, and to conſider the formation of the moſt agitated Bodies, the Motion of which is diffuſed into thoſe that ferment. We muſt, by clear Ideas, and by the moſt ſimple ways, examine what motion may produce in matter. And becauſe Fire, and the various fermentations are very general things, and conſequently depending upon few Cauſes; there will be no need of conſidering very long, what matter is able to perform, when animated by Motion, to find out the Nature of Fermentation in it's very Principle, and we ſhall learn withal ſeveral other things, altogether requiſite to the Knowledge of Phyſicks: Whereas he that would in ſuch a Queſtion argue from ſuppoſitions, ſo as to aſcend to the firſt Cauſes, even to the Laws of Nature, by which all things are formed, would make a great many of them, that ſhould prove falſe and unprofitable.

He might perhaps diſcover, that the Cauſe of the Fermentation is the motion of an inviſible matter, communicated to the agitated Parts: for 'tis ſufficiently known, that Fire, and the various Fermentations of Bodies, conſiſt in their Agitation, and that by the Laws of Nature Bodies receive their immediate Motion only from their meeting with others that are more agitated; ſo that he might diſcover that there is an Inviſible matter, the Motion of which is communicated to viſible Bodies. But 'tis morally impoſſible that he ſhould ever, by his ſuppoſition, find out how all that is perform'd, which however is not ſo hard to do when we examine the formation of Elements, or of Bodies of which there is a greater number of the ſame nature; as is to be ſeen in M. *des Cartes*'s Syſtem.

The third part of the Queſtion, concerning Convulſive Motions, will not be very difficult to ſolve, if we ſuppoſe that there are in our Body Animal Spirits ſuſceptible of Fermentation, and with all humours ſo piercing as to inſinuate themſelves into the Pores of the Nerves, through which the Spirits are diffuſed into the Muſcles; provided always that we pretend not to determine the true texture and diſpoſition of thoſe inviſible parts, that contribute to theſe Convulſions.

When we have ſeparated a Muſcle from the reſt of the Body, and hold it by the two ends, we ſenſibly perceive, that it endeavours to contract it ſelf, when pricked in the middle. 'Tis likely that this depends on the Conſtruction of the imperceptible Parts, of which 'tis made, which are as ſo many Springs determin'd to ſome certain Motions by that of compunction. But who may be ſure he has found out the true diſpoſition of the parts imploy'd in the production of that Motion; and who may give an uncontroverted demonſtration of it. Certainly that appears altogether impoſſible, though perhaps by long thinking we might imagine ſuch a Conſtruction of Muſcles, as would be fit to perform all the Motions we know them to be capable of: We muſt not therefore pretend to determine the true Conſtruction of the Muſcles; however becauſe it cannot be reaſonably doubted, but that there are Spirits ſuſceptible of ſome fermentation, by the mixture of a very ſubtle heterogeneous matter; and that acrimonious and pungent humours may creep into the Nerves, that Hypotheſis may be ſuppoſed.

Now to proceed to the Solution of the Queſtion propoſed; we muſt firſt examine how many ſorts of convulſive Motions there are, and becauſe their number is indefinite, we muſt inſiſt on the Principal, the Cauſes of which ſeem to be different, we muſt conſider in what Parts they are made, what diſeaſes precede and follow them, whether they are attended with Pain, or free of it; and above all, what are the degrees of their ſwiftneſs and violence; for ſome are very ſwift and violent, others are very ſwift, but not violent; a third ſort are violent and not ſwift; and others again are free from both thoſe Symptoms: Some finiſh and begin afreſh perpetually, others keep the parts rigid and unmovable for ſome time; and others deprive us of their uſe, and altogether deform them.

All this being well weighed, it will be no hard matter to explain in general, after what has been ſaid concerning natural and voluntary Motions, how the convulſive are perform'd; for if we conceive that ſome Matter capable of fermenting the Spirits, mixing with thoſe contained in a Muſcle, it muſt needs ſwell up, and produce in that part, a convulſive Motion.

If that Motion may eaſily be reſiſted, 'tis a ſign that the Nerves are not yet obſtructed by any Humour, ſince we may empty the Muſcle of the Spirits that have enter'd into it, and determine them to ſwell up the oppoſite Muſcle. But if we cannot do it, we muſt conclude that pungent and piercing Humours have ſome part at leaſt in that motion; even it may often happen that thoſe Humours are the only Cauſe of Convulſions; ſince they may determine the courſe of the Spirits to ſome certain Muſcles, by opening ſome paſſages that convey them, and ſhutting others; beſides, that they may contract the Tendons and Fibres by penetrating their Pores.

When a very ponderous weight hangs at the end of a Rope, it may conſiderably be raiſed by only wetting that Cord; becauſe the particles of Water penetrating as ſo many wedges betwixt the threads of the Rope, ſhorten it by dilating it: So the piercing and pungent Humours, inſinuating into the Pores of the Nerves, contract them, ſtreteh the parts to which they are tied, and produce in the Body convulſive Motions, that are extremely ſlow, violent and painful, and often leave the part ſadly diſtorted for a long time.

As to the convulſive Motions that are very ſwift, they are cauſed by the Spirits; but 'tis not neceſſary that thoſe Spirits ſhould receive any Fermentation, 'tis enough that their Conduits be more open at one ſide than at the other.

When all the parts of the Body are in their natural ſituation, the Animal Spirits diffuſe themſelves equally and readily through them, according as our Machine wants it, and faithfully perform the Orders of the Will: but when Humours diſturb the diſpoſition of the Brain, alter or variouſly move the apertures of the Nerves, or penetrate into the Muſcles, they agitate their Springs, and the Spirits diffuſing into thoſe parts after a new and unuſual manner, produce extraordinary Motions, without the conſent of the Will.

However, we may often by a ſtrong reſiſtance hinder ſome of thoſe Motions, and inſenſibly diminiſh the Traces that produce them, even when the habit is wholly formed. Thoſe that look carefully to themſelves find little difficulty in preventing grim Faces, unbecoming Geſtures, and a ſowriſh Countenance, though their Body have a diſpoſition to them; and may even conquer them, when ſtrengthened by habit, but with a great deal of difficulty; for ſuch diſpoſitions muſt be oppoſed in their birth, and before the Spirits have traced out a way not eaſie to be block'd up.

The Cauſe of thoſe Motions is often in the agitated Muſcle, and proceeds from ſome pungent Humour or fermenting Spirits; but we muſt judge that it is in the Brain eſpecially, when the Convulſions agitate not one or two parts of the Body, but moſt or all, and withal, in ſeveral Diſeaſes which alter the natural Conſtitution of the Blood and Spirits.

'Tis true, that one Nerve often having different Branches, which diſperſe through parts of the Body very remote, as into the Face and Bowels, it ſometimes happens that a Convulſion, the cauſe of which lies in a *part*, to which ſome one of thoſe Branches reſorts, may have communication with *thoſe* to which other Branches reach, without proceeding from the Brain, and without a corruption of the Spirits.

But when the convulſive Motions are common to moſt parts of the Body, we muſt needs ſay, Either that the Spirits ferment in a very extraordinary manner, or that the order and diſpoſition of the parts of the Brain is diſturb'd, or that it proceeds from both Cauſes together. I ſhall not inſiſt any longer upon this Queſtion, becauſe it grows ſo compound and depending on ſo many things, when we enter into particulars, that it may not eaſily be made ſerviceable to a clear Explication of our Rules.

There is no Science which may ſupply us with more Examples, to ſhow the uſefulneſs of thoſe Rules than *Geometry*, and eſpecially *Algebra*. *Geometry* plainly diſcovers the neceſſity always to begin with the moſt ſimple things, and which include the leaſt number of Relations. It always examines thoſe Relations by meaſures that are clearly known; it takes off whatever is unſerviceable to diſcover them; it divides into parts compound Queſtions, diſpoſes thoſe parts, and examines them in order: In ſhort, the only fault to be found in this Science is, as I have obſerved elſewhere, That it affords no convenient means to abridge Idea's and diſcover'd Relations: ſo that though it rules the Imagination, and makes the Mind exact, yet it encreaſes not it's extent very much, neither does it give a Capacity to diſcover very compound Truths.

But

But *Algebra*, continually teaching to abridge, and in the ſhorteſt way, Idea's and their Relations, extremely improve the Capacity of the Mind; for nothing ſo compound can be conceived in the relations of Magnitudes, but the Mind may diſcover it in time by the means it affords, when we know the way that ought to be taken.

The fifth Rule, and the following, which ſpeak of the Method of abridging Idea's concern only that Science; for none elſe has a convenient way of abridging them; ſo that I ſhall not inſiſt upon their Explication. Thoſe who have a great inclination for Mathematicks, and deſire to give their Mind all the force and extent it is capable of, and put themſelves into a ſtate of diſcovering without a Tutor, an infinite number of new Truths, will perceive, if they earneſtly apply themſelves to *Algebra*, that the uſefulneſs of that Science, as to the Enquiry after Truth, proceeds from it's obſerving the Rules we have preſcribed. But I muſt advertiſe that by *Algebra*, I eſpecially underſtand that, which *des Cartes*, and ſome others, have made uſe of.

Before the Concluſion of this Book, I ſhall ſet down an Example ſomewhat at large, to ſhow the uſefulneſs of the whole Treatiſe; I ſhall repreſent the advances of a Man who in the diſcuſſion of an important Queſtion, endeavours to free himſelf from Prejudices; I ſhall at firſt make him fall into ſome faults, that they may excite the Remembrance of what has been ſaid elſewhere. But at laſt his attention leading him to the Truth enquired, I induce him ſpeaking poſitively, and as one who pretends to have ſolved the Queſtion he Examines.

CHAP. IX.

The laſt Inſtance to ſhow the uſefulneſs of this Treatiſe, wherein the Cauſe of the Union of Parts in Bodies, and withal, the Rules of the Communication of Motion, are Examin'd.

BODIES are United together three different ways, by *Continuity*, *Contiguity*, and in a third manner, that has no particular name, becauſe it ſeldom happens, I ſhall call it by the general Word *Union*.

By *Continuity*, or by the cauſe of it, I underſtand ſomewhat or other which ties the parts of a Body ſo ſtrongly together, that we muſt uſe violence to ſeparate them; for which Reaſon they are look'd upon as a whole.

By *Contiguity* I underſtand that which makes me judge, That two Bodies touch one another immediately, ſo as that there is nothing betwixt them, though I judge not that they are ſtrictly united, becauſe I may eaſily ſeparate them.

By the third Word, *Union*, I underſtand ſomething which makes two Glaſſes, or two Marble-Stones, whoſe ſurfaces are well rub'd and poliſhed to adhere to each other, ſo as that though they can eaſily be ſeparated, by making them glide over one another, yet we find ſome reſiſtance when we endeavour to do it in another manner.

Now theſe two united Glaſſes, or Marble-ſtones, may not be called *continuous*, becauſe they are not conceived as a whole, ſince they may eaſily be ſeparated ſome certain way. Neither is this a *Contiguity*, though it be ſomething very like it, becauſe thoſe two pieces of Glaſs or Marble, are united ſtrictly enough, and even more than the parts of ſoft and liquid Bodies, as thoſe of Butter and Water.

Theſe Words being thus explained, we muſt now enquire after the Cauſe that unites Bodies, and the difference betwixt *Continuity*, *Contiguity*, and the *Union* of Bodies taken in this particular Senſe: I ſhall firſt ſeek the cauſe of *Continuity*, or that, I don't know what, which unites the parts of a Body, and links them ſo ſtrictly together, that violence muſt be uſed to ſeparate them, and that they are look'd upon as making together a whole. I hope that this Cauſe being found out, it will prove no hard task to explain the reſt.

It ſeems now neceſſary to me, that this, I don't know what, which binds even the ſmalleſt parts of that piece of Iron I hold in my hands, ſhould be ſomething very powerful, ſince I muſt uſe a very great force to break off a ſmall part of it. But I extremely miſtake, for it may be, that the difficulty I find in breaking the leaſt piece of this Iron, comes from my weakneſs, and not from the reſiſtance of Iron. And indeed, I remember, I have formerly uſed a greater violence than I now do, to break a piece of Iron like this; and if I fell ſick, it might happen that my utmoſt endeavours could not perform it. I muſt therefore not judge abſolutely of the firmneſs with which the parts of Iron are joyned together, by the endeavours I make to diſ-unite them, but only judge that they ſtick very ſtrictly to each other in relation to my little ſtrength, or that they hang more firmly together than the parts of my fleſh; ſince the

the Senſe of Pain I feel in uſing too much Force advertiſes me, I ſhall ſooner diſunite the Parts of my Body, than thoſe of the Iron.

Thence I muſt conclude, That as I am not abſolutely ſtrong nor weak, ſo Iron and other Bodies are not abſolutely hard or flexible; but only in reference to the Cauſe that acts upon them. And that my Endeavours cannot be a Rule to meaſure the Degrees of Force, that muſt be uſed to overcome the Reſiſtance and Hardneſs of Iron; ſince Rules muſt be unvariable: whereas thoſe Endeavours vary, according to the Time, the Plenty of Animal Spirits, and the Hardneſs of Fleſh; for, after all, I cannot always produce the ſame Effects by the ſame Endeavours.

This Conſideration frees me from a Prejudice, that made me imagine ſtrong Bands to unite the Parts of Bodies, which Bands perhaps are not in being, and I hope it will not be unprofitable hereafter: for I am wonderfully apt to judge of all things with relation to my ſelf, and to follow the Impreſſions of my Senſes, of which I ſhall more carefully beware. But let us proceed.

Having thought ſome Time, and ſearch'd with ſome Application, the Cauſe of this ſtrict Union, without being able to diſcover it; I find my ſelf inclin'd, by my own natural Lazineſs, to judge, as ſeveral others do, that it is the Form of Bodies that preſerves the Union betwixt their Parts, or the Friendſhip and Inclination they have for ſuch as are alike to them. And I am ſo much the more apt to paſs a Judgment of this nature, that ſometimes nothing is more convenient than to ſuffer our ſelves to be ſeduc'd, and to become Learned on a ſudden, with little Expences.

But I intend to believe nothing but what I know, nor to ſuffer my ſelf to be caſt down by my own Lazineſs, nor to yield to bare Glimpſes. Let us therefore lay aſide thoſe Forms and Inclinations, of which we have no diſtinct and particular, but only confuſed and general Idea's, which methinks we only frame with reference to our Nature, and the Exiſtence of which ſeveral Perſons, and perhaps whole Nations, do not own. But methinks I ſee the Cauſe of this ſtrict Union of the Parts, which make up hard Bodies, without admitting any thing in it, but what all the World grants; or at leaſt what all the World diſtinctly conceives to be poſſible. For every one diſtinctly conceives, that all Bodies are compoſed, or may be compoſed of ſmall Parts: It may then be that ſome ſhall be crooked and branched, and be able, as many little Fetters, ſtrongly to hold others, or that they ſhall be ſo intricated amongſt their Branches, that it will not be eaſie to diſunite them.

I am ſo much the apter to yield to this Thought, as I ſee viſible Parts of the groſs Bodies, hold and bind one another this way. But I can ſcarce ſufficiently miſtruſt my Prejudices and Impreſſion of my Senſes. I muſt therefore more ſtrictly examine this Matter, and enquire after the Reaſon, Why even the minuteſt and leaſt ſolid Parts of Bodies, in ſhort, even the Parts of every one of theſe little Bands, hang together: For they cannot be united by other ſmaller Bands; ſince I ſuppoſe them to be ſolid. Or if, I ſay, they are united in that Manner, it will reaſonably be ask'd, What unites theſe others together, and ſo *in infinitum*.

So that the Difficulty now is, How the Parts of thoſe little Fetters, or of thoſe branched Parts, can be ſo ſtrictly united as they are: *A a*, for Inſtance, with *B*, which I ſuppoſe to be Parts of a little Band; or, which is the ſame, Bodies being ſo much the more hard, as they are the more ſolid, and leſs porous? It is now required to know, How the Parts of a Column can be ſo ſtrongly joined together, and compoſe a very hard Body; ſince it cannot be ſaid, That the Parts of this Column hang together by ſmall Fetters; for being without Pores, they have no particular Figure.



I am again extreamly apt to ſay, That this Column is hard by its Nature; or that the ſmall Fetters, of which hard Bodies are made up, are Atoms, the Parts of which cannot be divided, as being the Eſſential and laſt Parts of Bodies, and eſſentially crooked, branched, or of a perplex'd Figure. But I freely own this is not ſolving the Difficulty, and that laying aſide my Prejudices, and the Illuſions of my Senſes, I ſhould be in the wrong, to have Recourſe to an abſtracted Form, and to embrace a Phantaſm of Logick, for the Cauſe I enquire after. I mean, I ſhould be in the wrong to conceive, as ſomething real and diſtinct, the rambling or indefinite Idea of Nature and Eſſence; which expreſſes nothing but what is known to us; and ſo to take an abſtracted univerſal Form for the Phyſical Cauſe of a real Effect: for there are Two things which I cannot too much miſtruſt. The *firſt* is, The Impreſſion of my Senſes; and the *other*, My Readineſs to take abſtracted Natures, and general Idea's of Logick, for real and particular, by which Means I remember to have been often ſeduc'd.

For

For to return to the Difficulty in hand; 'tis not possible to conceive, how those little Fetters should be indivisible by their own Essence and Nature, nor consequently how they should be inflexible; since, on the contrary, I conceive them most divisible, nay, necessarily divisible, by their own Essence and Nature. For the Part *A* is most certainly a Substance as well as *B*; and consequently 'tis plain, that *A* may exist without *B*; since Substances may exist without one another; otherwise they would be no Substances.

It cannot be said, That *A* is no Substance; for 'tis plain that it is not a bare Mode, whereas every Being is either a Substance, or the Mode of a Substance. And therefore since *A* is not a Mode, it is a Substance, and may exist without *B*, and much more the Part *A* exists separately from *B*; so that this Fetter is divisible in *A* and *B*.

Moreover if this Fetter were indivisible or crooked, by its own Nature and Essence, there would happen a thing quite contrary to Experience; For not one Body could be broken. Let us suppose, as before, a Piece of Iron, composed of many Fetters, perplexed within one another, and *A a*, *B b* to be two of them. I say it will not be possible to disintangle them, and consequently to break the Iron. For to break it, the Fetters that make it up must be beat, which however are supposed inflexible by their own Nature.

If they be not supposed inflexible, but only indivisible by their own Nature; the Supposition would be unserviceable for solving the Question. For then the Difficulty will be, Why those little Fetters obey not the Force that is used to bend a Bar of Iron? Neither must they be supposed indivisible, if they be not supposed inflexible. For if the parts of those Fetters could change their situation in reference to one another, 'tis visible that they might be separated; since there is no Reason, why, if one part may be somewhat removed from the other, it could not be entirely removed. And therefore whether these little Fetters are supposed indivisible or inflexible, the Question cannot be solved by that means: for if they be only supposed indivisible, a Piece of Iron must be broken without Trouble; and if they be supposed inflexible, it will be impossible to break it: since the little Fetters that make up the Iron being intricated within one another, it will be impossible to disintangle them. Let us therefore solve the Difficulty by clear and undeniable Principles; and find the Reason, why that little Band has two parts *A B* so firmly united to one another.

'Tis needful, I perceive, to divide the Subject of my Meditation into Parts, that I may examine it the more exactly, and with less Intention of Thought; since I could not, at first, at a single View, and with the whole Attention I am capable of, discover what I enquired after. This I might have done at the beginning; for when the Subjects of our Meditation are somewhat abstruse, 'tis always the best way to consider them by parts, and not fruitlessly weary our selves with the vain Hopes of meeting happily with the Truth.

What I enquire after is, The Cause of the strict Union betwixt the minute Parts, that make up the little Fetter *A B*. Now I conceive only distinctly three Things that can be this Cause, *viz.* The very parts of that little Fetter, the Will of the Author of Nature, or Invisible Bodies surrounding such little Bands. I might yet alledge as the Cause of these things, the Form of Bodies, the Qualities of Hardness, or some occult Quality; the Sympathy betwixt Parts of the same *Species*, *&c.* but since I have no distinct Idea of those fine things: I neither must nor can ground my Reasonings thereupon: so that if I find not the Cause I search after, in those things of which I have distinct Idea's, I will not fruitlessly trouble my self with the Contemplation of such rambling and general Notions of Logick; and shall supersede speaking of what I understand not. But let us examine the *first* of these things, that may be the Cause, why the parts of that small Band are so firmly joined; *viz.* the very Parts of which it is made up.

When I only consider the Parts of which hard Bodies are composed, I am inclined to believe; *That no* * *Cement, which unites the Parts of that Fetter, can be imagin'd besides themselves and their own Rest; for of what Nature could it be? It shall not be a thing subsisting of it self; since all those minute Parts being Substances, for what Reason should they be united by other Substances but themselves? Neither will it be a Quality different from Rest; because there is no Quality more contrary to Motion, that may separate those Parts, but their own Rest: but besides Substances and their Qualities, we know not any other sorts of things.*

* *M. Des Cartes* his *Principles, Art.* 55. *Part.* II.

'Tis true, that the Parts of hard Bodies remain united, as long as they are in rest one by another; and that when they are once in Rest, they remain of themselves in the same state, as long as they can: but this is not what I enquire after, and I know not how too I came to mistake the Subject: I endeavour here to discover, Why the Parts of hard Bodies have so great a strength, to remain in Rest one by another, that they withstand the Force that is used to move them.

*I might however answer my self, that every Body has truly a force of continuing fix't in it's present state, and that this force is equal whether in Motion or Rest: But that the Reason why the parts of hard Bodies remain in rest, by one another, and that we can † difficultly move and separate them, is our not imploying sufficient motion to overpower their rest. This is *probable*, but I am seeking *certainty*, if it be to be found, and not bare probability. And how can I know with certainty, and evidence, that each Body has this Force to continue in the state it's in, and that this Force is equal both as to Motion and Rest, since Matter on

* *Art.* 43. ibid.

† *Art.* 63.

the contrary, ſeems indifferently paſſive to either, and altogether deſtitute of force. Let us have recourſe then with M. *des Cartes* to the Will of the Creator, which is, it may be, that force which Bodies ſeem to have in themſelves, which is the ſecond thing above mention'd, ſuppos'd capable of preſerving the parts of this little Fetter we ſpeak of, ſo cloſely link'd to one another.

Certainly, 'tis poſſible that God may *will* every Body ſhould remain in it's preſent ſtate, and that his will ſhould be the force which unites their parts to one another, as I otherwiſe know his will to be the moving force which puts Bodies in motion: For ſince matter is incapable of moving it ſelf, I have reaſon, methinks, to conclude it is a Spirit, and even the Author of Nature, which puts it, and preſerves it, in Motion, by preſerving it ſucceſſively in different places by his bare will; in as much as an Almighty Being acts not with inſtruments, and his Will is neceſſarily follow'd by effects.

* Art. 33. of the ſecond Part.

* I acknowledge, then, it's poſſible, that God may will that every thing remain in its preſent ſtate, whether it be motion or reſt; and that his Will may be the natural power which Bodies have of remaining in the ſtate they once have obtain'd. And if ſo, we muſt like M. *des Cartes* meaſure that power, conclude what ought to be the effects of it, and give rules for the force and communication of motions upon the colliſion of different Bodies, in proportion to their magnitude, ſince we have no other way of coming to the knowledge of that general, and immutable Will of God, who makes the different power theſe Bodies have of acting upon, and reſiſting one another, conſiſt in their different ſize and ſwiftneſs.

But, however, I have no infallible proof that God wills by a poſitive Will that Bodies remain in Reſt, and one would think it ſufficient for God to will the exiſtence of matter, not only to cauſe it to exiſt, but to exiſt in reſt.

The caſe is not the ſame with motion, ſince the Idea of a matter mov'd certainly includes two Powers, to which it is related, *viz.* That which created, and alſo that which mov'd it. But the Idea of a matter in reſt, includes only the Idea of a power which has created it whilſt there is no neceſſity of any other power to put it in reſt, ſince if we barely conceive matter, without thinking on any power, we ſhall neceſſarily conceive it in reſt. Thus it is I conceive things: for I am to judge by my Ideas; and my Ideas tell me, Reſt is but the privation of Motion. For God need but ceaſe to will the motion of a Body; to make its motion ceaſe, and to cauſe it to reſt.

But I remember I have heard from many very ingenious Perſons, that Motion ſeem'd to them as much the privation of Reſt, as Reſt the privation of Motion. And ſome will not doubt to affirm, for reaſons I can't comprehend, that *motion* ſeems rather a *privation* than *reſt*. I do not diſtinctly call to mind the reaſons they alledge: however this ought to make me ſuſpicious, leſt my Ideas ſhould be falſe. For though moſt Men ſay what they pleaſe upon ſubjects that ſeem of little moment, yet I have reaſon to believe the Perſons I ſpeak of, were pleas'd to ſpeak what they thought: wherefore I muſt ſtill examine my Ideas more carefully.

To me it ſeems a thing of undoubted certainty, and the Gentlemen before-mention'd won't deny it, that 'tis the will of God which moves Bodies. The force then which that Bowl I ſee in motion has, is the will of God that moves it; what now is God requir'd to do to ſtop it? Muſt he will, by a poſitive will, that it ſhould reſt? or is it ſufficient to ceaſe to will its motion? Tis plain, that if God but ceaſe to will the motion of this Bowl, the ceſſation of its motion, and conſequently reſt will ſucceed the ceſſation of the Will of God. For the Will of God which was the force that moved the Bowl deſiſting, that force deſiſts, and the Bowl will be no longer mov'd. Therefore the ceſſation of the moving force produces reſt: Reſt then has no force to cauſe it; but is a bare privation that ſuppoſes no poſitive will in God. Thus we ſhould admit in God a poſitive will without any reaſon or neceſſity, if we aſcribed to Bodies any force to remain in reſt.

I imagine here only God, my ſelf, and one Bowl.

But to overthrow this argument, if poſſible, Let us now ſuppoſe a Bowl at reſt, as before we ſuppos'd it in motion, what muſt God do, in order to agitate it? Is it enough that he ceaſes to will its repoſe! if ſo, I have hitherto made no advance, for that motion will be equally the privation of reſt, as reſt of motion. I ſuppoſe then that God deſiſts to will the reſt of this Bowl; but ſuppoſing it, I ſee it not put in motion; and if any others do, I deſire them to inform me with what degree of motion it is carried. Certainly 'tis impoſſible it ſhould be mov'd, or have any degree of motion: and 'tis impoſſible to conceive any degree of motion in it, barely from our conceiving that God ceaſes to will it ſhould be at reſt; becauſe it goes not with motion as it does with reſt. Motions are infinitely various, and are ſuſceptible of *more* and *leſs*. But reſt being *nothing*, one cannot differ from another. One and the ſame Bowl which moves twice as faſt at one time as at another, has twice as much force, or motion, at one time as at another. But it cannot be ſaid that the ſame Bowl has reſt double at one time to its Reſt at another.

There muſt therefore be a poſitive will in God, to put a Bowl in motion, or to give it ſuch a force as it may move it ſelf with: But he need only ceaſe to will it ſhould be mov'd, to cauſe its motion to deſiſt, that is to make it reſt. Juſt as to the creating a World, it is not enough that God ceaſe to will its non-exiſtence, unleſs he likewiſe poſitively will the manner it ſhall exiſt in. But in order to annihilate it there is no need of God's willing it

ſhould

should not exist, since God cannot will nothingness by a positive will, but barely, that he cease to will its Being.

I consider not here *Motion* and *Rest*, according to their relative Capacity; (for 'tis manifest that resting Bodies have as real Relations to those about them, as Bodies in motion) I only conceive that Bodies mov'd have a moving force, and that others at rest have no force at all to persevere in it; because the relations of mov'd, to the circumambient Bodies, perpetually changing, they need a continual force to produce these Changes, it being indeed nothing but these Changes, that cause all that novelty we observe in Nature; but there is no need of force to do nothing. When the relation of a Body to those surrounding it is constantly the same, there is nothing done, and the continuance of that Relation, I mean the action of the Will of God, which preserves it, is not different from that which preserves the Body it self.

If it be true, as I conceive, That Rest is but the privation of Motion, the least Motion, or that of the least Body mov'd will include a greater force or power, than the rest of the greatest Body; and so the least force, and the least Body, suppos'd to be mov'd * in a *Vacuum*, against another never so great and bulky, will be capable of moving it, since the largest Body at rest will have no power of resisting the least Body that shall strike against it. Therefore the resistance which is made by the parts of hard Bodies to hinder their Separation, necessarily proceeds from something else than their repose.

*By a Body in a *vacuum*, I understand one so separate from others, whether hard or liquid, as that there is none either to aid or hinder the Communication of Motions.

But 'tis necessary to demonstrate by sensible Experiments, what we have been proving by abstracted Reasonings, to see whether our Idea's comport with our sense of things. For it often happens that such Reasonings deceive us, at least, will not convince others, and especially such as are prejudiced to the contrary. M. *des Cartes*'s Authority has such an influence upon some Men's Reason, that unless we prove all imaginable ways, that great Man in an Error, we cannot disabuse them. What I have said will be readily admitted by such as are not prepossest with a contrary Opinion; and I perceive that I shall even be blam'd by them, for proving things which seem to them indisputable: However, the *Cartesians* well deserve our endeavours to content them. The others may pass over this Discourse, if they think it tedious.

Here then are some Experiments, which sensibly demonstrate, That Rest has no *power* to resist *Motion*, and which consequently evince, that the Will of the Author of Nature, which constitutes the power and force, every Body has to continue in its present state, respects not rest, but motion only, since Bodies consider'd in themselves have no force at all.

We daily see great Ships, whilest floating in the Water, mov'd with little Bodies striking against them. From which experience I conclude, That if these great Bodies were in a *vacuum*, they might be moved with much greater facility, since the reason of a Vessel's being mov'd in the Water with some difficulty, is the resistance the Water makes to the imparted motion; which in a void space would not be found. Now that which manifestly shows that Water resists the motion impressed on the Vessel, is the cessation of its motion some time after the impulsion, which certainly would not happen, did not the Vessel lose its motion, by communicating it to the Water; or if the Water yielded to its passage without any opposition; or lastly imparted to it some of its own motion. Therefore since a Vessel agitated in the Water, ceases by degrees to move, 'tis an infallible sign that the Water, instead of forwarding, with-stands its motion, and consequently it would be infinitely easier to move a great Body in a *vacuum* than in Water, since there would be no resistance on the part of surrounding Bodies. 'Tis evident therefore, that Rest has no force to resist Motion, and that the least Motion contains more power, and force, than the greatest Rest; or at least, that we ought not to measure the force of Motion and Rest, by the proportion we find between the magnitude of Bodies in those two States, as M. *des Cartes* has done.

'Tis true, there is some reason to believe that the Vessel's mov'd, whilst in the Water, by reason of the continual change which happen in the watery parts about it, though to us it seems not to change its place: And this has been an inducement to some Persons to believe, That 'tis not the bare force of the impelling Agent which makes it advance in Water, but that having before receiv'd a great deal of motion from the little parts of the surrounding Liquid, which press it equally on all sides; this Motion is only determin'd by the adventitious motion of the impelling Body, so that what moves a Body in Water, could not do it in a *Vacuum*. And thus it is that M. *des Cartes*, and his followers, defend the Rules of Motion they have given us.

Let us suppose, for example, a piece of Wood of a Foot square, plac'd in a liquid Body, all the parts whereof act and move against it, and because they press it equally on all sides, as well towards A as B, the piece of Wood stirs neither one way nor another: Now if I drive another piece of Wood of half a Foot against the former, on the side A, I see it advance forward. Hence I conclude, that it might be mov'd in a *vacuum* with less force than that of the piece that drives it, for the foregoing Reasons. But the Persons I speak of deny it, and answer, That the reason of the greater piece's advancing, when urg'd by the little one, is, that the

* Art. 5. the * latter unable to move it singly, being joyn'd with the parts of the agitated Liquid, determines them to drive it, by imparting some of their motion to it. But 'tis manifest that by this answer, the piece of Wood, when once mov'd, could never diminish its motion, but must, on the contrary, perpetually increase it. For according to this answer, the piece of Wood is more driven by the Water to the side of A than B, therefore it must perpetually proceed; and because this impulsion is continual, its motion must constantly increase. But as I have said, the Water is so far from facilitating its motion, that it continually resists it, which resistance still lessening it more and more, at last makes it altogether insensible.

But I am now to prove that the piece of Wood which is equally push'd by the little parts of the encompassing Water, has no motion, or force at all, capable of moving it, though it continually changes its immediate place, and the surface of the Water round it is different at different times. For if it be so that a Body equally press'd on all sides, as a piece of Wood, be destitute of motion, undoubtedly that foreign force that strikes against it, must communicate it, since at the time of this force's urging it on, the Water resists, and insensibly dissipates the impress'd motion, causing it by little and little, at last to cease.

It is certain, at least to those I speak to, that there is no more motion in nature at one time than another; and that Bodies at rest cannot be put in motion, but by the collision of some agitated Bodies, which communicate their motion to them. Whence I conclude, that a Body, which I suppose, created perfectly at rest, in the midst of Water, will never receive any degree of motion, from the little parts of the Water which surround it, and which strike continually against it, provided their force be equal on all sides; because all these little parts which dash equally against it on all sides, rallying again with their whole motion, communicate none of it; and consequently this Body ought to be consider'd as at rest, and without any moving force, though it continually changes its situation.

Now the proof I have for the rebounding of these little parts together with their whole motion, is this; That otherwise the Water which touches this Body, must be much resolv'd, or even grow congeal'd, and become almost as hard as the Wood upon its surface, since the motion of the watry parts ought to be equally diffus'd into the little parts of the Body they encompass.

But that I may accommodate my self to the Patrons of M. *des Cartes*'s Opinion, I am willing to grant that we ought not to consider a Vessel on the Water as at Rest. I grant likewise, That all the parts of the environing Water are subservient to the new motion imprinted by the Waterman, though it be but too visible by the decrease of the Boats motion, that they resist it more on the side where it makes, than on the other whence it's driven: Notwithstanding which supposition, I say, that of all the parts of Water in the River, according to M. *des Cartes*, there are none which can promote the motion of the Vessel, except those
* Art. 63. which immediately touch it on the side it's driven on. For * according to that Philosopher, *The Water being fluid, all the parts that go to its composition, act not conjointly against the Body we would move; but only those which touching it, conjointly bear upon it.* But those which conjointly bear upon the Vessel, and the Boats-man together, are twenty times more inconsiderable than the Boat. 'Tis plain therefore, from the explication given by M. *des Cartes*, in this Article, concerning the difficulty we find to break a Nail between our Fingers, that a little Body is capable of moving one much bigger than it self. For in short, our Hands are not so fluid as Water; and when we would break a Nail, there are more parts that act jointly in our hands, than in the Water which pushes against a Vessel.

But here's a more sensible Experiment. Take a Plank well smooth'd, or any other very hard Plane, drive in it a Nail half way, and set this Plane in a somewhat inclining posture; then place a bar of Iron an hundred times thicker than the Nail, an Inch or two above it, and letting it slide down, it will not break it. Mean time it is observable, that all the parts of the Bar, which is hard and solid, act jointly upon the Nail. If, therefore there *were no other cement than Rest to unite the parts of the Nail*, the bar of Iron being an hundred times bigger, ought by the Fifth Rule of M. *des Cartes*, and according to Reason, communicate somewhat of its motion to the part of the Nail it fell upon, that is, to break it, and pass on, even though this Bar should slide with a very gentle motion. Therefore we must seek some other Cause than the Rest of Bodies, that makes them hard, and capable of resisting the violence that is offer'd to break them, since Rest has no force to with-stand Motion: And I am perswaded these Experiences are sufficient to evince, That the abstracted proofs we have given are not false.

We must then examine the third Thing, we supposed before, might be the cause of the strict Union found between the Parts of hard Bodies, namely, An invisible Matter which surrounds them, and which being rapidly mov'd, pushes most violently the external and internal Parts of these Bodies, and constringes them in such a manner as requires greater strength to separate them, than has that invisible and extremely agitated Matter.

Methinks I might reasonably conclude, That the union of the constituent parts of hard Bodies, depends on an invisible Matter which surrounds and compresses them, since the two other things supposed possible causes of this *union* have been discover'd not to be truly so. For since I meet with resistance in breaking a piece of Iron, which resistance proceeds not from

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the Iron, nor the Will of God, as I think I have prov'd, it muſt neceſſarily proceed from ſome invisible Matter, which can be no other than that which immediately ſurrounds and binds it. Nevertheleſs I ſhall give ſome poſitive Proofs of this Opinion, after I have more largely explain'd it by ſome Inſtance.

Take a Globe of any hard Metal, which is hollow within, and divided in two Halfs, join them together with a little bond of Wax, at the place of their Union, and then extract the Air: theſe two half Globes will be ſo firmly join'd to one another, that two Teams of Horſes faſtned to the Rings on the oppoſite ſides of the Globe, ſhall not ſeparate them, provided they be large in proportion to the Number of Horſes: when yet if the Air be ſuffer'd to enter, one Man ſhall ſeparate them with a great deal of Eaſe. From this Experiment 'tis eaſie to conclude, That what united the two *Hemiſpheres* to one another, was the Preſſure of the ſurrounding Air, upon their outward and convex Surface, whilſt there was no Compreſſion, in their concave and inward parts; ſo that the Action of the Horſes, which drew the two *Hemiſpheres* on either ſide, could not conquer the Reſiſtance made by innumerable little Parts of Air, by their preſſing theſe two Halfs. But the leaſt Force is capable of dividing them, when the Air entring in the Copper Globe, drives againſt the concave and inward Surfaces, as much as the external Air preſſes againſt the outward and convex.

Take, on the contrary, the Bladder of a Carp, and put it in a Veſſel, from which the Air is pump'd: this Bladder, being full of Air, will crack and burſt, becauſe then there is no exteriour Air to reſiſt that within the Bladder. 'Tis likewiſe for the ſame Reaſon I have given of the firſt Experiment, that two Glaſs or Marble Planks ground and poliſh'd upon one another, ſo cling together, that Violence muſt be us'd to ſeparate them one way; becauſe the two parts of the Marble are preſs'd and conſtring'd by the external Air that ſurrounds them, and are not ſo ſtrongly preſs'd by that between. I might produce infinite other Experiments, to prove, that the groſs Air which ſurrounds Bodies, ſtrongly unites their Parts. But what I have ſaid is enough to give a diſtinct Explication of my Thoughts upon the preſent Queſtion.

I ſay then, that what cauſes the Parts of hard Bodies, and the little Fetters before-mentioned, hang ſo cloſely united to each other, is, there being other little Bodies infinitely more agitated than the courſe Air we breathe, which bear againſt them, and compreſs them; and that which makes it ſo hard to ſeparate them, is not their Reſt, but the Agitation of theſe little ſurrounding Bodies. So that, that which reſiſts *Motion* is not *Reſt* (this being but the *Privation* of it, and has no force at all) but ſome contrary Motion.

This ſimple Expoſition of my Opinion ſeems doubtleſs highly reaſonable; yet I fore-ſee, that many Perſons will not eaſily be induc'd to yield to it. Hard Bodies make ſo great Impreſſion on the Senſes, when they ſtrike us, or when we uſe Violence to break them, that we are inclin'd to believe their Parts more ſtrictly united than they really are. And, on the contrary, the little Bodies, which I have ſaid encompaſs them, and to which I have aſcribed the Force of cauſing this Union, making no Impreſſion on our Senſes, ſeem too weak to produce ſo ſenſible an Effect.

But, to take away this Prejudice, which bottoms on the Impreſſions of our Senſes, and on the Difficulty we find, to imagine Bodies more little and agitated than thoſe we daily ſee; 'tis to be conſider'd, that the Hardneſs of Bodies is not to be meaſur'd with relation to our Hands, or the Endeavours we are able to make, which are different at different times. For indeed if the greateſt Force of Men be nothing in compariſon with the ſubtle Matter, we ſhould be much too blame to believe, That Diamonds, and the hardeſt Stones, cannot derive their Hardneſs from the Compreſſion of thoſe little rapid Bodies, which inviron them. Now we may viſibly diſcover, how inconſiderably weak is Humane Force, if it be conſider'd, that Man's Power of moving his Body, in ſo many manners, proceeds from a very moderate Fermentation of the Blood, which ſomewhat agitates the ſmaller parts of it, and ſo produces the Animal Spirits. For 'tis the agitation of theſe Spirits, which gives us the Power of making thoſe Endeavours, which we groundleſly regard, as ſomething great and mighty.

But it muſt be obſerv'd, That this Fermentation of our Blood, is but a ſmall Communication of that ſubtle Matter's Motion we have been ſpeaking of. For all the Fermentations of viſible Bodies, are nothing but Communications of Motion from the Inviſible; ſince every Body receives its Agitation from ſome other. 'Tis not therefore to be wonder'd, if our Force be not ſo great as that of the ſame ſubtle Matter we receive it from. But if our Blood fermented as much in our Heart, as Gun-Powder ferments, and is agitated, when Fire is put to it; that is, If our Blood receiv'd as great a Communication of Motion from the ſubtle Matter, as Gun-Powder receives, we might do extraordinary things with a great deal of Eaſe; as break a Bar of Iron, over-turn an Houſe, *&c.* provided we ſuppoſe a competent proportion between our Members and our Blood ſo violently agitated. We muſt therefore rid our ſelves of our Prejudice, and not, following the Impreſſion of our Senſes, imagine that the Parts of hard Bodies are ſo ſtrongly united to one another, becauſe of the Difficulty we find to break them.

But if, on another hand, we conſider the Effects of Fire in Mines, in the Gravity of Bodies, and ſeveral other natural Effects, which have no other Cauſe than the Commotion of

these insensible Corpuscles, as is prov'd by M. *des Cartes* in many places of his Works, we shall manifestly discover, that it does not exceed their Force, to unite and bind together the Parts of hard *Bodies* so powerfully as we find them. For, in short, I fear not to affirm, That a Cannon-*Bullet*, whose Motion seems so extraordinary, receives not the thousandth part of the Motion of the subtle Matter which surrounds it.

My Assertion will not be doubted of, if it be consider'd, *First*, That the Gun-Powder is not all inflam'd, nor at the same instant: *Secondly*, That though it were all on Fire in the self-same Moment, yet it floats a very short time in the subtle Matter; and *Bodies* swimming but a little while in others, can receive no great Motion from them; as may be seen in Boats when riding in a Stream, which receive their Motion by degrees. *Thirdly*, and principally, That each part of the Powder can receive but a collateral Motion, which the subtle Matter yields to. For Water only communicates to the Vessel the direct Motion which is common to all the parts of it, which Motion is generally very inconsiderable, in respect of the others.

I might still prove to M. *des Cartes*'s Followers, the Greatness of the subtle Matter's Motion, by the Motion of heavy Bodies, from whence might be drawn very certain and exact Proofs, if that were necessary to my Subject. But in order to have one sufficient Proof of the violent Agitation of the subtle Matter, to which I ascribe the Hardness of Bodies, it suffices to read attentively, what I have written in the *second Chapter* of the *fourth Book* towards the End.

Being now deliver'd from our Prejudices, which induc'd us to believe our Efforts very potent, and those of the subtle Matter, which surrounds and constringes hard *Bodies*, very feeble; being likewise satisfied of the vehement Commotion of this Matter, by what has been said of Gun-Powder; 'twill be no hard Matter to discover, that 'tis absolutely necessary that this Matter, acting infinitely more on the Surface, than the Inside of the hard *Bodies* it encompasses and compresses, should be the Cause of their Hardness, or of the Resistance we feel when we endeavour to break them.

But since there are always many Parts of this invisible Matter, passing through the Pores of hard *Bodies*, they not only render them hard, as I have before explain'd; but are also the Causes that some are springing, and elastical, that others stand bent, and others still are fluid and liquid; and in short are the Cause not only of the Force, which the Parts of hard Bodies have, to remain close by one another; but of that likewise which the parts of fluid Bodies have to separate; or, which is the same thing, are the Cause of the Hardness of some Bodies, and the Fluidity of others.

But whereas 'tis absolutely necessary to know distinctly the Physicks of M. *des Cartes*, the figure of his Elements, and of the parts which constitute particular Bodies, to account for the stiffness of some and the flexibility of others, I shall not insist upon explaining it. Such as have read the Works of that Philosopher, will easily imagine what may be the cause of these things; whereas it would be a difficult task for me to explain it; and those who are unacquainted with that Author would have a very confus'd Notion of the reasons I might offer.

Nor shall I stand to resolve a vast number of difficulties, which I foresee will be urg'd against what I have been establishing, because if those who propose them have no knowledge of True natural Philosophy, I should but tire and confound them instead of satisfying them. But if they were Men of Science, I could not answer them without a long train of diagrams and reasoning. Wherefore I think it best to intreat those who shall find any difficulty in what I have said, to give this discourse a more careful perusal: not doubting but if they read it and consider it as they ought, all their objections will fall to the ground. But after all, if they think my request inconvenient, let them sit still, there being no great danger in the ignorance of the cause of the hardness of Bodies.

I speak not here of *contiguity*: for 'tis manifest that contiguous things touch so little, that there's always a good quantity of subtle matter passing between them, which endeavouring to continue its motion in a right line hinders them from uniting.

As to the *union* found between two marbles that have been polish't one upon another, I have already explain'd it, and 'tis easy to see that though the subtle matter passes constantly between the two parts as close as they are, yet the air cannot get in; and therefore 'tis that which compresses, and constringes the two parts together, and makes them so difficult to be disunited, unless we glide them over one another.

From all this it is manifest that the *Continuity*, *Contiguity* and *Union* of two marbles would be one and the same thing in a *vacuum*: for neither have we different Ideas of them, so that it would be to talk without understanding our selves to make them differ absolutely, and without any regard to the surrounding Bodies.

I now come to make some reflexions upon M. *des Cartes*'s opinion, and the original of his Error: I call his opinion an Error, because I can find no sincere way of defending what he has said upon the rules of motion, and the cause of the hardness of *Bodies* towards the end of the second part of his principles in several places; and that he seems to have evidently prov'd the truth of the contrary Opinion.

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This great man most distinctly conceiving that matter could not naturally move it self; but that the moving force of all *Bodies* was nothing but the general will of the Author of Nature, and that therefore the communication of their motion, upon their natural collision must come from the same will, yielded to be carried away with this notion, That the rules of the different communication of motions, must be fetch'd from the proportion found between the different magnitudes of colliding *Bodies*, it being impossible to penetrate into the designs and will of God. And whereas he concluded that every thing had the force to persevere in its present state, whether it were in motion, or rest, because God, whose will constituted this force, acts always in the same manner. He infer'd that rest had an equal force with motion. Thus he measur'd the effects of the power of rest by the greatness of the Body it resided in, as well as those of motion; and hence he gave the rules of the communication of motion which are seen in his Principles, and the cause of the hardness of Bodies which I have endeavour'd to refute.

'Tis an hard matter not to submit to the opinion of M. *des Cartes*, when we contemplate it on the same side. For once more, since the communication of Motions proceeds only from the will of the Author of Nature, and that we see all Bodies continue in the state they have once been put in, whether it be motion or rest, it seems that we ought to seek for the rules of the different Communications of motion, upon the concourse of Bodies, not in the will of God which is unknown to us, but in the proportion that is found between the Magnitudes of these same Bodies.

I don't therefore admire that M. *des Cartes* should have light upon this notion, but I only wonder he did not correct it, when having pusht on his discoveries, he found out the existence and effects of the subtle matter which surrounds all Bodies.

I am surpriz'd to find him in the 192. Article of the fourth Part, attribute the elastick force of certain *Bodies* to the subtle matter, and yet not ascribe to it their hardness, and the resistance they make to our endeavours to bend and break them, but only to the rest of their parts. For I think it evident that the cause of the *Elasticity* and stiffness of some *Bodies* is the same with that which empowers them to resist the violence that is us'd to break them. For indeed the force which is imploy'd in breaking a piece of steel, has but an insensible difference from that which is us'd to bend it. *Art.* 55 & 43 of the *second Part* and elsewhere.

I mean not to multiply reasons here, which one might give for the proving these things, nor to answer some difficulties possible to be urg'd about *Bodies* which are not sensibly *springing*, and yet are difficultly *bent*. For all these Difficulties vanish, if we consider, that the subtle Matter cannot easily make new Tracks in Bodies which break in bending, as in Glass and temper'd Steel; which it can easier do in such Bodies as are compos'd of branchy Parts, and that are not brittle, as in Gold and Lead; and *lastly*, That there is no hard Body, but has some kind of *Elaterium*.

'Tis an hard Matter to perswade ones self, That M. *des Cartes* did positively believe the Cause of *Hardness* to be different from that which makes the *Elasticity*; and what looks most likely is, That he made not sufficient Reflection on that Matter. When a Man has for a long time meditated on any Subject, and is well satisfied about that of his present Enquiry; he commonly thinks no farther on it. He believeth, that the Conceptions he had of it, are undeniable Truths; and that it's needless to examine them any more. But a Man has so many things in him, which disrelish his Application, provoke him to precipitate Judgments, and subject him to Errour; that though his Mind remains apparently satisfied, yet it is not always well instructed in the Truth. M. *des Cartes* was a Man like us. No greater Solidity, Accuracy, Extent, and Penetration of Thought is any where to be met with, than in his Works, I confess; but yet he was not infallible. Therefore, 'tis very probable, he remain'd so setled in his Opinion, from his not sufficiently reflecting, that he asserted something in the Consequence of his Principles contrary to it. He grounded it on very specious, and probable Reasons; but such, notwithstanding, as being not capable of themselves to force his Consent, he might still have suspended his Judgment; and consequently, as a Philosopher, he ought to have done it. It was not enough to examine in an hard Body, what was in it that might make it so; but he ought likewise to have thought on the invisible Bodies, which might give it Hardness; as he did at the End of his *Philosophical Principles*, when he ascrib'd to them the Cause of their Elasticity: He ought to have made an exact Division, and comprehensive of whatever might contribute to the Hardness of Bodies. It was not enough to have sought the Causes of it in the Will of God; he ought also to have thought on the subtle Matter, which surrounds these Bodies. For though the Existence of that violently agitated Matter, was not yet proved in the place of his *Principles*, where he speaks of Hardness; it was not however rejected: He ought therefore to have suspended his Judgement, and have well remembred, That what he had written concerning the cause of hardness, and of the Rules of Motion, was fit to be revised; which I believe was neglected by him. Or at least, he has not sufficiently considered the true Reason of a thing, very easie to be discover'd, and which yet is of greatest consequence in Natural Philosophy. I thus explain my self:

M. *des Cartes* well knew, That to the support of his System, (the Truth of which he could not reasonably suspect) it was absolutely necessary, That great Bodies should always communicate

101 cate ſome of their motion to the leſſer which they met with; and that the latter ſhould rebound, at the encounter of the former, without the like loſs of their own: For otherwiſe the firſt Element would not have all the motion that is neceſſary above the ſecond, nor the ſecond above the third; and ſo all his Syſtem would be abſolutely falſe, as is manifeſt to thoſe who have a little conſider'd it. But in ſuppoſing that Reſt has force to reſiſt Motion, and that a great Body in Reſt, cannot be mov'd by another leſs than it ſelf, though moſt violently ſtriking againſt it, 'tis plain, that great Bodies muſt have much leſs motion, than an equal maſs of little ones, ſince they may always, by that ſuppoſition, communicate their own motion, but cannot always receive any from the leſſer. Thus this Suppoſition, being not contrary to all that M. *des Cartes*, had laid down in his Principles, from the beginning, to the eſtabliſhment of his Rules of Motion, and according very well with the conſequence of theſe ſame Principles, he thought the Rules of Motion, which he believ'd he had demonſtrated in their Cauſe, were ſufficiently confirm'd by their effects.

I agree with M. *des Cartes* in the bottom of the things, That great Bodies communicate their Motion much eaſier than the leſſer; and that therefore his firſt Element is more agitated than the ſecond, and the ſecond than the third; but the Cauſe is manifeſt without recourſe to his Suppoſition. Little and fluid Bodies, as Water, Air, *&c.* can but communicate to any great ones an uniform motion, which is common to all their parts. The Water of a River can only communicate to a Boat a deſcending motion, which is common to all the little parts the Water is compos'd of, each of which Particles, beſides its common motion, has infinite others, which are particular. Which reaſon makes it evident, That a Boat, for inſtance, cannot have ſo much motion, as an equal volume of Water; ſince the Boat can only receive from the Water a direct motion, and common to all the parts of it. If twenty parts of a fluid Body, drive againſt any other Body on one ſide, whileſt there are as many urging it on the other, it remains immoveable, and all the Particles of the ſurrounding Fluid it ſwims in, rebound without loſing any thing of their motion. Therefore groſs Bodies, whoſe parts are united one to the other, can receive only a circular and uniform motion from the *vortex* of the encompaſſing ſubtle Matter.

This Reaſon ſeems ſufficient to give us to underſtand, why groſs Bodies are not ſo much agitated as little ones; and that it is not neceſſary to the explaining theſe things, to ſuppoſe any force in Reſt to reſiſt Motion. The certainty of M. *des Cartes* Philoſophical Principles, cannot therefore be of uſe in proving or defending his Rules of Motion. And we have reaſon to believe, that if M. *des Cartes* himſelf, had, without prepoſſeſſion examin'd his Principles afreſh, at the ſame time weighing ſuch Reaſons as I have alledg'd, he would not have believ'd the effects of Nature, had corroborated his Rules, nor have fallen into a contradiction in attributing the hardneſs of hard Bodies only to the Reſt of their parts, and their Elaſticity to the Effort of the ſubtle Matter.

I now come to give the rules of the communication of motion in a *Vacuum*, which follow upon what I have before eſtabliſh't concerning the Nature of Reſt. *B*odies being not hard in a *Vacuum*, ſince they are only ſo, by the preſſure of the ſubtle matter that ſurrounds them; if two *B*odies meet together, they wou'd flatten without rebounding: We muſt therefore ſuppoſe them hard by their own Nature, and not by the preſſure of the ſubtle Matter, to give theſe Rules.

Reſt having no force to reſiſt motion, and many *B*odies being to be conſider'd but as one, at the inſtant of their colliſion: 'tis plain they ought not to rebound, ſave when they are equal in their bulk and ſwiftneſs, or that their ſwiftneſs compenſates for the want of bulk, or their bulk, the want of ſwiftneſs: And it is eaſy from hence to conclude, that they ought in all other caſes ſo to communicate their motion, as afterwards to proceed along together with an equal pace.

* General Rules of the Communication of Motions.

* Wherefore to know what ought to happen in all the different ſuppoſitions, of the Magnitude and celerity of colliding *B*odies, we need only add together all the degrees of Motion, of two or more, which ought to be conſider'd but as one, in the moment of their concourſe, and afterwards devide the ſumme of the whole Motion proportionably to the bulk of each reſpective *B*ody.

† See M. *des Cartes's* Rules in the ſecond Part of his Principles.

Hence I conclude, that the † ſeven Rules of Motion, M. *des Cartes* has given, the three firſt are good.

That the fourth is falſe, and that *B* ought to communicate it's motion to C, in proportion to the bigneſs of the ſame C, and after go along in company, ſo as if C be double to *B*, and B: have three degrees of Motion, it muſt give away two of them. For I have ſufficiently prov'd, that M. *des Cartes* ought not to have ſuppos'd in Reſt, a force to reſiſt Motion.

That the fifth is falſe.

That the ſixth is falſe, and that B ought to communicate half of it's Motion to C.

And that the ſeventh is falſe, and that *B* ought ever to communicate it's motion to C, in proportion to the magnitude of both *B* and C. *B*ut that if, according to the ſuppoſition C, be doubl'd to *B*, and have three degrees of Motion, whilſt C has but two, they muſt proceed together in company; C and *B* being but one *B*ody at the time of their colliſion, and therefore we muſt add together the degrees of ſwiftneſs, which are five, and afterwards devide

divide them in proportion to their bigneſs, and ſo diſtribute $1\frac{1}{2}$ to *B*, and $3\frac{1}{2}$ to C, which is double to *B*. But theſe rules, though certain, from what I have ſaid, are yet contrary to experience, ſince we are not in a *Vacuum*.

The chief of thoſe experiences, which are contrary to what I have ſaid about the rules of motion, is the conſtant rebounding of hard *B*odies, when they meet one one way and another another, or at leaſt, their not going in company after their encounter.

I anſwer to which, we muſt call to mind, what we have formerly ſaid of the cauſe of Elaſticity. Namely, that there is a Matter of a ſtrangely-violent Motion, which continually paſſes into the parts of hard Bodies, and makes them ſo, by it's compreſſing both their outward and inward parts. For it will be eaſy from hence to ſee, that at the time of percuſſion, two encountring Bodies drive a turn off the current of this Matter from the neareſt places to the ſtricken; which Matter reſiſting with great violence, repells the two *B*odies, which ſtrike againſt each other and reſtores it's paſſage, which the percuſſion had ſtopp'd up. That which more clearly ſtill proves my opinion is this, That if two *B*owls of lead, or of any other leſs Elaſtick Matter meet, they rebound not after their colliſion, but proceed almoſt according to the rules before eſtabliſh't, which they keep to ſo much more exactly, as they are leſs ſpringing. *B*odies therefore rebound after their percuſſion, becauſe they are hard, that is, as I have explain'd, becauſe there is an extreamly-agitated Matter, which compreſſes them, and which paſſing through their pores, with an extreme violence, repell the *B*odies, which meet againſt one another. *B*ut it ought to be ſuppos'd, that the percutient *B*odies break not thoſe which they daſh againſt by a motion over-powering the reſiſtance the little parts of the ſubtle Matter are capable of making; as when we diſcharge a Musket againſt a piece of Wood.

'Tis true the ſubtle Matter compreſſes ſoft *B*odies, and paſſes with a rapid courſe, through their pores no leſs than through thoſe of hard; and yet theſe ſoft *B*odies have no Elaſticity. The reaſon wherof is this: that the Matter paſſing through ſoft *B*odies, can with a great deal of eaſe, open it ſelf new paſſages, by reaſon of the minuteneſs of the parts compoſing them, or of ſome other particular configuration, proper for that *Effect*; which hard Bodies will not admit, by reaſon of the largeneſs and ſituation of their parts, which are contrary to the *ſame*.

Thus when a hard Body ſtrikes another that is ſoft, it alters all the roads the ſubtle Matter uſe to paſs through, which is commonly viſible, as in a Musket-bullet, which flattens when it is ſmitten. But when a hard *B*ody ſtrikes againſt another like it, it either makes none, or very few new paths, and the ſubtle Matter in its pores, is oblig'd to return upon the ſame ground, or elſe muſt repel the *B*ody, which blocks up its little Avenues.

Let A be a hard Body, B a ſoft one, C the Chanel of the ſubtle Matter. I ſay, That if A ſtrike B, in the point *c*, the Chanel *C c* is ſhut up, and the ſubtle Matter finds out new ways in the ſoft Body; and ſo having an open road, it repels not the ſtriking Body, but the Body ſtricken changes its figure, and batters it ſelf a little. And it muſt be ſuppos'd, that in the leaſt Body there are infinite paſſages like *C c*. But if the Bodies A and a, are both of them hard, the paſſage *C c* is ſtreightned, and the ſubtle Matter included in it, continuing its motion in a right Line, for want of new paths, repels the Body ſtriking it, ſo much more violently, as it finds greater difficulty in making a new way, or elſe the parts of the Body A, break and ſeparate from one another, and are reduc'd to Duſt, or Pieces.



Laſtly, it ſeems evident, That every mov'd Body, continually endeavouring to tend in a right Line, and declining from it as little as is poſſible, when it meets reſiſtance, ought never to rebound, ſince by that motion it extremely deviates from a right. 'Tis neceſſary therefore, either that *B*odies ſhould grow flat, or that the ſtronger ſhould conquer the weaker, and make it bear it company. *B*ut becauſe *B*odies are ſpringing and hard, they cannot go in company, ſince if A puſhes *a*, *a* repels A; and ſo they muſt recede from one another.

Notwithſtanding if two Bodies were in a *vacuum*, they would go in company, becauſe having no Body to ſurround them, they could have no elaſtick force, the ſtriker making no reſiſtance to the ſtriking, but Air, Gravitation, *&c.* reſiſting the great Motion, which the ſtriking Body gives the ſtricken, the ſtricken reſiſts the ſtriking, and hinders it from following. For Experience teaches us, that Air reſiſts Motion, and that this reſiſtance is ſo much greater, as the Motion is more violent. 'Tis eaſie to diſcover from what I have been ſaying, how it comes to paſs, that in the percuſſion of different Bodies, encompaſs'd with Air or Water, *&c.* ſometimes the ſmiting rebounds, ſometimes communicates all its motion, and

remains as it were unmoveable, and ſometimes it follows the ſmitten, but always with leſs degrees of ſwiftneſs, if one or other of them be not perfectly ſoft. For all this depends on the proportion that is found between the magnitude, the hardneſs, and the weight of one and the other, ſuppoſing them mov'd with an equal ſwiftneſs. If they are very hard, the ſmiting rebounds more, becauſe the *Elaterium* is ſtronger. If the ſmiting is very little, the ſmitten very large and weighty, the ſmiting rebounds ſtill much, becauſe of the weight and the great maſs of Air ſurrounding the ſmitten, which with-ſtands the motion. Laſt of all, if the force of the hardneſs is as it were abated, by the little volume of Air, anſwerable to the littleneſs of the ſtricken Bodies, or the contrary, it may happen, that the ſmiting may remain as immoveable after the percuſſion. We need therefore but compare the hardneſs of percutient Bodies, and the Air, which the percuſs'd ought to agitate anew at the time of percuſſion, whereby to move, to give a pretty exact conjecture, concerning what muſt happen in the percuſſion of different Bodies. I ſtill ſuppoſe, an equal ſwiftneſs, in the ſtriking, for the Air more reſiſts a great motion than a little one, and there is as much motion in a Body twice as little, as in another, when proceeding twice as faſt as that other. Thus the ſmitten being driven as faſt again, may be conſider'd, as having a volume of Air twice as big, to repel, in order to it's moving.

But it ought ſtill to be obſerv'd, That at the moment of one Bodies ſtriking another, the parts of this ſame Body have too contrary Motions. For thoſe on the fore-ſide have a backward tendency, by reaſon of the colliſion; when at the ſame time, thoſe behind tend forwards on the account of the firſt motion; and 'tis that counter-motion which flattens ſoft Bodies, and is the cauſe that ſome hard *B*odies break in pieces; but when *B*odies are very hard, this counter-ſtroke which vibrates ſome of the parts, and makes a ſort of trepidation in them, always produces ſome changes in the communication of Motion, which are very difficult to be known for many reaſons; and 'tis, in my mind, to little purpoſe to examine them in particular.

Would a Man meditate on all theſe things, I believe he would eaſily anſwer ſome difficulties, which might ſtill be rais'd upon the Subject; but if I thought, that what I have ſaid, were inſufficient to ſhew that *Reſt* has no force to reſiſt Motion, and that the Rules of the communication of Motions, given by *M. des Cartes*, are in part falſe; I would here make out, That 'tis impoſſible by his Suppoſition to move our ſelves in the Air. And that which makes the circulation of Motion in fluid *B*odies poſſible, without recurring to a *vacuum*, is that the firſt Element eaſily divides it ſelf in ſeveral different manners, the *repoſe* of its parts having no force to reſiſt *Motion*.

THE CONCLUSION OF THE Three Laſt BOOKS.

I Have, if I miſtake not, ſufficiently ſhewn in the *fourth* and *fifth Book*, that Mens natural Inclinations and Paſſions, frequently occaſion their falling into Errour; becauſe they induce them more to a precipitate Judgment, than a careful Examination of things.

I have ſhewn in the *fourth Book*, that our Inclination for Good in general, is the Cauſe of the Reſtleſneſs of the Will, that this Reſtleſneſs of the Will puts the Mind in continual Agitation; and that a Mind continually agitated, is utterly unfit for the Diſcovery of any whit intricate and hidden Truths. That the love of new and extraordinary things prepoſſeſſes us in their behalf, and that whatever bears the Character of Infinite, is capable of confounding our Imagination, and miſ-leading us. I have explain'd how our Inclination for Greatneſs, Elevation, and Independency, inſenſibly engage us in a falſly-pretended Learning, or in the ſtudy of all things vain and uſeleſs, which flatter the ſecret pride of our Heart; becauſe this is what recommends us to the admiration of the Vulgar. I have ſhewn, That the inclination for Pleaſures, conſtantly throws off the view of the Mind from the conſideration of abſtract Truths, which are the moſt ſimple and exuberant, and permits it not to conſider any thing with a competent attention and impartiality, to judge well of it. That Pleaſures being the Modes of our Souls exiſtence, they neceſſarily divide the capacity of the Mind, and that a Mind thus divided, cannot fully comprehend a Subject of any great extent. Laſt of all, I have made appear, That the relation and natural union, we have to all thoſe with whom we live

live and converse, is the occasion of many Errors we fall into, and of our communicating them to others, as others communicate to us the same they were engag'd in.

In the *fifth*, Where I have endeavour'd to give some Idea of our Passions, I have, I think, made it sufficiently evident, That they were ordain'd to unite us to all things sensible. And to give us, as we are among them, a due and necessary Disposition for their Preservation and our own. That as our *Senses* unite us to our Body, and expand our Soul into all the composing parts of it; so our *Commotions* carry us, as it were, out of our selves, and diffuse us upon all things round about us. That, *lastly*, they incessantly represent things, not as they are in themselves, whereby we may form true Judgments, but according to the Relation they have to us; whereby to form Judgments useful to the Preservation of our Being, and of those, to whom we are either naturally or voluntarily united.

After having attempted the Discovery of Errours in their Causes, and the Deliverance of the Mind from the Prejudices it is subject to; I thought it was time, at last, to prepare it for the *Search* of *Truth*. Wherefore, in the *sixth Book*, I have explain'd the Means, which I thought most natural for the increasing the attention, and inlarging the capacity of the Mind, by shewing the use that might be made of its *Senses*, its *Passions*, and *Imagination*, to the giving it all the force and penetration it is capable of. After which I have establish'd certain Rules which must of necessity be observed for the discovery of any Truth whatever; I have explain'd them by many Examples, that I might make them more sensible, and have chosen those, which I thought most useful, or that included more fecund and general Truths; that they might be read with greater application, and be made more sensible and familiar.

Possibly it may be acknowledg'd by this *Essay of Method* which I have given, how necessary it is to reason only about clear and evident Idea's, and in which we are inwardly convinc'd, that all Nations do agree. And never to proceed to compound Things, 'till having sufficiently examin'd the simple, whereon they depend.

And if it be consider'd, That *Aristotle* and his Followers, have not observ'd the Rules I have explain'd, as we ought to be assur'd by the Reasons I have alledg'd; and by the Correspondence, that may be had with the most zealous Defenders of that Philosopher, it may be we shall despise his Doctrine, in spight of all the Impressions, which perswade such as give way to be amuz'd by Words, they do not understand.

But if we take notice of the manner of M. *des Cartes*'s Philosophizing, we cannot doubt of the Solidity of his Philosophy. For I have sufficiently shewn, That he reasons but upon distinct and evident Idea's; beginning with most simple things, and afterwards passing on to the more Compound, which depend on them. Those who shall read the Works of that Learned Man, will have plenary Conviction of what I say of him; provided they read them, with all the Application that is necessary to understand them. And they will feel a secret Joy, for being born in an Age, and Country so fortunate, as to free them from the trouble of seeking a Master to teach them Truth, among the past Ages of the *Heathens*, and in the Extremities of the Earth, from *Barbarians* and *Strangers*.

But as we ought not to be very sollicitous to know the Opinions of Men, even though we were otherwise assur'd they had found out Truth: So I should be very sorry, if the Esteem I manifest for M. *des Cartes*, should prepossess any Man in his behalf, and make him sit down satisfied with reading and retaining his Opinions, without caring to be *enlightned* with the *Light of Truth*. This would be preferring Man before G O D, and consulting him in God's stead, and acquiescing in the obscure Answers of a Philosopher, which do not enlighten us; to avoid the trouble of interrogating, by our Meditation, Him who answers and enlightens us both together.

'Tis a mean and unworthy thing to become the Partizan of any Sect, and to look upon the Authors of it as infallible. And thus M. *des Cartes*, chusing rather to make Men Disciples of Truth, than opinionated Followers of his Sentiments, expresly forewarns them, *Not to take any thing he writes upon trust, and to embrace nothing but what the force and evidence of Reason should constrain them to believe.* He desires not, like some Philosophers, to be credited upon his Word. He ever remembers that he is a Man, and that disseminating his Light but by Reflexion, he ought to direct the Minds of those who would be illuminated by him, towards Him alone who can make them more perfect by the Gift of Understanding.

The principal advantage that can be made of Application to Study, is the rendring the Mind more accurate, more illuminated, more penetrating, and fit for the discovery of all the Truths we desire to know. But such as read the Philosophers, with design of remembring their Opinions, and factoring them to others, approach not Him who is the Life and Nourishment of the Soul. Their Mind grows blind and enervate by their Commerce with such as can neither strengthen nor enlighten them. They are swell'd up with a spurious sort of Learning, the weight whereof over-whelms, and the glittering blinds them; and fancying to themselves, they are hugely learn'd, when their heads are cramm'd with the Opinions of the Ancients, they forget that they become their Disciples, who, S. *Paul* says, *became Fools, by usurping the name of Wise. Dicentes se esse Sapientes, stulti facti sunt.*

The Method I have given, will, if I mistake not, be highly advantageous to those, who desire to make use of their Reason, or to receive of God, the Answers he gives all those, who

can

our faithfully conſult Him. For I think, I have ſaid what is chiefly requir'd, to corroborate and conduct the attention of the Mind, which is the Natural Prayer, we make to the true Maſter of all Men, in order to be inſtructed.

But becauſe this natural way of ſearching out Truth is very painful, and commonly impracticable, except in the reſolution of Queſtions of little uſe, the knowledge whereof commonly more gratifies our Pride, than perfects our Underſtanding. I think it my Duty to ſay, (That I may profitably conclude this Work,) that the moſt expeditious and certain Method of diſcovering Truth, and uniting our ſelves to God in the pureſt and perfecteſt manner poſſible, is to live as becomes true *Chriſtians*, to follow exactly the Precepts of Eternal Truth, which unites it ſelf with us, but to re-unite us with it: 'Tis to liſten rather to the dictates of our Faith than Reaſon, and to render leſs to God by our natural Forces, which ſince the Sin, are altogether languid and inactive, than by the aſſiſtance of Faith, by which alone, God purpoſes to lead us into that immenſe Light of Truth, which will diſſolve and diſſipate all our darkneſs. For in brief, 'Tis much better, as good Men, to ſpend ſome Years in ignorance of certain Things, and find our ſelves enlighten'd in a Moment for ever, than by natural means, and abundance of trouble and application, purchaſe a very imperfect Science, that ſhall leave us in Darkneſs to all Eternity.

F I N I S.

ILLUSTRATIONS
UPON THE
FOREGOING BOOKS.

THE
PREFACE,

Wherein is shewn what should be our Opinion of the several Judgments, commonly pass'd on Books, that encounter Prejudices.

WHEN a *BOOK* is first to appear in the World, one knows not whom to consult, to learn its Destiny. The Stars preside not over its Nativity: Their Influences have no Operation on it; and the most confident *Astrologers* dare not foretell the diverse Risks of Fortune it must run. Truth not being of this World, Celestial Bodies have no power over her; and whereas she is of a most spiritual Nature, the several Positions, or Combinations of Matter, can contribute nothing either to her Establishment, or Ruine. Besides, the Judgments of Men are so different in respect of the same things, that we can never more hazardously, and imprudently play the *Prophet*, than in presaging the happy, or unfortunate Success of a *BOOK*. So that every Man who ventures to be an *Author*, at the same time throws himself at the *Readers* Mercy, to make him, or esteem him what he pleases. But of all Authors, those who encounter Prejudices, ought most infallibly to reckon upon their Condemnation. Their Works lie too uneasie on most Mens Minds; and if they escape the Passions of their Enemies, they are obliged to the almighty Force of Truth for their Protection.

'Tis a common Miscarriage with all Mankind, to be too precipitate in judging: For all Men are obnoxious to Errour, and only obnoxious upon this account. But all hasty and rash Judgements are ever consonant to Prejudices; and therefore Authors who oppugn them, cannot possibly escape *Sentence* from all their Judges, who appeal to *ancient Opinions*, as the *Laws* whereby they ought to pronounce. For indeed most Readers are both *Judge* and *Party*, in respect of these Authors. Their Judges they are, that Quality is incontestable: But they are a Party likewise, being disturb'd by these Authors in the possession of their Ancient Prejudices, for which they have the Plea of *Prescription*, and to which they have been accustomed many Years.

I confess there's Abundance of Equity, Sincerity, and good Sence in a great many Readers; and that they sometimes are Judges rational enough to supersede common Opinions, as not being the infallible Rules of Truth. *Many* there are who retire into themselves, and consult that *Inward Truth*, which ought to be their Rule to judge of all things; but very *Few* that consult it upon all Occasions, and *None* at all who do it with all that Faithfulness and Attention, that is necessary to judge infallibly at all times. And thus, though we might suppose, there were nothing blameable in a Treatise, which yet it would be Vanity to pretend to: I am perswaded it would be impossible to find one single Man to approve it in every respect; especially if his Prejudices were attacked by it: since it is not naturally possible, that a Judge constantly provok'd, affronted, and outrag'd by a Party, should do him entire Justice; or that he should give himself the trouble of a strenuous Application to those Reasons, which at first sight appear to him as extravagant *Paradoxes*, or ridiculous *Paralogisms*.

But though a Man be pleased with many things in a *BOOK*, if he fortunes to meet with some that are offensive, he shall seldom be wanting to *speak ill* of it, but most commonly forgetful to *give* it any *good Character*. *Self-love* has a thousand Motives to induce us to condemn what we dislike; and Reason in this Instance fully justifies these Motives: since Men fansie they condemn Errours, and defend Truth, when they defend their Prejudices, and censure those that assault them. So that the most equitable Judges of Books, that fight against Prejudice, pass commonly such a general Sentence, as is no way favourable on their

behalf. Perhaps they will say there is something good in such a Work, and that the Author justly opposes certain Prejudices; but yet they shall be sure to condemn him; and as his Judges give an authoritative and grave decision upon the point; maintaining that he carries things too far on such or such an occasion. For when an Author is ruining prejudices, which the Reader is not prepossess'd with: whatever he shall say will seem reasonable enough. But the same Author ever stretches things too far, when he engages the Prejudices wherewith the Reader is too deeply ting'd.

But whereas the Prejudices of different Persons are not constantly the same, should one carefully gather the several Judgments that are made upon the same things, it would commonly appear, that according to these Judgments, there is nothing *Good*, and at the same time nothing *Bad* in such kind of Books: There would be nothing good: because there is no Prejudice, but one or other espouses: and there would be nothing bad, because there is no Prejudice whatever but some or other condemn. In which Judgments there is so much Equity, that should a Man pretend to make use of them to correct his Piece; he must necessarily strike it all out, for fear of leaving any thing that was *Condemn'd*: or not to touch it for fear of expunging something that was *approv'd*. So that a Poor *Author* that studies to be inoffensive, finds himself perplex'd on all hands, by all the various Judgments which are pronounc'd both for and against him; and unless he resolve to stand his ground, and to be reckon'd obstinate in his Opinions; he must inevitably contradict himself at every turn, and appear in as many different forms, as there are different heads in a whole Nation.

However, Time will do every Man Justice, and *Truth* which at first seems a Chimerical and ridiculous Phantasm, by degrees grows sensible, and manifest. Men open their Eyes, and contemplate Her, they discover her Charms, and fall in Love with Her. This Man who condemns an Author, for an Opinion that he dislikes, by chance meets with another that approves it, but condemns other Opinions which the former receives, as undeniable. Each of them talk suitably to his Notion, and each of them contradicts the other. Hence they come to examine both their own, and others Reasons afresh: they dispute, and consider, and hesitate, and are not so ready to determine upon what they have not Examin'd; and if they are brought to change their Opinion, and to acknowledge that an Author is more reasonable than was believ'd; there rises a secret Inclination in their Breast, which prompts them to speak as well of him for the future, as they have formerly spoken to his dishonour. Thus the Man who sticks resolutely to the Truth, though at first he move their Spleen, or Laughter, need not despair, one day, to see Truth triumph over the Prepossession of Men. For there's that difference between Good and Ill Books; between those which enlighten the *Mind*, and those which gratify the *Senses* and *Imagination*, that the latter look charming, and delightful at first, but they fade and wither in Time: whilst the former, on the contrary, have something of a strange and discouraging nature which troubles and sets the Mind aghast. But in time they are relish't, and so much the better, as they are more read, and digested. For 'tis time generally that regulates the price of things.

The Books that encounter Prejudices, leading to Truths through unbeaten Roads, require much longer time than others, to obtain the reputation their Authors expect from them. For because Men are frequently baulk'd in the hopes, that such sort of Performances had rais'd in them; but Few there are that read them: Fewer still that approve them: almost All condemn them, whether they read them, or read them not: and though we be well assur'd that the trite, and common roads, lead not where we design to go, yet the fear of venturing upon such as have no Footsteps of former Travellers dishearten us from entring on them. So that Men cast not so much as their Eye about them, to conduct themselves, but blindly tread in the steps of their *Predecessors*: Company is diverting and encouraging: they think not what they are doing; they perceive not where they go; and often forget the place where they design'd to arrive.

Men are made for a sociable Life, which to preserve it is not enough to use the same *Tongue*; we must moreover keep to the same way of *expression* and the same road of *thinking*, as other Men. We must live by *Opinion*, as we act by *Imitation*. We then consult advantageously, agreeably, and surely for the Good of the Body, and the Establishment of our Fortune when we submit to the Opinions of others, and give way to be perswaded by the Air, or sensible impression of the Imagination of those we hear speak. But we undergo much Pains, and run the extream hazard of our Fortune, when we will only hearken to internal Truth, and reject with scorn, and abhorrence, all the Prejudices of the Senses, and all the Opinions we have receiv'd without Examination.

Thus all those Writers who combat with Prejudices, are much mistaken if they think by that means to recommend themselves to the Favour and Esteem of others. Possibly if they have succeeded in their Studies, some few of the Learn'd will speak honourably of their Works, when they are dead: But while they live they must expect to be neglected by most People, and to be Despis'd, Revil'd, and Persecuted even by those that go for the Wisest and most Moderate sort of Men.

And indeed there are so many reasons, and those so strong, and convincing, which oblige us to do the same as those we live with; that we have commonly right to condemn, as Men

of fantastical, and capricious Spirits, such as act contrary to others. And because Men do not sufficiently distinguish between *acting* and *Thinking*, they commonly are highly offended that any one should fall upon their Prejudices. They suppose it not sufficient to the preservation of the Rules of civil Society, *externally* to comport with the receiv'd Opinions, and Customs of our Country. They pretend it is rashness to examine common Sentiments, and a breach of Charity to enquire after Truth, because Truth is not so much the Bond of civil Societies, as Customs and Opinion.

Aristotle is receiv'd in the *Universities* as the rule of Truth: he is cited as infallible; and 'tis a Philosophical Heresie to deny what he maintains: In a word he is reverenc'd as the *Genius* of Nature: and after all, Those that are best acquainted with his *Physicks*, cannot account for, nor perhaps are convinc'd of any thing: and the *Scholars* when they have finisht their course of *Philosophy*, dare not declare before Men of sence, what they have learnt of their *Masters*. Which, it may be, is enough with Men of Reflexion, to teach them what to think of such sort of studies: for that *Erudition* which a Man must *unlearn* to become *Reasonable*, cannot seem very solid. Yet a Man would be thought rash, and presumptuous, who would attempt to show the Falsity of the Reasons that authorize so strange, and unaccountable a Conduct: and he would necessarily make himself work with those, who *reap advantage* by it, though he were of competent Ability to disabuse the Publick.

Is it not evident, that we must proceed from things that are known, to learn what is not known? and that it would be imposing on a *French-man*, to give him a Grammar in *German Verse* to teach him the *German* Tongue, And yet we put into the hands of Children *Despanterius*'s Latin Verses, to teach them *Latin*: Verses intricate on all accounts, to Children that with difficulty comprehend things that are most easie. Reason and also Experience are visibly against this Custom: for they spend a great deal of time to learn *Latin* but by halves; yet it would be temerity to find fault with it. A *Chinese* who knew this Custom, could not help laughing at it: whilst in this part of the World, which we inhabit, the Wisest and most Learn'd can't forbear approving it.

If Prejudices thus false, and palpable, and Customs so irrational, and of so great Consequence, find so many Patrons, and Defenders, how shall they submit to reasons that oppose the Prejudices of a purely Speculative Nature? There needs but a very little attention to discover that the way taken to instruct Children is not the Best; and yet it is not acknowledg'd. Opinion and Custom carry it against Reason and Experience. How then can we imagine that the Books which destroy an infinite number of Prejudices, will not in many things be condemn'd, by those who pass for the most learn'd, and wisest part of Men.

It must be observ'd that those who go for the most understanding, and ingenious in the World, are Men that have read most Books, both good and bad: Men of a most happy Memory, and of a most lively and comprehensive Imagination. Now this sort of Persons, commonly judge readily on all things, without Examination. They consult their Memory, and therein immediately find the *Law*, or Prejudice by which they *Pronounce*, without much reflection. As they think their Parts better than other Men's, they afford little attention, to what they read; Hence it comes, that Women, and Children, easily discover the falsity of some Prejudices, which they see attack'd, because they dare not judge without Examining; and that they bring all the attention they are capable of, to what they read: whilst Scholars, on the contrary, stick resolutely to their Opinions, because they will not be at the Trouble of Examining those of others, when quite contrary to their preconceiv'd Notions.

As to the Attendants on the Great Men of the World, they have so many external Adherencies, that they cannot easily retire into themselves; nor bring a competent attention to distinguish Truth from Probability. Nevertheless they are not extreamly addicted to any kinds of Prejudices: For strongly to prosecute a Worldly Interest, neither Truth nor Probability must be rely'd on. As a seeming Humility, or Civility, and external shew of temper are qualities which all Men admire, and are absolutely necessary, to keep up Society, amongst Proud, and ambitious Spirits: Men of Worldly designs, make their Vertue and Desert to consist, in asserting nothing, and believing nothing as certain, and indisputable. It has ever been, and will ever be the fashion, to look upon all things as Problematical, and with a Gentleman-like-freedom to treat the most holy Truths: lest they should seem bigotted to any thing. For whereas the Gentlemen I mention, are neither applicative nor attentive to any thing but their Fortune; there can be no disposition more Advantageous, or that seems more reasonable to them; than that which the fashion justifies. Thus the Invaders of Prejudices, whilst they flatter on one hand, the Pride and Remisness of these Worldly Men, are well accepted by them; but if they pretend to assert any thing, as Undeniable, and to manifest the Truth of Religion, and Christian Morality, they are look'd upon as Opinionated, and as Men who avoid one Precipice, to run upon another.

What I have said, is, methinks, sufficient to conclude, what should be answer'd to the different Judgments, divers Persons have pronounc'd against *The Treatise concerning The search after Truth*; and I shall make no Application, which every Man may do himself to good purpose without any trouble. I know indeed that every Man will not do it; but perhaps I might seem to be the Judge in my own Case, if I should defend my self as far as I was able. I therefore

fore resign up my Right to the Attentive Readers, who are the natural Judges of Books, and I conjure them to call to Mind, the request I made in the Preface of the foregoing Treatise, and elsewhere, *Not to judge of my Opinions but by the clear and distinct answers they shall receive from the only Teacher of all Men, after having consulted him by a serious attention.* For if they consult their Prejudices, as the decisive Laws to judge of the Book, *Concerning the search after Truth*; I acknowledge it to be a very ill Book, since purposely written to detect the falsity, and injustice of these Laws.

Advertisement.

WHereas the following Illustrations *were compos'd to satisfie some particular Persons, who desir'd a more special Explication of some important Truths: I think fit to premise, that clearly to apprehend what I shall say, it will be requisite to have some Knowledge of the Principles I have explain'd in the* Treatise concerning the Search after Truth. *Therefore it will be the best way not to meddle with these Observations; till after having carefully read the whole Work for which they were made; and only to examine them at a second reading, as they shall be found referr'd to by the Margent. This Caution however is not absolutely necessary to be observ'd by understanding Persons, because I have endeavoured so to write these* Elucidations, *as that they might be read without referring to the Book they were compos'd for; I know that Truth is of all things in the World that which gives least trouble to acquire it. Men use not willingly to collate those Passages in a Book, which have Reference to one another; but commonly read things as they fall in their way, and understand of them as much as they can: wherefore to accommodate my self to this Temper of Men, I have tried to make these Remarks intelligible even to those who have forgotten the Places of the foregoing Treatise, whereunto they referr. Nevertheless I desire those who will not be at the Trouble of carefully examining these* Illustrations, *not to to condemn them of false and extravagant Consequences, which may be deduc'd from want of understanding them. I have some reason to make this Request, not only because I have right to demand of the Readers, who are my Judges, not to condemn without understanding me, but on several other Accounts, which it is not necessary for me to declare in this Place.*

ILLUSTRA-

ILLUSTRATIONS
UPON THE
TREATISE
Concerning the
SEARCH after TRUTH.

The First Illustration upon the First Chapter of the FIRST BOOK.

God works whatever is real in the Motions of the Mind, and in the Determinations of them; notwithstanding which, he is not the Author of Sin.

He works whatever is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence, and yet is not the Author of it.

SOME Persons pretend, that I relinquish the Comparison of the *Mind* and *Matter* too soon; and fansie the one has no more Power than the other, to determine the Impression which God gives it. And therefore wish me to explain (if I can) what it is that *God works* in us, and what *we* do *our selves*, when we sin; since, in their Opinion, I shall be oblig'd by my Explication, either to grant, That Man is capable of giving himself some new Modification; or to acknowledge, That God is actually the Author of Sin.

I answer, That *Faith*, *Reason*, and my *own inward Consciousness*, oblige me to quit the Comparison where I do; being every way convinc'd, that I have in *my self* a Principle of my own Determinations, and having Reasons to perswade, that *Matter* has no such Principle; which shall be prov'd hereafter: Mean while here is what God operates in us, and what we do our selves, when we sin.

First, God continually drives us, by an invincible Impression, towards *Good in general*. *Secondly*, He represents to us the *Idea* of a particular Good, or gives us the *Sensation* of it. *Lastly*, He inclines us to this particular Good.

First, *God drives us continually towards Good in general.* For God has *made* us, and still *preserves* us for Himself. He wills, that we shall love all Good, and is the *first*, or rather *only* Mover. In brief, this is evident from innumerable things that I have said elsewhere, and those I spoke to will not dispute it.

Secondly, *God represents to us the Idea of a particular Good*, or *gives us the Sensation of it*: For 'tis he alone that enlightens us, and the surrounding Bodies cannot act upon our Mind. In a word, we are neither our own *Light*, nor our own *Felicity*, as I have proved at large in the *Third Book*, and elsewhere.

Lastly, *God inclines us to this particular Good*: For God inducing us to all that's Good, by a necessary Consequence, inclines us to particular Goods, by producing the Idea, or Sensation of them, in our Mind. This therefore is what God effects in us, when we sin.

But whereas a particular Good includes not in it all Good; and the Mind, considering it with a clear and distinct View, cannot imagine it concludes all; God does not *necessarily* and *invincibly* incline us to the love of it. We are conscious of the Liberty we have to *stay* this Love, and of our *Tendency* to proceed farther: In a word, we feel the Impression we have

for Good Universal: or, to speak as others do, we are *sensible* that our *Will* is not under any *constraint or necessity* to fix upon this particular Good.

So then this is what the Sinner does. He *stops*: he *rests*: he follows not the Impression of God: he does *nothing*. For *Sin is Nothing*. He knows that the grand Rule he is to observe is to *Employ his Liberty so far as it will go*: and that he is not to fasten upon any good, unless he be inwardly convinc'd it would be offending against ORDER, to refuse to stay upon it. If he discovers not this Rule, by the light of his Reason, he learns it, at least, from the secret reproaches of his Conscience. 'Tis necessary, then, to follow the Impression he receives for the Universal Good; and to think of other Goods besides what he enjoys, and what he is only to make use of: For 'tis by thinking on other goods, besides what he enjoys, that he can produce in himself new determinations of his Love, and make use of his Liberty. Now I prove that by the Impression God gives him for Good in general, he may think of other Goods, besides that of his present Enjoyment; it being precisely in this that the difficulty consists.

See the 6. Chap. Book 3. and its Illustration.

'Tis a Law of Nature, that the Ideas of Objects should offer themselves to our Mind, when we desire to think of them, provided our Capacity of Thought be not fill'd up by the lively, and confus'd Sensations, we receive *occasionally* from the Motions in our Body. Now we can *Will* the thinking on *all* things; because the natural Impression which carries us towards Good reaches to all possible Objects of our Thought: And we can at all times *think* on all things; because we are united to Him who comprehends the Ideas of all things, as I have formerly proved.

If it be true then that we can *Will* the considering *nearly*, what we already see as *afar off*, since we are united with the Universal Being; and if it be certain that, by virtue of the Laws of Nature, Ideas approach us when we desire it; we ought thence to inferr,

First, *That we have a Principle of our Determinations.* For 'tis the actual Presence of particular Ideas, that positively determines towards particular Goods, the Motion we have towards good in general; and that changes our Natural Love into Free and deliberate Loves: Our *Consent*, or acquiescence in the perception of a Particular Good, has nothing *real*, or positive in it, on our Part; as I shall explain by and by.

Secondly, *That the Principle of our determinations is always free in regard to particular Goods.* For we are not invincibly inclin'd to love them; since we can examine them in themselves; and compare them with the Idea which we have of the Soveraign Good, or with other particular Goods. Thus the Principle of our libertie consists in this, that being made for God, and united to him, we can always think on the true good, or on other goods besides those which our Thoughts are actually engag'd on.

But this, on supposition that our *Sensations* do not take up the Capacity of our Mind. For to the end we may be *free* with the *liberty* fore-mention'd, it is necessary not only that God should not push us, invincibly, to particular goods, but also that we should be able to employ our Impression for Good in general, to the loving other objects, than those we love at present. But as those cannot be the actual objects of our *Love*, which cannot be of our *thoughts*, and that we cannot actually think except on those which occasion very lively Sensations, whilst they occasion them; it is plain, that the dependance we are in from our Body weakens our Liberty, and in some Junctures, quite destroys the use of it. So that our Sensations obliterating our Ideas; and the *Union* we have with our Body, *whereby* we discern only our selves enfeebling *that* we have with God, *whereby* all things are present to us; the Mind ought not to give way to be shar'd by confus'd Sensations, if it would preserve entire, the *free* Principle of its Determinations.

From all which it is evident, that God is not the Author of Sin, and that Man endues not himself with any *new Modifications*. God is not the Author of Sin; because He continually impresses on the Sinner, who stops at a particular good, a Motion to go farther; gives him a Power of *thinking* on other things, and *tending* to other Goods, than those which actually engage his *Thoughts*, and *Affections*; and commands him not to love whatever he can refuse to love, without inward disquiet, and remorse; withal continually recalling him to his God, by the secret reproaches of his Reason.

'Tis true that in one sense God inclines the Sinner to Love the object of his Sin; if this object appears Good to a Sinner: for as the *Divines* say, whatever there is of a *positive* nature of *Act* or *Motion* in the Sin, proceeds from God. But 'tis only by a false judgment of our mind that the Creatures seem good to us, I mean capable of acting in us, and making us happy. But the Sin of a Man consists not in his loving a particular good; for every good as such is amiable, but in his loving only this good; or loving it more than another, that is greater; or that which God forbids him to love; for that the Mind being subject to the Body, pursuant to the Fall, the Love or rather the Enjoyment of this good would encrease his *Concupiscence*, and alienate him from the love of the *supream Good*. In a word, the Sin of Man consists in his not referring all *particular* Goods to the *supream*: or rather in his not considering and loving the supream Good in all the Particular; and so not regulating his Love by the WILL of GOD, or according to Essential and necessary ORDER, of which all Men have a more

* See the Illustration upon the Third Chapter, Part 2d. Book 6th. where I explain my meaning more distinctly.

or

or less perfect Knowledge, as they are stricter or looser united to God; or are more or less to the impressions of their Senses and Passions. For our *Senses* *import* our Soul into our whole *Body*, and our *Passions*, as it were, *import it to* circumambient Objects; and so remove us from the *Divine Light*, which would penetrate and illuminate us.

Nor does Man give himself new Modifications: For the Motion of Love which God constantly imprints on us, is neither augmented nor diminish'd, Whether we do, or do not actually love; I mean, whether this natural motion of Love, be, or be not determin'd by some Idea of our Mind. Nor does this Motion cease by its acquiescence in the possession of Good, as motion of Bodies ceases by their rest. There is great likelihood that God pushes us at all times alike with an even force towards him; for he pushes us on towards Good in general, as fast as we are capable, and we are at all times equally capable, because our *Will*, or our natural Capacity of *Willing*, is always equal to it self. Thus, I say, the Impression, or natural Motion, which carries us towards Good, never encreases, or diminishes.

I confess we have no clear Idea, nor indeed inward Sensation of the Evenness of that Impression, or natural Motion towards Good: But this comes from our having no clear Idea of it; (which I have formerly * prov'd) and from our not being conscious of our Faculties, whilst they do not actually operate. We *feel* not what is natural and common, and always the same in us: as the Heat and Beating of the Heart. We are even insensible of our *Dispositions*, and whether we are deserving of the Love, or Wrath of God. We have perhaps infinite Faculties, which are perfectly unknown to us: For we are not inwardly conscious of all that we *are*, but only of all that we *feel*. Had we never felt Pain, nor desir'd particular Goods, we could not by our Self-Consciousness, have told whether we were capable of *feeling* Pain, or of *willing* those Goods: It being our *Memory*, and not our *internal Sense*, which teaches us we are capable of Feeling what we do not feel; or of being mov'd by such Passions, as do not actually agitate us. There is nothing therefore that can hinder our believing, that God draws us towards him with an equal Force, though in a very different manner; and that he preserves in our Soul an equal Capacity of *willing*, or one and the same Will, as he preserves in Matter collectively taken, an equal quantity of Motion. But though this should not be certain, yet I can't see how it can be said, that the Augmentation, or Diminution of the Natural Motion of our Soul, depends on us, since we cannot be the Cause of the Extent of our own Will.

* See the 7th Chap. of the 3d. Book, and the Illustration upon it.

Nemo scit utrum amore, vel odio dignus sit. Eccl. 4. 1.

It is moreover certain, from what I said before, That God *produces* and *preserves* in us all that's Real and Positive in the particular Determinations of the Motion of our Soul; namely, our *Idea's* and *Sensations*: For this it is which determines our Motion towards Good in general, to particular Goods, but not in an irresistable manner, because we have a tendency to go farther. Hence all that is *done* on our part when we sin, is but *not doing* all we yet have the power to do, by means of our impression towards Him, who comprehends all Goods; for all our Power is deriv'd from our Union with him, who works all in us. Now the principal cause of our sinning, is, that preferring Enjoyment, to Examination, by reason of the Pleasure accruing to our *Enjoying*, and the Pain attending our *Examining*, we desist to employ the Motion which is given us for the pursuit and disquisition of Good; and we fall upon the *enjoyment* of things, which we should no more than *make use of*. But if we observe the Matter nearly, we shall see that in this there is nothing *real* on our part, but only an *intermission* and *cessation* of Enquiry, which corrupts as I may so say, the Action of God in us, but yet can never destroy it. So then, when we do not sin, What is it we do? We do *all that God does in us*; for we do not confine to a particular Good, or rather a *False one*, the Love which God imprelles on us for the *True*. And when we sin, What do we do then? *Nothing*. For we love a *false Good*, to which God does not carry us by an irresistible impression; we cease to pursue the *true Good*, and frustrate the Motion God gives us towards it. Now whilst we love a *particular Good* only, or against *ORDER*, we receive as great an impression of Love from God, as if we did not fix to it. Moreover this *particular Determination*, which is neither necessary, nor invincible, is given us of God; and therefore in sinning, we produce no *new Modification* in our selves.

However I own that when we sin not, but resist temptation, we may be said in one sense, to give our selves a *new modification*, because we chose to think on other things than the *seeming goods* wherewith we are tempted. But all that we then do, is produc'd by the Action which God puts in us; that is, either by our *Motion* towards Good in general, or by our *Will* assisted by *Grace*; I mean, enlightned by *Knowledge*, and forwarded by a *preventing delectation*. For in fine, If the *willing different things* be suppos'd to be giving *different modifications*, I deny not but in this sense, the *Mind* may diversly *modifie* it self by the Action it receives from God.

But 'tis always to be observ'd, that this Action deriv'd into us from God, depends upon our selves, and is not irresistible, with respect to particular Goods. For upon the presentation of a particular Good, we are inwardly conscious of our *Liberty*, on its behalf, as we are of our *Pleasure* and *Pain*, when they sensibly affect us: And the same Reason convinces us we are *Free*, that convinces us we *Exist*; for 'tis the inward *consciousness* or *feeling* of our own Thoughts, that give us to know we have a Being. And, if at the same time that we are sensible

ſible of our *Liberty*, with reſpect to a particular Good, we ought to doubt of it, for want of having a clear Idea thereof: we ought no leſs to doubt of our Pain, and our Exiſtence, at the time of our Miſery, ſince we have no clear Idea, either of our Soul, or Pain.

It goes quite otherwiſe with our Inward Senſation, or *Conſcience*, than with our *outward Senſes*. The latter deceive us in every thing, when we follow their reports: but the former never deceives us. 'Tis by the *outward Senſes* I ſee Colours on the ſurface of Bodies, that I hear ſound in the Air, that I feel Pain in my hand, and their Teſtimony deceives me, if I rely upon it. But 'tis by my *inward Senſation* that I ſee Colour, that I hear ſound, that I ſuffer pain; and I err not in believing I *ſee* when I ſee, *hear* when I hear, and *ſuffer* when I ſuffer, provided I ſtop and go no farther. Theſe things are too ſelf-evident to be longer inſiſted on. Therefore being inwardly *conſcious* of our *Liberty*, at the time of a *particular* good's being preſent to the Mind, we are not to be doubtful of our *freedom* on *its* reſpect. But whereas this inward Senſation, is ſometimes abſent from our Mind, and we conſult only what confus'd remains it has left in our Memory; we may, by the conſideration of *abſtracted reaſons*, which keep us from an *inward feeling*, perſwade our ſelves that 'tis *impoſſible* for Man to be *free*: Juſt as a *Stoick* who in want of nothing, and Philoſophizing at his eaſe, may *imagine* that *Pain* is no *Evil*, becauſe the *Internal Senſe* he has of himſelf, does not actually convince him to the contrary; And ſo he may prove, like *Seneca*, by reaſons in one ſence moſt true, that 'tis a contradiction for the *wiſe man* to be miſerable.

But though our *Self-conſciouſneſs* were inſufficient to convince us of our Freedom, yet *Reaſon* might evince as much: For ſince the light of Reaſon aſſures us, that God acts only for himſelf, and that he can give no Motion to us, but what muſt tend towards him; the *Impreſſion* towards good in general may be irreſiſtible; but 'tis plain, that *that* which we have for particular goods muſt be neceſſarily free. For if it were invincible, we ſhould have no motion to carry us to God, though he gives it only for himſelf; and we ſhould be conſtrain'd to ſettle on particular Goods; though GOD, ORDER, and REASON, forbid us. So that Sin could not be laid at our door, and God would be the real Cauſe of our Corruptions; Foraſmuch as we ſhould not be Free but purely *Natural*, and altogether neceſſary Agents.

Thus though inward Senſation did not teach us we were *free*, Reaſon would diſcover it was neceſſary for Man to be created ſo; if we ſuppoſe him capable of deſiring particular Goods, and only capable of deſirng them through the Impreſſion or Motion which God perpetually gives us for himſelf. Which likewiſe may be prov'd by reaſon. But our capacity to ſuffer Pain cannot be prov'd this way; but can only be diſcover'd by Conſcience, or inward Senſation; and yet no Man can doubt but a Man is liable to ſuffer Pain.

As we know not our Soul by any *clear Idea* we have of it; as I have before explain'd, ſo 'tis in vain to try to diſcover what it is in us that *terminates* the Action which God impreſſes, or that yields to be conquer'd by a reſiſtable determination which we may change by our Will, or Impreſſion towards All-Good, and our Union with him, who includes the Ideas of all Beings. For in ſhort we have no clear Idea of any Modification of our Soul: Nothing but our Internal Senſe can teach us *that* we are and *what* we are: and this only muſt be conſulted to convince us we are *free*. And its Anſwers are clear, and ſatisfactory enough upon the Point, when we actually propoſe to our ſelves any particular Good; for no Man whatever can doubt whether he be invincibly inclin'd to eat fruit, or avoid ſome ſlight inconſiderable pain. But if inſtead of hearkning to our Inward Senſation, we attend to abſtracted Reaſons, which throw us off the Contemplation of *our ſelves*, poſſibly loſing ſight of *them*, we may forget that we are in Being; and trying to reconcile the *preſcience* of God, and his *abſolute power* over us, with our *Liberty*, we ſhall plunge into an Error that will overturn all the Principles of Religion and Morality.

I produce here an Objection which is uſually made againſt what I have been ſaying, which though but very weak, and defective, is ſtrong enough to give a great many trouble to evade. The *Hating* of God, ſay they, is an action which does not partake of Good; and therefore is all the *Sinner*'s, God having no part in it: And conſequently Man acts and gives himſelf new Modifications, by an action which does not come from God.

I Anſwer, That Sinners hate not God, but becauſe they *freely* and falſely judge that he is Evil; for good conſider'd as ſuch, cannot be the Object of Hatred. Therefore they hate God with that very motion of Love he influences them with, towards Good. Now the reaſon why they conclude he is not good, is their making an undue *uſe* of their Liberty; for being not convinc'd with irreſiſtible evidence that he is not good; they ought not to believe him *Evil*, nor conſequently to *hate* him.

In hatred two things may be diſtinguiſht, *viz.* the *Senſation* of the Soul, and *Motion* of the Will. This Senſation cannot be Evil; For it is a Modification of the Soul, and has neither Moral *good* nor *ill* in it. Nor is the Motion more corrupt, ſince it is not diſtinguiſhable from that of Love. For External Evil being only the privation of Good, 'tis manifeſt, that to fly *Evil*, is to fly the *privation of Good*, that is to *purſue good*. Wherefore all that is Real, and Poſitive, even in our hatred of God himſelf, has nothing evil in it; and the Sinner cannot hate *God*, without an abominable abuſe of the action which God inceſſantly gives to incline him to the love of *Him*.

God

God works whatever is real in the Sensations of Concupiscence; and yet is not the Author of Concupiscence.

AS the Difficulties that are rais'd about *Concupiscence*, are near akin to those before explain'd; I think it convenient to show, that God is not the Author of Concupiscence, though it be *He* that works all in us, even in the production of sensible pleasures.

This Illustration relates to the Fifth Chapter of the first Book of the Search.

It ought, I think, to be granted for the reasons produc'd in the *Fifth Chapter* of the *First Book*, of the preceding *Treatise*, and elsewhere that, by the natural Laws of the Union of the Soul, and Body, Man, even before the *Fall*, was inclin'd by preventing pleasures to the use of sensible Goods; and that as often as such and such traces were delineated in the principal part of his Brain, such and such thoughts arose in his mind. Now those laws were most Proper and Equitable, for the reasons I there have given, which being suppos'd, as before the Transgression all things were perfectly well Order'd, so Man had necessarily that Power over his Body, as that he could prevent the production of these Traces when he would: *Order* requiring that his Mind should preside over his Body. Which power of the Mind precisely consisted in this, that according to its different Desires, and Applications, it stopt the communication of motions which were produc'd in his *own* Body, by *circumambient* Objects, over which his will had not an immediate and direct Authority, as over his proper Body: And it cannot I think be conceiv'd how he could hinder the formation of the traces in his Brain, any other way. Therefore the *Will of God*, or the general law of Nature, which is the true cause of the communication of Motions, depended on some occasions, on the Will of *Adam*: For *God* had that consideration for him; that he produc'd not without his consent, new motions in his Body, or at least, in the principal part, to which his Soul was immediately united.

Such was the Institution of Nature before the Sin. ORDER would have it so; and consequently HE whose essential and necessary Will is always conformable to ORDER. Which Will remaining immutably the same, the Estabilsht Order was subverted by the first Man's Disobedience; because for the demerits of his Sin, it was consonant to Order, that he should be Lord of nothing. It is not reasonable that the Sinner should suspend the communication of Motions: that the Will of God should conform to his; or that any exceptions should be made to the Law of Nature, on his Behalf: In so much that Man is subjected to concupiscence: his Mind depends on his Body; he feels in himself, indeliberate Pleasures, and involuntary, and rebellious Motions, pursuant to that most just and exact Law which unites the two Parts, of which he is compos'd.

In the Objection to the Article of the Illustration upon the seventh Chapter of the second Book. I explain what I here say in general of the loss of Power, Man had over his Body.

Thus the *formal Reason* of *Concupiscence*, no less than *that* of *Sin*, is nothing real and positive; being no more in Man, than the loss of the power he had to wave, and suspend the communication of Motions on some occasions: Nor are we to admit any positive Will in God, to produce *it*. For this loss which Man has caused, was not a consequence of *Order*, or of the immutable Will of God, which never swerves from *It*, and is constantly the same; but only a consequence of Sin, which has rendred Man unworthy of an advantage due only to his Innocence, and Uprightness. Wherefore we may say, that not *God*, but *Sin* only has been the Cause of *Concupiscence*.

Nevertheless God works all that is *Real* and *Positive* in the Sensations, and Motions of *Concupiscence*: But all that has nothing of Evil. 'Tis by the general Law of Nature, that is by the Will of God, that sensible Objects produce in Mans Body certain Motions, and that these Motions raise in the Soul certain Sensations, useful to the preservation of the Body, or the Propagation of the Species. Who then dare presume to say these things are not good in themselves?

I know it is said, that Sin is the cause of certain Pleasures. But do they that say it, conceive it? Can it be thought that Sin which is *nothing* should actually produce *something*? Can *nothing* be suppos'd to be a (real) cause. However 'tis so said: but possible for want of taking due pains of seriously considering what they say; or because they are unwilling to enter on an Explication that is contrary to the discourses they have heard from Men, that it may be, talk with more Gravity and Assurance, than Reflection and Knowledge.

Sin is the cause of *Concupiscence*, but not of *pleasure*; as *Freewill* is the cause of *Sin*, though not of the natural Motion of the Soul. The Pleasure of the Soul is good, as well as its Motion or Love: and there is nothing good, but what God does. The Rebellion of the Body, and the guilt of Pleasure, proceed from Sin; as the adherency of the Soul to a particular good, or its Rest, proceeds from the Sinner; But these are only *Privations*, and *Nothings*, to which the Creature is obnoxious.

Every pleasure is *Good*, and likewise in some measure makes *happy* the Possessor, at least, for the time of the Enjoyment: But it may be said to be *evil*; because instead of elevating

the Mind to Him that is the *true* cauſe of it, through the Error of our *Intellectual*, and corruption of our *Moral* part, it proſtrates it before ſenſible Objects, that only *ſeem* to produce it. Again it is *Evil*, in as much as it is injuſtice in us who are Sinners, and conſequently meriting rather to be puniſh't, than rewarded, to oblige God purſuant to his Primitive Will, to recompenſe us with pleaſant Senſations. In a word (not to repeat here what I have ſaid in other places) it is *evil*, becauſe God at preſent forbids it, by reaſon of its alienating the Mind from himſelf, for whom he hath made and preſerves it. For that which was ordain'd by God to preſerve *Righteous* Man in his Innocence, now fixes *ſinful* Man in his Sin; and the Senſations of Pleaſure, which he wiſely eſtabliſht as the eaſieſt, and moſt obvious Expedients, to teach Man (without calling off his Reaſon, from his true Good) whether he ought to unite himſelf with the invironing Bodies; at preſent fill the Capacity of his Mind, and faſten him on objects incapable of acting in him, and infinitely below him; becauſe he looks upon theſe objects to be the *true cauſes* of the happineſs he enjoys *occaſionally* from them.

THE

THE
Second Illuſtration,
Upon the FIRST CHAPTER of the
FIRST BOOK;

Where I ſay, *That the Will cannot diverſly determine its Propenſity to Good,* but by commanding the *Underſtanding to repreſent to it ſome particular Object.*

IT muſt not be imagin'd, that the *Will commands* the *Underſtanding* any other way, than by its *Deſires* and *Motions*, there being no other Action of the Will: Nor muſt it be believ'd, that the *Underſtanding obeys* the *Will*, by producing in it ſelf the *Idea's* of things which the Soul deſires. For the Underſtanding acts not at all; but only receives Light, or the Idea's of things, through its neceſſary Union with Him who comprehends all Beings in an intelligible manner, as is explain'd in the *Third Book*.

Here then is all the Myſtery: Man participates of the ſovereign Reaſon, and Truth diſplays it ſelf to him, proportionably to his Application, and his praying to it. Now the *Deſire* of the Soul is a *Natural* Prayer, that is always heard; it being a natural Law, that Idea's ſhould be ſo much readier, and more preſent to the Mind, as the Will is more earneſt in deſiring them. Thus, provided our Thinking-Capacity, or Underſtanding, be not clogg'd, and fill'd up by the confuſed Senſations we receive occaſionally from the Motions occurring in our Body, we ſhould no ſooner deſire to think on any Object, but its Idea would be always preſent to our Mind; which Idea, Experience witneſſing, is ſo much more preſent, and clear, as our Deſire is more importunate, and our confuſed Senſations, furniſh'd to us by the Body, leſs Forcible and Applicative, as I have ſaid in the foregoing Illuſtration.

See the Illuſtration upon the 6. Chapter of Part II. Book III.

Therefore in ſaying that the *Will commands* the *Underſtanding* to repreſent to it ſome particular Object, I meant no more, than that the Soul, *willing* to conſider that Object with Attention, draws near it, by her Deſire; becauſe this Deſire, conſequently to the Efficacious Wills of God, which are the inviolable Laws of Nature, is the Cauſe of the Preſence, and Clearneſs of the Idea that repreſents the Object. I could not at that time ſpeak otherwiſe than I did, nor explain my ſelf as I do at preſent; as having not yet prov'd *God* the *ſole Author* of our Idea's; and our particular *Volitions* only the *occaſional Cauſes* of them. I ſpoke according to common Opinion, as I have been frequently oblig'd to do, becauſe all cannot be ſaid at once. The *Reader* ought to be equitable, and give credit for ſome time, if he would have Satisfaction: For none but *Geometricians* pay always down in hand.

THE

THE ILLUSTRATION UPON The Third Chapter.

Where I say, *That mysteries of Faith being of a supernatural Order, we need not wonder if we want the Evidence, since we want the Ideas of them.*

Ne omnino taceremus interrogati quid tres cum tres esse fateamur. De Trin. l. 7. c. 4. And in another place. *Cum quæritur quid tres? Magna prorsus inopia humanum labdrat Eloquium. Dictum est tamen tres personæ non ut illud diceretur, sed ne taceretur.* Ibid. l. 5. c. 9.

WHen I say that we have no Ideas of the *Mysteries of Faith*, it is visible from the foregoing, and following Discourse, that I speak but of *clear* Ideas, which are productive of *Light* and *Evidence*, and which give us a *Comprehension* of the Object: if we may be allow'd so to speak. I grant that a Peasant could not believe, for Example, that the *Son of God* was made *Man*; or that there were three *Persons* in the *Godhead*, if he had no Idea of the *Union* of the WORD with our *Humanity*; and no notion of *Person*: But if these Ideas were clear, we might by considering them, perfectly comprehend these Mysteries, and explain them to others; and so they would be no longer ineffable Mysteries: The Word *Person* has, as St. *Austin* says, been applied to the *Father*, *Son*, and *Holy Ghost*, not so much to express distinctly what they are, as not to be silent upon a Mystery, whereof we are oblig'd to speak.

I say here that we have no Ideas of our *Mysteries*, as I said elsewhere we have no Idea of our *Soul*: because the Idea we have of the latter is no *clearer* than those we have of the *former*. Therefore the Word *Idea* is equivocal: Sometimes I have taken it for whatever represents to the Mind any object whether clearly, or confused and darkly: Sometimes more generally, for whatever is the Immediate object of the Mind. Sometimes likewise for that which represents things so clearly, to the Mind, that we may with a bare Perception discover whether such or such Modifications do belong to them. For this reason I have sometimes said we * had an Idea of the Soul, and sometimes denied it. † For it is difficult, and often wearisom, and ungrateful to observe a too vigorous exactness in ones Expressions.

* Ch. 10. Book I.

† See Chap. 7. Book III. and its Illustration.

When an *Author* contradicts himself, but in the Opinion of his *Criticks*, or such as would fain have him do it; he ought not to be much concern'd at it: And if he would satisfy by tedious Explications, whatever the Malice, or Ignorance of Men might object to him; he would not only compose an ill Book: But all his Readers would be disgusted with the Answers he gave to Objections, either Imaginary, or contrary to that equitable temper which all the World pretends to: For a Man can't endure to be suspected either of Malice or Ignorance; nor is it allowable to answer weak or invidious Objections for the most part, except when there are Men that have urg'd them, and so have Skreen'd the Reader from the reproach which such Answers seem to asperse on those that demand them.

THE

THE ILLUSTRATION On these words of the FIFTH CHAPTER.

This being the Case, it ought to be concluded, That Adam *was not invited to the love of God, and the rest of his duty, by a preventing Pleasure: Forasmuch as the knowledge which he had of God as of his Good, and the Joy he was continually possess'd with, necessarily consequent to the View of his Felicity, in his uniting himself with God, were sufficient motives to recommend his duty to him, and to make his actions more meritorious than if he had been as it were determin'd by a preventing Pleasure.*

IN order to our distinct understanding all this, it must be known, that we are determin'd to act, from only *Knowledge* and *Pleasure*. For whenever we begin to love an object, 'tis from our discovering by Reason that it is *good*, or feeling by Pleasure that it is *agreeable*. But there is great difference between Knowledge and Pleasure. *Knowledge* enlightens our Mind, and manifests the good, but does not actually and efficaciously incline us to the loving it: whereas *Pleasure* effectually drives, and determines us, to love the Object that seems to cause it. Knowledge or Light does not induce us of it self; but leaving us wholly to our selves, lets us freely determine our own motion to the Good which it presents. Pleasure on the contrary anticipates our Reason, interrupts us from consulting it: leaves us not to our own Conduct, and weakens our Liberty.

Therefore as *Adam* had before his *Fall*, a time appointed to merit Eternal Happiness, and had a full and perfect liberty to that intent: and as his Light was sufficient to hold him closely united to God, whom he already lov'd by a natural tendency of his Soul; he ought not to be carried to his duty by *preventing Pleasures* which would have lessen'd his *Merit* as they would his *Liberty*. *Adam* might have had some sort of right to complain of God, if he had hindred him from *meriting* his Reward, as he *ought to do*, that is, by actions absolutely *free*. And it had been a sort of injuring his *Free Will*, for God to have given him that kind of Grace, which is at present only necessary to counterpoize the preventing delights of Concupiscence. Whilst *Adam* had all necessary supplies for his Perseverance, it had been to suspect his Vertue, and, as it were, to accuse him of Infidelity, to give him any Prevention: It had been leaving him an occasion of glorying in himself, to have taken away all sense of the wants possible to befal him, and infirmities he was obnoxious to; for I own that as yet he had neither want nor weakness. Lastly, what is infinitely more considerable, it had been to render the *Incarnation* of JESUS CHRIST indifferent, which certainly was the first and greatest Design of Him who suffer'd all Men to be involv'd in Sin, that he might shew them mercy, in JESUS CHRIST, to the end that he who glories might glory only in the LORD.

Fortissimo quippe dimisit atque permisit facere quod vellet. Aug. de corrupt. & grat. Cap. 12.

See the Fifth Dialogue of the Christian Conversations towards the end of the *Brussel* Edition.

To me therefore it seems undeniable that *Adam* had no sense of *Preventing Pleasures* in his Duty; but it does not seem equally certain that he had a sense of *Joy*; though I suppose it here, as believing it highly probable. But to explain my Self.

There is this difference between *preventing Pleasure*, and the *pleasure of Joy*, that the former precedes Reason, and the latter follows it. For Joy naturally results from the Knowledge one has of his own Happiness or Perfections, because he cannot consider himself as Happy or Perfect, but he must instantly thereupon feel a certain Joy. As we may be *conscious* of our Happiness *by Pleasure*, or *discover* it by *Reason*; so Joy is of two sorts; I speak not here of that which is purely *sensible*; but of that which *Adam might have been possess'd with, as necessarily consequent to the knowledge he had of his happiness, in uniting himself with God.* And some reasons there are which make it doubtful whether he was actually possess'd of it.

The Principal of all is that his Mind perhaps had been so taken up with it, that it had rob'd him of his Liberty, and invincibly united him to God; For 'tis reasonable to believe that this

Joy ought to be proportion'd to the Happineſs, which *Adam* poſſeſs'd, and conſequently exceeding great.

But in anſwer to this, I ſay, *Firſt*, That *purely intellectual Joy* leaves the Mind to its entire Liberty; and takes up but very little of its Thinking-Capacity, wherein it differs from *ſenſible Joy*; which commonly diſturbs the Reaſon, and leſſens the Liberty.

I anſwer, *Secondly*, That the Happineſs of *Adam*, at the firſt inſtant of his Creation, did not conſiſt in a plenary and entire Poſſeſſion of the Supream Good; it being poſſible for him to loſe it, and become miſerable; but herein his Happineſs eſpecially conſiſted, That he ſuffer'd no Evil, and was in the good Favour of him, who muſt have perfected his Felicity, if he had perſever'd in his State of Innocency. Thus his Joy was not excéſſive; nay, it was, or ought to have been temper'd with an Allay of Fear; for he ought to have been diffident of himſelf.

I anſwer, *Laſtly*, That Joy does not always *intend* the Mind upon the true Cauſe that produces it. As a Senſe of Joy ariſes upon the Contemplation of ones own Perfections, it is natural to believe that Proſpect is the Cauſe of it: for when a Thing conſtantly follows from another, it is naturally look'd upon as one of its Effects: Thus a Man conſiders himſelf as the Author of his own preſent Happineſs; he finds a ſecret Complacency in his natural Perfections: he loves himſelf; and thinks not of him who operates in him in an imperceptible manner.

'Tis true, *Adam* more diſtinctly knew than the greateſt of *Philoſophers*, That *God* alone was able to act in him, and produce that Senſe of Joy, which he felt upon the Conſideration of his Happineſs and Perfections: This he knew clearly by the *Light of Reaſon*, when he attended to it; but not by any *Senſation*: which, on the contrary, taught him, that his Joy was a Conſequence of his Perfection, ſeeing he had the conſtant Senſe of it, and that without any Application on his part. And ſo this Senſation might lead him to conſider his own Perfections, and take Pleaſure in himſelf, if he either forgot, or any ways loſt ſight of *Him*, whoſe Operations in us are not of a ſenſible Nature. So far would this Joy have been from rendring him impeccable, as is pretended, that, on the contrary, it might probably be the Occaſion of his Pride and Fall. And 'tis for this Reaſon that I ſay in this Chapter, That *Adam* ought to have taken care *not to have ſuffered the Capacity of his Mind to be fill'd with a preſumptuous Joy, kindled in his Soul, upon Reflection on his own natural Perfections.*

THE

THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE FIFTH CHAPTER;

Where I say, *That Preventing Delight is the Grace of JESUS CHRIST.*

THough I say in this Chapter, That *preventing Delight* is the *Grace* which *JESUS CHRIST* has particularly merited for us; and that I term it elsewhere absolutely, The Grace of our LORD; yet this is not said, as if there were any other Grace besides This, or besides what He has merited; but I name it so, to distinguish it from the *Grace* which GOD gave *Adam* in his Creation, which commonly we call the *Grace of the Creatour*. For the Grace, by which *Adam* might have persever'd in Innocence, was chiefly a *Grace of Light* or Knowledge, as I have explain'd in the foregoing Reflection; because, being free of Concupiscence, he had no need of *preventing Pleasures* to resist it.

But the Grace which is at present necessary to support us in our Duty, and to beget and keep Charity alive in us, is *preventing Delectation*. For as Pleasure produces, and cherishes the Love of the things that cause, or seem to cause it; so *preventing Pleasures*, which Bodies *occasionally* administer, produce, and maintain in us our *Cupidity*. So that *Cupidity* being entirely opposite to *Charity*, if God did not beget and sustain in us the *Latter*, by *preventing Delectations*, it is plain that it would be enfeebled by the *preventing Pleasures* of Concupiscence; proportionably as Concupiscence was corroborated by them.

What I here say supposes, that God leaves our Concupiscence to work in us, and does not weaken it by an infused Abhorrence to sensible Objects, which (as a Result from Sin) must necessarily tempt us. I speak of things according to ordinary procedure: but supposing that God lessens Concupiscence instead of increasing *delectable Grace*, it comes to the same thing. For 'tis plain that a Balance may be put two ways *in æquilibrio*, when one of the Scales is too heavy burden'd; either by adding weight to the opposite Scale, or retrenching the Excess of the over-weighted.

Nor do I suppose it is impossible to do any good Action without a *preventing Delectation*. Upon which Particular I have explain'd my self sufficiently in the Fourth Chapter of the Third Book. And it seems too evident to be doubted, that a Man having his Heart possess'd with the Love of God, may by the strength of his Love, unassisted with *preventing Delight*, give, for Instance, a Peny to a poor Man, or patiently suffer some little Affront. I am perswaded likewise that this *Delight* is not necessary, except when the Temptation is strong, or the Love for God weak. However it may be said to be absolutely necessary to a Righteous Man, whose Faith might (one would think) be resolute, and his Hope strong enough to conquer very violent Temptations; the Joy or *Fore-taste* of Eternal Happiness being capable of resisting the sensible Allurements of transitory Pleasures.

'Tis true; *Delectation*, or *Actual Grace* is necessary to every good Action; if by these Words, be meant *Charity*, in which Sence St. *Austin* commonly took them: for it is evident, that whatever is done, without some Respect or other had to God, is good for nothing. But clearing the Terms of Equivocations, and taking *Delectation* in the Sence I have given, I cannot see how what I have said can be call'd in question.

But see wherein the Difficulty consists: Pleasure and Love are supposed to be one and the same thing, because seldom apart: and St. *Austin* does not always distinguish them: and on this Supposition they may reasonably say as they do: and we may conclude with St. *Austin*, *Quod amplius nos delectat, secundum id operemur necesse est.* For certainly we *will* what we *love*; and so likewise it may be said, That we cannot perform any good or meritorious Action without *Charity*. But I hope to make it appear in the Explanation I shall make upon the *Tract* concerning the *Passions*, that there is as much difference between Pleasure, and deliberate or indeliberate Love, as there is between our Knowledge and our Love; or, to give a sensible Representation of this difference, between *the Figure of a Body* and its Motion. *Chap. 3. Book V.*

THE

THE ILLUSTRATION.

Upon what I have ſaid at the Beginning of the *Tenth Chapter* of the *Firſt Book*, and in the *Sixth* of the *Second Book* concerning *Method*, *That 'tis very difficult to prove the Exiſtence of Bodies*. What we ought to eſteem of the Proofs which are brought of their Exiſtence.

MEN are commonly perfectly ignorant of what they preſume beſt to underſtand, and have a good Knowledge of other things; whilſt they imagine they have not ſo much as their Idea's. When their Senſes have to do, in their Judgments, they ſubmit to what they do not comprehend; at leaſt to what they know but imperfectly and confuſedly. And when their Idea's are purely intellectual, (give me leave to uſe ſuch Expreſſions) they will hardly admit undeniable Demonſtrations.

What Notion, for Inſtance, have the generality of Men, when we prove to them moſt of Metaphyſical Truths: when we demonſtrate the Exiſtence of a God, the Efficacy of his Will, the Immutability of his Decrees. That there is but one God, or true Cauſe, that works all in all things: But one Supream Reaſon, which all Intelligent Beings participate: But one neceſſary Love, which is the Principle of all created Wills. They think we pronounce Words without Sence; that we have no Idea's of the things advanc'd, and that we had better ſay nothing. Metaphyſical Truths and Arguments, are not of a ſenſible Nature; they have nothing moving and affecting, and conſequently leave not Conviction behind them. Nevertheleſs *abſtract Idea's* are certainly the moſt diſtinct; and *Metaphyſical Truths* the moſt clear and evident of all other.

Men ſometimes ſay they have no Idea of God, nor any Knowledge of his Will; and commonly believe too what they ſay, but 'tis for want of knowing what they know, it may be, beſt. For where's the Man that heſitates in anſwering to the Queſtion, Whether God is Wiſe, Juſt, or Powerful? Whether he is Diviſible, Triangular, Moveable, or ſubject to any kind of Change whatever? Whereas we cannot anſwer without ſcruple, and fear of being miſtaken, whether certain Qualities do, or do not belong to a Subject which we have no Idea of. So again, Who is it dares ſay, that God acts not by the moſt ſimple Means? That he is Irregular in his Deſigns? That he makes Monſters by a poſitive, direct, and particular Will? And not by a kind of Neceſſity? In a word, That his Will is, or may be, contrary to ORDER, whereof every Man knows ſomething more or leſs: But if a Man had no Idea of the *Will* of *GOD*, he might at leaſt doubt whether he acted according to certain Laws, which he clearly conceives he is obliged to follow, on Suppoſition, *HE* will act.

Men therefore have the Idea's of things purely *Intelligible*; which Idea's are much clearer than thoſe of *ſenſible* Objects. They are better aſſured of the Exiſtence of a God, than of that of Bodies; and when they retire into themſelves, they more clearly diſcover certain Wills of God, by which he produces, and preſerves all Beings, than thoſe of their beſt Friends, or whom they have ſtudied all their Lives. For the *Union* of their Mind with God, and that of their Will with his, that is, with the *Law Eternal*, or *immutable Order*, is immediate, direct, and neceſſary: whereas their *Union* with ſenſible Objects, being founded only for the Preſervation of their Life, and Health, gives them no Knowledge of theſe Objects, but as they relate to that Deſign.

'Tis this immediate, and direct Union, which is not known, ſays St. *Auſtin*, but by thoſe whoſe Mind is purified; that enlightens our moſt ſecret Reaſon, and exhorts and moves us in the inmoſt Receſſes of our Heart. By this we learn both the *Thoughts*, and the *Wills* of God; that is, Eternal Truths, and Laws: for no one can doubt, but he knows ſome of them with Evidence. But our Union with our choiceſt Friends, teaches us not evidently either what they *think*, or what they *will*. We think we know right well, but we are moſt commonly miſtaken; becauſe we receive our Information only from their Lips.

Nor can our Union, which we have through our Senſes with circumambient Bodies, inſtruct us. For the Teſtimony of the Senſes is never exactly true, but commonly every way falſe, as I have made appear in this Treatiſe; and 'tis for that Reaſon I ſay 'tis an harder thing than is believ'd, to prove poſitively the Exiſtence of Bodies; though our Senſes tell us they

they Exist: because Reason does not so readily inform us, as we imagine; and it must be most attentively consulted to give us a clear Resolve.

But as Men are more *Sensible* than *Reasonable*, so they more willingly listen to the Verdict of the Senses, than the Testimony of Internal Truth; and because they have always consulted their Eyes to be assur'd of the Existence of matter, without troubling their heads to advise with their Reason; they are surpriz'd to hear it said, it is hard to demonstrate it. They think they need but open their Eyes, to see that there are Bodies; but if this does not take away all suspition of Illusion, they believe it abundantly sufficient to come near and handle them: after which they can hardly conceive we can have any *possible reasons* to make us doubt of their Existence.

But if we believe our Eyes they'll tell us, that Colours are laid upon the surface of Bodies; and Light diffus'd in the air and Sun: our Ears make us hear sounds as undulated in the air; and echoing from the *ringing* Bodies; and if we credit the report of the other Senses; Heat will be in the Fire, Sweetness in the Sugar, Odor in Musk, and all sensible Qualities in the Bodies, which seem to Exhale or Disperse them. And yet it is certain from the reasons I have given in the first Book *concerning the Search after Truth*, that these Qualities are not out of the Soul that *feels* them, at least it is not evident they are in the Bodies that are about us. What reason therefore is there, from the Reports of our always-treacherous, and delusive Senses; to conclude, there are actually *Bodies* without us, and that they are like those we *see*; I mean those which are the immediate object of our Soul, when we *behold* them with Bodily Eyes, certainly this does not want difficulty, whatever may be said of it.

Farther; if the Existence of any Body may be certainly prov'd upon the Testimony of our Senses, none could have better pretence than *That* to which the Soul is immediately united: The liveliest Sensation, and that which seems to have the most necessary relation to an actually existing Body, is Pain. And yet it often happens that those who have lost an Arm feel most violent pains in it long after it has been cut off. They know well enough they want it, when they consult their Memory, or only look upon their Body; but the sense of Pain deceives them. And if, as it often happens, they be suppos'd to have quite forgotten what formerly they were, and to have no other Senses left them than that, whereby they feel Pain, in their Imaginary Arm; certainly they could not be convinc'd, but that they had an Arm in which they felt so violent torment.

There have been those who have believ'd they had Horns on their Heads, Others who have imagin'd they were made of Butter, or Glass, or that their Body was not of the shape of other Mens; but fashion'd like that of a Cock, a Wolf, or an Ox. But these, you'll say, were mad Men; and I readily believe it. But their Soul was capable of deceiving them, about these things, and consequently all other Men may fall into the same Errors, if they judge of objects by the testimony of their Senses. For it must be observ'd, that these *Madmen* actually *feel* themselves to be such as they *think* they are, and their Error consists not in the *Sensation* they have, but in the Judgment they make: If they should only say, they *felt* or *saw* themselves like Cocks, they would not be deceiv'd. But herein only they deceive themselves, in that they believe their Body like that they *feel*, I mean, like that which is the immediate object of their Mind, when they consider it. And so those who believe themselves such as they really are, are no more judicious in their Judgments they make of themselves, than these Madmen; if they judge precisely by the Testimony of their Senses. But are to thank their Fortune more than their Reason if they are not mistaken.

But at the Bottom; how can we be sure that those who go under the Notion of Madmen are really what they are taken for? May we not say they are reckon'd craz'd, because they have peculiar *Sentiments*. For 'tis evident, that a Man is not reckon'd mad, for having the sense of what is not; but only for having a sense of things quite contrary to that of others, whether their sense be true, or false; right or wrong.

A Clown, for Example, having his Eyes so dispos'd as to see the Moon just such as she is; or only so as she is beheld, or sometime may be hereafter, with new invented Glasses, looks on her with admiration, and cries to his Companions: What high Mountains and deep Valleys, what Seas, and Lakes, and Gulphs, and Rocks, do I behold! See, says he, what a vast Sea lies all along the *East*; whilst nothing but Land and Mountains extend from *West* to *South*. Don't you see on the same hand a Mountain higher than ever we beheld, and don't you wonder to see a Sea all over black, and an huge dreadful Gulph in the middle of the Planet? What would his Fellows answer to such Exclamations, or what would they think of him? Certainly that he was mad or Lunatick, and distemper'd by the malign Influences of the Planet he beholds and admires. For no Man has the same notions, and that's enough. Thus to be Mad in the Opinion of others, there's no need to be really so, but only to have thoughts and Sensation, different from them. For if all Men should believe themselves to be Cocks; he that maintain'd he had an humane shape would certainly go for a Fool or a Madman.

The *Moon* when beheld with a Telescope looks much like what is here represented.

But you'll say, has a Man a Beak at the end of his Nose, and a Comb upon his Head? I suppose not: But I don't know so much, when I judge only by my Senses, and put them not to their proper use. In vain shall I try by handling my Head and Face; for I feel my own Body, and those about me, but with hands whose length and Figure I don't know. Nay I

cannot be certainly assur'd whether I have truly Hands or not; for that which makes me think I have, is, that at the time that I seem to move them, there happen some Motions in a particular part of my Brain, which, in the vulgar Notion, is the Seat of the *Common Sense*. But it may be I have not that part which is so generally talk'd of, and so little known; at least I am not *sensible* of this, though I *feel* my Hands: so that I have more right to believe I have Hands, than that little Gland, which is still daily disputed against. But *lastly*, I know neither the Figure, nor Motion of this Gland, and yet I am assured, that by them only I can be instructed in the Figure and Motion of my own Body, and those that are round about me.

Well then, What are we oblig'd to conclude from all this? Why, that 'tis not a *Body* that can give *Light* to Reason; that the Part to which the Soul is immediately united, is neither visible, nor intelligible of it self; that neither our own, nor surrounding Bodies can be the immediate Object of our Mind; that we cannot learn from our Brain so much, as whether it actually exists; much less whether there are circumambient Bodies. That therefore we are to fly to the Existence of some *superiour Intelligence*, who alone is capable of acting in us, in such a manner, as to give a Real Representation of external Bodies, without giving us any Idea of our Brain; though the Motions produc'd in it, serve as an *Occasion* to this *Intelligent Being*, to discover these Bodies to us. For in short we see with Eyes, whose Figure we do not know, what is the Figure of external Bodies; and though the Colours which appear on Objects, are no livelier than those which are painted on the Optick Nerve, these are quite hid from us, whilst we admire the Splendour of the other.

But after all, Under what Obligation is an *Intelligent Being*, to shew us Bodies upon some Motions happening in our Brain? Again; What necessity is there of external Bodies, for Him to stir up these Motions in our Brain? Do not Sleep, Passions, and Madness produce these Motions, though external Bodies do not contribute to them. Is it evident, that Bodies incapable of moving one another, * should communicate to those they strike, a moving Force which they have not in themselves? But grant that Bodies move themselves, and those they strike against. Can we thence infer, that he who gives Being to all things, cannot *immediately by himself* stir up in our Brain the Motions, to which the Idea's of our Mind are connected? *Lastly*, Where's the Contradiction, that our Soul should receive *new Idea's*, whilst our Brain remains without *new Motions*? since it is certain the *latter* do not produce the *former*; since we have no Knowledge of these Motions, and that God alone can represent to us our Idea's, as I have elsewhere proved. Therefore 'tis absolutely necessary (positively to be assured of the Existence of external Bodies) to know God who gives us the Sensation of them; and to know, that because he is infinitely perfect he cannot deceive us. For if the Intelligence, who furnishes us with the Idea's of all things, would, as I may say, divert himself, by representing Bodies as actually existing, whilst there was nothing of them, it is plain he could easily do it.

* See *Ch.* 3. *Part* II. of *Book* VI. with the Illustration.

* See *Ch.* 6. *Part* II. of *Book* III. with its Illustration.

For these, or the like Reasons, M. *des Cartes* resolving to establish his Philosophy, on immoveable Foundations, thought he had no right to suppose the Existence of Bodies, nor to prove them by sensible Arguments, though highly convincing with the common part of Mankind. Undoubtedly he knew as well as we, that he needed but open his Eyes to see Bodies, and to draw near and handle them, to be satisfied whether his Eyes abused him in their Reports. He well enough knew the mind of Man, to judge that such like Proofs had been acceptable and welcome. But he did not seek for *sensible* Probabilities, nor vain and popular Applauses, preferring despis'd Truth before the Glory of an unmerited Reputation, and chusing rather to render himself ridiculous to little Souls, by Doubts thought by them extravagant, than to maintain what he thought not certain and undeniable.

But though M. *des Cartes* has given the strongest Arguments, that bare Reason could furnish out, for the Existence of Bodies: though it be evident, that God is no Deceiver, and it may be said he would really deceive us, did we deceive our selves, whilst we made a due use of our Mind, and the other Faculties whereof he is the Author: yet it may be affirmed that the Existence of Matter is not yet perfectly demonstrated. For, in fine, in point of Philosophy, we are to believe nothing till the Evidence of it obliges us; but to make use of our Liberty as much as we can, giving no greater Extent to our Judgments than our Perceptions. Wherefore when we see Bodies, we should judge only that we see them, and that these *visible* or *intelligible Bodies* actually exist: but why must we judge positively there is a *Material World*, without us like the *Intelligible World* we perceive?

But, say you, we see these *Bodies without* us, and likewise very remote from *that* we animate. We may then judge they are without us, and yet our Judgments reach no farther than our Perceptions. But what? Don't we *see* light without us, and in the Sun, though it be not in it. But be it so: Bodies that we see *without* us are really without us: for indeed it is not to be deny'd. But is it not evident that there are *outnesses*, and *remotenesses*, and *intelligible spaces* in the intelligible World, which is the Immediate Object of our Mind? The *material Body* which we *animate*, (observe it well) is not the same we *see* when we *beheld* it, I mean when we *turn our Corporeal Eyes upon it*; but an *intelligible Body*; and there are intelligible spaces, between this intelligible Body, and the Intelligible Sun we see; as there are material

ſpaces between our Body and the Sun which we behold. Certainly God ordain'd ſpaces between Bodies which he created, but he neither ſees theſe Bodies nor theſe ſpaces by themſelves; he can only ſee them by Bodies and Spaces Intelectual: God derives no Knowledge but from himſelf; he ſees not the material World, ſave in the Intelligible World, which he comprehends, and in the Knowledge he has of his own Will, which gives actually Exiſtence and Motion to all things. Therefore there are intelligible Spaces between the intelligible Bodies, which we *immediately ſee*, as there are material Spaces between Bodies, which our Eyes *behold*.

Now it ought to be obſerv'd, that as there is none but God who knows his *Will by himſelf*, which produces all Beings; it is impoſſible to know from any other whether there be actually without us a *material World* like that we ſee; becauſe the material World is neither Viſible, nor Intelligible of it ſelf. Therefore to be fully convinc'd of the Exiſtence of Bodies, it is not only neceſſary to demonſtrate there is a God, and that he is no Deceiver; but alſo that this God has aſſur'd us there is ſuch a World actually created: Which thing I find wanting in M. *des Cartes*'s Works.

God ſpeaks to the Mind, and obliges it to aſſent but two ſeveral ways, By *Evidence* and *Faith*. I acknowledge that *Faith* obliges us to believe the Exiſtence of Bodies: But as to Evidence, methinks it wants ſomething to be perfect; and that we are not invincibly carried to believe there is any thing *Exiſting* beſides *God* and our *own Mind*. 'Tis true we have an extream propenſion to believe there are ſuch things, as circumambient Bodies: So far I agree with M. *des Cartes*. But this Propenſion however natural, does not evidently force us; but only perſwaſively induce us. But we ought only to form our Free Judgments, as Light and Evidence oblige us; for if we leave our ſelves to the guidance of ſenſible Impreſſions, we ſhall ſeldom or ever be unmiſtaken.

For how comes it that we erre in the Judgments we make about ſenſible Qualities, about the Magnitude, Figure, and Motion of Bodies, but from our following an *Impreſſion* like that which induces us to believe the Exiſtence of Bodies? Do not we *ſenſibly* perceive the Fire to be hot, Snow to be white, and the Sun to be all glorious with a radiating Light? Do not we ſee that ſenſible Qualities no leſs than Bodies are without us? And yet 'tis certain, that the former which we ſee without us are not really ſo; or if you had rather, there is no certainty about it. What Reaſon then have we to judge, that beſides *intelligible Bodies* which we *ſee* there are others that we *behold*. Or what Evidence can a Man have, that an Impreſſion, not only deluſive, in reſpect of ſenſible Qualities, but alſo in regard to the Magnitude, Figure, and Motion of Bodies, ſhould not be as treacherous in reſpect to the actual Exiſtence of the Bodies themſelves: I ask, what Evidence can a Man have? For as to Probabilities I grant they are not wanting.

I know very well there's this Difference between ſenſible Qualities, and Bodies; that Reaſon much eaſier corrects the Impreſſion, or natural Judgments which relate to *ſenſible Qualities*, than thoſe which concern the Exiſtence *of Bodies*: and likewiſe that all the corrections made by Reaſon, with reference to ſenſible Qualities, perfectly comport with Religion, and Chriſtian Morality; and that we cannot deny the Exiſtence of Bodies, through a Principle of Religion.

'Tis eaſy to conceive that Pleaſure, and Pain, Heat, and even Colours, are not Modes of corporeal Exiſtence; that ſenſible Qualities in general are not contain'd in the Idea we have of Matter. In a Word, that our Senſes do not repreſent ſenſible Objects, as they are in their own nature, but as they are with reference to the preſervation of our Health and Life; which is conformable, not only to Reaſon, but much more to Religion, and Chriſtian Morality; as has been evidenc'd in ſeveral places of this Treatiſe.

But 'tis not ſo eaſie to be poſitively aſcertain'd of the Non-exiſtence of External Bodies, as it is to be poſitively convinc'd, that Pain and Heat are not in the Bodies which ſeem to cauſe them in us. 'Tis moſt certain, at leaſt, that there's a poſſibility of outward Bodies: We have no argument to prove there are none, and we have a very ſtrong inclination to believe there are; and therefore we have more reaſon to conclude for the Exiſtence than the Non-exiſtence of them; and conſequently it ſeems that we ought to believe they *are*. For we are naturally enclin'd to follow our natural Judgment ſo long as it's not poſitively corrigible by Light and Evidence. For every natural Judgment coming from God may be rightly ſeconded by our free Judgments, when God furniſhes us not with means to manifeſt its falſity; And if on ſuch occaſions we miſtake, the Author of our Mind may ſeem in a manner to be the Author of our Errors and Delinquencies.

This Reaſoning is, poſſibly, good: though it muſt be acknowledg'd that it ought not to go for an Evident Demonſtration of the Exiſtence of Bodies: For indeed God does not irreſiſtibly force us to conſent to it; if we give our conſent, it is a free act, and we may with-hold it if we pleaſe: If this arguing I have made be juſt, we are to believe it highly probable, that there are Bodies; but this bare Argumentation ought not to give us a plenary Conviction and Acquieſcence; otherwiſe, it is we our ſelves that act, and not God in us; it being by a free act, and conſequently liable to Error, that we conſent, and not by an invincible Impreſſion: for we believe it freely becauſe we will, and not becauſe we ſee any obliging Evidence.

Surely

Surely nothing but Faith can convince us of the actual Existence of Bodies: We can have no exact Demonstration of any other *Being*'s Existence, than the *necessary*: and if we warily consider it, we shall find it even impossible to know with perfect Evidence, whether *GOD* is, or is not the Creatour of a Material, and sensible World; for no such Evidence is to be met with, except in necessary Relations, which are not to be found betwixt *GOD*, and such a World as this. It was possible for him not to have created it: If he has made it, it is because he *will'd* it, and *freely* will'd it.

The Saints in Heaven see by an evident Light, That the *FATHER* begets the *SON*, and that the *HOLY GHOST* proceeds from the *FATHER* and the *SON*; for these are necessary Emanations: But the World being no necessary Emanation from *GOD*: those who most clearly see his Being, see not evidently his External Productions. Nevertheless I am perswaded, that the Blessed are certain of the World's Existence; but 'tis because *GOD* assures them of it, by manifesting his Will to them, in a manner by us unknown; and we on Earth are certain too: but 'tis because Faith obliges us to believe, That *GOD* has created this World; and that this Faith is conformable to our natural Judgments, or our compound Sensations, when they are confirm'd by all our *Senses*, corrected by our *Memory*, and rectified by our *Reason*.

I confess, that at first sight the Proof or Principle of our Faith seems to suppose the Existence of Bodies: *Fides ex auditu*. It seems to suppose Prophets, Apostles, Sacred-Writ and Miracles; but if we closely examine it, we shall find, that in supposing but the *Appearances* of Men, Prophets, Apostles, Holy Scripture, Miracles, *&c.* what we have learn'd from these suppos'd Appearances, stands undeniably certain; since, as I have prov'd in several places of this Work, *GOD* only can represent to the Mind these pretended Appearances; and He is no Deceiver. For Faith supposes all this. Now in the *Appearance* of Holy Scripture, and by the *Seemingness* of Miracles, we learn, That *GOD* has *created* an Heaven and an Earth, that the *Word* is made *Flesh*, and other such like Truths, which suppose the Existence of a created World. Therefore Faith verifies the Existence of Bodies; and all these *Appearances* are actually *substantiated* by it. 'Tis needless to insist longer upon answering an Objection, which seems too abstracted for the common part of Men; and I believe that this will be enough to satisfie those who pretend not to be over-difficult.

From all which we are to conclude, That we both may, and ought to correct our Natural Judgments, or compound Perceptions, which relate to the sensible Qualities, we attribute to the *Bodies* that surround us, or to *That* we animate. But as for *natural Judgments*, which relate to the actual Existence of Bodies; though absolutely, we are not obliged to form free ones to accord with them; yet we ought not to supersede doing it, because these *natural Judgments* agree perfectly with *Faith*.

Finally, I have made this Explanation, chiefly to the intent we may seriously reflect upon this Truth; That nothing but Eternal Wisdom can enlighten us, and that all sensible *Notices*, wherein our Body is concern'd, are fallacious; at least are not attended with that Light, which we feel our selves oblig'd to submit to. I am sensible that these Notions will not pass with the common sort of Men; and that as they are dispos'd by the Superfluity, or Poverty of their Animal Spirits, they will either ridicule, or flinch at the Reasonings I have laid down. For the Imagination cannot endure abstract and un-ordinary Truths: but either considers them as ghastly Spectres, or ridiculous Phantasms; But I chuse rather to be the Subject of Droll, and Raillery for the strong and bold Imagination, and of Indignation and Fear for the weak and timorous; than to be wanting in what I owe to Truth, and to those generous Defenders of the Mind against the Efforts of the Body, who know how to distinguish the Responses of illuminating Wisdom, from the confus'd Noise of the perplexing, and erroneous Imagination.

THE

Surely

THE ILLUSTRATIONS UPON THE FIFTH CHAPTER OF THE SECOND BOOK.

Of the Memory, and Spiritual Habits.

I Had no mind to ſpeak in this Chapter of the Memory, and ſpiritual Habits, for ſeveral Reaſons; the chief of which is, That we have no clear Idea of our Soul. For how can we clearly explain what are the Diſpoſitions which the Operations of the Soul leave in her; (which Diſpoſitions are her Habits) whilſt we have no clear Knowledge of the Nature of our Soul? 'Tis plain that 'tis impoſſible to know diſtinctly the Changes, whereof a Being is capable, when we have no diſtinct Knowledge of the Nature of that Being. For if, for Inſtance, we had no clear Idea of Extenſion, in vain ſhould we endeavour to diſcover its Figures. However, ſince I am deſired to ſpeak of a Matter which I know not of it ſelf; ſee what a compaſs I fetch, that I may only keep to clear Idea's.

I ſuppoſe that there's none but God who acts upon the Mind, and repreſents to it the Idea's of all things; and that if the Mind perceive any Object by a very clear and diſtinct Idea, 'tis becauſe God repreſents that Idea in a moſt perfect manner.

I farther ſuppoſe, that the Will of God being entirely conformable to ORDER, and Juſtice, we need but to have a *Right* to any thing, to obtain it. Theſe Suppoſitions being laid down, which are eaſily conceiv'd, the *Spiritual Memory* is readily explain'd. For Order requiring, that Spirits, which have frequently thought of any Object, ſhould more eaſily think again upon it, and have a more clear and lively Idea of it, than thoſe who have but ſeldom conſider'd it. The Will of God, which continually operates by Order, repreſents to their Underſtanding, as often as deſir'd, the clear and lively Idea of that Object. So that, according to this Explication, the *Memory*, and other Habits of *pure Intelligences*, conſiſts not in an *Eaſineſs of operating*, which reſults from any Modifications of their Being; but in the *immutable Order of God*, and in a *Right* the Mind obtains to thoſe things, which have been already ſubmitted to it. And all the Power of the Mind immediately and ſolely depends on God alone; the force or facility of acting, which all Creatures have in their Operations, being in this Sence but the efficacious Will of the Creatour.

Nor do I think we are oblig'd to give up this Explication, by reaſon of the evil Habits of Sinners, and damn'd Perſons. For though God does all that is Real, and Poſitive in the Actions of Sinners, it is evident, by what I have ſaid in the *firſt Illuſtration*, that He is not the Author of Sin.

Nevertheleſs I believe, as I think I ought, that after the Action of the Soul, there remain ſome Changes which *diſpoſe* it to that ſame Action again. But as I know them not, ſo I cannot explain them; for I have no clear Idea of my own Mind, wherein to diſcover all the Modifications it is capable of. I believe by *Theological*, and not clear and evident Proofs; that the Reaſon of pure *Intelligences* ſeeing the Objects they have before conſider'd, more diſtinctly than others, is not meerly becauſe God repreſents them in a livelier and perfecter manner; but becauſe they are really more diſpos'd to receive the ſame Action of God in them. Juſt as the facility of playing on an Organ, which ſome have acquir'd, proceeds not from any greater Force and Action, which the Animal Spirits (that are neceſſary to the Motion of the Fingers) have in them, than in other Men: but from the Smoothneſs, and Glibneſs which the Paſſages of the Animal Spirits have gotten by Exerciſe, as in this Chapter is explain'd: But yet I grant the Uſe of Memory, and the other Habits is unneceſſary in thoſe, who being perfectly united to God, find in his *Light*, all ſorts of Idea's; and in his *Will*, all the facility of acting that can be deſired.

See the Illuſtration upon the 7th. *Chap.* of *Part* II. *Book* III.

THE ILLUSTRATION UPON The Seventh Chapter OF THE SECOND BOOK.

A Reduction of the Proofs and Explications I have given of Original Sin: Together with the Answers to the Objections, that I thought most urgent.

IN order to answer methodically to the Difficulties that may arise, touching *Original Sin*, and its manner of Derivation from Fathers to Children; I thought fit to exhibit in few words, what I have said on that Subject, in several places of the foregoing Treatise. Here follow my principal Proofs, which I have dispos'd after a particular fashion, to make them more sensible to those that will consider them.

I.

God *wills Order* in his Works. What we clearly conceive to be agreeable to *Order*, God *wills*; and what we conceive clearly to be repugnant to *It*, God *wills not*: which is a Truth, manifest to all those who can consider the infinitely perfect Being, with a steady and clear'd View. Nothing can unfix, or trouble their prospect of this Truth; whilst they clearly see, that all the Difficulties that can be raised against this Principle, proceed but from the Ignorance of those things which are necessary to be known to solve them.

II.

God has no other End in his Operations, than Himself; this *Order* demands.

III.

God creates, and preserves the Mind of Man to be taken up with him, to know and to love him; as being himself the End of his own Works; *Order* will have it so. God cannot *will*, that a Being should love what is not amiable; or rather, He cannot *will*, that what is less amiable, should be more belov'd. Therefore 'tis evident that Nature is corrupted, and in Disorder, since the Mind loves Bodies that are not amiable, and that commonly more than God. *Original Sin*, then, or the Corruption of Nature, needs no Proof: For every one finds plain enough in himself a Law, which captivates and disorders him; a Law that is not given by *God*, since it is contrary to *Order*, by which *His* Will is govern'd.

IV.

Nevertheless Man before his Fall, was admonish'd by preventing Sensations; and not by clear Knowledge, whether he ought to unite to, or separate from the encompassing Bodies; *Order* requir'd it. 'Tis a Disorder, that the Mind should be oblig'd to apply to them: for though it may be united to them, it is not made for them. It ought therefore to have *Knowledge* of God, and Sense of Bodies. Again; whereas Bodies are incapable of being the Good of the Mind, it would with Regret and Pain, unite to them, if it knew them to be only what they are, without being *sensible* of something in them, which is not. Wherefore the Counterfeit Good ought to be discern'd by a *preventing Sensation*, that it may be lov'd with a Love of Instinct; and the True Good ought to be known by a *clear Knowledge*, that it may be lov'd with a rational Love, and a Love of Choice. *Lastly*, Man being made, and preserved by God, to *know*, and *love* him; ought not to have the Capacity of his Mind either possess'd, or shar'd in spight of him, with the Knowledge of the infinite Figures, and Configurations

rations of Bodies about him, or of *that* he animates; and yet to know by a clear Knowledge, Whether such a Fruit, at such a Season, be fit for Nourishment of his Body, manifestly requires the Intelligence of so many things, and the making so many Argumentations, as would quite fill up the most comprehensive of created Minds.

VI.

But though the first Man was advertis'd by preventing Sensations, Whether he ought, or ought not to make use of surrounding Bodies, yet he was not mov'd by involuntary, and rebellious Passions; and he obliterated out of his Mind the Idea's of sensible things, when he pleas'd, whether he us'd them or not; because *Order* would have it so. The Mind may be united to a Body, but it should command it, and not depend on it. Again, All the Love which God invests us with, ought to terminate on him, because he produces nothing in us but what is for himself. *Lastly*, Bodies are not amiable; but behold what within us is capable of loving. Therefore in the first Institution of Nature, Bodies could not turn our Mind towards them, nor incline it to consider them, and love them, as its Goods.

VII.

The Bodies about us act not on our Soul, save when they produce some Motions in our Body, and that these Motions are communicated to the *principal Part* of our Brain. For it is by the Changes which happen in this Part, that the Soul changes her self, and finds her self moved by sensible Objects. This I have sufficiently prov'd, and Experience demonstrates the same. Which being suppos'd, it is clear, from the preceding Article, that *Adam* stopt when he pleas'd, the Motions communicated to his Body, at least those communicated to the principal part of his Brain: *Order will'd* it so; and consequently *He* who for ever always conforms to *Order*, and who can do nothing against *It* though He be *Almighty*. Thus Man might, on certain Occasions, *suspend* the Natural Law of the Communication of Motions, seeing he was not tainted with *Concupiscence*, nor did he feel in himself any involuntary and rebellious Motions.

VII.

But *Adam* lost that Power by sinning; *Order* would have it so: for it is not reasonable, that in Favour of a *Sinner*, and a *Rebel*, there should be any other Exceptions to the general Law of the Communication of Motions, than what are absolutely necessary to the Preservation of our Life and Civil Society. Therefore the Body of Man being continually shaken, by the Action of sensible Objects, and his Soul agitated by all the Concussions of the principal part of his Brain, he is become a dependent on the Body, to which he was only united, and over which he had a Sovereignty before his Fall.

VIII.

Let us see now how the *first Man* was capable of sinning. It is natural to love Pleasure, and to taste it; and this was not forbidden *Adam*. The Case is the same with Joy: one may rejoice at the sight of his Natural Perfections; That is not evil in it self. Man was made to be happy, and 'tis Pleasure and Joy which actually beatifie and content: *Adam* therefore tasted Pleasure in the use of sensible Goods; and he felt a Joy upon viewing his own Perfections: For 'tis impossible to consider ones self, as happy, or perfect, and not be possess'd with it. He felt no such Pleasure in his Duty; for though he knew God was his Good, it was not in a sensible way; as I have prov'd in several places. So the Joy he might find in his Duty, was not very sensible; which being suppos'd, we conclude, That whereas the *first Man* had not an infinite Capacity of Mind, his Pleasure, or his Joy weakned its clear sight, which gave him to know, That God was his Good, and that he ought only to love him. For Pleasure is in the Soul, and the Modification of it; and therefore fills up our Capacity of Thought, proportionably as it affects and works on us: this is a thing which we learn by Experience, or rather from that inward Consciousness we have of our selves. We may then conceive, That the *first Man* having insensibly suffer'd the Capacity of his Mind, to be possess'd, or divided, by the lively Sense of a presumptuous Joy, or, it may be, some Love, or sensible Pleasure, the Presence of God, and the Consideration of his Duty were eras'd from his Mind, for neglecting couragiously to pursue his Light in the Search of his True Good: so this Distraction made him capable of falling. For his principal Grace and Strength was his Light, and the clear Knowledge of his Duty; forasmuch as then he had no need of preventing Delights, which are now necessary to oppose to *Concupiscence*.

IX.

And it must be observ'd, That neither the preventing Sense of Pleasure, which *Adam* felt in the use of the Goods of the Body, nor the Joy that possess'd him, when reflecting on his own Happiness or Perfection, was the true Cause of his Fall; for he knew very well, that none but God could give him that Sense of Pleasure or Joy: and so he in Duty should have loved him only, forasmuch as none merits our Love, save the true Cause of our Felicity. As nothing perturbated his Knowledge and Light, whilst he strove to keep it pure and incorrupt; so he might, and ought to have expung'd from his Mind, those Sensations which divi-

ded

ded it, and which endanger'd its falling off, and losing sight of him, who strengthned, and enlightned it. He ought to have well remembred, that if God offer'd Himself not to his *Sense*, but only his *Understanding*, as his Good, it was to afford him a readier way to merit his Reward, by a continual Exercise of his Liberty.

Supposing then, That *Adam* and *Eve* have sinn'd, and consequently thereupon felt in themselves involuntary and rebellious Motions; I say, That their Children must needs be born Sinners, and subject, as they were, to Motions of *Concupiscence*. See my Reasons for it.

X.

I have prov'd at large, in the Chapter that occasion'd this Discourse, that there is such a Communication between the *Brain* of the Mother, and *that* of the Child, that all the Motions and Traces excited in the *one*, are stir'd up in the *other*. Therefore as the Soul of the Infant is united to its Body, at the very instant of its Creation, it being the *Confirmation* of the Body, which obliges God, in consequence of his general Will, to *inform* it with a Soul; 'tis plain, that at the very moment of this Soul's Creation, it has corrupt Inclinations, and turns towards the Body: since it has, from that same moment, Inclinations answerable to the Motions that are actually in the Brain it is united to.

XI.

But because it is a Disorder, That the Mind should propend to Bodies, and expend its Love upon them; the Infant is a Sinner, and in Disorder, assoon as out of the Hands of his Maker. God, who is the Lover of *Order*, hates him in this Estate; notwithstanding his Sin is not free and eligible. But his Mother conceiv'd him in Iniquity, because of the Communication establish'd by the Order of Nature, betwixt her Brain, and the Brain of her Infant.

XII.

Now this Communication is *very good* in its Institution, for several Reasons. *First*, Because useful, and it may be, necessary to the Conformation of the *Fœtus*. *Secondly*, Because the Infant, by this means, might have some Intercourse with his Parents; it being but reasonable, that he should know, to whom he was oblig'd for his Body, which he animated. *Lastly*, He could not, but by help of this Communication, know external Occurrences, and think of them, as he should do. Having a Body, 'twas fit he should have Thoughts relating to it, and not be hood-wink'd to the Works of God, amongst which he liv'd. There are, likely, many other Reasons for this Communication than those I have given; but these are sufficient to justifie it, and to cover His Conduct from Censure and Reproach, every Will of whom is conformable to ORDER.

XIII.

However, there is no Reason, that the Infant, in spight of his Will, should receive the Traces of sensible Objects. If the Souls of Children were created but one moment before they were united to their Bodies; if they were but an instant in a State of Innocence and Order; they would have plenary Right and Power, from the necessity of Order, or of the Eternal Law to suspend that Communication: just as the *first Man*, before his Sin, stopt when he pleas'd the Motions which arose in him; *Order* requiring, That the Body should be subject to the Mind. But whereas the Souls of Children were never well-pleasing to God; it was never reasonable, that God on their behalf should dispense with the Law of the Communication of Motions; and so it is just that Infants should be born Sinners, and in Disorder. And the Order of Nature, which is just, and equitable, was not the Cause of their Sin; but the Sin of their Progenitors. In which Sence it is not just and reasonable, that a sinful Father should procreate Children perfecter than himself, or that they should have a Dominion over their Bodies, which their Mother has not over her own.

XIV.

'Tis true, That after the Sin of *Adam*, which ruin'd and corrupted all things, God might by changing something in the Order of Nature, have remedied the Disorder which that Sin had caus'd. But God changes not his Will in that manner: He *wills* nothing but what is just, and what He once *wills*, He ever *wills*. He never corrects himself, nor repents of what He does; but his Will is constant and immutable. His Eternal Decrees depend not on the inconstant Will of Man, nor is it just they should be submitted to it.

XV.

But if it may be permitted to dive into the Councels of the *Almighty*, and to speak our Thoughts upon the Motives, which might determine him to establish the *Order* now explain'd, and permit the Sin of *Adam*; I can't see how we can conceive a Notion more worthy the Greatness of God, and more consonant to Reason and Religion, than to believe his principal Design in his External Operations, was the *Incarnation* of his *SON*, That God establish'd the *Order* of *Nature*, and permitted the *Disorder* which befel it, to help forward his Great Work; that He permitted all Men to be subjected to *Sin*, that none might *glory* in himself;

See the 5. *Dialogue of Christian Conversations.*

and ſuffer'd *Concupiſcence* in the Perfecteſt, and Holieſt of Men, leſt they ſhould take a vain Complacency in their own Perſons. For upon conſidering the Perfection of one's Being, 'tis difficult to deſpiſe it, unleſs, at the ſame time, we contemplate, and love the Supreme Good; before whom all our Perfection and Greatneſs diſſolves, and falls to Nothing. *Aug. in Pſal.* lib. 6. cap. 3.

I own, That *Concupiſcence* may be the occaſion of our Merit, and that 'tis moſt juſt the Mind ſhould for a Seaſon follow *Order* with Pain and Difficulty, that it may merit to be eternally ſubject to it with Eaſe and Pleaſure. I grant, That upon that Proſpect God might have permitted *Concupiſcence*, when he foreſaw the Sin. But *Concupiſcence* not being abſolutely neceſſary to our Meriting, if God permitted it, it was, That Man might be able to do no good, without the Aids which JESUS CHRIST has merited for him; and that he might not glory in his own ſtrength. For 'tis viſible, That a Man cannot encounter and conquer himſelf, unleſs animated by the Spirit of Chriſt, who, as Head of the Faithful, inſpires them with quite oppoſite Sentiments to thoſe of *Concupiſcence*, deriv'd to them from the *Original Man*.

XVI.

Suppoſing then, That Infants are born with *Concupiſcence*, 'tis plain they are effectively Sinners, ſince their Heart is ſet upon Bodies as much as it is capable: there is as yet in their Will but one Love, and that diſorder'd and corrupt; and ſo they have nothing in them that can be the Object of the Love of God, becauſe he cannot love Diſorder.

XVII.

But when they have been regenerated in JESUS CHRIST, that is, when their Heart has been *converted* to God, either by an actual Motion of Love, or by an internal Diſpoſition, like that which remains after an Act of Loving God: then *Concupiſcence* is no more a Sin in them, becauſe it does not ſolely poſſeſs the Heart, nor domineer any longer in it. Habitual Love, which remains in them, through the Grace of *Baptiſm* in our *LORD*, is more free, or more ſtrong than that which is in them through the Contagion of *Concupiſcence* deriv'd from *Adam*. They are like the Juſt, who in their Sleep obey the Motions of *Concupiſcence*, yet loſe not the Grace of their Baptiſm, becauſe their Conſent to theſe Motions is involuntary.

XVIII.

It ſhould not be thought ſtrange, That I believe it poſſible for Children to love God with a Love of Choice, at the time of their Baptiſm. For ſince the *Second Adam* is contrary to the *Firſt*, why ſhould he not, at the time of Regeneration, deliver Children from the Servitude of their Body, whereunto they are ſubjected by the *Firſt*? That being enlightned and quickned by a lively and efficacious Grace, to the loving of God, they may love him with a free and rational Love, without being obſtructed by the *firſt Adam*. You ſay, it is not obſervable, that their Body for a moment leaves acting on the Mind: But is that ſuch a Wonder, that we can't ſee what is not viſible? One ſingle Inſtant is ſufficient for the Exerciſe of that Act of Love: And as it may be perform'd in the Soul, without imprinting any Footſteps in the Brain, 'tis no more to be admir'd, that the Adult in their Baptiſm do not always mind it; for we have no Memory of things which are not regiſtred in the Traces of the Brain.

XIX.

St. *Paul* teaches us, That the *Old Man*, or *Concupiſcence*, is crucified with JESUS CHRIST, and that we are dead and buried with him by Baptiſm. What means this, but that then we are deliver'd from the *Warring of the Body, againſt the Mind*, and that *Concupiſcence* is as it were mortify'd in that moment: 'Tis true it revives; but having been deſtroy'd, and thereby left Children in a State of loving God, it can do them no harm by its reviving. For when there are Two Loves in the Heart, a Natural, and a Free, *Order* will, that the Free be only reſpected. But if Infants in Baptiſm lov'd God by an Act in no wiſe *free*, and afterwards lov'd Bodies by many Acts of the *ſame Species*; God could not perhaps, according to *Order*, have more reſpect to *one* ſingle Act, than to *many*, which were *all natural*, and without Liberty. Or rather, if their contrary Loves were equal in force, he muſt have reſpect to that which was Laſt; by the ſame Reaſon, that when there has been ſucceſſively in an Heart Two Free-Loves contrary to each other, God has always reſpect to the Laſt, ſince Grace is deſtroy'd by any one Mortal Sin.

XX.

Nevertheleſs, it cannot be denied, but God may juſtifie the Infant, without interrupting the Dominion of his Body over his Mind; or convert his Will towards him, by depoſiting in his Soul a Diſpoſition like that, which remains after an Actual Motion of our Loving God. But that way of acting, I doubt, ſeems leſs Natural than the Other; for it cannot clearly be conceiv'd what theſe remaining Diſpoſitions can be. 'Tis true, that ought not to be much admir'd; ſince having no clear Idea of our Soul, as I have elſewhere prov'd, we need not wonder if we know not all the Modifications it is capable of. But the Mind cannot be fully ſatisfied upon things, which it does not clearly conceive; And without recourſe to an extraordinary Miracle, we cannot ſee what can give the Soul theſe *Diſpoſitions*, without a *See Ch. 7. Part II. of Book II. with its Illuſtration.*

preceding *Act*: surely it cannot be done by ways that seem most plain and simple. Whereas the *second Adam* acting on the *baptiz'd Infant's* Mind for one moment, the contrary to what the *first Adam* produc'd in it before. Regeneration is perform'd by the usual ways of acting which God takes in his sanctifying the Adult: For the Infant, at that moment, being void of Sensations and Passions, which divide its *Thinking* and *Willing* Capacity, has nothing to encumber it, and prevent its knowing and loving its true Good. This is all I say at present, because it is not necessary to know precisely, how Regeneration of Infants is performed; provided we admit in them a true Regeneration, or an inward and real Justification, caused by Acts, or at least by Habits of Faith, Hope, and Charity. My offering an Explication so repugnant to Prejudices, is design'd for the Satisfaction of those, who will not allow of Spiritual Habits, and to prove to them the Possibility of the Regeneration of Infants: For the Notion of Imputation seems to me to include a manifest Contradiction; It being impossible, That God should consider his Creatures as Righteous, and actually love them, whilst they are actually in Disorder and Corruption. Though He may for his SON's sake have a Design to re-instate them in ORDER, and love them when re-instated.

OB-

OBJECTIONS
Against the
Proofs and Explications of *Original Sin.*

OBJECTION
Against the first ARTICLE.

GOD wills Order, it is true; but 'tis his Will that makes it: it does not suppose it: Whatever God wills is in Order purely for this Reason that God wills it: If God wills that *Minds* should be *subject* to *Bodies*, should love and fear them, there is no disorder in all this. If God will'd that two times two should not be four, we should not speak false, in saying two times two were not four: For it would be a Truth. God is the Principle of all Truth: and the Master of all Order: he supposes nothing; neither Truth, nor Order: but makes all.

At every Objection turn to the Article it is made gainst.

ANSWER.

Then all is thrown in Confusion. There is no longer any Science nor Morality, nor undeniable Proofs of our Religion. Which consequence is evident to any man who clearly comprehends this false Principle; That God produces *Order* and *Truth* by a *Will* absolutely *Free*. But this is not to answer it.

I Answer then that God can neither *do*, nor *will* any thing without knowledge; that therefore his Will *supposes* something; but what it supposes is nothing of a *created* nature, *Order*, *Truth*, *Eternal Wisdom*, is the Exemplar of all the Works of God: which Wisdom is not made; God who makes all things never made it, though he constantly begets it by the necessity of his Essence.

Whatever God wills is in Order, for that sole reason, that he wills it: No body denies it. But this is because God cannot act against himself, that is, his Wisdom and his Knowledge. He is at liberty not to produce any External Work: but supposing he will act; he cannot act otherways than by the immutable order of his Wisdom. Which he necessarily Loves. For *Religion* and *Reason* teach me that he works nothing without his SON, without his WORD, without his WISDOM. Therefore I fear not to affirm, that *God cannot positively will that the mind should be subject to the Body*. Because that Wisdom, whereby God wills, whatever he wills, makes me clearly understand it is contrary to *Order*: And I see this clearly in that same *Wisdom*; because it is the Soveraign and Universal Reason, which is participated by all Spirits, for which all Intelligences are created, and by which all men are Reasonable. For no Man is his own *Reason*, *Light* and *Wisdom*; unless it be when his Reason is *Particular*, his Light, an *Ignis fatuus*, and his Wisdom *Folly*.

As the Generality of Men know not distinctly that it is only Eternal Wisdom which enlightens them; and that Intelligible Ideas which are the Immediate object of their Mind, are not created; so they imagine, that Eternal Laws and Immutable Truths, receive their Establishment from a free will of God. And this is what occasion'd *M. des Cartes* to say, that God was able to effect that twice four should not be eight; and that the three Angles of a Triangle should not be equal to two Rights. Because *there is no Order*, says he, *no Law*, *no Reason*, *Goodness*, *or Truth*, *but depends on God*, and that is he *who from all Eternity*, *has ordain'd and establisht*, *as supream Legislator*, *Eternal Truths*. This Learned Man did not observe that there was an Order, a Law, a Soveraign Reason *Coeternal* with God, and necessarily lov'd by him, and according to which he must necessarily act, supposing he will act. For God is *indifferent* as to his External Workings, but the *manner* of his working, though he be perfectly *free*, is not *indifferent* to him. He always acts in the wisest and perfectest manner possible: he constantly follows immutable, and necessary *Order*. Thus God is at liberty not to make either *Spirits*, or *Bodies*, but if he creates these two Kinds of Beings, he must create them by the simplest ways, and situate them in the most perfect *Order*. He may for Example *unite* Spirits to Bodies, but I maintain that he cannot *subject* them thereunto, unless in pursuance of the Order which he always follows, the Sin of Spirits obliges him to use them in that manner:

Answer to the sixth Objection against his Meditations. Art. 6. Art. 8. See the Illustration upon the 6th. *Chap.* of *Part* II. *Book* III.

as

as I have already explain'd in the ſeventh Article, and in the firſt Explication towards the end.

To anticipate ſome inſtances that might be urg'd againſt me, I think it neceſſary to ſay that Men are to blame to conſult themſelves when they would know what God can do or will. They are not to judge of his wills by the inward ſenſe they have of their own Inclinations. For otherwiſe they would often make him an unjuſt, cruel, ſinful, inſtead of an Almighty God. They ought to lay aſide the general Principle of their Prejudices, which diſpoſes them to judge of all things with reference to themſelves, and not to attribute to God what they do not clearly conceive to be included in the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect. For they ought not to judge of things ſave by clear Ideas. And then the God they worſhip, will not be like thoſe of Antiquity, Cruel, Adulterous, Voluptuous, as Men have Imagin'd them: nor will he reſemble the God of ſome Chriſtians, who to make him as powerful as the Sinner wiſhes him, aſcribe to him an abſolute power of acting againſt all Order, of leaving *Sin unpuniſht*, and of *condemning* to eternal Torments Perſons never ſo *righteous* and *Innocent*.

Second OBJECTION

Againſt the Firſt Article.

If God wills *Order*, what is it that makes *Monſters*, I ſay not amongſt Men; for they have ſinn'd, but amongſt Animals and Plants? What is the cauſe of the general corruption of the Air which breeds ſo many Diſeaſes? By what Order is it that the Seaſons are ſo irregular, and that the Sun and the Froſt burn up and kill the Fruits of the Earth? Is it to act with Wiſdom and Order, to furniſh an Animal with parts quite uſeleſs, and to congeal the Fruits after they are perfectly form'd? Is not this rather becauſe God does what he pleaſes, and that his power ſuperſedes all Order and Rule? For to mention things of greater Importance than the Fruits of the Earth, wherewith he may do as he ſees good: the *Clay* whereof God makes *Veſſels of wrath*, is the ſame with that of which he faſhions *Veſſels of Mercy*.

ANSWER.

Theſe are the difficulties which ſerve only to obſcure the Truth, as proceeding from the darkneſs of the Mind. We know that God is juſt: we ſee that the wicked are Happy: ought we to deny what we *ſee*; ought we to doubt of what *we know*, becauſe we may poſſibly be ſo ſtupid as not to know, and ſo Libertine as not to believe what Religion teaches us of future Torments? So we know that God is Wiſe; and all that he does is Good; mean while we ſee Monſters, or defective Works. What are we to believe that God is out of his aim, or that theſe Monſters are not his handiwork? Certainly if we have ſence and conſtancy of Mind, we ſhall believe neither the one nor the other. For 'tis manifeſt that God does all, and that whatever he does is as perfect as poſſible, with relation to the ſimplicity and fewneſs of the means he imploys, in the Formation of his Work. We muſt hold faſt to what we ſee, and not quit our ground for any difficulties impoſſible to be reſolv'd; when our Ignorance is the cauſe of that Impoſſibility. If Ignorance muſt raiſe Difficulties, and ſuch like Difficulties overthrow the beſt eſtabliſht Opinions, what will remain certain among Men who know not all things? What? Shall not the brighteſt Lights be able to diſperſe the leaſt Darkneſs; and ſhall any little ſhadow Eclipſe the cleareſt and the livelieſt Light?

But the anſwering ſuch ſort of Difficulties might be diſpens'd with, without Prejudice to the fore-eſtabliſh't Principle; yet it is not amiſs to ſhow they are not unanſwerable. For the mind of Man is ſo unjuſt in its Judgments, that it may poſſibly prefer the Opinions which ſeem to reſult from theſe imaginary *Difficulties*, before certain Truths, which no Man can doubt of, but becauſe he *will*; and with that deſign ceaſes to examine *them*. I ſay then that God *wills order*, though there are *Monſters*; and 'tis moreover *becauſe God wills order, that there are Monſters*; and this is my reaſon.

Order requires that the Laws of nature whereby God produces that infinite Variety, ſo conſpicuous in the World, ſhould be very ſimple, and very few in number. Now 'tis the ſimplicity of theſe general Laws, which on ſome particular Junctures, and becauſe of the Diſpoſition of the ſubject, produces irregular Motions, or rather Monſtrous Combinations: and conſequently God's willing order is the cauſe of theſe Monſters. Thus God does not poſitively or directly will the Exiſtence of Monſters: but he poſitively wills certain Laws of the Communication of Motions, whereof Monſters are the neceſſary conſequences; becauſe their Laws, though of a moſt ſimple kind, are nevertheleſs capable of producing that variety of forms which can't be ſufficiently admir'd.

For Example: In conſequence of the general Laws of the communication of Motions, there are ſome Bodies which are driven near the Centre of the Earth. The Body of a Man, or an Animal is one of theſe: that which upholds him in the Air breaks under his Feet: is it juſt, or according to Order, that God ſhould change his general Will, for that particular Caſe? Surely it ſeems not probable. That Animal therefore muſt neceſſarily break, or maim its Body. And thus we ought to argue about the generation of Monſters. Order

ORDER requires that all Beings should have what's ne… *preservation*, and the *Propagation* of the *Species*; provided this may be done … thy the Wisdom of God. And so we see that Animals … to preserve themselves, and to continue their *Species*; and … some particular Occasions, 'tis because these general … not these private Emergencies, because they respect no … tend to all Beings; and that the Good of the Pub… Advantages.

'Tis evident, That if God made but *one* … would require, That he should not make … forms all others; for the Action of God must … of Nature he … the *simplest* Means … that the general … be … Censure and …

If, for all … constituted … it; I confess … perhaps be forc… is … able to rec… infinite Number of … what we … the *Spo*… dom … the Author of all …

GOD

God should do for … for himself, if by the … God desires nothing … *ficacy* of his *Will*. The … useful to others, … whom it may make happy. Therefore … supremely good, to act for himself.

N…

GOD may be said to act for him… two … vantage from what he does, or to the … on in him. I enquire not, at … whether … whether to receive an Honour worth… him … his *SON*, in whom, according to the Scripture, … cannot create, and prefer … Spirits, in order to know, … mutable, Eternal, and necessary Law, That they should … plain'd in the *Third Article*. Thus this Objection does … the contrary, corroborates it; and if it is certain, that 'tis … nate, and communicate it self … (for I stand not to exam… dent, That God being essenti… supremely Good, it is … in the Sence I intended.

I C…

Against the … T…

Ignorance being a Consequence of Sin, … the Nature of … own Body, and of those … been perfectly acquainted with … Natures … and Animals, to give … Names as agreed to them.

ANSW…

'Tis a Mistake: *Ignorance* … neither an *Evil* … Blindness of Mind, which is … one, and the other a Name … out any Shadow of Ignorance; … is incident to the brightest, and most enlightned … Intelligences.

Intelligences. [illegible] cannot comprehend Infinity; and thus there is no Spirit that can [illegible] Properties of *Triangles*, *Adam* knew, the first minute of his Creation, [illegible] he should know, and nothing more; it was to no purpose for him [illegible] Disposition of all the Parts of his Body, and of those he made use [illegible] Matter in this Article, and elsewhere.

And calls them all by their names! Psal. 147. The [illegible] tion, rather denotes the *Authority* than the perfect *Knowledge* of the [illegible] *Heaven* had made *Adam* the *Lord* of *Earth*, he communded him the Privilege of [illegible] to the *Animals*, as He himself had done to the *Stars*. 'Tis evident [illegible] never have, nor can have any natural relation to the [illegible] and the *Hebrew Pythagoras* [illegible] Book, but [illegible] in an [illegible] fled in Hebrew [illegible] represent the Nature [illegible] bilities [illegible] were imposed by [illegible] Gen. 49. 17. Name [illegible] That the 92. 5. cannot [illegible] in use [illegible] time, for *ipsum nomen* [illegible] *decuit* [illegible] *viventis*,

But [illegible] ture [illegible] ce to the [illegible] earn [illegible] gives us of [illegible] r keeping [illegible] *Ajit*, [illegible] *Gomer*, be[illegible] the Eye [illegible] Roe-Asles are common [illegible] conceiv[illegible] open the [illegible] know if a Buck be swift [illegible] red, [illegible] by the Name [illegible] *Be-hemoth* [illegible] domestick [illegible] because these [illegible] and [illegible] de. That [illegible] perfects their Nature. That [illegible] is not [illegible] concluded. That *Adam* [illegible] Domestick [illegible] Animal [illegible] by a Term

CHAP. [illegible]

ARTICLE [illegible]

[illegible] are [illegible] nd painful: *Adam* was just and innocent, [illegible] to feel the [illegible] He ought then on all occasions to be [illegible] ledge, [illegible] ing Sensations, like those we have at pre[illegible]

[illegible] WER.

[illegible] there [illegible] sations, which are disagreeable and painful, but they never occasion'd [illegible] rst Man; because in the instant they gave him *any*, he, by an act of [illegible] Impression, and, in the very instant of that *Volition*, he ceas'd to be [illegible] sations did only respectfully caution him what ought to be done, [illegible] not incommode his Felicity; they but made him sensible that he [illegible] and that he who made him Happy could punish and make him Miserable [illegible] delity.

[illegible] always [illegible] that the first Man was [illegible] ken with the Sense of any [illegible] y Pain, we here [illegible] sider these Two things [illegible] Pain is very light, when [illegible] languishes [illegible] it [illegible] proportion'd to the force of [illegible] otion [illegible] ted [illegible] part of the Brain. *Secondly*, That is of the Nature [illegible] *Succ* [illegible] and it cannot be violent at the first instant [illegible] plain, that the first Man never [illegible] that [illegible] make him miserable; because he could put a [illegible] d it [illegible] but it [illegible] he could effectually stop them at the first instant [illegible] their [illegible] e is no doubt but he would [illegible], since he was always desirous of Happiness; and that [illegible] naturally determin'd to the Sense of Pain.

Adam therefore never suffer'd any [illegible] Pain; but I think we are not oblig'd to say, that he never felt any light and inconsiderable [illegible] hurt, such as is that when we taste a sowre Fruit, supposing it to be ripe. His [illegible] very tender, if so little a thing had been able to disturb it. For [illegible] Weakness: for now even that Joy and Pleasure but substantial, that such a Trifle [illegible] dissolve. Pain never truly molests our Happiness but when it is involuntary, and possesses us in spight of our Reason. JESUS CHRIST was happy, though on the Cross, in the midst of his Groans and Agonies, because he suffered nothing

nothing, but what he was willing to undergo.

OBJECTION

I Answer

Fourth

particula

do for the

Secondly, that

and its Love.

Pleasure is to

But the Motion

Soul which

Body when

But the figure

rest: 'Tis true,

sure but

self, drives them

the Soul, is the

may yet be always

I answer lastly, that although pleasure

Soul, yet that which the first Man felt in

him to the Living Bodies. 'Tis true,

for it in Heaven: but it is not the fruit

us. Not Bodies but God only can act

we are in an Error to think that Bodies

presence. before his Sin, being not so

ties of his Nature, was not carried to the love

Pleasures. If pleasure contributed to the fall of the first Man

what at present it does; But only by filling up or dividing

efface'd or diminish't from his Mind the presence of his true good.

OBJECTION

What likelyhood is there

Man, and that on Adam's

mutation of Motions?

ANSWER

At least it is very evident but such exceptions must be made;

ble order requires the subjection of the Body to the Mind: and

not to love, and will order: * for God necessarily loves his Son

before the Sin of the first Man, that exception

Law of the Communication of Motion. This

Here then is somewhat of a more sensible kind.

I shall more particularly

Man though a Sinner has the power of moving and stopping his arm when he pleases.

Therefore according to the different volitions of Man the Animal Spirits are determin'd to

the

* In the Illustration about the nature of Ideas, and why God necessarily loves it.

See the Illustration upon

towards

as a

figure.

DEFECTIVE ORIGINAL

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cannot be perform'd by the
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? If for the good of the Body,
of motions in Sinners, why would he not
the good of his Soul, and for the preſervation
daily he was made. As God will have no
ſure all the
ſenſible Good
communication of
alſo for things uſeful to
often Evil, and diſor-
will order have
account of Good.
produce in his Body
and returning
by
and his Arm, and other parts

he ought to have
to receive it, he
and therefore
exiſtence of Cre-
exiſt if he does
loſt order, because he cannot juſtify
his offence. He muſt then be reduc'd to
makes a work to annihilate it, or to let
that God would not have made Man,
had in view the *Incarnation* of his Son;
receives a Beauty, a Perfection, and
power of the Author.

without a *Reſtorer*, but under the Expectation of
a *Reſtorer*, we plainly ſee he ought to have no Society with
God; that he is not to offer himſelf to make the leaſt approaches to him, that God muſt needs
repel him, and [illegible] him, when he offers to leave the Body to unite himſelf to him;
that is to ſay, [illegible] the Sin muſt loſe the power of getting clear of ſenſible impreſſi-
ons, [illegible] ſubſiſtence. He ought likewiſe to be annihilated, for the foremen-
[illegible] expects a *Reſtorer*, and if we [illegible] him under that Expectation, we
[illegible] muſt ſubſiſt. He and his Poſterity [illegible] Reſtorer is to arrive, and
that it is neceſſary [illegible] is ſo preſerve [illegible] of diverſifly moving all thoſe
parts of the Body, [illegible] tion may be ſerviceable [illegible] ation.
[illegible] the power they have [illegible] certain motions, and that
[illegible] power [illegible], is the cauſe of innumerable
Evils. But [illegible] that powe [illegible] abſolutely neceſſary to keep up Society,
to co [illegible] and [illegible] Life, and to inſtruct them in Religion,
which [illegible] emer [illegible] World ſubſiſts. If we carefully examine
who [illegible] the [illegible] odnce in us, and what parts of our Body we can effect them, we
ſhall eaſily [illegible] has left us the po [illegible] our Body no farther than is neceſſary to the
preſervation of Life [illegible] the cheriſhing and upholding civil Society. The Beating of the
Heart, the Dilatation of the Midriff, the Periſtaltick motion of the Guts, the Circulation of
the Spirits, and Blood, and the di [illegible] motions of the Nerves in the Paſſions, are produc'd
in us without ſtaying for the order [illegible] Soul. As they ought to be much what the ſame on
all occaſions, nothing [illegible] to [illegible] mit them now to the will of Man. But the motions
of the Muſcles imploy'd [illegible] ring the Tongue, the Arms, and Legs, being to change every
minute, according to the almoſt infinite diverſity of [illegible] or evil Objects all about us, it was
neceſſary theſe motions ſhould depend on the will of M [illegible]

But

But we are to remember, That God acts always by the ſimpleſt ways: and that the Laws of Nature ought to be general; and that ſo, God having given us the Power of moving our Arm and Tongue, he ought not to take away that of ſtriking a Man unjuſtly, or of ſlandering or reproaching him. For if our natural Faculties depended on our Deſigns, there would be no Uniformity nor certain Rule in the Laws of Nature: which however muſt be moſt ſimple and general, to be anſwerable to the Wiſdom of God, and ſuitable to Order. So that God, in purſuance of his Decrees, chuſes rather to cauſe the *Materiality* of Sin, as ſay the *Divines*, or to make uſe of the Injuſtice of Men, as ſays one of the Prophets, than by changing his Will to put a ſtop to the Diſorders of Sinners. But he defers his revenging the injurious Treatment, which they give him, till the time when it ſhall be permitted him to do it, without ſwerving from his immutable Decrees; that is to ſay, when Death having corrupted the Body of the voluptuous, God ſhall be freed from the neceſſity he has impoſed on himſelf, of giving them Senſations and Thoughts relating to it.

OBJECTION

Againſt the Eleventh and Twelfth ARTICLES.

Original Sin not only enſlaves Man to his Body, and ſubjects him to the Motions of *Concupiſcence*, but likewiſe fills him with Vices wholly Spiritual: not only the Body of the Infant before Baptiſm being corrupted, but alſo his Soul, and all his Faculties ſtain'd and infected with Sin. Though the Rebellion of the Body be the principle of ſome groſſer Vices, ſuch as *Intemperance* and *Uncleanneſs*, yet it is not the Cauſe of Vices purely Spiritual, as are *Pride* and *Envy*. And therefore *Original Sin* is ſomething very *different* from *Concupiſcence*, which is born with us; and is more likely the *Privation of Grace, or of Original Righteouſneſs.*

ANSWER.

I acknowledge, That Children are void of *Original Righteouſneſs*; and I prove it, in ſhewing, That they are not born upright, and that God hates them. For methinks one cannot give a clearer Idea of *Righteouſneſs* and *Uprightneſs*, than to ſay a *Will* is *upright* when it *loves God*, and that it is *crooked* and perverſe when it *draws* towards *Bodies*. But if by *Righteouſneſs*, or Original Grace, we underſtand ſome unknown Qualities, like thoſe which God is ſaid to have infus'd into the Heart of the firſt Man, to adorn him, and render him pleaſing in his ſight; it is ſtill evident, that the Privation of this is not Original Sin; for to ſpeak properly, that Privation is not hereditarily tranſmitted. If Children have not theſe Qualities, 'tis becauſe God does not give 'em them; and if God does not beſtow them, 'tis becauſe they are unworthy to receive them: and 'tis that *Unworthineſs* which is tranſmitted, and which is the Cauſe of the *Privation of Original Righteouſneſs*: And ſo that *Unworthineſs* is properly *Original Sin.*

Now this Unworthineſs, which conſiſts, as I have ſhewn, in this; That the Inclinations of Children are actually corrupt, and their Heart bent upon the Love of Bodies; this, I ſay, is really in them. 'Tis not the *Imputation* of the Sin of their Father; they are *actually* themſelves in a diſorder'd State. In like manner as thoſe who are juſtify'd by JESUS CHRIST, of whom *Adam* was the Type, are not juſtify'd by *Imputation*: But are really *reſtored* to Order, by an inward Righteouſneſs, different from that of our LORD, though it be he that has merited it for them.

The Soul has but Two natural or eſſential *Relations*; the *one* to *God*, and the *other* to her *Body*. Now 'tis evident, That the Relation, or Union which ſhe has with God, cannot vitiate or corrupt her: and therefore ſhe is neither vicious, nor corrupt, at the firſt inſtant of her Creation; but by the relation ſhe has to her Body. Thus one of the two muſt needs be ſaid, either that Pride, and other, which we call, Spiritual Vices, can be communicated by the Body, or that Children are not ſubject to them at the moment of their Birth: I ſay at the moment of their Birth; for I do not deny but theſe ill Habits are not eaſily acquir'd. Though pure Intelligences have no other relation than to God, and at the inſtant of their Creation were ſubject to no Vice, yet they fell into Diſorder. But the Cauſe of it was their making a wrong uſe of their Liberty, whereof Infants have made no uſe at all: For Original Sin is not of a *free* Nature.

But to come to the Point; I am of Opinion, That they erre, who think that the Rebellion of the Body is the Cauſe but of groſs Vices, ſuch as *Intemperance* and *Uncleanneſs*; and not of thoſe which are call'd Spiritual, as *Pride* and *Envy*: and I am perſwaded there is that Correſpondence between the Diſpoſition of our Brain, and thoſe of our Soul, as that there is not perhaps any corrupt Habit in the Soul, but what has its Principle in the Body.

St. *Paul* in ſeveral places terms by the Name of the *Law*, the *Wiſdom*, the *Deſires*, and the *Works* of the *Fleſh*; whatever is contrary to the *Law* of the *Spirit*. He ſpeaks not of Spiritual Vices; He reckons amongſt the Works of the Fleſh, *Idolatry*, *Hereſies*, *Diſſentions*, and many other Vices which go by the Name of *Spiritual*. To give way to Vain-glory,

Wrath and Envy is, in his Doctrine, to follow the Motions of the *Flesh*. In short, It appears from the Expreſſions of that *Apoſtle*, That all Sin proceeds from the Fleſh: not that the Fleſh commits it, or that the Spirit of Man, without the Grace, or Spirit of CHRIST, can do good: but becauſe the Fleſh acts upon the Spirit in ſuch a manner, that the latter works no evil without being ſollicited to it by the former. Hear what St. *Paul* ſays in the Epiſtle to the *Romans*, *I delight in the law of the Lord, after the inward man. But I ſee another law in my members warring againſt the law of my mind, and bringing me into captivity to the law of ſin, which is in my members.* And a little lower; *So then with my mind I my ſelf ſerve the law of God, but with the fleſh the law of ſin:* He ſpeaks after the ſame manner in ſeveral places of his *Epiſtles*. So that *Concupiſcence*, or the Rebellion of the Body, not only diſpoſes us to *Carnal* or ſhameful Vices, but likewiſe to thoſe which are thought to be *Spiritual*. I here ſhall endeavour to prove it by a ſenſible Inſtance. Rom. c. 7.

When a Man's in Converſation, it is certain, as I think, that ſome Tracks are machinally produc'd in his Brain, and Motions excited in his Animal Spirits, that beget in his Soul corrupt Thoughts and Inclinations. Our Thoughts on theſe Occaſions are not naturally conformable to Truth, nor our Inclinations to Order. They riſe in us for the Good of the Body, and of the preſent Life, becauſe 'tis the Body that excites them: So they obliterate the Preſence of God, and the Thoughts of our Duty out of our Mind; and tend only to recommend us to other Men, and make them conſider us as worth their Affection and Eſteem. Therefore this ſecret Pride, which kindles in us on ſuch Occaſions, is a *Spiritual* Vice, whoſe Principle is the Rebellion of the Body.

For Example; If the Perſons, in whoſe Preſence we are, are rais'd to Honorary Poſts and Titles, the Luſtre of their Grandeur both dazzles, and dejects us. And as the Traces which their Preſence imprints on our Brain are very deep, and the Motions of the Spirits rapid; they radiate, as I may ſay, through all the Body; they ſpread themſelves on the Face, and give a ſenſible Teſtimony of our Reverence and Fear, and our moſt latent Sentiments. Next, Theſe Traces, by the ſenſible Expreſſions of our inward Motions, work upon the Perſon that obſerves us; whom they diſpoſe to Sentiments of Candour and Civility, by the Traces which our reſpectful and timorous Deportment machinally produce in his Brain: which Traces, rallying on his Face, diſarm him of that Majeſty which appear'd in't, and give the reſt of his Body ſuch an Air and Poſture, as at length rid us of our Concern, and re-embolden us. Thus by a mutual and frequent Repercuſſion of theſe ſenſible Expreſſions, our Air and Behaviour at laſt ſettles in that faſhion which the governing Perſon wiſhes.

But as all the Motions of the Animal Spirits are attended with Motions of the Soul, and the *Traces* of the *Brain* are purſu'd by *Thoughts* of the *Mind*; 'tis plain, that ſince we are depriv'd of the Power of expunging theſe Traces, and ſtopping theſe Motions we find our ſelves ſollicited, by the over-ruling Preſence of the Perſon, to embrace his Opinions, and ſubmit to his Deſires, and to be wholly devoted to his Pleaſure, as he indeed is diſpos'd to ſtudy ours, but in a very different manner. And for this Reaſon worldly Converſation quickens and invigorates the *Concupiſcence* of Pride, as diſhoneſt Commerce, feaſting and enjoying ſenſible Pleaſures, ſtrengthen *Carnal Concupiſcence*; which is a Remark very neceſſary for Morality.

'Tis of great Uſe and Advantage, that there are Traces in the Brain, which inceſſantly repreſent Man to himſelf, to make him careful of his Perſon: and that there are others, which ſerve to make and preſeve Society, ſince Men are not made to live alone. But Man having loſt the Power of eraſing them when he pleas'd, and when convenient, they perpetually provoke him to Evil. As he cannot hinder their repreſenting him to himſelf, he is continually ſollicited to Motions of Pride and Vanity, to deſpiſe others, and center all things in himſelf. And as he is not Maſter of thoſe Traces which importune him, to keep up Society with others, he is agitated by Motions of Complaiſance, Flattery, Jealouſie, and the like Inclinations, as it were in ſpight of him. Thus all thoſe, which go by the Name of *Spiritual Vices*, derive from the *Fleſh*; as well as *Unchaſtneſs* and *Intemperance*.

There are not only in our Brain, Diſpoſitions which excite in us Senſations and Motions, with reference to the Propagation of the *Species*, and the Preſervation of Life; but it may be a greater Number that ſtir up in us Thoughts and Paſſions, with reſpect to Society, to our own private Advancements, and to thoſe of our Friends. We are by Nature united to all ſurrounding Bodies, and by them, to all the things that any way relate to us: But we cannot be united to them, ſave by ſome Diſpoſitions in our Brain. Having not therefore the Power of withſtanding the Action of theſe natural Diſpoſitions, our Union turns into Dependence, and we grow ſubject through our Body to all kinds of Vices.

We are not pure Intelligences: all the Diſpoſitions of our Soul produce reſpective Diſpoſitions in our Body; and thoſe in our Body mutually excite others like them in our Soul. Not that the Soul is abſolutely incapable of receiving any thing, except by the Body; but becauſe, as long as *She* is united to *It*, ſhe cannot admit any Change in her Modifications, without making ſome Alteration in the Body. 'Tis true, ſhe may be enlightned, or receive new Idea's, and the Body need not have any hand in it; but that's becauſe pure Idea's are not Modifications of the Soul, as I have prov'd in another place. I ſpeak not here of ſenſible

Idea's,

Ideas, because these include a Sensation, and every *Sensation* is a *mode* of the Souls *existing*.

The Second OBJECTION
Against the Eleventh and Twelfth ARTICLES.

If Original Sin descends, by reason of the Communication which is found between the Brain of the Mother, and that of her Infant, the *Mother* is the cause of the Sin; and the *Father* has no part in it. Yet St. *Paul* teaches us, *that by Man came sin into the World:* He does not so much as speak of the *Woman*. Therefore, *&c.*

As by one Man sin entred into the World, &c. Rom. 5. 12.

ANSWER.

David assures us, that his Mother *conceiv'd him in iniquity*: and the Son of *Syrach* says, *Of the Woman came the beginning of Sin, and by her we all dy.* Neither of them speak of *Man*. St. *Paul* on the contrary says, that *by Man*, *Sin entred into the World*, and speaks not of the *Woman*. How will these testimonies accord, and which of the two is to be justify'd, if it be necessary to vindicate either. In discourse we never attribute to the *Woman* any thing peculiar to the *Man*, wherein she has no part: But that is often ascrib'd to the *Man* which is proper to the *Woman*, because her *Husband* is her Master and *Head*. We see that the *Evangelists*, and also the *Holy Virgin*, call *Joseph* the Father of *Jesus*, when she says to her Son, *Behold thy Father and I have sought thee sorrowing.* Therefore seeing we are assur'd by Holy Writ, that Woman has subjected us to sin and death, it is absolutely necessary to believe it; nor can it be thrown upon the Man; But though it testifies in several places that 'tis by Man that Sin enters into the World, yet there is not an equal necessity to believe it, since what is of the Woman is commonly attributed to the Man. And if we were oblig'd by Faith to excuse either the Man, or the Woman, it would be more reasonable to excuse the former than the latter.

I was shapen in Iniquity, and in sin hath my Mother conceiv'd me. Ps. 51. 5. Ec. 25. 23. Luke 2. 48.

However I believe these forecited passages are to be literally explain'd, and that we are to say both the Man and Woman are the true causes of Sin, each in their own way. The Woman, in that by her, Sin is communicated; it being by her that the Man begets the Children; and the Man, in that his Sin is the cause of Concupiscence; as his action is the cause of the fecundity of the Woman, or of the communication that is between her and her Infant.

It is certain, that 'tis the Man that impregnates the Woman, and consequently is the cause of that communication, between her Body and the Child's, since that communication is the Principle of its Life. Now that Communication not only gives the Child's Body the dispositions of its Mother's, but also gives its Mind the dispositions of her Mind: Therefore we may say with St. *Paul*, that *by one Man sin entred into the World*; and nevertheless by reason of that communication we may say, *that Sin came from a Woman, and by her we all dy*; *and that our Mother has conceiv'd us in Iniquity*, as is said in other places of Scripture.

It may be said perhaps, that though Man had not sinn'd, yet Woman had produc'd sinful Children; for having her self sinn'd, she had lost the Power God gave her over her Body: and thus, though Man had remain'd Innocent, she had corrupted the Brain, and consequently the Mind of her Child, by reason of that communication between them.

But this surely looks not very probable. For Man whilst righteous, knowing what he does, cannot give the Woman that wretched fecundity of conceiving sinful Children. If he remains Righteous, he wills not any Children but for God, to whom Infant Sinners cannot be well pleasing; for I suppose not here a Mediator. I grant however that in that case the Marriage had not been dissolv'd, and that the Man had known his Wife. But it is certain, that the Body of the Woman belong'd to her Husband; since it was taken out of his; and was the same Flesh. *Duo in carne una.* It is moreover certain, that Children are as much the Fathers as the Mothers. Which being so; we can't be perswaded that the Woman would have lost the Power over her Body, if her Husband had not sinn'd as well as she. For if the Woman had been depriv'd of that Power whilst the Man remain'd Innocent, there had been this Disorder in the Universe, that an upright Man should have a corrupt Body, and sinful Children. Whereas it is against Order, or rather a contradiction, that a just God should punish a perfectly Innocent Man. And for this reason *Eve* feels no involuntary and rebellious Motions, immediately after her sin; as yet she is not asham'd of her Nakedness, nor goes to hide her self. On the contrary, she comes to her Husband, though naked as her self; her Eyes are not yet open'd; but she is still as before, the absolute Comptroller of her own Body. Order requir'd that immediately after her Sin, her Soul should be disturb'd by the rebellion of her Body, and by the shame of her own and her Husband's nakedness; for there was no reason that God should any longer suspend on her behalf the Laws of the Communication of Motions: as I have said in the seventh Article. But because her Body is her Husband's, who is as yet Innocent; she is not punisht in this Body; but this punishment is defer'd till the time that he should eat himself of the Fruit which she presented him: Then it was they both began to feel the rebellion of their Body; that they

saw

ſaw they were naked, and that ſhame oblig'd them to cover themſelves with Fig-leaves. Thus we muſt ſay, that *Adam* was truly the cauſe of Original Sin, and Concupiſcence, ſince it was
Gen. c. 3. his Sin that depriv'd both himſelf and his Wife of their power over their Body; by which defectiveneſs of power the Woman produces in the Brain of her Child ſuch tracks as corrupt its Soul at the very inſtant of its Creation.

OBJECTION

Againſt the Twelfth ARTICLE.

'Tis but random divining to ſay the communication between the Mother's and the Infant's Brain is neceſſary or uſeful to the conformation of the *fœtus*. For there is no ſuch Communication between the Brain of an Hen, and that of her Chickens, which notwithſtanding are perfectly and compleatly form'd.

ANSWER.

I anſwer that in the ſeventh Chapter of the Second Book, I have ſufficiently demonſtrated that Communication, by the uſe I make of it, in explaining the Generation of Monſters; as alſo certain natural *Marks* and Fears deriv'd from the Mother. For 'tis evident, that a Man who ſwoons away at the ſight of a Snake, becauſe his Mother was frighted with one when ſhe bore him in her Womb, could not be ſubject to that Infirmity, but becauſe formerly ſuch Traces had been imprinted on his Brain, as theſe which open upon ſeeing a Snake, and that they were accompanied with a like Accident. And herein I am no Diviner; for I do not venture to determine wherein that Communication preciſely conſiſts. I might ſay it was perform'd by thoſe Fibres which the *Fœtus* ſhoots into the *Matrix* of the Mother, and by the Nerves wherewith that part is, very probably, fill'd; and in ſaying ſo I ſhould no more di-
La Samaritaine upon *Pont neuf* in *Paris*. vine, than would a Man who had never ſeen the Engines call'd *La Samaritaine*, in affirming there were Wheels and Pumps to raiſe the Water. Nevertheleſs I can't ſee why *divining* is not ſometimes allowable, provided a Man ſets not up for a *Prophet*, and ſpeaks not in too poſitive a ſtrain; I rather think he is permitted to ſpeak his Thoughts, whilſt he pretends not to be Infallible, nor Lords it unjuſtly over others by dogmatical *Deciſions*, or by the help of *Scientifick Terms*. 'Tis not always *divining* to ſpeak of things which are not viſible, and which contradict Prejudices, If ſo be we ſpeak no more than we eaſily conceive, and which readily makes its way into the mind of others who deſire to underſtand Reaſon.

I ſay then, that ſuppoſing the general Laws of the Communication of Motions, ſuch as they are, there is great Probability that the particular Communication of the Mother's Brain, with that of her Infant, is neceſſary to form its Body in a requiſite manner; or at leaſt is neceſſary to give the Brain of the Infant certain diſpoſitions, which ought to vary according to different Times and Countries, as I have explain'd in the ſame Chapter.

I confeſs there is no communication between the Brain of an Hen, and that of a Chicken, in the Egg, which nevertheleſs is perfectly well form'd. But it ought to be obſerv'd, that the Chicken is farther advanc'd in the Egg, when the Hen lays it, than the *Fœtus* when it deſcends into the *Matrix*: which may well be concluded, ſince there goes leſs time to the hatching Chickens, than there goes to the bringing forth Whelps; though the Belly of the Bitch being very hot, and her blood in perpetual motion, the Whelps ſhould be ſooner form'd than the Eggs Hatch'd, were not the *Chickens* farther advanc'd in their *Eggs*, than the *Whelps* in their Cicatricles. Now there is great probability that the formation of the Chicken in the Egg before it was laid was effected by the communication I am ſpeaking of.

I anſwer in the ſecond place, that the growth of the body of Fowls, is poſſibly more conformable to the general laws of Motion than that of four-footed Animals; and that ſo the communication of the Females Brain, with that of her young ones, is not ſo neceſſary in Fowls as in other Animals: For the reaſon that makes that communication neceſſary, is probably the remedying the defect of theſe general Laws, which in ſome particular Caſes, are inſufficient to regulate the Formation and Growth of Animals.

I anſwer laſtly, there is no ſuch neceſſity, to the preſervation of the Life of Birds, that they ſhould have ſo many particular Diſpoſitions in their Brain as other Animals. They have Wings to fly harm, and to ſecure their feed; and have no need of all that particular *Mechaniſm* which is the principle of the cunning, and docility of ſome domeſtick Creatures. Therefore the old ones need not inſtruct their young in many things, as they breed them, nor capacitate them to be taught many afterwards, by giving them a diſpoſition of Brain that's fit for Docility. Thoſe who breed young Dogs for the Game, ſometimes find thoſe which naturally ſet, meerly from the inſtruction they receiv'd from their Damm, who often us'd to ſet with them in her Belly. There is a great difference almoſt always obſervable in the breed of theſe Creatures, ſome of which are much more Docil and Tractable than others of the ſame Species. But I do not think there ever was a Fowl that taught any thing extraordinary to her young; that a Hen, for Example, ever hatch'd a Chicken who could do any thing but what they all do naturally. *Birds* then are not ſo tractable or capable of inſtruction as other *Animals*.

Animals. The Diſpoſition of their Brain is not ordinarily capable of many Changes; nor do they act ſo much by Imitation, as ſome domeſtick Animals. Young Ducks, which follow an Hen, don't ſtay for her Example to take the Water; and the Chickens, on the contrary, never betake themſelves to ſwim, though hatch'd and led by a Duck, that loves the Water. But there are Animals that eaſily and readily imitate the uncommon Motions, which they ſee others do. However I do not pretend, that much ſtreſs is to be laid on theſe laſt Reflections, ſince they are not neceſſary to eſtabliſh my Opinion.

Second OBJECTION
Againſt the Twelfth ARTICLE.

'Tis likewiſe divining to affirm, That the Mother before her Sin might have any intercourſe with her *Embryo*; there being no neceſſary relation between our Thoughts and Motions happening in our Brain. And therefore that Communication between the Mother's and the Infant's Brain is uſeleſs.

ANSWER.

It is evident, That without this Communication, the Infant was incapable of having any Commerce with its Mother, or the Mother with her Infant, without a particular *Miracle*. Now before the Sin *Order* requir'd, That the Mother ſhould have notice of all the Corporeal Wants of her Infant, and that the Infant ſhould reſent its Obligations to its Parents. Therefore ſince all things were in Order before the Sin, and that God acts always agreeably to Order, the Mother and the Child had ſome Commerce by means of this Communication.

To underſtand wherein this Commerce may have conſiſted, it muſt be remembred, That the Connexion of the Tracks of the Brain, with the Idea's of the Soul, may be ſeveral ways effected, either by Nature, or by the Inſtitution of Men, or ſome other way, as I have ſhewn how in the *Second Book*. Chap. 2. Part 2.

In beholding a *Square*, or the *Look* of a *Perſon ſuffering* any *Pain*, the *Idea* of a Square, or of an afflicted Perſon, riſes in the Mind. This is common to all Nations, and the Connexion between theſe Idea's and theſe Traces, is natural. When an *Engliſhman* hears pronounced, or reads the Word *Square*, he has likewiſe the Idea of a Square: but the Connexion, which is between the *Sound* or the *Letters* of that *Word*, and its *Idea*, is not natural, nor is it general with all the World. I ſay then, That the Mother and her Infant muſt naturally have had a Correſpondence between them, upon all the things that could be repreſented to the Mind by natural Connexions: That if the Mother, for Inſtance, had ſeen a *Square*, the Infant would have *ſeen* one too; and that if the Infant had *imagin'd* any Figure, he would have likewiſe excited the Traces of the ſame *Figure* in the Imagination of his Mother. But they would have had no Commerce together about things of a purely Spiritual Nature, nor even about Corporeal things, whenever they conceiv'd them, without the help of the *Senſes* and *Imagination*. The Mother might have thought on *GOD*, have heard or read the Word *Square*, or the like; and yet the Child not have diſcover'd what were her Thoughts thereof, unleſs in Tract of Time, ſhe ſhould have ſettled a new Commerce with it, much what the ſame with that of Nurſes, when they teach their Children to ſpeak. I explain and prove theſe things.

One would think I had ſufficiently prov'd them, by the Explication I gave of the Cauſe of *Hereditary Averſions*, and *Marks* which Children bring with them into the World, deriv'd from the Traces of their Mothers. Now theſe Corporeal Traces are inſeparable from their Idea's; which makes the Idea's to be communicated along with them, and the Children to *ſee*, *feel*, *imagine* the ſame things as their Mothers. They have *now*, whether they will or not, the Senſations of their Mothers: but were they not *Sinners*, they would have had the power of hindring, when they pleas'd, the Effect of that their Communication with their Mother. They might likewiſe have re-excited in their Brain, the Tracks which they received from their Mothers, by the ſame reaſon that we imagine what we pleaſe, when our Senſations are not too vivid and affecting: which being ſuppoſed, it is evident, That the Mother, when conſiderately attending to her Infant, might have diſcover'd, by a kind of Repercuſſion, whether or no it receiv'd the Impreſſion ſhe excited in it, and likewiſe other things that it might think upon. For as the Mother could not vibrate the Fibres of her Brain, but the Fibres of the Infant's Brain muſt have received the Impreſſion; ſo the Infant could not ſtop that Vibration, or cauſe any other, without giving the Mother notice by ſome light Impreſſion, provided ſhe made her ſelf very attentive, by the power ſhe had of ſtifling every other Noiſe than that which her Infant caus'd in her. Thus it muſt be acknowledg'd, That the Mother and the Infant would have had ſome intercourſe before the Sin, or elſe we muſt deny all Correſpondence between their Brains, or the Power of the Soul over the Bo-

dy, to be such as I have before maintain'd. This appears evident, though the surly Imagination resists, and Prejudices band against it. 'Tis true, this Commerce at first would have reach'd but to Matters that come under the Senses and Imagination; it not being absolutely necessary, that the Child, which had only a Corporeal Dependence on the Mother, should receive from her any other Idea's than those of sensible Objects. For its Soul being strictly united to God, whilst in a State of Innocency, would have receiv'd immediately from Him all the Idea's which respected not the Body: But whereas in time we may affix the most abstract Idea's to things sensible, which have no relation to them, this Commerce between the Mother and her Child, would, very likely, have quickly extended to things of a more *Spiritual* Order, if they strove to correspond about such sort of Matters.

I am sensible, that what I now say will not seem reasonable to very many; and that even those who resist their Prejudices, and labour against the continual Tide of sensible Impressions, will admire at the Novelty of this Notion. But if we seriously reflect on the way that a Master takes to instruct his Disciples, and observe what different means he is obliged to make use of, to manifest his own Idea's of things to them; the Comparisons he makes, and the Judgments he passes about these Idea's, and the other Dispositions of his Mind, in reference to his Scholars; we shall see it will be a much harder Task for him to discover his Thoughts and inward Dispositions of Mind to them, than for a Mother to do it to her Infants; provided we only suppose, that the Traces of the Mother's Brain are imprinted on the Child's, which is evident from all that I have said before. For, *in fine*, it is manifest, that the Voice, and all exteriour Signs that we employ to express our Thoughts to others, obtain the desired Effect, only because they imprint on the Brain of our Hearers, the same Traces, and raise the same Emotions of the Spirits, as accompany our Idea's, and our inward Disposition, on their respect.

OBJECTION

Against the Seventeenth, and following ARTICLES.

'Tis a rash Assertion to say, Children in Baptism are justify'd by actual Motions of their Will towards God. We must not give vent to such New Opinions; which do no good, but only make a noise.

ANSWER.

I grant, that we ought not positively to affirm, That Children are justify'd by *formal* Acts of their Will: I believe it impossible to know any thing of it; and that we are not positively to assert any thing but what we know. But because there are but too many, who are apt to believe, That *Justification* of Children is only *external*, and by *Imputation*, by reason, say they, they are incapable of performing any *Act* of *Love* towards God; I think it fit to let them know, that they are brought by Prejudice to that Opinion. For the Prejudices of Men, in respect of Children, are such, as make them fansie they have no Thought in their Mother's Womb, and in the beginning of their Age, and even that they are absolutely incapable of thinking. They believe that they have not so much as the Idea's of things; that it is their Masters that furnish them with Discourse; and that if they have any Inclinations, they are of another Nature from ours, and incompetent to carry them to the Sovereign Good. The greatest part of Men can't distinctly conceive, That Childrens Souls are like those of grown up Persons; And that they do not come to Strength and Perfection by degrees, like the Body; And that if they were deliver'd one moment from the Impression the Body made upon them, and mov'd by the Delectation of Grace, they would in that moment be more pure and enlighten'd than the Souls of the greatest Saints; who feel always working in their Mind and Heart the *Leaven* of *Concupiscence*.

Concupiscence is commonly look'd upon as Natural, and is not always consider'd as a consequence of *Sin*: and this makes Men conclude unawares, that the Stupidity of Children is a necessary consequence of their Infirmity of Body, Tenderness of Age, and also Incapacity of Mind. Which Conclusion or Prejudice is constantly represented to the Mind, and prepossess it in such a manner, as hinders it from examining the thing in its own Nature. Therefore those who have treated of the Effect of Baptism, in the Ages past, have omitted the explaining the *Regeneration* of *Infants* by the actual Motions of their Heart: Not that they were induc'd by strong Reasons to judge it *impossible*; for their Works do not shew they have ever so much as examin'd it; but (as is visible) because they have suppos'd it *so*; and that it has hardly entred their Heads to doubt of it: or possibly, because they wav'd giving an Explication so repugnant to Prejudices, at a Time when no such Attempts were made, to get rid of them, as now-a-days there are.

But

But considering how necessary it is to give a closer Explication than that, for Instance, which St. *Austin* gives in * several places, which looks towards *Imputation*; though in others he speaks in a way that does † not countenance it: considering that *Imputation* is very *commodious*, and likely for that Reason embrac'd by some Ancient and ‖ *Orthodox Divines*; and moreover *absolutely necessary* for those, who, without any convincing Proof, deny Spiritual Habits; whom it may be good to satisfie, if possible. *Lastly*, having respect to natural Equity, which forbids us to condemn the secret Purposes and Intentions: after all this, I say, what I offer may possibly appear improbable? But yet I can't see why it should be taken ill, that I endeavour to content even the most querulous Minds touching their Difficulties about *Original Sin*.

* Lib. 1. *de Nupt.* Cap. 25, 26, 27. & in *Jul.* l. 6. c. 19. & alibi.

† Ep. 23. lib. *de peccator. meritis*, c. 19. & alibi.

‖ Innocent. III. *in Decret.* 3. *de Baptismo & ejus Effectu.* Et in Concil. *Viennensi generali* 15. sub Clement V.

THE

THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE THIRD CHAPTER

Of the Third Part of the SECOND BOOK:

Wherein I ſpeak of the power of Imagination of ſome Authors, and particularly of Tertullian.

AS I am well ſatisfy'd that the moſt general and fruitful *Principle* of *Errors* in the *Sciences, and eſpecially in Morals*, is the Impreſſion made by lively Imaginations on the Mind of Men, who are manag'd more by *Mechaniſm* than by *Reaſon*; ſo I thought it lay upon me to ſet this truth to open view, by all the ways that might awaken them from their ſlumber on its account: And becauſe Examples ſtrike deepeſt, eſpecially when the Inſtance is ſomewhat great, and uncommon; I thought that the celebrated names of *Tertullian*, *Seneca*, and *Montague*, were the moſt proper to raiſe their Attention, and give them a ſenſible conviction of the contagious Empire of the *Imagination* over *Reaſon*. For if Words, all-dead, and unanimated by the look and ſenſible behaviour of theſe famous Authors, have ſtill more Force than the Reaſon of a great many others; if the Turn of Expreſſion, that gives but a faint Idea of the ſenſible action, which the Imagination lively diffuſes over the face, and the reſt of the Body of thoſe who are pierc'd with what they ſay; is able to Agitate, Penetrate, and Convince a great many: certainly it muſt be granted that nothing is more dangerous, than a reſpectful Attention to Men of a ſtrong and lively Imagination. For their *Air* and *Way* is a natural Language, ſo powerful, and convincing; and they know how to Image things ſo paſſionately to the Life, that they ſeldom fail of raiſing the Senſes and Paſſions againſt Reaſon, and pouring, as I may ſay, Conviction and Certitude into their Spectators.

I eaſily foreſaw, in alledging theſe great *Examples*, that it was impracticable to cure thoſe who were amaz'd, and thunder-ſtruck, with the reading of theſe three fam'd Authors. For a little knowledge of the nature of Man will ſuffice to teach us, that the words of the Brain are harder to be heal'd than thoſe of the other parts of the Body, and that 'tis eaſier to cloſe up a ſore not expos'd to freſh Inſults from without, than to make a perfect care of inveterate Prejudice that juſtifies it ſelf each minute by very-probable-Reaſons.

'Tis extreamly difficult to cloſe up exactly the traces of the Brain, becauſe expos'd to the courſe of the Spirits, and liable to be conſtantly renew'd by infinite other Traces which may be call'd *acceſſory*. Theſe ſorts of *Wounds* cannot ordinarily be *cur'd*, or made up, till the brain receives others more deep, which oppoſing them cauſe a violent and continual *Revulſion* in the Spirits. For we ought not to reckon a Prejudice quite cur'd, when we fancy it is, becauſe we are not actually affected with it: then only the cure is perfected when the Trace is quite ſhut up; and not when the Spirits deſiſt from their wonted courſe for ſome particular Reaſon.

I knew then well enough that ſuch as had been proſtrated, and over-whelm'd by the Force and Motions of *Tertullian*, raviſh't and dazled by the loftineſs and beauties of *Seneca*, charm'd and corrupted by the gentile eaſie and natural Turns of *Montague*, would not change their Opinion by reading a few Pages of my Book. I judg'd on the contrary I ſhould incur their diſpleaſure, by trying to diſſolve the inchantment which ſo held them.

But as I hop'd theſe Examples would be uſeful to my deſign for the fore-mention'd reaſons: I thought I was to be more regardful of the *Profit* of many who were Free from Prepoſſeſſion, than of the *Spleen* of ſome particulars, that I concluded would cenſure the liberty I had taken. I conſider'd there were very few ſo ſtrongly prevented with eſteem for theſe Authors, but it was hop'd might return to ſound ſence again. I concluded laſtly, that there being hardly one, it may be, prepoſſeſs'd with all Three together, becauſe of the diverſe Characters of their Imagination; the moſt Opinionated might find I was in the right in a good many things.

I know what Reſpect I ought to have for the Works of *Tertullian*, as well on the account of the Subjects that he treats of, as of the Approbation they have receiv'd from ſeveral Perſons, who ought to be able to judge of them. And I have ſufficiently manifeſted that Temper of Mind, by what I have ſaid of him, and by the *Quality* of the Book *de Pallio*, of which alone I have ſpoke with ſo much freedom, though there were others, it may be, fitter for my Purpoſe.

But after all I don't think that Time ought to change and amplifie the Idea's of things; that all Antiquities are venerable; and that illegitimate Reaſons, and extravagant ways are worthy of Reſpect, becauſe they were a long time in the World before us. I can't think that affected Obſcurities ought to be venerated like Sacred Myſteries; Sallies of Imagination to go for ſhining Lights of Knowledge; and *African Heats*, which work in a Mind naturally full of Fire, to be look'd on as Motions of a *Prophetick Spirit*, which can divulge nothing but ſublime Truths.

I am certain, that even thoſe who defer moſt to *Tertullian*'s Works, will agree with me in all this, and that they are too equitable, to juſtifie the Diſorders of Imagination againſt Reaſon. But it may be they are a-kin to thoſe Judicious Perſons, who, though they infinitely love Truth, yet they are not inſenſible to outſide *Manners*. For I have oftentime obſerv'd ſome of them ſo enchanted with certain ſtrong, lively, great, and pompous Expreſſions of *Tertullian*, that having prov'd to them that *Author* was none of the moſt Judicious and Reaſonable, they would think it enough to convince and ſurprize me, only to repeat them.

I own that *Tertullian* has Expreſſions extreamly ſtrong and bold, which produce moſt lively and animated Images in the Mind; and upon that ſcore I juſtly bring him for an Example, of the power which ſtrong Imaginations have to *move*, and *convince* by Impreſſion. Thus thoſe who urge to me theſe Objections, confirm my Opinion by oppoſing it: Their Prepoſſeſſion and Eſteem for *Tertullian* juſtifies my Conduct: the frequent Citations, and the big Words, which they alledge, prove what I ſay. For they uſe not in Diſcourſe to produce entire Reaſonings; but often quote ſtrong and lively Expreſſions, in order to dazzle, perturbate, and convince by the ſenſible Impreſſion.

There is no Reaſon, I think, to imagine, that I ſet up for a *Cenſour* of ſo many great Men, who cite *Tertullian* conſtantly in the Pulpit, and elſewhere; They have their Reaſons for it; into which I neither do, nor ought to enquire. What I have ſaid of that Author is methinks evident enough: Let every one deduce his Conſequences according to his Knowledge, without attributing thoſe Thoughts to me, which I never had. Thoſe who pretend to dive into the Deſigns of others, frame commonly ſuch Phantaſms as reſemble but themſelves; it being cuſtomary with Men, to taint and infect others with the Venom of their own Paſſions. We are apt to meaſure all things by our ſelves, and they would do well to conſider, who condemn me, whether they do not judge themſelves un-a-wares, in doing it. But if they would have me declare my ſelf upon the Citations of *Tertullian*, I grant a Man has right to make uſe of them for ſeveral Reaſons; and likewiſe that they are ſometimes moſt uſefully employ'd, to make ſome *practical* Truths more *ſenſible*, which are barren and unfruitful, as long as they lie dormant in our inward Reaſons, and raiſe in us no contrary Motions to thoſe which the Goods of the Body excite in us.

Nevertheleſs I can't think thoſe Mens Opinions very unreaſonable, who believe we are not to cite Authors by Name, ſave when they are infallible; and that, except in things out of Reaſons Prerogative, and in which Authority ought to take place, no Quotations are to be made. This formerly was the Cuſtom of the Fathers: St. *Cyprian* never cited *Tertullian* though he has taken moſt from him; and if it be true what St. *Jerome* reports of that Holy *Biſhop*, by hear-ſay, *viz.* That talking of *Tertullian* he call'd him his Maſter; either his Name muſt not have been ſo Authoritative, nor his Expreſſion ſo forcible as they are at preſent, in Mens Opinion; or elſe St. *Cyprian* was wonderfully rigorous in the Obſervance of that Cuſtom of his Time: it being very ſtrange ſuch a *Diſciple* ſhould never have mention'd his Maſter in any of his Works.

St. *Jerome*'s Hiſtory is commonly urg'd in Defence of *Tertullian*; and I have been ſometimes told, I was to blame to ſpeak ſo as I did, of a Man, whom St. *Cyprian* call'd his Maſter. But I queſtion whether St. *Jerome* would not have been too eaſie of belief, in what made for the Honour of *Tertullian*. To me he ſeems to have had ſomewhat too great an Inclination for him, ſince he in ſome meaſure excuſes his Hereſie, by retorting it on the Envy of the *Romiſh Clergy*, and the evil Uſage he receiv'd from them. But if that Story, which is founded only on what St. *Jerome* heard one Perſon ſay, be true; I muſt confeſs, I know not what to make of that Silence obſerv'd by St. *Cyprian* in his Writings, with reference to *Tertullian*. That Silence of a *Scholar* may be ſuſpected to conceal ſome Myſtery not advantageous to the *Maſter*; And if that Hiſtory, as well as *Tertullian*'s own Works, did not give us ſufficiently to underſtand, that he was not altogether worthy of the great Eſteem that is paid him by very many; yet I queſtion whether St. *Cyprian*'s Conduct, his Stile, his Ways, would not be ſufficient to leſſen it; and to make us think, That, probably, that *Author*'s Reputation was not ſo well eſtabliſh'd in *Africa* it ſelf, which ought to have been more favourable to him than a Clime ſo temperate as ours.

Our own Country and *Africa* produce very different Wits: the *Genius* of the former, being natural, rational, and irreconcileable to all overſtrain'd Manners, it is ſtrange to find any among them addicted to an Author, who never ſtudied nor follow'd Nature: and who inſtead of conſulting his Reaſon, ſuffers himſelf to be tranſported with the heats of altogether obſcure, monſtrous, and extravagant Expreſſions.

Which probably is owing to the mighty Force of Imagination which diſarms Reaſon, and even changes Nature. And indeed a Man in the Fury of Paſſion perturbates, and even changes the natural ſituation of our Imagination to adapt it to his own. And then there is no Motion but what ſeems Natural, no Expreſſion but's Agreeable, no Nonſence but's convincing. For we ſtand to examine nothing ſeriouſly. Now as the Paſſions vindicate themſelves, and diſorder'd imaginations take delight only in Irregularity, 'tis impoſſible to judge ſoberly of things, as long as the Brain preſerves the violent Impreſſion it has receiv'd. There is no Man in the Tranſport of Paſſion but is perpetually ſollicited to juſtify it; nor any diſturb'd in Brain, but is pleas'd in the diſturbance. For if thoſe who fancy themſelves *Cocks*, *Woolves*, *Oxen*, are extreamly taken with the cuſtomary actions of thoſe Creatures, though quite contrary to the nature of Man: it may eaſily be judged that we ſhall be far from condemning the Behaviour of thoſe, who by the contagion of their Imagination have made us in a manner like them. For in condemning them we are conſcious we condemn our ſelves.

There's a very particular Reaſon why ſome of the Learn'd ſhould glory in eſpouſing *Tertullian*, and expreſſing ſo extraordinary an eſteem for him. Which is that affected obſcurity, which ſerves as one of the principal Rules of his *Rhetorick*.

In theſe days all empty and ſenſeleſs Expreſſions, and all obſcure and perplex'd ways of ſpeaking, go under the name of *nonſence*. But there have been found ſuch as have look't upon Obſcurity, as one of the greateſt myſteries in Eloquence, with whom the Art of perſwading conſiſted partly in being unintelligible.

If publick *Haranguers* had always the clear and diſtinct Ideas of the Truths they go about to perſwade, and ſpoke only to perſons that were capable of a competent Attention to underſtand them, the precept of affecting obſcurity in diſcourſe, would be the moſt extravagant in the World. But though this precept abſolutely contradicts all Reaſon, yet it may be ſaid to be proportionate and fit for the *Genius* of moſt Men: not only becauſe a Myſterious Obſcurity conceals the Ignorance of the Speaker, but alſo for its raiſing ſuch a ſenſe in others as diſpoſes them to yield, and be convinc'd.

Experience manifeſts, that moſt Men eſteem what they do not comprehend; that they reverence, like Myſteries, whatever is above their reach, and think an Orator has a wonderful Talent, when he dazles them, by the glitterings of diſcourſe, and by a Language of *Imagination*, wherein *Reaſon* has nothing to do.

The Inclination Men have for *Grandeur* exceeds that which they have for *Truth*: wherefore Pompous Nonſence which perſwades by the *Impreſſion*, is better receiv'd than pure Argumentation which perſwades by force of Evidence: ſince Evidence makes way only by Reflections, which always coſt the Maker trouble: but ſenſible Conviction flows into the Soul, and penetrates it in a moſt agreeable manner.

The Good which alone is capable of ſatisfying our deſires, is at once Infinite, and Inacceſſible, and great and obſcure Expreſſions have ſomething of this Character. So that Obſcurity raiſing our Deſires, whilſt Greatneſs provokes our Admiration, and Eſteem; theſe Expreſſions win us by the Motions they produce in us.

When we underſtand, or think we underſtand a difficult and obſcure Author, we value our ſelves above others that do not; and ſometimes look upon them, as Ignorant. The Pains we have taken to maſter him, intereſs us in his Defence. For by venerating this Author, and procuring the Veneration of others, we juſtify our own ſtudies: and as we find pleaſure in juſtifying our ſelves, ſo we muſt not fail to praiſe and defend him with earneſtneſs and Zeal, and by lively and ſenſible ways.

Theſe Reaſons, and ſome others of leſs force are ſufficient, I think, to let us know, that the obſcurity of *Tertullian* is no diſadvantage to him in the Opinion of ſome Perſons; and that likely they would have leſs admir'd him, if the Truths which are ſcatter'd over his Works were reduc'd to their more ſimple and clear Ideas.

Mathematical Truths and Relations are always Summ'd up in their *Exponents*, that is, in the moſt ſimple terms that expreſs them; and are diſengag'd from all perplexing and obſcuring Dependencies. For *Geometricians* love naked Truth; and deſire not to convince by Impreſſion, but by Light and Evidence. But what would become of moſt of *Tertullian*'s Thoughts, were they reduc'd to their *Exponents* by the Rules of Logical Geometricians, and ſhould we ſee them ſtript of all that ſenſible Pomp which dazles Reaſon, yet if we would judge ſolidly of this Author's Reaſonings, we ought to make the Experiment.

However I do not pretend that *Tertullian* ought to have written with *Geometrical* Plainneſs. Figures which expreſs our ſentiments and motions, with reſpect to the Truths we expoſe to others, are abſolutely neceſſary; and I think that more eſpecially in diſcourſe of *Religion* and *Morality* we ought to Employ thoſe Ornaments which procure all the reverence that is due to Truth, and thoſe Motions which actuate the Soul, and incline her to vertuous Actions. But

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we are not to dreſs up and adorn a Phantaſm without ſubſtance and reality; nor excite Motions when there's no occaſion; and if we will vigorouſly impreſs on our Hearers Conviction, and Certitude, 'tis neceſſary that the Conviction ſhould relate to ſomething true and ſolid. We muſt neither convince, nor be convinc'd without knowing evidently, diſtinctly, preciſely, why we do the one, or ſuffer the other. We ought to know both what we ſay, and what we think; and only to Love *Truth*, and *Knowledge*, without putting out the Eyes of others, after we have made blind our ſelves.

THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE *Nature of IDEAS.*

Wherein I explain how we ſee all things in God, both Truths and Laws Eternal.

I Hoped that what I had ſaid upon the nature of Ideas, was ſufficient to have ſhown that God only enlightens our underſtanding. But I have found by Experience, that there are Perſons incapable of a competent Attention to conceive the Reaſons I have given of this Principle. Abſtracted reaſons are incomprehenſible to the greateſt part of Men, but that which is ſenſible awakens them, and fixes and keeps open the Eye of their Mind. They cannot conſider, nor, conſequently, comprehend what comes not under the Senſes, nor Imagination. Which thing I have often ſaid, nor can I too often repeat.

'Tis plain that Bodies are not viſible of themſelves: that they cannot act upon our mind, nor repreſent themſelves to it. This has no need of proof; but is diſcover'd by a bare perception, and is infinitely more certain, than that Bodies communicate their Motion when they meet. But it is not certain, ſave with thoſe who ſilence their Senſes, to liſten to their Reaſon. Therefore all Mankind believes that Bodies impel each other, becauſe the Senſes tell them ſo, but they do not believe that Bodies are of themſelves abſolutely inviſible, and incapable of acting on the mind, becauſe the Senſes do not tell them this, but ſeem to ſay the contrary.

Nevertheleſs there are ſome whoſe reaſon is ſo ſtedfaſt and reſolv'd, as to riſe up to the moſt abſtract Truths. They contemplate them with attention, and couragiouſly reſiſt the Impreſſion of their Senſes and Imagination. But the Body inſenſibly weighing down the Mind, they relapſe, theſe Ideas vaniſh, and whilſt the Imagination ſtirs up more ſenſible and lively, the former are beheld as Apparitions, that only cauſe miſtruſt and fear of deluſion.

We are eaſily apt to diſtruſt thoſe Perſons, or things, we are not familiar with, and which have not afforded us any ſenſible pleaſure: For 'tis *Pleaſure* that wins the Heart, and *Familiarity* that cures our trouble and diſquiet of Mind. Wherefore thoſe who are not us'd to Metaphyſical, and abſtract Truths, are very prone to believe we purpoſe to ſeduce them, when we only labour to inſtruct them. They look with a ſuſpitious Eye, and a kind of dread, upon Ideas which have nothing charming and ſenſible, and the Love they bear to their own Repoſe and Felicity, ſpeedily rids them of ſo vexatious a contemplation, which ſeems incapable of contenting them.

If the Queſtion, before us, were not of the greateſt Importance, the Reaſons I have given, and ſome others not neceſſary to be produc'd, would oblige me to ſay no more of it; for I foreſee that whatever I can ſay upon this ſubject will never enter the heads of ſome People. But this Principle, That *there is none but God who enlightens us*; and that this illumination is effected by the manifeſtation of an *immutable*, and *neceſſary Reaſon*, or *Wiſdom*; ſeems to me ſo conformable to Religion, that I think my ſelf indiſpenſably oblig'd to Explain it, and maintain it to the utmoſt of my Power. I had rather be call'd a *Viſionift*, *Enthuſiaſt*, and all the fine Names that the Imagination, (which in little Souls is always Sarcaſtical) uſes to oppoſe to reaſon it cannot comprehend, or defend it ſelf againſt; than to grant that *Bodies* are capable of inſtructing me; that I am my own *Maſter*, *Reaſon* and *Light*: and that, to be thoroughly inform'd in all things, I need only conſult my ſelf; or other Men, who perhaps may fill my Ears with a loud noiſe, but certainly cannot infuſe Light and Knowledge into my Mind. Here then are ſome Reaſons for the Opinion I have eſtabliſht, in the Chapter belonging to this Illuſtration.

No body will deny that Man is capable of knowing Truth: and the leaſt intelligent Philoſophers acknowledge that he partakes of a certain Reaſon, which they don't determine. And

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therefore they define him *animal Rationis particeps*. For there is no body but knows, at leaſt confuſedly, that the eſſential difference of Man conſiſts in his neceſſary union with Univerſal Reaſon, though it be not commonly known who it is that includes this Reaſon, and little Care is taken to diſcover it. I ſee for Example, that two times two are four, and that a Friend is preferable to a Dog; and I am certain there is no Man in the World but ſees this as well as I. Now I diſcover not theſe truths in the Mind of others, no more than others do in mine: Therefore there is neceſſarily an *Univerſal Reaſon* which enlightens me, and all intelligent Beings. For if the Reaſon I conſult were not the ſame as that which anſwers the *Chineſe*, 'tis evident, I could not be aſſur'd, as I am, that the *Chineſe* ſee the ſame Truths as I ſee. Therefore the Reaſon we conſult, when we *retire* into our ſelves, is an univerſal Reaſon: I ſay when we retire into our ſelves, for I ſpeak not here of the Reaſon which is follow'd by a Man in a *Paſſion*. When a Man prefers the Life of his *Coach-Horſe* before that of his *Coach-man*, he has his reaſons for it, but they are particular Reaſons which every rational Man abhors. They are *reaſons* which at Bottom are not *reaſonable*, becauſe not conformable to *Soveraign* or univerſal Reaſon, which all Mankind conſults.

Si ambo videmus verum eſſe quod dicis & ambo videmus verum eſſe quod dico, ubi quæſo id videmus? Nec ego utique in te, nec tu in me; ſed ambo in ipſa, quæ ſupra mentes noſtras eſt, incommutabili veritate. Confeſs. de S. Aug. *l.* 12. *c.* 25.

See St. *Auſtin De libero arbitrio*, &c. Book 2. Chap. 8.

I am certain that the *Ideas* of things are *immutable*, and that *Eternal Truths* and *Laws* are *neceſſary*. 'Tis impoſſible they ſhould not be what they are. But in my ſelf I find nothing either immutable, or neceſſary: 'Tis impoſſible for me not to exiſt: or exiſt otherwiſe than I do. There may be Minds that are not like me: and yet I am certain there can be no mind that ſees other Truths, and Laws than what I ſee. For every mind neceſſarily ſees that two times two are four; and that a Friend is to be prefer'd before a Dog. We muſt then conclude, That the Reaſon which is conſulted by all minds is an immutable and neceſſary Reaſon.

Moreover it is evident, that this ſame reaſon is Infinite. The mind of Man clearly conceives that there either are or may be an infinite number of intelligible *Triangles*, *Tetragones*, *Pentagones*, and other ſuch like Figures. Nor does it only conceive, that the Ideas of figures are inexhauſtible, and that it might ſtill diſcover new ones, though it ſhould ſtudy only theſe figures to all Eternity; but it perceives an Infinity in Extenſion. The mind clearly perceives that the number which multiplied by it ſelf produces 5, or any of the numbers between 4 and 9, between 9 and 16, between 16 and 25, *&c.* is a *Quantity*, a *Relation*, a *Fraction*, whoſe terms contain more figures than will reach from one Pole of the World to the other. It clearly ſees it is ſuch a *Relation* as none but God can comprehend, and that 'tis impoſſible to expreſs it exactly, becauſe to expreſs it we need a *Fraction* whoſe two terms are Infinite. I might bring a great many ſuch Examples, from which we might conclude, not only that the Mind of Man is finite, but that the *Reaſon* he conſults is infinite. For in brief the Mind clearly ſees Infinite, in this *Reaſon*, though he does not comprehend it, ſince he can compare incommenſurable numbers together, and know their Relations, though he cannot compare them with the unite. Or, (that we may ſtick only to what is ſenſible,) The Reaſon which Man conſults is infinite, ſince it cannot be exhauſted, and it has always ſomething to anſwer to whatever we demand.

But if it be true, that the Reaſon whereof all Men participate be univerſal, and infinite: if it be true that it is immutable and neceſſary; it is certain, that it differs not from that of God himſelf. For none but the univerſal and infinite Being contains in himſelf univerſal and infinite Reaſon. All Creatures are *particular Beings*; wherefore *Univerſal Reaſon* is not created. No Creatures are infinite: Univerſal Reaſon therefore is no Creature. But the Reaſon we conſult is not only Univerſal and Infinite, but alſo neceſſary and independant, and we conceive it in one ſence more *independant* than God himſelf. For God cannot but act by this Reaſon; on which he in one ſence depends; and which he muſt needs conſult and follow. But God conſults only himſelf: He depends on nothing. This Reaſon therefore is not diſtinct from him; but is coeternal and conſubſtantial with him. We ſee clearly that God cannot puniſh an innocent Creature: that he cannot ſubject minds to Bodies, and that he's oblig'd to follow Order. We ſee therefore the Rule, Order and Reaſon of God; for what other Wiſdom than that of God can we ſee, when we fear not to affirm, that God is oblig'd to follow it?

But after all, can we conceive any Wiſdom which is not the Wiſdom of God? Does *Solomon* who ſpeaks ſo well of Wiſdom, diſtinguiſh it into two ſorts? Does not he teach us that which is Coeternal with God, that by which he has eſtabliſht the Order we ſee in his Works, is the ſame which preſides over all Minds; and which *Legiſlators* conſult to make Juſt and Reaſonable Laws. We need only read the *Eighth Chapter of Proverbs*, to be perſwaded of this Truth. I know that the Holy *Scripture* ſpeaks of a certain *Wiſdom*, which it names the Wiſdom of the *Age*, the Wiſdom of Men; but then it ſpeaks only according to appearance, or ordinary Opinion: For we learn in other places, that that Wiſdom is Folly, and Abomination, not only before God, but before all Men that conſult Reaſon.

Certainly, if Eternal Laws and Truths depended on God, and were eſtabliſht by a free will of the Creator: in a word, if the Reaſon we conſult were not neceſſary and independant: it

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seems evident to me, that we must bid farewel to all true Science; and that we might err in affirming that the *Arithmetick* and *Geometrie* of the Chineſe is the ſame as ours. For indeed if it were not abſolutely neceſſary that 2 times 4 ſhould be 8, or the three angles of a Triangle equal to two right ones; what proof could we have that theſe ſorts of Truth were not like thoſe which are receiv'd, but in ſome Univerſities, and which continue but a certain Season? Do we clearly conceive that God cannot deſiſt to will what he will'd with a will abſolutely free and indifferent? or rather do we clearly conceive it impoſſible for God to have will'd certain things, for a determinate time, or place, for ſome particular Perſons, or certain kinds of Beings; ſuppoſing him as ſome will have him, intirely free and indifferent in that Will; For my own part, I cannot conceive any *Neceſſity* in *Indifferency*, nor reconcile two ſo oppoſite things together.

But let it be ſuppos'd, that it can be clearly perceiv'd, that God by a will intirely indifferent, has eſtabliſh't for all times, and for all places, Laws and Truths Eternal; and that at preſent they are immutable becauſe of that Decree. But where do they ſee this Decree? Has God created any Being repreſentative of it? Will they ſay it is a modification of their Soul? They ſee clearly that decree; for they have learn't that Immutability is aſcertain'd to Eternal Truths and Laws: But where is it that they ſee it? Certainly if they ſee it not in God, they ſee it not at all. For that Decree can be no where but in God, nor can it be ſeen but where he is. The Philoſophers cannot then be certain of any thing, unleſs they conſult God, and are anſwered by him. 'Tis in vain for them to exclaim: and they muſt either yield or hold their Peace.

But after all, that Decree is an ungrounded Imagination. When we think on Order and eternal Laws and Truths, we do not naturally enquire the Cauſe; for they have none. We do not clearly ſee the neceſſity of this decree, nor do we think immediately upon it: On the contrary we perceive evidently by a ſimple view, that the nature of numbers, and intelligible Ideas, is immutable, neceſſary, and independent. We ſee clearly that it is abſolutely neceſſary, for 2 times 4 to be 8, and that the *ſquare* of the *Diagonal* of a ſquare is double to that ſquare. If we doubt of the abſolute neceſſity of theſe Truths, 'tis becauſe we turn our back upon their Light, reaſon upon a falſe Principle, and ſearch for their nature, their Immutability, and independance out of themſelves. Thus the decree for the Immutability of theſe Truths is a fiction of the mind, which ſuppoſing it ſees not what it ſees in the Wiſdom of God; and knowing him to be the cauſe of all things, thinks it ſelf oblig'd to imagine a Decree to aſcertain immutability to theſe Truths, which it cannot chooſe but acknowledge to be immutable. But this Suppoſition is falſe, and we ought to beware of it. 'Tis only in the *Wiſdom of God*, that we ſee Eternal, immutable, and neceſſary Truths: nor can we ſee any where elſe the *Order* which God himſelf is oblig'd to follow, as I have ſaid before: The mind is made for that Wiſdom, and in one ſence it can ſee nothing elſe. For if it can ſee the Creatures, 'tis becauſe He whom it ſees, though in a very imperfect manner, during this life, comprehends them all in the immenſity of his Being, in an intelligible manner, and proportionate to the mind, as I have ſhown in another place.

If we had not in our ſelves the Idea of Infinite, and if we ſaw not all things by the natural union of our mind with univerſal, and infinite Reaſon, it ſeems evident, that we could not have liberty to think on all things: For the mind cannot *deſire* to conſider things except it has ſome Idea of them, and it is not in its Power to think actually on any thing but what it deſires to think on. And ſo we ſhall caſhiere Man of his Liberty of thinking on All, if we ſeparate him from the mind of him who compreſends all. Again: ſince we can love nothing but what we ſee, if God ſhould only give us particular Ideas, it is manifeſt he would ſo determine all the Motions of our Will, that it would be neceſſary for us to Love only particular Beings. For in brief, if we had not the Idea of infinite, we could not love it: and if thoſe who poſitively affirm they have no Idea of God, ſpeak as they think, I ſcruple not to affirm they have never lov'd God, for nothing ſeems certainer to me, than that nothing can be the Object of our Love, which is not of our conception.

Laſtly if Order, and Eternal Laws were not immutable, by the neceſſity of their nature, the cleareſt and ſtrongeſt proofs of Religion would, I queſtion not, be deſtroyed in their Principle, as well as Liberty, and the moſt certain Sciences. For it is evident, that the Chriſtian Religion which propoſes JESUS CHRIST as a *Mediator*, and *Reſtorer*, ſuppoſes the Corruption of nature, by original Sin. But what proof can we have of this Corruption? The fleſh wars, you will ſay, againſt the Spirit, has brought it into ſubjection, and tyranizes over it. This I grant. But this, ſays a *Libertine*, is no *Diſorder*. This is as it pleas'd God; who ordain'd it ſo; who is the Maſter of his own decrees; and who conſtitutes what Order he thinks fit amongſt his Creatures. How ſhall it be prov'd that 'tis a Diſorder for Minds to be ſubjected to Bodies, unleſs we have a clear Idea of Order, and Neceſſity, and know, that God himſelf is oblig'd to follow it, by a neceſſary Love which he bears to himſelf? But farther, ſuppoſing that Order depends on a *free Decree of God*, we muſt ſtill have recourſe to him to be inform'd of it: God muſt nevertheleſs be conſulted, notwithſtanding the averſion which ſome of the Learn'd have, to apply to him; and this truth muſt ſtill be granted, that we have need of God to be inſtructed. But that ſuppos'd *free Decree* which is the cauſe of Order, is a meer *fiction* of mind for the Reaſons I have given.

If it be not a necessary Order that Man should be made for his Author, and that his will should be conformable to Order, which is the essential and necessary Rule of the will of God: If it be not true that *Actions* are *good*, or *ill*, because *agreeable* or *repugnant* to an immutable and necessary *Order*, and that this same order requires that the Good should be rewarded, and the Evil punish't: Last of all, if Men have not naturally a clear Idea of Order, even of such an one as God himself cannot *will* the contrary to what it prescribes, (since God cannot will Disorder) certainly I can see nothing but Universal Confusion. For what is there to be blam'd in the most infamous and unjust actions of the Heathens, to whom God has given no Laws? What will be the *reason* that will dare to *judge* them, if there be no *supream reason* that *condemns* them?

Nec natura potest justo secernere iniquum. Lucretius. *Diogenes.*

There is a *Poet* who says, 'tis impossible to distinguish Justice from Injustice: and a *Philosopher* that will have it an infirmity; to blush or be asham'd for infamous actions. These and the like *Paradoxes* are often asserted in the heat of Imagination, and in the transport of the Passions. But how can we condemn these Opinions, if there be not an Universal and Necessary *Order*, *Rule*, or *Reason*, which is always present to those who can retire into themselves? We fear not on several occasions to judge others, and also our selves: but by what Authority should we do it, if the inward Reason that judges, when we pronounce Sentence upon others and our selves, be not supream, and common to all men?

But if this Reason were not present to those who retreat into their own Breast: and if the Heathens too, had not naturally some union with the order we speak of; upon the score of what Sin or Disobedience could they be reckon'd culpable, and by what Justice could God punish them? This I say, upon a *Prophet*'s teaching me that God is willing to * make Men the Arbiters betwixt him and his People, provided they determine by the immutable, and necessary order of Justice. *Nero* kill'd his Mother it is true: But in what has he done amiss? He follow'd the natural Motion of his Hatred: God gave him no Precept to the contrary: the Laws of the Jews were not made for him. You'll say perhaps that such actions are restrain'd by the Natural Law, and that was known to him: But what proof can you have of it? For my own part I agree to it; because indeed this is an irresistible Proof for an Immutable, and Necessary Order; and for the *Knowledge* which every *Mind* has of it, and *that* so much more clear, as it is more united to Universal Reason, and less sensible to the impression of the Senses and Passions. In a word, as it is more reasonable. But 'tis requisite that I explain as clearly as possibly I can, the sense I have about *Natural*, or *Divine Order* and *Law*. For the difficulty that is found to embrace my Opinion, proceeds, it may be, from the want of a distinct conception of my meaning.

* *And now O Inhabitants of* Jerusalem, *judge betwixt me and my Vineyard.* Isa. 5. 3.

'Tis certain that God comprehends in himself, after an Intelligible manner, the *Perfections* of all the Beings he has created, or can create; and that by these Intelligible *Perfections*, he knows the essence of all things, as by his own *Wills* he knows their *Existence*. Which perfections are likewise the immediate object of the mind of man, for the Reasons I have given. Therefore the intelligible Ideas, or the Perfections which are in God, which represent to us what is external to him, are necessary and immutable. But *Truths* are nothing but *relations of Equality*, or *Inequality*, that are found between these Intelligible Ideas; since it is only true that 2 times 2 are 4, or that 2 times 2 are not 5, because there is a *Relation of Equality* between 2 times 2 and 4, and of inequality between 2 times 2 and 5. Therefore Truths are as immutable, and necessary as Ideas. It has ever been a truth, that 2 times 2 are 4, and 'tis impossible it should ever be false: which is visible, though there be no Necessity, that God, as supream Legislator, should have establisht these Truths, so, as is said by M. *des Cartes*, in his answer to the sixth Objection. Art. 6. & 8.

We easily comprehend then what is *Truth*, but men find some difficulty to conceive what is this immutable, and necessary *Order*: what is this *natural*, and *Divine Law* which God necessarily wills, and which the righteous likewise will. For a Man's *righteousness* consists, in his *Loving Order*, and in his conforming his will in all things to it: as that which makes a *sinner* is his *disliking Order* in some things, and willing that it should conform to his Desires. Yet methinks these things are not so mysterious, as is imagin'd; and I am perswaded all the difficulty that is found in them proceeds from the trouble the mind is at to aspire to abstract, and metaphysical Thoughts. Here then is in part what are my Thoughts of *Order*.

'Tis evident that the perfections which are in God representative of created, or possible Beings, are not all Equal: That those for Example which represent Bodies, are less noble, than others that represent Spirits; and that even in those which represent only Bodies, or Spirits, there are degrees of perfection greater, and lesser *ad infinitum*. This is clearly, and easily conceiv'd, though it be hard to reconcile the *simplicity* of the *Divine Essence*, with that *variety* of Intelligible Ideas, included in his *Wisdom*. For 'tis evident, that if all the *Ideas* of God were *equal*, he could see no difference between his Works; since he cannot see his Creatures, save in *that* which is in himself, *representing* them: And if the Idea of a Watch which shows the hour, with all the different Motions of the Planets, were no perfecter than that of another, which only points to the hour, or than that of a Circle and a Square, a Watch would be no perfecter than a Circle. For we can judge of the Perfection of Works, only by the Perfection of the Ideas we have of them: and if there was no more understanding, or sign of Wisdom,

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in a Watch, than a Circle, it would be as easie to conceive the most complicated Machines, as a Square, or a Circle.

If then it be true, that God is the *Universal Being*, who includes in Himself all Beings, in an intelligible manner, and that all these Intelligible Beings, which have not a necessary Existence, are not equally perfect; 'tis evident, there will be between them an Immutable, and Necessary Order, and that as there are *Eternal and necessary Truths*, because there are *Relations of Magnitude* between intelligible Beings, there must likewise be an *immutable, and necessary Order*, by reason of the *Relations of Perfection*, that are between these Beings. 'Tis therefore an *Immutable Order*, that Spirits should be nobler than Bodies, as it is a *necessary Truth*, that a times a should be a, or that a times a should not be a.

But hitherto immutable Order seems rather a Speculative Truth, than a necessary Law; For if Order be consider'd but as we have just now done; we see, for example, that it is *True*, that *Minds are more noble than Bodies*: but we do not see that this Truth is at the same time an *Order*, which has the force of a *Law*, and that there is an obligation of *preferring* minds before Bodies. It must then be consider'd, that God loves himself, by a necessary Love, and therefore has a greater degree of love for that which in him represents, or includes a greater degree of perfection, than for that which includes a less. So that if we will suppose an *Intelligible Mind* to be a thousand times perfecter, than an *Intelligible Body*, the love wherewith God loves *Himself* must necessarily be a thousand times greater for the former, than for the latter. For the Love of God is necessarily proportion'd to the Order which is between the intelligible Beings, that he includes. Insomuch that the Order which is purely Speculative, has the force of a Law in respect of God himself, supposing, 'tis certain, that God loves himself *Necessarily*. And God cannot love *Intelligible Bodies*, more than *intelligible Minds*, though he may love *created Bodies* better than created Minds, as I shall show by and by.

Now that immutable Order, which has the force of a Law in regard of God himself, has visibly the force of a Law in reference to us. For this Order we know, and our natural love comports with it, when we retire into our selves, and our Senses and Passions leave us to our Liberty. In a word, when our *Self-love* does not corrupt our *Natural*. Being we are made for God, and that 'tis impossible for us to be quite separate from him, we discern in him this Order, and we are naturally invited to love it. For 'tis His Light which enlightens us, and his Love which animates us, though our Senses and Passions obscure this Light, and determine against Order, the Impression we receive to love according to it. But in spite of *Concupiscence* which conceals this Order, and hinders us from following it, it is still an essential, and indispensable Law to us; and not only to us, but to all created Intelligences, and even to the Damn'd. For I do not believe they are so utterly estrang'd from God, as not to have some Idea of Order, as not to find still some beauty in it, and even to be ready to conform to it in some particular Instances, which are not prejudicial to Self-Love.

Corruption of Heart consists in *Opposition to Order*. Therefore malice or Corruption of Will, being not equal even among the Damn'd, it is plain, they are not all equally opposite to *Order*, and that they do not hate it in all cases, unless in consequence of their Hatred to God. For as no one can hate Good consider'd barely as such, so no one can hate Order, but when it seems to thwart his Inclinations. But though it seem contrary to our Inclinations, it nevertheless retains the force of a Law, which condemns, and also punishes us, by a Worm that never dies.

Now then we see what Order is, and how it has the strength of a Law, by that necessary Love which God has for himself. We conceive how this Law comes to be general for all Minds, God not excepted, and why it is necessary, and absolutely indispensable. Lastly we conceive, or we may easily conceive in general, that it is the Principle of all Divine, and humane Laws, and that 'tis according to this Law that all Intelligences are judg'd, and all Creatures dispos'd in the respective rank that belongs to them.

I acknowledge it is not easie to explain all this in particular, and I venture not to undertake it. For should I go to show the Connection particular Laws have with the general, and account for the agreement which certain manners of acting have to Order, I should be forc'd to engage in Difficulties, that it may be I could not resolve, and which would lead me out of sight of my subject.

Nevertheless if it be consider'd that God neither has, nor can have any other Law, than his own *Wisdom*, and the *necessary Love* he has for it, we shall easily judge, that all divine Laws must depend on it: And if it be observ'd that he has made the World with reference only to that Wisdom, and Love, since he acts only for Himself; we shall not doubt but all natural Laws must tend to the Preservation, and Perfection of this World, according to indispensable Order, and by their dependance on necessary Love. For the *Wisdom* and *Will* of God regulates all things.

There is no need I should explain at present, this Principle more at large: what I have already said being sufficient to inferr this Consequence, That in the first institution of Nature it was Impossible for *Minds* to be subjected to *Bodies*. For since God cannot act without *Knowledge* and against his *Will*, he has made the World by his *Wisdom*, and by the motion of his

Love:

Love: He has made all things by his *Son*, and in his holy *Spirit*, as we are taught in Scripture. Now in the *Wisdom* of God Minds are perfecter than Bodies, and by the *necessary Love* God has for himself, he prefers what is more perfect to what is less so. Therefore it is not possible that Minds should be subject to Bodies in the first Institution of Nature. Otherwise it must be said, that God in creating the World, has not follow'd the *rules* of his Eternal Wisdom, nor the *Motions* of his natural and necessary Love: which not only is inconceivable, but involves a manifest contradiction.

True it is that at present the created Mind is debas'd below a material and sensible Body, but that's because Order considered as a necessary Law, will have it so. 'Tis because God loving himself by a Necessary Love, which is always his inviolable Law, cannot love *Spirits* that are *repugnant* to him, nor consequently prefer them to *Bodies*, in which there is *nothing evil*, nor in the hatred of God. For God loves not Sinners in themselves. Nor would they subsist in the Universe but through JESUS CHRIST. God neither preserves them, nor loves them, but that they may cease to be Sinners, through the grace of CHRIST JESUS: or that, if they remain eternally Sinners, they may be eternally condemn'd, by immutable and necessary Order, and by the Judgment of our LORD, by vertue of whom they subsist for the glory of the Divine Justice: for without Him they would be annihilated. This I say by the way, to clear some difficulties that might remain touching what I said elsewhere about Original Sin, or the general Corruption of nature.

See the Fifth Dialogue of Christian Conversations.

'Tis, if I mistake not, a very useful reflection to consider that the mind has but two ways of knowing Objects. By *Light* and by *Sensation*. It sees them by *Light*, when it has a clear Idea of them, and when by consulting that Idea it discovers all the properties whereof they are capable. It sees things by Sensation, when it finds not in it self their clear Idea to consult it, and so cannot clearly discover their properties, but only know them by a confus'd Sensation without Light and Evidence. 'Tis by Light and a clear Idea the mind sees the *Essences* of things, Numbers and Extension: 'Tis by a confus'd Idea, or Sensation, that it judges of the *Existence* of Creatures, and knows its *own*.

What the Mind perceives by *Light* or by a clear Idea, it perceives in a most perfect manner: moreover it sees clearly that all the Obscurity or Imperfection of its Knowledge proceeds from its own Weakness and Limitation, or from want of application, and not from the Imperfection of the Idea it perceives. But what the mind perceives by *Sensation* is never clearly known: not for want of any application on part of the mind, (for we always are too applicative to what we feel,) but by the defectiveness of the Idea, which is extreamly obscure and confused.

Hence we may conclude that it is in God or in an immutable nature, that we see all that we know by Light, or a clear Idea; not only because we discover by Light, only numbers Extension, and the Essences of Beings, which depend not on a free act of God, as I have already said; but also because we know these things in a very perfect manner, and we should even know them in an infinitely perfect manner, if our thinking Capacity were infinite, since nothing is wanting to the Idea that represents them. We ought likewise to conclude, that we see in our selves whatever we know by sensation. However, this is not, as if we could produce in our selves any new *modification*, or that the sensations, or modifications of our soul could represent the Objects, on occasion whereof God excites them in us: but only that our sensations which are not distinguisht from our selves, and consequently cannot represent any thing distinct from us, may nevertheless represent the existence of Beings, or cause us to judge that they exist. For God raising sensations in us upon the presence of Objects, by an action that has nothing sensible, we fancy we receive from the Object not only the Idea which represents its essence, but also the Sensation which makes us judge of its existence: For there is always a pure Idea, and a confus'd sensation in the *Knowledge* we have of things as actually existing, if we except *that* of God, and of our own Soul. I except the Existence of God. For this we know by a pure Idea, and without Sensation, since it depends not on any cause, and is included in the Idea of a necessary Being, as the Equality of Diameters is included in the Idea of a Circle. And I except the Existence of our Soul; because we are inwardly conscious that we Think, Will, and Feel: and have no clear Idea of our Soul, as I have sufficiently explain'd in the seventh Chapter of the second Part of the third Book, and elsewhere.

These are some of the Reasons which we have to add to those already given, to prove that all our Light is deriv'd to us from God, and that the immediate and direct Object of our clear and evident notices is an immutable, and necessary Nature: Some objections are usually made against this Opinion; which I shall now indeavour to solve.

Against

Againſt what has been ſaid, that none but God enlightens us, and that we ſee all things in him.

OBJECTION I.

OUR Soul thinks becauſe it is her *Nature*. God in creating her gave her the *faculty* of thinking: and ſhe needs nothing more. But if any thing elſe is wanting, let us ſtick to what experience teaches us of our *ſenſes*, which is, that they are the manifeſt cauſes of our Ideas. 'Tis an ill way of Philoſophizing to argue againſt *Experience*.

ANSWER.

I cannot but admire that the Carteſian Gentlemen, who with ſo much reaſon reject and ſcorn the general Terms of *nature* and *faculty* ſhould ſo willingly employ them on this occaſion. They cry out againſt a man that ſhall ſay the fire burns by its *nature* and converts certain Bodies into glaſs by a *natural Faculty*: and yet ſome of them fear not to ſay that the Humane mind produces all things in it ſelf by its *nature*, and becauſe it has a *thinking faculty*. But be it ſpoken without offence, theſe words are no more ſignificative in their Mouths, than in the Peripateticks.

I know very well that the Soul is capable of *thinking*. But I know likewiſe that extenſion is capable of *Figures*: the Soul is capable of *Will* as matter is of *Motion*. But as it is falſe that matter though capable of figure, and motion, has in it ſelf a *force*, *faculty*, or *nature* by which it can move it ſelf, and give it ſelf now a round figure, and anon a ſquare one; ſo though the Soul be naturally, and eſſentially capable of Knowledge, and Will, it is falſe that ſhe has faculties whereby ſhe can produce in her Ideas, or motion towards good. There is a great difference between being *Moveable* and *ſelf moving*. Matter is by its nature moveable, and capable of Figures; nor can it ſubſiſt without a figure. But it neither moves it ſelf, nor ſhapes it ſelf, nor has it any faculty to do it. The mind is of its nature capable of motion, and Ideas, I acknowledge. But it neither *moves*, nor *enlightens* it ſelf. But 'tis God that does all in Minds, as well as in Bodies.

Can we ſay that God effects the changes that happen in matter, and that he cauſes not thoſe which occur in the Mind? Is this to give to God the things that are his, to leave theſe latter ſort of Beings to their own management? Is he not equally Lord of all things? Is he not the Creator, Preſerver and true mover of minds as well as Bodies? Certainly he makes all, both Subſtances, Accidents, Beings, and modes of Being. For in ſhort he knows all: But he knows nothing but what he does. We therefore ſtraiten him in his Knowledge, if we limit him in his Action. See the firſt Illuſtration.

But if it muſt be ſaid that Creatures have ſuch *faculties* as are commonly conceiv'd, and that natural Bodies have a *Nature* which is the Principle of their *motion*, and *Reſt*, as ſay *Ariſtotle* and his Followers: This indeed overthrows all my Ideas: but yet I will rather agree to it, than ſay the Mind enlightens it ſelf. Men may ſay that the Soul has the force of moving diverſly the Limbs of her Body, and of communicating to them Senſe and Life: They may ſay, if they pleaſe, that it is ſhe that gives heat to the Blood, motion to the Spirits! and to the reſt of her Body, its Bulk, Situation, and Figure: Only let them not ſay that the Mind gives *Light* and *Motion* to it ſelf. If God works not all, let us allow him at leaſt to do what is nobleſt, and perfecteſt in the World. And if Creatures do any thing, let them move Bodies, and range and poſture them as they think fit: but let them never act upon Minds.

We will ſay (if that will ſerve) that Bodies move each other, after they have been mov'd themſelves; or rather will ſit down ignorant of the different Diſpoſitions of matter as not concerning us: But let not our Minds be ignorant whence proceeds the Light that enlightens them: let them know from what hand they receive all that can make them more happy or more perfect, let them acknowledge their dependence in its whole extent, and know, that whatever they actually have, God gives them every moment; for as ſayes a great Father upon another ſubject, *'Tis a very criminal Pride to uſe the gifts of God, as our own innate Perfections.* Above all let us take heed of imagining that the ſenſes inſtruct Reaſon, that the Body enlightens the Mind, that the Soul receives of the Body what it wants it ſelf. We had better believe our ſelves independent, than to believe we truly depend on Bodies. 'Tis much better to be our own Maſters, than to ſeek for Maſters amongſt inferior Creatures. But we had much better ſubmit our ſelves to Eternal Truth which aſſures us in the Goſpel, that none elſe is our Inſtructor; than to believe the teſtimony of our ſenſes, or of ſome men, who preſume to talk to us as our Teachers. Experience (whatever may be ſaid,) does not countenance prejudices. For our ſenſes, no leſs than our

Eſt quippe ſuperbia, & peccatum maximum, uti datis, tanquam inmatis. S. Bern. *de diligendo Deo.*

Teachers after the Flesh, are only occasional causes of the Instruction which Eternal Wisdom infuses into our most inward Reason. But because this Wisdom enlightens us by an insensible Operation, we imagine it is our Eyes, or the words of those that verberate the air against our Ears, who produce this Light or pronounce that intelligible voice which instructs us. And for this Reason, as I have said in another place, our LORD thought it not enough to instruct us in an intelligible manner by his Divinity; unless he condescended also to inform us in a sensible way by his humanity, thereby teaching us that he is every way our Master. And because we cannot easily retire into our selves, to consult him, in Quality of *eternal Truth*, *immutable Order*, *Intelligible Light*, he has rendred *Truth sensible* and familiar by his *Words*, *Order Amiable* by his *Example*, *Light Visible* by a *Body* which breaks the force of its Lustre; and after all we are still so ungrateful, unjust, stupid and insensible, as to respect as our masters, and that against his expres prohibition, not only other Men, but it may be the most insensible and vilest Bodies.

OBJECTION II.

Since the Soul is more perfect than Bodies, how comes it that she cannot include in her that which represents them? why may not the Idea of extension be one of her Modifications; 'Tis true there is none but God who acts in her, and modifies her. But why must she see Bodies in God if she can see them in her own Substance, she is not material, it's confess'd. But God though a pure Spirit, sees Bodies in himself; why then may not the Soul though spirituall see Bodies by considering *herself?*

ANSWER.

Do not we see that there is this difference between God and the humane Soul, that God is Being without restriction, Universal, Infinite Being, and the Soul is a sort of particular Being? 'Tis a property of infinite to be at the same time one, and yet all things compos'd as we may say of infinite perfections, and yet so simple that every perfection he possesses includes all the other without any real distinction; for as every Divine perfection is infinite, it constitutes the whole Divine Essence; But the Soul since a limited Being cannot have extension in her without becoming material. God includes in himself Bodies in an intelligible Manner. He sees their Essences or Ideas, in his Wisdom; and their Existence in his Love or in his Wills. This must necessarily be said, since God has made Bodies; and he knew what he made before any thing was created. But the Soul cannot see in her self what she does not contain: nor can she see clearly what she does contain, but only has a confus'd Sensation of it. I explain my self.

The Soul does not include Intelligible extension, as one of her modes of Existing: Because this extension is not any *mode of Being* but a *true Being*. We can conceive that Extension separately from any thing else, but we cannot conceive any modes of Being without perceiveing the subject, or Being whereof they are the modes. We perceive this extension without thinking on our mind, and we cannot conceive it to be any modification of our mind. This extension when circumscrib'd makes some figure, but the Limits of the mind cannot be figured. This extension having parts way be divided, at least in one sence, but we see nothing in the Soul that is divisible. This extension therefore that we see is no mode of the minds Existence, and therefore the mind cannot see it within itself. How can we see in one species of Being all sorts of Beings? in one particular and finite Being a Triangle in general, and infinite Triangles? For in fine the Soul perceives a Triangle or a Circle in general, though it be a contradiction for the Soul to have a modification in general. The Sensations of *Colour* which the Soul ascribes to *figures* make them *particular*, because no modification of a particular Being can be general.

Surely we may affirm what we clearly conceive. But we clearly conceive that the Extension which we see is something distinct from ourselves, therefore we may affirm that this extension is not a modification of our Being, and that 'tis something actually distinct from us. For we must observe, that the Sun for instance that we see is not that we look upon. The Sun and all we see in the material world is not visible of it self, as I have formerly prov'd. The Soul can only see the Sun to which she is immediately united. But we have a *clear Perception*, and a *distinct Sensation*, that the Sun is something different from us. Therefore we speak against our *Light*, and against our *conscience*, when we say the Soul sees all surrounding Bodies in her own modifications.

Pleasure, Pain, Savour, Heat, Colour, all our Sensatious, and Passions, are the modifications of our Soul. But though they be so, do we clearly know them? Can we compare Heat with Savour, Order with Colour? Can we discover what Relation there is between Red and Green? or even between green and green? 'Tis not so with figures, we compare them with one another, we find out exactly their Proportions: we know precisely that the diagonal of a Square, multiplied into it self, makes a Square that's double to the former, what Analogy is there between these intelligible Figures, which are most clear Ideas, with the modifications of our Soul, which are only confus'd Sensations? and why must it be pretended, that intelligible Figures cannot be perceiv'd

perceiv'd by the Soul, unleſs they be her modifications, ſince the Soul knows not any of her modifications by a clear Idea, but only by conſcience or internal ſenſe? as I have elſewhere prov'd, and ſhall prove again in the next Illuſtration. If we could not ſee the figures of Bodies, except in our ſelves, they would be on the contrary *unintelligible* to us: we do not *know* our ſelves, but are in darkneſs to our ſelves; and we muſt caſt our Eye outward if we will behold our ſelves! and we ſhall never know what we are till we ſhall contemplate our ſelves in him who is our Light, and in whom all things become Light. For no where but in God material Beings are perfectly intelligible; but out of him the moſt ſpiritual ſubſtances are utterly unintelligible. The Idea of Extenſion, which we ſee in God, is moſt clear. But though we ſee not in God the Idea of our Soul, we are very *conſcious* that we *exiſt*, and are ſenſible of what we actually *have*. But 'tis impoſſible to diſcover what we are, or any of the modifications we are capable of.

OBJECTION III.

In God there is nothing *moveable*: In him there is nothing *Figured*. If there be a Sun in the Intelligible World, that Sun is always equal to itſelf; whereas the viſible Sun appears bigger when near the Horizon, than when remote from it, therefore it is not the Intelligible Sun we ſee. The caſe is the ſame in reſpect of other Creatures. Therefore we ſee not in God the Works of God.

ANSWER.

To give an Anſwer to all this we need only conſider, that God includes within himſelf, an infinite *intelligible* Extenſion; For God knows Extenſion, in as much as he has made it, and he can know it no otherwiſe than in himſelf. Therefore as the mind may perceive part of that intelligible Extenſion, which God includes, it is certain it may perceive in God all Figures; for all *finite* Intelligible Extenſion is neceſſarily an *intelligible Figure*, ſince Figure is nothing but the termination of Extenſion. Moreover that Figure of intelligible and general Extenſion becomes ſenſible, and particular, by Colour, or ſome other ſenſible Quality, which the Soul aſcribes to it; for the Soul almoſt always beſtows her own Senſation upon a lively and affecting Idea. Thus there is no neceſſity, that there ſhould be in God *ſenſible* Bodies, or Figures in *Intelligible* Extenſion, in order to our ſeeing them in God, or that God may ſee them Himſelf, though he conſiders nothing but Himſelf.

So likewiſe if it be conceiv'd that a Figure of Intelligible Extenſion, made ſenſible by Colour, ſhould be taken, ſucceſſively, from the different Parts of that ſame infinite Extenſion; or if it be conceiv'd that a Figure of Intelligible Extenſion may turn upon its Center, or ſucceſſively approach another; we perceive the motion of a *ſenſible* or Intelligible Figure, though there be no motion in intelligible Extenſion. For God ſees not the motion of Bodies in his *Subſtance*, or in the *Idea* he has of them in himſelf. But only by the knowledge he has of his own *Wills* relating to them. He ſees their Exiſtence only by that way, becauſe his *Will* only gives Being to all things. The *Wills* of God change nothing in his Subſtance; nor do they *move* it: Intelligible Extenſion is immoveable all manner of ways, even *intelligibly*. But though we ſee only this intelligible Extenſion, it ſeems moveable to us, becauſe of the Senſation of *Colour*, or the confus'd *Image* remaining after the Senſation, which we ſucceſſively annex to the ſeveral parts of Intelligible Extenſion, that furniſhes us with an Idea, when we ſee or imagine the motion of any Body.

From what I have ſaid we may underſtand why we ſee the *Intelligible Sun*, ſometimes greater and ſometimes leſs, though it be always the ſame with reſpect to God. For all that is requir'd to this, is but to ſee, one while, a greater part of Intelligible Extenſion, and another while a leſs, and to have a lively Senſation of Light, to beſtow upon that part of Extenſion. Now as all the Parts of Intelligible Extenſion are all of the ſame nature, they may all indifferently repreſent any Body whatever.

It muſt not be imagin'd that the Intelligible World has any ſuch relation to the material, and ſenſible, that there muſt be for inſtance an Intelligible Sun, an intelligible Horſe, and an intelligible Tree deſtin'd to repreſent to us the Sun, an Horſe and a Tree; and that all thoſe who ſee the Sun neceſſarily ſee this pretended intelligible Sun. All intelligible Extenſion may be conceiv'd Circular, or to have an intelligible Figure of an Horſe, or a Tree, and ſo may ſerve to repreſent the Sun, an Horſe and Tree, and conſequently be a Sun, a Horſe and a Tree in the intelligible World, and likewiſe to become a ſenſible and viſible Sun, Horſe, and Tree, if the Soul has any Senſation occaſion'd by Bodies to affix to theſe Ideas.

Therefore when I ſaid that we ſaw different Bodies by the knowledge we have of the Perfections of God which repreſent them: I did not mean preciſely that there were certain particular Ideas in God to repreſent each Body in particular; and that we ſaw ſuch a particular Idea, in ſeeing ſuch a particular Body. For it is certain we could not ſee this Body ſometimes great, and ſometimes ſmall, one while round, and another while ſquare, if we ſaw it by a particular Idea, that was always the ſame. But I ſay we ſee all things in God, by the application God makes of intelligible Extenſion to our mind, in a thouſand different ways,

and

and that thus intelligible Extenſion includes in it all the Perfections, or rather differences, of *Bodies*; becauſe of the different ſenſations, the Soul beſtows upon the Ideas which ſhe receives occaſionally from *them*. I have diſcours'd after *another* manner; but it ſhould be concluded, that was only to make ſome of my proofs more forcible and ſenſible; and it ſhould not be gather'd from what I have here ſaid, that the foundation of thoſe proofs is ruin'd. I could give the reaſons of the different ways wherein I explain my ſelf, if I thought it neceſſary.

I venture not to dive deeper into this Subject for fear of ſpeaking things either too Abſtract or Uncommon: or, if that ſeem better, for fear of hazarding to ſpeak things which I neither know, nor am capable of diſcovering: only let me produce thoſe paſſages of Scripture which ſeem contrary to what I have now eſtabliſh't, which I ſhall indeavour to *Explain.*

OBJECTION.

Ch. 1. 18. Ch. 4. 12. St. *John* in his Goſpel, and in the firſt of his Epiſtles, ſays, *No man hath ſeen God at any time: The Only begotten Son who is in the boſom of the father he hath declar'd him.*

ANSWER.

I anſwer, that 'tis not properly to ſee God, to ſee the Creatures in him. 'Tis not to ſee his eſſence to ſee the eſſences of Creatures in his Subſtance; as it is not to ſee a Mirrour, to view only the Objects it repreſents.

Cor. 13. Not but that we might ſay with St. *Paul*, St. *Auſtin*, St. *Gregory*, and many other *Fathers* of the Church, that we *ſee God* in this Life though in a very imperfect Manner. The Words of L. 31. c. 20. St. *Gregory* in his Morals upon *Job* are theſe. *A luce incorruptibili caligo nos noſtræ corruptionis obſcurat; cumq; & videri aliquatenus poteſt & tamen videri lux ipſa ſicuti eſt non poteſt, quam longe ſit indicat. Quam ſi mens non cerneret, nec quia longe eſſe videret. Si autem perfectè jam cerneret, profectò hanc quaſi per caliginem non videret. Igitur quia nec omnino cernitur, nec rurſum omnino non cernitur, rectè dictum eſt, quia à longe Deus videtur.* Though St. *Gregory* in explaining this paſſage of *Job*, *Oculi ejus à longe proſpiciunt* ſays, that in this life we only ſee God a far of: This is not as if God were not moſt preſent to us; but that the Clouds of our Concupiſcence conceal him from us. *Caligo nos noſtræ corruptionis obſcurat.* For in other places, he with St. *Auſtin* compares the light of God, which is God himſelf, to the Light of the Sun which ſurrounds us, and which we ſee not becauſe we are blind, or ſhut our Eyes when dazled with its Luſtre. *In ſole oculos clauſos tenemus.*

St. *Auſtin* goes farther yet than his faithful Diſciple St. *Gregory*. For though he confeſſes that we know God but in a very imperfect manner at preſent, yet he affirms, in ſeveral places, that God is better known to us, than thoſe things we fancy we know beſt. *He that has made all things,* (ſays he) *is nearer us, than his Creatures; For in him we have Life, and Motion and Being, Moſt of Created Beings are not proportionate to our Mind, becauſe they are corporeal, and of a ſort diſtinguiſh't from it.* And lower: *The Inquirers into the ſecrets of Nature, are juſtly condemn'd in the Book of Wiſdom; for if they have been able to penetrate what is moſt ſecret and unreveal'd to men, with how much greater eaſe might they have diſcovered the Author and ſoveraign of the univerſe; The foundations of the Earth are hid from our Eyes: But he that laid the foundations is preſent to our Minds.* And for this Reaſon that Holy Father believes, that he that has Charity knows God better than he knows his Brother. *Ecce* (ſays he) *jam poteſt notiorem Deum habere quàm Fratrem. Planè notiorem, quia præſentiorem: notiorem quia interiorem: notiorem quia certiorem.* I bring not any other proofs of St. *Auſtin's* Opinion: Thoſe who deſire them may find all ſorts in that learn'd Collection *Ambroſius Victor* has made of them, in the Second Volume of his Chriſtian Philoſophy.

Propinquior nobis qui fecit, quam multa quæ facta ſunt. In illo enim vivimus, movemur & ſumus. Iſtorum autem pleraq; remota ſunt à mente noſtra propter diſſimilitudinem ſui generis.

Recte culpantur in libro ſapientiæ inquiſitores hujus ſæculi. Si enim tantum, *inquit*, potuerunt valere ut poſſent æſtimare *quomodo ejus Dominum, non facilius invenerunt? Ignota enim ſunt fundamenta oculis noſtris; & qui fundavit terram, propinquat noſtris.* De Gen. ad litt. l. 5. ch. 16. *De Trinitate*, lib. 8. ch. 8.

ſæculum, *mentibus*

But to return to the paſſage of St. *John*, *No man has ſeen God at any time.* I believe the deſign of the Evangeliſt, in affirming no Man has ſeen God, is to ſtate the difference between the *Old* and *New* Teſtament. Between JESUS CHRIST and the *Patriarchs* and *Prophets*, of whom it is written, that they have *ſeen God.* For *Moſes*, *Jacob*, *Iſaiah* and others, ſaw God only with corporeal Eyes, and under an unknown Form: they have not ſeen him in himſelf, *Deum nemo vidit unquam*; But the only Son, who is in the Boſom of the Father, has inſtructed us in what he has ſeen. *Unigenitus qui eſt in ſinu Patris: ipſe enarravit.*

OBJECTION.

1 Tim. 16. St. *Paul* writing to *Timothy* ſays, that God *inhabits inacceſſible Light which no man hath ſeen, nor can ſee.* If the Light of God *cannot be approach't to*, we cannot ſee all things in it.

A N-

ANSWER.

St. *Paul* cannot be contrary to St. *John* who assures us, that JESUS CHRIST is the *true Light* that lightens all men who come into the World. For the mind of man, which many of the * Fathers call *illuminated* or *Enlightned light*. *Lumen Illuminatum*, is Enlightned only with the *Light* of *Eternal Wisdom*, which the Fathers therefore call *illuminating Light*, *Lumen Illuminans*. *David* advises to approach to God and be enlightned by him; *Accedite ad eum, & illuminamini*. But how can we be enlightned by it, if we cannot see the Light by which we are to be enlightned? Therefore when St. *Paul* says, that Light is inaccessible, he means to † carnal man who cannot retire into himself to contemplate it: Or if he speaks of all men, 'tis because there are none but are disturb'd from the perfect contemplation of Truth, because our Body incessantly troubles the attention of our mind.

* St. *Cyrill* of *Alexandria* upon the words of St. *John*, *Erat lux vera*. St. *Aug.* Tr. 14. upon St. *John*, St. *Greg.* c. 27. upon 28. of *Job*.

† *Inaccessibilem dixit; sed omni homini humana sapienti: Scriptura quippe sacra omnes carnalium sectatores humanitatis nomine notare solet.* St. *Greg.* in cap. 28. *Job*.

OBJECTION.

God answering *Moses* when he desir'd to see him, says, *Thou canst not see my Face; For there shall no man see me and live.* Ex. 33. 20.

ANSWER.

It is evident that the literal sence of this Passage is not contrary to what I have said hitherto. For I do not suppose it possible to see God in this life, as *Moses* desir'd to see him. However, I Answer, that we must dy to see God: For the *Soul unites* herself to *Truth* proportionably as she quits her *union* with the *Body*: Which is a Truth that cannot be sufficiently consider'd. Those who follow the Motions of their passions; those whose Imagination is defiled, with the enjoyment of Pleasures; Those who have strengthned the Union, and Correspondence of their Mind with their Body: In a word, those who *live* cannot see God: For they cannot retire into themselves to consult the Truth. Happy therefore are they who have a pure Heart, a disengag'd Spirit, a clear Imagination, who have no dependance on the World, and hardly any on the Body. In a word, happy are the Dead, for they see God. Wisdom has publisht it openly upon the Mountain; and Wisdom whispers it secretly to those who consult Her by retiring into themselves.

Neither is it found in the land of the living. Job 28. 13.

Those who are costantly quickning in them the Concupiscence of Pride, who are indefatigably forming a thousand Ambitious designs, who unite, and even enslave their Soul, not only to the Body, but all surrounding Objects: In a word, those who *Live* not only the *Life of the Body*, but also that of the *World*, cannot see God: For WISDOM inhabits the most retir'd and inward Reason, whilst they perpetually expand themselves abroad.

But such as constantly deaden the Activity of their Senses, who faithfully preserve the Purity of their Imagination, who couragiously resist the Motions of their passions; In a word, that break all those Bonds whereby others continue enchain'd to the Body, and sensible grandeur; may discover infinite Truths, and see that *Wisdom which is hid from the Eyes of all Living*. They after a sort do cease to live when they retire into themselves: they relinquish the Body when they draw near to Truth. For the mind of man obtains that Site and Position between God and Bodies, that it can never quit the one but it must approach the other. It cannot draw towards God but it must remove from Bodies, nor pursue Bodies but it must recede from God: But because we cannot give an absolute *Farewel* to the Body, till *Death* makes the separation, I confess it impossible, till then, to be perfectly united to God. We may at present, as says St. *Paul*, see God confusedly as in a Glass, but we cannot see him face to face. *Non videbit me homo & vivet*. Yet we may see him *in part*, that is, imperfectly and confusedly.

Job 28. 21.

Now we see through a Glass darkly, but then face to face. Now I know in part, &c. 1 Cor. 13. 2.

It must not be imagin'd, that life is equal in all men living, or that it consists in an *indivisible* point. The Dominion of the Body over the Mind, which withstands our uniting our selves with God by the Knowledge of Truth, is susceptible of *more* and *less*. The Soul is not equally in all Men united by *Sensations* to the Body, which she animates, nor by *Passions* to those, her Inclinations carry her to: and there are some who so mortify the Concupiscence of Pleasure, and of Pride within them, that they scarce retain any Commerce with their Body, or the World; and so are as it were Dead: St. *Paul* is a great Instance hereof, who chastis'd his Body, and brought it to subjection; who was so humbled, and destroy'd, that he thought no longer on the World, nor the World on him: For the World was dead, and crucified to him, as he was dead and crucified to the World. And on this account it was, says St. *Gregory*, that he was so *sensible* to Truth, and so prepar'd to receive those Divine Lights which are included in his Epistles; which however all glorious and splendid, make no impression save on

The natural Man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him. 1 Cor. c. 2. 14.

those who mortify their Senses and Passions by his Example. For as he says himself, the carnal and sensible Man cannot comprehend spiritual things: Because Worldly address, the tast of the Age, the fineness of Wit, the Nicety, the Liveliness, the Beauty of Imagination, whereby we live to the World, and the World to us, infuses into our Mind an incredible stupidity and *terror* to all those truths which cannot be perfectly conceiv'd, unless in the silence and calm of the Senses and Passions.

Ad Moysen dicitur, non videbit me homo & vivet; ac si apertè diceretur: Nullus unquam Deum spiritualiter videt qui mundo carnaliter vivit. St. *Greg.* upon the 28. of *Job* ch. 28.

We must therefore desire that Death which unites us to God, or at least the Image of that Death, that is, the Mysterious sleep in which all our External Senses being lock't up, we may hear the Voice of internal Truth, which is never audible but in the silence of the Night, when Darkness involves sensible objects, and when the World is as it were dead to us. *Thus it is,* says St. *Gregory*, that the *Spouse heard the Voice of her beloved in her sleep, when she said, I sleep, but my heart wakes; Outwardly I slumber but my heart watches within: For having no life nor sense with reference to External Objects, I become extreamly sensible to the Voice of inward Truth, which accosts me, in my inmost reason. Hinc est quod sponsa in canticis canticorum sponsi vocem quasi per somnium audierat, quæ dicebat: Ego dormio, & cor meum vigilat. Ac si diceret, dum exteriores sensus ab hujus vitæ sollicitudinibus sopio, vacante mente, vivacius interna cognosco. Foris dormio, sed intus cor vigilat: quia dum exteriora quasi non sentio, interiora solerter apprehendo. Bene ergo Eliu ait quod per somnium loquitur Deus.* St. *Gregory*'s Morals upon the 33. Ch. of *Job*.

THE

THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE SEVENTH CHAPTER Of the Second Part of the THIRD BOOK:

Where I prove,

That we have no clear Idea of the Nature or Modifications of our Soul.

I Have often ſaid, and think ſufficiently prov'd in the third Book, of the preceding Treatiſe, that we have no *clear Idea*, but only the *Conſcience*, or *inward Senſation* of our Soul; and that therefore we have an infinitely leſs perfect knowledge thereof than we have of Extenſion. Which to me ſeem'd ſo evident, that I did not think it neceſſary to prove it more at large. But the Authority of M. *des Cartes*, who poſitively ſays, *that the nature of the Mind is better known than that of any other thing*, has ſo prepoſſeſs'd ſome of his Diſciples, that what I have ſaid upon that ſubject ſerves only to make them think me a weak perſon unable to reach to, and hold faſt abſtracted Truths, which have nothing in them to wellcome and retain the attention of their Contemplators.

Anſwer to the fifth Objection againſt the ſecond Meditation towards the end.

I confeſs I am extremly Feeble, Senſible, and Heavy, and that my Mind depends on my Body more ways than I can expreſs. I *know* it: I *feel* it: and I continually labour to increaſe this knowledge I have of my Self. For though we cannot help our being miſerable; we ought at leaſt to have the knowledge, and the ſenſe of it; we ought at leaſt, to be humbled, upon the ſight of our inward miſeries, and to acknowledge the need we have of being deliver'd from this Body of Death which throws trouble and confuſion into all the faculties of our Soul.

But yet the Queſtion before us is ſo well proportion'd to the Mind, that I can ſee no need of any great application to reſolve it, and for that reaſon I did not inſiſt upon it. For I think it may be affirm'd, that moſt Mens Ignorance about the Soul, as of it's diſtinction from the Body, of it's Spirituality, Immortality, of it's other properties, is ſufficiently demonſtrative, that we have no clear and diſtinct Idea of it.

It may be ſaid that we have a clear Idea of Body, becauſe we need but conſult the Idea that repreſents it, to diſcover what Modifications it is capable of. We plainly ſee, that it may be either round or ſquare, in Reſt or Motion. We eaſily conceive, that a ſquare may be divided into two Triangles, two Parallelogramms, or two Trapezia. We never are at a ſtand what to anſwer to the demand, whether this or that be implied or denied in Extenſion, becauſe the Idea of Extenſion being clear, we eaſily and by a bare perception, diſcover what it includes, and what it excludes.

But it does not appear to me that we have any ſuch Idea of our Mind, as can diſcover when we conſult it, the modifications it will admit. Had we never felt either Pleaſure or Pain, we could not tell whether our Soul were ſuſceptible of either. If a Man had never eaten a Melon, felt ſmart, or ſeen red or blue, he might have conſulted long enough this pretended Idea of his Soul, before he could diſtinctly diſcover whether it was capable or not, of ſuch Senſations or Modifications. I ſay farther, that though a Man actually feel Pain, or ſees Colour, he cannot diſcover by a ſimple view, whether theſe Qualities belong to the Soul. He'll imagine that Pain is in the Body, which occaſions him to ſuffer it, and that Colour is diffus'd upon the ſurface of Objects, though it be clearly conceiv'd, that theſe Objects are diſtinguiſh'd from the Soul.

To be ſatisfied whether or no ſenſible qualities are Modes of the Mind's exiſtence, this pretended Idea of the Soul is never conſulted. On the contrary the *Carteſians* themſelves conſult the Idea of extenſion, and reaſon in this manner: *Heat*, *Pain*, *Colour*, cannot be Modifications of *Extenſion*: For this is capable but of different *figures* and Motions. Now there are but two kinds of Beings, *Bodies* and *Minds*. Therefore Heat, Pain, and Colour, and all other ſenſible Qualities, are the furniture of the Mind.

Whilſt they are oblig'd to conſult their Idea of Extenſion, to diſcover whether ſenſible qualities

qualities are Modifications of their Soul; is it not evident they have no clear Idea of it? For otherwiſe would they ever bethink themſelves of ſo indirect a conduct: When a Philoſopher would know whether Rotundity belongs to Extenſion, does he enquire into the Idea of the Soul, or any other beſides that of Extenſion? Does he not ſee clearly in the ſame Idea of Extenſion, that Rotundity is a Modification of it? and would it not be extravagance in him to argue thus? There are only two ſorts of Beings, Minds and Bodies: Roundneſs is not a Modification of a Mind; therefore it is a Modification of a Body.

We diſcover then by a rare perception without Argumentation, and by the meer Application of the Mind to the Idea of Extenſion, that Roundneſs and every other Figure is a Modification belonging to Body, and that Pleaſure, Pain, Heat, and all other ſenſible Qualities, are not Modifications of it. There can be no Queſtion propos'd about what does, or does not appertain to Extenſion, but may be eaſily, readily, and boldly anſwer'd by the ſole conſideration of the Idea that repreſents it. All Men are agree'd, in their notion, and believe upon this Point. For thoſe who will have Matter capable of *Thought*, do not imagine this Faculty is to be attributed to Extenſion, being perſwaded that *Extenſion* conſider'd preciſely as ſuch, cannot *Think*.

But Men are not ſo well agreed about what they are to think of the Soul, and her Modifications: for ſome there are, who fancy, that Pain, and Heat, or at leaſt that *Colour* does not belong to her: And a Man would be laught at among ſome *Carteſians*, that ſhould affirm, the Soul grows actually *Blue*, *Red*, *Yellow*, and that ſhe is dyed with all the Colours of the Rain-Bow, when ſhe contemplates it. There are many who doubt, and more that don't believe, that the Soul becomes formally *ſtinking* upon the ſmell of carrion; and that the *taſt* of Sugar, Pepper, and Salt, are properties belonging to her. Where then is the *clear Idea* of the Soul that the *Carteſians* may conſult it, and may all agree about the ſubject where Colours, Savours, Odors, ought to center.

But though the *Carteſians* were agreed upon theſe difficulties, yet we were not to conclude from their agreement, that we have a clear Idea of the Soul: For if they agree at laſt that 'tis ſhe which is actually Green, or Red, when a Man ſees theſe Colours, yet this could not be concluded without a long train of *Reaſonings*; they could not ſee it by a ſimple view, nor ever diſcover it by conſulting the pretended Idea of the Soul, but rather by conſulting that of the Body. They could not be certain, that ſenſible Qualities belong'd to the Soul, were it not becauſe they did not belong to extenſion, whereof they have a clear Idea. Nor could they ever convince of it ſuch as having little thought are incapable of complicated Perceptions, or Reaſonings; or rather ſuch as cannot dwell upon the conſideration of the clear Idea of Body, and who are apt to confound all things: And ſo there would be always, Clowns, Women, Children, and it may be ſome Scholars, and Doctors who would doubt of it. But Women, and Children, Learn'd and Unlearn'd, the moſt Intelligent and moſt ſtupid perſons, eaſily conceive, by their Idea of extenſion, that it is ſuſceptible of all ſorts of Figures they clearly comprehend that Extenſion is not capable; of Pain, Savour, Odor, or any other Senſation, when they but faithfully and attentively conſider the Idea that repreſents it: For there is no ſenſible Quality included in it's repreſentative Idea.

'Tis true, they may doubt whether Body is, or is not capable of admitting ſome Senſation, or ſenſible Quality: But then they underſtand by Body ſome other thing than extenſion, and have no clear Idea of Body taken in this ſenſe. But when *des Cartes*, or the *Carteſians*, whom I am concern'd with, maintain that the Soul is better known than Body, they mean only by body, bare Extenſion. Which makes me admire how they can hold, that the nature of the Soul is clearer known than that of the Body, ſince the Idea of Body, or Extenſion, is ſo manifeſt, that all the World's agreed about what it contains, and what it excludes, whilſt the Idea of the Soul is ſo confus'd, that the *Carteſians* themſelves daily diſpute, whether the Modifications of Colour appertain to it.

We know, (ſay theſe Philoſophers, with their Maſter *des Cartes*) *the nature of a ſubſtance ſo much more diſtinctly, as we know more of its Attributes. Now there is nothing whereof we know ſo many Attributes as of our Mind. Becauſe as many as we know in other things we may put to the mind's account from its knowing them; and therefore its Nature is better known than that of any other thing.*

But who is it that ſees not a great deal of difference between knowing by a *clear Idea* and knowing by *Conſcience*. When I know that 2 times 2 are 4, I know it very clearly; but I know not clearly *what within me* 'tis that knows it. I *feel* it, I confeſs; I know it by conſciouſneſs, or internal ſenſe: But I have no clear Idea of it as I have of Numbers, whoſe Relations I can diſtinctly diſcover. I can reckon in my mind three properties, one of knowing that 2 times 2 are 4, another of knowing that 3 times 3 are 9, a third of knowing that 4 times 4 are 16. And theſe Properties, if you pleaſe, ſhall be different from one another, and ſo I may count an infinite number of Properties belonging to me. But I deny that we can *clearly know* the nature of the things that we can *reckon* thus.

It may be ſaid that we have a *clear Idea* of a Being, and that we know its *Nature*, when we can compare it with others, which we likewiſe have a clear Idea of, or at leaſt when we can compare together the Modifications incident to it. We have clear Ideas of Numbers, and of the

the parts of Extenſion, becauſe we can compare theſe things together. As 2 may be compar'd with 4, 4 with 16, and every number, with any other ſo likewiſe a *ſquare* may be compar'd with a *Triangle*, a *Circle* with an *Ellipſis*, a *Square* and a *Triangle* with every other *Square* and *Triangle*; and thus the Proportions may be diſcover'd theſe Figures and Numbers have to one another. But we cannot compare our Mind with other Beings, thereby to diſcover clearly their Relations; nor can we compare the Modifications of the Mind together. Can we clearly diſcover what Relation, or Proportion there is between Pleaſure and Pain, Heat and Colour? or to keep to Modifications of the ſame ſort; can we determine exactly the Proportion between Green and Red, Yellow and Purple, or even between Purple and Purple? We ſee well enough that one is darker, or brighter than the other. But we know not evidently how much, nor what it is to be Darker or Brighter. We have then no clear Idea either of the Soul, or her Modifications; and though I ſee or have the ſenſe of Colours, Taſts, Smells; yet I may ſay as I have done, that I know them not by a clear Idea, ſince I cannot clearly diſcover their Relations.

'Tis true I can diſcover the exact proportions between ſounds: That a *Diopaſon* for inſtance is *Double*, that a *Fifth* is as 3 *to* 2, and that a *Fourth* is as 4 *to* 3. But I cannot know theſe proportions by the ſenſation I have of them. If I know that an *Eighth* or *Diopaſon* is double, 'tis becauſe I have learn't, by Experience, that the ſame ſtring ſounds an *Eighth*, when having ſtricken it whole, I ſtrike it preſently again, dividing it into two equal parts, or becauſe I know the number of *Vibrations* is double in equal time, or by ſome ſuch way: and this becauſe the *Trepidations* of the air, the *Vibrations* of the ſtring, and the ſtring it ſelf are things which may be compared by clear Ideas, and that we diſtinctly conceive what relations there can be between a *ſtring* and it's *parts*, as likewiſe between the *celerity* of different Vibrations. But we cannot compare *ſounds* betwixt themſelves, or as they are ſenſible Qualities, and Modifications of the Soul; nor that way are their Proportions or Relations diſcoverable. And though Muſicians diſtinguiſh very well the different concords, yet they do not diſtinguiſh their proportions by clear Ideas. By the ear only they judge of the difference of ſounds, Reaſon knows nothing of it. But it cannot be ſaid that the Ear judges by a clear Idea, or otherwiſe than by ſenſation. Therefore Muſicians have no clear Idea of ſounds, as they are ſenſations or Modifications of the Soul: and conſequently we conceive not the Soul nor her Modifications by a clear Idea, but only by Conſcience or internal ſenſe.

Moreover we know not wherein conſiſt thoſe diſpoſitions of the Soul, which facilitate her to act and repreſent Objects to her ſelf. Nay we cannot conceive wherein ſuch Diſpoſitions might poſſibly conſiſt. I ſay farther, that we cannot be poſitively aſſur'd by Reaſon, whether the *meer Soul* ſeparate from the Body, or conſider'd without relation to it, be capable of *Habits* or *Memory*. But how can we be ignorant of theſe things, if the nature of the Soul be better known to us than of the Body. 'Tis eaſily diſcern'd wherein that readineſs conſiſts, wherewith the animal Spirits flow into the nerves, which they have often us'd to glide into; at leaſt 'tis no trouble to diſcover, that whilſt the conduits of the nerves are widned, and the Fibres recumbent after a particular manner, the Spirits may eaſily inſinuate themſelves. But what is it we can conceive capable of augmenting the Soul's Facility to act or think. For my part, I own, I cannot comprehend it: and in vain ſhould I interrogate my ſelf what theſe diſpoſitions are; For I could give my ſelf no anſwer, nor light upon the matter, though I have a moſt lively ſenſe of that eaſineſs, with which ſome Thoughts ariſe in me. And if I had no particular Reaſons to induce me to believe that I really have ſuch Diſpoſitions, though I know them not in me; I ſhould judge there neither was any ſpiritual Habit, nor Memory in my Soul. But in ſhort, ſeeing there is doubt and ſcruple about it, we have an infallible ſymptom, that men are not ſo inlightned as is pretended. For *Doubt* can never be reconcil'd to *Evidence*, and clear Ideas.

'Tis certain, that a Man of the greateſt Underſtanding, cannot evidently know whether he deſerves Hatred or Love, as ſpeaks the Wiſeman. My own conſciouſneſs of my ſelf cannot ſatisfy me herein. St. *Paul* ſays indeed, his Conſcience reproach't him with nothing, yet for all that he does not affirm he is juſtified; On the contrary he aſſerts he is not thereby juſtified, and that he dares not judge himſelf, ſince he that judges is the Lord. But having a clear Idea of *Order*, if we had another as clear of the Soul, from the inward *feeling* of our ſelves we ſhould evidently know, whether ſhe was conformable to Order. We ſhould know whether we were Righteous or not, and we could exactly diſcover all our interiour Diſpoſitions to Good and Evil, whenever we were conſcious of them. But if we could know our ſelves juſt as we are, we ſhould not be ſo ſubject to Preſumption; And there is great likelyhood that St. *Peter* would not have ſaid to his Maſter whom he was not long after to deny, *Why cannot I follow thee now? I will lay down my life for thy ſake. Animam meam pro te ponam.* For being inwardly conſcious of his own Strength and good Will, he might have ſeen with Evidence, whether he had Reſolution and Courage to conquer Death, or rather the inſults of a ſilly Maid, and two or three Servants.

Eccl. c. 9. 1. *I judge not mine own ſelf. For I know nothing by my ſelf, yet I am not hereby juſtified, but he that judgeth me is the Lord.* 1 Cor. c. 4. 4. John 13. 37.

If the nature of the Soul be more known than any other. If the Idea we have of her be as clear as that we have of the Body, I ask only how it comes to paſs that there are ſo many who confound her with it? Is it poſſible to confound clear Ideas intirely different? Let us do juſtice

ſtice to all Mankind: Thoſe who diſſent from our Opinion are as rational as our ſelves, they have the ſame Ideas of things, and are partakers in the ſame Reaſon. Why then do they confound what we diſtinguiſh? Do they uſe on other occaſions to confound things, whereof they have clear Ideas? Do they ever confound two different numbers, or take a *Square* for a *Circle?* And yet the Soul differs more from the Body, than one of theſe Figures from the other; For they are two ſubſtances which are in nothing alike, and are confounded notwithſtanding. Which muſt therefore proceed from ſome difficulty there is to diſcover their difference; from its not being obſervable by a ſimple perception; and from the Impoſſibility of concluding that one is not the other without Argument and Reaſoning. It muſt come from hence, *viz.* That the Idea of Extenſion muſt be cautiouſly conſulted, and Extenſion diſcover'd to be no Mode of Exiſtence of a Body, but the Body it ſelf, as being repreſented a ſubſiſting Thing, and as the Principle and Foundation of whatever we conceive clearly in Bodies: and that ſo the Modes of which Body is capable, having no Proportion to ſenſible Qualities; the ſubject of theſe Qualities, or rather the Being of which they are Modes, muſt needs be different from Body: For ſuch like argumentation is requiſite to prevent our confounding the Soul with the Body. But if we had a clear Idea of the Soul, as we have of Body, certainly we need not take theſe round-about-ways to diſtinguiſh her from it. Since it would be diſcoverable by a ſimple view, and with as great eaſe as we ſee a Circle is not a Square.

I inſiſt not longer upon proving that we know not the Soul nor her Modifications by clear Ideas. Survey our ſelves on what ſide ſoever we will; this ſufficiently appears: and I had not added this to what I have ſaid in the *ſearch after Truth*, if ſome *Carteſians* had not found fault with it. If this will not ſatisfy them, I ſhall expect they will make me ſenſible of this clear Idea, which I am not able to find in my ſelf, do whatever I can to diſcover it.

THE

THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE EIGHTH CHAPTER Of the Second Part of the THIRD BOOK:

Of looſe and general terms which ſignify nothing. How they are diſtinguiſht from others.

IN order to comprehend what I have ſaid in ſome places; how that they give not the reaſons of things who explain them by logical and general Terms, we need but conſider; that whatever exiſts is reduc'd to *Being*, or *Modes* of Being; whatever term ſignifies neither of theſe ſignifies nothing, and every Term that ſignifies not one or other of them diſtinctly, and in particular, ſignifies nothing diſtinct. This to me ſeems moſt clear and evident, but what is evident in it ſelf, is not ſo to all the World. Words are the current Coin, wherewith men pay themſelves, and others. All Terms that are inoffenſive to the Ear, have free Paſsport amongſt them. And Truth comes ſo rarely into the Commerce of the World, that thoſe who ſpeak it, or hear it, have commonly no regard for it. The gift of Speech is the greateſt of Talents; the language of Imagination is the ſureſt of means; and a Memory charg'd with incomprehenſible Terms will always make a ſplendid appearance, whatever the *Carteſians* may ſay of it.

When men ſhall have no addiction but to Truth, they will be Cautious of what they ſay, they will carefully examine their own meaning, rejecting with ſcorn ſenſeleſs and inſignificant Terms, and cloſely adhering to clear Ideas. But when will the time come that men ſhall love Truth only? We may ſay, when they ſhall depend no longer on their Body, when they ſhall have no neceſſary relation to ſenſible Objects, when they ſhall not any more corrupt one another, but faithfully conſult their Maſter who inſtructs them in the receſſes of their Reaſon. But this will never happen whilſt we live on Earth.

However all men are not equally indifferent for Truth. If there are ſome who ſpeak without Reflection, and hear without diſtinction, and have no attention but to what affects them: there are others who induſtriouſly labour to inform themſelves, and to convince others of the Truth. And to theſe chiefly I addreſs my ſelf, for at their Inſtance I entred on making theſe Remarks.

I ſay then that whatever is, whether it actually exiſts or not, and conſequently whatever is intelligible is either a Being, or a mode of Being. By *Being* I mean ſomething of an abſolute Nature, or that may be conceiv'd alone, as unrelated to any other thing. By *mode of being* I underſtand ſomething relative, or that cannot be conceiv'd alone. Now there are two kinds of modes of Being. The one conſiſts in the Relation of the Parts of any Whole, to any part of the ſame whole: the other in the Relation of one thing to another which makes not any part of the ſame whole. The Roundneſs of wax is a Mode of Being of the former ſort, as conſiſting in the *Equality* of *Diſtance*, which have all the *Superficial* parts to the *central*. The Motion or ſituation of the wax is a mode of Being of the ſecond ſort: which conſiſts in the Relation the wax has to circumambient Bodies. I ſpeak not of motion taken for the Moving Force; for it is plain, that that force neither is nor can be a Mode of Bodies exiſting, for conceive them Modified how we will, we cannot conceive them as a *moving Force*.

It being certain that whatever is intelligible, is either a *Being*, or a *mode of Being*, it is as evident that every Term that ſignifies not one or other of theſe, ſignifies nothing; and that every Term that ſignifies not this or that particular Being, or mode of Being, is obſcure and confus'd; and conſequently we cannot conceive either what others ſay to us, or we to others, if we have no diſtinct Ideas of Being, or of the mode of Being, which reſpectively anſwer to the terms they uſe, or we imploy our ſelves.

Nevertheleſs

Nevertheleſs I grant that we may, and even ſometimes muſt imploy thoſe words which do not directly raiſe diſtinct Ideas. *We may*, becauſe it is not always neceſſary to put the *Definition* inſtead of the *Defin'd*, and that abridg'd Expreſſions are to good uſe imploy'd though confus'd in themſelves. And *we muſt*, when we are oblig'd to ſpeak of things whereof we have no clear Idea, and which we cannot conceive, but by our inward Senſation, as when we ſpeak of the Soul, and her Modifications. Only we muſt take care not to uſe obſcure and equivocal, when we have clear Terms; or any which may excite falſe Ideas in thoſe we ſpeak to. This will be better underſtood by an inſtance.

It is more perſpicuous to ſay, that God created the World by his *Will*, than to ſay he created it by his *Power*. This laſt word is a Logical Term, which excites no diſtinct and particular Idea, but affords Liberty to imagine that the Power of God is ſomething diſtinct from the efficacy of his Will. We ſpeak more clearly when we ſay God pardons Sinners, in JESUS CHRIST; than in abſolutely ſaying, he forgives them by his *Clemency* and *Mercy*: Theſe Terms are *Equivocal*; and adminiſter occaſion to think that the Clemency of God, is, it may be, contrary to his Juſtice: that Sin may be left unpuniſh't; and that the ſatisfaction of our LORD is not neceſſary, and the like.

Theſe Terms of a Looſe and Indefinite ſenſe are often us'd when we ſpeak of the divine Perfections; which is not to be condemn'd, ſince Philoſophical accuracy is not at all times neceſſary. But by a culpable dullneſs and negligence ſuch abuſe is made of theſe general Expreſſions and ſo many falſe conſequences are drawn from them, that though all men have the ſame Idea of God, and that they conſider him as a Being infinitely Perfect; yet there was hardly any Imperfection but was attributed to him in Idolatrous times, and mens diſcourſes of him were commonly unſeemly and unworthy: and all for want of carefully comparing the things they ſaid of him with the *Idea* that repreſents him, or rather with *Himſelf*.

But chiefly in matter of natural Philoſophy, theſe rambling and general Terms are abus'd, which excite no diſtinct Ideas either of Beings or their Modes. For example when we ſay that Bodies tend to their *Center*, that they fall by their *Gravity*, that they aſcend by their *Levity*, that they move by their *Nature*, that they ſucceſſively change their *Forms*, that they act by their *Vertues*, *Qualities*, *Faculties*, *&c.* we uſe ſuch Terms as have no ſignification, and all theſe Propoſitions are abſolutely falſe, in the ſenſe that moſt Philoſophers take them. There is no *Center* in the ſenſe that is commonly underſtood. Theſe terms, *Gravity*, *Form*, *Nature*, and the like, excite no Idea either of a Being or a mode of Being. They are empty and inſignificative Terms, which wiſe men ſhould avoid. *The Knowledge of the unwiſe is as talk without ſenſe*, ſaies the Son of *Sirach*. Theſe terms are good for nothing, but to ſhelter the Ignorance of Pretenders to Learning, and to make the Ignorant and Libertines believe that God is not the True Cauſe of all things.

Eccl. 21. 18.

This methinks is certain, and eaſy to be conceiv'd: yet moſt men talk freely of all things, without caring to examine whether the Terms they employ have any clear and exact ſignification. And many Authors there are of huge and bulky Volumes, in which 'tis harder than may be thought, to find any paſſage where they have underſtood what they have written. Therefore thoſe who are great Readers, and reſpectful Hearers of the rambling and general Diſcourſes of the falſly Learn'd, are in the darkeſt Ignorance. And I ſee no way they have to get free of it, but by conſtantly making, and renewing their Reſolution, of believing no Man on his word, and before they have annex'd very diſtinct Ideas to the moſt common Terms which others uſe. For theſe Terms are not clear, as is commonly imagin'd; and they ſeem ſo only from the common Uſe that is made of them: becauſe men fancy they well underſtand what they ſay or hear, when they have ſaid or heard the ſame an hundred times, though they have never examin'd it.

THE

THE ILLUSTRATION

Upon the Concluſion of the Three Firſt BOOKS.

That Phyſicians and Caſuiſts are abſolutely neceſſary for us ; But that it is dangerous to conſult the one, and follow the other in many occaſions.

CErtainly Man before his Fall, was poſſeſs'd of all things neceſſary to preſerve his Mind and Body in a perfect State. He needed neither *Phyſician*, nor *Caſuiſt :* he conſulted Inward Truth, as the Infallible Rule of his duty ; and his *Senſes* were ſo faithful in their Reports, that they never deceiv'd him in the uſe he ought to make of encompaſſing Bodies, for the preſervation of his own.

But ſince the Tranſgreſſion all things are chang'd. We conſult our Paſſions much more than Law or Truth Eternal ; and our Senſes are ſo diſorder'd, that in following them we ſometimes deſtroy our Health and Life. The *Caſuiſt* and *Phyſician* are become abſolutely neceſſary. And thoſe who pretend to be moſt dexterous at Self-management upon all occaſions, fall commonly into the groſſeſt Miſcarriages , which teach them a little too late , that they follow a Maſter that is not over-wiſe.

Nevertheleſs I think I may ſay that Sin has not ſo diſorder'd all the faculties of the Soul, but that we may conſult our ſelves, in many inſtances, and that it often fortunes that we loſe the Life of our *Soul*, or *Body*, by applying to *Phyſicians*, unexpert in their Profeſſion, and unacquainted with the conſtitution of our Body, or to *Caſuiſts* unskill'd in Religion and Morality, who pierce not to the bottom of the conſcience, to diſcover the Engagements and Diſpoſitions of thoſe who come to be reſolv'd.

What I have ſaid in the Concluſion of the three firſt Books of *The Search after Truth* , has given occaſion to ſome Perſons, to imagine I pretended that in Order to preſerve life and health, we ought to follow our *Senſes* and Paſſions in all things ; and that to be guided in our Duty it was needleſs to conſult other men , ſince Eternal Wiſdom is our Teacher that ſpeaks intelligibly to us in the receſſes of our Reaſon. And though I never ſaid nor thought that *Phyſicians* and *Caſuiſts* were uſeleſs, ſome Perſons expedite at judging and concluding, are perſuaded it was my opinion, becauſe, it may be, it was theirs : and that they do not ſo much conſider Man as he is at preſent, as what he was before the Fall. Here then in a great part are my thoughts upon the queſtion.

Man may be conſider'd in two ſtates of Body, Health and Sickneſs. If he be conſider'd in perfect Health, it cannot I think be doubted but his ſenſes are much more uſeful to preſerve it, than the Reaſon and experience of the ableſt Phyſicians. There's no need of adviſing with the Doctor to know what Weight a man may bear, whether Wood and Stones are to be eaten, whether he may throw himſelf from a Precipice. His ſenſes teaching him, in the readieſt and moſt undoubted manner, what ought to be done in the like ordinary occaſions. Which is, one would think, ſufficient, to juſtify what I have ſaid in the concluſion of the three firſt Books.

But that will not ſerve turn to juſtify my Thoughts, and even my words in another place. *viz. That our ſenſes acquit themſelves of their Duty ſo excellently well, and conduct us in that juſt and faithful manner to their End, that they ſeem to be injuriouſly charg'd with Corruptneſs and Irregularity.* Book 1. For I have always been perſwaded that the Juſtneſs, Exactneſs and admirable Order which is found in our Senſations with reference to the preſervation of Life, was no Conſequence of Sin, but the firſt Inſtitution of Nature.

'Tis objected that at preſent this Order is diſorder'd, and that if we were led by our ſenſes, we ſhould not only eat Poiſon , but ſhould almoſt always receive in , much more Nutriment than we could digeſt.

But as to *Poiſons* i don't believe our ſenſes would ever invite us to eat them ; but that if our Eyes ſhould by chance provoke us to Taſt them, we ſhould not find in them a reliſh that would induce us to ſwallow them, ſuppoſing theſe poiſons were in their natural ſtate. For there is great difference between Poiſons, as they are naturally produc'd, and empoiſon'd food ; between crude Pepper , and pepper'd meats. Our ſenſes I grant provoke us to eat poiſon'd

Victuals. But they do not incline us to eat Poiſons, or it may be, not ſo much as to taſte them, provided theſe poiſons remain in the capacity wherein God has produc'd them. For our ſenſes reach but to the natural Order of things and as conſtituted by their Maker.

I grant likewiſe that our ſenſes at preſent induce us to eat certain meats to exceſs and ſurfeiting, but that's becauſe theſe Meats are not in their *natural* ſtate. We ſhould never perhaps overcharge our ſelves with wheat, if we ground it with teeth, made for that purpoſe; But it is ground, and ſifted, and kneaded, and baked; ſophiſticated too ſometimes with Milk, with Butter, and Sugar, it's eaten alſo with preſerves, and with *Ragoos* of ſeveral ſorts which provoke appetite. And ſo we need not wonder if our *ſenſes* incline us to exceſs, when Reaſon and Experience lend both their aſſiſtance to impoſe on them.

So it is in reſpect of fleſh, which the ſenſes abhor when Raw and Full of Blood, when beheld after the Animal died of it ſelf. But men have bethought themſelves to kill the Beaſts, to drain out the Blood, to concoct the fleſh with Fire, to Seaſon, and Diſguiſe it, and after this accuſe their Senſes of corruption and diſorder; ſince they Imploy their Reaſon in preparing other ſorts of Diet than Nature ſupplies to them, I muſt own there is need of the ſame Reaſon to moderate their Appetite, in their Eating: and if the Cooks have found out the art of making us eat old ſhoes in their high Seaſon'd diſhes, it lies upon us to make as much uſe of our reaſon in miſtruſting theſe Adulterated meats which are not ſuch as God has made them: For he has given us our ſenſes only with relation to the natural Order of things.

It muſt farther be obſerv'd that our Imagination, and ſenſes are miſtruſtful and ſuſpicious when we take unuſual Aliments. For if a man had never eaten, nor ſeen eaten a particular fruit he met with, he would have ſome averſion and ſenſe of fear upon the taſting it: His Imagination and ſenſes would be naturally arrect and attentive to the reliſh it afforded; though never ſo hungry he would eat but little the firſt time, and if this Fruit had any dangerous quality it would be ſure to create in him ſome dread or abhorrence. Thus his machine would be ſo diſpos'd as to decline it another time; and the odium which he had to it ſenſibly diſcovering it ſelf in his Looks, would prevent others from eating it. All this would be perform'd, or might be perform'd in him, whilſt Reaſon had no ſhare in it: for I ſpeak not here of thoſe ſupplies which Reaſon, and Experience may adminiſter. But ſeeing our Friends take corrupt nutriment, we do the ſame: for we live by opinion; and Example emboldens us.

We examine not the effects theſe aliments may produce in us, and we fear not to eat them to exceſs. But our ſenſes are not ſo great abettors of the Intemperance as is believ'd. 'Tis true there poſſibly are in the World ſuch fruits as that their Taſts may impoſe on Perſons never ſo attentive to the Reports of their ſenſes: but this certainly is very rare: And we ought not to conclude from theſe particular inſtances, that our ſenſes are all corrupt, and that they commonly deceive us, in things relating to the good of the Body. It may be, theſe fruits deceive our Taſt, becauſe we have altered, and corrupted our Organ by the frequent uſe of unnatural nouriſhment. For 'tis certain that the high ſeaſon'd diſhes, we feed upon, by their too poignant, and penetrating Particles, hurt the Fibres of the Tongue, and deprive it of it's niceneſs and ſagacity. The Example of thoſe who can find no reliſh except in *Ragoos*, proves my aſſertion; for if we find no ſavour in Corn, and in crude Fleſh, 'tis becauſe our tongue is grown inſenſible to thoſe Particles, whoſe motions are moderate.

But though we ſuppoſe there are ſome Fruits whoſe ſavour is capable of deceiving the moſt curious ſenſes, and which ſtill retain their natural perfection; yet we ought not to believe this proceeded from Sin: but only that from the great ſimplicity of natural Laws, by vertue of which the ſenſe of Taſt is form'd and perfected 'twas impoſſible for it to have ſufficient niceneſs and ſagacity for all ſorts of Eatables. Beſides that defect of ſenſe would not be remedileſs, becauſe when the mother had an averſion to dangerous fruits, ſhe would communicate it to her Children, not only when unborn, but alſo when come into the World. For children only eat what is given them by their Mothers, and they machinally, and by the air of their countenance infuſe into them an abhorrence for fruits that are dangerous to be eaten. So that God has made ſufficient proviſion by our ſenſes for the preſervation of our Life, and nothing can be better order'd. For as *Order* requires, that the laws of union of our Soul and Body ſhould be moſt *ſimple*; they muſt be of a very *general* nature: and God ought not to eſtabliſh particular laws for ſuch inſtances and emergences, as moſt rarely happen, *Reaſon* on ſuch occaſions muſt *help* out the *ſenſes*: for Reaſon may be employ'd in all things. But the ſenſes are determin'd to ſome natural judgments, which are more advantageous, than can be conceiv'd, as I have prov'd in the firſt Book. Yet even theſe judgments are ſometimes fallacious; becauſe 'tis impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe without multiplying the moſt ſimple laws of Union of the Body with the Soul.

If we conſider Man as now he is, under a ſtate of ſickneſs, we muſt confeſs his ſenſes often deceive him, even in things that relate to the preſervation of his Life. For the *œconomy* of his machine being diſturb'd in proportion to it's diſturbance, irregular motions muſt unavoidably be excited in his Brain. Nevertheleſs his ſenſes are not ſo corrupted, as is ordinarily believ'd: and God has ſo wiſely provided for the preſervation of Life by the laws of union of the Soul and Body, that though theſe laws are extreamly ſimple, they often ſuffice to reſtore

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us to our Health; and it is much the ſurer way to follow them, than to employ our Reaſon, or certain Phyſicians that do not carefully ſtudy the diſpoſition of their Patients. For as a wound cloſes and heals up of it ſelf when conſtantly cleans'd and lick'd, as is done by Animals when wounded: ſo ordinary diſeaſes are ſpeedily diſpers'd, when we let them alone, and exactly obſerve that courſe of life, which theſe Diſeaſes, as it were by inſtinct, and Senſation, put us upon.

Wine, for example, ſeems bitter to a Man in a feaver, and likewiſe is prejudical to him in that condition: This ſame Man finds it agreable to the Palate, when he is in Health, and then too it is wholeſome for him. It ſometimes even happens that wine is moſt uſeful to the ſick that reliſh it, provided their taſt be not an effect of the habit of drinking it, and that their deſire of it proceed from the preſent diſpoſition of their Body: that it cannot be doubted but that we are to conſult our ſenſes in ſickneſs for the way we are to take to the recovery of our Health. Here follows my opinion about what we ought to do.

'Tis requiſite that the diſtemper'd perſon ſhould be extreamly attentive to thoſe ſecret deſires which ſometimes ariſe in him on occaſion of the actual diſpoſition of his Body; but above all, take heed leſt theſe deſires ſhould be the conſequence of ſome preceding Habit. He muſt, to that intent, ſlacken, as I may ſay, the bent of Imagination, or, thinking on nothing that may determine it, obſerve to what he is inclin'd, and examine whether his preſent Inclination proceeds from the actual diſpoſition of his Body: Which done, he ought to follow it, but with much caution and reſerve; it being extreamly difficult to be aſſur'd whether theſe ſecret Inclinations are owing to the preſent ſtate of Body; and 'tis ſometimes good to have the advice of ſome experienc'd Perſon upon it. But if the ſick Perſon thus giving a looſe to his Imagination, as I have been ſaying, finds nothing offer it ſelf to his mind, he muſt remain quiet, and uſe abſtinence, for this likely will quicken him to ſome deſire, or ſpend the humours that diſtemper him. But if the diſeaſe increaſe, notwithſtanding his Abſtinence and Reſt, 'tis then neceſſary to have recourſe to experience and the Phyſician. He muſt then give an exact account of all to a Skillful one that knows, if poſſible, the Conſtitution of his Body; He muſt clearly explain to *him* the beginnings, and progreſs of his *diſeaſe*, and the ſtate of Body he was in, before he fell into *it*, that *He* may conſult his experience and Reaſon with reference to the Perſon to be cur'd by him. And then though the Phyſician preſcribe bitter Medicines, and which are really ſorts of Poiſon, yet they muſt be taken becauſe we experimentally know that theſe poiſons ſtay not in the Body, but drive out ſometimes along with them the corrupt humours which are the cauſe of the diſeaſe. Here it is that Reaſon, or rather Experience, muſt over-rule the Senſes; provided the abhorrence of the recommended Potion be not of a freſh date. For if this Averſion was cotemporary with the diſeaſe, it would rather be a ſymptom of the Medicine's being of the ſame nature with the ill humours that caus'd the diſtemper, and ſo perhaps would but augment and ſtrengthen it.

Nevertheleſs I think it adviſable before we venture upon ſtrong Medicines, and which we are much averſe to, to begin with thoſe that are more gentle and natural: as by drinking a good quantity of water, or taking an eaſie *Emetick*, if we have loſt our appetite, and are not very hard to vomit. *Water* may attenuate the too condens'd humours, and facilitate the circulation of the Blood into all the parts of the Body: and *vomitives* cleanſing the ſtomach, hinder the nouriſhment we take in, from corrupting, and feeding any longer intermittent Feavers. But I ought not to inſiſt upon theſe things. I am therefore of Opinion that we ought to follow the advice of wiſe Phyſicians, who are not too haſty and expeditious, who are not too preſumptuous upon their *Recipe*'s, nor too eaſie to give their *Noſtrums* and Preſcriptions. For where one remedy does a ſick Man good, there are a great many that do him harm. As the ſuffering Perſons are impatient, and as it makes not for the Honour of the *Phyſicians*, nor the profit of the *Apothecary*, to viſit the ſick without preſcribing to them, ſo they viſit too ſeldom, and preſcribe too often. When therefore a Man is ſick, he ought to requeſt of his Phyſician, that he would *hazard* nothing; but follow nature, and ſtrengthen it if he can: he ought to let him know that he has more Reaſon, and Patience, than to take it ill that he viſits him often without giving him relief: For on theſe occaſions he ſometimes does a *great deal*, who does no *miſchief*.

I conclude then that we muſt have recourſe to Phyſicians, and refuſe not to obey them, if we would preſerve our life. For though they cannot be aſſur'd of reſtoring our Health, yet ſometimes they may contribute much to it, by reaſon of the continual experiments, they make upon different Diſeaſes. They know indeed very little, with any exactneſs, yet ſtill they know much more than our ſelves; and provided they will give themſelves the trouble of ſtudying our conſtitution, of carefully obſerving all the ſymptoms of the Diſeaſe, and diligently attending to our own inward *Feeling*; we may hope from them all the Aſſiſtances that we may reaſonably expect from Men.

What we have ſaid of *Phyſicians* may in a manner be apply'd to *Caſuiſts*, whom 'tis abſolutely neceſſary to conſult on ſome occaſions; and commonly uſeful. But it ſometimes happens not only to be moſt uſeleſs, but highly dangerous, to adviſe with them; which I explain and prove.

'Tis commonly ſaid that humane Reaſon is ſubject to Error; but herein there is an equivo-

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cal ſence, which we are not ſufficiently aware of. For it muſt not be imagin'd that the Reaſon which Man conſults is corrupted, or that it ever *miſleads*, when faithfully conſulted. I have ſaid it, and I ſay it again, that none but the Soveraign Reaſon makes us rational: none but the ſupream Truth enlightens us, nor any but God, that ſpeaks clearly, and knows how to inſtruct us. We have but one True Maſter, even JESUS CHRIST our LORD, Eternal WISDOM, the WORD of the Father, in whom are all the Treaſures of Wiſdom, and the Knowledge of God: and 'tis blaſphemy to ſay, this *Univerſal Reaſon*, whereof all Men participate, and by which alone they are reaſonable, is ſubject to Error, and capable of deceiving us. 'Tis not Man's Reaſon but his Heart that betrays him; 'Tis not his Light, but his Darkneſs that hinders him from ſeeing. 'Tis not the Union he has with God, which ſeduces him, nor in one ſence, his Union with the Body: But 'tis the dependance he has on his Body, or rather, 'tis becauſe he will deceive himſelf; and enjoy the *pleaſure* of *judging*, before he has been at the *Pains* of *examining*; 'tis becauſe he will reſt, before he arrives to the place of the Reſt of Truth. I have more exactly explain'd the cauſe of our Errors, in many places of the preceeding Book, and I here ſuppoſe what I there have ſaid.

Which being laid down, I affirm it is needleſs to conſult *Caſuiſts* when it is certain, that Truth ſpeaks to us; which we are ſure it does when Evidence diſplays it ſelf in the anſwers that are made to our *Enquiries*, that is, to the attention of our Mind. Therefore when we retire into our own Breaſt, and in the ſilence of our Senſes, and Paſſions, hear a Voice ſo clear, and intelligible, that we cannot be doubtful of the truth of it, we muſt ſubmit to it, let the World think of us what they pleaſe: We muſt have no regard to cuſtom, nor liſten to our ſecret Inclinations, nor defer too much to the reſolves of thoſe who go for the Learned part of Men. We muſt not give way to be miſguided by the falſe ſhew of a pretended Piety; nor be humbled by the oppoſitions of thoſe who know not the Soul which animates them: but we muſt bear patiently their proud Inſults, without condemning their Intentions, or deſpiſing their Perſons. We muſt, with ſimplicity of heart, rejoice in the Light of Truth, which illuminates us; and though its anſwers condemn us, yet ought we to prefer them, before all the ſubtil Diſtinctions the Imagination invents, for the juſtification of the Paſſions.

Every Man, for Example, that can enter into himſelf, and ſtill the confus'd noiſe of the Senſes and Paſſions, clearly diſcovers that every motion of love, which is given us by God, muſt center upon him, and that God himſelf cannot *diſpenſe* with the obligation we have to love him, in all things. 'Tis evident, that God cannot ſuperſede acting for Himſelf, cannot create, or preſerve our Will, to *will* any thing beſides him, or to *will* any thing but what he wills Himſelf. For I cannot ſee how it is conceivable, that God can will a Creature ſhould have more love for what is leſs lovely, or ſhould love ſoveraignly, as its end, what is not ſupreamly amiable.

I know well that Men who interrogate their *Paſſions*, inſtead of conſulting *Order*, may eaſily imagine that God has no other *rule* of his will than his *will* it ſelf, and that if God obſerves *Order*, 'tis meerly becauſe he *will'd* it, and has made this ſame Order by a Will abſolutely *free* and indifferent. There are thoſe who think there is no Order immutable and neceſſary by its nature: and that the Order or Wiſdom of God, whereby he has made all things, though the firſt of Creatures, is yet it ſelf a Creature, *made* by a Free will of God, and not *begotten* of his ſubſtance by the neceſſity of his Eſſence. But this Opinion which ſhakes all the Foundations of Morality by robbing Order, and the Eternal Laws, depending on it, of their Immutability, and overturns the entire Edifice of the Chriſtian Religion, by diveſting JESUS CHRIST, or the WORD of God, of his Divinity, does not yet ſo perfectly benight the Mind, as to hide from it this Truth: *That God wills Order.* Thus whether the will of God *makes* Order, or *ſuppoſes* it, we clearly ſee when we retire into our ſelves, that the God we worſhip cannot do what plainly appears to us to be contrary to Order. So that Order willing that our Time, or the Duration of our Being, ſhould be for him that preſerves us, that the motion of our Heart ſhould continually tend towards him, who continually impreſſes it in us; that all the Powers of our Souls ſhould labour only for him, by vertue of whom they act. God cannot diſpenſe with the Commandment he gave by *Moſes* in the Law, and repeated by his Son in the
Mark 12. 30. Goſpel, *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy Soul, and with all thy Mind, and with all thy Strength.*

But becauſe Order requires that every Righteous Perſon ſhould be happy, and every Sinner miſerable, that every action conformable to Order, and every Motion of Love to God ſhould be rewarded, and every other contrary to order, or that tends not to him, puniſht: it is evident, that whoever will be happy muſt conſtantly tend towards God; and reject with abhorrence whatever ſtops or retards him in his courſe, or weakens his propenſion to the true good: And for this he need not conſult any *Caſuiſt*; For when God ſpeaks, 'tis fit that Men ſhould be ſilent: and when we are abſolutely certain, that our Senſes, and Paſſions, have no voice in thoſe reſolves we hear, in our moſt ſecret and inward Reaſon, we ought always reſpectfully to attend and ſubmit to them.

Would we be reſolv'd whether we may go to a Ball or a Play: whether we may in Conſcience ſpend a great part of the day in Sports, and vain Converſation, whether certain Converſations, Studies, and Employs, are conformable to our Obligations: Let us retire into our

our ſelves; and huſh our Senſes and Paſſions, and then ſee in the Light of God, whether we can do for him any ſuch action: Let us interrogate him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life, to know if the Road we purſue will not lead us to the Gates of Death: and whether (God being Eſſentially Juſt, and neceſſarily oblig'd to puniſh what is not agreeable to Order, and to reward all conformity to it) we have reaſon to believe we are going to augment, or enſure our Felicity, by the action we intend to do.

If it be our Love to God that leads us to the Ball, let us go: If Heaven is to be gain'd by playing, let us play day and night: If we have in proſpect the Glory of God in our Employment, let us exerciſe it; Let us do all things with Joy, for our Recompence ſhall be great in Heaven. But if after having carefully examin'd our Eſſential Obligations, we clearly diſcover that neither our Being, nor the Time that meaſures it, is at our own diſpoſal, and that we do an unjuſt thing, which it neceſſarily lies upon God to puniſh, when our only ſtudy is how to ſpend our time in Mirth and Pleaſure. If our Lord and Maſter CHRIST, who has purchas'd us by his Blood, reproaches our Infidelity and Ingratitude in a moſt clear and intelligible manner, for living after the Fleſh and the World, for Leading an Effeminate, and Voluptuous Life, and following Opinion and Cuſtom: Let us yield to his Voice, and not harden our Hearts, nor ſeek out ſuch Spiritual Guides, as comfort us under theſe Reproaches, and ſecure us againſt theſe Menaces, and involve in delightful Clouds that Light which ſtrikes, and pierces our very Soul.

When the Blind leads the Blind they both fall into the Ditch, ſays the *Evangeliſt*. But if God excuſes not the blind who commits himſelf to the Conduct of a blind Leader, will he excuſe him who ſeeing clearly will yet willingly be guided by the Blind, becauſe he leads him pleaſantly, and entertains him by the way, according to his Inclinations? Theſe voluntary blind Men ought to know, that God who never deceives, frequently permits theſe Seducers in puniſhment to the corrupt Affections of thoſe that ſeek them. That Blindneſs is a penalty of Sin, though it be often the cauſe of it; and that it is juſt, that he who cared not to hear Eternal Wiſdom, who ſpoke only for his good, ſhould at laſt ſuffer himſelf to be corrupted by Men, whoſe deception is ſo much more dangerous, as their Flatteries are more pleaſing.

'Tis true 'tis no eaſie thing to retire into our ſelves, to ſilence our Senſes, and Paſſions, and to diſtinguiſh the Voice of God, from that of our Body: For we moſt commonly take ſenſible Proofs for evident Reaſons; and on that account it is neceſſary to conſult the *Caſuiſts*. But it is not always needful: for we ſee our duty on many occaſions, with the cleareſt Evidence, and an undoubted certainty. And then it is even dangerous to conſult them, unleſs it be done with the greateſt Sincerity, and by a Spirit of Humility, and Obedience. For theſe diſpoſitions oblige God to prevent our deception, or at leaſt to keep us from deceiving our ſelves in any hurtful manner.

When it is convenient to adviſe with a Spiritual Guide, ſuch an one is to be choſen as underſtands Religion, and reverences the Goſpel, and is acquainted with humane nature. We muſt take heed leſt the converſe of the World has corrupted him, leſt Friendſhip ſhould make him too Gentle and Complaiſant, leſt he ſhould be brib'd by his hopes or fears of us; We muſt chooſe one in a thouſand, ſays St. *Thereſia*, who, as ſhe relates her ſelf, had like to have loſt her way to Heaven, by the means of an Ignorant Guide.

The World is full of Deceivers, I ſay of Well-meaning Deceivers; no leſs than others. Thoſe who love us, ſeduce us by their Complaiſance: Thoſe who are below us, flatter us; out of Reſpect or Fear: Thoſe above us out of Contempt, or negligence, overlook our neceſſities. Beſides, all Men give us Counſel, agreeable to the *Breviates* we give of our own condition, and we never fail to make the beſt of our Caſe, inſenſibly laying our hand upon our ſore when we are aſham'd of it. We often deceive our Counſellours, that we may deceive our ſelves: For we fancy our ſelves ſecure, whilſt we follow their Directions. They do but conduct us whither we deſign'd to go; and yet we would fain perſwade our ſelves, in ſpite of our Light, and the ſecret reproofs of our Reaſon, that 'tis our Obedience which determines us. We ſeduce our ſelves, and God permits us; but we can never deceive him who penetrates the bottom of our Hearts. And though we deafen our ſelves never ſo much to the Voice of Internal Truth, we are ſufficiently made ſenſible by the inward Reproaches, we receive, from the ſupream Truths, leaving us to our ſelves, that it enlightens our Darkneſs, and diſcovers all the Wiles and Stratagems of Self-Love.

'Tis therefore evident, that our Reaſon muſt be conſulted for the Health of our Soul, as our Senſes are to be adviſ'd with for the Health of our Body; and that when the former cannot clearly reſolve us, we muſt apply to the *Caſuiſt*, as we muſt have recourſe to the *Phyſician*, when the latter are defective: But this is to be done with Judgment, ſince *Ignorant Caſuiſts* may murther our Soul, as *Unskilful Phyſicians* may Poiſon our Body.

Whereas I explain not in particular the Rules which may be given about the choice and uſe that's to be made of *Phyſicians* and *Caſuiſts*. I deſire my Sentiments may be candidly interpreted, and that it may not be imagin'd I am againſt drawing all poſſible ſupplies from other Men. I know that a particular Bleſſing attends our ſubmiſſion to the Opinions of the Wiſe and Underſtanding: and I am willing to believe this general Rule, that 'tis requiſite to dy in the uſual Forms, is ſurer for the common ſort of Men; than any I could eſtabliſh for the Preſervation of Life.

But becauſe 'tis of perpetual uſe to retire into our ſelves, to conſult the Goſpel; and to liſten to JESUS CHRIST, whether he ſpeaks immediately to our mind and Heart, or by faith declares himſelf to our Ears and Eyes; I thought I might be allow'd to ſay what I have ſaid. For our Caſuiſts deceive us when they go contrary to the doctrine of our faith and Reaſon. And as we give honour to God by believing that his Works have what is neceſſary to their preſervation, I thought I could make men ſenſible their *machine* was ſo admirably contriv'd, that it's own *Nature* can better furniſh it with what's neceſſary to it's ſafety, than *Science* and even the *Experience* of the ableſt Phyſicians

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THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE THIRD CHAPTER OF THE FIFTH BOOK:

That Love is different from Pleaſure and Joy.

THE Mind commonly confounds things that are very different, when they happen at the ſame time, and are not contrary to each other. As I have ſhown by many Inſtances in this Work; becauſe herein chiefly conſiſt our Errors, in Reſpect of what paſſes within us. Being we have no clear Idea of what conſtitutes the Nature or Eſſence of our Mind, nor of any of the Modifications it can receive, it often falls out, that to our confounding different things, they need but happen in us at the ſame time. For we eaſily confound what we know not, by a clear and diſtinct Idea.

It is not only impoſſible clearly to conceive wherein conſiſts the difference of our Internal Motions; it is even difficult to diſcover any difference between them: for to do this we muſt turn our Eyes inward, and retire into our ſelves; not to conſider them with reference to *Good*, and *Evil*, which we do willingly enough: but to contemplate our ſelves with an abſtract and barren conſideration, which coſts us great trouble, and diſtraction of Thought.

We eaſily conceive, that the *Roundneſs* of a Body differs from its *Motion*; and though we know by Experience, that a Bowl on a plane cannot be preſs'd without being mov'd, and ſo Motion and Roundneſs are found together: yet we uſe not to confound them with one another, becauſe we conceive Motion and Figure by clear and diſtinct Ideas. But 'tis not ſo with *Pleaſure* and *Love*, which we almoſt always confound together. Our Mind grows, as it were, *moveable* by Pleaſure, as a Bowl by it's roundneſs, and becauſe it is never void of an impreſſion towards Good, it immediately puts it ſelf in motion towards the objects which cauſes, or ſeems to cauſe the Pleaſure. So that the Motion of *Love* happening in the Soul at the very time of it's feeling this *pleaſure*, is ſufficient to make her undiſtinguiſh or confound them, becauſe ſhe has no clear Idea of her Love and Pleaſure as ſhe has of Figure and Motion. And for this Reaſon ſome are perſwaded, that *Pleaſure* and *Love* are not different, and that I diſtinguiſh too many things in each of our *Paſſions*.

But that it may clearly appear, that *Pleaſure* and *Love* are two very different things: I divide Pleaſures into two ſorts, the one ſort precedes Reaſon, as are agreeable Senſations, and go commonly by the name of the Pleaſures of the Body. The other ſort neither precede Reaſon, nor the ſenſes, and are generally call'd the Pleaſures of the Soul. Such is the Joy that ariſe in us, in *purſuance* of a clear knowledge or confus'd ſenſation we have of ſome Good, that either does, or ſhall accrue to us.

For Example, a Man in taſting a Fruit, which he does not know, finds pleaſure in eating it, if it be good for nouriſhment. Which is a *preceding* or *preventing* pleaſure; for ſince he feels it before he knows whether the fruit be good, 'tis evident it prevents his Reaſon. An Huntſman when hungry expects to find, or actually finds ſomething Eatable; which gives him an actual ſenſe of Joy. Now this Joy is a Pleaſure which *follows* the knowledge of his preſent or future good.

It is perhaps evident by this diſtinction of Pleaſure into that which *follows*, and that which

prevents

prevents Reaſon; that neither of them but differs from Love. For *preventing* Pleaſure undoubtedly preceds *Love*, ſince it precedes all *Knowledge*, which ſome way or other is always ſuppos'd by Love. On the contrary, *Joy*, or the Pleaſure which *ſuppoſes* foregoing *Knowledge*, preſuppoſes likewiſe *Love*; ſince Joy ſuppoſes either a confus'd Senſation, or a clear Knowledge of the preſent or future Poſſeſſion of what we love: For if we poſſeſs'd a thing for which we have no Love, we ſhould receive no Joy from it. Therefore *Pleaſure* is very different from *Love*, ſince that which *prevents* Reaſon; prevents and *cauſes* Love, and that which *follows* Reaſon, neceſſarily *ſuppoſes* Love; as an Effect ſuppoſes the Cauſe.

Moreover, if Pleaſure and Love were the ſame thing, there could be no Pleaſure without Love, nor Love without Pleaſure; otherwiſe a thing could be without it ſelf. Nevertheleſs a Chriſtian loves his Enemy, and a well-educated Child his Father, though never ſo irrational and unkind. The Sight of their Duty, the Fear of God, the Love of Order and Juſtice cauſes them to love, not only without Pleaſure, but even with a ſort of Horrour, thoſe Perſons that are no ways delightful. I own they ſometimes have the Senſe of Pleaſure or Joy, upon the Reflection, that they perform their Duty; or upon the Hopes of being rewarded as they do deſerve. But beſides, that this Pleaſure is very manifeſtly different from the Love they bear to their Father, and Enemy; though perhaps it may be the Motive of it, it ſometimes is not ſo much as the Motive of their acting; but 'tis only an abſtract View of Order, or a Notion of Fear, which preſerves their Love. In one ſenſe it may be truly ſaid, they have a Love for theſe Perſons, even whilſt they do not think of them. For Love remains in us during the Avocations of Thought, and in Sleep: but I conceive that Pleaſure has no longer a Subſiſtence in the Soul, than ſhe is aware of it. Thus Love or Charity remaining in *us* without Pleaſure or Delectation, cannot be maintain'd to be the very ſame thing.

Since Pleaſure and Pain are two contraries; if *Pleaſure* were the ſame with *Love*, *Pain* would not differ from *Hatred*. But 'tis evident, that Pain is different from Hatred; becauſe it often ſubſiſts without it. A Man, for Inſtance, who is wounded unawares, ſuffers a moſt real and cutting *Pain*, whilſt he is free from *Hatred*. For he knows not even the *Cauſe* of his Pain, or the *Object* of his Hatred, or rather the Cauſe of his Pain not deſerving his Hatred, cannot raiſe it. Thus he hates not that Cauſe of his Pain, though his Pain moves or diſpoſes him to Hatred. 'Tis true, he deſervedly hates Pain; but the Hatred of Pain is not Pain, but ſuppoſes it. Hatred of Pain does not merit our Hatred, as does Pain: for the former is, on the contrary, very agreeable; in that we are pleaſed in Hating it, as we are diſpleaſed in Suffering it. Pain therefore not being Hatred, the Pleaſure which is contrary to Pain is not Love, which is contrary to Hatred, and conſequently the Pleaſnre which is *precedaneous* to Reaſon, is not the ſame thing as Love. I prove likewiſe that Joy, or the Pleaſure which *purſues* Reaſon, is diſtinguiſh'd from Love.

Joy and Sorrow being contraries; if Joy were the ſame thing with Love, Sorrow and Hatred would be all one. But it is evident, that Sorrow differs from Hatred, becauſe it ſometimes has a ſeparate Subſiſtence. A Man, for Example, by chance finds himſelf depriv'd of things that he has need of; this is enough to make him *ſorrowful*: But it cannot provoke him to *Hatred*; Either becauſe he knows not what it was that depriv'd him of this neceſſary thing; or becauſe, being unworthy of his Hatred, it could not excite it. 'Tis true, this Man hates the Privation of the Good which he loves; But it is manifeſt, that this kind of Hatred is really Love: For he hates the *Privation of Good*, meerly becauſe he loves Good; and ſince to *fly* the privation of Good, is to *tend towards* Good; It is evident, that the Motion of his Hatred is not different from that of his Love. Therefore his Hatred, if he have any, being not contrary to his Love, and Sorrow being always contrary to Joy, it is evident, that his Sorrow is not his Hatred: and conſequently Joy is different from Love. *Laſtly*, It is evident, that Sorrow proceeds from the Preſence of ſomething which we hate, or rather from the Abſence of ſomething which we love. Therefore Sorrow ſuppoſes Hatred, or rather Love, but 'tis very different from them both.

I know St. *Auſtin* defines Pain to be an *Averſion the Soul conceives from the Bodies being diſpoſed otherwiſe than ſhe would have it*; and that he often confounds *Delectation* with *Charity*, *Pleaſure* with *Joy*, *Pain* with *Sorrow*; Pleaſure and Joy with Love; Pain and Sorrow, with Averſion or Hatred. But there's great Probability this Holy Father in all this follow'd the common way of ſpeaking of the Vulgar, who confound moſt of thoſe things which occur in them at one and the ſame time: or, it may be, did not examine theſe things in ſo nice and philoſophical a manner as he might have done. Yet I think I both may and ought to ſay, that to me it ſeems neceſſary to diſtinguiſh them, if we would explain our ſelves clearly and without Equivocation upon moſt of the Queſtions handled by him. For even Men of a quite oppoſite Opinion uſe to build upon the Authority of this great Man, becauſe of the various Senſes and Conſtructions his Speech will afford; which is not always nice and accurate enough to reconcile Perſons, who are perhaps more eager to *diſpute*, than deſirous to *agree*.

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THE ILLUSTRATION UPON THE THIRD CHAPTER OF THE SECOND PART OF THE SIXTH BOOK.

Concerning the Efficacy aſcribed to Second Cauſes.

EVER ſince the Tranſgreſſion of our *firſt Parent*, the Mind rambling conſtantly abroad, forgets both it ſelf, and Him who pierces and enlightens it; and is ſo abſurdly pliant to the Seducements of its Body, and thoſe about it, as to imagine its own Happineſs and Perfection is to be found in them. He that alone is able to act in us, is at preſent hidden from our Eyes: His Operations are of an *inſenſible* kind; and though he produces and preſerves all Beings, yet the Mind whilſt the earneſt Enquirer of the Cauſe of all things, cannot eaſily know him, though it meets him every moment. Some Philoſophers chuſe rather to imagine a *Nature* and *particular Faculties*, as the Cauſes of thoſe which we term *natural* Effects, than to render to God all the Honour that is due to his Power. And though they have no Proof, nor even clear Idea of this pretended *Nature* and *Faculties*, as I hope to make appear, they had rather talk without knowing what they ſay, and reverence a purely imaginary Power, than by any Eſſay of Thought to diſcover that *Inviſible* Hand which works all in all things.

'Tis unavoidable for me to believe, that one of the moſt deplorable Conſequences of Original Sin, is our having no *Taſte* nor *Senſe* for Good; or our Incapacity of *Taſting* or *meeting* him without a ſort of Dread and Abhorrence. We ought to *ſee* God in all things, to be *ſenſible* of his Power and Force in all natural Effects; to admire his Wiſdom in the wonderful Order of his Creatures: in a word, to *worſhip*, to *fear*, to *love* Him only in all his Works. But in our preſent State there is a ſecret Oppoſition between Man and GOD; Man, conſcious of his being a Sinner, hides himſelf, flies the Light, and is afraid to meet his Maker; and therefore had rather imagine in ſurrounding Bodies, a blind Power or Nature with which he can be familiar, than find in them the terrible Power of an Holy and Juſt GOD, who knows and operates all in all.

I confeſs there are very many Perſons, who from another Principle than that of the *Heathen* Philoſophers, follow *their* Opinion about *Nature*, and *Second Cauſes*: But I hope to convince them in the Proceſs of this Diſcourſe, that they fall into this Sentiment, out of a *Prejudice* which 'tis impoſſible to ſhake off, without thoſe Succours which are furniſh'd by the Principles of a Philoſophy, that has not always been ſufficiently known. For in all likelyhood, this is what has kept them from declaring for an Opinion, which I think my ſelf oblig'd to eſpouſe.

I have a great many Reaſons which will not let me attribute to *Second* or natural *Cauſes*, a Force, Power, or Efficacy, to produce any thing whatever. The chief whereof is, That this Opinion is to me utterly inconceivable. Though I uſe all poſſible Endeavours to comprehend it, I cannot find in my ſelf the Idea to repreſent to me, what can be that Force or Power aſcrib'd to the Creatures. And I need not fear paſſing a raſh Judgment, in affirming that thoſe who hold that the Creatures are endued with a Force and Power, advance what they do not clearly conceive. For, in ſhort, if the Philoſophers clearly conceive, that *Second Cauſes* have a real Force to act and produce their Like; I being a Man as well as they, and *participating* of the ſame *Sovereign Reaſon*, might in all probability diſcover the Idea which

which represents to them that Force. But, all the efforts that my Mind can make can discover no other *Force*, *Efficacy* or *Power*, than in the *Will* of the Infinitely perfect Being.

Besides, when I think upon the different opinions of *Philosophers* upon this subject, I can no longer doubt of my assertion. For if they see clearly *what* this *Power* of *creatures* is, or what is in them truly powerful, they would agree in their Opinion about it. When men cannot accord, though they have no private Interest to hinder them, 'tis a certain Sign they have no clear Idea of what they say, and that they understand not one another, especially if they dispute on subjects that are not of a complex nature, and of difficult discussion, like this before us. For there would be no difficulty to resolve it, if men had a clear Idea of a created Force or Power. Here then follow some of their Opinions, that we may see how little agreement there is among them.

There are Philosophers who maintain that second Causes act by their *Matter*, *Figure* and *Motion*, and these in one sense are right enough: others by their *substantial form*. Many by *Accidents* or *Qualities*, some by *Matter* and *Form*; others by *Form* and *Accidents*, and others still by certain *vertues*, or *faculties distinct* from all this. There are of them who affirm that the *substantial Form* produces *Forms*; and the *Accidental form*, *Accidents*: others say that the *Forms* produce both other *forms* and *Accidents*: others still, that bare *Accidents* are not only capable of producing *Accidents*, but even *Forms*. But it must not be imagin'd that those for instance, who say, that *accidents* can produce *forms* by vertue of the *form* they are join'd to, understand it the same way. For one part of them will have *accidents* to be the very *Force*, or *Vertue* of the *substantial Form*: another that they imbibe into them the *Influence* of the *Form*, and only act so by vertue of it: a Third lastly will have them to be but *Instrumental* Causes. But neither are these latter sort altogether agreed about what is meant by *Instrumental* Cause, and the vertue they receive from the *Principal*. Nor can the Philosophers compromise about the Action whereby second Causes produce their Effects. For some of them pretend that *Causality* ought not to be produc'd, since it is this which produces. Others will that they truly act by their own Action. But they are involv'd in so many *Labyrinths* in explaining precisely wherein this action consists, and there are so many different opinions about it, that I cannot find in my Heart to recite them.

For the most extraordinary of these Opinions: See *Suarez* Metaphysicks. Disp. 18. Sect. 2. Assert. 2. & 3. Scot. in 4. Sent. Dist. 12. 1. D. 37. 2. D. 17. Paludan. in 4. Sent. D. 12. Q. 1 Art. 1. Perer. 8. Phys. Ch. 3. *Conimbr.* upon *Aristotle's* Physicks, and many others cited by *Suarez*. See *Fonseca's* Metaphys. qu. 13. Sect. 3. and *Soncin.* and *Javell.* upon the same Question.

Such is the strange variety of Opinions, though I have not produc'd those of the Ancient Philosophers, or that were born in very remote Countries. But we have sufficient Reason to conclude, that they are no more agreed upon the subject of second Causes, than those before alledg'd. *Avicenna*, for instance, is of Opinion that *Corporeal Substances* cannot produce any thing but *Accidents*: This, according to *Ruvio*, is his *Hypothesis*. He supposes that God produces immediately a *most* perfect *Spiritual Substance*: that *this* produces another *less perfect*, and *this* a *third*, and so on to the *last*, which produces all *corporeal substances*; and *corporeal substances*, *accidents*. But *Avicembrom* not able to comprehend how *corporeal substances*, which cannot penetrate each other, should cause alterations in them, supposes that there are *Spirits* which are capable of acting on *Bodies*, because they alone can penetrate them. For these Gentlemen not admitting the *Vacuum*, nor the *Atoms* of *Democritus*, nor having sufficient knowledge of the *subtil matter* of *M. des Cartes*, could not with the *Gassendists* and *Cartesians*, think of Bodies which were little enough to insinuate into the pores of those that are hardest, and most solid.

Ruvio lib. 2. Ph. Tract. 4. qu. 2. See *Suarez* Disp. 18. Sect. 1.

Methinks this diversity of Opinions justifies this thought of ours, that Men often talk of things which they understand not; and that the *Power* of Creatures, being a *Fiction* of Mind, of which we have naturally no Idea, every Man makes it, and imagines it what he pleases.

'Tis true, this Power has been acknowledg'd for a Real and True, by most Men in all Ages; but it has never yet been prov'd, I say not *demonstratively*, but in any wise so, as to make an impression upon an Attentive, thinking Man. For the confus'd Proofs which are built only upon the fallacious testimony of the Senses, and Passions, are to be rejected by those who know how to exercise their Reason.

Aristotle, speaking of what they call *Nature*, says it is ridiculous to go about to prove that natural Bodies have an inward Principle of *Motion and Rest*; because says he, it is a thing that's Self-Evident. He likewise does not doubt but a Bowl which strikes another, has the force of putting it in Motion. This is witnessed by his *Eyes*, and that's enough for him, who seldom follows any other testimony than of the Senses, (whilst he examines not his Reason) and is very indifferent whether their Reports be intelligible or not.

Ch. 1. of the second Book of his Physicks.

Those who impugn the Opinion of some Divines, who have written against second Causes, say, like *Aristotle*, that the Senses convince us of their Efficacy: and this is their first and principal proof. 'Tis evident, say they, that the Fire *burns*, that the Sun *shines*, that Water *cools*, and he must be out of his Senses who can doubt of it. The Authors of the other Opinion, says the great *Averroes*, are out of their Wits. We must say almost all the *Peripaticks* use sensible proofs for their Conviction, who deny this Efficacy, and so oblige them to confess we are capable of acting on them, and wounding them. 'Tis a judgment which * *Aristotle* has already pronounc'd against them, and it ought to be put in Execution.

See *Fonseca*, *Suarez*, and others before cited. * Book 1. of his Topicks. C. 1.

But this pretended *Demonstration* cannot but create pity: For it gives us to know the weakness of an humane Mind: and that the *Philosophers* themselves are infinitely more *sensible* than *Reasonable*. It evinces that those who glory in being the Inquirers of Truth, know not even

whom they are to consult to hear any news of it: whether *Soveraign Reason*, which never deceives, but always speaks things as they are in themselves, or the *Body* which speaks only out of Interest, and with reference to the preservation and convenience of Life. For in fine what prejudices will not be justified if we set up our Senses for Judges, to which most of them owe their Birth? As I have shown in *The Search after Truth*.

When I see a Bowl shake another, my *Eyes* tell me, or seem to tell me, that it is the *true cause* of the motion it impresses; for the true cause that moves Bodies, is not visible to my Eyes. But if I interrogate my *Reason*, I evidently see, that Bodies having no power to move themselves, and their *moving force* being nothing but the *Will* of God, which preserves them successively in different places, they cannot communicate a power which they have not, nor could communicate, if they had it. For 'tis plain that there must be Wisdom, and that Infinite, to regulate the communication of motions, with that exactness, Proportion, and uniformity which we see. A Body cannot know that infinite multitude of impuls'd Bodies round about it; and though we should suppose it to have knowledge, yet it would not have enough so proportionably to regulate and distribute, at the instant of protrusion, the *moving force* it self is carried with.

When I open my Eyes, the Sun appears to me splendidly glorious in Light: and it seems not only to be *visible* it self, but to make all the world *so* too. Methinks 'tis he that arrays the Earth with flowers, and enriches it with fruits. That gives life to Animals and striking by His Heat, into the very womb of the Earth, impregnates Her with Stones Marbles and Metalls. But in consulting my Reason I see nothing of all this: and if I faithfully consult it, I plainly discover the *seducement* of my senses, and find that God works all in all. For knowing that all the changes which accrue to Bodies, have no other principle than the different Communications of Motions, which occur in *visible* and *invisible* Bodies: I see that God does all; since 'tis his will that *causes*, and his Wisdom that *regulates* all these Communications.

I suppose that local Motion is the principle of Generations, Corruptions, Alterations, and universally of all the changes incident to the Corporeal World; which is an Opinion sufficiently now receiv'd among *Men of Letters*. But let their Opinion about it be what it will, that matters not much; since it seems much easier to conceive, that a Body *drives* another when it strikes it, than to comprehend how Fire can *produce* Heat and Light, and *educe* from the *power* of *matter* a substance that was not in it before. And if it be necessary to acknowledge that God is the *True Cause* of the different Communications of Motion, by a much stronger reason we should conclude, that none but He can *Create*, and *Annihilate* real Qualities, and substantial forms. I say *create* and *annihilate*: for it seems to me at least as difficult to *educe* from matter a substance that was *not in it*, or to *reduce* it into it again, whilst yet there *nothing* remains of it, as to create it, or *annihilate* it. But I stick not to the terms: and I make use of those, because there are no other that I know of, which express without Obscurity and Ambiguity the changes suppos'd by the Philosophers to arrive every moment by the force of second Causes.

I had some scruple to set down here, the other Arguments which are commonly urg'd, for the Force and Efficacy of natural Causes; For they appear so weak and trifling to those who withstand Prejudices, and prefer their Reason before their Senses, that I can scarce believe, methinks, that Reasonable Men could be perswaded by them. However I produce, and answer them, since there are many Philosophers who urge them.

ARGUMENT I.

If second Causes did not operate, say * *Suarez*, † *Fonseca*, and some others, animate things could not be distinguisht from inanimate, since neither one, nor the other, would have an inward principle of their actions.

* In his Metaph. Disp. 18. Sect. 1. Assert. 1.

† In Metaph. *Arist.* qu. 7. sect. 2.

ANSWER.

I answer, that Men would have the same sensible proofs that have convinc'd them of the distinction they make between things Animate and Inanimate. They would still see Animals do the same actions, as eat, grow, cry, run, bound, *&c.* and would discern nothing like this in Stones: And this one thing makes the vulgar Philosophers believe, that Beasts live, and that Stones do not. For we are not to fancy that they know by a clear and distinct view of Mind, what is the Life of a Dog. 'Tis their Senses which regulate their Decisions upon this Question.

See Book 4. Ch. 11. toward the end, and Book 6. Part 2. Ch. 7.

If it were necessary, I could prove here that the principle of the Life of a Dog differs not from the principle of the motion of a Watch. For the life of Bodies whatever they be, can consist but in the motion of their parts: and we may easily judge that the same *subtil matter*, which causes the Fermentation of the Blood, and Animal Spirits, and which is the principle of his Life, is no perfecter than that which gives motion to the Spring of a Watch, or which causes the gravitation in the Weights of a Clock, which is the principle of their *Life*, or to speak as the rest do of their *Motion*.

It

It behoves the *Peripateticks* to give those whom they stile *Cartesians* a clear idea of what they call the *Life of Beasts*, *Corporeal Soul*, *Body*, *which Perceives*, *and Desires*, *Sees*, *Feels*, *Wills*, and then we shall clearly resolve their Difficulties, if after that they shall persist in raising them.

ARGUMENT II.

It were impossible to discover the Differences, or Powers of the Elements; so that Fire might refrigerate as Water, and nothing would be of a settled and fix'd Nature.

ANSWER.

I answer, That whilst Nature remains as it is, that is to say, whilst the *Laws* of the *Communication* of Motions remain constantly the same; it is a Contradiction, that Fire should not burn, or separate the Parts of certain Bodies. Fire cannot refrigerate like Water, unless it becomes Water; for Fire being only Fewel, whose Parts have been violently agitated, by an invisible surrounding Matter, as is easie to demonstrate; it is impossible its Parts should not communicate some of their Motion to approaching Bodies: now as these *Laws* are constant, the Nature of Fire, its Virtues and Qualities are unchangeable. But this Nature, and these Vertues, are only Consequences of the *general* and *efficacious Will* of GOD, who does all in all things. Therefore the Study of Nature, is in all respects false and vain, when we look for other true Causes than the *Wills* of the ALMIGHTY. See *Ch.* 2. *Book* IV.

I confess that we are not to have recourse to God, or the Universal Cause, when we require the Reason of particular Effects. For we should be ridiculous to assert, for Instance, That GOD dries the Ways, or freezes the Water in the River. We must say, The Air dries the Earth, because it moves, and bears off the Water with it that dilutes it: or that the Air, or the subtil Matter freezes the River in Winter, because at that time it communicates not sufficient Motion to the Parts that constitute the Water. In a word, we must, if we can, assign the *natural* and particular Cause of the Effects propos'd, to Examination. But because the Action of these Causes consists in the moving Force, which actuates them, which *moving Force* is the *Will* of GOD, which creates them; we ought not to say they have in themselves a Force or Power to produce any Effects. And when in Reasoning we are at last arriv'd to a general Effect, of which we seek the Cause; 'tis no good Philosophy to imagine any other than the general. And to feign a *certain Nature*, a *first Moveable*, an *universal Soul*, or some such *Chimera*, whereof we have no clear and distinct Idea, would be to argue like an *Heathen Philosopher*. For Example, when we are ask'd, whence it comes that some Bodies are in motion, or that the agitated Air communicates its Motion to the Water, or rather whence proceeds the mutual Protrusion of Bodies: Motion and its Communication being a general Effect, on which others depend; we cannot answer, I do'nt say like *Christians*, but *Philosophers*, without ascending to the Universal Cause: since 'tis His Will that is the moving Force of Bodies, and that regulates the Communication of their Motions. Had he will'd there should be no new Production in the World, he would not have put its Parts in motion: and if hereafter He shall *will* the Incorruptibility of some of the Beings he had made, he shall cease to *will* the Communication of Motions in point of those Beings.

ARGUMENT III.

'Tis needless to plow, to water, and give several preparatory Dispositions to Bodies, to fit them for what we desire from them. For GOD has no need of preparing the Subjects on which he works. *Suarez* ib.

ANSWER.

I answer; That GOD may do absolutely all he pleases, without finding any Dispositions in the Subjects he works upon. But he cannot do it without a Miracle, or by natural ways; that is, by the general Laws of the Communication of Motions, which he has constituted, and which he almost always follows in his Actings. GOD never multiplies his *Wills* without Reason; but acts always by the *simplest Ways*; and for that Reason he makes use of the *Collision* of Bodies, in giving them Motion. Not that this Collision is absolutely necessary to it, as our Senses tell us, but that being the Occasion of the Communication of Motions, there need be but very few natural Laws to produce all the admirable Effects we see. For by this means we may reduce all the Laws of the Communication of Motions to one: *viz.* That percutient Bodies being considered as but one, at the moment of their Contact, or Collision, the moving Force is divided between them at their Separation, according to the Proportion of their Magnitude. But whereas concurrent Bodies are surrounded with infinite others, which act upon them, by Virtue and Efficacy of this Law; however constant and uniform it be, it produces a World of quite different Communications, because it acts upon infinite Bodies, which are all related to one another. See *Chap.* the last of *The Search.*

It

It is neceſſary to water a Plant to make it grow; becauſe by the Laws of the Communication of Motions, hardly any other than watry Particles can by their Motion, and by reaſon of their Figure, inſinuate, and wind up themſelves into the Fibres of Plants, and by variouſly faſtning and combining together, take the Figure that's neceſſary to their Nouriſhment. The *ſubtil Matter* which is conſtantly flowing from the *Sun*, may, by its agitating the *Water*, lift it into the Plants; but it has not a competent Motion to raiſe groſs *Earthy* Particles. Yet Earth and Air too are neceſſary to the Growth of Plants; Earth to preſerve the Water at their Root, and Air to give this water a moderate Fermentation. But the Action of the Sun, the Air, and Water, conſiſting but in the Motion of their Parts, in proper ſpeaking, GOD is the only Agent. For as I have ſaid, there is none but He that can by the efficacy of his Will, and by the Infinite Extent of his Knowledge cauſe and regulate thoſe infinitely infinite communications of motions, which are made every moment, and in a Proportion infinitely exact, and regular.

ARGUMENT IV.

Can God reſiſt, and Fight againſt Himſelf? Bodies juſtle, ſtrike, and reſiſt one another, therefore God acts not in them, unleſs it be by his concourſe. For if it were he only that produc'd, and preſerv'd motion in Bodies, he would take care to divert them before the Viſion, as knowing well that they are impenetrable. To what purpoſe are Bodies driven to be beaten back again, why muſt they proceed to recoil? or what ſignifies it to produce and Preſerve uſeleſs Motions; Is it not an Abſurdity to ſay that God impugns himſelf, and that He deſtroys his Works, when a Bull fights with a Lyon, when a Wolf devours a ſheep, and a ſheep eats the Graſs which God makes to grow? Therefore there are ſecond cauſes.

ANSWER.

Thus Second Cauſes do all, and God does nothing at all. For God cannot act againſt himſelf, but *Concourſe* is *Action*. The concurring to contrary actions is giving contrary Concourſe, and conſequently doing contrary actions. To concur with the Action of creatures that reſiſt each other, is to act againſt himſelf. To concur to uſeleſs motions, is to act in vain. But God does nothing needleſs or in vain; he does no contrary actions, and therefore concurs not to the action of Creatures that often deſtroy one another, and makes uſeleſs actions and motions. See where this proof of ſecond cauſes leads us. But let us ſee what reaſon ſaies to it.

God *Works* all in every thing, and nothing *reſiſts* him. He works all things, in as much as his Will both makes, and regulates all motions: And nothing *reſiſts* him, becauſe he *does* what ever he *Wills*. But let us ſee how this is to be conceiv'd. Having reſolv'd to produce by the ſimpleſt ways, as moſt conformable to Order that infinite variety of creatures which we admire, he will'd that Bodies ſhould move in a *right* line, becauſe that is the moſt *ſimple*. But Bodies being impenetrable, and their Motions tending in Lines that oppoſe, or interſect one another, they muſt neceſſarily fall foul together, and conſequently ceaſe moving in the ſame manner. God foreſaw this, yet notwithſtanding poſitively will'd the Colliſion, or ſhock of Bodies; not that he's delighted in impugning himſelf, but becauſe he deſign'd to make uſe of this Colliſion as an *Occaſion* for his eſtabliſhing the *general Law* of the communication of Motions; by which he foreſaw he muſt produce an infinite variety of admirable Effects. For I am perſwaded that theſe two natural Laws which are the ſimpleſt of all others: namely, that *All motion tends to make it ſelf in a right line*; and that *in the Colliſion, motions are communicated proportionably to the magnitude of the colliding Bodies*; *are ſufficient to produce ſuch a World as we ſee*: that is, the Heaven and Stars, and Planets, and Comets, Earth, Water, Air, and Fire: In a word, the Elements, and all Unorganiz'd, and inanimate Bodies. For organiz'd Bodies depend on many other natural Laws, which are perfectly unknown. It may be living Bodies are not form'd like others by a determinate number of natural Laws. For there is great probability, they were all form'd at the Creation of the World, and that Time only gives them a neceſſary Growth, to make them Viſible to our Eyes; Nevertheleſs, it is certain, they receive that Growth, by the general Laws of nature, whereby all other Bodies are form'd, which is the Reaſon, that their Increaſe is not always Regular.

I ſay then that God by the *firſt* of natural laws poſitively *wills*, and conſequently *cauſes* the Colliſion of Bodies; and afterwards imploys this Colliſion as an occaſion of eſtabliſhing the *ſecond* natural law; which regulates the communication of Motions; and that thus the actual Colliſion, is the natural, or occaſional Cauſe of the Actual communication of Motions.

If this be well conſider'd, it will be evidently acknowledg'd that nothing can be better order'd. But ſuppoſing that God had not ſo ordain'd it, and that he had diverted Bodies, when ready to encounter, as if there were a *Vacuum* to receive them, Firſt they would not be ſubject to that perpetual Viciſſitude which makes the Beauty of the Univerſe: For the Generation of ſome Bodies is perform'd by the Corruption of Others; and 'tis the contrariety of their Motions which produces their variety. Secondly God would not act in the moſt ſimple manner:

manner: for if Bodies ready to meet ſhould continue on their motion, without touching, they muſt needs deſcribe Lines carv'd in a thouſand different Faſhions; and conſequently different wills muſt be admitted in God to determine their motions. Laſtly, if there were no Uniformity in the action of natural Bodies, and that their motion were not made in a right Line, we ſhould have no certain Principle for our Reaſonings in natural Philoſophy, nor for our conduct in many actions of our life.

'Tis not a diſorder that *Lyons* eat *Wolves*, and that *Wolves* eat *Sheep*, and *Sheep graſs*, of which God has had ſo ſpecial a regard, as to give it all things neceſſary to its preſervation, and likewiſe a Seed for perpetuating it's kind. This proves ſecond cauſes no more, than the Plurality of Cauſes, or contrary principles of Good, and Evil, which the *Manichees* imagin'd to account for theſe effects: But 'tis a certain Sign of the Grandeur, Wiſdom and Magnificence of God. For God does no works unbecoming an infinite Wiſdom, and that munificence he beſtows on them is a manifeſt proof of his Power, and Greatneſs. Whatever is deſtroy'd, is repair'd again by the ſame Law that deſtroy'd it: So great is the Wiſdom, Power and Fecundity of that Law.— God prevents not the deſtruction of Beings by any new Will: not only becauſe the firſt ſuffices to reſtore them; but eſpecially becauſe his Wills are of much greater value than the Reparation of theſe Beings. They are far more valuable than all that they produce. And God had never made this World, ſince not worthy of the Action by which it was produc'd, unleſs he had other proſpects than are known by the Philoſophers, and knew how to honour himſelf in JESUS CHRIST, with an honour which the Creatures are not capable of giving him.

When a Houſe falls, and cruſhes an Honeſt Man to death: a greater Evil happens, than when one Beaſt devours another, or when a Body is forc'd to rebound by the ſhock it receives from the Encounter of another. But God does not multiply his Wills, to redreſs either the true or apparent Diſorders which are the neceſſary Conſequences of natural Laws. God ought not to correct nor change theſe Laws, though they ſometimes produce monſters. He is not to confound the Order, and ſimplicity of his Ways. He muſt neglect mean and little things: I would ſay, he muſt not have particular Wills to produce effects, which are not equivalent to, or worthy of the action of the Producer. God works not *Miracles* ſave when *Order* which he conſtantly follows requires it: which Order requires that he ſhould act by the moſt ſimple ways; and make no exceptions to his general Wills, but when 'tis abſolutely neceſſary to his deſigns, or on particular occaſions, which we are abſolutely ignorant of. Though we are all united to Order, or the Wiſdom of God, yet we know not all the Rules of it. We ſee in it what we ought to do, but we cannot diſcover in it what God ought to will, nor is it our buſineſs to be very ſollicitous to know it.

A great inſtance of what I have ſaid, we have in the Damnation of an infinite number of Perſons, whom God ſuffer'd to periſh in times of Ignorance, and Error: God is infinitely Good: he loves all his Works; he wills that all Men ſhould be ſav'd, and come to the Knowledge of the Truth, for he has made them to injoy him. And yet the greateſt number are damn'd. They live and die in blindneſs, and will remain in it to all Eternity. Comes not this from his acting by the ſimpleſt means, and his following Order? * We have ſhown, that according to Order, God ought not to prevent by Indeliberate Pleaſures the † will of the firſt Man, whoſe Fall has diſorder'd Nature. It was requiſite that all Men ſhould deſcend from one, not only becauſe that is the moſt ſimple way, but for ſeveral too Theological and abſtract Reaſons to be here explain'd. In fine we ought to believe this conformable to the Order which God follows, and to the Wiſdom he always conſults in the intention, and execution of his deſigns. The firſt Man's Sin has produc'd infinite Evils, I confeſs, but certainly Order requir'd that God ſhould permit it, and that he ſhould inſtate Man in a peccable condition.

* See the Illuſtration upon the Fourth Chapter of the ſecond Part concerning Method.

† See the firſt Illuſtration upon the Fifth Chapter.

God minded to repair his laps'd Work, ſeldom gives Victorious Graces that prevail over the malice of the greateſt Sinners. Sometimes he gives Graces uſeleſs to the converſion of the Receiver, though he foreſees their inutility, and ſometimes ſheds them in great Plenty, yet with little effect: Commonly he acts as it were by degrees, giving Men ſecret inſpirations of Self-denial and Repentance, as formerly he gave them Counſels in his Goſpel. Thus he prepares them for the grace of Converſion, and laſt of all beſtows it. Why all theſe round-about Methods and ways indirect? Would it not have been enough for him to have poſitively will'd the Converſion of a Sinner, to have effected it in an efficacious and irreſiſtible manner? But is not it viſible that this proceeds from his acting by the ſimpleſt Methods, and Orders willing it, though we do not always ſee it? For God muſt neceſſarily follow Order, and Wiſdom in his actings; though theſe are Unfathomable Abyſſes to the Mind of Man. There are certain moſt ſimple Laws in the Order of Grace, by which God for the moſt part acts: for this Order has its Rules as well as that of Nature, though we *know* them not, as we *ſee* thoſe of the Communications of Motions. Only let us follow the Counſels which are given us in the Goſpel by him, who perfectly knows the Laws of Grace.

This I ſay to pacify the unjuſt Complaints of Sinners, who deſpiſe the Counſels of JESUS CHRIST, and charge their Malignity and diſorders upon God. They would have God ſhow Miracles in their behalf, and diſpenſe with the general Laws of Grace. They lead their

Life in Pleaſures, they ſeek out for Honours, and daily renew thoſe wounds which ſenſible Objects have given their Brain, and add more to them, and after this expect God ſhould cure them by a Miracle. Not unlike wounded Men, who in the exceſs of their Pain tear their Cloaths, renovate their Wounds, and when in the ſight of approaching Death, complain of the cruelty of their Surgeons. They would have God to ſave them, becauſe ſay they, God is Good, Wiſe, Powerful, and needs but determine it, to make us happy. Why did he make us to damn and deſtroy us? They ought to know that God wills they ſhould be ſav'd, and to that intent has done all that could be done by Order, and Wiſdom, which he conſults. We cannot believe that he deſerts us, whilſt he gives us his own *Son* to be our *Mediator*, and *Sacrifice*. Yes, God is willing that all Mankind ſhould be ſav'd; but by ways that we ought to ſtudy with care, and follow with caution and warineſs. God is not to conſult our Paſſions, in the Execution of his deſigns: he can have no regard but to his Eternal Wiſdom, nor follow any other rule than the Divine Order, which Order will have us imitate JESUS CHRIST, and obey his Counſels, for our Sanctification and Salvation. But if God has not predeſtin'd all Men to be conformable to the Image of his Son who is the Model, and Exemplar of the Elect: 'tis becauſe herein God acts by the moſt ſimple means, with reference to his deſigns, which all make for his Glory: 'Tis becauſe God is an univerſal Cauſe, which ought not to act like particular Cauſes, which have particular *Volitions* for all they do. 'Tis becauſe his *Wiſdom*, which in this reſpect, is an Abyſs to our apprehenſions, wills it ſo. Laſtly, 'tis becauſe this Conduct is more worthy of God than could be any other more favourable for the Reprobate. For even they are condemn'd by an Order as worthy our Adorations, as that whereby the Elect are ſanctified and ſav'd: And nothing but our Ignorance of Order, and our Self-love, make us blame a Conduct which the Angels and Saints eternally admire. But let us return to the proofs of the efficacy of ſecond Cauſes.

ARGUMENT V.

If Bodies had not a certain *Nature* or Force to act with, and if God did all things, there would be nothing but what was *Supernatural*, in the moſt ordinary effects. The diſtinction of *Natural*, and *Supernatural*, which has been ſo well receiv'd in the World, and eſtabliſht by the univerſal approbation of the Learn'd, would be *Chimerical* and Extravagant.

ANSWER.

I anſwer that *diſtinction* is abſurd in the Mouth of *Ariſtotle*, ſince the *Nature* he has eſtabliſh't is a meer *Chimera*. I ſay that diſtinction is not clear in the mouth of the Vulgar part of Men, who judge of things by the Impreſſion they make upon their Senſes. For they know not preciſely what they mean when they ſay, the Fire burns by it's Nature. I ſay that this diſtinction may paſs in the mouth of a Divine, if he means by natural Effects, the conſequences of the General Laws which God has ſettled for the production and preſervation of all things: and by ſupernatural Effects thoſe which are independent from theſe laws. In this ſenſe the *Diſtinction* is *true*. But the Philoſophy of *Ariſtotle* together with the Impreſſion of the ſenſes, makes it, as I think, dangerous, becauſe it may divert from God the too reſpectful admirers of the Opinions of that wretched *Philoſopher*; or ſuch as conſult their ſenſes inſtead of retiring into themſelves to conſult the Truth. And therefore that diſtinction is not to be made uſe of without an Explication, St. *Auſtin* having us'd the word *fortune*, retracted it, though there are few that could be deceiv'd by it. St. *Paul* ſpeaking of meats offer'd to *Idols*, adverтiſes that an Idol is nothing. If the *Nature* of the Heathen Philoſophy be a *fiction*, if that *nature* be *nothing*, it ſhould be precaution'd, for that there are many who are abus'd by it: And more than we ſuppoſe who inconſiderately attribute to it the Works of God, who are taken up with this *Idol* or fiction of the Humane mind, and pay it thoſe Honours which are only due to the *Divinity*. They are willing to let God be author of Miracles, and ſome Extraordinary effects, which in one ſenſe, are *little worthy* of his Greatneſs and Wiſdom, and they refer to the Power of their Imaginary *nature* thoſe conſtant and regular Effects, which none but the Wiſe know how to admire. They ſuppoſe too that this ſo wonderfull diſpoſition which all living Bodies have to preſerve themſelves, and beget their like, is a production of their *Nature*; for according to theſe Philoſophers the *Sun* and *Man* beget a Man.

Lib. 1. *de Retract.*

1 Cor. 10. 19.

We may ſtill diſtinguiſh between ſupernatural and natural Order, ſeveral ways. For we may ſay that the ſupernatural relates to future Goods; that it is eſtabliſh't, upon conſideration of the merits of CHRIST; that it is the firſt and principal in the deſigns of God; and other things enough to preſerve a diſtinction, which they are vainly apprehenſive ſhould fall to the ground.

ARGU-

ARGUMENT VI.

The main proof which is brought by the Philoſophers for the Efficacy of ſecond Cauſes, is drawn from the will and liberty of Man, Man *wills*, and *determines* of himſelf. But to will and determine is to act. 'Tis certainly Man who *commits Sin*, God not being the Author of it, any more than of *Concupiſcence* and Error. Therefore Man acts.

ANSWER.

I have ſufficiently explain'd in ſeveral Places of the Treatiſe about *the Search of Truth*, what is the *Will*, and *Liberty* of Man, and eſpecially in the firſt Chapter of the *firſt Book*, and in the firſt *Illuſtration* upon it; ſo that it is needleſs to repeat it again. I acknowledge Man wills, and determines himſelf, in as much as God cauſes him to Will; inceſſantly carries him towards good, and gives him all the Idea's and Senſations, by which he determines his Impreſſion. I know likewiſe that Man alone commits *Sin*. But I deny that therein he *does* any thing; For *Sin*, *Errour*, and even *Concupiſcence* are *nothing*. I have explain'd my ſelf upon this Point in the *firſt Illuſtration*.

Man wills, but his Volitions are impotent in themſelves; they produce nothing, and God works all notwithſtanding them. For 'tis even God that makes our Will, by the Impreſſion he gives us towards Good. All that Man has from himſelf are * *Errour* and *Sin*, which are *nothing*.

* *Nemo habet de ſuo niſi mendacium & peccatum*, Concil. Araus. 2. Can. 22.

There is a great difference between our Minds and Bodies that are about us; I grant, Our Mind in one ſenſe wills, acts, and determines it ſelf. Our own inward Conſciouſneſs is an evident Conviction. If we were deſtitute of *Liberty*, there could be no future Recompence and Puniſhment, for 'tis our Liberty that makes our Actions *good* or *bad*; and without it Religion would be but a *Phantaſm*, and a Dream. But that which we cannot ſee clearly is, That Bodies have a force of acting. This it is we cannot comprehend, and this we deny, when we deny the Efficacy of *Second Cauſes*.

Even the Mind acts not in that meaſure which is imagin'd. I know that I *will*, and that I will *freely*; I have no Reaſon to doubt of it; which is ſtronger than that *inward feeling* I have of my ſelf. Nor do I deny it, but I deny that my Will is the * true Cauſe of the Motion of my Arm, of the Idea's of my Mind, and of other things which accompany my Volitions. For I ſee no Relation between ſo different things: Nay, I moſt clearly ſee there can be no Analogy between my Will to move my Arm, and the Agitation of ſome little Bodies, whoſe Motion and Figure I do not know, which make choice of certain *nervous Canals*, amongſt a million of others unknown to me, in order to cauſe in me the *Motion* I *deſire*, by a world of *Motions*, which I *deſire* not. I deny that my Will produces in me my Idea's: I cannot ſee how 'tis poſſible it ſhould; for ſince it cannot *act* or *will* without *Knowledge*, it ſuppoſes my Idea's, but does not make them. (Nay, I do not ſo much as know preciſely what an Idea is.) I cannot tell, whether we produce them out of nothing, and ſend them back to the ſame nothing, when we ceaſe to perceive them. I ſpeak after the Notion of ſome Perſons.

* In the Sence explain'd in the Chapter belonging to this Illuſtration.

I produce, you'll ſay, my Idea's by the *Faculty*, which God gives me of *Thinking*. I move my Arm, becauſe of the Union which God has eſtabliſh'd between my Mind and Body. *Faculty*, *Union*, are Logical Terms, of looſe and indeterminate Signification. There is no particular *Being*, nor *Mode* of *Being*, which is either *Faculty* or *Union*. Therefore theſe Terms ought to be explain'd, if, you'll ſay, that the Union of my Mind and Body conſiſts, in God's willing, That, upon my Deſire to move my Arm, the Animal Spirits ſhould betake themſelves to the Muſcles it is compos'd of, to move it in the manner deſir'd: I clearly underſtand this Explication, and receive it: But this is exactly my own Aſſertion. For if my Will determine that of God, 'tis evident, that my Arm is mov'd, not by my Will, which is impotent of it ſelf, but by the Will of God, which never fails of its Effect.

But if it be ſaid, The Union of my Mind and Body conſiſts in God's giving me a * Force to move my Arm, as he has given my Body likewiſe a Force of making me feel Pleaſure and Pain; to the end I may be ſollicitous for this Body, and be concern'd for its Preſervation; certainly this is to ſuppoſe the thing in diſpute, and to make a Circle. No Man has a clear Idea of that Force which the Soul has over the Body, or the Body over the Soul; nor knows very well what he ſays when he poſitively aſſerts it. That Opinion has been embrac'd thro' Prejudice, has been learn'd in Infancy, and in the Age of Senſe. But Underſtanding, Reaſon, and Reflexion have no part in it; which is manifeſt enough from what I have ſaid in the *foregoing Treatiſe*.

* I ſtill mean a true and efficacious Force.

But you'll ſay, I know by my inward *Conſcience* of my Action, that I really have this Force; and therefore am not miſtaken in believing it. I anſwer, That when I move my Arm, I am conſcious to my ſelf of the actual Volition by which I move it; and I erre not in believing I have that Volition. I have an inward Senſe of a certain Effort or *Endeavour*, which accompanies

panies this Volition, and it is to be believ'd that I make this Endeavour. Laſt of all, I grant that * I have an inward feeling of the Motion of my Arm, at the inſtant of this Effort; which ſuppos'd, I agree to what is ſaid, That the Motion of the Arm is perform'd at the inſtant a Man feels this Effort, or has a *practical Volition* of moving his Arm. But I deny that this *Effort*, which is no more than a *Modification*, or Senſation of the Soul, which is given us to make us underſtand our Weakneſs, and to afford us a confus'd and obſcure Senſation of our Strength, can be capable of moving, and determining the Spirits. I deny there is any *Analogy* or Proportion between our *Thoughts*, and the *Motions* of Matter. I deny that the Soul has the leaſt Knowledge of the Animal Spirits, which ſhe imploys to move the Body animated by her. Laſt of all, Though the Soul exactly knew the Animal Spirits, and were capable of moving them, or determining their Motions, yet I deny that with all this ſhe could make choice of theſe *Ductus* of the Nerves, of which ſhe has no Knowledge, ſo as to drive the Spirits into them, and thereby move the Body with that Readineſs, Exactneſs, and Force; as is obſervable even in thoſe who are the leaſt acquainted with the Structure of their Body.

* It ſeems evident to me that the Mind knows not by internal Senſation, or Conſcience, the motion of the Arm ſhe animates. She knows by Conſcience only what ſhe feels, or thinks. By inward Senſation, or Conſcience, we know the ſenſe we have of the motion of our Arm. But Conſcience does not notify the motion of our arm, or the pain we ſuffer in it, any more than the Colours we ſee upon Objects. Or if this will not be granted, I ſay, that inward Senſation is not infallible, for Error is generally found in the Senſations when they are compos'd. I have ſufficiently prov'd it in the firſt Book of the *Search after Truth*.

For ſuppoſing that our Volitions are truly the moving Force of Bodies, (howbeit that ſeems inconceivable) how can we conceive the Soul moves her Body? The *Arm* for Example is mov'd by means of an *inflation* or contraction caus'd by the Spirits in ſome of the Muſcles, that compoſe *it*. But to the end the Motion imprinted by the Soul on the Spirits in the Brain may be communicated to thoſe in the Nerves, and from thence to others in the Muſcles of the Arm, the Volitions of the Soul muſt needs multiply, or change in proportion to thoſe almoſt infinite ſhocks or Colliſions, that are made by the little Bodies that conſtitute the Spirits. But this is inconceivable, without admitting in the Soul, an infinite number of Volitions, upon the leaſt motion of the Body, ſince the moving it would neceſſarily demand an innumerable multitude of Communications of Motions. For in ſhort, the Soul being but a particular Cauſe; and not able to know exactly the degrees of agitation, and the dimenſions of infinite little Corpuſcles, which encounter, upon the diſperſion of the Spirits into the Muſcles; ſhe could not ſettle a general Law for the Communication of theſe Spirits Motion, nor follow it exactly, if ſhe had eſtabliſh't it. Thus it is evident, the Soul could not move her Arm, although ſhe had the power of determining the motion of the animal Spirits. Theſe things are too clear to be longer inſiſted on.

The caſe is the ſame with our *Thinking faculty*. We are inwardly conſcious that we *Will* the *Thinking* on ſomething; that we make an *effort* to that purpoſe, and that in the moment of our *deſire* and *effort*, the Idea of the thing preſents it ſelf to our Mind, but our inward Senſation does not tell us, that our Will or Effort produces our Idea. *Reaſon* does not aſſure us that it's poſſible; and only *prejudice* makes us believe that our *deſires* are the cauſes of our *Ideas*, whilſt we *experiment* an hundred times a day, that the latter accompany or purſue the former. As God and his operations have nothing ſenſible in them, and as we are not conſcious of any thing but our deſires that precede the preſence of our Ideas, ſo we do not think our Ideas can have any other cauſe than theſe deſires. But view the thing cloſely, and we ſhall ſee no force in us to produce them; neither Reaſon nor Conſcience giving us any information thereupon.

I don't think my ſelf oblig'd to tranſcribe all the other proofs employ'd by the patrons for the Efficacy of ſecond Cauſes. Becauſe they ſeem ſo trifling, that I might be thought to deſign to render them ridiculous: and I ſhould make my ſelf *ſo*, if I gave them a ſerious anſwer. An Author, for Example, very gravely aſſerts in behalf of his opinion: *Created Beings are true Material, Formal, Final Cauſes, why muſt not they likewiſe, be Efficient or Efficacious*? I fancy I ſhould give the World little ſatisfaction, if to anſwer this Gentlemans Queſtion, I ſhould ſtand to explain ſo groſs an Ambiguity, and ſhow the difference between an efficacious cauſe and that which the Philoſophers are pleas'd to call material. Therefore I leave ſuch arguments as theſe, to come to thoſe which are drawn from Holy-Writ.

ARGUMENT VII.

The Defenders of the Efficacy of ſecond Cauſes, commonly alledge the following paſſages to
Gen. 1. ſupport their opinion. *Let the Earth bring forth Graſs: Let the waters bring forth the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly*, &c. Therefore the Earth and Water, by the word of God, receiv'd the power of producing Plants, and Animals. Afterwards God commanded the Fowls and Fiſhes to multiply, *Be fruitfull and multiply, and fill the Waters in the Seas, and let fowl multiply in the Earth.* Therefore he gave them a power of begetting their like.

Our Saviour in the fourth Chapter of St. *Mark* ſays, *the ſeed which falls on good ground, brings forth fruit an hundred-fold, and* that the *Earth bringeth forth fruits of her ſelf, firſt the blade, then*

then the Ear, after that the full corn in the Ear. Lastly, it is written in the Book of Wisdom, that the fire had as it were forgotten it's *strength* to burn, in favour of the People of God. It is therefore certain from the old and new Testament, that second Causes have an active Force.

ANSWER.

I answer, that in Holy-Writ there are many passages which ascribe to God the pretended efficacy of second Causes, some of which are these. *I am the Lord that maketh* ALL THINGS, *that stretcheth forth the Heavens* ALONE, *that spreadeth abroad the Earth by MYSELF. Thine hands have made me and fashion'd me* * *together round about.* *I cannot tell how you came into my Womb.*—— *It was not I that form'd the Members of every one of you. But doubtless the Creator of the World who form'd the Generation of Man*, &c. *Seeing he giveth to all Life, and breath, and all things. He causeth Grass to grow for the Cattel, and Herb for the service of Men, that he may bring forth food out of the Earth.* There are infinite such like passages, but let these suffice.

Isa. 44.24. Job 10.8. * Vulg. *totum.* 2 Macc. Ch. 7. v. 22, 23. Acts 17. 25. Psal. 104. 14.

When an Author seems to contradict himself: and natural Equity, or a stronger Reason obliges us to reconcile him to himself; methinks we have an infallible rule to discover his true Opinion. For we need but observe, when he speaks according to his own *Light*, and when after *common opinion*. When a Man accommodates himself to the vulgar way of speaking, that is no sure sign he is of their opinion. But when he says positively the contrary to what Custom authorises, though he say it but once, we have Reason to conclude it his judgement, provided we know he speaks seriously and with mature deliberation.

For instance, when an Author speaking of the properties of Animals, shall say an hundred times over, that *Beasts* have *sense*, that Dogs *know* their Master, that they *love* and *fear* him; and but in two or three places shall affirm that Beasts are insensible, that Dogs are incapable of Knowledge, and that they neither love nor fear any thing; how shall we reconcile this Author to himself? Must we make a Collection of all his passages for and against it; and judge of his opinion by the greater number? If so, I conceive there is no Man to whom, for example, may be attributed this opinion, That *Animals have no Soul.* For even the *Cartesians* most frequently say, that a Dog *feels* when he is *beaten*, and rarely it is that they affirm he does not feel. And although I my self encounter a vast multitude of prejudices in this Treatise, yet many passages may be gather'd from it, by which, unless this present Rule be admitted, it may be prov'd that I confirm them all, and even that I hold the Opinion of the Efficacy of second Causes, which I am now refuting; or it may be it might be concluded that the *Search after Truth* abounds with gross and palpable contradictions, as do some persons who I fear have not Equity, and penetration enough, to set up for judges of the works of others.

Holy Scripture, and Fathers, and most Religious men, speak oftner of sensible goods, Riches, and Honours, in the vulgar opinion, than by the true Ideas they have of them. Our LORD brings in *Abraham* saying to the Wicked Rich Man, *Son, thou hast receiv'd thy GOOD things in thy Life time*; that is to say, Riches and Honour. What we by prejudice call *Good*, our Good, that is Gold and Silver, is stil'd in Scripture, in an hundred places our *Sustenance*, and *Substance*, and even our *honesty*, or that which honours us, *Paupertas & Honestas à Deo sunt.* Must these ways of speaking us'd by the Holy Scripture, and the most religious Persons, make us believe that they contradict themselves, or that Riches and Honours are truly our goods, and worthy our Love and our Researches? No, doubtless; Because the modes of speech, suiting with prejudices, signify nothing: and that we see elsewhere that our SAVIOUR has compar'd Riches to Thorns, has told us, we must renounce them; that they are deceitful, and that all that's great and glorious in the World is an abomination in the sight of God. Therefore we must not heap together the passages of Scripture or the Fathers, to judge of their opinions by the greater number, unless we will attribute to them every moment, the most irrational prejudices in the World.

Eccl. 11. 14.

This being suppos'd, 'tis plain that Holy Scripture says positively, 'tis God that makes all even to the grass of the field, that arrays the Lilies with such ornaments as CHRIST prefers before those of *Solomon* in all his glory. 'Tis not only two or three, but innumerable passages, that attribute to God the pretended efficacy of second Causes; and overthrow the *Nature* of the Peripateticks.

Besides, we are inclin'd as it were by a kind of natural prejudice not to think on God, in ordinary effects. And to attribute force and efficacy to second Causes; for the generality none but miraculous effects can make us think on God as the Author; and the sensible impression engages us in the opinion of second Causes. The *Philosophers* hold this opinion, because, say they, the *Senses* evince it: which is their mightiest Argument. Lastly, this opinion is receiv'd by all that follow the judgment of their senses. The *Language* is accommodated to this *prejudice*, and 'tis as commonly said, That Fire has a power to burn, as that Silver and Gold are a Man's goods. Wherefore those Passages which the Scripture or Fathers afford us for the efficacy of second Causes, prove no more than those; That an Ambitious or Covetous person would

chooſe for the vindication of his Behaviour But we are not to ſay ſo of thoſe Expreſſions that may be brought for the proof of God's working all in all. For ſince this opinion is repugnant to prejudice, the paſſages that aſſert it, are to be interpreted in their utmoſt Rigour: for the ſame reaſon that we are to conclude it the ſentiment of a Carteſian, that Beaſts are Inſenſible, though he ſhould ſay it but now and then, and ſhould conſtantly in common diſcourſe ſay the contrary; as that they feel, ſee, and hear.

In the firſt Chapter *of Geneſis*, God commands the Earth to produce Plants, and Animals, and orders the Waters to bring forth Fiſh, and conſequently ſay the *Peripateticks* the Water and Earth, were indued with a competent *Virtue*, to produce theſe effects.

I cannot ſee the certainty of this concluſion; nor any neceſſity of admitting this conſequence, though we were oblig'd to explain this Chapter by it ſelf, without recourſe to other paſſages of Scripture. This method of expounding the creation, is adapted to our way of conceiving things, and ſo there is no neceſſity of our taking it literally, nor ought we to lay it as a foundation to our prejudices. Since we ſee Animals, and Plants on the Earth, Fowls inhabiting the Air, and Fiſhes living in the Water, God, to let us underſtand, that his order conſtituted them in theſe places, produc'd them therin. From the Earth he form'd Animals, and Plants, not that the Earth was capable of generating, or as if God had to that intent given it a force, and Vertue which it retains till now; (For we are ſufficiently agreed that the Earth does not procreate Horſes and Oxen) but becauſe out of the Earth the Bodies of Animals were form'd, as is ſaid in the following Chapter. — *Out of the ground the* Gen.2.19. *Lord form'd every Beaſt of the field, and every Fowl of the Air.* The Animals were form'd *out of* the ground, (*formatis de humo animantibus*, ſaies the Vulgar Latin) and not produc'd *by* it. Therefore when *Moſes* had related how Beaſts and Fiſh were produc'd by Vertue of the command which God gave the Earth and Water to produce them, he adds that it was *God that made them*, leſt we ſhould attribute their production to the Earth and Water. Ch. 1.21. *And God CREATED great Whales, and* every living Creature *that moveth, which the WATERS BROUGHT FORTH abundantly after their kind, and every winged Fowl after his kind*, and a little lower, after he had ſpoken of the formation of Animals, he adjoyns, *And GOD MADE the Beaſt of the Earth after his kind, and cattel after their kind, and every thing that creepeth on the Earth after his kind.*

But 'tis obſervable, by the way, That what the Vulgar Tranſlates, *Producant aquæ reptile animæ viventis, & volatile ſuper terram*, and our Engliſh, *Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, and fowl that may fly above the earth*, the Hebrew has it *Volatile VOLITET, Let the fowl fly above the earth*: Which diſtinction ſhows, as is evident from the fore-cited paſſage of the next Chapter, that Fowl were not produc'd from the Water, and that it was not *Moſes*'s deſign to prove that the Waters were truly empower'd to produce Fiſh and Fowl, but only to denote the reſpective place deſign'd for each, by the order of God, whether to live, or to be produc'd in; *Et volatile VOLITET ſuper Terram.* For commonly when we ſay that the Earth produces Trees, and Plants, we only mean to ſignifie that it furniſhes Water, and Salts, which are neceſſary to the germination, and increaſe of Seeds. But I dwell no longer on the Explication of theſe Scripture Paſſages, which literally taken, make for Second Cauſes: For we are ſo far from being oblig'd, that it is ſometimes dangerous to take Expreſſions in the *Letter*, which are founded on common Opinion, by which the Language is form'd. For the vulgar part of Men ſpeak of all things according to the Impreſſions of Senſe, and the Prejudices of Infancy.

The ſame Reaſon which conſtrains us to interpret literally ſuch Scripture Paſſages, as directly oppoſe Prejudices, gives us Reaſon to believe the Fathers never deſign'd *ex propoſito*, to maintain the efficacy of Second Cauſes, or the *Nature* of *Ariſtotle*. For though they often ſpeak in a manner that countenances Prejudices, and the Judgments of Senſe, yet they ſometimes ſo explain themſelves, as to manifeſt the diſpoſition of their Mind and Heart. St. *Auſtin*, for inſtance, gives us ſufficiently to underſtand, That he believed the *Will* of God, to be the *Force* and *Nature* of every thing, when he ſpeaks thus, *We are wont to ſay, but not truly, that Prodigies are againſt Nature; For the nature of every Creature being but the Will of the Creator; How can that which is done by the Will of God be contrary to Nature? Miracles therefore and Prodigies are not againſt Nature, but againſt what we know of it.*

Omnia quippe portenta contra naturam dicimus eſſe, ſed non ſunt. Quomodo enim eſt contra naturam, quod Dei ſit voluntate? Cum voluntas tanti utique creatoris conditæ rei cujuſque natura ſit? Portentum ergo fit non contra naturam, ſed contra quàm eſt nota natura. S. Aug. de Civita. Dei. *l.* 21. *c.* 8.

'Tis true, St. *Auſtin* ſpeaks in ſeveral places according to *Prejudices*: But I affirm that that is no Argument; for we are not literally to explain, but thoſe Expreſſions which are contrary to them; for which I have given the Reaſons.

If St. *Auſtin* in his Works, had ſaid nothing againſt the efficacy of Second Cauſes, but had always favour'd this Opinion, his Authority might be made uſe of to confirm it. But if it ſhould not appear that he had induſtriouſly examin'd that Queſtion, we might ſtill have reaſon to think he had no ſettled and reſolv'd Opinion about the Subject, but was, it may be, drawn by the Impreſſion of the Senſes inconſiderately to believe a thing which no man would doubt of, before he had carefully examin'd it.

'Tis

'Tis certain that St. *Auſtin* always ſpeaks of Beaſts, as if they had a Soul, I ſay not a corporeal Soul; for that Holy Father too well knew the diſtinction of the Soul and Body, to think there were corporeal Souls; I ſay a Spiritual Soul, for Matter is incapable of Senſe. And yet it would ſeem, methinks, more reaſonable, to employ the Authority of St. *Auſtin* to prove that Beaſts have not a Soul, than to prove they have. For from the Principles which he has carefully examin'd, and ſtrongly eſtabliſh'd, it manifeſtly follows they have none, as is ſhown by *Ambroſius Victor*, in his Sixth Volume of *Chriſtian Philoſophy*. But the Opinion that Beaſts have a Soul, and are inſenſible of Pain when we ſtrike them, being conſonant to Prejudices, (for there is no Child but believes it;) we have ſtill reaſon to believe that he ſpeaks according to Cuſtom and Vulgar Opinion; and that if he had ſeriouſly examin'd the Queſtion, and once began to doubt and make reflexion, he would never have ſaid a thing ſo contrary to his Principles.

Some of S. *Auſtin*'s Principles are theſe. What has never ſinned, can not ſuffer evil. But according to him, Pain is the greateſt Evil, and Beaſts ſuffer it. That the more Noble cannot have the leſs Noble for its end. But with him the Soul of Beaſts is Spiritual, and more noble than the Body, and yet has no other End. That what is Spiritual is Immortal, yet the Soul of Beaſts, though Spiritual, is ſubject to death. Many ſuch like Principles there are in his Works, whereby it may be concluded, That Beaſts have no ſuch Spiritual Soul as he admits in them.

And thus, though all the Fathers had conſtantly favour'd the Efficacy of Second Cauſes, yet, it may be, no regard were due to their Opinion, unleſs it appear'd that they had carefully Examin'd the Queſtion, and that their Aſſertions, were not the reſults of common Speech, which is form'd and founded upon Prejudices. But the caſe is certainly quite contrary; for the Fathers, and ſuch as were moſt Holy, and beſt acquainted with Religion, have commonly manifeſted in ſome places or other of their Works, what was their Diſpoſition of Mind and Heart, in reference to the preſent Queſtion.

The moſt Underſtanding, and indeed the greateſt number of Divines, ſeeing that on one hand the Holy Scripture was repugnant to the Efficacy of Second Cauſes, and on the other, that the Impreſſion of the Senſes, the publick Vote, and eſpecially *Ariſtotle*'s Philoſophy, which was had in veneration by the Learned, eſtabliſht it: For *Ariſtotle* believ'd God unconcern'd in the particulars of Sublunary Tranſactions; That that charge was below his Majeſty, and that *Nature* which he ſuppoſes in all Bodies, ſuffic'd to produce all that was done below. The Divines, I ſay, have ſo equally balanc'd theſe Two, as to reconcile *Faith* with *Heathen Philoſophy*, *Reaſon* with *Senſe*, and to make Second Cauſes *ineffective* without the additional *concourſe* of God Almighty. But becauſe that immediate *concourſe*, whereby God acts jointly with Second Cauſes includes great difficulties, ſome Philoſophers have rejected it, pretending that in order to their acting, there needs no more than that God ſhould continue to them their Vertue he endow'd them with in their Creation. And ſince this Opinion is exactly agreeable with Prejudice, becauſe of the inſenſible Operation of God, in Second Cauſes, it is commonly embrac'd by the vulgar ſort of Men, and ſuch as have more ſtudied ancient *Naturaliſts* and *Phyſicians*, than *Theology* and *Truth*. Moſt are of Opinion that God created all things at firſt, and gave them all the Qualities and Faculties that were neceſſary to their preſervation; that he has, for example, given the firſt motion to Matter, and left it afterwards to it ſelf, to produce, by the communication of its motions, that admirable variety of Forms we ſee. 'Tis ordinarily ſuppos'd that Bodies can move one another; and this is ſaid to be Mr. *des Cartes*'s Opinion, though he ſpeaks expreſly againſt it, in the *Thirty Sixth* and *Seventh* Articles of the Second Part of his *Philoſophical Principles*. Since Men muſt unavoidably acknowledge that the Creatures depend on God, they leſſen and abridge, as much as poſſible, that dependance, whether out of a ſecret averſion to God, or a ſtrange and wretched ſtupidity and inſenſibility to his Operation. But whereas this Opinion is receiv'd but by thoſe who have not much ſtudied Religion, and have preferr'd their *Senſes* to their *Reaſon*, and *Ariſtotle*'s Authority to that of *Holy Writ*, we have no reaſon to fear its making way into the mind of thoſe, who have any love for Truth and Religion; for provided a Man ſeriouſly examin'd it, he muſt needs diſcover its falſity. But the Opinion of God's immediate concourſe to every Action of Second Cauſes, ſeems to accord with thoſe Paſſages of Scripture, which often attribute the ſame effect, both to GOD and the Creature.

We muſt conſider then, that there are places in Sripture, where 'tis ſaid that God is the only Agent: *Ego ſum Dominus*, ſays Iſaiah, *faciens OMNIA, Extendens cœlos SOLUS, ſtabiliens Terram*, & *NULLUS Mecum*. A Mother animated with the Spirit of God, tells her Children, it was not her that form'd them, *Neſcio qualiter in utero meo apparuiſtis, ſingulorum membra NON EGO IPSA COMPEGI, ſed mundi creator*. She does not ſay with *Ariſtotle*, and the School of the Peripateticks that to her, and the Sun, they ow'd their Birth; but to the Creator of the Univerſe. Which Opinion that God only works, and forms Children in their mothers womb, not being conformable to Prejudice and Common Opinion; Theſe ſentences according to the pre-eſtabliſht Principle, muſt be explain'd in their litteral ſenſe. But on the contrary, the notion of ſecond Cauſes falling in with the vulgar opinion, and being Suited to the ſenſible impreſſion; the paſſages which expreſly make for the ſeparate efficacy of ſecond Cauſes, muſt be reckon'd invalid when compar'd with the former

Ch. 44. 24.
2 Mac. 7. 22, & 23.
Sol & homo generant hominem. Ariſt. Phy. Auſc. l. 2. c. 2.
See St. *Th.* upon the Text.

former in *Concourſe* therefore is ſufficient to reconcile the different Texts of Scripture; and all Force, Power and Efficacy muſt be aſcrib'd to God.

But though the immediate concurrence of God with ſecond Cauſes, were fit to accommodate the diſagreeing paſſages of holy Writ, yet after all it is a queſtion whether it ought to be admitted. For the Sacred Books were not compos'd for the Theologiſts of theſe times, but for the people of the *Jews*. So that if this people had not underſtanding, or Subtilty enough, to imagine a *Concourſe*, ſuch as is admitted in *School-divinity*, and to agree to a thing which the greateſt Divines are hard put to, to explain, it follows, if I miſtake not, that the Holy Scripture which attributes to God, and even to God alone, the production and preſervation of all things, would have betray'd them into Error. And the Holy Pen-Man had ſtood chargeable with writing not only in an unintelligible, but deceitful Language. For in ſaying that God work'd all, they would have deſign'd no more than that God aſſiſted to all things with his concourſe, which was not probably ſo much as thought on by the Jews; Thoſe amongſt them, who were not very great Philoſophers, believing, that God work'd all, and not that he *concurr'd* to all.

But that we may paſs a more certain judgement about this concourſe, it would be requiſite to explain with care the different Hypotheſes of the School-men upon it. For beſides, thoſe impenetrable clouds, and obſcurities which involve all the opinions, that cannot be explain'd and defended without looſe and indefinite terms; there are upon this Matter ſo great a variety of Opinions, that it would be no hard matter to diſcover the cauſe of them. But I deſign not to engage in a diſcuſſion that would be ſo wearifom to my ſelf as well as the greateſt part of Readers: On the contrary, I had rather try to ſhow that my opinions may in ſome thing accord with thoſe of the greater number of Scholaſtick Divines, though I cannot but ſay their Language looks very ambiguous and confus'd. To explain my ſelf:

I am of opinion, as I have ſaid elſewhere, that Bodies for example have no Force to move themſelves, and that therefore their moving force is nothing but the action of God; or not to make uſe of a Term which has no diſtinct import, their moving force is nothing but the *Will* of God, alwaies neceſſarily efficacious, which *ſucceſſively* preſerves them in different Places. For I believe not that God creates any particular Beings, to make the moving force of Bodies; not only becauſe I have no Idea of ſuch a kind of Being, nor ſee how they could move Bodies: but alſo becauſe theſe Beings themſelves would have need of others to move them, and ſo *in infinitum*. For none but God is truely *Immoveable*, and *Mover* alltogether.

Which being ſo; when a Body ſtrikes, and moves another, I may ſay that it acts by the concurrence of God, and that this concurrence is not diſtinct from its own action. For a Body meeting another moves it, by its action, or its *moving force*, which at bottom is nothing but the *will* of God preſerving the Body ſucceſſively in different Places, the tranſlation of a Body being not it's *action*, or *moving force*, but the *Effect* of it. Almoſt all Divines ſay too, that the action of ſecond Cauſes is not different from that of God's concurrence with them. For though they have a various meaning, yet they ſuppoſe that God acts in the creatures by the ſame action as the creatures. And they are oblig'd, if I miſtake not, thus to ſpeak: For if the creatures acted by an action which God work'd not in them, their action, conſider'd as ſuch, would, no doubt, be *independent*. But they acknowledge, as it becomes them, that the creatures depend immediately on God, not only as to their *Being*, but likewiſe as to their *operation*.

So likewiſe, in point of free Cauſes, I believe that God inceſſantly gives the Mind an Impreſſion towards Good in general, and that he moreover determines this Impreſſion towards particular Goods, by the *Idea's* or *Senſations* that he gives us, as I have explain'd in the firſt Illuſtration; which is the ſame with what the Divines intend, by affirming, That God *moves*, and *prevents* our Wills. Thus the Force which puts our Minds in motion, is the Will of God, which animates us, and inclines us towards Good. For God creates not Beings to conſtitute the moving force of Minds, for the ſame Reaſon that he creates none to be the moving force of Bodies. The Wills of God being of themſelves efficacious, He need but *Will*, to *do*. And we ought not to multiply Beings without neceſſity. Beſides, whatever is real in the determinations of our Motions, proceeds likewiſe from the Action of God in us, as appears from the firſt Elucidation. But all we act or produce, is by our Wills, that is, by the impreſſion of the Will of God, which is our moving force. For our Wills are efficacious no farther than they are of God, as mov'd Bodies impell not others, but in as much as they have a moving force that tranſlates them; which is no other than the Will of God, which creates or preſerves them ſucceſſively in different places. Therefore we act no otherwiſe than by the *concourſe* of God; and our action conſider'd as efficacious, and capable of producing any effect, differs not from his, but is, as ſay moſt Divines, the ſelf ſame Action, *eadem numero actio*.

V. Suarez *l.*1. *de concurſu Dei cum voluntate.*

Now all the Changes which arrive in the World have no other natural Cauſe, than the *Motions* of Bodies, and *Volitions* of Minds. For, *Firſt*, by the general Laws of the Communications of Motions, the inviſible Bodies which ſurround the viſible, produce, by their various Motions, all theſe divers Changes, whoſe *Cauſe* is not *apparent*. And, *Secondly*, by the Laws of Union of our Soul and Body, when circumambient Bodies act upon our own, they produce in our Soul a multiplicity of *Senſations*, *Idea's*, and *Paſſions*. *Thirdly*, Our Mind, by its

its Volitions, produces in it ſelf infinite *different Idea's*; for they are our Volitions, which as natural Cauſes intend, and modifie our Mind: Their Efficacy, nevertheleſs, proceeds from the Laws which God has eſtabliſht. And, *Laſtly*, when our Soul acts upon our Body, ſhe produces *ſeveral Changes* in it, by vertue of the Laws of her union with it; and by means of our Body ſhe effects in thoſe about it *abundance of Changes*, by vertue of the Laws of communication of Motions. So that the *Motions* of Bodies and the *Volitions* of Minds, are the only natural, or occaſional Cauſes of natural Effects, which no Man will deny who uſes any Attention; ſuppoſing only, he be not prepoſſeſt by thoſe who underſtand not what they ſay, who fancy perpetually to themſelves ſuch Beings as they have no clear Idea's of, and who offer to explain things which they do not underſtand, by others abſolutely incomprehenſible. Thus having ſhown that God by his *concourſe*, or rather by his *efficacious Will*, performs whatever is done by the Motions of Bodies, and the Wills of Minds, as natural or occaſional Cauſes, it appears that God does every thing by the ſame Action of the Creature. Not that the Creatures have of themſelves any efficacious Action, but that the Power of God is in a manner communicated to them, by the natural Laws which God has eſtabliſht on their account.

This then is all that I can do to reconcile my Thoughts to the Opinion of thoſe Divines, who defend the neceſſity of immediate Concourſe, and hold that God does All in all things by an Action no ways differing from the Creatures. For, as to the reſt of the Divines, I think their Opinions utterly indefenſible, and eſpecially that of *Durandus*, together with the Sentiment of ſome of the *Ancients*, refuted by St. *Auſtin*, who abſolutely denied the neceſſity of God's Concurrence, pretending, that Second Cauſes did all things by the Power which God in their Creation gave them. For though this Opinion be leſs intricate and perplex'd, than that of other Divines, yet to me it ſeems ſo repugnant to Scripture, and ſo ſuitable to Prejudices, to ſay no worſe of it, that I think it altogether unwarrantable.

Durand. in 2 diſt. *Qu.* 5. & *Diſt.* 37. *De Geneſi ad literam* l. 5. c. 20.

I confeſs that the School-Men, who make God's immediate concourſe to be the ſame Action with that of the Creatures, do not perfectly agree with my Explication; and all thoſe that I have read, except *Biel* and Cardinal *d' Ailly*, are of Opinion, That the Efficacy which produces Effects proceeds from the Second Cauſe as well as the Firſt. But as I make it indiſpenſable for me to ſpeak nothing but what I clearly conceive, and always to take the ſide that beſt comports with Religion, I think I am not liable to blame, for deſerting an Opinion which to many Men ſeems ſtill more inconceivable, as they ſtrive more to comprehend it; and for eſtabliſhing another, which agrees perfectly not only with *Reaſon*, but alſo with the Sacredneſs of our *Religion*, and *Chriſtian Morality*, which is a Truth already prov'd in the Chapter that's the Subject of theſe Reflexions. However, 'tis not inconvenient to ſay ſomething to it, that I may fully verifie what I have ſaid upon the preſent Queſtion.

In 4 Sent. Diſt. 1. *q.* 1. *De Aliaco ibid.*

Both Reaſon and Religion evince, That God will be Lord, and rever'd by his Creatures: *Lord* as *Good*, and *Rever'd* as *Power*. Which is ſuch a Truth as it would be Impiety and Madneſs to doubt of. To love God, as he requires and deſerves, we muſt, according to the Firſt Commandment, both of the *Law* and *Goſpel*, and by *Reaſon* it ſelf, as I have * ſomewhere ſhown, love Him with all our *Strength*, or with the whole extent of our Loving Capacity. 'Tis not ſufficient to prefer Him *before* all things, unleſs we moreover love Him *in* all things. For otherwiſe our Love is not ſo perfect as it ought to be, and we return not to God all the Love that he gives us, and gives us only for Himſelf, in whom every one of His Actions center.

* *Book* 4. *c.* 1.

So to render to God all the Reverence that is due to Him; 'tis not enough to adore Him, as the Supreme Power, and fear Him more than His Creatures; we muſt likewiſe fear and adore Him in all His Creatures; all our reſpects muſt perpetually tend towards Him, to whom alone *Honour* and *Glory* are to be aſcrib'd: Which is what God commands us in theſe Words: *Thou ſhalt love the Lord thy God, with all thy Heart, and with all thy Soul, and with all thy Strength.* And in theſe: *Thou ſhalt fear the Lord thy God, and Him only ſhalt thou ſerve.* Thus the Philoſophy that convinces us that the *Efficacy* of Second Cauſes is a *Fiction* of the Mind, that the *Nature* of *Ariſtotle*, and ſome other Philoſophers, is a *Chimera*, that none but God is ſtrong and powerful enough, not only to act on our Soul, but even to give the leaſt Motion to Matter. This Philoſophy, I ſay, perfectly accommodates with Religion, whoſe end is to unite us to God in the ſtricteſt Bonds.

Deut. c. 6.

'Tis cuſtomary with us to *Love* only thoſe things which are capable of doing us ſome *Good*. This Philoſophy therefore Authoriſes only the Love of God, and condemns the Love of every thing elſe. We ought to *fear* nothing but what is able to do us ſome *Evil*. Therefore this Philoſophy approves the fear of God, and condemns all other: Thus it juſtifies all the juſt and reaſonable Motions of our Soul, and condemns all thoſe that are contrary to Reaſon and Religion: For we can never juſtifie the love of Riches, the deſire of Greatneſs, the extravagance of Debauchery by this Philoſophy, by the Principles whereof, the Love for Bodies is abſurd and ridiculous.

'Tis an indiſputable Truth, 'tis a natural Opinion, 'tis even a common notion that we ought to Love the cauſe of our Pleaſure, and to love it proportionably to the Felicity it either actually does, or is able to poſſeſs us with. 'Tis not only *juſt*, but as it were *neceſſary* that the cauſe of our happineſs, ſhould be the object of our Love. Therefore this Philoſophy

will teach us to Love God only, as being the only Cauſe of our Felicity: That ſurrounding Bodies cannot act upon that we animate; and conſequently much leſs upon our Mind. That 'tis not the Sun which enlightens us, and gives us life and Motion: nor that fills the Earth with Fruits, and beautifies it with Flowers, and ſupplies us with Food and Nouriſhment. This Philoſophy ſeconding the Scripture, * teaches that 'tis God alone who gives us Rain, and Regulates *the Seaſons, that fills our Bodies with Food, and our hearts with Joy, that he alone is able to do us good, and thereby has given a perpetual teſtimony of what he is; though in the ages paſſed he ſuffer'd all nations to walk in their own ways.* According to the language of this Philoſophy, we muſt not ſay that 'tis nature that fills us with good; nor that it is * God and Nature together: but that it is God alone, ſpeaking thus without ambiguity, for fear of deceiving the Ignorant. For we muſt diſtinctly acknowledge one cauſe of our happineſs, if we will make it the only object of our Love.

*Acts 14. 15, 16.

Ergo nihil agis, ingratiſſime mortalium, qui te negas Deo debere, ſed naturæ: quia nec naturæ ſine Deo eſt, nec Deus ſine natura, ſed idem eſt utrumque, nec diſtat. Officium ſi quod a Seneca accepiſſes, Annæo diceres te debere, vel Lucio: non creditorem mutares, ſed nomen. Sen. l. 4. de Benef.

'Tis likewiſe an undeniable Truth, That we ought to fear things that are able to harm us, and to fear them, in proportion to the Evil they can do us. But this Philoſophy teaches us that God only can do us evil; that 'tis he, as ſays Iſaiah, *who forms the Light and creates darkneſs, who makes peace and creates Evil; and there is no Evil but what he does*, as ſays the Prophet *Amos*. Therefore it is he only that is to be fear'd. We muſt not fear either Plague or War, or Famine, or our Enemies, or even Devils themſelves: but God alone. We ought to ſhun the Sword, when we ſee a Blow a coming, we are to fly the Fire, and avoid a ruinous Houſe that's ready to cruſh us; but we muſt not fear theſe things. We may fly from thoſe Bodies which are the occaſional or natural Cauſes of Evil, but we muſt fear God as the true cauſe of all the misfortunes of Sinners; and hate only Sin which neceſſarily provokes the cauſe of our Happineſs to become the cauſe of our Miſery: In a Word all the motions of our mind, muſt center upon God, ſince he alone's above it, and the motions of our Body may relate to the Bodies round it. This is what we learn from that Philoſophy that admits not the Efficacy of ſecond Cauſes.

Iſa. 45. 7. Amos 3. 6.

But this Efficacy being ſuppos'd, I cannot ſee but we have reaſon to fear and love Bodies; and that to regulate our Love by Reaſon, we need but prefer God before all things; the *Firſt* and *univerſal*, to every *Second* and *Particular* Cauſe. We can ſee no need of loving him with all our Strength; *Ex totâ mente, ex toto corde, ex totâ animâ, ex totis viribus*, as ſays the Scripture.

Yet when a Man contents himſelf in preferring God to all things, and adoring him with a Worſhip, and a Love of Preference, without making a continual Effort to love and honour him in all things: it often fortunes that he deceives himſelf, that his Charity vaniſhes, and is loſt: and that he is more taken up with *ſenſible* than the *ſupream Good*. For ſhould it be demanded of the greateſt Sinners, and even Idolaters, whether they preferr'd the univerſal to particular Cauſes, they would make no ſcruple to anſwer amidſt their Debauches, Errours and Extravagance; that they are not wanting to their eſſential Duty, and that they are very ſenſible of what they owe to God. 'Tis acknowledg'd that they are deceiv'd. But take away the Efficacy of Second Cauſes, and they have no probable Pretext left to juſtifie their Conduct and Behaviour; whilſt if it be granted them, they will think and diſcourſe with themſelves in the following manner, when blinded by their Paſſions, and attentive to the Teſtimony of their Senſes.

" I am made for Happineſs: neither can I, nor indeed ought I, to ſuperſede my Love and " Reſpect, for whatever can be the Cauſe of my Felicity: Why then muſt not I love and reſpect " ſenſible Objects, if they be the true Cauſes of the Happineſs I find in their Enjoyment? I ac- " knowledge the Sovereign Being as only worthy of Sovereign Worſhip, and I prefer Him " before all the World. But ſince I ſee not that He requires any thing from me, I enjoy the " Goods he affords by Means of Second Cauſes, to which he has ſubjected me: and I pay not " my Gratitude to him, which perhaps would be to his Diſhonour. As he gives me no Bleſ- " ſing, immediately and by himſelf, or at leaſt without the Aſſiſtance of his Creatures, 'tis a " Sign he requires not the immediate Application of my Mind and Heart; at leaſt, that " he deſires the Creatures ſhould partake with him, in the Acknowledgments and Re- " ſentments of my Heart and Mind, ſeeing he has communicated Part of his Power and Glo- " ry to the Sun, has environ'd him with Splendour and Majeſty, and has given him the Su- " premacy in all his Works; and ſeeing from the Influence of this great Luminary, we receive " all the neceſſary Bleſſings of Life; Why ſhould we not employ a part of this indebted " Life, in rejoicing in his Light, and teſtifying the Senſe we have of his Greatneſs and his " Benefits? Would it not be the moſt ſhameful Ingratitude, to receive from that excellent " Creature abundance of all things, and yet to ſhew no Senſe of Gratitude to him for them? " And ſhould we not be unſpeakably blind-and ſtupid, to be unmov'd with Fear and Vene- " ration in Reſpect of him, whoſe Abſence freezes us to death, and whoſe too near Ap- " proach can burn and deſtroy us? I ſay it again, that God is preferable to all things, and infi- " nitely more eſtimable than his Creatures: but we are to fear and love his Creatures alſo. For

" hereby

" hereby we pay legitimate Honour to their Creatour; merit his good Graces, and oblige " him to ſhower new Benefits upon us. 'Tis manifeſt, he approves of the Honour that is gi- " ven to his Creatures; ſince they partake of his Power, and all Power deſerves to be ho- " nour'd. But becauſe Honour ought to be proportion'd to Power, and that the Power of " the Sun, and all other ſenſible Objects, is ſuch, as derives to us all ſorts of Goods, 'tis rea- " ſonable we ſhould honour them with all our Strength, and, next to God, conſecrate to " them all our Being.

Theſe are the natural Reaſonings a Man would fall into, that ſhould ground upon the Preju- dice of the Efficacy of Second Cauſes; and probably ſuch was the Arguing of the firſt Founders of *Idolatry*. Take here his Senſe of it, who paſſes for the moſt Learned of all the *Jews*: He prefaces a Treatiſe he wrote about *Idolatry* with theſe Words. " *In the days of* Enos *Men fell* " *into ſtrange Illuſions, and the Wiſe Men of that Age quite loſt their Senſe and Reaſon.* Enos " *himſelf was one of thoſe deluded Perſons, whoſe Errours were theſe. Since God, ſaid they, has created* " *the Heavens and Stars to govern the World, has conſtituted them on high, and inveſted them* " *with Glory and Luſtre, and employs them in executing his Commands, 'tis juſt that we ſhould ho-* " *nour them, and pay them our Deference and Homage. 'Tis the Will of our God, that Honour* " *ſhould be given to thoſe whom he has exalted and enthron'd in Glory; as a Prince requires that his* " *Miniſters ſhould be honour'd in his Preſence, becauſe the Honour which is given to them redounds* " *to himſelf. When once this Notion had entred their Head, they fell to building Temples in Honour* " *of the Stars, gave them Sacrifice and Praiſes, and even proſtrated themſelves before them; there-* " *by imagining to purchaſe the favour of Him that created them: And this was the Original of* " *Idolatry.* *R. Moſes Maimonid.* Vide *Voſſium*, lib. 2. *de Idololatria.*

It is ſo natural and juſt to have grateful reſentments in proportion to the Goods we re- ceive, that almoſt all Nations have ador'd the Sun, becauſe they all concluded him the Cauſe of the Bleſſings they enjoy'd. And if the *Ægyptians* ador'd not only the *Sun* and *Moon*, and River *Nile*, becauſe its overflowing caus'd the Fertility of their Country, but even the vileſt of *Animals*: 'twas (as *Cicero* relates) from the Emolument they receiv'd from them. Therefore, as we cannot, and indeed ought not to extirpate from Men's minds, their natu- ral Inclination for the true Cauſes of their Happineſs, 'tis evident there is at leaſt ſome dan- ger in aſcribing Efficacy to Second Cauſes, though we conjoyn the neceſſity of an immediate *concourſe*, which has, methinks, I know not what of incomprehenſible purport, and which ſtrikes in as an after-game to juſtifie our imbib'd Prejudices, and *Ariſtotle*'s Philoſophy.

Ipſi qui irridentur Ægyptii, nullam belluam niſi ob aliquam utilitatem quam ex ea caperent, conſecraverant. Cic. l. 1. *de Natura Deorum.*

But there's no danger in ſpeaking only what we ſee, and of attributing only to God Efficacy and Power, ſince we ſee nothing but His Wills, which have an abſolutely neceſſary and indi- ſpenſible connexion with natural Effects. I own that now adays, Men are wiſe enough to avoid thoſe groſs Errors of Heathens and Idolaters; but I fear not to ſay, our Mind is ſtill diſpos'd, or rather our Heart is often bent like that of the Heathens; and that there will ever be in the World ſome kind of Idolatry, until the day in which JESUS CHRIST ſhall reſtore up His Kingdom to God His Father, having firſt deſtroy'd all Empire, Dominion and Power, that God may be All in all. For is it not a kind of Idolatry, to make a God of ones Belly, as ſpeaks S. *Paul?* * Is not he an Idolater to the God of Riches, who labours night and day to acquire them? Is this to render to God the Worſhip we owe Him? Is this to adore Him in Spirit and in Truth, to have our Hearts fill'd with ſome ſenſible Beauty, and our Mind ſtruck and dazled with the luſtre of ſome imaginary Grandeur?

Phil. 3. 9. * No Whoremonger nor unclean Perſon, nor covetous Man, who is an Idolater, *Eph.* 5. 5. † They that Worſhip him, muſt Worſhip him in Spirit and in Truth, *Joh.* 4.24.

Men fancying to themſelves, that circumambient Bodies afford the pleaſures they enjoy in the uſe of them, unite to them with all the Powers of their Soul; and thus the Principle of their Corruption lies in the ſenſible Conviction of the Efficacy of Second Cauſes. 'Tis only Reaſon that aſſures them none but God acts in them. But beſides that, this Reaſon ſpeaks ſo low that it is ſcarce audible, and that the contradicting Senſes cry ſo loud, that their clamour ſtunns and ſtupefies them, they are yet farther confirm'd in their Prejudice, by Reaſons and Arguments that are ſo much more dangerous, as they have more external Characters and ſen- ſible marks of Truth.

The Philoſophers, but eſpecially the Chriſtian Philoſophers, ought to wage an uninterrup- ted War with Prejudices, or the Judgements of their Senſes, and particularly thoſe of ſo dangerous importance, as that of the efficacy of Second Cauſes. And yet there are Men, whom I extremely honour, (as I have juſt Reaſon) who from I know not what Principle en- deavour to confirm this Prejudice, and to make ſo holy, ſo pure and ſolid a Doctrine as this, which owns no other true Cauſe than God, paſs for a ſuperſtitious and extravagant Opinion. They will not have us to love and fear God *in* all things, but to love and fear all things *with reference* to God. We ought, ſay they, to love the Creatures, ſince they are good; to love and reſpect our Father; to give honour to our Prince and Superiour, ſince God commands it.

Nos ſi hominem patrem vocamus honorem ætati deferimus, non Authorem vitæ noſtræ oſtendimus. Hier. in cap. 33. Matth.

Nor

Nor do I deny it; but I deny that we are to love the Creatures as our Goods, though they be good or perfect in themſelves. I deny that we are to pay ſervice and reſpect to Men as to our Maſters. Or, to explain my ſelf more clearly, I ſay, we muſt not ſerve our Maſter, obey our Father, or Prince, with any other deſign than to ſerve and obey God. S. *Paul*, who
1 Cor. 9. 22. & 10. 33. became all things to all Men, and was complaiſant in all things, for the Salvation of thoſe he preach'd to, ſpeaks thus: *Servants be obedient to them that are your Maſters, according to the fleſh, with fear and trembling, in ſingleneſs of your heart, as unto CHRIST; not with Eye-ſervice, as Men pleaſers, but as the Servants of Chriſt, doing the will of God from the heart, with good will*
Eph. 6. 6. Col. 3. 22. *doing ſervice, AS TO THE LORD, AND NOT TO MEN.* And in another Epiſtle. *Not with eye-ſervice, as to MEN, but in ſingleneſs of heart, fearing GOD. And whatever ye do, do it heartily, AS TO THE LORD, and NOT UNTO MEN.* We muſt therefore obey our Father, ſerve our Prince, and honour our Superiours, AS UNTO GOD AND NOT UNTO MEN. This is manifeſt, and can have no evil conſequences: For hereby Superiours would always be more honour'd, and better ſerv'd. But I think it may be ſaid, That a Maſter, who would be honour'd and ſerv'd, as having in himſelf another Power than that of God, would be a *Devil*; and that thoſe who ſerv'd him under that apprehenſion would be *Idolaters*; for I cannot refrain from believing that all Honour and Love, that have not God for their End, are Species of Idolatry.

Soli Deo honor & gloria.

I L L U-

THE ILLUSTRATION UPON WHAT I have ſaid in the *Fourth Chapter* of the *Second Part*, concerning Method, and elſewhere;

That God acts always with Order, and by the ſimpleſt ways.

'TIS thought by ſome Perſons to be too raſh, and venturous conjecturing, and abuſing looſe and general Terms, To ſay that God always acts with *Order*, and by ways that are *moſt ſimple* and eaſie for the execution of his deſigns. Wherefore it will not be an uſeleſs undertaking to prove and explain this Truth, ſince 'tis of the greateſt conſequence, not only to the knowledge of *Nature*, but much more for the knowledge of *Religion* and *Morality*.

By the Word [*God*] we underſtand an infinitely perfect Being, whoſe Wiſdom and Knowledge have no bounds, and who conſequently knows all the means by which he can execute his Deſigns. Which ſuppos'd, I ſay, that God acts always by the ſhorteſt means, and by the ſimpleſt ways.

To make my meaning better underſtood, I take a ſenſible Example. I ſuppoſe that God wills the Body A ſhould ſtrike the Body B. Since God knows all, He perfectly knows that A may tend to ſtrike againſt B by innumerable *crooked* Lines, and by but one *right*. Now God wills only the impulſion of B by A; and we ſuppoſe that he only wills the Tranſlation of A to B, to effect this impulſion. A then muſt be convey'd to B by the ſhorteſt way, that is, by a right Line. For if the Body A were convey'd to B by a crooked Line, that would ſhow either that the conveyer knew no other way, or that he purpos'd not only the colliſion of theſe Bodies, but alſo the means of making it, otherwiſe than by relation to it, which is againſt the Suppoſition.

There is required ſo much more action to convey a Body from A to B, by a curv'd than by a right Line, as the curv'd is longer than the right. If therefore, God tranſlated A to B by a curv'd Line, double to the interjacent right, half of the action of God would be intirely uſeleſs, and ſo half his action would be produc'd without deſign and end, as well as without effect; therefore,

Again, *Action* in God is *Will*; therefore more Will is requir'd in God, to cauſe A to be circulary than directly tranſlated. But we ſuppoſe that God had no Will in reſpect of the motion of A, but as it relates to the colliſion; therefore there is not Will enough in God to move A by a crooked Line; and conſequently 'tis a contradiction for A to be ſo mov'd. Thus it is a contradiction, that God ſhould not act by the moſt ſimple ways, unleſs we ſuppoſe that God, in the choice of means he imploys for the executing his deſigns, has ſomething elſe in view than theſe deſigns, which is a contradiction in our Suppoſition.

When I ſay there is more Will in God to tranſlate a Body from A to B, by a crooked Line than by a ſtrait; it is not to be thence concluded, againſt the ſimplicity of God's Eſſence and Action. For it muſt be acknowledged, That it is not comprehenſible, how either the *ſimplicity* of an infinite Being, includes all the *different perfections* of finite Beings; or how his *Will* continuing ever the *ſame*, and always *conformable* to *Order*, *varies* with reference to the *different* Beings it produces, and preſerves. I ſpeak but according to our way of conceiving things: Now, methinks, I have a moſt clear conception, That when God Wills, and Creates, for Example, one *cubical foot* of Matter, He Wills another thing than when He Creates two. For nothing is plainer than that God could not create two different things, nor know whether he created one or two Cube-feet of Matter, or whether he convey'd a Body *circularly*

or *directly*, if there were not in His *Wills* ſome *difference*, in regard to Matter and its motion, ſince God ſees no otherwiſe than in Himſelf, and in his own Wills, all the differences of His Creatures. Now whatever that Action is in God, which relates to the different Beings produc'd, or preſerv'd by Him, I call the *differences*, or *augmentations* and *diminutions* of *Will* in God. And in this way of conceiving things, I ſay that God cannot employ *more* Will than is neceſſary to the executing his *Deſigns*, and therefore acts always by the ſimpleſt ways with reference to *them*.

However I deny not, but it's poſſible for God to have a great number of ways equally ſimple for the producing the ſame effects, or that He may produce them by different means: But this I ſay, that He always brings them to paſs, by the ways that are moſt ſimple, provided they be all of the ſame kind; it being a contradiction that an infinitely wiſe Being, ſhould have uſeleſs or diſorderly Wills.

Now if we bring home this Principle to *Morality*, we ſhall ſee that thoſe enſure their Salvation, who ſo prepare themſelves for *Grace*, by *Self-denial* and *Repentance*, and an exact Obedience to the Precepts of our LORD, as that God acting by the ſimpleſt ways, that is, in giving them but *little additional Grace*, may operate *much* in them. For though God *would* have all Men *ſaved*, yet he ſhall ſave none but thoſe that can be ſav'd by the moſt *ſimple* means, which have reference to his great deſign of Sanctifying through JESUS CHRIST, a determinate number of Elect unto his Glory; and he will multiply the Children of *Eve*, till that number be fulfill'd. For God's deſign of Sanctifying us by the ſimpleſt ways, made it neceſſary for him, after the Sin, to *multiply* the Children of Men, that he might *fill up* the number of the Elect; ſince there are a great many Perſons who *damn themſelves*, by with-drawing from the Order of God.

But whereas *God* does not work like a *Particular* Cauſe, we ought not to imagine that He has, like us, particular Volitions for every thing He produces: For if it were ſo, it ſeems evident to me, That the generation of Monſters would be impoſſible, and it would never happen that one of God's Works ſhould deſtroy another. And ſince God cannot have contrary Wills, we muſt have had recourſe with the *Manichees*, to a Principle of Evil, to freeze, for Example, the Fruits which God made to grow: Which being ſo, there is, methinks, a neceſſity to conclude the eſtabliſhment of ſome *general Laws*, by which God *Predeſtines* and *Sanctifies* his Elect in JESUS CHRIST; which Laws are what we call the *Order of Grace*, as God's *general Wills*, whereby he produces, and preſerves all things in the World, are the *Order of Nature*.

I know not but I may be miſtaken, yet I doubt not but from this Principle might be directly drawn a great many Conſequences, which might reſolve thoſe difficulties that have been the controverted Subjects of ſeveral Years. But I do not think my ſelf oblig'd to deduce them; let every one do it according to his *Light* and Abilities; 'tis more to the purpoſe to ſay nothing, than to ſay ſuch things as are unneceſſary to be known, and which, it may be, would be eaſier agreed to ſome time hereafter than at preſent. Only this I would have well underſtood, That the ſimpleſt ways to our Sanctification are Self-denial and Repentance; or at leaſt that it be well conſider'd, that ſince JESUS CHRIST diſtinctly knows the Laws of the Order of Grace, we run continual dangers, in not following the ways he has mark'd us out, not only by his Words, but all the Actions of his Life.

Yet ſince we meet with ſuch particular Occurrences in the courſe of Life, as make us *dubious* which way to determine, becauſe of the contrary Reaſons that may be brought *for* and *againſt* certain Opinions; it will perhaps be time well ſpent to ſhow here, by ſome particular Example, that much uſe may be made of the fore-going Principle, *viz. That God acts always by the ſimpleſt ways.*

Let us ſuppoſe, for inſtance, that I deſir'd to be reſolv'd, whether I ought every day to ſet apart ſome *Conſtant* Times for Retiring into my ſelf, for ſetting my own weakneſs and miſeries before me, and for conſidering my Obligations in the preſence of God, and praying for his Aſſiſtance, in conquering my Paſſions; or on the other hand, whether I ought to wait for the Spirit of God, which blows where, and when it pleaſes, to call me from my ſelf, and my ordinary Employments, to apply me unto Him. For probable Reaſons may be given both for and againſt each of theſe Opinions; and Men frequently take up with probability on ſuch occaſions, which is the Reaſon that religious Perſons follow ſometimes a quite different conduct, and not always that which is the ſafeſt.

I conſider then, That if I ſtay for the particular motions of the Spirit of God, I ſhall never pray unleſs I receive particular *Illuminations*, or *preventing Delights* for that intent. Now theſe Illuminations or Delectations, being produc'd of God by *Wills* more *particular* than are thoſe general Wills, which conſtitute the order of Nature, are ſorts of *Miracles*. Therefore, to expect God's *Graces*, which are not always neceſſary, is to ſuppoſe that He induces me to pray by means that are not the moſt ſimple, and in ſome meaſure to *tempt* God.

But if I uſe my ſelf to a cuſtom of appearing, or endeavouring to appear in the preſence of God at particular Hours, the ſound of the Clock will ſuffice to remind me of my Duty, and there is no need that God ſhould by a particular will inſpire me with the thoughts of Prayer. The general Laws of Union of my Body and Soul, will make me think of my Duty, when the time

time I have appointed for it, by ſome ſenſible notice makes it ſelf remarkable. But as *Self-Examination* and *Prayer* are neceſſary, and as we cannot pray without having at leaſt the *Thoughts* of it; and as we cannot have the Thoughts of it, unleſs God gives them, it is ſome *advance* to Salvation to have theſe Thoughts without *obliging* God to give them us by *particular Wills*, or kinds of *Miracles*. It is poſſibly the want of this *firſt Thought* of praying and conſidering their obligation before God, which is the origine of the blindneſs and deluſion of many Men, and conſequently of their Eternal Damnation. For God acting always by the *ſimpleſt* means, ought not by *particular* Wills to give them thoſe Thoughts which they might have obtain'd by vertue of his *general* Wills, if they had once accuſtom'd themſelves, to pray regularly at particular Hours. Therefore, as God wills the Saving all Men by the *ſimpleſt* ways, it is evident we ought, as much as poſſible, to make the order of *Nature* ſubſervient to that of *Grace*, and to reconcile, as I may ſay, God's Wills together, by regulating a time which may ſupply us at leaſt with the Thoughts of Prayer.

For theſe Reaſons, probably, God commanded, heretofore, the *Jews* to write His Commandments upon the Doors of their Houſes, and conſtantly to carry ſome ſenſible Marks that might put them in mind of them; which *remitted* God his particular Will, if I may ſo ſpeak, of inſpiring them with theſe Thoughts. For Miracles of Grace were extremely rare among the *Jews*, the time being not yet fulfill'd when God was to engrave his Law, and infuſe his Spirit, and his Charity in the heart of Men.

I acknowledge that all things we can do, by meer natural ſtrength, are inſufficient to fit us meritoriouſly for Grace, without which all the exteriour ſhow of Religion can but feed and cheriſh our Pride and Self-love. The *Phariſees* were vain-glorious upon their carrying the *ſenſible ſigns* and *memoratives* of the Law of God, as our Saviour reproves them; and *Chriſtians* often make uſe of *Croſſes* and *Images*, out of Curioſity, of Hypocriſie, or ſome other motive of Self-love: Yet, ſince theſe things may put us in mind of God, they may be to good purpoſe imploy'd; becauſe we ought to make Nature, as far as poſſible, *inſtrumental* to *Grace*, that God may ſerve us by *the ſimpleſt ways*.

For though we cannot naturally fit and diſpoſe our ſelves for Grace, yet we may often contribute to make it effectual, in as much as we can curb the eagerneſs of a Paſſion, by removing from the objects that cauſe it, or by urging contrary Reaſons to thoſe of its Suggeſtion. Thoſe who watch more carefully than others over the purity of their Imagination, or give not ſo much way to be corrupted by the enjoyment of ſenſible Pleaſures, and worldly Commerce, make Grace efficacious, by taking away that impediment and reſiſtance which it finds in others. In which ſenſe a Diſeaſe, a ſhower of Rain, or any other accident, that keeps us at home, may render Grace efficacious: For ſuch a degree of Grace as would have been too *weak* and ineffectual for our *reſiſting* the ſenſible impreſſion of a *preſent* and agreeable Object, is ſtrong enough to make us *reject* and deteſt the impure *Thought*, or Imagination of the ſame Object.

This is all we need to ſay to make it manifeſt, That the Counſels of the Goſpel are neceſſary, in order to God's Saving us by the *ſimpleſt means*. For 'tis advantageous to follow them, not only becauſe when we follow them by the motion of God's Spirit, they determine it by vertue of immutable Order, or of the general Laws of the order of Grace, to increaſe in us our love of Him; but alſo, becauſe the practiſing theſe Counſels, may frequently render Grace efficacious, though Self-love be the motive, as it may be on many occaſions.

F I N I S.

17 JY 60

THE DEFENCE OF THE AUTHOR OF THE TREATISE

Concerning the

Search after Truth,

Againſt the

ACCUSATION

OF

Monſieur de la *VILLE.*

In which is ſhewn, That if Particular Perſons be allow'd to call in Queſtion the FAITH of others, upon Conſequences well or ill drawn from their Principles, no Man could be ſecure from the Imputation of Hereſie.

ACCUSATION

OF THE

AUTHOR

OF THE

DEFENCE

OF THE

PREFACE

F. *MALEBRANCHE's*

DEFENCE

Againſt the

ACCUSATION

OF

Monſieur de la VILLE.

SOME time ago came forth a *Treatiſe*, whoſe very *Title* ſcar'd a great many, and raiſed much Commotion in their Minds. Many Perſons wiſh'd I would engage in the Quarrel, which the Author made with the *Carteſians*. For as, on one hand, Monſieur *de la Ville*, that was his Name, had done me the Honour to liſt me among theſe Philoſophers, with what Deſign I know not; and, on the other hand, found himſelf Diverſion, by turning me into Ridicule, they aſſur'd me, that if I was willing to paſs for a *Raſh*, *Fooliſh*, and *Extravagant* Perſon, for a *Viſioniſt*, and, in fine, an *Heretick*, yet I could not in Conſcience deſert the Cauſe of Truth, and leave the Enemies of our Faith, the Advantages he gave them.

I muſt do theſe Gentlemen Juſtice, in confeſſing their Reaſons were very ſolid: but beg they would believe, that if I have not ſubmitted to them, 'tis becauſe, there were others of a very different *Opinion*; *which* to me ſeem'd likewiſe highly reaſonable, and for which indeed I had greater Inclination; for I will not determine about the Weightineſs of their Reaſons. Beſides, as Monſieur *de la Ville* is not very tender of Integrity, I foreſaw that his Work would make a greater Flaſh and Report, than it would do Injury to Truth. And as to my own Particular, I did not think he injur'd me by deſpiſing me: For, I can aſſure him, I deſpiſe my ſelf much more than he deſires. 'Tis true my *Self-Contempt* is not grounded on the ſame Idea's, as induc'd him to treat me ſo faſtuouſly, as he does. But I would grant that the Reaſons I had for deſpiſing my ſelf, were not true; and would willingly conſent, that all my ill Qualities were converted into thoſe he's pleas'd to give me, provided he'll except that one of *Heretick*, or of a Perſon whoſe Faith deſerves to be ſuſpected.

Since I know that 'tis of moſt dangerous Conſequence, to ſtir up the *Paſſions* of Men, eſpecially on ſuch Subjects as ſeem to cover from the Reproofs of Reaſon, the moſt *violent* and *irrational*: I thought my ſelf oblig'd to continue ſilent, for fear of ſupplying with freſh Fuel thoſe Heats I perceiv'd in their Minds. But now that this Fervency is abated, and that I cannot ſee any more miſchievous Events to be fear'd: I think I am bound to ſatisfy my Friends, and content my ſelf, I am not willing to affect an inſolent and contemptuous Silence, in Regard to M. *de la Ville*. I ſincerely confeſs, he has ſenſibly offended me: For I am neither *Stoick*, nor *Stupid*; I feel when I am hurt, and am not aſham'd to own it. The publick Accuſation of *Hereſie* is not eaſie to be born, eſpecially by *Eccleſiaſticks*: which though never ſo unjuſt, fails not to make the Faith of the accus'd ſuſpected, in this Age, more than any other: and no Man may be prodigal of this ſort of Reputation, unleſs Charity oblige him to it, which ſeldom or never happens.

I have nothing, then, to anſwer to the Calumnies, wherewith this Author tries to blacken me. I ſhall not bring him before the Common Magiſtrate, to have publick Reparation made me; nor will I uſe any other ways permitted by Natural Law, for the Reſtitution of that which I can in Conſcience give up. I am *all* that he will have me, a *Fool*, a *Viſioniſt*, only I am no *Heretick*; nor am I ſuſpected of *Hereſie* at leaſt by thoſe that know me. But I confeſs I cannot avoid having my Faith ſuſpected, if a Stranger may be allowed to brand me with the Name of *Heretick*, for Conſequences he is pleas'd to draw from my Principles; for

'tis

'tis not poſſible but *M. de la Ville*'s Book muſt have deceiv'd ſome one or other. If at preſent I am ſuſpected of Hereſie, 'tis a Misfortune I cannot help.

But if it be a Crime, 'tis not I that have committed it, but rather he that draws conſequences from a Principle not including them. For my part I diſown theſe conſequences: I believe them falſe and Heretical; and if I clearly ſaw they were directly inferr'd from any one of my Principles, I would forſake it: for that Principle would be falſe, Truths being not contrary to one another.

But be it granted that *M. de la Ville*'s reaſonings were juſt, and that Heretical *Conſequences* were perfectly well deduc'd from their *Principle*; yet neither I nor many others, that he treats ſeverely, ſaw before he wrote his Book, that *they* were contain'd *in it*. So that his conduct is indefenſible, which way ſoever we examine it. For in fine the Articles of Faith depend not on the Quickneſs and Reach of thought of any Particular Divine, as I indeavour to ſhow; and though we ſhould be certain that ſome principles included *impious* Conſequences, yet no Man has right to treat the Maintainers of theſe principles as *Hereticks*.

* *Ep.* 3. *Ch.* 2. 28. *Ch.* 2. 57. *Ch.* 6. *contra Epiſt. Manichei. Ch.* 16. *de Trin. l.* 10. *& alibi.*

I have ſeen in the Fathers, and chiefly in St. *Auſtin*, the * principle I have advanc'd, but never obſerv'd *M. de la Ville*'s there. To me it appear'd a common notion, *that if God had annihilated all the extenſion in the World, all the matter, the world is made up of, would be annihilated.* I had conſulted ſeveral Perſons about it, to know whether they had the ſame Idea as my ſelf of the matter, whoſe anſwers confirm'd me in my opinion. I concluded, for the Reaſons I ſhall give anon, that we could no longer have any *direct* and natural Demonſtration, that the Soul is diſtinguiſh't from the Body, or that ſhe is Immortal, if that principle be laid aſide. I ſaid in the *Search after Truth* that I did not believe any conſequence could be inferr'd from this principle repugnant to Faith, which ſame thing was defended in the *Sorbon*, before my maintaining it, in the publick *Theſes*. Nay I proceeded to ſay, *That if it were requiſite, I would explain how this opinion might be reconcil'd with what the Fathers, and Councils have left us touching our Faith, about the myſtery of Tranſubſtantiation.* Laſtly, I renounc'd all *Heretical* conſequences, and even the Principle, if it contain'd them, which I could not believe, nor can I to this hour.

What ought I to ſay more, to clear my Faith from the ſuſpicion of *Hereſy* even to the moſt malicious? Could I imagine any man would have the boldneſs to rank St. *Auſtin* and other Fathers among the *Calviniſts*, by condemning in the Perſon of the *Carteſians* and *Gaſſendiſts* the ſentiment of that holy *Doctor*, as contrary to Tranſubſtantiation? No, doubtleſs. For neither *Monſieur de la Ville* durſt do it, ſave in a collateral manner. St. *Auſtin* in an hundred places advances as undeniable, the principle now in diſpute. He never goes to prove it, becauſe it does not appear that any Man in his time doubted of it. For indeed 'tis a principle that ought to be look't on as a common notion with all thoſe, whoſe mind is not prepoſſeſs'd with falſe ſtudies. Whence this Father concludes, That the Soul is immortal, That ſhe is more noble than the Body, That ſhe is a diſtinct ſubſtance from it, with many other like Truths of the utmoſt importance. And yet *M. de la Ville*, under ambiguous terms, advances that this Principle is not to be found in St. *Auſtin*: He anſwers but one ſingle paſſage of that Father's Works, and to explain it, makes that learn'd Man argue at an extravagant rate. Laſtly he oppoſes to his conſtant doctrine, only the Book of Categories, as if he knew not that Book to be none of St. *Auſtin*'s, and that it belongs rather to *Logick* than to *Phyſicks*.

Part 2. Ch. 3. Art. 6.

I will not ſtand to prove this in particular; for I ſee no neceſſity of anſwering *M. de la Ville*'s Book: and I deſign to keep inviolably to the reſolution I made, and have declar'd at the end of the Preface to the Second Vol. of the *Search after Truth*, viz. That I would anſwer none of thoſe who oppos'd me before they underſtood me, or whoſe diſcourſes gave occaſion to believe, they were made from ſome other motive than the Love of Truth. As for the reſt, I ſhall indeavour to content them. I have no delight in diſquieting Mens Minds, and troubling my own repoſe by contentious Books, or Works abſolutely uſeleſs to the diſcovery of Truth; and only proper to violate Charity, and ſcandalize our Neighbour. And if I now put Pen to Paper, 'tis becauſe I ought not to ſuffer my Faith to be call'd in Queſtion, and that I deſire to make it clearly underſtood, That no Man is permitted to charge me with Hereſie for conſequences deducible from the Principles I have eſtabliſht.

Which is not as if I thought it poſſible to inferr directly, any Hereſie, or even Error from the *Book concerning the Search after Truth*. I am ready to anſwer with Charity and Reſpect, all thoſe who ſhall do me the honour to make their Animadverſions without Paſſion; and I ſhall always be glad to follow Truth as ſoon as any Man can diſcover it to me. But I offer to prove, That we cannot juſtly treat as Hereticks, even obſtinate Defenders of ſuch Principles, as Divines may inferr impious Concluſions from; ſince if it might be allow'd, no Writer whatever could eſcape the Imputation of Hereſie. My proofs of my aſſertion are as follow: which I do not deduce from that which is leaſt Reaſonable in the common Opinions of Philoſophers, with deſign to make them odious, or ridiculous; but chooſe to take for the ſubject of what I offer to prove, *univerſally receiv'd Opinions*, upon which the *Peripateticks* are ſo bold and preſuming, as to inſult perpetually over their Adverſaries.

ARGU-

ARGUMENT I.

The *Peripateticks*, and almoſt all Men, believe that Beaſts have Souls, and that theſe Souls are nobler than the Bodies which they animate. 'Tis an Opinion receiv'd in all times, and in all Nations, that a Dog ſuffers Pain when he is beaten; That he is ſuſceptible of all the Motions of the *Paſſions*, *Fear*, *Deſire*, *Envy*, *Hatred*, *Joy*, *Sorrow*, and even that he *knows* and *loves* his Maſter. Yet from this Opinion conſequences may be drawn directly oppoſite to what we are Taught by Faith.

The firſt Conſequence oppoſite to Faith.

That God is Unjuſt.

Beaſts ſuffer Pain, and ſome of them are more miſerable than others. Now they never made an ill uſe of their *Liberty*, ſince they have none: Therefore God's *Unjuſt*, in puniſhing them, and making them Miſerable, and unequally Miſerable, ſince they are equally Innocent. Therefore this Principle is falſe, *That under a Righteous God, a Creature can be miſerable without deſerving it*, a Principle nevertheleſs imploy'd by St. *Auſtin*, to demonſtrate Original Sin againſt the *Pelagians*.

Moreover there is this difference between the condition of Men and Beaſts, that Men after Death may receive an Happineſs which may countervail the Pains endur'd in Life. But Beaſts at Death loſe all; they have been miſerable, and innocent, and have no Future Retribution. Therefore though God be Juſt, yet Man may ſuffer in order to Merit, but if a Beaſt ſuffers, God is not Juſt.

It may be ſaid perhaps, that God may do with the Beaſt as he thinks fit, provided he obſerves the rules of Juſtice, with reſpect to Man. But if an Angel ſhould think in like manner, that God could not puniſh him without ſome Demerits; and that he was not oblig'd to do juſtice unto Man, ſhould we like that thought? Certainly God renders Juſtice to all his Creatures; and if the meaneſt of them are liable to Miſery, they muſt needs be capable of being Criminal.

The ſecond Conſequence contrary to Faith.

That God wills Diſorder, and that Nature is not corrupted.

The Soul of a Dog is a ſubſtance more noble than the Body animated by it. For according to St. *Auſtin* *, 'tis a ſpiritual Subſtance more noble than the nobleſt Body. Beſides which reaſon demonſtrates that Bodies can neither *Know* nor *Love*; and that Pleaſure, Pain, Joy, Sorrow, and the other Paſſions, cannot be modifications of Bodies. Now 'tis believed that Dogs know, and love their Maſters, and that they are ſuſceptible of paſſions, as of Fear, Deſire, Joy and Sorrow, and many others: The Soul of a Dog therefore is not a Body, but a Subſtance nobler than Bodies. But the Soul of a Dog is made for his Body, and has no other End or Felicity than the enjoyment of Bodies: Therefore Man's nature is not corrupted: Concupiſcence is no diſorder. God might make Man for the enjoyment of Bodies, and ſubject him to the motions of concupiſcence, *&c.*

* *De Quantitate animæ, Ch.* 31, 32. *&c. Lib.* 4. *de anima, & ejus originе, Ch.* 13. *& alibi.*

It may be ſtill ſaid perhaps that the Soul of Beaſts is made for Man: but 'tis hard to eſcape by this ſubterfuge. For whether my Dog, or my Horſe has, or has not a Soul, is indifferent to me. 'Tis not my Horſe's Soul, which carries, or draws me, but his Body. 'Tis not the Soul of a Chicken which nouriſhes me, but its fleſh. Now God might, and ought conſequently to create Horſes, to perform all their functions which we need, without a Soul, if it be true that he has made them only for our uſe. Again the Soul of an Horſe is more valuable than the nobleſt Body: God therefore ought not to create it for the Body of Man. Laſtly God ought not to have given Souls to Flyes which Swallows feed upon. Swallows are of very little uſe to Man, and they might have fed upon grain, as other Birds.

What need then of ſo innumerable a number of Souls to be annihilated, to preſerve the Bodies of theſe Birds, ſince the Soul of a Fly is more worth than the Body of the perfecteſt animal? Wherefore in affirming that Beaſts have Souls, that is to ſay, ſubſtances, more noble than Bodies, we deprive God of Wiſdom, make him act without Order, deſtroy original ſin, and conſequently overthrow Religion, by taking *away the neceſſity of a Mediator*.

The third Conſequence contrary to Faith.

The Soul of Man is Mortal, or at leaſt the Souls of Beaſts paſs from one Body to another.

The Soul of a Beaſt is a Subſtance diſtinct from its Body. This Soul is annihilated, and therefore Subſtances may naturally be annihilated. Therefore though the Soul of Man be a Subſtance diſtinct from his Body, it may be annihilated, when the Body is deſtroyed: and thus the Immortality of the *Humane Soul* cannot be demonſtrated by Reaſon. But if it be own'd to be moſt certain, That no Subſtance can be naturally reduc'd to nothing, the Soul of Beaſts will ſubſiſt after Death; and ſince they are made for Bodies, they muſt at leaſt paſs out of one to another, that they may not remain uſeleſs in Nature: which ſeems to be the moſt reaſonable Inference.

Now 'tis Matter of Faith, That God is Juſt and Wiſe, That he loves not Diſorder, That Nature is corrupted, That the Soul of Man is Immortal, and that That of Beaſts is Mortal: becauſe indeed it is not a diſtinct Subſtance from their Body, nor conſequently capable of Knowledge and Love, or of any Paſſions and Senſations like ours. Therefore in the Stile of M. *de la Ville*, who condemns Men upon Conſequences that he draws from their Principles, the *Carteſians* may juſtly charge him with a Crime, and all Mankind beſides, for believing Beaſts have Souls.

What would M. *de la Ville* ſay, if in his way of proceeding we ſhould tax him of Impiety, for entertaining Opinions, from whence it might be concluded, That God is not Juſt, Wiſe, or Powerful; Opinions that overthrow Religion, that are oppoſite to Original Sin, that take away the only Demonſtration Reaſon can give of the Immortality of the Soul? What would he ſay, if we ſhould charge him with Injuſtice and Cruelty for making innocent Souls to ſuffer, and even for annihilating them, to feed upon the Bodies which they animate? He is a Sinner, but they are Innocent; and yet for the Nouriſhment of his Body he kills Animals, and annihilates their Souls, which are of greater Worth than his Body. Yet if his *Body* could not ſubſiſt without the Fleſh of Animals, or if the Annihilation of a Soul ſhould render his Body for ever immortal; this Cruelty, as unjuſt as it is, might perhaps be excuſable: But with what Pretence can he annihilate Subſtances altogether innocent, to ſuſtain but a few days a Body juſtly condemn'd to Death becauſe of Sin.

Would he be ſo little a Philoſopher, as to excuſe himſelf upon the Cuſtom of the Place he lives in? But what if his Zeal ſhould carry him into the *Indies*, where the Inhabitants *found* Hoſpitals for Beaſts; and the *Philoſophers*, and the better and more gentile Part of them, are ſo charitable to the ſmalleſt Flies, that, for fear of killing them, by Breathing, and Walking, they wear a fine Cloth before their Mouths, and fan the Ways through which they paſs? Would he then fear to make innocent Souls to ſuffer, or to annihilate them for the Preſervation of a Sinner's Body? Would he not rather chuſe to ſubſcribe to their Opinion, who give not Beaſts a Soul more Noble than their Body, or diſtinct from it; and by publiſhing this Opinion acquit himſelf of the Crimes of Cruelty and Injuſtice, which theſe People would charge upon him; if having the ſame Principles he follow'd not their Cuſtom?

Linſch. cap. 37.

This Example may ſuffice to ſhew, that we are not permitted to treat Men as *Hereticks*, and dangerous Perſons, becauſe of Irreligious Conſequeuces that may be deduc'd from their Principles, when theſe Conſequences are diſown'd by them. For though I think it would be an infinitely harder Task, to anſwer the aforeſaid Difficulties, than thoſe of M. *de la Ville*, yet the *Carteſians* would be very ridiculous, if they ſhould accuſe M. *de la Ville* and others, that were not of their Opinion, of Impiety and Hereſie. 'Tis only the Authority of the Church, that may decide about Matters of Faith; and the Church has not oblig'd us, and probably whatever Conſeqnence may be drawn from common Principles, never will oblige us to believe, that Dogs have not a Soul more Noble than their Body, that they know not their Maſters; that they neither fear, nor deſire, nor ſuffer any thing, becauſe it is not neceſſary that *Chriſtians* ſhould be inſtructed in theſe Truths.

ARGUMENT II.

Almoſt all Men are perſwaded, That ſenſible Objects are the true Cauſes of Pleaſure, and Pain, which we feel, upon their Preſence. They believe, that the Fire ſends forth that agreeable Heat which rejoyces us; and that our Aliments act in us, and give us the welcome Senſations of Taſts. They doubt not but 'tis the Sun which makes the Fruits neceſſary for Life, to thrive; and that all ſenſible Objects have a peculiar *Vertue*, by which they can do us a great deal of *good* and *Evil*. Let us ſee, if from theſe Principles we cannot draw Conſequences contrary to Religion and Points of Faith.

A Conſe-

A Conſequence oppoſite to the Principle of Morality, which obliges us to love God with all our Strength, and to fear none but Him.

'Tis a common Notion, by which all Men order their Behaviour, That we ought to *love*, and *fear* what has Power to do us *Good* and *Harm*, to make us feel Pleaſure and Pain, to render us happy or miſerable; and that this Cauſe is to be lov'd, or fear'd, proportionably to its Power of acting on us. But the Fire, the Sun, the Objects of our Senſes, can truly act on us, and make us in ſome manner happy or miſerable. This is the Principle ſuppos'd; we may therefore Love and Fear them. This is the Concluſion which every one naturally makes, and is the general Principle of the corruption of Manners.

'Tis evident by Reaſon, and by the Firſt of God's Commandments, That all the motions of our Soul, of Love or Fear, Deſire or Joy, ought to tend to God; and that all the motions of our Body may be regulated and determin'd, by encompaſſing Objects. By the motion of our Body we may approach a Fruit, avoid a Blow, fly a Beaſt that's ready to devour us. But we ought to Love and Fear none but God; all the motions of our Soul ought to tend to Him only; we are to love Him with all our ſtrength; this is an indiſpenſible Law. We can neither love or fear what is below us, without diſorder and corruption: freely to fear a Beaſt ready to devour us, or to fear the Devil, is to give them ſome honour; to love a Fruit, to deſire Riches, to rejoyce in the light of the Sun, as if he were the true cauſe of it; to love even our Father, our Protector, our Friend, as if they were capable of doing us good, is to pay them an honour which is due to none but God, in which ſenſe it is lawful to love none. But we may, and ought to love our Neighbour, by wiſhing and procuring him, as natural or occaſional Cauſes, all that may make him happy, and no otherwiſe. For we ought to love our Brothers, not as if able to do them good, but as capable to enjoy together with them the true Good. Theſe Truths ſeem evident to me; but Men ſtrangely obſcure them, by ſuppoſing that the ſurrounding Bodies can act on us as True Cauſes.

Indeed, moſt *Chriſtian* Philoſophers acknowledge, That the Creatures can do nothing, unleſs God concur to their Action; and that ſo, ſenſible objects being unable to act on us without the Efficacy of the Firſt Cauſe, muſt not be lov'd or fear'd by us, but God only, on whom they depend.

Which Explication makes it manifeſt, That they condemn the conſequences, which I have now deduc'd from the Principle they receive: But if in imitation of M. *de la Ville*'s Conduct, I ſhould ſay 'twas a ſlight and ſubterfuge of the Philoſophers, to cloak their Impiety; if I ſhould urge them with the crime of ſupporting *Ariſtotle*'s Opinions, and the prejudices of Senſe, at the expence of their Religion; if piercing too into the inmoſt receſſes of their Heart, I ſhould impute to them the ſecret deſire, of debauching Men's Morals by the defence of a Principle, which ſerves to juſtifie all ſorts of diſorders, and which by the conſequences I have drawn from it, overthrows the firſt Principle of Chriſtian Morality. Should I be thought in my Senſes whilſt I went to condemn moſt Men as impious upon the ſtrength of the inferences I had deduc'd from their Premiſes?

M. *de la Ville* will no doubt pretend that my Conſequences are not rightly inferr'd; but I pretend the ſame of his; and to ruine them all, I need but explicate ſome equivocal Terms, which I ſhall ſometime do, if I find it neceſſary.

But how will M. *de la Ville* juſtifie the common Opinion of the Efficacy of Second Cauſes, and by what ſort of concourſe will he aſcribe to God all that is due to Him? Will he make it clearly appear, that one individual action is all of God, and all of the Creature? Will he demonſtrate that the power of the Creature is not uſeleſs, though without its Efficacy, the ſole action of God would produce the ſame effect? Will he prove that Minds neither ought to Love nor Fear Bodies, though the latter have a true power of acting on the former; and will he make multitudes of Converts hereupon, among thoſe whoſe Mind and Heart are taken up with ſenſible Objects, from a confus'd Judgment they make that theſe Objects are capable of making them happy or miſerable? Let him confeſs then, That if we might treat as Hereticks, and profane Perſons, all that hold Principles, from which heretical and impious Conſequences may be drawn, no Man whatever could ſecure his Faith from being ſuſpected.

ARGUMENT III.

The Conſequence of the Principle propos'd by M. de la Ville, *as a Point of Faith,* viz. That the Eſſence of Body conſiſts not in Extenſion. *This negative Principle overthrows the only demonſtrative and direct Proof we have of the Soul's being a diſtinct Subſtance from the Body, and conſequently of her Immortality.*

When this truth is receiv'd, which I preſume, with many other Perſons, to have demonſtrated; which *M. de la Ville* impugns as contrary to the deciſions of the Church, viz. *That the Eſſence of matter conſiſts in Extenſion in Length, Breadth, and Thickneſs.* It is eaſie to comprehend that the Soul, or that which is capable of Thought, is a diſtinct ſubſtance from the Body. For it's manifeſt that Extenſion, whatever *Diviſion* and *Motion* be conceiv'd in it, can never arrive to *Reaſon, Will* or *Senſe.* Wherefore that *thinking thing* which is in us, is neceſſarily a ſubſtance diſtinct from our Body.

Intellectual Notices, Volitions, and *actual Senſations,* are actually *modes* of ſome ſubſtance's *exiſtence.* But all the Diviſions incidental to extenſion can produce nothing but figures: nor all its various motions, any thing but relations of Diſtance: therefore extenſion is not capable of other modifications. Therefore our Thought, Deſire, Senſations of Pleaſure, and Pain, are modes of a Subſtance's exiſtence: Therefore the Soul is diſtinct from the Body, which being conceded, we thus demonſtrate her Immortality.

No ſubſtance can be annihilated by the ordinary ſtrength of nature. For as nature cannot produce ſomething out of nothing: So ſhe cannot reduce ſomething into nothing. Modifications of Beings may be annihilated; *Rotundity* of a Body may be deſtroy'd; for that which is *round* may become *ſquare.* But this roundneſs is not a *Being*, a *Thing*, a *Subſtance*; but only a *relation* of *Equality* of diſtance, between the terminating parts of the Body, and that which is in the center. Which relation changing, the Roundneſs is deſtroy'd, but the ſubſtance cannot be reduc'd to nothing. Now for the foremention'd Reaſons the Soul is not a mode of a Body's exiſting. Therefore ſhe is immortal; and though the Body be diſſolv'd into a thouſand parts of a different nature, and the ſtructure of its organs broke to pieces, ſince the Soul conſiſts not in that ſtructure, nor in any other modification of matter, 'tis evident that the diſſolution, and even the annihilation of the ſubſtance of an humane Body, were that annihilation true, could not annihilate the ſubſtance of our Soul. Let us add to this another proof of the immortality of the Soul, grounded upon the ſame Principle.

Though the Body cannot be reduc'd to nothing, becauſe it is a ſubſtance, it may notwithſtanding dy, and all its parts may be diſſolv'd: becauſe extenſion is diviſible. But the Soul being a ſubſtance diſtinct from extenſion, cannot be divided. For we cannot divide a Thought, a Deſire, a Senſation of Pain, or Pleaſure, as we may divide a ſquare into two or four Triangles. Therefore the ſubſtance of the Soul is indiſſoluble, incorruptible, and conſequently immortal, becauſe unextended.

But if M. *de la Ville* ſuppoſes that the Eſſence of Body conſiſts in ſomething beſides extenſion, how will he convince the Libertines that ſhe is neither material nor mortal. They will maintain, that *ſomething* wherein the Eſſence of Body conſiſts, is capable of *thinking*, and that the ſubſtance which *thinks* is the *ſame* with that which is *extended.* If *M. de la Ville* denies it, they'll ſhow that he does it, without Reaſon, ſince according to his Principle, Body being ſomething elſe than extenſion; he has no diſtinct Idea of what that can be, and conſequently cannot tell but that unknown thing may be capable of Thought. Does he think to convince them, by ſaying as he does in his Book, that the Eſſence of Body is to have Parts without Extenſion? Certainly they will not take his word for it; for finding it as hard to conceive parts without Extenſion, as *indiviſible Atoms*, or *Circles*, without two *Semi-circles*, they muſt have more deference for him, than he has for God himſelf. For M. *de la Ville*, in the laſt part of his Book, pretends that God himſelf cannot oblige us to believe contradictory things, ſuch as are the Parts of a Body, without any actual extenſion.

But the Libertines on their part would not fail of probable Reaſons to confound the Soul with the Body. Experience, they'll ſay, teaches us, That the Body is capable of Feeling, Thinking, and Reaſoning. 'Tis the Body which is ſenſible of Pleaſure, and Pain. 'Tis the Brain which thinks and reaſons. The weight of the Body makes heavy the Mind. Madneſs is a true diſtemper; and thoſe who have moſt Wiſdom loſe it, when that part of the Brain, where it reſides, is diſeas'd. The Eſſences of Beings are unknown to us, and therefore Reaſon cannot diſcover of what they are ſuſceptible. So that reaſon refers us to Experience, and Experience confounds the Soul with the Body, and teaches us, that this is capable of thinking: ſuch would be their Reaſons.

And in Truth thoſe who aſſure us, That the Eſſences of Beings are unknown; and make

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it criminal for Philoſophers to demonſtrate Extenſion *no* Modification of Being, but the very Eſſence of Matter; would do well to conſider the miſchievous Conſequences, deducible from their Principles; and not go to overthrow the only Demonſtration we have, for the Diſtinction between the Soul and Body. For, in fine, the *Diſtinction* of theſe two Parts of our Selves, *prov'd* by clear Idea's, is the moſt fruitful and neceſſary of all Truths in point of *Philoſophy*, and perhaps of *Divinity*, and *Chriſtian Morality*. But this Diſtinction is likewiſe exactly demonſtrated in many Places of the *Search after Truth* *. And I undertake to M. *de la Ville*, notwithſtanding his Anſwer fraught with *Ambiguities*, *Figures*, and *Contradictions*; or rather, I undertake to the *Libertines*, for as for him, I believe him ſo ſetled in his Faith, as not to want ſuch ſort of Proofs. I undertake, I ſay to the *Libertines*, That they will never find any Sophiſm in my Demonſtration, That 'tis impoſſible to conceive it clearly and diſtinctly, without embracing it; and that all the Proofs they offer, to confound the Soul with the Body, are drawn from Senſe; that they are obſcure and confus'd, and can never perſwade ſuch as judge of things by clear and diſtinct Idea's.

* *Book* IV. *Chap.* 2. *Book* VI. *Part* II. *Chap.* 7. *Book* III. *Part* II. *Chap.* 8.

From this Principle, That the Eſſence of Body conſiſts not in Extenſion, and that the Eſſences of things are unknown; I could ſtill draw many other Conſequences oppoſite to Faith: but that is not neceſſary; and I would rather, if it were poſſible, reconcile all falſe as well as true Philoſophies with Religion. However impious and Heretical would be the Conſequences I could deduce from the Opinions of Philoſophers, I ſhould think I wanted the Charity which I owe them, if I endeavoured to make their Faith ſuſpected. So far am I from imitating the Conduct of M. *de la Ville*, who leaving a Principle demonſtrated in all its Strength, and receiv'd by all Ages, lays out himſelf in drawing Heretical Conſequences from it; though of no uſe but to ſtrengthen the *Calviniſts*, and encreaſe their Number, and to diſturb the Faith of the *Orthodox:* I would, on the contrary, that no one ſhould think on theſe Conſequences; or diſown them as falſe, and wrong-inferr'd from the Principle.

All Truths hang in a Chain together; and no falſe Principle can be held, but thoſe who are any thing vers'd in the Art of Reaſoning, may infer from it abundance of Conſequences repugnant to Religion. So that if it were permitted to blacken the Faith of others, upon Conſequences drawn from Principles believ'd by them, ſince there is no Man but errs in ſomething, we might treat all the World, as Heretical. Wherefore the allowing Men to dogmatize, and to make others Faith ſuſpected, who are not of their Opinion, would be opening a Gap to infinite Quarrels, Schiſms, Diſturbances, and even Civil Wars; and all Mankind is concern'd to look upon the Abettors of ſuch a Conduct, as Slanderers and Diſturbers of the publick Peace. For, in ſhort, the different Parties in Religion, which are almoſt always form'd from ſuch like Conſequences, produce ſtrange Events in a State; which all Hiſtories abound with. But the Liberty to philoſophize, or to reaſon upon Common Notions, is not to be denied Men; it being a Right which is as natural to them as to breathe. *Divines* ought to diſtinguiſh *Theology* from *Philoſophy*, *Articles* of our *Faith* from *Opinions* of Men. *Truths*, which *GOD imparts* to all Chriſtians by a *viſible Authority*, from thoſe which he *beſtows* on ſome particular Perſons, in *Recompence* of their *Attention* and Induſtry. They ſhould not confound things that depend on ſo different Principles. No Queſtion Humane Sciences ought to be made ſubſervient to Religion; but with a Spirit of Peace and Charity; without condemning one another, ſo long as we agree about Truths which the Church has determin'd: For this is the way for Truth to ſhine out, and all Sciences to be brought to greater and greater Perfection, by the Addition of New Diſcoveries to the Ancient.

But the Imaginations of moſt Men cannot be reconcil'd to New Diſcoveries, but even Novelty in Opinions, never ſo advantageous to Religion, frights them; whilſt they eaſily inure themſelves to the falſeſt and obſcureſt Principles, provided ſome Ancient has advanc'd them. But when once theſe Principles are grown familiar, they find them *evident*, though never ſo *obſcure:* they believe them moſt *uſeful*, though extremely *dangerous:* and they are ſo well us'd to ſay and hear what they do not conceive, and to ſlurr a real Difficulty by an imaginary Diſtinction, that they are ever well ſatisfy'd with their falſe Idea's, and can't endure to be talkt to in a clear and diſtinct Language; like Men coming out of a dark Room, they are fearful of the Light, which ſtrikes too violently on their Eyes, and they imagine we go to blind them, when we try to diſſipate the involving Darkneſs.

Thus though I have ſhown by many Conſequences, that 'tis dangerous, for Example, to maintain that Beaſts have a Soul more noble than the Body; yet ſince this opinion is ancient, and moſt Men are accuſtom'd to Believe it, whilſt the contrary bears the character of Novelty; Thoſe who judge of the Harſhneſs of opinions rather by the Fear they produce in the Imagination, than by the Evidence and Light they ſhed in the Mind, will be ſure to vote the *Carteſians* Opinion dangerous; and will condemn theſe Philoſophers, as raſh and preſumptuous, rather than thoſe who make Beaſts capable of Reaſoning.

Let a Man but ſay in Company, with an Air of Gravity, or rather with a Look, into which the Imagination, ſcar'd with ſomething extraordinary, forms the Face: *Really the* Carteſians *are ſtrange People; They maintain, That Beaſts have no Soul. I am afraid in a little time they will ſay as much of Man:* And this will be enough to perſwade a great many, that this is a dangerous Opinion. No Reaſons can prevent the Effect of this Diſcourſe upon weak Imagi-

nations; and unleſs there happen to be ſome brisk Wit, that with the gayety of Carriage, ſhall re-embolden the Company from the Fear they had conceiv'd, the *Carteſians* might tire themſelves to death, before they could by their Reaſonings obliterate the Character that had been given of their Perſons.

And yet 'tis but placing the *definition* inſtead of the thing *defin'd*, to ſhew the extravagance of this Diſcourſe. For if a Man ſhould ſay ſeriouſly, the *Carteſians are ſtrange ſort of Men, they affirm, That Beaſts have neither Thought nor Senſe; I fear, in a ſhort time, they will ſay as much of us.* Certainly we ſhould conclude this Man's apprehenſions but ill-grounded. But the generality of Men are unable to extricate the leaſt Ambiguity, eſpecially when their Imagination is frighted with the notion of Novelty, which ſome repreſent to them as dangerous. Beſides that the Air and exteriour Manners eaſily perſuade, but Truth is not diſcover'd without ſome application of Thought, whereof the greateſt part of Mankind is incapable.

Certainly Men that have moſt Light and Underſtanding, whoſe Opinions are implicitely embrac'd by the Vulgar, ought not to be ſo eaſie to condemn their Brethren, at leaſt before they have examin'd their Sentiments with a ſerious Attention; nor ought they to poſſeſs their reſpectful Hearers with diſadvantageous Notions of their Neighbour, this being contrary to the Rules of Charity and Juſtice.

But the *Carteſians*, you'll ſay, admit Principles which have miſchievous Conſequences; and I grant it, ſince you'll have it ſo. But they diſown theſe Conſequences: They, it may be, are ſo groſs and ſtupid, as not to ſee theſe Conſequences are included in their Principles. They think they can ſeparate one from the other, and do not ſuppoſe other Philoſophers are to be believ'd upon their bare word: They break not their Charity with thoſe who hold Principles which they think big with impious Conſequences, and as contrary to Religion, as ſound Senſe. For it may be concluded from the dangerous Conſequences I have drawn from thoſe very Principles, which fluſh the *Peripateticks* even to the triumphing over their Adverſaries; How many, and how much worſe than theſe I might infer, if I ſhould give my ſelf liberty to chooſe out of the Body of their Philoſophy that which was moſt exceptionable? But whatever the advantage is in Theological Diſputes, as well as in Field-Battles, to be the Aggreſſors; I had rather defend my ſelf weakly, than conquer and triumph by aſſaulting. For in ſhort, I do not conceive how Men delight in making Hereticks, and prophane Perſons of thoſe who ſubmit to all the deciſions of the Church, upon Conſequences which they diſavow. The Victory methinks is very fatal, which ſpills but the Blood of our own Countrymen.

Nevertheleſs, I do not believe I have advanc'd in the *Search after Truth*, any Principle productive of dangerous Conſequences; on the contrary, I have left M. *des Cartes* in ſome places, and *Ariſtotle* almoſt in all; becauſe I could not reconcile the *Former* with *Truth*, nor the *Latter* with *Truth* or *Religion*; this I leave to Men of more Wit and Invention than my ſelf. I ſaid that the *Eſſence of Matter conſiſted in Extenſion*, becauſe I thought I had, evidently, demonſtrated it, and thereby given clear and uncontroverted proofs of the Immortality of the Soul, and her diſtinction from the Body: A Truth which is eſſential to Religion, and which the Philoſophers are * oblig'd by the laſt *Lateran* Council to prove. But I never thought this Principle ſo fecund with Truths advantageous to Religion, was contrary to the Council of *Trent*: M. *de la Ville* ought not to affirm it, for that will do but miſchief. This is the Conduct of the *Proteſtants* in *Holland*, * *Vitichius*, * *Poiret*, and ſeveral others. I ſay not this to make his Faith ſuſpected, but I am under ſtrong apprehenſions, leſt his Conduct may give them occaſion to affirm, That we own in *France* a Man cannot be a *Catholick* without believing that the parts of a Body may be without any actual Extenſion, ſince a Book dedicated to the Biſhops, publiſh'd with all the Ceremonies, with *Approbation* and *Privilege*, treats the *Carteſians* as *Hereticks* on that particular: I fear, leſt by his probabilities, he may ſhake the Faith of ſeveral Perſons, who know not perciſely what is neceſſary to make an Article of Faith. But I am ſtill more apprehenſive leſt the Libertines ſhould ſtrengthen themſelves in their Opinions, That the Soul is corporeal, and conſequently mortal; That a thinking Subſtance is the ſame with an extended One, becauſe Extenſion with them, and M. *de la Ville*, being but the mode of a Being, whoſe Eſſence is unknown to us, we have no Argument from Reaſon, that this Being is not capable of Thinking; and we have many Arguments from Senſe which, though never ſo falſe, are yet convincing, and even demonſtrative with thoſe who will not be at the pains of Reaſoning.

* *Seſs.* 8.

* *Th. Pac. ch.* 4.

* *l.*3.*ch.*13 *Cog. Nat.*

And upon theſe grounds I think I am oblig'd to affirm, with all the confidence afforded me by the view of the Truth I have demonſtrated, That *Extenſion* is not a *Mode* of *Being*; but a *Being*, a *Thing*, a *Subſtance*, in a Word, *Matter* or *Body*, and that many Anſwers are to be ſeen in the *Search after Truth*, to thoſe proofs of Senſe by which the Libertines confound the two Subſtances, that Man's compos'd of. I maintain farther, That M. *de la Ville* has not ſhown that Opinion of the Eſſence of Matter to be contrary to Tranſubſtantiation; that he has propos'd only thoſe Anſwers which are eaſie to be reſolv'd, That we may more eaſily triumph over his Adverſaries: That he has not impugned mine, and probably not ſo much as known them, and that in the Humour I ſee him, I think not my ſelf obliged to acquaint

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him with them; Laſtly, That he has added to the Council of *Trent*, more Articles of Faith, or Explications, than any private Perſon has Right to give after expreſs Prohibitions contain'd in the *Bull*, which confirms the ſaid Council *.

* By that *Bull* it is forbidden under Pain of Excommunication, to give any Explication of the Decrees of the Council. *Ullum omnino interpretationis genus ſuper ipſius Concilii decretis quocunque modo edere*, &c. That Power is reſerv'd to the Pope.

As to what regards my own Particular, I deſire the Reader not to believe M. *de la Ville*, upon his Word, but to examine with Caution and Diſtruſt, even thoſe Matters of Fact which he vouches with the greateſt Confidence. He boaſts himſelf upon his Sincerity and Ingenuouſneſs, and I am far from diſputing him thoſe Qualities, which are indiſpenſable to every honeſt Man; but I cannot help ſaying in the Defence of Truth, and my own Juſtification, that he has often forgotten himſelf in his Book; of which here follows a ſufficient Proof.

In the Frontiſpiece of his Work he has inſerted an Advertiſement, which has a Look of Integrity; for 'tis compos'd only to make a *kind of Reparation*: Theſe are his Words; He ſays, He met with a Copy of the *Search after Truth*, of the *Strasbourgh-Edition*, in the Year 1677. which obliges him to ſignifie to his dear Reader, that I have in that Impreſſion retracted an *Errour*, which I had advanc'd in the *Firſt*. *But it is ſo true*, that I am either little skill'd in Divinity, or very daring, that I could not recant that *Errour*, without advancing *Two* others. His whole Advertiſement is only to make me a charitable Reparation.

However it is falſe, *Firſt*, That I have retracted that pretended *Errour* about *Original Sin*: The ſame Propoſition being found in the ſame Words, in the Edition he * cites, and in all thoſe that are Printed at *Paris*.

* *Edit. Strasb.* p. 190. *Par. Edit.* 1. p. 172. in the *ſecond*, p. 190. in the *third*, 187. in the *fourth*, 95.

Secondly, That Propoſition is not my peculiar Opinion; ſince it is the common Doctrine of the Schools. But though it were not at preſent taught, yet 'tis certainly no Errour, much leſs a moſt pernicious one, as he elſewhere ſtiles it *. * *Pag.* 90.

The two Errours he ſuppoſes me to ſubſtitute, in the room of this recanted one, are Two things I never ſaid; and which he puts upon me. 'Tis but reading his own Words relating to the Queſtion, to diſcover the Truth of what I ſay; and therefore I ſhall not ſtand to prove it; eſpecially ſince 'tis done ſufficiently by an unknown Hand. I could only wiſh this unknown Perſon had alledg'd the Reaſons which I had for ſaying, That an Infant at the time of Baptiſm was juſtified by an Actual Love, and which I have given in the *Illuſtration* upon *Original Sin*.

Let a Man judge then, after he has examin'd the *candid* and *ſincere* Advertiſement of M. *de la Ville*, whether I have not reaſon to require the Equitable Readers not to credit him, on his bare Word. For if we believe him, he is the moſt ſincere and courteous Man in the World; but we cannot find all the Marks of Sincerity and Candour, when we carefully examine him. At the End of his Advertiſement, he proteſts, he has endeavour'd, as much as poſſible, to obſerve all the Moderation which he ought, that he has no ill Will but to the Errours of his Adverſaries, and for their Perſons all Eſteem and Reſpect: whilſt yet one cannot conſider that Advertiſement, without diſcovering at leaſt the Symptoms of a diſingenuous Spirit, and a malign Temper, which ſurprizes and irritates Mens Minds. I pray God to pardon him his Outrages, to regulate his Zeal, and to inſpire him with the Spirit of Meekneſs, Charity and Peace towards his Brethren. I know not whether he finds Pleaſure in abuſing me ſo hainouſly as he does; but I deſire to aſſure him, That it is Matter of much Sorrow, and Trouble to me, That I am forc'd in the Defence of Truth, to give ſome Suſpicion of his Probity; and that I ſhould, on the contrary, be extreamly joyful, if he could know how ſincerely I honour, reſpect, and love him, in Him in whom we all are Brethren. *Noverit quam eum non contemnam, & quantum in illo Deum timeam, & cogitem caput noſtrum in cujus corpore fratres ſumus.* Aug. ad Fortunianum, *Epiſt.* 3.

FINIS.

17 IX 60

A

TREATISE

CONCERNING

Nature and Grace.

BY

FATHER *MALEBRANCHE*,

Of the ORATORY.

Done into English *out of* French.

17 JY 60

ADVERTISEMENT.

I *INTREAT those into whose Hands this* Tract *shall come, to believe I principally undertook it to satisfy the Difficulties of some* Philosophers, *who, methoughts, had not all that due Sence* Religion *teaches us to have of the Goodness of* GOD, *nor were sufficiently acquainted with the Obligations we are under to* JESUS CHRIST. *I desire it may be look'd on only as an Essay, and and not judg'd of, before it be attentively examin'd; and that the* Reader *would not let himself be surpriz'd by the Motions of Fear, and Mistrust, which naturally arise in us from any thing that bears the Character of Novelty. Having written for* Philosophers, *who stand upon a great Accuracy and rigorous Exactness, I have been oblig'd to avoid the general Terms in ordinary use; since I could not content them, without using such Terms as raise distinct, and particular Idea's in the Mind, as far as the Subject will permit. I question not but equitable Persons will conclude I had no other Design, than to prove in all possible manners the Truths we are taught by* Faith; *and that I am not so inconsiderate as to call in question, what the* Church *entertains as certain, and* Religion *obliges us to believe. But it has ever been allow'd Men to give new Proofs of Ancient Truths; to endear* GOD *to the Affections of Men, and to shew that there is nothing harsh, or unjust in the Conduct He takes for the Establishment of His* Church.

This Piece is divided into three Discourses. In the first I represent GOD *as working for His Creatures all the Good His Wisdom will permit. In the second I explain how the SON of* GOD, *as Incarnate Wisdom, and Head of the* Church, *sheds on His Members the Graces He could not bestow, as eternal Wisdom, and they could not receive from His* Father. *And I likewise endeavour to make Men sensible of the Obligations and Relations they are under to* JESUS CHRIST. *Lastly in the third Discourse, I shew what is Liberty, and how Grace works in us with a* Salvo *to it: since there are Persons of so little Equity, as to draw dangerous Consequences from Principles most advantageous to* Religion; *I desire I may not be condemn'd upon their bare word, but that before I am judg'd, I may have the Justice done me of being understood. Surely there ought to be no necessity of my making this Petition.*

CON-

CONCERNING

Nature and Grace.

DISCOURSE the FIRST.

Of the Necessity of the General Laws of NATURE, *and of* GRACE.

PART the FIRST.

Of the Necessity of the General Laws of Nature.

I.

SINCE *GOD* can act only for his own *Glory*, and can find *This* no where but in Himself; He could have no other Design in the *Creation* of the World, than the Establishment of His *Church*.

II. *JESUS CHRIST*, who is the Head of it, is the *Beginning of the ways of the LORD*: is the *First Born of the Creatures*; and though sent among Men in the *Fulness of Time*, was their Exemplar in the Eternal Designs of His *Father*: After His Image all Men were Created, as well those that preceded, as we that succeed His Temporal Birth. In a word, 'tis He in whom the Universe subsists, there being none besides, that could make the Work of *GOD* perfectly worthy of its Author.

prov. 8. 22, Eccl. 24. 5. 14. Eph. 1. 21. 22, 23. 2. 10. 21, 22. 4. 13. 16. Col. 1. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19. Ps. 72. 17. Joh. 17. 15; 24. Rom. 8. 29. 1 Pet. 1. 20. Apoc. 13. 8. 1. 8. &c.

III. Some Proportion there ought to be between the World, and the Action that produc'd it. But the Action that educ'd it out of nothing, is that of *GOD*; of an infinite worth, whilst the World, though never so perfect, is not infinitely amiable; nor can render to its Author, an Honour worthy of Him. Thus separate *JESUS CHRIST* from the rest of the Creatures, and see if He who acts but for his own Glory, and whose Wisdom has no bounds, can purpose the Production of any External Work.

But joyning *JESUS CHRIST* to His *Church*, and the *Church* to the rest of the World, it is taken from you, raise to the Glory of *GOD*, a Temple so Majestick, Magnificent and Holy, that you'll wonder perhaps he laid the Foundations of it so late.

IV. Yet if you observe, that the Glory which redounds to *GOD* from His Work, is not Essential to Him; if you are perswaded, that the World cannot be a necessary Emanation of Deity, you will evidently see that it must not have been Eternal, though it ought to have no End. *Eternity* is the Character of Independency. The World therefore must have a Beginning; Annihilation of Substances is a sign of Inconstancy in Him that produc'd them; therefore they will have no End.

V. If it be true then, that the World must have begun, and that the *Incarnation* of *JESUS CHRIST* could not have been so ancient, as the Eternal Generation of His Divine Person; An Eternity must necessarily have preceded Time. Think not therefore that *GOD* delay'd the Production of His Work: He has a greater Love for the Glory He receives from it in *JESUS CHRIST*. In one sence it may be most truly affirm'd, that He made it as soon as possible. For though to us, He might have created it ten thousand Years before the beginning of Ages, yet ten thousand Years having no proportion to Eternity, He could neither do it *sooner* nor *later*, since an Eternity must have gone before.

VI. 'Tis manifest that *Soon* and *Late* are Properties of Time: and though we suppose that *GOD* had created the World as many millions of Years, as there are Grain of Sand on the Sea-shore, before He did; it might still be enquir'd, why *GOD*, who so loves the Glory He receives in the Establishment of His *Church*, had not begun it many Ages before. Thus it suffices to say, That an *Eternity* ought to forego the *Incarnation* of the *WORD*, to manifest why this Great Mystery was accomplish'd neither sooner nor later. *GOD* then must

have created the Universe for the *Church*, and the *Church* for *JESUS CHRIST*; and *JESUS CHRIST* that He might find in Him a Sacrifice, and High-Priest worthy of the Divine Majesty. We shall not doubt of this Order of the Designs of *GOD*, if it be observ'd that He can have no other End of his Actions than Himself. And if it be conceiv'd that *Eternity* does not belong to Creatures, we shall acknowledge they were produc'd, when 'twas requisite they should be: Which Truths suppos'd, let us try to discover something in the Method *GOD* takes for the Execution of His Grand Design.

VII. Were I not perswaded that all Men are no farther Reasonable, than enlightened by Eternal Wisdom, it would, no doubt, be great Temerity to speak of the Designs of *GOD*, and offer to discover any of His ways, in the Production of His Work. But whereas it is certain that the word *Eternal* is the Universal Reason of Minds, and that by the Light which he continually sheds in us, we may have some communication with *GOD*; I ought not to be blam'd for consulting that Light, which though Consubstantial with *GOD* Himself, fails not to answer those who know how to enquire of it by a serious Attention.

VIII. However, I confess that *Faith* teaches a great many Truths not discoverable by the natural Union of the Mind with *Reason*. *Eternal Truth* answers not to all we ask, since we ask sometimes more than we can receive. But this must not serve for a pretence to justify our Laziness and Inapplication.

IX. Vulgar Heads are soon wearied with the Natural Prayer, the Mind by its Attention ought to make to Inward Truth, in order to receive Light and Understanding from It: and thus fatigu'd by that painful Exercice, they talk of it in a contemptuous manner. They dishearten one another: and cover their Weakness and Ignorance, under the delusive appearances of a counterfeit Humility.

X. But their Example is not to infuse into us that agreeable Vertue, which cherishes carelessness, and negligence in the Mind, and comforts it under its Ignorance of most necessary Truths. We must pray constantly to Him who enlightens all Men, that He will bestow His Light upon us, recompence our Faith with the Gift of Understanding; and especially, to prevent us from mistaking Probability, and confus'd Sensations, which precipitate proud Minds into Darkness and Error, for the Evidence which accompanies His resolves.

XI. When we design to speak of *GOD*, with any exactness, we must not consult our selves, nor the vulgar part of Men; but elevate our Thoughts above all Creatures, and with great Reverence and Attention, consult the vast and immense Idea of a Being infinitely perfect: which representing the true *GOD* very different from what the Vulgar fancy Him to themselves; we are not to treat of Him in popular Language. Every body is allow'd to say with the Scripture, that *GOD Repented* Him that He Created Man; that He was *Angry* with His People; that He deliver'd *Israel* from Captivity by the strength of *His Arm*. But these, or the like Expressions are not permitted Divines, when they should speak accurately and justly. Therefore 'tis not to be wondred, if in the sequell of Discourse, my Expression shall be found uncommon. It ought rather to be carefully observ'd, whether they be clear, and perfectly adapted to the Idea, which all Men have of an infinitely perfect Being.

XII. This Idea of a Being infinitely perfect includes two Attributes absolutely necessary to the Creation of the World; an unlimited Wisdom, and an irresistible Power. The Wisdom of *GOD* affords infinite Idea's of different Works, and all possible Ways for the Executing His Designs: and His Power renders Him so absolutely Master of all things, and so independent of all assistances whatever, that he need but *Will*, to execute what he *Wills*. For we must above all take notice, that *GOD* needs no Instruments to work with, that His Wills are necessarily efficacious; in a word, that as His Wisdom is His own Understanding, His Power is no other than His will. Among these innumerable ways whereby *GOD* might have executed His Design, let us see which was preferable to all other; and let us begin with the Creation of this Visible World; from which, and in which He forms the Invisible, which is the Eternal Object of His Love.

XIII. An excellent Artist ought to proportion his Action to his Work; he does not that by ways compound, which may be perform'd by more simple, he acts not without End, and never makes insignificant Essays. Whence we are to conclude, that *GOD* discovering in the Infinite Treasures of His Wisdom, an infinity of possible Worlds, as necessary consequences of the Laws of Motion, which He could establish, was determin'd to the Creation of that which might be produc'd and preserv'd by the simplest Laws, or which should be the perfectest that could be, considering the simplicity of the ways, necessary to its Production and Preservation.

XIV. *GOD* might, doubtless, have made a perfecter World than that we inhabit. He might, for instance, have caus'd the Rain, which fecundates the Earth, to have fallen more regularly on Plow'd-lands, than in the Sea, where it is not necessary. But in order to this, He must have chang'd the Simplicity of His ways, and have multiplied the Laws of the Communications of Motions, by which our World subsists: and so there would not have been that Proportion between the Action of *GOD*, and His Work, which is necessary to determine an infinitely wise Being to act: or, at least, there would not have been the same Proportion between the Action of *GOD*, and this so perfect World, as there is between the

Laws of Nature, and the World we inhabit: For our World, imagine it as imperfect as you will, is founded on ſo ſimple and Natural Laws of Motion, as make it perfectly worthy of the infinite Wiſdom of its Author.

And indeed I am of Opinion, that the Laws of Motion, neceſſary to the Production and Preſervation of the Earth, and all the Stars in the Heavens, are reduc'd to theſe Two. Firſt, That mov'd Bodies tend to continue their Motion in a right line: Secondly, That when two Bodies meet, their Motion is diſtributed to each, in proportion to their Magnitude; ſo that after the Colliſion they ought to move with equal degrees of Celerity. Theſe two Laws are the Cauſe of all thoſe Motions which produce that variety of Forms, which we admire in Nature.

XVI. 'Tis own'd notwithſtanding, that the ſecond is never manifeſtly obſervable in the Experiments that can be made upon the Subject; but that comes from our ſeeing only what happens in viſible Bodies, and our not thinking on the inviſible that ſurround them, which by the efficacy of the ſame Law, giving the *Elaſticity* to viſible Bodies, oblige them to rebound, and hinder them from obſerving it. But this I ought not to explain more at length.

XVII. Now theſe two Laws are ſo Simple, ſo Natural, and at the ſame time ſo Fruitful, that though we had no other Reaſon to conclude they are obſerv'd in Nature, we ſhould be induc'd to believe them eſtabliſh'd by Him, who works always by the ſimpleſt ways, in whoſe Action there is nothing but what's ſo juſtly uniform, and wiſely proportion'd to His Work, that He does infinite wonders, by a very ſmall number of Wills.

XVIII. It fares not ſo with the General Cauſe, as with Particular; with infinite Wiſdom, as with limited Underſtandings. *GOD* fore-ſeeing, before the Eſtabliſhment of Natural Laws, all that could follow from them, ought not to have conſtituted them, if He was to diſannull them. The Laws of Nature are conſtant, and immutable, and general for all times and places. Two Bodies of ſuch degrees of Magnitude, and Swiftneſs, meeting, rebound ſo now, as they did heretofore. If the Rain falls upon ſome Grounds, and the *Sun* ſcorches others; if a ſeaſonable time for Harveſt is follow'd by a deſtructive Hail; if an Infant comes into the World, with a monſtrous and uſeleſs Head growing from his Breaſt, that makes him wretched: this proceeds not from the particular Wills of *GOD*, but from the ſettlement of the Laws of Communication of Motions, whereof theſe Effects are neceſſary conſequences; Laws at once ſo ſimple and ſo fruitful, that they ſerve to produce all we ſee Noble in the World, and even to repare in a little time the moſt general Barrenneſs and Mortality.

XIX. He that having built an Houſe, throws one wing of it down, that he may rebuild it, betrays his Ignorance; and he who having planted a Vine, plucks it up as ſoon as it has taken root, manifeſts his Levity; becauſe he that wills and unwills, wants either Knowledge or Reſolution of Mind. But it cannot be ſaid that *GOD* acts either by this Freakiſhneſs, or Ignorance, when a Child comes into the World with ſuperfluous Members, that make him leave it again; or that an Hail-ſtone breaks off a Fruit half ripe. If He cauſes this, 'tis not becauſe He wills and unwills; for *GOD* acts not like particular Cauſes, by particular Wills: Nor has He eſtabliſh'd the Laws of the Communications of Motions, with deſign to produce Monſters, or to make Fruit fall before Maturity: it not being their Sterility but Fecundity, for which He will'd theſe Laws. Therefore what He once will'd, He ſtill wills, and the World in general for which theſe Laws were conſtituted, will eternally ſubſiſt.

XX. 'Tis here to be obſerv'd, that the Eſſential Rule of the Will of *GOD* is Order: and that if Man, for example, had not ſinn'd, (a Suppoſition which had quite chang'd the Deſigns) then Order not ſuffering him to be puniſh'd, the Natural Laws of the Communications of Motions would never have been capable to incommodate his Felicity. For the Law of Order, which requires that a Righteous Perſon ſhould ſuffer nothing againſt his Will, being Eſſential to *GOD*, the Arbitrary Law of the Communication of Motions muſt have been neceſſarily ſubſervient to it.

XXI. There are ſtill ſome uncommon Inſtances, where theſe General Laws of Motions ought to ceaſe to produce their Effect: not that *GOD* changes or corrects His Laws, but that ſome Miracles muſt happen on particular occaſions, by the Order of *Grace*, which ought to ſuperſede the Order of *Nature*. Beſides, 'tis fit Men ſhould know that *GOD* is ſo Maſter of *Nature*; that if He ſubmits it to His Laws eſtabliſh'd, 'tis rather becauſe He wills it ſo, than by an abſolute Neceſſity.

XXII. If then it be true, that the General Cauſe ought not to produce His Work by particular Wills, and that *GOD* ought to ſettle certain conſtant, and invariable Laws of the Communication of Motions, by the efficacy whereof He fore-ſaw the World might ſubſiſt in the ſtate we find it; in one ſence, it may be moſt truly ſaid, that *GOD* deſires all His Creatures ſhould be perfect: that He wills not the Abortion of Children, nor loves monſtrous Productions; nor has made the Laws of *Nature*, with deſign of cauſing them; and that if it were poſſible by ways ſo ſimple, to make and preſerve a perfecter World, He would never have eſtabliſh'd thoſe Laws, whereof ſo great a number of Monſters are the neceſſary Reſults: But that it would have been unworthy His Wiſdom to multiply His Wills, to prevent ſome particular Diſorders, which by their diverſity, make a kind of Beauty in the Univerſe.

XXIII. *GOD* has given to every Seed a Cicatricle, which contains in *Miniature* the Plant and Fruit, another Cicatricle adjoyning to the former, which contains the Root of the Plant, which Root contains another Root ſtill, whoſe imperceptible Branches expand themſelves into the two Lobes, or Meal of the Seed. Does not this manifeſt, that in one moſt real ſence He deſigns all Seeds ſhould produce their like? For why ſhould He have given to thoſe Grains of Corn He deſign'd ſhould be barren, all the parts requiſite to render them fecund? Nevertheleſs, Rain being neceſſary to make them thrive, and this falling on the Earth by General Laws, which diſtribute it not preciſely on well-manur'd Grounds, and in the fitteſt Seaſons; all theſe Grains come not to good; or if they do, the Hail, or ſome other miſchievous accident, which is a Neceſſary Conſequence of theſe ſame Natural Laws, prevents their Earing. Now *GOD* having conſtituted theſe Laws, might be ſaid to will the fecundity of ſome Seeds, rather than others, if we did not otherwiſe know that, it not becoming a General Cauſe to work by particular Wills, nor an infinitely wiſe Being by complicated ways: *GOD* ought not to take other Meaſures than he has done, for the Regulating the Rains according to time and place, or by the deſire of the Husbandman. Thus much is ſufficient for the Order of *Nature*. Let us explain that of *Grace*, a little more at large; and eſpecially remember that 'tis the ſame Wiſdom, and the ſame Will; in a word, the ſame *GOD*, who has eſtabliſh'd them both.

PART the SECOND.

Of the Neceſſity of the General Laws of Grace.

XXIV.

GOD loving Himſelf by the Neceſſity of His Being, and willing to procure an Infinite Glory, an Honour on all hands worthy of Himſelf, conſults His Wiſdom for the accompliſhing His Deſires. This Divine Wiſdom fil'd with Love for Him, from whom He receives His Being, by an Eternal and Ineffable Generation, ſeeing nothing in all poſſible Creatures worthy of the Majeſty of His Father, offers Himſelf, to eſtabliſh to His Honour an Eternal Worſhip, and to preſent Him, as High Prieſt, a Sacrifice, which through the Dignity of His Perſon, ſhould be capable of contenting Him. He repreſents to Him infinite Models, for the Temple to be rais'd to His Glory; and at the ſame time, all poſſible ways to execute His Deſigns. Mongſt all which, that which inſtantly appears Greateſt, and moſt Magnificent, moſt Uniform, and Comprehenſive, is that whereof all the parts have moſt Symmetrie with the Perſon, who conſtitutes the whole Glory and Sanctity of it: And the wiſeſt way of executing that Deſign, is the Eſtabliſhing certain moſt ſimple and fruitful Laws, to bring it to its Perfection. This is what Reaſon ſeems to anſwer to all thoſe, who conſult it with Attention, when following the Principles which *Faith* teaches us. Let us examine the Circumſtances of this Great *Deſign*, and then endeavour to diſcover the ways of executing it.

XXV. The Holy Scripture teaches us, That 'tis *JESUS CHRIST* who ought to make all the Beauty, the Sanctity, the Grandeur, and Magnificence of this Work. If Holy Writ compare it to a City, 'tis *JESUS CHRIST* who makes all the Luſtre; it not being the *Sun* and the *Moon*, but the *Glory* of *GOD*, and the Light of the *LAMB* that ſhine upon it. When repreſenting it as a Living Body, whereof all the parts have a wonderful proportion; 'tis *JESUS CHRIST* who is the Head of it. 'Tis from Him, the Spirit, and Life are communicated into all the Members that compoſe it. Speaking of it as a Temple, *JESUS CHRIST* is the Chief Corner-ſtone, which is the Foundation of the Building. 'Tis He who is the High Prieſt, and Sacrifice of it. All the Faithful are Prieſts; but as they participate of His Prieſthood, they are Victims, only as partaking of His Holineſs: it being in Him and through Him alone they continually offer themſelves to the Majeſty of *GOD*. In fine, 'tis only from the Analogy they bear to Him, that they contribute to the Beauty of this Auguſt and Venerable Temple, which has always been, and will eternally continue the Object of the good Pleaſure of *GOD*.

Apoc. 21. 23.

Col. 1. 18. 2. 20. Epheſ. 1. 12.

XXVI. *Reaſon* likewiſe evinces theſe ſame Truths. For what Proportion is there between Creatures, how perfect ſoever we ſuppoſe them, and the Action that produces them? How can any Creatures, which are finite, be equivalent to the Action of *GOD* of infinite worth? Can *GOD* receive any thing from a meer Creature, that determines Him to act? But be it ſo, that *GOD* made Man with hopes of being honour'd by him; whence comes it that thoſe who diſhonour Him, make the greateſt number? Is not this a ſufficient indication that *GOD* is very negligent of His pretended Glory, which He receives from His Work, if ſeparated from His Well-beloved *SON*? that it was in *JESUS CHRIST* that He reſoly'd to produce it, and that without Him it would not ſubſiſt a moment.

XXVII. A Man resolves upon a Work, because he has need of it, or has a Mind to see what effect it will have, or lastly because by this Essay of his strength, he learns what he is able to produce. But *GOD* has no need of His Creatures; nor is He like Men, who receive new Impressions from the presence of Objects. His Idea's are Eternal, and Immutable. He saw the World before it was form'd, as well as He sees it now. Lastly, knowing that His Wills are efficacious, He perfectly knows without making tryall of His Strength, all that He's capable of producing. Thus Scripture and *Reason* assures us, that by reason of *JESUS CHRIST* the World subsists, and through the Dignity of His Divine Person receives an additional Beauty, which renders it well pleasing in the sight of *GOD*.

XXVIII. From which Principle, methinks it follows, that *JESUS CHRIST* is the Modell, by which we are made; that we were fram'd after His Image, and Similitude, and have nothing comely in us any farther, than we are the Draught and *Ectypon* of Him; that He is the End of the Law, and the Archetype of the Ceremonies and Sacrifices of the *Jews*. That to determine that Succession of Generations preceding His Birth, they must needs have had some certain agreements with Him, whereby they became more pleasing to *GOD* than any other. That since *JESUS CHRIST* was to be the *Head*, and *Husband* of the *Church*, 'twas requisite he should be typified by the Propagation of Mankind, from one Person; as related by *Moses*, and explain'd by St. *Paul*. In a word, from this Principle it follows, that the present World ought to be the Figure of the Future; and that as far as the Simplicity of General Laws will permit, all the Inhabitants of it have been, or shall be the Figures and Resemblances of the only *SON* of *GOD*, quite from *Abel* in whom he was sacrificed, to the last Member that shall constitute His *Church*.

XXIX. We judge of the Perfection of a Work, by its Conformity with the Idea afforded us by Eternal Wisdom. For there is nothing Beautiful or Amiable, but as related to Essential, Necessary, and Independent Beauty. Now that Intelligible Beauty, being made sensible, becomes even in this Capacity the Rule of Beauty, and Perfection. Therefore all Corporeal Creatures ought to receive from it all their Excellency and Lustre. All Minds ought to have the same Thoughts, and the same Inclinations as the Soul of *JESUS*; if they would be agreeable to those who see nothing Beautiful, nothing Amiable, save in what is comformable to Wisdom and Truth. Since therefore we are oblig'd to believe the Work of *GOD* to have an absolute Conformity with Eternal Wisdom, we have all reason to believe, that the same Work has infinite Correspondencies with Him, who is the Head, the Principle, the Pattern, and the End of it. But who can explain all these Agreements?

XXX. That which makes the Beauty of a Temple, is the Order and Variety of Ornaments that are found in it. Thus to render the Living Temple of the Divine Majesty worthy of its Inhabitant, and proportionate to the Wisdom, and infinite Love of its Author, all possible Beauties are to make it up. But it is not so with this Temple rais'd to the Glory of *GOD*, as with Material ones. For that which constitutes the Beauty of the Spiritual Edifice of the *Church*, is the infinite Diversity of Graces, communicated from Him, who is the Head of it, to all the constituent parts. 'Tis the Order and admirable Proportions settled among them, 'tis the various Degrees of Glory shining and reflecting on all sides round about it.

XXXI. It follows from this Principle, that to the establishing that variety of Rewards, which make up the Beauty of the Heavenly *Jerusalem*, Men ought to be subject upon Earth, not only to Purgative Afflictions, but also to the Motions of Concupiscence, which make them gain so many Victories, by administring such a multitude of various Combats.

XXXII. The Blessed in Heaven, no doubt, will be endow'd with a Sanctity, and Variety of Gifts, perfectly corresponding to the Diversity of their good Works. Those continual Sacrifices, whereby the Old Man is destroy'd and annihilated, will enrich the Spiritual Substance of the *New Man* with Graces, and Beauties. And if it were necessary that *JESUS CHRIST* should suffer all sorts of Afflictions before He entred on the possession of His Glory: *Sin*, which introduc'd in the World the Miseries of Life; and *Death* which follows it, were necessary, that Men after their Tryall upon Earth, might be legitimately crown'd with that Glory, the Variety and Order whereof shall make the Beauty of the future World.

XXXIII. 'Tis true, that *Concupiscence* which we feel in us is not necessary to our Meriting: For *JESUS CHRIST*, whose Merits are infinite, was not subject to it. But though He absolutely controll'd it, He was willing to admit in Himself the most vexatious Motions and Sensations, that He might merit all the Glory that was prepar'd for Him. Of all Sensations, that which is most repugnant to a Soul *willing*, and deserving to be happy, is Pain; which yet He was willing to suffer in the most excessive degree. Pleasure makes actually happy the Person that actually enjoys it, which yet He willingly deny'd Himself. Thus He has offer'd like us innumerable Sacrifices, through a Body which He took like ours: But these Sacrifices were of a different kind from those of the greatest Saints; because He voluntarily rais'd in Himself all those painful Sensations, which in the rest of Men are the necessary Consequences of *Sin*: which being thus perfectly voluntary, were therefore more pure and meritorious.

XXXIV. If I had a clear Idea of the Bleſſed Spirits, who are not embody'd, I perhaps could clearly reſolve a difficulty that ariſes from their Conſideration. For it may be objected, either that there is very little Variety in the Merits, or Rewards of Angels, or that it was to ill purpoſe for *GOD* to unite Bodies to Spirits, which are whilſt united, ſo dependent on them. I confeſs I do not ſee any great Diverſity, in the Rewards anſwering the Merits of purely Intelligible Subſtances, eſpecially if they have merited their Recompence by one ſole Act of Love. For being not united to a Body, which might be an *Occaſion* to *GOD*'s giving them by moſt Simple and General Laws, a train of different Thoughts and Senſations, I ſee no Variety in their Combats, or Victories? But poſſibly another Order has been Eſtabliſh'd, which is unknown to me; and therefore I ought not to ſpeak of it. And 'tis ſufficient that I have eſtabliſh'd a Principle, from whence may be concluded, that *GOD* ought to create Bodies, and unite Minds to them, that by the moſt ſimple Laws of Union of theſe two Subſtances, He might give us in a general, conſtant, and uniform manner, that great Variety of Senſations and Motions, which is the Principle of the Diverſity of our Merits, and Rewards.

XXXV. Laſtly, 'twas requiſite that *GOD* alone ſhould have all the Glory of the Beauty, and Perfection of the future World. This Work which infinitely excells all others, ought to be a Work of pure Mercy. It was not for Creatures to glory in having any other part in it, than that the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST* had given them. In a word, 'twas fit
Rom. 11. 32. that *GOD* ſhould ſuffer all Men to be involv'd in Sin, that He might ſhew them Mercy in
Gal. 3. 22. *JESUS CHRIST.*

XXXVI. Thus the Firſt Man, being impower'd by the ſtrength of His Charity, to perſevere in Original Righteouſneſs, *GOD* ought not to have fix'd him to his Duty, by preventing Pleaſures: for having no Concupiſcence to conquer, *GOD* ought not to prevent his Free-will, by the Delectation of His Grace. In ſhort, having all in general that was neceſſary to His meriting His Reward, *GOD* who works nothing in vain, ought to leave him to himſelf, though He fore-ſaw his Fall, ſince He deſign'd to raiſe him up in *JESUS CHRIST*, put Free-will to confuſion, and manifeſt the Greatneſs of His *Mercy*. Let us now endeavour to diſcover the ways, whereby *GOD* executes His Eternal Purpoſe of the Sanctification of His *Church*.

XXXVII. Though *GOD* in the Eſtabliſhment of the future World, acts in ways very different from thoſe, by which He preſerves the preſent; yet it ought not to be imagin'd that difference is ſo great, as to take from the Laws of Grace the Character of the Cauſe that made them. As it is the ſame *GOD*, who is the Author both of the Order of Grace and Nature; theſe two Orders muſt agree in all thoſe included Symptoms, which diſcover the Wiſdom, and Power of their *Founder*. Therefore ſince *GOD* is a *General Cauſe*, whoſe Wiſdom has no bounds, He muſt needs, for the Reaſons before given, act as *ſuch* in the Order of Grace, as well as in that of Nature; and His own Glory being His End, in the Conſtruction of His *Church*: He muſt eſtabliſh moſt Simple and General Laws, and which have the greateſt proportion of Wiſdom, and fertility with their deſign'd Effect.

XXXVIII. The more wiſe an Agent is, the more comprehenſive are his Wills. A very limited Underſtanding is conſtantly taking freſh Deſigns, and in the Execution of any one of them employs more means than are uſeful. In a word, a ſtraitned Capacity does not ſufficiently compare the Means with the End; the Force and the Action, with the Effect to be produc'd by them.

On the contrary, a Mind of Great Reach and Penetration, collates and weighs all things: forms not Deſigns, except upon the Knowledge of the Means to diſpatch them: and when it has obſerv'd in theſe Means a certain Proportion of Wiſdom with their Effects, he puts them in Practice. The more ſimple are the Machines, and more different their Effects, the more works they bear of an intelligent Workman, and more worthy they are to be eſteem'd. The great number of Laws in a State, are commonly a Proof of the want of Inſight and Extent of Thought in their Founders; it being rather the Experience of their Exigency, than a wiſe Fore-ſight that eſtabliſh'd them. *GOD* therefore, whoſe Wiſdom is infinite, ought to employ the ſimpleſt, and moſt comprehenſive Means in the Formation of a future World, as well as in the Preſervation of the preſent. He ought not to multiply His Wills, which are the executive Laws of His Deſigns, ſave when neceſſity obliges Him to it. But muſt act by General Wills, and ſo ſettle a Conſtant and Regular Order, by which He fore-ſees through the infinite Comprehenſion of His Wiſdom, that a Work ſo admirable as His, muſt needs be form'd. Let us ſee the Conſequences of this Principle, and the Application we may make of it in the Explication of thoſe Difficulties, which ſeem very puzzling and perplex'd.

XXXIX. Holy Writ on one hand teaches us, that *GOD* wills all Men ſhould be ſav'd, and come to the Knowledge of the Truth; and on the other, that He does whatever He wills: and yet *Faith* is not given to all Men; and the number of thoſe that periſh, is greater than that of the Predeſtinate. How can this be reconcil'd with His Power?

XL. *GOD* fore-ſaw from all Eternity Original Sin, and the infinite number of thoſe whom Sin ſhould caſt into *Hell*; and nevertheleſs created the Firſt Man in a ſtate from whence He

knew

knew he must fall: and likewise has appointed such Relations betwixt this Man, and his Posterity, as must communicate his Sin, and render them all worthy His Aversion, and His Anger. How is this to be reconcil'd with His Goodness?

GOD often sheds abroad His Graces, without having the Effect for which His Goodness obliges us to believe He gives them. He increases Piety in Persons, till towards the End of their Days, and *Sin* triumphs over them at *Death*, and throws them headlong into *Hell*. He makes the Rain of His Grace to fall on hardned Hearts, as well as on prepar'd Grounds: which Men resist, and render ineffectual. In a word, *GOD* continually does, and undoes: and seems to will and nill again. How shall this be reconcil'd with His Wisdom?

Lo, here great difficulties. And the whole *œconomy* of *Religion*: the Idea we have of a Good, Wise, Powerful *GOD*, constant in His Designs, Regular in His Action: and a thousand places in Scripture, furnish us with several others, contrary to what we experimentally find every day in the Order of Grace: and though very Learned Men have answer'd them; to me they seem incapable of a satisfactory and clear Resolution, without the fore establish'd Principle.

XLII. For my own part I always believ'd, that *GOD* would have all Men saved. Reason and Scripture will not suffer me to doubt it. And though the Authors whom I honour with a very profound Reverence, have in the preceding Ages given out various Explications of this Truth, I have ever been uneasy to receive such, as without any necessity seem'd to me to give bounds to the Extent of *GOD*'s Goodness and Mercy. Therefore consulting the Idea which all Men have of *GOD*, I entred on this Opinion, which I now expose to the Censure of all those who shall be willing to examine it attentively, and pass an equitable Judgement on it.

XLIII. *GOD* being oblig'd to act always in a manner that becomes Him, by ways Simple, General, Constant, and Uniform: In a word, suitable to the Idea we have of a General Cause, whose Wisdom has no bounds; ought to settle certain Laws in the Order of Grace, as, I have prov'd He has done, in the Order of Nature. Which Laws by reason of their Simplicity, must necessarily have unhappy Consequences in reference to us: But these Consequences are not of such Account, as should cause *GOD* to change these Laws for more Compounded; as having a greater proportion of Wisdom, and Fecundity to the Work they produce, than all that could be establish'd for the same Design: since He always acts in the wisest, and perfectest manner. 'Tis true, GOD could redress these unhappy Consequences, by an infinite number of particular Wills: But Order will not suffer Him. The Effect producible by each Will would not countervail the Action that should produce it. And consequently GOD is not to be blam'd, for not disturbing the Order and Simplicity of His Laws by Miracles, which would be very wellcome to our Exigencies, but very repugnant to the Wisdom of GOD, whom it is not lawful to tempt.

XLIV. Therefore as 'twould be unreasonable in us to be angry at the Rain's falling in the Sea, where 'tis useless, and escaping Seeded-grounds where 'tis necessary; since the Laws of Communication of Motions are most Simple, most Exuberant, and perfectly worthy of their Author's Wisdom; and that by these Laws, it is impossible the Rain should fall rather on the Earth, than Sea: So we ought not to complain of the seeming Irregularity, by which Grace is given to Men. 'Tis the Regularity wherewith GOD works; 'tis the Simplicity of the Laws He observes, 'tis the Wisdom and Uniformity of His Conduct, which is the Cause of that seeming Irregularity. 'Tis necessary by the Laws of Grace establish'd by GOD in favour of His Elect, and for the Construction of His *Church*, that Celestial Rain should fall as well on hardn'd as prepar'd Hearts, and if it be shed in vain, 'tis not because GOD acts without Design: Much less with Design of making Men more culpable by the abuse of His Favours: But because the Simplicity of General Laws permits not that Grace, which is lost in a corrupt Heart, to fall upon another, where it would have been effectual. Since this Grace is not given by a particular Will, but in pursuance of the Immutability of the General Order of Grace: If this Order produces a Work proportion'd to the Simplicity of its Laws it suffices to rend it worthy of the Wisdom of its Author. For in short, the Order of Grace would be less perfect, less admirable, and amiable, if it were more complex'd.

XLV. If GOD gave Grace by particular Wills, doubtless He would never go to convert a Sinner, who had four Degrees of Concupiscence, by giving Him three Degrees of Spiritual Election, supposing these Degrees insufficient for his Conversion. He would defer His Liberality, till the Sinner was absent from the tempting Object, or rather would bestow the same Grace of three Degrees-strength to him whose Concupiscence was less lively. For to what purpose is it to give three Degrees of Spiritual Delectation to one that wants four, and to deny them him whom they were sufficient to convert? Is this suitable to the Idea we have of the Wisdom and Goodness of GOD? Is this to love Men, to will they should be sav'd, and to do for them all He can? Nevertheless, GOD crys out by His Prophet, *O inhabitants of Jerusalem*, and Men *of Judah, judge, I pray ye, betwixt me and my Vineyard. What could have been done more to my Vineyard, that I have not done in it: wherefore, when I look'd that it should bring forth grapes, brought it forth wild grapes?* What Wisdom is there in giving by particular wills so many fruitless Graces to Sinners, if we suppose GOD wills Isaiah 5. 3, 4.

their Converſion, as we are taught by Scripture, and has no fatal Deſign of rendring them more culpable and criminal by His Gifts?

XLVI. But if Grace be beſtow'd on Men by moſt ſimple and General Laws, all theſe great Difficulties vaniſh. The ſettled Order of Grace having a greater proportion of Wiſdom, and Fecundity to the Work which GOD produces than any other, ought to be choſen for the eſtabliſhment of His *Church*. Thus we may affirm, that GOD truly wills the Salvation of all Men; that He does for them all that's poſſible, whilſt he acts as becomes Him: that if there were any Order of Grace as ſimple, but more fecund, as worthy of His Wiſdom, and more advantageous to Men, He would have choſen it; and that therefore He ſaves as many as it's poſſible to ſave, whilſt acting by the adorable Rules preſcrib'd by His Wiſdom.

XLVII. Let Men therefore love and adore not only the Good Will of GOD, by which the Elect are ſanctify'd; but alſo the ſecret Judgements of His juſtice, by which ſo great a number are rejected. 'Tis the ſame Order of Wiſdom: they are the ſame Laws of Grace, which produce theſe ſo different Effects. GOD is equally adorable and amiable in all He does: His Conduct always abounds with Wiſdom and Goodneſs. Wo to the Wicked, who condemn it without underſtanding it, and who would have the immutable Order of Divine Wiſdom, to ſtoop and accommodate it ſelf to their Paſſions, and Intereſts!

XLVIII. The wiſe and induſtrious Husbandmen, Plow, Dung, and Sow their Lands with great Labour and Coſt. They carefully obſerve the fitteſt Seaſons, for the different Agriculture, and tax not GOD with the Succeſs of their Labours. They leave their Work to the Order of Nature, well knowing it's in vain to tempt GOD, and to fancy that on our behalf He will change the Order which His Wiſdom preſcribes.

XLIX. *JESUS CHRIST* came to teach us to imitate their Conduct; who having for us an immenſe Charity, and deſiring to ſave us, as much as the Simplicity of the General Laws of Nature and Grace will permit; has forgotten nothing that might bring us into the ways that lead to Heaven. That which moſt withſtands the Efficacy of Grace, are ſenſible Pleaſures, and Senſations of Pride. There being nothing which ſo much corrupts the Mind, and hardens the Heart more than theſe. But has not *JESUS CHIST* ſacrificed and annihilated in His Perſon all Grandeurs and Pleaſures ſenſible? Was not His Life to us a continual Example of *Humility* and *Repentance*? How was He born: how did He die; what was His Converſation in the World? every body knows. To what likewiſe is His Doctrine reducible, and whither tend all His Councels? Is it not to *Humility*, and *Repentance*, to a General *Self-denyall* of all that gratifies the Senſes, of all that corrupts the purity of the Imagination, of all that cheriſhes and ſtrengthens the Concupiſcence of *Pride*? Therefore whatever He has ſaid, whatever He has done, whatever He has ſuffer'd; was to prepare us by His Doctrine, His Example and Merits, to receive the Celeſtial Rain of Grace, and to render it efficacious. Since He could not, or ought not to alter the Laws of Nature, tempt GOD, or trouble the Order and Simplicity of His ways; He has done all for Men that could inſpire them with the moſt Extenſive, Induſtrious and Ardent *Charity*.

L. I fear not, after what the Scripture has ſaid of it, to affirm that the Charity of *JESUS CHRIST* is Immenſe, and Incomprehenſible: And though all Men receive not the Effects of it, it would be preſumptuous raſhneſs to go to ſet bounds to it. He died for all Men, even for thoſe who periſh everlaſtingly. Why do not Sinners enter into the Order of Grace? why do not they follow the councels of *JESUS CHRIST*, and prepare themſelves for the Reception of the Rain of Heaven? They cannot merit it, but they may increaſe its Efficacy on their account. Cannot they from a Principle of *Self-love*, through the Fear of *Hell*; or if you will by General Graces, avoid many occaſions of ſinning? deny themſelves Pleaſures, at leaſt thoſe they have not yet taſted, and conſequently are not enſlaved to? Thus they may take away ſome Lets and Impediments to the Efficacy of Grace, and prepare the Earth of their Heart, ſo as to make it fruitful, when GOD ſhall pour His Rain upon them, by the General Laws He has preſcrib'd Himſelf. But they would have GOD to ſave them, without any trouble on their part; like thoſe lazy and ſenſeleſs Labourers, who without giving their Fields the ordinary Improvements, pretend that GOD ought to ſhower down ſo impregnating and abundant Rains, as may ſave them their Trouble. Falſe and vain Confidence! GOD cauſes it to rain as well on Fallow as Cultivated Lands. But let the Proud, and Voluptuous know, that the Rain of Grace ſhall fall much leſs on them, than on other Men, whilſt yet they put themſelves in ſuch a Condition as requires much more to convert them.

1 Cor. 8. 11.

LI. Since GOD ordinarily diffuſes His Graces by General Laws, we clearly ſee the neceſſity of the Councels of *JESUS CHRIST*. We ſee that they ought to be follow'd; that GOD may ſave us by the ſimpleſt ways; whilſt giving us but little Grace, he operates a great deal in us. We ſee clearly that it lies on us to Labour, and to Cultivate our Field, before the Heats of Concupiſcence have dried and hardned it; or at leaſt when the Rain has diluted and ſoftned it: that we muſt diligently obſerve the moments in which our Paſſions leave us ſome Liberty, that we may ſeize the Advantage that is offer'd: That we muſt extirpate, as much as poſſible, whatever may ſuffocate the Seed of the *Word*; and not fooliſhly imagine we ſhall repent, when we have made our Fortune in the *World*, or are ready to leave it. For beſides that, it depends not on the Husbandmen to make it rain, when

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their occasions call for it: when a Field has lain long fallow, the Brambles and Thorns strike their Roots so deep, that those who are most us'd to labour, have neither strength, nor desire to cultivate it.

LII. But if *GOD* acted in the Order of Grace by particular Wills, and efficaciously caus'd in all Men all their good Motions, and Operations, with a particular Design; I see not how it might be justify'd, that He acts by the most simple Laws: when I consider all those indirect ways by which Men arrive to the place where *GOD* conducts them. For I doubt not but *GOD* sometimes gives a Man no more than an hundred good Thoughts in a whole Day. Nor can I any more conceive how 'tis possible to reconcile His Wisdom and Goodness, with all the ineffectual Graces the Malice of Men resists. For *GOD* being Good and Wise, ought He not to proportion His Supplies to our Needs, if He afforded them with a particular Design of comforting us?

LIII *GOD* makes the Weeds to grow with the Corn till the time of Harvest; He causes it to rain on the Just and Unjust; because Grace falling on Men by General Laws, is often given to such as make no use of it: whereas if others had receiv'd it, they would have been converted. If *JESUS CHRIST* had preached to the *Syrians* and *Sydonians*, as well as to the Inhabitants of *Bethsaida* and *Chorazin*, they would have repented in Sack-cloth and Ashes. If the Rain which falls on the Sands, had been shower'd upon prepar'd Fields, it would have made them fruitful. But what is regulated by General Laws, is not suited to particular Designs; and it suffices to justify the wise Establishment of these Laws, that being extreamly simple, they carry to its Perfection the Grand Work for which they were Enacted.

But though I do not believe that *GOD* has innumerable particular Designs for every of His Elect, or that He daily gives them multiplicity of good Thoughts and Motions by particular Wills; yet I deny not but they are predestined, by a bounteous Will of *GOD* had to them, for which they ought to pay their Eternal Gratitude and Acknowledgments. Which things I explain as follows.

LIV. *GOD* Discovers in the Infinite Treasures of His Wisdom, an infinity of possible works; and at once the perfectest way of producing each of them. Amongst which He considers His *Church*: *JESUS CHRIST* who is the Head of it, and all the Persons which in consequence of some General Laws establish'd, ought to compose it. In brief, upon Consideration of JESUS CHRIST and all His Members, He constitutes Laws for His own Glory. Which being so, is it not evident that JESUS CHRIST, who is the Principle of all the Glory redounding to GOD from His work, is the first of the Predestinate? and that all the Elect are likewise truly lov'd, and predestined *gratis* in JESUS CHRIST; because they may honour GOD in His SON: that lastly they are all under infinite obligations to GOD, who without regard to their Merit, has settled the General Laws of Grace, which ought to sanctify them, and conduct them to the Glory they shall eternally possess.

LV. You'll say perhaps, that these Laws are so simple and exuberant, that GOD must prefer them to all other: and that since He only loves His own Glory, His SON ought to become Incarnate: and so has done nothing purely for His Elect. I confess *GOD* has done nothing purely for His Elect. For St. *Paul* teaches us, that He has made His Elect for JESUS CHRIST, and JESUS CHRIST for Himself. If GOD cannot be rendred amiable to Men, unless we make Him act purely for them, or not in the wisest manner, I had rather be silent. *Reason* teaches me that we render GOD amiable by shewing Him to be infinitely perfect, and by representing Him so full of Love for His Creatures, as not to produce any one with Design of making him Miserable. For if all are not so happy as to enjoy His Presence, 'tis because Order requiring that so great a Good should be merited: all do not deserve it, for the Reasons I have given. Surely this is to make GOD Lovely, to represent Him such as even the Reprobate cannot choose but adore His Conduct, and repent them of their Negligence.

LVI. Yet for their Satisfaction, who will have GOD to predestine every of His Elect by a particular Will; it may be said with a *Salvo* to the fore-going *Hypothesis*, That GOD before He created Souls to unite them to Bodies, fore-saw all that could befall them by the General Laws of Nature and Grace, and all that they should do in all possible Circumstances: Therefore being able to create, as is suppos'd, the Soul of *Paul*, or of *Peter*, and to unite it to a Body which He fore-saw should be that of a Predestinate Person; He resolved, from all Eternity, to create the Soul of *Paul*, by a benevolent will had for him, and to predestine him by this Choice to Life Eternal: whereas He creates the Soul of *Peter*, not for any benevolent will had to him; but by a kind of necessity, by reason of the Laws of Union, which He has most wisely establish'd betwixt Souls and Bodies: by which He is oblig'd as soon as Bodies are form'd, to unite Souls to them: which would have been advantageous to all, if Man had not sinned. But the Body of *Peter*, being begotten of an *Heathen* Father, or of one that is careless of his Children's Education: Or lastly, *Peter*, being engag'd by the fortune of his Birth, Places, Times, Employments, which induce him to Evil, will infallibly be one of the Reprobate. Yet *Peter* shall be useful to the Designs of GOD. For though he himself shall not enter into the number of the Predestinate; yet he shall by some of his Posterity. He

ſhall be ſubſervient to the Beauty, and Grandeur of the *Church* of JESUS CHRIST, by the infinite Relations he ſhall have to the Elect. Furthermore, he ſhall not be miſerable, but in proportion to the wrong uſe he has made of his Liberty; ſince *GOD* puniſhes with Pain only voluntary Diſorders. This is what may be offer'd for the Satisfaction of ſome Perſons Inclination; though I cannot clearly ſee how it can be altogether rely'd on.

LVII. Such as aſcribe to *GOD* particular Deſigns, and Wills, for all the particular Effects produc'd in Conſequence of General Laws, commonly employ the Authority of Scripture to juſtify their Opinion. But being the Scripture is made for all the World, for the Simple, as well as the Intelligent; it abounds with *Anthropologies*. It not only aſcribes to *GOD* a Body, a Throne, a Chariot, and Equipage: Paſſions of Joy, Sorrow, Wrath, Repentance, and other Motions of the Soul; but alſo attributes to Him the cuſtomary ways of humane Actings, that it may ſpeak to the Simple in a more ſenſible manner. If JESUS CHRIST became Man, 'twas in part to ſatisfy the Inclination of Men, who love what is like them; and are ſtudious of what affects them. 'Twas by this real and true kind of *Anthropologie*, to perſwade Men of thoſe Truths, they were incapable to comprehend any other way. Thus St. *Paul*, to accommodate himſelf to the World, ſpeaks of the Sanctification, and Predeſtination of the Saints, as if *GOD* continually work'd in them by particular wills: and even JESUS CHRIST ſpeaks of His Father, as if He took care by ſuch like wills to adorn the Lilies, and to preſerve every hair of the head of His Diſciples: Becauſe, in truth, the Goodneſs of *GOD* to His Creatures being extream, theſe Expreſſions afford a great Idea of it, and recommend *GOD* to the Affections of the groſſeſt Souls, and ſuch as are moſt infected with *Self-love*. Yet as by the Idea we have of *GOD*, and by the Paſſages of Scripture conformable to that Idea, we correct the Sence of other Texts, which attribute to *GOD* Members and Paſſions like ours. So when we would ſpeak with exactneſs of the manner of *GOD*'s Acting in the Order of Grace, or Nature, we ought to explain thoſe Paſſages, which make Him Act as a Man, or a particular Cauſe, by the Idea we have of His Wiſdom, and Goodneſs, and other Scripture Paſſages comporting with that Idea. For in fine, if we may ſay, or rather if we are oblig'd to ſay, from the Idea we have of *GOD*, that He cauſes not every drop of Rain to fall by particular wills; though the Natural ſenſe of ſome Scripture Paſſages Authoriſes that Opinion: there is the ſame neceſſity to think, notwithſtanding ſome Authorities of the Scripture, that *GOD* gives not by particular wills to ſome Sinners all thoſe good Motions which are uſeleſs to them, and which would be uſeful to ſeveral others: For otherwiſe, I ſee not how 'tis poſſible to reconcile the *Holy Scripture*, either with Reaſon, or it ſelf; as I think I have prov'd.

If I thought what I have ſaid inſufficient to convince attentive Perſons, that *GOD* Acts not by particular wills, like particular Cauſes, and finite Underſtandings; I would proceed to ſhew that there were very few Truths that would admit of greater probation; on ſuppoſition that *GOD* governs the World, and that the Nature of the *Heathen Philoſophers* is nothing. For indeed every thing in Nature proves this Opinion, except Miracles: which yet would not be Miracles, or different from thoſe we call Natural Effects, if it were true that GOD acted by particular wills; ſince Miracles are ſuch only from their not happening by General Laws. Therefore Miracles ſuppoſe theſe Laws, and prove the Opinion I have eſtabliſh'd. But as to ordinary Effects, they clearly and directly demonſtrate General Laws or Wills. If, for inſtance, a Stone be drop'd upon the Head of Paſſengers, it will continually fall with an equall ſpeed, not diſtinguiſhing the Piety or Quality, or Good or Ill Diſpoſition of thoſe that paſs. If we examine any other Effect, we ſhall ſee the ſame Conſtancy in the Action of the Cauſe of it: But no Effect proves that GOD acts by particular wills; though Men commonly fancy GOD is conſtantly working Miracles in their Favour. That way they would have GOD to act in, being conſonant to their own, and indulgent to Self-love, which centers all things on themſelves: and very proportionate to their Ignorance of the Complication of Occaſional Cauſes, which produce extraordinary Effects, Naturally falls into into Men's Thoughts, when but greenly ſtudied in Nature, and conſult not with ſufficient Attention the abſtract Idea of an infinite Wiſdom, of an Univerſal Cauſe, of a Being infinitely perfect.

CON-

CONCERNING

Nature and Grace.

DISCOURSE the SECOND.

Of the Laws of GRACE *in particular, and of the Occasional Causes, which regulate and determine their Efficacy.*

PART the FIRST.

Of the Grace *of* JESUS CHRIST.

I.

SINCE none but *GOD* can act immediately and by Himself on Minds, and produce in them all the various Motions they are capable of, 'Tis He alone who sheds His Light within us, and inspires us with certain Sensations, which determine our diverse Volitions. And therefore none but He can, as a * *True Cause*, produce Grace in our Souls. For *Grace*, or that which is the Principle or Motive of all the Regular Motions of our Love, is necessarily either a Light which instructs us, or a confus'd Sensation that convinces us, that *GOD* is our Good; since we never begin to love an Object, unless we see clearly by the Light of *Reason*, or feel confusedly by the tast of Pleasure, that this Object is good; I mean capable of making us happier than we are.

* By True Cause, I understand that which acts by its own Force.

II. But since all Men are involv'd in Original Sin, and even by their Nature infinitely beneath the Majesty of *GOD*: 'Tis JESUS CHRIST alone that can by the Dignity of His Person, and the Holiness of His Sacrifice, have Access to His Father, reconcile Him to us, and merit His Favours for us; and consequently be the Meritorious Cause of Grace. These Truths are certain: But we are not seeking the Cause which produces Grace by its own Efficacy; nor that which merits it by its Sacrifice, and Good-works. We enquire for that which regulates and determines the Efficacy of the General Cause, and which we may term the Second, Particular, and Occasional.

III. For to the end the General Cause may act by General Laws, or Wills; and that His Action may be regular, constant and uniform; 'tis absolutely necessary there should be some Occasional Cause, to determine the Efficacy of these Laws, and to help to fix them. If the Collision of Bodies, or something of like Nature, did not determine the Efficacy of the General Laws of the Communication of Motions; it would be necessary for *GOD* to move Bodies by particular Wills. The Laws of Union of the Soul and Body become efficacious only from the changes befalling one or other of these two Substances. For if GOD made the Soul feel the Pain of pricking, though the Body were not prick'd, or though the same thing did not happen in the Brain, as if it were; He would not act by the General Laws of Union of the Soul and Body, but by a particular will. If Rain fell on the Earth otherwise than by a necessary Consequence of the General Laws of Communication of Motions, the Rain, and the fall of every drop that composes it, would be the Effect of a particular will. So that unless Order requir'd it should rain, that will would be absolutely unworthy of GOD. 'Tis necessary therefore that in the Order of Grace, there should be some Occasional Cause, which serves to fix these Laws, and to determine their Efficacy. And this is the Cause we must endeavour to discover.

IV. Provided we consult the Idea of intelligible Order, or consider the sensible Order, which appears in the works of GOD; we shall easily discover, that Occasional Causes, which determine the Efficacy of General Laws, and are of use in fixing them, must necessarily be related to the Design for which G O D has establish'd them.

For example, Experience evidences, that GOD has not made, and *Reaſon* certifies that He ought not to make the Courſes of the *Planets* the Occaſional Cauſes of the Union of our Soul and Body. He ought not to will that our Arm ſhould be mov'd in ſuch or ſuch a manner; or that our Soul ſhould feel the Tooth-ake, when the *Moon* ſhall be in Conjunction with the *Sun*; if ſo be this Conjunction acts not on the Body. *GOD*'s Deſign being to unite our Soul to our Body, He cannot in proſecuting that Deſign give the Soul ſenſations of Pain, ſave when there happen ſome changes in the Body repugnant to it. Wherefore we are not to ſeek out of our Soul or Body the Occaſional Cauſes of their Union.

V. Hence it follows, that GOD deſigning to form His *Church* by *JESUS CHRIST*, could not, according to this Deſign, ſeek the Occaſional Cauſes, which ſerve to ſettle the General Laws of Grace, (by which the Spirit of *JESUS* diffus'd through His Members communicates Life, and Holineſs to them) except in *JESUS CHRIST*, and in the Creatures united to Him by *Reaſon*. Thus the Rain of Grace is not deriv'd to our Hearts, by the diverſe ſituations of the *Stars*, nor by the Colliſion of certain Bodies, nor even according to the different Courſes of the Animal Spirits, which give us Motion and Life. All that Bodies can do, is to excite in us Motions, and Senſations purely Natural. For whatever arrives to the Soul through the Body, is only for the Body.

VI. Yet, as Grace is not given to all that deſire it, nor as ſoon as they deſire it, and is granted to thoſe who do not aſk it: it thence follows, that even our Deſires are not the occaſional Cauſes of Grace, For this ſort of Cauſes have conſtantly and moſt readily their effect; and without them the Effect is not produc'd. For Inſtance, the Colliſion of Bodies being the occaſional cauſe of the Change which happens in their motion, if two Bodies did not meet, their Motions would not alter; and if they alter'd, we may be aſſur'd they met. The general Laws which ſhed Grace upon our Hearts, find nothing therefore in our Wills to determine their Efficacy: as the general Laws which regulate the Rains, are not founded on the Diſpoſitions of the Places rain'd upon. For it indifferently Rains upon all Places, on hollow and manur'd Grounds, even on the Sands and the Sea it ſelf.

VII. We are therefore reduc'd to confeſs, that as *JESUS CHRIST* alone can merit Grace for us, ſo it is He alone that can adminiſter *occaſions* to the general Laws, by *which* it is diſtributed to Men. For the Principle or Foundation of theſe general Laws, or that which determines their Efficacy, being neceſſarily either in us, or in *JESUS CHRIST*, ſince it is certain that it is not in us, it muſt needs be found in Him.

VIII. Beſides, when Man had Sinn'd, did it behove *GOD* to have any more regard to his Deſires? Being we are all in a diſorder'd State we can no longer be an occaſion of *GOD*'s ſhewing us favour: But a Mediator was needful, not only to give us Acceſs towards *GOD*, but to be the occaſional Cauſe of the Favours we hope from Him.

IX. Whereas *GOD* had a Deſign of making His Son the Head of His Church, it was requiſite He ſhould conſtitute Him the occaſional, or natural Cauſe of the Grace which ſanctifies it. For 'tis the Head which communicates Life and Motion to the Limbs; and with that Proſpect *GOD* permitted Sin. For if Man had continued in Innocence; as his Will had been meritorious of Grace, and even of Glory; ſo the inviolable Laws of Order would have requir'd that *GOD* ſhould have appointed in Man, the occaſional Cauſe of his Perfection, and his Happineſs: In ſo much that *JESUS CHRIST* would not have been the Head of the Church; or, at moſt, had been but the Head of thoſe Influences which all the Members might have eaſily diſpens'd with.

X. If our Soul were in our Body before it was form'd, and if by her divers Volitions all the Parts, which compoſe it, were rang'd and poſtur'd; with how many various Senſations and different Motions would She be touch'd, upon conſideration of all the Effects which were to follow her Volitions? Eſpecially if She were extreamly deſirous of forming the moſt vigorous and beſt made Body poſſible?

XI. Now Holy Scripture does not only ſay, that *JESUS CHRIST* is the Head of the Church; but alſo that He begets it, and faſhions it, and gives it increaſe; that He ſuffers Merits, Acts and Influences continually in it. The Zeal which *JESUS CHRIST* has for His Fathers Glory, and the Love He bears to His Church, conſtantly ſuggeſt to Him the Deſire of making it the moſt ample, the moſt magnificent, and the perfecteſt that can be. Therefore as the Soul of *JESUS* has not an infinite Capacity, and yet would endow His Church with infinite Beauties and Ornaments: we have all reaſon to believe, that there is in His holy Soul, a continual Chain of Thoughts and Deſires, with reference to the myſtical Body which He conſtantly forms.

Eph. 1. 22. 23. 4. 16. Col. 1. 24. 2. 19. 1 Cor. 12. 27. Act. 1. 24. &c.

XII. Now they are theſe continual Deſires of the Soul of *JESUS*, that tend to Sanctify His Church, and render it worthy of His Father's Majeſty, which *GOD* has eſtabliſht the occaſional Cauſes of the Efficacy of the general Laws of Grace. For we are taught by Faith, that *GOD* hath given His Son an abſolute Power over Men, in Conſtituting Him Head of His Church; which yet cannot be conceiv'd, unleſs the ſeveral Volitions of *JESUS CHRIST* are follow'd by their Effects. For 'tis manifeſt I ſhould have no Power over my Arm, if it mov'd when I would not have it, and remain'd dead and motionleſs when I deſir'd to move it.

This

XIII. This Sovereign Power JESUS CHRIST has merited over Men, as alſo that Quality of Head of the Church, by the Sacrifice He offer'd upon Earth, on full Poſſeſſion of which Right, He entred after his Reſurrection. 'Tis now that He is High Prieſt of future Goods, and that He by His diverſe Deſires prays indefatigably for Men to the Father. And ſince His Deſires are occaſional Cauſes, His Prayers are always heard. His Father denies Him nothing as the Scripture aſſures us; and yet His Prayers and Deſires are neceſſary to obtain. Becauſe Occaſional, Phyſical, Natural Cauſes (for theſe three Terms have here the ſame Signification) have no Power of themſelves, and all the Creatures, even JESUS CHRIST conſider'd as Man, are in themſelves but Weakneſs and Impotence. Joh. 7. 39. Heb. 7. 25. Rom. 8. 34. 1 Joh. 2. 1.

XIV. Therefore the Soul of JESUS, having a Succeſſion of various Thoughts, with reference to the diverſe Diſpoſitions whereof Souls in general are capable, has theſe Thoughts attended with certain Deſires relating to the Sanctification of theſe Souls. Which Deſires being occaſional Cauſes of Grace, ought to ſhed it on thoſe Perſons in particular, whoſe Diſpoſitions reſemble that which the Soul of JESUS CHRIST actually thinks on; and this Grace ought to be ſo much ſtronger and more abundant, as His Deſires are more ſtrong and laſting.

XV. When a Perſon conſiders any part of his Body that is not form'd as it ought to be, he naturally has certain Deſires relating to it, and to the Uſe he would make of it in a Sociable Life; which Deſires are proſecuted with certain inſenſible Motions of the Animal Spirits, and tend to the poſturing, or proportioning it in a due manner. When the Body is quite form'd, and the Fleſh is grown ſolid, and conſiſtent, theſe Motions cannot change the Contexture of the Parts; but only give them certain Diſpoſitions which we call Corporeal Habits. But when the Body is not compleatly form'd, and the Fleſh is extreamly ſoft and tender, theſe Motions which accompany the Deſires of the Soul, not only give the Body particular Diſpoſitions, but alſo change its Conſtruction. Which is ſufficiently manifeſt in Children un-born: For they are not only mov'd with the ſame Paſſions as their Mothers; but alſo receive on their Bodies the Marks of theſe Paſſions, from which their Mothers are always exempt.

XVI. The Myſtical Body of JESUS CHRIST is not yet grown into a perfect Man, nor will be till the accompliſhment of Ages; but He continually is forming it. For He is the Head, which gives all the Members their increaſe by the Efficacy of His Influence, according to the proportion convenient for each, to the end it may be form'd and edified by Charity. Which are Truths we are taught by St. *Paul*. Now ſince JESUS CHRIST has no other Action than the diverſe Motions of His Will, 'tis neceſſary that His Deſires ſhould be follow'd with the Influence of Grace, which only can form Him in His Members; andg ive them that Beauty and Proportion which ought to be the Eternal Object of Divine Love. Eph. 4. 13. Ibid. 15 & 16.

XVII. The diverſe Motions of the Soul of JESUS, being the occaſional Cauſes of Grace, we need not wonder if it be ſometimes given to the greateſt Sinners, or to Perſons that make no uſe of it. For the Soul of JESUS deſiring to raiſe a Temple of a vaſt Extent, and of infinite Beauty, may wiſh that Grace may be given to the greateſt Sinners; and if in that Moment JESUS CHRIST thinks actually on the Covetous, for Inſtance, the Covetous ſhall receive Grace. Or JESUS CHRIST wanting, for the Conſtruction of His Church, Minds of a certain Character, commonly not attainable, but by thoſe who ſuffer certain Perſecutions, whereof the Paſſions of Men are the natural Principle: In a word, JESUS CHRIST needing Minds of particular Diſpoſitions, for the cauſing particular Effects, may in general apply to them; and by that Application infuſe into them ſanctifying Grace: As the Mind of a Projector thinks in general of ſquare Stones, when theſe Stones are actually neceſſary to his Building.

XVIII. But the Soul of JESUS being not a general Cauſe, we have reaſon to think it has often particular Deſires, in regard to particular Perſons. When we intend to ſpeak of GOD, we muſt not conſult our Selves, and make Him act like us; but conſider the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, and make GOD act according to that Idea. But in ſpeaking of the Action of the Soul of JESUS, we may look into our Selves, and make Him act like particular Cauſes. For Example, we have reaſon to believe that the Converſion of St. *Paul* was owing to the Efficacy of a particular Deſire of JESUS CHRIST. And we are to look upon the Deſires of the Soul of JESUS, which have a general reſpect to Minds of a certain Character, as particular Deſires, though they comprehend many Perſons, becauſe theſe Deſires change daily like thoſe of particular Cauſes. But the general Laws by which God acts are always the ſame; becauſe the Wills of God ought to be firm and conſtant, by reaſon that His Wiſdom is infinite.

XIX. The diverſe Deſires of the Soul of JESUS diſtributing Grace; we clearly conceive why it is not equally diſperſt to all Men, and why beſtow'd on ſome more abundantly at one time than another. For His Soul not thinking on all Men at Once, cannot at the ſame time have all the Deſires whereof it is capable: So that He acts not on His Members in a particular manner, except by ſucceſſive Influences; as the Soul moves not at once all the Muſcles of our Body: for the Animal Spirits are unequally and ſucceſſively diſtributed

into our Members according to the various Impreſſions of Objects, the diverſe Motions of our Paſſions, and the ſeveral Deſires we freely excite within us.

XX. True it is, that all the Righteous conſtantly receive the Influence of their Head, which gives them Life; and that when they act by the Spirit of JESUS CHRIST they merit, and receive new Graces, though it be not neceſſary that the Soul of JESUS ſhould have any particular Deſires as the occaſional Cauſes of them. For Order, which requires that every Deſert ſhould be rewarded, is not an arbitrary but a neceſſary Law, and independant from any occaſional Cauſe. But though he who performs a meritorious Action may be rewarded for it, whilſt the Soul of JESUS has no actual Deſires relating to him, yet 'tis certain that he merited not this Grace but by the Dignity and Sanctity of the Spirit which
Joh. 5. 4. 5. CHRIST has communicated to him. For Men are not well-pleaſing to GOD, nor able to do Good, but in as much as they are united to His SON by Charity.

XXI. It muſt be farther acknowledg'd, that thoſe who obſerve the Counſels of JESUS CHRIST out of an Eſteem they have for them, and through the Fear of future Puniſhment, Sollicite, as I may ſay, by their Obedience, the Charity of CHRIST to think on them, though they act from a Principle of Self-love. But their Actions are not the occaſional Cauſes either of Grace, ſince it does not infallibly follow them; or even of the Motions of the Soul of JESUS in their favour, ſince theſe Motions never fail to communicate it. Thus only the Deſires of JESUS CHRIST as occaſional Cauſes, have infallibly their Effect; becauſe GOD having conſtituted Him Head of the Church, ought by Him only to communicate His ſanctifying Grace to His Elect.

XXII. Now we may conſider in the Soul of JESUS CHRIST Deſires of two ſorts; *viz.* Actual, Tranſitory and Particutar, that have but a ſhort-liv'd Efficacy: and ſtable and permanent; which conſiſt in a ſetled and couſtant Diſpoſition of the Soul of JESUS CHRIST, with relation to certain Effects which tend to the Execution of His Deſign in general.

If our Soul by its various Motions communicated to our Body all that was neceſſary to its Formation and Growth, we might diſtinguiſh in her two Kinds of Deſire. For it would be by the actual and tranſitory Deſires, that ſhe would drive into the Muſcles of the Body the Spirits which gave it a certain Diſpoſition with reference to preſent Objects, or to the actual Thoughts of the Mind. But it would be by ſtable and permanent Deſires, that ſhe would give to the Heart and Lungs the natural Motions by which Reſpiration and the Circulation of the Blood were perform'd. By theſe Deſires ſhe would digeſt the Aliments, and diſtribute them to all the Parts that needed them, in as much as that ſort of Action is at all times neceſſary to the Preſervation of the Body.

XXIII. By the actual Tranſitory and Particular deſires of the Soul of JESUS, Grace is deriv'd to un-prepar'd Perſons, in a manner ſomewhat ſingular and extraordinary. But 'tis by His permanent Deſires, that it is given regularly to thoſe who receive the Sacraments with the neceſſary Diſpoſitions. For the Grace we receive by the Sacraments is not given us preciſely becauſe of the merit of our Action, though we receive them in Grace; but becauſe of the Merits of *JESUS CHRIST*, which are freely applied to us in conſequence of His permanent Deſires. We receive in the Sacraments much more Grace than our Preparation deſerves; and it ſuffices to our receiving ſome Influence from them, that we do not oppoſe and reſiſt it. But 'tis abuſing what is moſt Sacred in Religion to receive them Unworthily.

XXIV. Amongſt the actual and tranſitory Deſires of the Soul of *JESUS*, there are certainly ſome more durable, and frequent than others; and the Knowledge of theſe Deſires is of greateſt Conſequence in Point of Morality. Doubtleſs He thinks oftner on thoſe who obſerve His Counſels, than on other Men. His Motions of Charity for Believers are more frequent and laſting, than thoſe for Libertines and Atheiſts. And as all Believers are not equally prepar'd to enter into the Church of the Predeſtinate, the Deſires of the Soul of *JESUS* are not equally lively, frequent and durable on the account of them all.

Man more earneſtly deſires the Fruits that are fitteſt for the Nouriſhment of his Body: he thinks oftner on Bread and Wine, than on Meats of difficult Digeſtion. So *JESUS CHRIST* deſigning the Formation of His Church, ought to be more taken up with thoſe who can moſt eaſily enter, than on others which are extreamly remote.

The Scripture likewiſe teaches us that the Humble, the Poor, the Penitent receive greater Graces than other Men; becauſe the Deſpiſers of Honours, Riches and Pleaſures, are the fitteſt for the Kingdom of Heaven.

Thoſe, for Example, who have learnt of *JESUS CHRIST* to be meek and humble in Heart, ſhall find reſt to their Souls. The Yoke of Chriſt, which is inſupportable to the Proud, will become eaſy and light by the Aſſiſtances of Grace. For God hears the Prayers of the Humble, He will comfort them, juſtify them, and ſave them; He will fill them with Bleſſings, and will debaſe the high Mind of the Proud. Bleſſed are the Poor in Spirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven; but Wo to the Rich, for they have their Conſolation in this World. How hard is it, ſays our *Saviour*, for thoſe that have much Wealth to enter into the Kingdom of Heaven? 'Tis harder for a Camel to paſs through the Eye of a Needle. Which cannot be done without a Miracle.

As for those who, like *David*, humble their Souls with Fasting, change their Garments for Sack-cloth, in a word, Afflict themselves upon sight of their Sins, and the Holiness of God; they are the worthy Objects of the Compassion of JESUS. For God despises not a broken and contrite Heart. We constantly disarm the Anger of GOD, when we take His part against our Selves, and revenge His Quarrel.

The Will of JESUS CHRIST being intirely conformable to Order, whereof all Men have naturally some Idea, we might still discover by Reason, that He has more Thoughts and Desires in regard to some Persons than others. For Order requires that more Graces should be shed on those, for Example, who are call'd to Holy Orders, than on Others whose Imployment necessarily engages them in Worldly Commerce; in a word, On those who Constitute the principal Parts of the Church Militant; than on such as have no Regard to any Body, or that meddle in the Ecclesiastical State, or raise themselves above others out of Ambition or Interest. For though it be requisite that JESUS CHRIST should give them Graces in relation to their Charge, they merit not the Gift of that Grace which may Sanctify them in the station they have chosen out of Self-love. They may have the Gift of Prophecie, whilst they may want Charity, as we are taught by Scripture. 2 Cor. 13. 2.

XXVI. But though we may discover by the Light of *Reason*, and the Authority of Holy Writ, something of the diverse Wills of the Soul of *JESUS*, yet that Order and Process of Desires, which accomplish the Predestination of the Saints, and which tend only to the honouring *GOD* in the Establishment of His *Church*, is an unfathomable Abyss to the Mind of Man. For if St. *Paul* had not taught us, that *GOD* would that all Men should be included in Unbelief, that He might exercise His mercy towards them; should we ever have thought that the *Jews* were to fall into a willful Blindness, not only that the multitude of the Nations might enter into the *Church*, but that they themselves might receive Mercy, at the accomplishment of Ages? The future World being to be a work of pure Mercy, and to have infinite Ornaments, whereof we have no Idea; since the substance of Spirits is unknown to us; it is plain we can discover very little in the different Desires of the Soul of *JESUS*, these Desires being related to Designs we are ignorant of. Thus in the Distribution *GOD* makes of His Graces, we ought to cry out with St. *Paul*, *O the depth of the Riches both of the Wisdom and Knowledge of GOD! how unsearchable are His Judgements, and His ways past finding out!*

XXVII. We have prov'd that the diverse Designs of the Soul of *JESUS*, are the Occasional Causes of Grace; and we have endeavour'd to discover something of these Desires. Let us now see of what sort of Grace they are the Occasional Causes. For though *JESUS CHRIST* be the Meritorious Cause of all Graces, it is not necessary He should be the Occasional Cause of the Graces of Light, and of certain External Graces, which are preparatory to the Conversion of the Heart, and which do not operate. For *JESUS CHRIST* is always the Occasional, or Necessary Cause, according to the Establish'd Order of *GOD*, in point of all those Graces, which operate Salvation.

XXVIII. In order to our distinct understanding what this Grace is, which *JESUS CHRIST*, as Head of the *Church*, diffuses in His Members, we ought to know what is that Concupiscence which the First Man has communicated to all his Posterity. For the Second *Adam* came to remedy the Disorders, which the First *Adam* was the cause of. And there is such an Affinity between the sinful and Earthly, and the Innocent and Heavenly *Adam*, that St. *Paul* looks upon the former communicating sin to his Children by his Disobedience, as the Type and Figure of the latter infusing Justice and Holiness into *Christians* by His Obedience. Rom. 5. 14. 17, 18, 19. 1 Cor. 15. 48.

XXIX. *Order* requires that the Mind should have the Supremacy over the Body, and not be divided against its Will, by all those Sensations and Motions, which apply it to sensible Objects. Therefore the First Man, before his sin, was so absolute over his Senses and Passions, that they were mute and silent, as soon as he desir'd it: nothing could give him an involuntary Diversion from his Duty; and all the Pleasures, which at present precede *Reason*, did only respectfully caution him, in a ready and easy manner, of what ought to be done for the Preservation of his Life. But after his sin, he lost on a suddain that Power over his Body. So that not being able to stop the Motions, nor obliterate the Traces which sensible Objects produc'd in the principal part of his Brain; his Soul by the Order of Nature, and in punishment of his Disobedience, found her self miserably enslav'd to the Law of Concupiscence; to that Carnal Law which constantly wars against the Mind, inspiring it with the love of sensible Goods; and so ruling it by strong, and lively, and at once soft and agreeable Passions, that it cannot, and indeed will not, make the necessary struggles for its breaking the captivating Bonds. For the contagion of sin is spread through the Children of *Adam*, by an unavoidable Consequence of the Order of Nature, as I have explain'd in another place.

XXX. The Heart of Man is the constant slave of Pleasure; and when *Reason* teaches us, that 'tis not convenient to enjoy it, we put it off but with design of finding it more delicate and solid. We willingly sacrifice little Pleasures to the greater: but the invincible Impression we are under for happiness, will not permit us to deny our selves all our Life the satisfaction we enjoy, when we give our selves up to follow our Passions.

XXXI. 'Tis certain that Pleaſure makes happy the Poſſeſſor, at leaſt whilſt he enjoys it. Therefore Men being made to be happy, Pleaſure always gives the Will the firſt ſhock, and puts it conſtantly in motion towards the Good that cauſes or ſeems to cauſe it. The contrary is to be ſaid of Pain. Now *Concupiſcence*, conſiſting only in a continual train of Senſations and Motions antecedent to *Reaſon*, and not ſubject to it: of Pleaſures which ſeeming to flow from ſurrounding Objects, inſpire into us the Love of them; and of Pains, which rendring the Exercice of Vertue rough and painful, make us hate it: The Second *Adam*, to remedy the Diſorders of the Firſt, ought to produce in us contrary Pleaſures, and Averſions, to thoſe of *Concupiſcence*: Pleaſures for the True, and Averſions or Diſlikes for ſenſible Goods. Thus the Grace, whereof JESUS CHRIST is the Occaſional Cauſe, and which He inceſſantly ſheds on us, as *Head* of the *Church*; is not a Grace of Light, though He has merited that Grace likewiſe for us; and ſometimes may communicate it, as I ſhall ſay by and by: but 'tis a Grace of Senſation; 'tis the preventing Delectation, which begets and nurſes Charity in our Hearts. For Pleaſure naturally produces, and cheriſhes the Love of thoſe Objects which cauſe, or ſeem to cauſe it. 'Tis likewiſe the diſguſt which ſometimes ſenſible Objects give us, which create an Averſion to them, and capacitate us to guide the motions of our Love, by Light or Knowledge.

XXXII. We muſt oppoſe the Grace of *Senſation* to *Concupiſcence*, Pleaſure to Pleaſure, Diſlike to Diſlike; that the Influence of JESUS CHRIST may be directly oppoſite to the Influence of the Firſt Man. The Remedy muſt be contrary to the Diſeaſe, that it may cure it. For Illuminating Grace cannot heat an Heart that is wounded by Pleaſure: this Pleaſure muſt ceaſe, or another ſucceed it. Pleaſure is the weight of the Soul, and naturally bears it along with it, and ſenſible Pleaſures weigh it down to Earth. In order to her determining her ſelf, theſe Pleaſures muſt vaniſh, or delectable Grace muſt raiſe her up towards Heaven, and inſtate her well nigh in *Equilibrio*. Thus it is the *New Man* may war againſt the *Old*, the influence of our *Head*, may reliſt that of our *Progenitor*; and JESUS CHRIST may conquer in us all our Domeſtick Enemies.

The Firſt Man being free from *Concupiſcence* before his ſin, needed not be invited to the love of the True Good, by preventing Delectation. He *knew* clearly that GOD was his Good; and there was no neceſſity he ſhould have the *ſenſe* of it. 'Twas not fit he ſhould be allur'd by Pleaſure to the Love of Him, ſince nothing withſtood this Love; and he knew Him perfectly deſerving it. But after the ſin, the Grace of Delectation was neceſſary to counterpoize the continual ſtruggle of *Concupiſcence*. Therefore Light is the Grace of the Creator, Delectation is that of the Reſtorer. Light is communicated by JESUS CHRIST as Eternal Wiſdom, Delectation is given by Him, as Wiſdom Incarnate. Light in its Original, was meer Nature. Delectation has ever been Pure Grace. Light after the ſin, was granted us only for the Merits of JESUS CHRIST. Delectation is granted both for the Merits, and by the Efficacy of the ſame JESUS. Laſtly, Light is ſhed into our Souls, according to our own ſeveral Volitions, and various Applications; as I ſhall explain by and by: but the Delectation of Grace is infus'd into our Hearts, according to the diverſe deſires of the Soul of JESUS CHRIST.

XXXIII. 'Tis true Pleaſure produces Light, becauſe the Soul is more attentive to Objects that give her Pleaſure. Since moſt Men deſpiſe, or neglect the Truths of Religion; becauſe abſtract or unaffecting, it may be ſaid that the Delectation of Grace inſtructs them: For that rendring theſe Truths more ſenſible, they more eaſily learn them by the Attention they afford.
1 Joh 2.27. And for this Reaſon St. *John* ſays, That the Unction we receive from JESUS CHRIST, teaches all things; and that thoſe who have receiv'd it, have need of no Inſtructor.

XXXIV. Yet it muſt be obſerv'd, That this Unction does not produce Light immediately, and by its ſelf; it only excites our Attention, which is the Natural, or Occaſional Cauſe of our Knowledge. So we ſee that Men of the greateſt Charity, are not always the moſt Underſtanding. All Men being not equally capable of Attention, all the Receivers of the ſame Unction are not equally inſtructed by it. Therefore though Light may be ſhed on the Soul by a ſupernatural Infuſion, and Charity often produces it; yet we are always to look upon this kind of Grace but as a Natural Effect: For ordinarily Charity produces not Light in the Mind, ſave in proportion to the inducement it gives the Soul to deſire the Knowledge of what ſhe loves. For, in fine, the diverſe Deſires of the Soul are the Natural, or Occaſional Cauſes of the Diſcoveries we make on any ſubject whatſoever. But theſe things we muſt explain more at large in the Second Part of this Diſcourſe.

PART

PART the SECOND.

Of the Grace *of the* CREATOR.

XXXV.

I KNOW but two Principles that directly and of themselves determine the Motion of our Love. Light and Pleasure: Light, to discover our several Goods; and Pleasure, to make us taste them. But there is a great difference betwixt Light and Pleasure: the former leaves us absolutely to our selves, and makes no intrenchment on our Liberty. It does not efficaciously carry us to love, nor produce in us Natural or Necessary Love; but only induces us to carry our selves to the loving, with a Love of choice, the Objects it discovers; or which is the same thing, only causes us to determine to Particular Goods the general Impression of Love, *GOD* constantly gives us for the General. But Pleasure effectually determines our Will, and as it were conveys us to the Object, which causes or seems to cause it. It produces in us a Natural, and Necessary Love; weakens our Liberty, divides our Reason, and leaves us not perfectly to our own Conduct. An indifferent Attention to the sense we have of our internal Motions, will convince us of these differences.

Thus Man before the sin, being perfectly free, and having no *Concupiscence* to hinder him from prosecuting his Light in the Motions of his Love, and knowing clearly that *GOD* was infinitely amiable, ought not to be determin'd by preventing Delight, as I have already said, or by any other Graces of Sensation, which might have lessened his Merit, and induc'd him to love by Instinct the Good which should only be lov'd by Reason. But after he had sinned, he, besides the Grace of Light, had need of that of Sensation, to resist the Motions of *Concupiscence*. For Man, having an invincible desire for Happiness, cannot possibly sacrifice his Pleasure to his Light: his Pleasure which makes him actually happy, and subsists in him in spight of his Resistance to his Light, which subsists but by a painful Application of Thought, and dies at the presence of the least Actual Pleasure; and lastly, which promises no solid Happiness, till after Death, which to the Imagination seems a perfect Annihilation.

Light therefore is due to Man, to conduct him in the quest of Happiness; and belongs to Natural Order, and supposes neither Corruption, nor Reparation in Nature. But Pleasure, which relates to the true Good, is pure Grace. For naturally the true Good ought not to be belov'd otherwise than by Reason. Therefore the Occasional Causes of the Graces of Sensation, ought to be found in *JESUS CHRIST*; because He is the Author of this Grace. But the Occasional Causes of Light ought to be ordinarily found in the Order of Nature, because Light is the Grace of the *Creator*.

XXXVI. In the establish'd Order of Nature I can see but two Occasional Causes, which shed Light on Minds, and so determine the General Laws of the Grace of the *Creator*: one which is in us, and depends in some measure on us: The other, which is found in the Relation we have with surrounding Objects. The former is nothing but the diverse Motions of our Will. The second is the occurrence of sensible Objects, which act on our Mind, in consequence of the Laws of Union of our Soul with our Body.

XXXVII. We are taught by our own inward Consciousness, That the love of Light produces it; and that Attention of Mind is a Natural Prayer, by which we obtain Instruction of *GOD*: for all the Enquirers of Truth, who apply themselves to Truth, discover it in proportion to their Application. And if our Prayer were not interrupted, nor our Attention disturb'd, if we had any Idea of what we ask, and should ask it with a competent Perseverance, we should not fail to obtain, whilst we were capable of receiving it. But our Prayers are continually interrupted, unless Self-interress'd; our Senses and Imagination muddy, and confound all our Idea's. And though the Truth we consult, answers our Enquiries, the confus'd noise of our Passions deafens us to its answers, or makes us speedily forget them.

XXXVIII. If it be consider'd, that Man before the Fall was animated with Charity, and possess'd with all that was requisite to his Perseverance in Innocence; and that by his Perseverance and Application, he ought to merit his Reward, 'twill easily be conceiv'd, that the several Desires of his Will, were establish'd the Occasional Causes of the Light receiv'd in his Understanding; otherwise his Distraction had not been voluntary, nor his Attention meritorious. But Nature, however corrupted, is not destroy'd: *GOD* has not desisted to will what He once will. And the same Laws still subsist. Therefore our manifold Volitions are still the Occasional, or Natural Causes of the presence of Idea's to our Mind. But because the Union of the Soul with the Body is chang'd into a Dependence on it, by a Natural Consequence of sin, and the immutable Will of *GOD*, as I have explain'd elsewhere; our Body at present disturbs our Idea's, and speaks so loud in favour of its respective Goods, that the Mind but seldom consults, and distractedly listens to Internal Truth.

XXXIX. Moreover, Experience daily teaches us that our Converſation with Underſtanding Perſons, is capable of inſtructing us by raiſing our Attention; that Preaching, Reading, Converſe, a thouſand occurrencies of all ſorts, may raiſe ſome Idea's in us, and likewiſe inſpire us with good Thoughts. The Death of a Friend is, doubtleſs, capable of putting us in Mind of *Death*; unleſs ſome great Paſſion takes us up. And when a Preacher of great Natural Endowments undertakes to demonſtrate a moſt ſimple Truth, and convince others of it; it muſt be own'd that he may perſwade his Hearers, and even move their Conſcience, give them Fear and Hope, and raiſe in them ſuch other Paſſions, as put them in a leſs ſtate of Oppoſition to the Influence of the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST*.

Men being made for a ſociable Life, 'twas requiſite they ſhould mutually communicate their Thoughts and Motions. 'Twas fit they ſhould be united in Mind, as well as Body; and that ſpeaking by the Voice to their Ears, and by Writing to their Eyes, they ſhould infuſe Light and Underſtanding into one another's Minds.

XL. But *Light*, whatever way produc'd in us, whether by particular Deſires, or fortuitous Inſtances, as the Occaſional Cauſes of it, may be call'd *Grace*; eſpecially when it nearly relates to *Salvation*: though it be but a Conſequence of the Order of Nature; becauſe ſince Sin, *GOD* owes us nothing; and all the Good we have, is merited for us by *JESUS CHRIST*; in whom our very Being ſubſiſts. But this kind of Grace, though merited for us by *JESUS CHRIST*, is not the Grace of our *LORD*: But that of the *CREATOR*; ſince *JESUS CHRIST* is not uſually the occaſional Cauſe of it, but the Cauſe of it is diſcoverable in the Order of Nature.

XLI. There are ſtill ſeveral other Natural Effects, which we might reaſonably look upon as *Graces*. For Example; Two Perſons have at the ſame time two Deſires of Curioſity. The one to go ſee an *Opera*,, the other to Hear a Celebrated Preacher. If they ſatisfy their Curioſity; he that goes to the *Opera*, ſhall find ſuch Objects, as according to his preſent diſpoſition of Mind, ſhall raiſe in him Paſſions that will damn him. Whilſt the other ſhall find in the Preacher ſo great Force and Light, that the Grace of Converſion working in him at that moment, ſhall be able to ſave him. Which ſuppos'd, Let but a ſhower of Rain, or any other Accident happen, that may ſtay them at home. Though the Rain be a Natural Effect, as depending on the Natural Laws of the Communication of Motions; yet it may be ſaid to be a *Grace*, in reſpect of him whoſe Damnation it prevents, and a Puniſhment to him, whoſe Converſion it hinders.

XLII. *Grace* being conjoyn'd to Nature, all the Motions of our Soul and Body have ſome relation to Salvation. This Man is ſav'd, by having in a ſtate of Grace made a falſe ſtep, which happily broke his Neck: and another is damn'd, by having on ſome occaſion misfortunately avoided the ruines of a falling Houſe. We know not what is for our Advantage, but we well know, there is nothing of it ſelf ſo indifferent, but has ſome reference to our Salvation; becauſe of the mixture and combination of Effects, depending on the General Laws of Nature, with others that depend on the General Laws of Grace.

XLIII. As therefore Light points out to us the True Good, the means to obtain it, our Duties to *GOD*; in a word, the ways we are to follow, it is ſufficient to cauſe thoſe who are animated with Charity, to do good; to merit new Graces, and to conquer ſome Temptations; as I ſhall explain in another place; ſo I think we may lawfully give it the name of *Grace*, though *JESUS CHRIST* be only the Meritorious Cauſe of it. And whereas External Graces, which have no immediate influence on the Mind, come nevertheleſs into the Order of Predeſtination of Saints; I conſider them alſo as True Graces. In a word, I ſee not why we may not give the name of *Grace* to all Natural Effects, when relating to Salvation, ſubſervient to the Grace of JESUS CHRIST, and delivering us from ſome hindrances to His Efficacy. Yet if others will not agree with me, I ſhall not contend with them about Words.

XLIV. All theſe Graces, if we may be allow'd to call them ſo, being thoſe of the *Creator*, the General Laws of theſe Graces are the General Laws of Nature. For we muſt ſtill obſerve, that ſin has not deſtroy'd Nature, though it has corrupted it. The General Laws of the Communications of Motions are always the ſame; and thoſe of the Union of the Soul and Body are chang'd no otherwiſe, than that the Union of the former is grown into a Dependance, for the Reaſons I have given elſewhere. For at preſent we depend on that Body, to which before ſin, we were only united.

XLV. Now the Laws of Nature, are always moſt Simple and General. For *GOD* acts not by Particu lar Wills; unleſs Order requires a Miracle. Which Truth I have ſufficiently prov'd in the Firſt Diſcourſe. Thus when a ſtone falls on the Head of a good Man, and rids him of his Life, it falls in conſequence of the Laws of Motions; and not becauſe that Man is Juſt, and *GOD* deſigns to recompenſe him. When a like Accident deſtroys a Sinner, 'tis not becauſe *GOD* will actually puniſh him. For *GOD*, on the contrary, would have all Men ſav'd: But He is not to change the ſimplicity of His Laws, to ſuſpend the puniſhment of a Criminal. So likewiſe, when Light breaks into our Underſtanding, 'tis becauſe our Deſires are the Natural, or Occaſional Cauſes of it: 'tis becauſe we hear ſome Underſtanding Perſon, and becauſe our Brain is diſpos'd to receive the Impreſſions of the Speaker:

And

And not that *GOD* has a particular Will on our behalf, but that He follows the General Laws of Nature, to which He has oblig'd Himself, I can see nothing Mysterious in the Distribution of these kinds of *Graces*, and I stand not to draw Consequences deducible from these Truths.

XLVI. 'Tis to be observ'd, that *JESUS CHRIST*, who is the sole Meritorious Cause of the Goods we receive from *GOD*, by the Order of Nature, is sometimes the Occasional Cause of the Grace of Light, as well as of that of Sensation; yet I am of Opinion, that this but rarely happens; because indeed it is not necessary it should. *JESUS CHRIST* as much as possible makes the Order of Nature subservient to that of Grace. For besides that Reason evinces, that Order will have it so; because that Method is most simple, it is sufficiently manifest by the Conduct He takes on Earth, and the Order He has establish'd, and still preserves in His *Church*. *JESUS CHRIST* made use of Speech for the Instruction of the World, and likewise sent His *Disciples*, two by two, to prepare the People to receive Him. Luc. 10. He has settled *Apostles*, *Prophets*, *Evangelists*, *Doctors*, *Bishops* and *Priests*, to labour in the Edification of the *Church*. Eph. 11. 12. Is not this to make *Nature* Handmaid to *Grace*; and to propagate the *Light* of *Faith* in Mens Minds, by ways most Simple and Natural? And indeed JESUS CHRIST on Earth was not to instruct Men by particular Wills, since He might instruct them as interior Truth and Eternal Wisdom, by the most simple and exuberant Laws of *Nature*.

XLVII. That which lies most hidden and unreveal'd in the Order *GOD* has follow'd for the Establishment of His *Church*, is, doubtless, the Time, Place, and other Circumstances of the *Incarnation* of His *SON*, and the Preaching of the *Gospel*. For, why should JESUS CHRIST, for whom the World was created, become Man four thousand Years after its Creation? Why must He be Born among the *Jews*, He that was to reject that wretched Nation? Why must He chuse to be the Son of *David*, when the Family of *David* was obscur'd; and not rather to be Born from Emperours, who have commanded the whole World; since He came to Convert and Enlighten all the Earth? Why to Elect His *Apostles* and *Disciples* out of the Ignorant and Illiterate? to Preach to the Inhabitants of *Bethsaida* and *Corazin*, who remain in Incredulity; and to leave *Tyre* and *Sidon*, who would have been Converted by the like Grace afforded them: To hinder St. *Paul* from Preaching the Word of *GOD* in *Asia*, and to appoint him to pass into *Macedonia*? A thousand other Circumstances, which have accompanied the Preaching of the *Gospel*, are, no doubt, such Mysteries as admit not clear and evident Reasons: nor is it my Design to give them. My Purpose is only to establish some Principles, that may afford some Light to these and the like Difficulties; or at least, give us to understand, that nothing can be thence concluded against what I have said of the Order of *Nature* and *Grace*.

XLVIII. 'Tis certain, that Natural Effects are complicated, and mix'd a thousand ways with the Effects of *Grace*: and that the Order of *Nature* strengthens or weakens the Efficacy of Effects of the Orders of *Grace*, according as these two Orders variously combine together. *Death*, which by the General Laws of *Nature*, at a particular Juncture befalls a good or ill Prince, or *Bishop*, occasions a great deal of Good or Evil in the *Church*: because such kind of Accidents cause a great Diversity in the sequel of Effects, which depend on the Order of *Grace*. But *GOD* would have all Men sav'd by the simplest ways. Therefore we may, and ought to say in general, That He has chosen the Time, the Place and Manners, which in the process of Time, and by the General Laws of *Nature* and *Grace*, must, all things consider'd, introduce a greater number of the Predestinate into the *Church*. *GOD* does all things for His *Glory*: Therefore among all the possible Combination of *Nature* and *Grace*, He has from the infinite Extent of His Knowledge made choice of that, which could form the perfectest *Church*, and most suitable to His Majesty and Wisdom.

XLIX. This, one would think, were sufficient to answer all the Difficulties that can arise about the Circumstances of our Mysteries: For if it be said, that JESUS CHRIST ought to be Born to a *Roman* Emperour, and to perform His Miracles in the *Metropolis* of the World, that the *Gospel* might spread it self with greater ease into the remotest Countries: it may be boldly answer'd, That though this seems so to Men, yet that Combination of *Nature* and *Grace* had not been so worthy of the Wisdom of *GOD*, as that which He has chosen. I confess *Religion* had been propagated with greater ease; but its Establishment had not been so Divine and Extraordinary, nor consequently an invincible proof of its Reality and Truth. So that, according to that Combination, *Religion* would at this day have been destroy'd; at least less disseminated abroad the World. Besides, when we say that *GOD* acts by the simplest ways, we ever suppose an Equality in the rest, and especially in the *Glory* that ought to redound to *GOD* from His Work. But the *Church* had not been so perfect, nor so worthy of the Greatness and Holiness of *GOD*, if it had been form'd with so much ease. For the Beauty of the Heavenly *Jerusalem* consisting in the Variety of Rewards, accruing upon the several Combats of *Christians*, 'twas requisite the *Martyrs* should lay down their Lives, as well as JESUS CHRIST, to enter into the Possession of their present *Glory*. In a word, this Principle, That of all the infinite Combinations of *Nature* and *Grace*, *GOD* has chosen that, which ought to produce an Effect most worthy of His Greatness and Wisdom, suffices for a General Answer to all the Difficulties that can be started, about the Circum-

ſtances of our Myſteries: like as, to vindicate the Orders of *Nature* and *Grace* in themſelves, we need but know, That GOD being infinitely wiſe, frames no Deſign, but upon the admirable Proportion of Wiſdom and Fecundity, diſcover'd in the ways capable to bring it to paſs, as I have explain'd in the Firſt Diſcourſe.

L. Moſt Men judging of GOD by meaſure of themſelves, imagine that He firſt forms a Deſign, and afterwards conſults His Wiſdom about ways to execute it. For our Volitions generally prevent our Reaſon, and our Deſigns are hardly ever perfectly Rational. But GOD's ways are not like thoſe of Men: who acts in the following manner, if I have well conſulted the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect. GOD, by the infinite Light of His Wiſdom, knows all poſſible Works; and at once all the reſpective ways of producing them. He ſees all the Proportions between Means, and their End. He compares all things by one Eternal, Immutable and Neceſſary View; and by the Compariſon He makes of the Proportions of Wiſdom, and Fecundity, which He diſcovers between the Deſigns and Ways of Executing them, He *freely* forms a Deſign. But the Deſign being form'd, He *neceſſarily* chooſes the general Ways moſt worthy of His Wiſdom, Greatneſs and Goodneſs. For ſince He forms no Deſign, but through the Knowledge of the Means of Executing it, the choice of the Deſign includes the Choice of Means.

LI. When I ſay, That GOD forms His Deſign freely, I would not be thought to mean that He may make choice of another leſs worthy, and reject that which is more worthy of His Wiſdom. For ſuppoſing that GOD wills the Production of an External Work worthy of Him, He is not indifferent in the choice, but muſt produce the perfecteſt poſſible; with reference to the ſimplicity of the ways He acts by. This GOD owes to Himſelf, from following the Rules of His Wiſdom, and He muſt always act in the wiſeſt and perfecteſt manner. But I ſay, that GOD forms His Deſign freely: Becauſe He does not invincibly and neceſſarily love any thing beſides His own Subſtance. Neither the *Incarnation* of the *Word*, nor for a much ſtronger Reaſon, the *Creation* of the World, are neceſſary Emanations of His Nature. GOD is fully ſelf-ſufficient. For the Being infinitely perfect, may be conceiv'd alone, and without neceſſary Relation to any of His Creatures.

LII. As GOD neceſſarily loves Himſelf, He neceſſarily follows the Rules of His Wiſdom. But whereas His Creatures conſtitute no part of His Being; He is ſo full and ſufficient in Himſelf, that nothing obliges Him to produce them; and He is abſolutely indifferent, or free on their account. And therefore it is, that He has made the World in Time. For that Circumſtance ſufficiently ſhews, that the Creatures are not neceſſary Emanations of the Divinity, but eſſentially depending on the Free-will of the *Creator*.

LIII. Lo! however an Objection that offers it ſelf immediately to the Mind. If it were true, that GOD neceſſarily follow'd the Rules of His Wiſdom, the World would not have been created in Time. For either the World is worthy, or unworthy of GOD: if it were better that the World ſhould not be produc'd from nothing, it ought to be Eternal: if on the contrary that it ſhould remain in Nothingneſs, it ought not to be created. Therefore GOD is not oblig'd to ſtick to Rules which His Wiſdom preſcribes, ſince the World was created in Time.

But this Objection is eaſily anſwer'd. 'Tis better for the World to be, than not to be: but it had better not be at all, than be Eternal. The Creature ought to carry the Eſſential Character of Dependency. If Spirits were Eternal, they might have ſome reaſon to conſider themſelves as Gods, or neceſſary Beings; or at leaſt, as capable of contributing to the Greatneſs or Felicity of GOD; whilſt imagining He could not fore-go producing them. They might in a manner compare themſelves with the Perſons in the *Deity*, while believing themſelves produc'd like them by a neceſſary Emanation. Thus GOD ought by the Rules of His Wiſdom to leave Creatures the Mark of their Dependence; and yet give them Aſſurance that He made them not to annihilate them; and that being conſtant in His purpoſes, by reaſon of His unlimited Wiſdom, they ſhall eternally ſubſiſt.

LIV. This Difficulty may ſtill be driven farther in this manner. GOD neceſſarily follows the Rules of His Wiſdom, and neceſſarily does what is beſt. But it was at leaſt better for the World to be created in Time, than not to be at all. And certainly it was fit by the Rules of the Wiſdom of GOD, that the World ſhould be produc'd in the Circumſtances, in which He produc'd it. Therefore the Creation of the World in time is abſolutely neceſſary, GOD was not at Liberty on its account, not capable of hindring its Temporary Production.

For the Reſolution of this Difficulty, it muſt be obſerv'd, That though GOD follows the Rules preſcrib'd by His Wiſdom, yet He does not neceſſarily what is beſt; becauſe being Maſter of His Action, He may chooſe to do any thing. To Act, and not to follow the Rules of His Wiſdom, is a Fault: Therefore on ſuppoſition that GOD acts, He neceſſarily acts in the wiſeſt manner conceivable. But His Liberty in the Production of the World, is a ſign of His Abundance, Fulneſs, and Self-ſufficiency. 'Tis better for the World to be, than not to be; the *Incarnation* of JESUS CHRIST renders the Work of GOD worthy of its Author, I acknowledge: But whereas GOD is eſſentially happy and perfect, and as nothing is good on His conſideration, but Himſelf, or the Cauſe of His Perfection and His happineſs, He loves nothing invincibly beſides His own ſubſtance; and whatever is exteriour to Him, ought to be produc'd by an Action really eternal, and immutable, but that derives its neceſſity from ſuppoſition of the Divine Decrees.

LV.

LV. I offer another Principle, which I have already mention'd, which may afford ſome light to the difficulties that may riſe about the Incarnation of *JESUS CHRIST*, and the Creation of the World. Reaſon and Authority of Holy Writ teach us, that the Firſt and Principal of the Deſigns of *GOD*, is the conſtitution of His *Church* in *Jeſus Chriſt*. The preſent World is not created to remain as it is: The falſhood and Error, the injuſtice, and diſorder that are ſeen in it, give us ſufficiently to underſtand it ought to have an end. The future World, which Truth and Juſtice ſhall inhabit, is the Earth which *GOD* has ſettled on inviolable foundations; and which being the Object of Divine Love, ſhall eternally ſubſiſt. *GOD* has not created this Viſible World with other deſign, than to raiſe by degrees that inviſible City, whereof St. *John* ſpeaks ſo many wonders; and as *Jeſus Chriſt* ſhall be the principal Beauty of it: He was always had in view by *GOD*, in the production of His Work. He has made all for Man, and with reference to him, as the Scripture teaches; But He, for whom according to St. *Paul*, *GOD* has made all things, is the Man *Jeſus Chriſt*. Heb. 2. 'Tis to teach Men that they are created, and that they ſubſiſt in *Jeſus Chriſt*; 'tis to unite them ſtraitly to Him; 'tis to induce them to make themſelves like Him, that *GOD* has figur'd *Jeſus Chriſt* and His *Church*, in the principal of His Creatures. For 'tis neceſſary that *Jeſus Chriſt* ſhould be found in the whole Work of *GOD*, that it might be the worthy Object of His Love, and of the Action that produc'd it.

LVI. If we conſider the manner of the Firſt Man's Creation, as related by Holy Scripture, how his Wife was form'd out of his Fleſh and Bone; his love to her, and the Circumſtances of their ſin, we ſhall doubtleſs judge that *GOD* thought on the Second *Adam* in the formation of the Firſt; that He conſider'd the Father of the future World, in creating the Father of the preſent; and that He deſign'd the Firſt Man and Woman for expreſs Types of *Jeſus Chriſt*, and His *Church*. St. *Paul* permits us not to doubt of this Truth, when he aſſures us, we are form'd of the Fleſh and Bone of *Jeſus Chriſt*, that we are His Members; and that the Marriage of *Adam* and *Eve*, is the Figure of *Jeſus Chriſt* and His *Church*. 1 Cor. 12. 27. Eph. 5. 30, &c.

LVII. *GOD* might perhaps form Men and Animals by ways as ſimple, as common Generation. But ſince this way typified *JESUS CHRIST*, and His *Church*, ſince it wore the Impreſs of the principal of *GOD*'s Deſigns, and repreſented, as I may the well-belov'd Son to His Father, that *Son*, in whom alone the whole Work of the Creation ſubſiſts, *GOD* ought to prefer it before all other: thereby likewiſe to teach us, that as intelligible Beauties conſiſt in their Relation to Eternal Wiſdom, ſo ſenſible Beauties muſt, though in a manner little known to us, relate to Incarnate Truth.

LVIII. Doubtleſs there are many *Analogies*, and agreements betwixt the moſt principal of the Creatures, and *Jeſus Chriſt*, who is their pattern, and their end. For all is full of *Jeſus Chriſt*: every thing repreſents and typifies Him, as much as the ſimplicity of the Laws of Nature will permit. But I ſhall not venture to enter on the particulars of this ſubject. For beſides that I am fearful of miſtaking, and have not a competent Knowledge either of *Nature*, or *Grace*, of the preſent World, or the future, to diſcover their Relations; I know that the Imagination of Men is ſo ſarcaſtical and nice, than we cannot by *Reaſon* lead them to GOD, much leſs to *JESUS CHRIST*, without tiring their Patience, or provoking their Raillery. Moſt *Chriſtians* are accuſtom'd to ~~a *Philoſophy* that had rather have recourſe to~~ Fictions, as extravagant as thoſe of the Poets, than to GOD: and ſome of them are ſo little acquainted with *JESUS CHRIST*, that a Man would perhaps be reckon'd a *Viſioniſt*, if he ſaid the ſame things with St. *Paul*, without uſing his words. For 'tis rather that great Name which perſwades them, than the view of Truth. The Authority of Scripture keeps them from blaſpheming what they do not underſtand: but whereas they are but little converſant with it, it cannot much enlighten them.

LIX. 'Tis certain that the *Jewiſh* People was the figure of the *Church*, and that the moſt Holy and Remarkable Perſons among the Kings, Prophets, and Patriarchs of that Nation, were the Types of the *Meſſiah* our *Saviour Jeſus Chriſt*, which is a Truth not deniable, without undermining the Foundations of the *Chriſtian Religion*, and making the moſt learned of the *Apoſtles* paſs for the moſt ignorant of Men. *JESUS CHRIST* being not yet come, ought at leaſt to be typified. For He ought to be expected, He ought to be deſired, and by His Types He ought to ſtrew ſome ſort of Beauty over the Univerſe, to make it acceptable to His Father. Thus it was neceſſary He ſhould in ſome manner be as ancient as the World, and that He ſhould die preſently after the Sin in the Perſon of *Abel*. *The Lamb that was ſlain from the foundation of the World: The Beginning and End: Alpha and Omega; Yeſterday and to Day: He is, was, and is to come.* Theſe are the Qualifications St. *John* attributes to the *Saviour* of Men.

LX. But ſuppoſing that *Jeſus Chriſt* ought to be typified, 'twas neceſſary it ſhould be done by His Anceſtors eſpecially: and that their Hiſtory dictated by the *Holy Spirit*, ſhould be handed down to future Ages, to the end we might ſtill compare *Jeſus Chriſt* with His Figures, and aknowledge Him for the true *Meſſiah*. Of all Nations GOD loving that moſt which had neareſt Relation to His *Son*, ought to make the *Jews* the Fathers of *Jeſus Chriſt* according to the Fleſh, ſince they had been the moſt lively and expreſs Figures of His *Son*.

LXI. But, if driving this difficulty up higher, the Reaſon be demanded of the choice *GOD* made of the *Jews* to be the principal Figures of JESUS CHRIST, I think I may and ought affirm, that GOD acting always by the ſimpleſt ways, and diſcovering in

the infinite Treasures of His Wisdom, all the Combinations of Nature with Grace, chose that which was to make the *Church* the most ample, most perfect, and most worthy of His own Greatness and Holiness; as I have said before. Secondly, I think I ought to answer, that GOD fore-seeing that what was to happen to the *Jewish* People by a necessary consequence of Natural Laws, would have more *Analogy* to His design of typifying JESUS CHRIST and His *Church*, than all that could befall other Nations; thought fit to choose that People rather than any other. For in brief, Predestination to the *Laws* is not like Predestination to *Grace*, and though there be nothing in *Nature* that can oblige GOD to shed His Grace equally on a whole People, yet methinks Nature may merit the Law, in the sense I here understand it.

LXII. 'Tis true that all that befell the *Jews* who represented JESUS CHRIST, was not a necessary Consequence of the Order of Nature: There was need of Miracles to make the *Jews* lively, and express Figures of the *Church*. But Nature at least furnish'd Ground-work, and Materials, and possibly the principal strokes in most instances, and Miracles finish'd the rest. Whereas no other Nation would have been so proper for so just and accomplish'd a Design.

LXIII. If I mistake not, we are oblig'd to think that *GOD*, having a Wisdom prescious of all the Events and Consequences of all possible Orders, and all their Combinations, never works Miracles when Nature is sufficient; and that therefore He must choose that Combination of Natural Effects, which, as it were, remitting Him the expence of Miracles, nevertheless most faithfully executes His Designs.

For Example, 'Tis necessary that all sin should be punish'd. But that's not always done in this World. Yet supposing it was requisite for the Glory of *Jesus Christ*, and the Establishment of Religion, that the *Jews* should be punish'd in the face of the whole World, for the crime they had committed in murdering our *Saviour*; it was fit that *Jesus Christ* should come into the World about the Reign of *Herod*, supposing that People by the necessary Consequence of the Order of Nature, was to be divided about that time; that Civil Wars and perpetual Seditions were to weaken them; and that lastly, the *Romans* were to ruine and disperse them, with the total destruction of their City and Temple. 'Tis true, there seems to be something extraordinary in the Desolation of the *Jews*: But as it shews greater Wisdom in *GOD*, to produce so surprizing Effects, by the most simple and general Laws of Nature, than by particular Wills, which are always Miracles; I question whether on that occasion we are to fly unto a Miracle. But for my part, I dispute it not here; since 'tis a fact, that we cannot easily, nor need we explain our selves upon: And I produce this instance, only to make some Application of my Principles, and to make them more easily intelligible to others.

I have, I think, said enough of *Nature* and *Grace*, to satisfy all equitable and moderate Persons about an infinite number of Difficulties, which disturb only their Minds, who must needs judge of *GOD* by themselves. For if Men would consult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being, of a general Cause, of an infinite Wisdom; and if they would consent to the Principles I have establish'd comformable to that Idea, I believe they would neither be surpriz'd, nor offended at the conduct of GOD, and that they would change their Murmurs and Censures, into Wonder and Adoration.

CONCERNING

Nature and Grace.

DISCOURSE the THIRD.

Of the manner of GRACE's *acting in us.*

PART the FIRST.

Concerning Liberty.

I.

THERE is nothing more rude and unform'd, than the substance of Spirits, if we separate it from GOD. For what's a Mind void of Understanding and Reason; destitute of Motion and Love? Yet it is the *Word* and *Wisdom* of GOD, which is the universal Reason of Minds; and 'tis the Love whereby GOD loves Himself, that gives the Soul the Motion she has towards Good. If the Mind knows Truth, 'tis by its Natural and Necessary Union with Truth it self: if it is reasonable, 'tis so through supream Reason: Lastly, if it be a Spirit, or Intelligence, 'tis in one sense, because its sub-

stance

ſtance is enlightned, penetrated, and perfected by the Light of GOD Himſelf. Theſe Truths I have explain'd in another place. So likewiſe the ſubſtance of the Soul is not capable of loving Good, ſave by its Natural and Neceſſary Union with the Eternal, and Subſtantial Love of the ſupream Good; it advances not towards Good any farther than convey'd by GOD: it is volent only from the Motion it continually receives from Him: It lives only through Charity, and wills meerly through the Love of Good, which GOD makes it participate, though it abuſes it. For in fine, GOD making and preſerving Minds only for Himſelf, inclines them towards Him as long as He preſerves their Being, and communicates the Love of Good to them, whilſt they are capable of receiving it. Now that Natural and continual Motion of the Soul towards Good in general, towards Good indefinite, towards GOD, is what I here call *Will*. Since 'tis that Motion which capacitates the Subſtance of the Soul to love different Goods.

II. This Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general, is invincible; for 'tis not in our Power not to will to be happy. We neceſſarily love what we clearly know, and lively feel to be our Good. All Minds love *GOD* by the neceſſity of their Nature; and if they love any thing elſe by a free choice of their Will, 'tis not becauſe they ſeek not *GOD*, or the cauſe of their Felicity, but becauſe they are deceiv'd. 'Tis becauſe, perceiving by a confus'd ſenſation, that ſurrounding Bodies make them happy, they conſider them as good, and by an Ordinary and Natural Conſequence, love them, and unite to them.

III. But the Love of all theſe particular Goods, is not naturally invincible. Man conſider'd in his original ſtate, might ſuperſede loving thoſe Goods that fill'd not the whole Capacity of his Affection. There being but one Good which includes all others, he might ſacrifice every other Love to the Love of this. For *GOD* having made Minds only for Himſelf, cannot invincibly carry them to the loving any thing beſides Him, or without relation to Him. Laſtly, our own inward Conſciouſneſs informs us, that we can reject a Fruit, though we are inclin'd to take it. Now that Power of loving, or not loving particular Goods, the *Non-invincibility* which is found in the Motion, which carrys Minds to the loving what does not ſeem every way incluſive of all Goods. That Power, or *Non-invincibility*, is what I call *Liberty*. Thus placing the Definition inſtead of the thing defin'd, that Expreſſion our *Will is free*, ſignifies that the Natural Motion of the Soul towards Good in general, is not invincible in point of Good in particular. To the word *Free*, the Idea of Voluntary is commonly annex'd; but in the ſequel of this Diſcourſe, I ſhall take the word in the ſence I have obſerv'd, as being the moſt Natural and Ordinary.

IV. The word *Good* is equivocal, and may ſignify either Pleaſure which makes formally happy, or the true, or ſeeming cauſe of Pleaſure. In this Diſcourſe I ſhall conſtantly take the word Good in the ſecond Sence; becauſe indeed Pleaſure is imprinted on the Soul, that ſhe may love the Cauſe that makes her happy, that ſhe may advance towards it by the Motion of her Love, and may ſtrictly unite to it, to be perpetually happy. When the Soul loves nothing but her own Pleaſure, ſhe in effect loves nothing diſtinct from her ſelf. For Pleaſure is only a condition or modification of the Soul, which renders her actually happy and content. But whilſt the Soul cannot be the cauſe of her own Pleaſure, ſhe's unjuſt, ungrateful and blind, if ſhe loves her Pleaſure, and forgets to pay the Love and Devotion which is due to the true cauſe that produces it in her. As none but God can act immediately and by Himſelf on the Soul, and make her ſenſible of Pleaſure, by the actual Efficacy of His all-potent Will. So He alone is truly Good. However I term the Creatures Good which are the ſeeming Cauſes of the Pleaſures we feel occaſionally from them. For I am unwilling to deviate from the Cuſtomary way of Speaking any farther than is neceſſary to explain my ſelf clearly. All Creatures though Good in themſelves, or Perfect with reference to the Deſigns of GOD, are not Good with reference to us. They are not our Good, nor the true cauſe of our Pleaſure or Felicity.

V. The natural Motion which GOD conſtantly imprints on the Soul to carry it to love Him, or (to make uſe of a Term which is the Abridgment of ſeveral Idea's, and can be no longer equivocal or confus'd after the Definition I have given of it,) the *Will* is determin'd towards particular Goods, either by a clear and evident Knowledge, or by a confus'd Senſation which points theſe Goods out to us. Whilſt the Mind perceives or taſts not any particular Good, the Motion of the Soul remains as it were undetermin'd, it tends towards Good in general. But this Motion receives a particular Determination, as ſoon as the Mind has the Idea or Senſation of ſome particular Good: For the Soul being continually bent towards Good undetermin'd, ought to move when the Good appears.

VI. But when the Good which is preſent to the Mind and Senſes, fills not theſe two Faculties; when its diſcover'd under the Idea of a particular Good, of a Good that comprehends not all Goods; and when it is taſted by a Senſation that takes not up the whole Capacity of the Soul; ſhe may ſtill deſire the perception and fruition of ſome other Good: ſhe may ſuſpend the Judgment of her Love. She may refuſe to acquieſce in the actual Enjoyment, and by her Deſires ſeek out ſome novel Object. And as her Deſires are the occaſional Cauſes of her Light and Knowledge, ſhe may by the natural and neceſſary Union of all Minds with Him, who includes the Idea's of all Goods, diſcover the True Good, and in the True, many other particular Goods different from that ſhe perceiv'd and enjoy'd before.

Therefore having ſome Knowledge of the Emptineſs and Vanity of ſenſible Goods, and attending to the ſecret Reproaches of her Reaſon, to the Remorſes of her Conſcience, to the Complaints and Menaces of the True Good, who will not that ſhe ſhould Sacrifice to ſeeming and imaginary Goods; may, by the Motion which GOD continually imprints on her for Good in general, Sovereign Good, that is for Himſelf, check her ſelf in her courſe towards any particular Good. She may reſiſt the ſenſible Allurements, ſearch and find out other Objects, compare them together, and with the indelible Idea of the Supream Good; and love none of them with a determinate Love. And if the Sovereign Good comes to be ſomewhat reliſht, ſhe may prefer it to all particular Goods, though the Pleaſure and Satisfaction they ſeem to infuſe into the Soul, be extreamly great and very agreeable. But theſe Truths require a larger Explication.

VII. The Soul is conſtantly driven towards Good in general: ſhe deſires the Poſſeſſion of all Goods; and will never limit her Love; there being no Good that appears ſuch, that ſhe refuſes to love. Therefore when ſhe actually enjoys a particular Good, ſhe has a Tendency to proceed farther: ſhe ſtill deſires ſomething more, by the natural and invincible Impreſſion which GOD gives her; and to change or divide her Love, it ſuffices to preſent her another Good beſides that of her preſent Enjoyment, and to give her a Taſt of the Pleaſure it affords. Now the Soul may ordinarily ſeek and diſcover new Goods. She may likewiſe approach and enjoy them. For in fine, her Deſires are the natural or occaſional Cauſes of her Knowledge: and Objects appear, and draw towards her in proportion to her Earneſtneſs to know them. A Man of Ambition who conſiders the Luſtre of a Dignity, may likewiſe think on the Slavery, Conſtraint, and the true Evils that accompany Humane Grandeur. He may ſumm up the Account, weigh and compare all together, if his Paſſion does not blind him. For I confeſs there are Moments, in which Paſſion takes away all Liberty from the Mind, and that it always leſſens it. Thus as a Dignity, however great it appears, cannot be taken by a perfectly free and rational Man, for univerſal and infinite Good, whilſt the Will extends to all Goods: This perfectly free and perfectly rational Man, may enquire after and find out others, in as much as he can deſire them; it being his Deſires which diſcover and preſent them to him. He may then examine them and compare them with that which he enjoys. But whereas he can find only particular Goods on Earth, he may and ought whilſt he lives here below, to examine them, and perpetually ſeek and never acquieſce. Or rather, that he may not be conſtantly following a freſh Chaſe, he ought in general to neglect all tranſitory Goods, and deſire only ſuch as are Immutable and Eternal.

VIII. But whereas we love not to ſeek, but to enjoy, and that the Labour of Examination is at preſent very painful, but Repoſe and Enjoyment always very agreeable, the Soul commonly reſts when ſhe has found any Good; ſhe ſtops at it to enjoy it: She deceives her ſelf; becauſe by her miſtaking and judging ſhe has found what ſhe looks for, her Deſire is chang'd into Pleaſure; and Pleaſure makes her happier than Deſire. But her Happineſs cannot laſt long: Her Pleaſure being ill-grounded, unjuſt and deceitful, immediately diſquiets and moleſts her; becauſe ſhe deſires to be ſolidly and truly Happy. Thus the natural love of Good quickens her, and produces in her new Deſires. Theſe confus'd Deſires repreſent new Objects. The love of Pleaſure puts her on the purſuit of thoſe which afford or ſeem to afford it, and the love of her Repoſe faſtens her upon them. She does not immediately examine the Defects of the preſent Good, when pre-poſſeſt with its ſweetneſs; but rather contemplates it on its beſt ſide, applies to that which charms her; and thinks only of enjoying it. But the more ſhe enjoys, the more ſhe loves it, and the cloſer ſhe approaches, the more curiouſly ſhe conſiders it. But the more ſhe conſiders it, the more Imperfections ſhe ſpies in it; and ſince ſhe deſires to be truly Happy, ſhe cannot for ever be miſtaken. When ſhe is thirſty and hungry, and weary with ſeeking, ſhe preſently inebriates and fills her ſelf with the firſt Good ſhe finds; but ſhe is preſently diſguſted with a Nouriſhment which was not made for Man. Thus the love of the true Good excites in her new Deſires for freſh Goods; and whilſt ſhe conſtantly changes her purſuit, all her Life, and her whole Happineſs on Earth, conſiſts in a continual Circulation of Thoughts, Deſires and Pleaſures. Such ist he Soul which makes no uſe of her Liberty, but leaves her ſelf to the Conduct of Chance, to be guided by the obtaining Motion, and the fortuitous Concourſe of determining Objects. But this is the State of a Man whoſe Underſtanding is ſo weak, as daily to miſtake the falſe for the true Good; and whoſe Heart is ſo corrupt, as to betray and ſell it ſelf to every thing it is toucht with, to the Good which gives it an actual Senſe of the moſt ſweet and agreeable Pleaſures.

IX. But a Man perfectly free, ſuch as we conceive *Adam* immediately after his Creation, knows that none but GOD is his Good, or the true Cauſe of the Pleaſures he enjoys. Though he feels Satisfaction upon the approach of circumambient Bodies, he loves them not; GOD only he loves, and if GOD forbid him to unite to Bodies, he is ready to forſake them, what Pleaſure ſoever he finds in them. He reſolves to fix only in the Enjoyment of the ſupream Good, and to ſacrifice all others to it; and though never ſo deſirous of Happineſs, or the enjoyment of Pleaſures, no Pleaſure is ſtronger than His Light. Not but that Pleaſures can blind him, perturbate his Reaſon, and fill up his thinking Capacity. (For the Mind being finite, all Pleaſure is capable of dividing and diſtracting it:) but that Pleaſures

ſures being ſubjected to his Will, he is too cautious, to be intoxicated by them. For the ſole invincible Pleaſure is that of the Bleſſed, or that which the Firſt Man had found in GOD, if GOD ſhould have prevented and hindred his Fall; not only becauſe this Pleaſure fills all the Faculties of the Soul, without diſturbing her Reaſon, or carrying her to the love of a pretended Good; but alſo becauſe nothing withſtands the Enjoyment of this Pleaſure; neither the Deſire of Perfection, nor that of Felicity. For when we love GOD we are perfect; when we enjoy Him we are happy: and when we love Him with Pleaſure, we are happy and perfect all at once. Thus the perfecteſt Liberty is that of Minds, which can at all times overcome the greateſt Pleaſures: of Minds, to which no Motion towards particular Goods is ever irreſiſtible: 'tis that of a Man before the Sin, before Concupiſcence troubled his Mind, and corrupted his Heart. And the moſt imperfect Liberty is that of thoſe to whom no Motion towards a particular Good, though never ſo little, but is invincible in all ſorts of Circumſtances.

X. Now betwixt theſe Two ſorts of Liberty there are more and leſs Perfect to an Infinity of Degrees; which is a thing not ſufficiently minded. 'Tis commonly imagin'd that Liberty is equal in all Men, and that 'tis an Eſſential Faculty of the Mind, the Nature whereof remains conſtantly the ſame, though its Action varies according to the diverſity of Objects. For we regardleſly ſuppoſe a perfect Equality in all things, wherein no ſenſible Inequality appears. Men indulge their Mind, and rid it of all tedious Application, by giving things an abſtract Form, conſiſting in a ſort of indiviſible Eſſence. But this is an Error, Liberty being no ſuch Faculty as is imagin'd. There are not Two Perſons equally Free in reſpect of the ſame Objects. Children have leſs Liberty than Men arriv'd to the perfect Exerciſe of their Reaſon: Nor are there Two Men whoſe Reaſon is equally clear, conſtant and certain in regard of the ſame Objects: Thoſe whoſe Paſſions are unruly, and who have been unaccuſtom'd to reſiſt them, are leſs Free than others who have couragiouſly impugn'd them, and who are naturally Men of Temper; and there are not Two Men equally moderate, equally ſenſible to the ſame Objects, and who have equally *fought* for the Preſervation of their Liberty. Some Perſons there are ſo ſold to Sin, that they leſs reſiſt, or think of reſiſting it when Awake, than Pious Men in their Sleep; ſince we are taught by the Word of Truth, that he who commits Sin, becomes a Slave to it.

XI. True it is, that by the Inſtitution of Nature, all Men are equally Free: for GOD does not invincibly determine Men to the love of any particular Good. But Concupiſcence corrupts the Moral and Intellectual part; and ſince Man has loſt the power of obliterating the tracts of ſenſible Pleaſures, and ſtopping the Motions of Concupiſcence: That Liberty which had been equal in all Men, if they had not ſinn'd, grows unequal according to their different degrees of Light, and as variouſly work'd on by Concupiſcence. For Concupiſcence it ſelf, which is equal in all Men, in as much as they have loſt their Power over their Body, is a thouſand ways unequal; becauſe of the diverſity that is found in the conſtruction of the Body, in the multiplicity and Motion of the Spirits, and thoſe almoſt infinite Alliances and Relations obtain'd through the Commerce of the World.

XII. To our diſtincter underſtanding the Inequality which is found in the Liberty of different Perſons, we muſt obſerve that every Man perfectly reaſonable, perfectly free, and who would be truly happy, may and ought, upon the preſence of any Object which gives him the ſenſe of Pleaſure, ſuſpend his Love, and carefully examine whether this Object be the true Good, or whether the Motion which carries him towards it, exactly comport with that which leads him to the true Good: Otherwiſe he would love by Inſtinct, and not by Reaſon; and if he could not ſuſpend the Judgement of his Love, before he had examin'd it, he would not be perfectly free. But if he clearly diſcovers that this Object, which gives him the ſenſe of Pleaſure, is truly good to him; and if the Evidence in conjunction with the Senſation be ſuch as will not permit him to ſuſpend his Judgement, then, though perfectly free, he is no longer free in reſpect of that Good; but he invincibly loves it, becauſe Pleaſure agrees with Evidence. But being that *GOD* alone can act in us, as our Good, and the Motion which byaſſes us towards the Creatures is repugnant to that which carries us towards *GOD*: every Man perfectly reaſonable and entirely free, may and muſt forbear to judge that ſenſible Objects are his Goods. He may and ought to ſuſpend the Judgement which regulates, or ſhould regulate his Love. For he can never evidently ſee that ſenſible Goods are true Goods, ſince that can never be evidently ſeen, which is not.

XIII. This Power of ſuſpending the Judgement, which is the actual rule of Love; this Power, which is the principle of our Liberty, and by which Pleaſures are not always invincible, is very much weaken'd ſince the ſin, though not quite deſtroy'd. And that we may have actually this Power, when we are tempted by an Object, 'tis neceſſary beſides the Love of Order, to have a thoughtful Mind, and to be ſenſible to the remorſe of Conſcience; for a Child or a Man aſleep have not actually this Power. But all Men are not equally enlightned. The Mind of Sinners is full of Darkneſs. Conſciences are not equally tender, the Heart of Sinners is hardned. The Love of Order, actual Graces are unequal in all Men: therefore they are not equally free; nor have equal power of ſuſpending their Judgement: Pleaſure determines them, and moves ſome rather than others. This man can ſuſpend his Judgement, and

wave his Conſent, when a preſent Object gives him the taſt of a moſt quickning and ſenſible Pleaſure. And another is of ſo narrow a Mind, and corrupt an Heart, that the leaſt Pleaſure is irreſiſtible, and the leaſt Pain inſupportable. Being not wont to fight againſt ſenſible Allurements, he becomes ſo diſpos'd as not even to think of reſiſting them. Thus he has not then the Power of deferring his Conſent, ſince he even wants the Power of making a Reflection; and in regard to that Object, is like a Man aſleep, or out of his Wits.

XIV. The more weak is Reaſon, the more ſenſible grows the Soul, and more readily and falſly ſhe judges of ſenſible Good and Evil. If a Leaf pricks, or even tickles a Man when aſleep, he wakes in a ſtart, frighted as if bitten by a Serpent. He perceives this little Evil, and judges of it as of the greateſt misfortunes: ſo intolerable it appears to him. His Reaſon fainting by the ſlumber, incapacitates him from ſuſpending his judgement. To him the leaſt Goods as well as Evils, are almoſt always inſuperable. For 'tis the Senſes which judge in him, and theſe are haſty Deciders: which muſt be ſo for ſeveral reaſons. When Reaſon is leſs diſabled, little Pleaſures are not invincible, nor little Evils intolerable: and Men are not always bound, where moſt Pleaſure is to be found. For ſome Pleaſures are ſo little, that they are deſpicable to Reaſon, which is never quite deſtitute of the love of Order. The preſence of little Evils, is not very frightful: A Man, for Example, reſolves to be let Blood, and ſuffers it: he judges not ſo haſtily, but examines: and the ſtronger is Reaſon, the longer is its ſuſpence, againſt ſenſible Invitations and Diſcouragements. Now there is nothing more certain, than that all Men who partake of the ſame Reaſon, partake not of it equally, that all are not equally ſenſible; at leaſt to the ſame Objects: that they are not all equally well Born, equally well Bred, equally aſſiſted by the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST*; and therefore not equally free, or capable of ſuſpending the Judgement of their Love in point of the ſame Objects.

XV. But we are to take notice, that the chief Duty of Minds is to preſerve and increaſe their Liberty; ſince 'tis by the good uſe poſſible to be made of it, they may merit their Felicity, if ſuccour'd by the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST*, at leaſt leſſen their Miſery, if left to themſelves. That which weakens our Liberty, or makes moſt Pleaſures irreſiſtible to us, is the Eclipſe of our Reaſon, and the loſs of Power we ought to have over our Body. Reaſon therefore muſt be inſtructed by continual Meditations: we muſt conſider our Duties, that we may perform them; and our Infirmities, that we may have recourſe to Him, who is our Strength. And ſince we have loſt the Power of ſtopping the Impreſſions made by the preſence of Objects on the Body, which thence corrupt the Mind and Heart, we ought to avoid Objects, and make uſe of the Power that is left us. We ought to watch conſtantly over the purity of our Imagination, and labour with all our Powers to efface the adulterate Traces imprinted by falſe Goods, ſince they kindle Deſires in us, which divide our Mind, and weaken our Liberty. By this means the Man whoſe Liberty is juſt expiring, who cannot conquer the leaſt of Pleaſures, may obtain ſuch a Strength, and ſuch a Freedom, as not to yield to the greateſt Souls, their Succours being ſuppos'd equal. For at leaſt whilſt theſe Pleaſures do not importune us to Evil, we may lay in to avoid them. We may fortify our ſelves by ſome reaſon, that may through future Pleaſures countervail thoſe we don't actually enjoy. For as every one has ſome love of Order, there is no Man but may vanquiſh a feeble and light Pleaſure, by a ſtrong and ſolid Reaſon. Laſtly, there is no one but may by the Ordinary ſupplies of Grace, vanquiſh ſome Pleaſures, and avoid others: Which Pleaſures formerly invincible or ſtudied, being vanquiſh'd or avoided, are a preparatory to our aſſaulting others, at leaſt before they tempt us. For the Satisfaction we find in the Victory, provokes us again to battle: and the Joy of a good Conſcience, and the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST* adminiſter Courage: And even the Fear of a Defeat is not uſeleſs, ſince it makes us fly to Him who can do all things; and make us diſcreet in avoiding perillous occaſions. Thus we are always gainers in this ſort of Exerciſe: for if we are worſted, we become more humble, wiſe, and circumſpect; and ſometimes more earneſt for the Combat, and more capable of conquering or Reſiſting.

XVI. As in the ſtudy of the Sciences, thoſe who ſubmit not to the falſe glimpſes of Probabilities, and who are wont to ſuſpend their Judgement, till the Light of Truth breaks into them, fall rarely into Error: whereas the vulgar part of Men, are daily deceiv'd by their precipitate Judgements. So in Moral Diſcipline, thoſe who uſe to ſcrifice their Pleaſures to the love of Orders, and who continually mortify their Senſes and Paſſions; eſpecially in things which ſeem of little moment, which every one may do, will in things important obtain a great facility of ſuſpending the Judgement, which regulates their Love. Pleaſure does not ſurprize them, like other Men, at leaſt does not drag them along unawares. It ſeems on the contrary, that whilſt it ſenſibly affects them, it cautions them to take care of themſelves, and to conſult Reaſon, or the Rules of the Goſpel. Their Conſcience is more nice and tender than that of others, who in the Scripture Phraſe, drink ſin like water. They are ſenſible to the ſecret Reproaches of Reaſon, and the wholeſome precautions of inward Truth. So that the acquir'd habit of Reſiſting feeble and light Pleaſures, makes way for the Conquering the more violent; at leaſt for the ſuffering ſome regret and ſhame, when a Man is conquer'd, which creates forthwith diſlike and abhorrence. Liberty thus inſenſibly increaſing, and perfecting it ſelf by Exerciſe, and the Aſſiſtance of Grace, we may at laſt put our ſelves in a

capacity

capacity of performing the most difficult Commandments; in as much as by the ordinary Graces which are constantly afforded *Christians*, we may overcome common Temptations, and for the most part avoid the greatest; and by the Assistance of the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST* there is none but may be vanquish'd.

XVII. 'Tis true, that a Sinner so dispos'd, as not able so much as to think of resisting a surprizing Pleasure, cannot actually accomplish the Commandment that orders him not to enjoy it. For the Pleasure is insuperable to him in that estate. And if we but suppose this Person in this state of Impotence, through a Natural Necessity, his sin not being free could not make him more culpable, I mean more worthy of the punishment of Pain, than if he were inordinate in his sleep. Nay, if this Impotency were a necessary Consequence of the free Disorders which had preceded his Conversion, it would not be imputed to him, by reason of his *Charity*. But since he was both able, and oblig'd to use himself to resisting Pleasure, and combating for the Preservation and Augmentation of his Liberty; this sin though actually committed by a kind of Necessity, renders him guilty and punishable; if not by reason of his sin, at least because of his Negligence, which is the principle of it. The Commandment of *GOD* is not absolutely impossible; but the Sinner may and ought for the fore-going Reasons, to put himself into a condition of observing it: since Men are oblig'd as well as able to labour constantly to augment and perfect their Liberty: not only by the helps reach'd to them by *JESUS CHRIST*, but also by Natural Forces, or ordinary Graces. For in brief, Nature may be made subservient to Grace in a thousand Instances.

PART the SECOND.

Of GRACE.

XVIII.

THE inequality which is found in the Liberty of different Persons being clearly known, it will be no hard matter, methinks, to discover how Grace works in us; if we but affix to the word *Grace* distinct and particular Idea's, and remember the difference between the Grace of the *Creator*, and *Renovator*. I said in the preceding Discourse, that there is this difference between Light and Pleasure, that the former leaves us entirely to our selves; whilst the latter incroaches upon our Liberty. For Light is something extraneous to us: it does not affect and modify our Soul: it does not drive us to the Objects it discovers; but only disposes us to move our selves, and to consent freely, and by reason to the Impression GOD gives us towards Good. The Knowledge of our Duty, the clear Idea of Order, separate from all sensation, the contemplation of naked, abstract, wholly pure, and intelligible Good, that is good, without Tast or Fore-tast, leaves the Soul to her entire Liberty. But Pleasure is an In-mate to the Soul, it touches and modifies her. And so it diminishes our Liberty, makes us love Good, rather by a Love of Instinct and Passion, than of Choice and Reason. And it transports us, as I may say, to sensible Objects: Not that Pleasure is the same thing as Love, or the Motion of the Soul towards Good; but that it causes this Love, or determines this Motion towards the Object that makes us happy. But because no Truths are demonstrable, save those whereof we have clear Idea's; which we have not of our own inward Motions, 'tis not possible for me to demonstrate what I advance, as we demonstrate the Conclusions depending on common Notions. Every one therefore must consult his own inward feeling of what passes in his Soul, if he would be convinc'd of the difference between Light and Pleasure; and must carefully observe, that commonly Light is attended with Pleasure, which yet he must separate to judge soundly of it. But of this I have said enough.

XIX. If then it be true, that Pleasure naturally produces Love, and is like a weight, which gives the Soul a propensity to the Good that causes, or seems to cause it: 'tis visible that the Grace of JESUS CHRIST, or the Grace of sensation, is of it self efficacious. For tho' preventing Delectation when but weak, works not an entire Conversion in the Heart of those whose Passions are too lively; yet it never fails of its Effect, in as much as it always inclines them towards GOD. It is in some measure always efficacious, but it has not always all possible Effect, because of the Resistance of Concupiscence.

XX. Put, for Example, in one Scale of a Ballance ten pound weight, and in the other only six; this latter weight shall truly gravitate: for adding but so much more weight to this, or taking it from the opposite Scale, or lastly, hanging the Ballance nearer the over-weighted, and the six pounds shall carry it. But though this weight gravitates, 'tis visible its effect depends still on the resisting weight, and the manner of its resisting. Thus the Grace of Sensation is always of it self efficacious; it constantly weakens the Effort of Concupiscence, since Pleasure Naturally creates Love, for the Cause which produces, or seems to produce it. But though this Grace be always self-efficacious, yet it depends, or rather its effect depends

on the actual Diſpoſitions of the Receiver. The weight of Concupiſcence reſiſts it, and ſenſible Pleaſures, which draw us to the Creatures, which ſeem to produce it in us, hinder the Pleaſures of Grace from uniting us ſtrictly to Him, who alone can act in us, and make us happy.

XXI. But the caſe is otherwiſe with the Grace of Light, or the Grace of the *Creator*. It is not of it ſelf efficacious. It does not move or convey the Soul, but leaves her perfectly to her ſelf. But though it be not efficacious of it ſelf, it nevertheleſs is purſued by many effects, when 'tis great, and animated by ſome delectable Grace, which gives it Force and Vigour; or when it meets with no contrary Pleaſure that reſiſts it. Such is the difference between the Grace of the *Creator*, and that of the *Reſtorer*. between Light and Pleaſure; between the Grace which ſuppoſes not Concupiſcence, and the Grace which is given us to counterpoize the Pleaſures of it. The one is ſufficient to a Man perfectly Free and Fortify'd with Charity. The other is efficacious to a Man Infirm, to whom Pleaſure is neceſſary to draw him to the love of the true Good.

XXII. But the Force and Efficacy of Grace ought always to be compar'd with the Action of Concupiſcence, with the Light of Reaſon; and eſpecially with the degree of Liberty the Perſon is endued with. And we muſt not imagine that *GOD* beſtows it by particular Wills, with deſign to produce certain Effects by it, and nothing more. For when 'tis ſaid, that Grace always works in the Heart the Effect for which 'tis given, we err if we ſuppoſe *GOD* acts like Men, with particular Conſiderations. *GOD* gives His Grace with a General Deſign of ſanctifying all that receive it. Mean while, He knows very well that it will not have ſo much Effect in ſome, as in others; not only becauſe of the Inequality of Force on the part of Grace, but of the Inequality of Reſiſtance on the part of Concupiſcence.

XXIII. Since Concupiſcence has not utterly deſtroy'd the Liberty of Man, the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST*, as efficacious as it is, is not abſolutely irreſiſtible. A ſenſible Pleaſure is ſuperable, when weak; and a Man may ſuſpend the judgement of his Love, when he is not hurried by a too violent Paſſion: And when he ſtoops to the Lure of an adulterate Pleaſure, he is culpable through the abuſe of his Liberty. So likewiſe the Delectation of Grace is not ordinarily invincible. A Man may decline following the good Motions it inſpires, which remove us from the falſe Objects of our Love. This Grace fills not the Soul in ſuch a manner, as to hurry her to the true Good, without Choice, Judgement, and Free Conſent. Thus when we reſign up our ſelves to its Motion, and advance farther, as I may ſay, than it irreſiſtibly carries us: when we ſacrifice the Pleaſures of Concupiſcence, which weaken its efficacy, we merit through the good uſe we make of our Liberty.

XXIV. 'Tis true, that Delectable Grace conſider'd in it ſelf, and ſeparate from the Pleaſures of Concupiſcence, which are contrary to it, is alwys invincible. Becauſe this holy Pleaſure being conformable to the Light of Reaſon, nothing can withſtand its Effect in a Man perfectly free. When the Mind ſees clearly by the Light of Reaſon, that *GOD* is its Good; and has a lively ſenſe of Him by the taſt of Pleaſure, 'tis not poſſible to avoid loving Him. For the Mind deſires Happineſs, and then nothing hinders it from following the agreeable Motions of its Love. It feels no remorſes which oppoſe its preſent Felicity: Nor is it withheld by Pleaſures contrary to that which it enjoys. The Delight of Grace is then invincible; nor is the Love it produces meritorious, unleſs it be greater than its Cauſe. I ſay, that the Love which is meerly a Natural or Neceſſary Effect of the Delectation of Grace, has nothing meritorious, though it be good in it ſelf. For whilſt we move no farther than we are driven, or rather when we advance no longer than we are paid in hand, we haveno claim to any Recompence. When we love *GOD* but ſo far as we are attracted, or becauſe we are attracted, we love Him not by Reaſon, but by Inſtinct; we love Him not on Earth as He requires and deſerves from us. But we merit only when we love *GOD* by Choice, by Reaſon, by the Knowledge we have of His being amiable. We merit in proceeding on, as I may ſay, towards Good, when Pleaſure has determin'd the Motion of Love.

XXV. This ſole Reaſon demonſtrates either that the Firſt Man was not invited to the love of *GOD*, by the blind Inſtinct of Pleaſure; or at leaſt, that this pleaſure was not ſo lively as what he felt in reflecting on his own Natural Perfections, or in the actual uſe of ſenſible Goods. For 'tis evident, ſuch a Pleaſure would have made him impeccable: It would have put him in a ſtate like that of the Bleſſed; which merit no longer: not becauſe they are out of a way-fairing ſtate. For Merit always follows from meritorious Actions, ſince *GOD* being Juſt, muſt neceſſarily reward them: but they merit not, becauſe the Pleaſure they find in *GOD* is equal to their Love, that they are throughly imbued with it, and that being freed from all ſort of Pain, and all Motions of Concupiſcence, they have nothing left to ſacrifice to *GOD*.

XXVI. For that which makes us impeccable, is not preciſely that which incapacitates us to merit. *JESUS CHRIST* was impeccable, and yet He merited His Glory, and that of the *Church*, whereof He is the Head. Being perfectly free, He lov'd His Father, not by the Inſtinct of Pleaſure, but by choice and Reaſon. He lov'd Him, becauſe He intuitively ſaw how

how amiable He was. For the most perfect Liberty is that of a Mind which has all possible Light, and is not determin'd by any pleasure; because all Pleasure preventing or other, naturally produces some love: and unless we resist it, it efficaciously determines towards the agreeable Object the Natural Motion of the Soul But Light, though conceiv'd never so great, leaves the Mind perfectly free, supposing this Light be consider'd alone, and separate from Pleasure.

XXVII. As *JESUS CHRIST* is nothing but the *Word*, or *Reason Incarnate*, certainly He ought not to love Good with a blind Love, with the Love of Instinct, with the Love of Sensation He ought not to love an infinitely amiable Good, and which He knew perfectly worthy of His Love, as we love Goods that are not amiable, and which we cannot know as worthy of Love. He ought not to love His Father by a Love in any respect like that wherewith we love the vilest Creatures; wherewith we love Bodies. His Love to be pure, at least, to be perfectly meritorious, ought to be no wise produc'd by preventing Pleasures.

For Pleasure may and must be the Recompence of a Legitimate Love, as in effect it is in the Saints, and *JESUS CHRIST* Himself. But it cannot be the principle of Merit, nor ought it to precede Reason, unless debilitated. But Reason in *JESUS CHRIST* was no ways weakned. Supream Reason supported the Created. *JESUS CHRIST* who was free from the Motions of Concupiscence, had no need of preventing Delight to counterbalance sensible Pleasures which surprize us. Nay, it may be He refus'd to taste the Pleasure of Joy, which was a natural Result of the Knowledge He had of His Vertue, and perfections, that His Sacrifice might be more holy, more pure, and more disinteress'd. Lastly, beside the privation of all Pleasures preventing, and others; 'tis likely He inwardly suffer'd unspeakable Droughts, not better expressible than by the Dereliction of *GOD*, according to these words of our *Saviour* on the Cross; *My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?* But if we will absolutely have it, that *JESUS CHRIST* was carried by preventing Pleasures to the Love of His Father, 'tis necessary to say, according to the Principles I have laid down, either that His Love was more intense than His Pleasure; since Natural Love produc'd by the Instinct of Pleasure is no ways meritorious; or at least, we must say He merited by sensible Pains, by the continual Sacrifice, which He freely and voluntarily offer'd to His Father. For 'twas necessary He should suffer to enter in possession of His *Glory*: as we are taught by Scripture.

XXVIII. Though the Delectation of Grace, without relation to any contrary Pleasure intelligibly gains the consent of the Will; yet it is not so with the Pleasures of Concupiscence, These Pleasures consider'd in themselves, without respect to other actual Pleasures, are not always insurmountable. The Light of Reason condemns them; the Remorse of Conscience makes us abhor them; and we may commonly suspend our Consent. Therefore the Grace of *JESUS CHRIST* is stronger than Concupiscence; and we may call it Victorious, since the Torments always master the Heart, when equal to the latter. For when the Ballance of our Heart is perfectly in *Equilibrio* by the even weights of contrary Pleasures, that which is most solid and reasonable, has the advantage: because Light adds some grains to its efficacy, and the Remorses of Conscience withstand the Influence of a counterfeit Pleasure.

XXIX. We must conclude from what we have said, that we always merit when we love the true Good by Reason; and that we merit not at all, when we love it by Instinct. We merit always when we love the true Good by Reason; because Order will have the true Good lov'd in that manner, and that meer Light does not convey us, or invincibly determine us to the Good discover'd by it. We merit not when we love the true Good by Instinct, or as much as we are invincibly mov'd, and determin'd by Pleasure. Because Order requires that the true Good, or the Good of the Mind should be lov'd by a free Love, a Love of Choice, and Judgement; whilst the Love which is produc'd by Pleasure, is a Blind, Natural, and Necessary Love. I own that when we advance farther than Pleasure forces us, we merit. But that's because we therein act by Reason, and in the way that Order would have us. For Love, so much as it exceeds Pleasure, is a pure and resonable Love.

XXX. So likewise we must conclude, that we always demerit when we love a false Good, by the Instinct of Pleasure, provided we love it more than we are invincibly forc'd. For when our Liberty is naturally so straitned, and our Capacity of Mind so little, that we are carried in an irresistible manner, then though we are corrupt, and our Love be evil, and against Order; yet we don't demerit, to demerit, I mean to deserve to be punish'd, we must pursue false Goods with more ardency, or tend farther than Pleasure irresistibly carries us. For we must observe, that there is great difference between a Good, and a Meritorious Action; between a Corrupt, and a Demeritorious. The Love of the Blessed is Good, but it is not Meritorious: The Love of a Righteous Person is often deprav'd in his sleep; but it is not Demeritorious. Whatever is conformable to Order, is good; and whatever is contrary to it, is naught. But there is nothing of Merit or Demerit, save in the good or ill use of our Liberty, save in that in which we are the Factors. But we make a good use of our Liberty, when we follow Light: when we unconstrain'd and of our selves advance to the true Good, or were

at first determin'd by preventing Delectation, or the Light of Reason. When we sacrifice sensible Pleasures to our Duty, and surmount Pain by the love of Order. On the contrary, we make an ill use of our Liberty, when we make Pleasure our Reason, when we sacrifice our Duty to our Passions, our Perfection to present Felicity, the Love of Order to the Love of our selves: and all this at a time, when we might really have prevented it. But I proceed to explain this still more clearly.

XXXI. When two Objects are offer'd to the Mind, and it determines it self about them, I confess it never fails to take that side where most Reason and Pleasure appears; or, all things consider'd, where most good is to be found. For the Soul not being able to will, or love, but through the Love of Good, and the Natural Motion of the Soul towards it, she unavoidably loves what has most conformity with what she loves invincibly. But 'tis certain, that when sensible Pleasure, or something of like nature does not perturbate the Mind, we may ever suspend the Judgement of our Love, and not determine, especially in point of false Good. For the Soul can have no Evidence that false Goods are the true, or that the Love of the former agrees perfectly with the Motion which carries us to the latter. Therefore when a Man loves false Goods, whilst his Senses and Passions leave his Reason entirely free, he demerits: Because then he may and ought to suspend the Judgement of his Love. For if he stood any time to examine what was speedily to be done, the false Good would appear in its own colours, the Pleasure which it seems to infuse into the Soul would vanish, the Idea of some other Good would present it self to the Mind; the Remorse of Conscience, and perhaps the Delectation of Grace would change all the Dispositions of his Mind and Heart. For the state of a Traveller has nothing certain: A thousand different Objects are continually offer'd to the Mind, and the Life of Man on Earth is nothing but a continual train of Thoughts and Desires.

XXXII. At first sight it seems that we cannot suspend the Judgement of our Love; for we cannot suspend our Judgment, save when Evidence is not perfect. Now we may see with the clearest Evidence that *GOD* is the true Good; and that none but He can be good to us: we know that He is infinitely more amiable than we can conceive. But it is observable that though we cannot suspend the Judgement of Reason in respect of Speculative Truths, when the Evidence is entire; yet we may suspend the Judgement of our Love in point of Goods, whatever Evidence there is in our Ideas. For when Sense fights against Reason, when Tast opposes Light, when that is found sensibly bitter and disagreeable, what Reason clearly represents as sweet and delectable, we may suspend our Choice, and follow either Reason, or the Senses. We may act, and commonly do act against our Light; because when we attend to the Sensation, Light disappears, unless we strive to retain it; and because we are more attentive to Sensation, than to Light; because Sensation is always more lively and agreeable, than the most evident Knowledge.

XXXIII. 'Tis Pleasure which makes Minds actually happy. Therefore we ought to enjoy Pleasure, when we love the true Good. Yet a Mind thinks on *GOD*, draws nigh Him by its Love, and tasts no Satisfaction. On the contrary, *GOD* fills it sometimes with bitterness and drought, He deserts it, and repels it, as I may say; not that it may cease to love Him; but that its Love may be more humble, more pure, and meritorious: Lastly, He prescribes it certain things, which render it actually miserable. But if it approaches Bodies, it finds it self happy in proportion to the strictness of its Union to them. Certainly, this is perplexing to a Man never so intelligent, since we are invincibly passionate for Happiness. Therefore we merit much, if following our Light, we renounce our selves; notwithstanding those discomforting droughts, if we sacrifice our actual Happiness to the Love of the true Good; if living by Faith, and relying on the Promises of *GOD*, we remain inviolably bent upon our duty. Hence we clearly understand, that *JESUS CHRIST* might merit His Glory, though He knew the true Good in the highest Evidence; because having an extream Love for His *Father*, He was entirely comformable to His Orders, without being carried by preventing Pleasures: because being steadily guided by His Light, He suffer'd most violent pains, and sacrific'd the most lively and sensible Pleasures to His Charity. For He took on Him a Body like to ours, that He might have a Victim to offer to *GOD*, and that duly receiving through this Body, as the occasional or natural Cause, an abundance of various Sensations, He might accomplish a perfect Holocaust to the honour of the true Good, by the enduring pain, and the privation of sensible Pleasures.

XXXIV. To the end every one may have a most perfect Idea of the Grace of *Jesus Christ*, I think it requisite to add, that it consists not in Delectation alone: For all Grace of Sensation is the Grace of *Jesus Christ*. But of this Grace there are many species, and of every species infinite degrees. *GOD* sometimes casts distast and bitterness on the Objects of our Passions, He weakens their sensible charms, or makes us hate or abhor them. And this kind of Grace of sensation makes the same effect as preventing Delight. It restores and fortifies our Liberty, reinstates us almost in *Equilibrio*, and thereby puts us in a capacity of following our Light in the motion of our Love. For to restore a Balance to an even poize, or to change its propension, we need not augment the lesser weight, but only retract from the overloaden Scale. Thus there are Graces of Sensation of several sorts, and every sort is capable of infinite degrees. For

there are Pleaſures, Averſions, and Diſlikes, greater and leſſer *ad infinitum*. What I have hitherto ſaid of Delectation, may be eaſily apply'd to other ſpecies of the Grace of Senſation. I only made choice of Pleaſure or Delectation, as a particular Example, to explain my ſelf clearly, and without Ambiguity.

If there be any other principle of our Determinations to Good beſides the Grace of Senſation, and that of Light, I confeſs I am utterly ignorant of it; and therefore I have reſolv'd to explain the effects of Grace, neceſſary to the converſion of Heart, but by theſe two Principles, for fear of incurring the blame of diſcourſing in general Terms, that of themſelves excite only confus'd Idea's: which thing I avoid with all poſſible care. But tho' I have explain'd my ſelf in Terms underſtood by all Mankind; ſince there is no body but knows, that the *Knowledge*, and *Senſe* of Good, are Principles of our determinations: yet I preſume not to impugn thoſe, who ſticking not to theſe clear Idea's, ſay in general, that GOD operates the converſion of our Souls by a particular action, different, it may be, from all I have here ſaid; and in another place, that GOD * works in us. Experiencing in my ſelf no other Motion than towards Good in general, and that determin'd by Knowledge or Senſation, I ought to ſuppoſe nothing more; if by this alone I can account for all that the Scripture and Councels have determin'd about the preſent Subject. In a word, I am well aſſur'd that Light and Senſation are the Principles of our Determinations, but I declare, that I cannot tell but there may be ſome other whereof I have no Knowledge.

* *Illuſtrations upon the Search after Truth.*

XXXV. Beſides Grace of it ſelf efficacious, and that the Effect whereof depends on the good diſpoſitions of the Mind; beſides the Grace of Senſation and the Grace of Light, the Righteous have moreover an *Habitual Grace*, which makes them agreeable to GOD, and capacitates them to work Actions meritorious of *Salvation*. This Grace is *Charity*, the Love of GOD, or the Love of Order; a Love which is not properly Charity, unleſs it be ſtronger and greater than every other Love. As it is commonly Pleaſure which produces the Love of the Object that's the true, or apparent Cauſe of it; ſo 'tis the Delectation of Grace which produces the Love of GOD. 'Tis the enjoyment of Senſible Pleaſures, which heightens Concupiſcence; and 'tis the Grace of Senſation which increaſes Charity. Concupiſcence diminiſhes by the deprivation of Senſible Pleaſures, and then Charity is eaſily preſerv'd, and nouriſh'd. And whilſt Charity faints by the privation of the actual Grace of *Jeſus Chriſt*, Concupiſcence ſpeedily thrives, and grows upon it. For theſe two Loves *Charity* and *Cupidity* conſtantly war with one another, and gather ſtrength from the weakneſs of their Enemy.

XXXVI. Whatever participates of Charity, is well-pleaſing to *GOD*; but Charity is not always active in the Juſt themſelves. In order to its working, 'tis neceſſary at leaſt it be Illuminate: For Knowledge is needful to determine the Motion of Love. Thus the Grace neceſſary to every good work relating to Salvation is that of Senſation in thoſe who begin their Converſion; is that of Light at leaſt, or ſome Motion of Faith or Hope in thoſe who are animated with Charity. For though the Righteous may do good works without the Grace of Delectation, they have always need of ſome actual aſſiſtence to determine the Motion of their Charity. But although Charity without Delectation is ſufficient to conquer many temptations, yet the Grace of Senſation is neceſſary on many occaſions. For Men cannot without the continual help of the Second *Adam*, reſiſt the continual action of the Firſt. They cannot perſevere in Righteouſneſs, unleſs aſſiſted with the particular Grace of *JESUS CHRIST*, which produces, augments, and maintains Charity againſt the continual Efforts of Concupiſcence.

XXXVII. The Effects of Pleaſure, and of all the Senſations of the Soul, have a thouſand ſeveral dependencies on the actual diſpoſitions of the Mind. The very ſame weight has not always the ſame effects. It depends in its Action on the ſtructure of the *Machine* by which it is applied to the contrary weight. If a Balance be unequally ſuſpended, the force of the weights being unequally applied, the lighter may overweigh the heavier. So it fares with the weight of Pleaſures: They act one on another, and determine the Motion of the Soul, according as they are diverſly applied. Pleaſure ought to have a greater influence on the Perſon, who has already a Love for the Object which cauſes it, than on another who has an Averſion, or that loves oppoſite Goods. Pleaſure forcibly determines a Perſon who clearly knows, or vividly imagines the Advantages of Good, which ſeems to cauſe it: and acts feebly on the Mind of him, who knows this Good but confuſedly, and is diſtruſtful of it. Laſtly, it acts with its whole on him, who blindly follows all that gratifies Concupiſcence; and perhaps will have no effect on him, who has acquir'd ſome habit of ſuſpending the Judgement of his Love.

Now the different degrees of Light, Charity, Concupiſcence, and the different degrees of Liberty, are perpetually combating infinite ways, with the different degrees of actual Pleaſures; which Pleaſures being operative, according to their relation to the diſpoſitions of the Mind, and Heart, 'tis manifeſt that no finite Mind can with any certainty pronounce of the Effect a particular Grace ought to produce in us. For beſides that, there's an infinite combination in the things concurring to the Efficacy of Grace; this combination is not like that of moving Springs and Forces, which have always infallible and neceſſary Effects. Therefore 'tis impoſſible for any finite Mind to diſcover what paſſes in the Heart of Man.

XXXVIII. But whereas GOD has an infinite Wisdom, 'tis visible that He clearly knows all the Effects that can result from the mixture and combination of all these things; and that penetrating the Heart of Man, He infallibly discovers even the Effects, which depend on an Act, or rather on a free consent of our Wills. Nevertheless I confess I cannot conceive how *GOD* can discover the Consequences of Actions, which derive not their infallibility from His absolute decrees. But I have no Mind to insist on *Metaphysicks*, at the expence of *Morality*, and to affirm as undeniable Truths, Opinions that are contrary to my own inward Consciousness of my self; or in fine, to speak to the Ears a certain Language, which affords no clear Idea to the Mind. I know well that such Objections may be made, as would be too hard for me to answer satisfactorily and clearly. But it may be these Objections are naturally full of obscurity and darkness: are founded on the Ignorance we are in of the properties of our Soul. 'Tis from our having (as I have elsewhere prov'd) no clear Idea of our Being, and that what is in us, which gives way to be conquer'd by a Determination not invincible, is absolutely unknown to us. Furthermore, if I cannot clearly answer these Objections, I can answer by others, which to me seem more incapable of Solution: I can from Principles oppos'd to mine, deduce more harsh and unlucky Consequences, than those which are presum'd to follow from Liberty, such as I have suppos'd in us. But I engage not on the particulars of all this, as taking no delight to walk in the dark, and to lead others upon Precipices.

First Illustration on the 7. Ch. of the 2. Part of the 3d. Book of the Search.

Second Illustration.

THE

THE Illuſtration, or Continuation OF THE TREATISE CONCERNING *Nature and Grace.*

What is meant by acting by General and Particular Wills.

I Say that *GOD* acts by General Wills when he acts in conſequence of the General Laws which He has eſtabliſht. For example, I ſay that *GOD* acts in me by General Wills, when he gives me the ſenſe of Pain when I am prickt; ſince in purſuance of the General and Efficacious Laws of Union of my Soul and Body which He has conſtituted, He makes me ſuffer Pain when my Body's ill diſpos'd.

So when a Bowl ſtrikes another, I ſay *GOD* moves the Striker, by a General Will, becauſe He moves it in purſuance of the General and Efficacious Laws of the communicating of Motions. *GOD* having generally Ordain'd that at the inſtant of Colliſion of two Bodies, the Motion ſhould be diſtributed between them according to certain Proportions: and 'tis by the efficacy of that General Will, that Bodies have the force of moving one another.

II. I ſay, on the contrary, that *GOD* acts by particular Wills, when the efficacy of His Will is not determin'd by ſome General Law to the producing any Effect. Thus ſuppoſing *GOD* ſhould make me feel the Pain of pricking, whilſt there happen'd no change in my Body, or in any Creature whatſoever, which determines Him to Act in me by ſome General Law; I ſay that then *GOD* acts by particular Wills.

So again ſuppoſing a Body begins to move without being ſtricken by another, or without any alteration happening in the Will of Spirits, or in any other Creature which determines the efficacy of ſome General Laws; I ſay that *GOD* would move that Body by a particular Will.

III. According to theſe Definitions it plainly appears that I ſuppoſe *GOD* works all in all things, that the Nature of the Heathen Philoſophers is a Chimera, and that to ſpeak Properly, *Nature* is nothing but the General Laws which *GOD* has eſtabliſht for the Conſtruction or Preſervation of His Work, by the ſimpleſt ways, by an Action always Uniform, conſtant, perfectly worthy of an infinite Wiſdom, and an univerſal Cauſe. But that which I here ſuppoſe, though certain for the Reaſons I have given in *The Search after Truth* is not abſolutely neceſſary to what I deſign to prove. For if it be ſuppos'd that *GOD* has communicated His Power to the Creatures in ſuch a manner, as that ſurrounding Bodies had a real and true Force, by which they might act on our Soul, and make her happy and miſerable by Pleaſure and Pain; and that Bodies in Motion had in themſelves a certain *Entity*, which they call *Impreſs'd Quality*; that they can communicate it to thoſe about them, and with that Celerity and Uniformity we obſerve: it would be ſtill equally eaſy to prove what I intend. For then the efficacy of the concurrent Action of the general Cauſe would be neceſſarily dete. in'd by the Action of the particular Cauſe. *GOD* for inſtance would be oblig'd, by theſe principles, to afford His concourſe to a Body at the inſtant of Colliſion, that it might communicate its Motion to others; which is ſtill to act by vertue of a General Law. Yet I do not argue upon that ſuppoſition, as believing it utterly Falſe, as I have ſhown in the Third Chapter and Second Part of the Sixth Book of *The Search after Truth*, in the Illuſtration of the ſame Chapter, and elſewhere.

Which Truths ſuppos'd, here follow the Notes by which we may diſcover whether an Effect be produc'd by a General or Particular Will.

MARKS *by which we may judge whether an Effect be produc'd by a General or Particular Will.*

IV. When we ſee an Effect immediately produc'd after the action of an occaſional Cauſe, we ought to judge it produc'd by the Efficacy of a General Will. A Body moves immediately after the Colliſion; the Colliſion of Bodies is the Action of an occaſional Cauſe. Therefore this Body moves by a General Will. A Stone falls on the Head of a Man, and kills him: and this Stone falls like all others, that is, continues its Motion almoſt in Arithmetical proportion, 1. 3. 5. 7. 9. *&c.* Which ſuppos'd, I ſay it moves by the efficacy of a General Will, or by the Laws of the Communications of Motion, as eaſy to demonſtrate.

V. When we ſee an Effect produc'd without the Mediation of the known occaſional Cauſe; we have reaſon to think it produc'd by a particular Will; ſuppoſing this Effect be not manifeſtly unworthy of its Cauſe, as I ſhall ſay hereafter.

For example, when a Body's mov'd without being ſmitten by another, there's great probability it was mov'd by a particular Will: But yet we cannot be confident of it. For on ſuppoſition of a General Law, that Bodies ſhould move according to the ſeveral Volitions of Angels, or the like, 'tis viſible this Body might be put in Motion without Impulſion: the particular Will of ſome Angel being in this caſe able to determine the Will of the general Cauſe to move it. Thus we may be often poſitive that GOD acts by General Wills, but we cannot have the like aſſurance that He acts by particular Wills, even in the moſt averr'd Miracles.

VI. Since we have not a competent Knowledge of the various Combinations of occaſional Cauſes, to diſcover whether ſuch and ſuch Effects arrive in conſequence of their Action; and are not ſufficiently intelligent to diſcover whether ſuch a Rain be Natural or Miraculous, produc'd by a neceſſary conſequence of the Communication of Motions, or by a particular Will; we muſt judge an Effect is produc'd by a General Will, when 'tis viſible the Cauſe did not propoſe it ſelf a particular End. For the Wills of Intelligences have neceſſarily an End; general Wills a general End, and particular Wills a particular Deſign. Nothing can be more plain and evident.

For example, tho' I cannot diſcover whether a ſhower of Rain which falls on a Meadow, falls in conſequence of General Laws, or by a particular Will of GOD, I have reaſon to think it falls by a General Will, if I ſee it fall as well on the neighbouring Grounds, or on the River which bounds the Meadow, no leſs than on the Meadow it ſelf. For if GOD caus'd it to Rain on this Meadow by a particular Benevolence to the Owner, this Rain would not fall on the River where 'tis inſignificant: ſince it could not fall there without a Cauſe or Will in GOD which has neceſſarily ſome End.

VII. But we have ſtill more reaſon to think an Effect is produc'd by a General Will, when this Effect is contrary or even uſeleſs to the Deſign which we are taught by Faith or Reaſon, the Cauſe propos'd.

For inſtance, the end which GOD propoſes in the various Senſations He affords the Soul, in our taſting different Fruits, is that we may eat thoſe which are fit for Nouriſhment, and reject the reſt: I ſuppoſe thus: Therefore when GOD gives a grateful Senſation at the inſtant of our eating Poiſons, or empoiſon'd Fruits: He acts not in us by particular Wills. So we ought to conclude, ſince that agreeable Senſation is the Cauſe of our Death, whilſt the end of GOD's giving us diverſe Senſations, is to preſerve our Life by a convenient Nouriſhment; for I once more ſuppoſe thus. For I ſpeak only with reference to the Grace which GOD gives us, doubtleſs to convert us; ſo that 'tis viſible GOD ſhews it not on Men by particular Wills, ſince it frequently renders them more Culpable and Criminal: For GOD cannot have ſo fatal a Deſign. GOD gives us not therefore agreeable Senſations by particular Wills, when we eat poiſonous Fruits. But becauſe a poiſonous Fruit excites in our Brain Motions like thoſe produc'd by wholſome Fruits, GOD gives us the ſame ſenſations, by reaſon of the General Laws which unite the Soul to the Body, that ſhe might be wakeful for its preſervation.

So likewiſe GOD gives not thoſe who have loſt an Arm ſenſations of Pain relating to it, but by a General Will. For 'tis uſeleſs to the Body of this Man that his Soul ſhould ſuffer Pain relating to an Arm that's loſt. 'Tis the ſame caſe with Motions produc'd in the Body of a Man, in the commiſſion of a Crime.

Finally, ſuppoſing that GOD ſcatters His Rain upon the Earth with intent to make it fruitful; we cannot believe He diſtributes it by particular Wills, ſince it falls upon the ſands, and in the Sea, as well as on plow'd-lands, and is often ſo exceſſive on ſeeded Ground, as to extirpate the Corn, and fruſtrate the labours of the Husbandman.

Thus it is certain that Rains are uſeleſs or noxious to the Fruits of the Earth, are neceſſary conſequences of the General Laws of the Communications of Motions, which

GOD

GOD has eſtabliſht for the producing better Effects in the World; ſuppoſing, (which I again repeat) that *GOD* cannot will by a particular Volition that Rain ſhould cauſe the barrenneſs of the Earth.

VIII. When an Effect happens which has ſomething extraordinary, 'tis reaſonable to believe it is not produc'd by a General Will.

Nevertheleſs 'tis impoſſible to be ſure of it. If for example in the proceſſion of the Holy Sacrament, it Rains on the Aſſiſtants, ſave on the Prieſts and thoſe which carry it, we have reaſon to think this proceeds from a particular Will of the univerſal Cauſe; yet we cannot be certain, becauſe an Occaſional intelligent Cauſe may have this particular Deſign, and ſo determine the Efficacy of the General Law to execute it.

IX. When the preceding Marks are not ſufficient for us to judge whether a certain Effect is or is not produc'd by a General Will, we are to believe it is, if it be certain there is an Occaſional Cauſe eſtabliſht for the like Effects.

For example, we ſee it Rain to ſome purpoſe in a Field: we do not examine whether this Rain falls or not in the great Roads, we know not whether it be noxious to the bordering Grounds: nay we ſuppoſe it only does good, and that all the attending Circumſtances are perfectly accommodated to the Deſign for which we are oblig'd to believe that *GOD* would have it Rain: Nevertheleſs I ſay that we ought to judge this Rain is produc'd by a General Will, if we know that *GOD* has ſetled an Occaſional Cauſe for the like Effects. For we muſt not have recourſe to Miracles without neceſſity. We ought to ſuppoſe that *GOD* acts herein by the ſimpleſt ways; and though Lord of the Field ought to return thanks to *GOD* for the Bounty, yet he ought not to imagine it was caus'd in a miraculous manner by a Particular Will.

The Owner of the Field ought to thank GOD for the Good he receives, ſince GOD ſaw, and will'd the good effect of the Rain, when He eſtabliſht the General Laws whereof it is a neceſſary Conſequence, and that it was for the like Effects they were eſtabliſht. On the contrary if the Rains are ſometimes hurtful to the Earth, as it was not to render them unfruitful, that GOD eſtabliſht the Laws which make it Rain, ſince Drought ſuffices to make them barren, 'tis plain we ought to thank GOD, and to adore the Wiſdom of His Providence, even when we do not feel the Effects of the Laws eſtabliſht in our favour.

X. But, to conclude, when we cannot be certifyed by the Circumſtances which accompany certain Effects, that there is an Occaſional Cauſe eſtabliſht to produce them, 'tis ſufficient to know they are very common, and relate to the principal deſign of the General Cauſe, in order to judge they are produc'd by a General Will.

For example, the Springs which water the ſurface of the Earth are ſubſervient to the principal Deſign of *GOD*, which is that Men ſhould not want things neceſſary to Life: I ſuppoſe ſo. Beſides theſe Fountains are very common, therefore we ought to conclude they are form'd by ſome General Laws. For as there is much more Wiſdom in executing His Deſigns by Simple and General Means, than by Complicated and Particular, as I think I have ſufficiently prov'd elſewhere; we owe that Honour to *GOD*, as to believe His way of acting is general, Uniform, Conſtant, and proportion'd to the Idea we have of an infinite Wiſdom. Theſe are the Marks by which we are to judge whether an Effect be produc'd by a General Will. I now come to prove that *GOD* beſtows His Grace on Men by General Laws, and that *JESUS CHRIST* has been eſtabliſht the Occaſional Cauſe to determine their Efficacy. I begin by the Proofs of Holy Scripture.

XI. St. *Paul* teaches us that *JESUS CHRIST* is the Head of the Church: That He conſtantly influences it with Spirit and Life. That He forms the Members, and animates them as the Soul animates the Body, or to ſpeak ſtill more clearly, the Holy Scripture teaches us two things: The firſt, that *JESUS CHRIST* prays continually for His Members. The ſecond, that His Prayers are always heard. Whence I conclude that He was conſtituted by *GOD* the Occaſional Cauſe of Grace: and likewiſe that Grace is never given to Sinners, but through His Means. Col. 2. 19. Heb. 7. 25. 9. 24. Joh. 11. 42.

The Occaſional Cauſes have conſtantly and readily their Effect. The Prayers and diverſe Deſires of *JESUS CHRIST* with reference to the formation of His Body, have likewiſe moſt conſtantly and ſpeedily their Accompliſhment. *GOD* denies His Son nothing, as we learn from *JESUS CHRIST* Himſelf.

Occaſional Cauſes produce not their Effect by their own Efficacy, but by the Efficacy of the General Cauſe. 'Tis likewiſe by the Efficacy of the Power of *GOD*, that the Soul of *JESUS CHRIST* operates in us, and not by the Efficacy of Man's Will. 'Tis for this Reaſon that St. *Paul* repreſents *JESUS CHRIST* as praying to His Father without intermiſſion. For He is oblig'd to Pray, in order to Obtain.

Occaſional Cauſes have been eſtabliſh'd by *GOD* for the determining the Efficacy of His General Wills: and JESUS CHRIST according to the Scripture has been appointed by *GOD*, after His Reſurrection to Govern the Church which He had purchas'd by His Blood. For JESUS CHRIST became the Meritorious Cauſe of all Graces by His Sacrifice; But after His Reſurrection, He entred into the Holy of Holies as High Prieſt of future Goods, to appear in the preſence of *GOD*, and to endue us with the Graces which He

has merited for us. Therefore He Himself applies and distributes His Gifts as Occasional Cause, He disposes of all things in the House of *GOD*, as a well-beloved Son in the House of His Father.

XII. I say farther that no One is Sanctify'd but through the Efficacy of the Power which *GOD* has communicated to JESUS CHRIST in constituting Him the Occasional Cause of Grace. For if any Sinner were converted by a Grace whereof *JESUS CHRIST* was not the Occasional, but only the Meritorious Cause, that Sinner not receiving his New Life through the Efficacy of *JESUS CHRIST*, would not be a Member of the Body of which *JESUS CHRIST* is the Head; in that manner explain'd by St. *Paul* by these words of the Epistle to the *Ephesians*; *That we may grow up into Him in all things who is the Head even CHRIST; from whom the whole Body fitly joyn'd together, and compacted by that which every Joynt supplieth according to the Effectual working in the measure of every Part maketh increase of the Body unto the edifying it self in Love.* Which words not only say JESUS CHRIST is the Meritorious Cause of all Graces: but likewise distinctly signify that Christians are the Members of the Body whereof JESUS CHRIST is the Head; that 'tis in Him we increase and live with an entire New Life. That 'tis by His inward Operation, κατ' ἐνέργειαν, that His Church is form'd, and that thus He has been constituted by *GOD* the sole Occasional Cause, who by His several Desires and Applications distributes the Graces which *GOD*, as the True Cause, showers down on Men.

C. 4. 13. 15, 16. Col. 2. 19.

Coll. 2. 7.

'Tis on this account St. *Paul* says Christians are united to *JESUS CHRIST* as their root: *Rooted and built up in Him.* 'Tis for the same reason that *JESUS CHRIST* compares Himself to a Vine, and His Disciples to the Branches, that derive their Life from Him. *I am the Vine, ye are the Branches.* On the same Grounds St. *Paul* affirms that *JESUS CHRIST* lives in us, and that we live in Him: that we are rais'd up in our Head, that our Life is hidden with *JESUS CHRIST* in *GOD*, in a word, that we have already Life Eternal in JESUS CHRIST. All these and many other Expressions of like nature clearly manifest that JESUS CHRIST is not only the Meritorious, but also the Occasional, Physical or Natural Cause of Grace: and that as the Soul informs, animates and consummates the Body, so JESUS CHRIST diffuses through His Members as Occasional Cause, the Graces He has merited to His Church by His Sacrifice.

For my part I cannot see how these Reasons can be call'd in question, or upon what Grounds a most edifying Truth, and as ancient as the Religion of *JESUS CHRIST* can be treated as a dangerous Novelty. I grant my Expressions are novel, but that's because they seem to me the fittest of all others distinctly to explain a Truth, which can be but confusedly demonstrated by Terms very loose and general. These words, *Occasional Causes*, and *Natural Laws*, seem necessary to give the Philosophers, for whom I wrote this Treatise of *Nature and Grace*, a distinct Understanding of what most Men are content to know confusedly. New Expressions being no farther dangerous than involving Ambiguity, or breeding in the Mind some Notion contrary to Religion; I do not believe that Equitable Persons, and conversant in the Theology of St. *Paul*, will blame me for explaining my self in a particular manner, when it only tends to make us Adore the Wisdome of *GOD*, and strictly to Unite us with *JESUS CHRIST*.

First OBJECTION.

XIII. 'Tis Objected against what I have establisht, That neither Angels nor Saints of the Old Testament, receiv'd Grace pursuant to the Desires of the Soul of JESUS, since that Holy Soul was not then in Being; and therefore though JESUS CHRIST be the Meritorious Cause of all Graces, he is not the Occasional Cause which distributes them to Men.

As to Angels I Answer, That 'tis very probable Grace was given them but Once: So that if we consider things on that side I grant, there is nothing can oblige the Wisdom of GOD to constitute an Occasional Cause for the Sanctification of Angels. But if we consider these blessed Spirits as Members of the Body whereof JESUS CHRIST is the Head, or suppose them unequally supplied; there's all reason to believe the Diversity of their Graces must proceed from Him who is the Chief of Angels as well as Men, and who under that Character has merited by His Sacrifice all the Graces which GOD has given His Creatures, but has variously applied them by His different Desires.

It being Undeniable that JESUS CHRIST long before His Birth, or Meriting, might be the Meritorious Cause of the Graces given to the Angels, and Saints of the Old Testament; it ought methinks be granted, that by His Prayers He might be the Occasional Cause of the same Graces long before they were demanded. For indeed there is no necessary Relation between Occasional Causes, and the time of Production of their Effects; and though commonly these sort of Causes are follow'd by their Effects at the time of their Action, yes their Action being not of it self efficacious, since its Efficacy depends on the Will of the universal Cause, there's no necessity of their actual Existence for the producing their Effect.

For Instance, Suppose JESUS CHRIST at this present time should desire of His Father, that such a Person might receive such a supply of Grace, at certain Moments of his

Life, that Prayer of *JESUS CHRIST* would infallibly determine the Efficacy of the General Will GOD has of saving all Men in His *SON*. This Person will receive these Assistances, though the Prayer of *JESUS CHRIST* be past'd, and his Soul actually think on another thing, and never think again on that which He requir'd for him. But the past Prayer of *JESUS CHRIST* is no more present to His Father, than a future. For all that must happen in all times, is equally present to *GOD*. Thus *GOD* loving His *SON*, and knowing He shall have such Desires, with respect to His Ancestors, and those of His own Nation; and likewise to the Angels which must enter into the Spiritual Edifice of His *Church*, and constitute the Body whereof He is the Head; ought to accomplish the Desires of His *SON*, before they were made, that the Elect which preceded His Nativity, and which He purchas'd by the Merit of His Sacrifice, might as peculiarly belong to Him as others, and that He might be their Head as really as He is ours. I acknowledg it is fit, that Meritorious and Occasional Causes should rather precede their Effects, than follow them, and that Order would have Causes and their Effects exist together: For 'tis plain that all Merit ought to be instantly recompenc'd, and every Occasional Cause actually to produce its Effect, provided nothing hinders but it may or ought be done. But *Grace* being absolutely necessary to *Angels* and *Patriarchs* could not be deferr'd. But as for the Glory, and Reward of the Saints of the Old Testament, since that might be deferr'd, 'twas fit that *GOD* should suspend its Accomplishment till *JESUS CHRIST* should ascend into *Heaven*, be constituted High Priest over the House of *GOD*, and begin to exercise the Sovereign Power of Occasional Cause of all the Graces merited by His Labours upon Earth. Therefore we are to believe that the *Patriarchs* entred not *Heaven*, till after JESUS CHRIST their Head, Mediator, and Fore-runner.

But though it should be granted, that *GOD* had not appointed an Occasional Cause for all the Graces afforded the *Angels* and *Patriarchs*, I see not how it can be thence concluded, that *JESUS CHRIST* does not at present endue the *Church* with the Spirit, which gives it Increase and Life; that He does not pray for it, or that His Prayers are not effectually heard: in a word, that He is not the Occasional Cause which applies to Men the Graces He has merited. I grant, if you'll have it so, that *GOD*, before *JESUS CHRIST* gave Grace by particular Wills; The necessity of Order requiring it; whilst by Order, the Occasional Cause could not be so soon establish'd, and the rest were very few in number. But now when the Rain of Grace falls, not as heretofore on a small number of Men, but is shower'd on all the Earth, and *JESUS CHRIST* may, or ought, be constituted the Occasional Cause of the Goods which He has merited for His *Church*, what reason is there to believe *GOD* works so many Miracles, as He gives us good Thoughts? For, in short, all that is done by particular Wills is certainly a Miracle, as not being a Result of the General Laws He has ordain'd, whose Efficacy are determin'd by Occasional Causes. But how can we imagine that in order to save Men, He works so many Miracles useless to their Salvation? I would say, affords them all these Graces which they resist, because not proportion'd to the actual Force of their Concupiscence.

St. *John* teaches us that *Christians* receive from the fulness of JESUS CHRIST Graces in abundance: *For*, says he, *the Law was given by Moses, but Grace and Truth came by Jesus Christ*. For indeed the Graces which preceded Him, were not comparable to those He distributed after His Triumph: If they were Miraculous, we are to suppose they were extreamly rare. Even the Grace of the *Apostles*, before the *Holy Spirit* was given them, could not come in comparison with those they receiv'd, when the *High Priest* of future goods, having entred by His Blood into the *Holy of Holies*, had obtain'd by the force of His Prayers, and sent through the Dignity of His Person, the *Holy Spirit*, to animate and sanctify His *Church*. The unaccountable Blindness of the *Jews*; their gross and carnal Notions, their frequent Relapses into *Idolatry*, sufficiently manifest their disregard for true Goods; and the dispiritedness of the *Apostles*, before they had receiv'd the *Holy Ghost*, is a sensible Proof of their Weakness. So that Grace in those days was extreamly rare, because our Nature in *Jesus Christ*, was not yet establish'd the Occasional Cause of Graces: *Jesus Christ* was not yet fully Consecrated Priest after the Order of *Melchisedech*: Nor had His *Father* given Him that Immortal and Glorious Life, which is the particular Character of His *Priesthood*. For 'twas necessary that *Jesus Christ* should enter the Heavens, and receive the Glory and Power of Occasional Cause of true Goods, before He sent the *Holy Spirit*, according to the words of St. *John*, *The Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified*: and according to others of *Jesus Christ* Himself, *It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you: but if I go, I will send Him unto you.*

St. John Ch. 1. 17.

Hebr. 4. Hebr. 7. 16. 17.

Joh. 16. 7.

Now it cannot be imagin'd, that *Jesus Christ* consider'd as *GOD* is the Head of the *Church*. As Man, He has obtain'd that Quality, the Head and Members of a Body must be of the same nature. *Jesus Christ* as Man, intercedes for Men; as Man He receiv'd from *GOD* a Sovereign Power over His *Church*. For as He is *GOD*, He intercedes not; as *GOD*, He has not receiv'd a Name, which is above every Name: but He is equal to the *Father*, and absolute Lord of all things by right of Generation. These Truths are evident, as we are assur'd by *Jesus Christ* Himself, who says, that His *Father* has given Him power to judge Men, because

He is the Son of Man. So we ought not to think that Scripture Expreſſions, which make *Jeſus Chriſt* the Author of Grace, muſt be underſtood of Him conſider'd in His Divine Perſon. For if ſo, I confeſs I ſhould not have prov'd Him the Occaſional Cauſe, ſince He would be the True Cauſe of it. But whereas it is certain, that the Three *Perſons* of the *Trinity* are equally the True Cauſe of Grace, becauſe all the External Operations of *GOD* are common to them all, my Proofs are undeniable, ſince Holy Scripture ſays of the *Son*, and not of the *Father*, or the *Holy Spirit*, that He is the Head of the *Church*; and that in this Capacity He communicates Life to the conſtituent Members of it.

Second OBJECTION.

XIV. 'Tis *GOD* who gives the Soul of *Jeſus Chriſt* all the Thoughts and Motions relating to the Formation of His Myſtical Body. So that if on one hand the Wills of *Jeſus Chriſt*, as Occaſional or Natural Cauſes determine the Efficacy of the General Wills of *GOD* on the other; 'tis *GOD* Himſelf who determines the ſeveral Wills of *Jeſus Chriſt*. And thus it comes to the ſame thing: For in brief, the Volitions of *Jeſus Chriſt* are always comformable to theſe of His *Father*.

I grant that the particular Volitions of the Soul of *Jeſus Chriſt*, are always conformable to the Wills of His *Father*; not as if there were any particular Wills in the *Father*, which anſwer to thoſe in the *Son*, and determine them; but only that the Volitions of the *Son* are always conform'd to Order in general, which is the neceſſary Rule of the Will of *GOD*, and of all thoſe who love Him. For to love Order, is to love *GOD*, 'tis to will what He wills; 'tis to be Juſt, Wiſe, Regular in our Love. The Soul of JESUS deſires to form to the Glory of His *Father*, the largeſt, moſt ſumptuous and accompliſh'd Temple poſſible. *Order* demands this, ſince nothing can be made too great for *GOD*: All the ſeveral Thoughts of this Soul perpetually intent on the Execution of its Deſign, proceed likewiſe from *GOD*, or the *Word* to which it is united: but its various deſires are certainly the Occaſional Cauſe of theſe various Thoughts: for it thinks on what it will.

Now theſe diverſe Deſires are ſometimes entirely free: and probably the Thoughts which excite them, do not invincibly determine the Soul of JESUS CHRIST, to apply her ſelf to the means of ſatisfying them. For, in brief, 'tis equally advantageous to the Deſign of JESUS CHRIST, whether it be *Peter* or *John* that cauſes the Effect, which the Regularity of his work requires. 'Tis true the Soul of JESUS is not indifferent in any thing that relates to His *Father*'s Glory, but is entirely free in all the reſt: there is nothing extraneous to GOD, which invincibly determines His Love. Thus we ought not to wonder, if JESUS have particular Wills, though there be not the like Wills in *GOD* to determine them.

But let it be granted that the Volitions of JESUS CHRIST are not free, and that His Light invincibly carries Him to will, and to will always in a determinate manner, in the Conſtruction of His *Church*; and that it is Eternal Wiſdom to which His Soul is united, that muſt determine His Volitions. We muſt not for that Effect ſuppoſe particular Wills in GOD. But all the Wills of JESUS CHRIST are particular, or have no Occaſional Cauſe to determine their Efficacy, as have thoſe of *GOD*.

For the Soul of JESUS CHRIST having not an infinite Capacity of thinking, His Notices, and conſequently His Volitions, are limited. Therefore His Wills muſt needs be particular, ſince they change according to His diverſe Thoughts, and Applications. The Soul of JESUS CHRIST cannot think at once on all the Beauties, with which He would adorn His *Church*, nor on the different ways of executing each of His Deſigns. For *JESUS CHRIST* deſiring to render the *Church* worthy of the infinite Majeſty of His *FATHER*, would gladly perfect it with infinite Beauties, by ways moſt conformable to Order. He muſt then conſtantly change His Deſires; there being but one infinite Wiſdom, who can fore-ſee all, and preſcribe Himſelf General Laws, for the executing His Deſigns.

But the future World being to ſubſiſt eternally, and to be infinitely more perfect than the preſent, it was requiſite that *GOD* ſhould eſtabliſh an Occaſional Cauſe, Intelligent, and Enlightned by Eternal Wiſdom, to remedy the Defects which ſhould unavoidably happen in the Works that were form'd by General Laws. The Colliſion of Bodies, which determines the Efficacy of the General Laws of Nature, is an Occaſional Cauſe, without Underſtanding and Liberty; and therefore 'tis impoſſible but there muſt be Imperfections in the World, and Monſters produc'd, which are not of ſuch account, as that the Wiſdom of *GOD* ſhould deſcend to remedy them, by particular Wills. But *JESUS CHRIST* being an Intelligent Occaſional Cauſe, illuminate with the Wiſdom of the *Word*, and ſuſceptible of Particular Wills, according to the particular Exigencies of the Work He forms: 'tis plain that the future World will be infinitely more perfect than the preſent, that the *Church* will be without ſpot or wrinkle, as we are taught by Scripture; and that it will be a Work moſt worthy of the Complacency of GOD Himſelf.

'Tis

'Tis in this manner that Eternal Wisdom renders, as I may say, to His *Father* what He had taken from Him. For not permitting Him to act by Particular Wills, He seem'd to disable His Almighty Arm: But becoming incarnate, He so brings it to pass, that GOD acting in a mannner worthy of Him, by most Simple and General Laws, produces a Work, wherein the most Illuminate Intelligences cannot observe the least Imperfection.

PROOFS founded on REASON.

XV. Having demonstrated by the Authority of Scripture, that the diverse Motions of the Soul of *JESUS CHRIST*, are the Occasional Causes which determine the Efficacy of the general Law of Grace, by which *GOD* would have all Men sav'd in His SON; 'tis necessary to shew in general, by *Reason*, that we are not to believe *GOD* acts in the Order of *Grace* by particular Wills. For though by *Reason*, separate from *Faith*, it cannot be demonstrated, that *GOD* has constituted the Wills of *Man-God* the Occasional Causes of His Gifts; yet it may without *Faith* be shewn, that He distributes them not to Men by particular Wills; as it is easy to prove, from the Fore-going *Marks* I have given to distinguish the Effects produc'd by particular Wills, from those which are the necessary Consequences of some general Law.

GOD, being infinitely Wise, neither Wills nor does any thing without Design or End. But *Grace* falls often on Hearts so dispos'd, as to frustrate His Operation; and therefore falls not on them by a particular Will, but only by a necessary Consequence of General Laws, for the same reason that Rain falls on the Sands and in the Sea, no less than on Seed-grounds.

XVI. Though *GOD* may punish Sinners, or make them more miserable than they are, He can have no Design of making them more culpable and criminal: which yet is an effect of *Grace*, and *GOD* knows certainly that according to their actual Dispositions, the Graces He bestows will have that calamitous Event. Therefore Graces are not shed on corrupt Hearts by a particular Will of *GOD*, but by a necessary Consequence of general Laws, establish'd for the Production of the best Effects: by the same Reason that on some occasions too abundant Rain corrupt and putrifies the Fruits of the Earth, though *GOD* by His general Will causes it to rain, to make them thrive.

XVII. If GOD was minded that some Lands should continue barren, He need but have ceas'd to will that the Rain should water them. So if *GOD* purpos'd that the Hearts of some Sinners should remain hardned, as it would be sufficient for the Rain of Grace not to water them; He need but leave them to themselves, and they would corrupt fast enough. Why must we attribute a particular Will to *GOD*, to make so cruel and unhappy use of the price of His *SON*'s Blood? But many others will say, *GOD* in giving Grace to Sinners, has never that Design; and this, doubtless, seems more reasonable. But if *GOD* gives His Grace by a particular Will, He has some particular Design; and whereas Grace has that sad Effect, *GOD* is frustrated in His Expectation, since He gave it with a Design, and that a particular one of doing good to a Sinner. For I speak not here of the Graces, or rather Gifts, explain'd by St. *Paul*, in the 12 Chapter of his first Epistle to the *Corinthians*. I speak of the Grace which *GOD* gives for the Conversion of him it's given to, and not of those Gifts *GOD* bestows on some for the profit of others: such as are the Gifts of Prophesie, of Discernment of Spirits, of Speaking diverse Tongues, of Healing the Sick, and the like.

XVIII. When the Rain falls in such excess, that the Floods extirpate the Fruits of the Earth, we ought to conclude this Rain comes by a necessary Consequence of the general Laws *GOD* has establish'd for better Effects. Yet it is certain GOD may have appointed it by a particular Will. For GOD, for the punishment of Men, may will that the Rains ordain'd to secundate the Earth, may make it barren on some occasions. But it is not so with the Rain of Grace, since GOD cannot dispense it with Design of punishing Men, much less of making them more culpable and criminal. Thus 'tis much more certain that the Rain of Grace falls by general Wills, than that the common Rains do so; yet most Men can easily believe, that Rains are the necessary Consequences of the general Laws of the Communication of Motions; whilst there are few but find some reluctancy in believing GOD gives us by general Wills all these Motions of Graces, whose Effects we our selves prevent.

There's great likelihood this Disposition of Mind naturally grows from our thinking GOD acts almost like our selves, and that He has on all occasions particular Wills for all Men, in something resembling those Desires we have for our Friends. For though we outwardly confess, that there is an infinite difference between GOD's way of acting, and our own; yet since we ordinarily judge of others with relation to our selves, without considering few Persons seriously consult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being, when they would speak of GOD. And because there is some air of Novelty in what I say, it creates a sort of Pain in the Mind, which is reasonably mistrustful of what is not common and ordinary.

I have a particular Honour and Esteem for all those, who in matter of Religion, have a a secret Aversion for all Novelties: When this is the Motive which induces them to oppose my Opinions, they give me no offence; and whilst their Prejudices are legitimate, though

they ſhould give me hainous Provocations, I ſhould preſerve a Reſpect for them. For their Diſpoſition of Mind is infinitely more reaſonable, than that of others, who fall foul upon all that bears the Character of Novelty. Nevertheleſs as I believe that we are bound to love and ſearch out Truth with all our Strength, and communicate it to others, when we believe we have found it; I think that, ſuppoſing the Doctrines of Faith undeniable, we may and even ought endeavour to confirm them, and recommend them to the Reception of all Men. I might vindicate this Opinion, by the Conduct of the Fathers, and by the Authority of St. *Auſtin*, who frequently exhorts to the clear Diſcovery, and Underſtanding of thoſe Truths, which we already believe in the Obſcurity of *Faith*. But I don't ſuppoſe there are any ſo irrational, as to find fault with my Conduct however prejudic'd againſt my Opinions. Wherefore I intreat thoſe, who will be at the pains of Reading what I have written, not to ſuppoſe me in an Error, but to ſuſpend their Judgement, till they have well underſtood my Opinion; and not to condemn me in general Terms, nor draw too haſtily from my Principles unwarrantable Concluſions,

In Matters ſo obſcure as thoſe of *Grace*, the Advantage is always on the ſide of the Aggreſſor: and 'tis not juſt to make uſe of it to the Defendants prejudice. He ſhould judge equitably, and without Prepoſſeſſion compare all the Conſequences deducible from the ſeveral Opinions, that he may embrace that which ſeems moſt agreeable to the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of GOD. For 'tis unreaſonable to condemn an Opinion unexamin'd for ſome unhappy Conſequences, which Men never fail to infer from it, when the Imagination is ſcar'd, and the Mind prepoſſeſs'd with contrary Notions.

XIX. I know, for Example, that ſome Perſons have ſaid, I make all Prayers uſeleſs, and rob Men of the Confidence they ought to have in GOD; ſince, in their Notions GOD acting by general Wills, we muſt not expect particular Supplies from Heaven. I confeſs if this ſole Conſequence were included in my Principles, they would be falſe, heretical, and impious. For we overturn *Religion*, if we take from Men their due Hope and Confidence in GOD: and 'tis partly on that very account I cannot admit of thoſe Men's Opinions, which are moſt oppoſite to my manner of Reconciling *Grace* with *Liberty*. But ſo far are my Principles from leading to Deſpair, that on the contrary, they give the Righteous, and even Sinners Conſolation, in ſhewing them the means of obtaining of GOD the things they ſtand in need of.

For if we are Righteous, our Prayers are meritorious; and if meritorious, Order requires that they ſhould be heard; and Order being with GOD a Law, infinitely more inviolable than any other eſtabliſh'd for the Conſtruction of His Work, He never fails to do what Order preſcribes Him. Therefore the Prayers of the Righteous are never ineffectual, which is what I have eſtabliſh'd in the XIX. Section of the Second Diſcourſe.

But if we are Sinners, 'tis certain our Prayers are of themſelves in vain; for GOD hears not Sinners; Order will have it ſo: Nevertheleſs we muſt not deſpair; *We have an Advocate with the Father, JESUS CHRIST the Righteous. He came into the World to ſave Sinners: His Prayers are conſtantly and moſt readily heard.* Let us pray in His Name, or addreſs our ſelves to Him. Our Prayers will ſollicit Him to form ſome Deſires relating to us, and His Deſires are the Occaſional Cauſes which infallibly determine the General Law of Grace, by which *GOD* wills the Salvation of all Men in His *SON*. This is what I have maintain'd at large in the Second Diſcourſe. Thus I am ſo far from depriving Men of the Confidence they ought to have in *GOD*, that on the contrary I preciſely ſhew by the Authority of Scripture, the way we ought to take, for the obtaining of *GOD* the Graces that we want. Therefore I pray my *Readers* to do me the Juſtice of Examining my Opinions without prevention; and I am willing they ſhould afterward judge of them according to their Light and Knowledge. For I ſubmit all my Thoughts not only to the Cenſure of the *Church*, which has Right to make me quit them by an Authority; which I ſhall be ever ready to defer to, but alſo to the Judgements of all particular Perſons, by whoſe Admonitions I ſhall endeavour to profit.

1 Joh. 2. 1. Mat. 9. 15. Joh. 11. 42.

The END.

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